Baustista vs Borromeo

Facts

1. The truck of petitioner Roberto Tan Ting driven by Abelardo Bautista, the other petitioner, and the Volkswagen
delivery panel truck owned by respondent Federico O. Borromeo, Inc. were involved in a traffic accident along
Epifanio de los Santos Avenue. In said traffic accident, Quintin Delgado, a helper in Borromeo’s delivery panel
truck, sustained injuries which resulted in his instantaneous death. Borromeo had to pay Delgado’s widow the
sum of P4,444 representing the compensation (death benefit) and funeral expenses due Delgado under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act.
2. Upon the averment that the said vehicular accident was caused by petitioners’ negligence, Borromeo started suit
to recover from petitioners the compensation and funeral expenses it paid to the widow of Quintin Delgado.
3. At the scheduled hearing, neither petitioners nor their counsel appeared. Borromeo was thus allowed to present its
evidence ex parte. On the same day, the municipal court rendered judgment in favor of Borromeo and against the
petitioners in the principal sum of P4,444, and P500 attorney’s fees, and costs.
Issue

1. WON there is obligation on the part of Borromeo, Inc. to pay Delgado’s widow death benefits?

Ruling

1. Yes, there is.

Borromeo paid the widow of its employee, Quintin Delgado, compensation (death benefit) and funeral expenses
for the latter’s death while in the course of employment. This obligation arises from law – Section 2 of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act. The same law in its Section 6 also provides that “[i]n case an employee suffers an
injury for which compensation is due under this Act by any other person besides his employer, it shall be optional
with such injured employee either to claim compensation from his employer, under this Act, or sue such other
person for damages, in accordance with law; and in case compensation is claimed and allowed in accordance with
this Act, the employer who paid such compensation or was found liable to pay the same, shall succeed the injured
employee to the right of recovering from such person what he paid: …”

It is evident from the foregoing that if compensation is claimed and awarded, and the employer pays it, the
employer becomes subrogated to and acquires, by operation of law, the worker’s rights against the tortfeasor.”

No need then there is to establish any contractual relationship between Quintin Delgado and herein petitioners.
Indeed, there is none. The cause of action of respondent corporation is one which does not spring from a creditor-
debtor relationship. It arises by virtue of its subrogation to the right of Quintin Delgado to sue the guilty party.
Such subrogation is sanctioned by the Workmen’s Compensation Law aforesaid. It is as a subrogee to the rights
of its deceased employee, Quintin Delgado, that Borromeo filed a suit against petitioners.

Pelayo vs Lauron

Facts

1. On November 23, 1906, a physician named Arturo Pelayo filed a complaint against Marelo Lauron and Juana
Abellana. On the night of October 13th of the same year, the plaintiff was called to render medical assistance to
the defendant’s daughter-in-law, who was about to gie birth.

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 2. After the consultation of Dr. Escaño, it was deemed that the operation was going to be difficult for child birth, but
regardless, Dr. Pelayo proceeded with the job of operating on the subject and also removed the afterbirth. The
operation went on until morning, and on the same day, visited several times and billed the defendants the just
amount of P500 for the services rendered to which defendants refused to pay.
3. In answer to the complaint, counsel for the defendants denied all of the allegation and alleged as a special defense,
that their daughter-in-law had died in consequence of the said childbirth, that when she was alive she lived with
her husband independently and in a separate house without any relation whatever with them, and that, if on the
day when she gave birth she was in the house of the defendants, her stay there was accidental and due to
fortuitous circumstances. Therefore, he prayed that the defendants be absolved of the complaint with costs against
the plaintiff.

Issue

1. Can the defendants be held liable to pay for the obligation?

Ruling

2. No. According to article 1089 of the Civil Code, obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasicontracts,
and by illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs. Obligations arising
from law are not presumed. Those expressly determined in the code or in special laws, etc., are the only
demandable ones. Obligations arising from contracts have legal force between the contracting parties and must be
fulfilled in accordance with their stipulations. (Arts. 1090 and 1091.) The rendering of medical assistance in case
of illness was comprised among the mutual obligations to which the spouses were bound by way of mutual
support. (Arts. 142 and 143.) If every obligation consists in giving, doing or not doing something (art. 1088), and
spouses were mutually bound to support each other, there can be no question but that, when either of them by
reason of illness should be in need of medical assistance, the other was under the unavoidable obligation to
furnish the necessary services of a physician in order that health may be restored, and he or she may be freed from
the sickness by which life is jeopardized. The party bound to furnish such support was therefore liable for all
expenses, including the fees of the medical expert for his professional services. In the face of the above legal
precepts, it was unquestionable that the person bound to pay the fees due to the plaintiff for the professional
services that he rendered to the daughter-in-law of the defendants during her childbirth, was the husband of the
patient and not her father and mother- in-law of the defendants herein.

Perez vs Pomar

Facts

1. The petitioner Don Vicente Perez filed before the Court of First Instance of Laguna a complaint asking the court
to determine the amount due to him for the services he rendered in the Tabacalera Company and that the
defendant Eugenio Pomar be condemned to the payment of damages amounting to $3,200, gold, together with the
costs of suit.
2. Prior to this event, the petitioner was asked to be an English interpreter between the defendant and the military
authorities and that after that incident, the petitioner continued to render his services to the respondent and that he
obtained passes and accompanied Pomar upon his journeys to some of the towns in Province of Laguna( e.g
conferences between the respondent and the colonel commanding the local garrison, conferences with Captain
Lemen in the town of Pilar, major in command in Pagsanjan about the shipment of goods from Manila) and that
the plaintiff was assured by the respondent that in every rendered service to the said company, there would be
such payment.
3. Thus, causing him to abandon his soap business and suffered damages in the sum of $3,200.
4. The defendant filed for dismissal of the complaint denying the allegations stated by the petitioner. He also stated
that Perez borrowed from time to time money amounting to $175 for his soap business, that Perez purposes in

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 accompanying him is to extend his business and mercantile relations, free transportation, and that Perez had acted
as interpreter of his own free will without any offer of payment and therefore no legal relation between them
existed.
Issue

1. Whether or not the respondent is oblige to pay the continued service rendered by the petitioner.

Ruling

1. Yes. The Court decision is that the judgement should be rendered against Don Eugenio Pomar for the payment
to the plaintiff of the sum of 200 Mexican pesos.

The Court ruled out that if there is a tacit and mutual consent as to the rendition of the services, the defendant
is still obliged to pay such compensation to the petitioner even if there is no written contract entered between
the two parties on the basis of quasi-contract. When one party knowingly receives something for nothing, the
courts may impose a quasi contract. Under a quasi contract, neither party is originally intended to create an
agreement. Instead, an arrangement is imposed by a judge to rectify an occurrence of unjust enrichment. On the
services rendered by the petitioner in the province of Laguna, it follows that there was a bilateral obligation on
the part of both parties because the defendant accepted the benefit of the service rendered by the petitioner and
that in turn the petitioner expected him to pay his rendition of service. Provided in Article 22 of the Civil Code,
Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
The fact that the defendant consented to accept an interpreter's services on various occasions, rendered in his
behalf and not considered as free, it is just that he should pay the reasonable payment because it is well-known
principle of law that no one should be permitted to enrich himself to the damage of another.

Maritime Company vs Reparations Committee

Facts

1. Plaintiff Maritime Co. of the Philippines would deny that it is controlling in its suit to hold defendant
Reparations Commission liable for the freight charges as the consignee of reparations goods, notwithstanding
that under Section 11 of the Reparations Act, ocean freight and other expenses incident to importation shall be
paid by the end-user and not by such agency; that defendant is exempt from such obligation. In plaintiff’s
complaint, it alleged that shipments of reparation goods were loaded in 3 of its vessels consigned to the
defendant w/ freight charges.
2. Then came to allegation that said vessels arrived in Manila and discharged all such shipment of reparations
goods w/c were duly received by defendant in good order and condition but defendant failed and refused to pay
not withstanding repeated demands.

Issue

1. WON the contention of the plaintiff will prosper?

Ruling

1. No. it is a fundamental requirement that the contract entered into must be in accordance with, and not repugnant
to, an applicable statute. Its terms are embodied herein. The contracting parties need not repeat them and they do
not even have to be referred to. Every contract thus contains not only what has been explicitly stipulated, but the
statutory provisions that have any bearing on the matter. The principle is thus well-settled that and existing law

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 enters into and forms part of a valid contract w/o the need for the parties expressly making reference to it. Only
thus could its validity insofar as some of its provisions are concerned to be assured

NHA vs Grace Baptist Church

Facts

1. On June 13, 1986, Respondent Grace Baptist Church wrote a letter to NHA manifesting their intent to purchase
Lot 4 and 17 of the General Mariano Alvarez Resettlement Project in Cavite.
2. The latter granted request hence respondent entered into possession of the lots and introduced improvements
thereon.
3. On February 22, 1991, NHA passed a resolution approving the sale of the subject lots to respondent Church for
700 per square meter, a total of P430,500. Respondents were duly informed.
4. On April 8, 1991, respondent church tendered a check amounting to P55,350 contending that this was the agreed
price. NHA avers stating that the price now (1991) is different from before (1986).
5. The trial court rendered a decision in favour of NHA stating that there was no contract of sale, ordering to return
the said lots to NHA and to pay NHA rent of 200 pesos from the time it took possession of the lot.
6. Respondent Church appealed to the CA which affirms the decision of RTC regarding “no contract of sale” but
modifying it by ordering NHA to execute the sale of the said lots to Church for 700 per square, with 6% interest
per annum from March 1991.
7. Petitioner NHA filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Hence this petition for review on certiorari

Issue

1. WON NHA can be compelled to sell the lots under market value?

Ruling

1. No, because the contract has not been perfected.

The Church despite knowledge that its intended contract of sale with the NHA had not been perfected proceeded
to introduce improvements on the land. On the other hand, NHA knowingly granted the Church temporary use of
the subject properties and did not prevent the Church from making improvements thereon. Thus the Church and
NHA, who both acted in bad faith shall be treated as if they were both in good faith. In this connection Art
448provides: “

the owner of the land in which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546
and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper
rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land and if its value is considerably more than
that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to
appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree, on case of disagreement, court
shall fix.”

NCBSA vs CA and PNB

Facts

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 1. National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia (NCBSA) filed a case against respondent Philippine Banking
Corporation (PBC) to recover the duplicate payment of the proceeds of a letter of credit issued by NCBSA in
view of the fact that both the head office and Makati branch of PBC collected the proceeds.
2. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati ruled in favor of NCBSA. PBC filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
The motion, however, did not contain a notice of hearing. PBC tried to cure the defect by subsequently filing a
Motion to Set “Motion for Reconsideration” for Hearing nine days after the period for filing the Notice of Appeal
had expired which was vigorously opposed by NCBSA.
3. NCBSA called for the strict application of the Philippines‘ rules of procedure to prevent any more delay in the
disposition of the case, which has been pending for more than seventeen years. On the other hand, PBC invokes a
just and fair determination of the case.

Issue

1. WON the obligation stems from a contract with a prescription of 10 years or a quasi-contract of Solutio Indebiti
which has a prescription period of 6 years

Ruling

1. Obligation stems from a contract which was the Letter of Credit.

Solutio indebiti applies where: (1) a payment is made when there exists no binding relation between the payor,
who has no duty to pay, and the person who received the payment, and (2) the payment is made through mistake,
and not through liberality or some other cause.

In the case at bar, PBC and NCBSA were bound by their contract, the letter of credit, under which NCBSA
obliged itself to pay PBC, subject to compliance by the latter with certain conditions provided therein. As such,the
cause of action was based on a contract, and the prescriptive period is ten, not six years.

Siga-an vs Villanueva

Facts

1. On March 3, 1998, respondent Alicia Villanueva filed a complaint for a sum of money against petitioner
Sebastian Siga-an. Respondent alleged that she was a businesswoman engaged in supplying office materials and
equipments to the PNO; while petitioner was a military officer and comptroller of the PNO from 1991-1996.
2. Sometime in 1992, respondent claimed that the petitioner approached her inside the PNO office and offered to
loan her the amount of P540,000. She accepted the offer since she needed capital for her business. The loan
agreement was not reduced in writing and there was no stipulation as to the payment of interest for the loan.
3. On August 31, 1993, respondent issued a check worth P500,000 to petitioner as partial payment of the loan. Two
months later she issued another check in the amount of P200,000 as payment of the remaining balance. Petitioner
told her that she since she paid a total amount of P700,000 for the P540,000 worth of loan, the excess amount of
P160,000 would be applied as interest for the loan. Not satisfied with the amount applied as interest, the petitioner
pestered her to pay additional interest. He threatened to block her transactions with the PNO if she won't comply.
The respondent conceded since all her transactions with the PNO need the approval of the petitioner. Thus, she
paid addt'l amounts in cash and checks as interest for the loan. She asked the petitioner to give her receipts but he
told her that there's no need for a receipt because there's mutual trust and understanding between them.
4. Thereafter, the respondent consulted a lawyer regarding propriety of paying interest on the loan despite the
absence of agreement to that effect. Her lawyer told her that petitioner could not validly collect interest on the
loan because there was no agreement between her and petitioner. Upon being advised by her lawyer that she made

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 an overpayment, she sent a demand letter to petitioner asking for the return of the excess amount. But the
petitioner just ignored the demand letter.
5. Respondent prayed that the RTC render judgment ordering petitioner to pay respondent(1) P660,000.00 plus legal
interest from the time of demand; (2) P300,000.00 as moral damages; (3) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
(4) an amount equivalent to 25% of P660,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
6. In his answer to the complaint, the petitioner denied that he offered a loan to respondent and mentioned the
mistakes committed by the respondent regarding the payment of the loan and that there was no overpayment.
7. After the trial, the RTC rendered a decision holding that respondent made an overpayment of her loan obligation
to petitioner and that the latter should refund the excess amount to the former. The alleged interest should not be
included because there was no agreement between them regarding the payment of interest. It concluded that since
respondent made an excess payment to petitioner in the amount of P660,000.00 through mistake, petitioner should
return the said amount to respondent pursuant to the principle of solution indebiti
8. Petitioner appealed to the CA but the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration to the appellate court, hence this petition.

Issue

1. WON the principle of Solutio Indebiti applies

Ruling

1. Yes, Solutio Indebiti applies in this instant case.

Under Article 1960 of the Civil Code, if the borrower of loan pays interest when there has been no stipulation
therefor, the provisions of the Civil Code concerningsolutio indebiti shall be applied. Article 2154 of the Civil
Code explains the principle of solutio indebiti. Said provision provides that if something is received when there is
no right to demand it, and it was unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises. In such a
case, a creditor-debtor relationship is created under a quasi-contract whereby the payor becomes the creditor who
then has the right to demand the return of payment made by mistake, and the person who has no right to receive
such payment becomes obligated to return the same. The quasi-contract of solutio indebiti harks back to the
ancient principle that no one shall enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another.

The principle of solutio indebiti applies where (1) a payment is made when there exists no binding relation
between the payor, who has no duty to pay, and the person who received the payment; and (2) the payment is
made through mistake, and not through liberality or some other cause. We have held that the principle of solutio
indebiti applies in case of erroneous payment of undue interest.

It was duly established that respondent paid interest to petitioner. Respondent was under no duty to make such
payment because there was no express stipulation in writing to that effect. There was no binding relation between
petitioner and respondent as regards the payment of interest. The payment was clearly a mistake. Since petitioner
received something when there was no right to demand it, he has an obligation to return it.

DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative Inc., vs Velez

Facts

2. On February 18, 1994, the prosecuting attorney filed with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 37,
an information for estafa against Carmen Mandawe for alleged failure to account to respondent Eriberta Villegas
the amount of P608,532.46. Respondent Villegas entrusted this amount to Carmen Mandawe, an employee of
petitioner DMPI-ECCI, for deposit with the teller of petitioner. Subsequently, on March 29, 1994, respondent

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 Eriberta Villegas filed with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 20, a complaint against Carmen
Mandawe and petitioner DMPI-ECCI for a sum of money and damages with preliminary attachment arising out of
the same transaction. In time, petitioner sought the dismissal of the civil case on the following grounds:
a. that there is a pending criminal case in RTC Branch 37, arising from the same facts, and
b. that the complaint failed to contain a certification against forum shopping as required by Supreme Court
Circular No. 28-91.
3. On December 12, 1996, the trial court issued an order dismissing Civil Case No. CV-94-214. On January 21,
1997,respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the order.
4. On February 21, 1997, the trial court issued an order granting respondent’s motion for reconsideration, thereby
recalling the dismissal of the case. Hence, this petition for certiorari seeking for the annulment of the order of the
Trial Court, granting the motion for reconsideration of respondent Eriberta Villegas, and thus reversing the
previous dismissal of Civil Case No. CV-94-214.

Issue

1. WON the civil case could proceed independently of the criminal case for estafa without having reserved the filing
of the civil action.

Ruling

1. Yes. A case for estafa is an independent civil action and may proceed independently and separately from the
criminal case.

As a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The first is the social injury produced by the
criminal act which is sought to be repaired thru the imposition of the corresponding penalty, and the second is the
personal injury caused to the victim of the crime which injury is sought to be compensated through indemnity
which is civil in nature.

Thus, “every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."

This is the law governing the recovery of civil liability arising from the commission of an offense. Civil liability
includes restitution, reparation for damage caused, and indemnification of consequential damages. The offended
party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from the commission of the offense in the criminal case
since the civil action is either deemed instituted with the criminal action or is separately instituted.

Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective on December 1, 2000,
provides that:

“When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.”

Rule 111, Section 2 further provides that

“After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted
until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.”

However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code arising from the same act or omission, the rule has been changed. Under the present rule, only the civil
liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
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 action. There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil actions under Articles 32,
33, 34and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines

Rule 111, Section 3 reads:

“The reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising
from the offense charged. This does not include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission which may be prosecuted separately even
without a reservation.”

Hun Hyung Park vs Eung Won Choi

Facts

1. Eung Won Choi (Choi) was charged for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing
Checks Law, before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati for issuing a postdated check in the amount of
P1,875,000. The same was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds.
2. Choi filed a demurer to evidence after the prosecution rested its case. The Makati Metropolitan Trial Court
granted the Demurrer and dismissed the case.
3. Hun Hyung Park (Park) appealed the civil aspect of the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati,
contending that the dismissal of the criminal case should not include its civil aspect.
4. RTC held that while the evidence presented was insufficient to prove respondent‘s criminal liability, it did not
altogether extinguish his civil liability. Upon a motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC set aside its
decision and ordered the remand of the case to the MeTC for further proceedings, so that the defendant may
adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case.

Issue

1. Whether or not the remand of the case to the MeTC for further proceedings on the civil aspect of the case

Ruling

1. Yes, the remand is proper in the instant case.

When a demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the whole case is submitted for judgment on the basis
of the evidence for the prosecution as the accused is deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. At that
juncture, the court is called upon to decide the case including its civil aspect, unless the enforcement of the civil
liability by a separate civil action has been waived or reserved.

In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce countervailing evidence if the
court denies the demurrer. Such denial bears no distinction as to the two aspects of the case because there is a
disparity of evidentiary value between the quanta of evidence in such aspects of the case. In other words, a court
may not deny the demurrer as to the criminal aspect and at the same time grant the demurrer as to the civil aspect,
for if the evidence so far presented is not insufficient to prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt, then the same
evidence is likewise not insufficient to establish civil liability by mere preponderance of evidence.

On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt, it does not
follow that the same evidence is insufficient to establish a preponderance of evidence. For if the court grants the
demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of the case generally proceeds. The only recognized instance when an
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 acquittal on demurrer carries with it the dismissal of the civil aspect is when there is a finding that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Absent such determination, trial as to the civil
aspect of the case must perforce continue.

In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case without any finding that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Choi did not assail the RTC order of remand. He
thereby recognized that there is basis for a remand. Indicatively, Choi stands by his defense that he merely
borrowed P1,500,000 with the remainder representing the interest, and that he already made a partial payment of
P1,590,000. Park counters, however, that the payments made by Choi pertained to other transactions. Given these
conflicting claims which are factual, a remand of the case would afford the fullest opportunity for the parties to
ventilate, and for the trial court to resolve the same.

Dayap vs Sendiong

Facts

1. Dayap was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, less serious physical injuries and damage to
property. It was alleged that Dayap was the driver of a cargo truck which figured in an accident with a Colt Galant
driven by Lou Gene Sendiong causing instant death to the latter and less serious physical injuries to the latter’s
passenger.
2. The MTC granted Dayap Demurrer to Evidence saying that prosecution failed to establish that Dayap was really
the one driving the cargo truck. The MTC further stated that prosecution also wasn’t able to prove the death and
injuries of the victim as there were not death certificate and medical certificates submitted as evidence. The MTC
gave credence to the evidence of the Dayap, showing that it was the victim’s car which swerved into the cargo
truck’s lane thereby being the proximate cause of the accident. The MTC relied on the accident sketch contained
in the police blotter to support this conclusion.
3. Aggrieved, Sendiong filed a petition for certiorari under 65 with the RTC. The RTC affirmed the acquittal of
Dayap but ordered the case remanded to the MTC for the hearing of the civil aspect.
4. Sendiong filed a petition for review (42) with the CA. the CA concluded that it was the RTC which had
jurisdiction and not the MTC. The CA explained that according to Cuyos v Garcia, jurisdiction over damage to
property cases should be determined by the imposable fine and not the penalty for the physical injuries and
following BP 129, MTC only has jurisdiction over those felonies with imposable fine not exceeding 10,000. Since
in this case, no proof of total damage was given and Sendiong claims 1.5M in civil damages, the same should
have been brought before the RTC.

Issue

1. Whether or not a grant of a demurrer is reviewable – ONLY UNDER 65

2. Whether or not remand to the MTC of the case for the determination of civil liability was proper – NO

Ruling

1. A grant of a demurrer to evidence is tantamount to an acquittal and cannot be reviewed on appeal otherwise, the
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy is offended. A demurrer must be filed after the prosecution rests
its case. It entails and appreciation of the evidence of the prosecution and when the same if found insufficient to
support a conviction beyond reasonable doubt, the demurrer is proper. Once granted, the court must enter a partial
judgment of conviction but must continue with the trial for the reception of the defense’ evidence on the civil
aspect. This is because at the moment the demurrer is granted, only prosecution’s evidence (both as to the
criminal and civil aspect) is on record. However, the grant of a demurrer may still be reviewed by the courts but

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 only on grounds of GADLEJ under rule 65. In this case, there being not finding of GADLEJ on the part of the
MTC, the demurrer stands.

2. The acquittal of an accused does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability when
a. acquittal was based on reasonable doubt
b. court determines that there is only a civil liability
c. the civil liability of the accused does not arise or is not based on the crime for which he was acquitted.

On the other hand, acquittal of an accused carries the extinction of civil liability when
d. there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist or
e. the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him. In this case, the acquittal by the MTC
was based on findings that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist and
that petitioner did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him; hence, petitioner’s civil liability has
been extinguished by his acquittal.

Thus, because there was no civil liability to hear, the case should not have been remanded to the MTC.

Lasam vs Smith

Facts

1. The defendant was the owner of a public garage in the town of San Fernando, La Union, and engaged in the
business of carrying passengers for hire from one point to another in the Province of La Union and the
surrounding provinces.
2. Defendant undertook to convey the plaintiffs from San Fernando to Currimao, Ilocos Norte, in a Ford automobile.
On leaving San Fernando, the automobile was operated by a licensed chauffeur, but after having reached the town
of San Juan, the chauffeur allowed his assistant, Bueno, to drive the car.
3. Bueno held no driver’s license, but had some experience in driving. The car functioned well until after the
crossing of the Abra River in Tagudin, when, according to the testimony of the witnesses for the plaintiffs, defects
developed in the steering gear so as to make accurate steering impossible, and after zigzagging for a distance of
about half kilometer, the car left the road and went down a steep embankment.
4. The automobile was overturned and the plaintiffs pinned down under it. Mr. Lasam escaped with a few contusions
and a dislocated rib, but his wife, Joaquina, received serious injuries, among which was a compound fracture of
one of the bones in her left wrist. She also suffered nervous breakdown from which she has not fully recovered at
the time of trial.
5. The complaint was filed about a year and a half after and alleges that the accident was due to defects in the
automobile as well as to the incompetence and negligence of the chauffeur. The trial court held, however, that the
cause of action rests on the defendant’s breach of the contract of carriage and that, consequently, articles 1101-
1107 of the Civil Code, and not article 1903, are applicable. The court further found that the breach of contract
was not due to fortuitous events and that, therefore the defendant was liable in damages.

Issue

1. WON the trial court is correct in its findings that the breach of contract was not due to a fortuitous event?

Ruling

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 1. Yes. It is sufficient to reiterate that the source of the defendant’s legal liability is the contract of carriage; that by
entering into that contract he bound himself to carry the plaintiffs safely and securely to their destination; and that
having failed to do so he is liable in damages unless he shows that the failure to fulfill his obligation was due to
causes mentioned in article 1105 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:

2. “No one shall be liable for events which could not be foreseen or which, even if foreseen, were inevitable, with
the exception of the cases in which the law expressly provides otherwise and those in which the obligation itself
imposes such liability.”

3. A caso fortuito presents the following essential characteristics:

a. The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his
obligation, must be independent of the human will.

b. It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it
must be impossible to avoid.

c. The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner.

d. And the obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to
the creditor.”

4. As will be seen, these authorities agree that some extraordinary circumstance independent of the will of the
obligor, or of his employees, is an essential element of a caso fortuito. Turning to the present case, it is at once
apparent that this element is lacking. It is not suggested that the accident in question was due to an act of God or
to adverse road conditions which could not have been foreseen. As far as the records shows, the accident was
caused either by defects in the automobile or else through the negligence of its driver. That is not a caso fortuito.

5. We agree with counsel that neither under the American nor Spanish law is a carrier of passengers an absolute
insurer against the risks of travel from which the passenger may protect himself by exercising ordinary care and
diligence.

6. There can be no doubt that the expenses incurred by the plaintiffs as a result of the accident greatly exceeded the
amount of the damages awarded. But bearing in mind that in determining the extent of the liability for losses or
damages resulting from negligence in the fulfillment of a contractual obligation, the courts have “a discretionary
power to moderate the liability according to the circumstances”

7. As pointed out by that court in its well-reasoned and well-considered decision, by far the greater part of the
damages claimed by the plaintiffs resulted from the fracture of a bone in the left wrist of Joaquina Sanchez and
from her objections to having a decaying splinter of the bone removed by a surgical operation. As a consequence
of her refusal to submit such an operation, a series of infections ensued and which required constant and
expensive medical treatment for several years. We agree with the court below that the defendant should not be
charged with these expenses.

Elcano vs Hill

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Facts

1. Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-
8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint
of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the
occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the
killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the
said accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of “lack of intent to kill, coupled
with mistake.”
2. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the defendants of such denial, reiterating the grounds that the
following order was issued, the Court finds the same to be meritorious and well-founded.
3. Hence, plaintiffs-appellants appealed in the Supreme Court the following resolutions: THE PRESENT ACTION
IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE
REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS
APPLICABLE; THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RES-
ADJUDICTA; THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE,
ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF
ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF
THE OTHER.

Issue

1. WON the present civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case extinguished?

Ruling

1. No, it is not a bar.

The acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for civil case and quasi-delict,
hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

According to the Code Commission: “The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not
so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a
violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a “culpa aquiliana” or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having
always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between
criminal negligence and “culpa extra contractual” or “cuasi-delito” has been sustained by decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist.

Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal
negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or ‘culpa aquiliana’. But said article forestalls a double
recovery.”, (Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)

The extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a
quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal
act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.

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Virata vs Ochoa

Facts

1. In September 1975, Borilla was driving a jeep when he hit Arsenio Virata thereby causing the latter’s death. The
heirs of Virata sued Borilla through an action for homicide through reckless imprudence in the CFI of Rizal.
Virata’s lawyer reserved their right to file a separate civil action the he later withdrew said motion.
2. But in June 1976, pending the criminal case, the Viratas again reserved their right to file a separate civil action.
Borilla was eventually acquitted as it was ruled that what happened was a mere accident.
3. The heirs of Virata then sued Borilla and Ochoa (the owner of the jeep and employer of Borilla) for damages
based on quasi delict. Ochoa assailed the civil suit alleging that Borilla was already acquitted and that the Virata’s
were merely trying to recover damages twice.
4. The lower court agreed with Ochoa and dismissed the civil suit.

Issue

1. Whether or not the heirs of Virata may file a separate civil suit.

Ruling

1. Yes. It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choose between an action under the Revised
Penal Code or of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to recover twice for the same negligent
act. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal
negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or ‘culpa aquiliana’. But said article forestalls a double
recovery.

Neplum, Inc. vs Orbeso

Facts

1. On 29 October 1999, the trial court promulgated its judgment (the ‘Judgment’) in Criminal Case No. 96-246
acquitting the accused of the crime of estafa on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. The accused and her counsel as well as the public and private prosecutors were
present during such promulgation.
2. The private prosecutor represented the interests of the petitioner who was the private offended party in Criminal
Case No. 96-246.’
3. On 12 November 1999, the petitioner, through the private prosecutor, received its copy of the Judgment.
4. On 29 November 1999, petitioner filed its 25 November 1999 Motion for Reconsideration (Civil Aspect) of the
Judgment.
5. Considering that 27 November 1999 was a Saturday, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration on 29
November 1999, a Monday.’
6. On 28 January 2000, a Friday, petitioner received its copy of the 24 January 2000 Order of the Trial Court
denying for lack of merit petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
7. On 31 January 2000, a Monday, petitioner filed its 28 January 2000 Notice of Appeal from the Judgment. On the
same day, petitioner filed by registered mail its 28 January 2000 Amended Notice of Appeal.

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 8. On 17 February 2000, the Trial Court issued its Challenged Order, which petitioner received through the private
prosecutor on 22 February 2000, denying due course to petitioner’s Notice of Appeal and Amended Notice of
Appeal.

Issue

1. Within what period may private offended parties appeal the civil aspect of a judgment acquitting the accused
based on reasonable doubt? Is the 15-day period to be counted from the promulgation of the decision to the
accused or from the time a copy thereof is served on the offended party?
2. WON there is a need for reservation of the civil aspect of the case

Ruling

1. Our short answer is: from the time the offended party had actual or constructive knowledge of the judgment,
whether it be during its promulgation or as a consequence of the service of the notice of the decision.

2. At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure deleted the requirement of reserving
independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately from criminal ones. Thus, the civil actions
referred to in Articles 32,[27] 33,[28] 34[29] and 2176[30] of the Civil Code shall remain “separate, distinct and
independent” of any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Here are some direct consequences of such
revision and omission:

a. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved in the criminal
prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein.

b. The institution or waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from the crime charged does not
extinguish the right to bring such action.

c. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the same act or omission.

3. Thus, deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se
(civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a
civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended
party may — subject to the control of the prosecutor — still intervene in the criminal action in order to protect
such remaining civil interest therein. By the same token, the offended party may appeal a judgment in a criminal
case acquitting the accused on reasonable doubt, but only in regard to the civil liability ex delicto.

4. And this is precisely what herein petitioner wanted to do: to appeal the civil liability arising from the crime — the
civil liability ex delicto.

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