ELECTION LAW CASES

POWER TO REGULATE ELECTION LAWS 1. COMELEC Rules of Procedures, 1993

- Macalintal v. COMELEC (July 10, 2003) 2. COMELEC Resolution No. 8804

3. COMELEC Resolution No. 9366
PURPOSE OF ELECTION LAWS
4. COMELEC Resolution No. 9518
- Macquiling v. COMELEC (July 2, 2013)
- Millare v. Hon. Gironella 5. COMELEC Resolution No. 9576
6. COMELEC Resolution No. 9476
CONSTRUCTION OF ELECTION LAWS
7. COMELEC Resolution No. 9751
- Ysip v. Municipal Council of Cabiao (April 29,
8. COMELEC Resolution No. 9763
1922)
- Violago Sr. v. COMELEC (October 4, 2011) 9. COMELEC Resolution No. 9797

MAIN FEATURE OF ELECTION LAWS ELECTION LAWS:

- U.S. v. Cueto (October 29, 1918) 1. Omnibus Election Code, 1985
DEFINITION, BASIS AND NATURE OF ELECTION 2. Republic Act No. 9369
- Rulloda v. COMELEC 3. Republic Act No. 9006

INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 4. Republic Act No. 9225

5. Republic Act No. 7941
- Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. COMELEC
6. Republic Act No. 8189
RECALL
7. Republic Act No. 7166
- Claudio v. COMELEC (May 4, 2000) 8. Republic Act No. 10366
- Mayor Angobung v. COMELEC (March 5, 1997)
9. Republic Act No. 9189
ELECTION PERIOD VS. CAMPAIGN PERIOD
10. Republic Act No. 10367
- Peralta v. COMELEC (March 11, 1978) 11. Supreme Court decisions:
SUFFRAGE AS A PRIVILEGE a. Term limits
b. Dual citizens as candidates
- People v. Corral (January 31, 1936) c. Premature campaigning
POSTPONEMENT OF ELECTIONS d. Nuisance candidates
e. Jurisdiction
- Dimaporo v. COMELEC ( January 7, 1983) f. Rehearing
g. Deemed resigned
FAILURE OF ELECTIONS
h. Campaign period
- Banaga, Jr. v. COMELEC (July 31, 2000) i. Election period
j. Substitution
k. Withdrawal
l. Residence
m. Cancellation of registration
n. Party-list
o. Succession

NOTES;
COMELEC RESOLUTIONS:
 - The rules and regulations, for the conduct of
elections, are MANDATORY BEFORE the election, but
when it is sought to enforce them after election, they
are held to be DIRECTORY only, if that is possible,
especially where, if they are held to be mandatory,
innocent voters will be deprived of their votes
without any fault on their part.
- Election: means the choice or selection of candidates
to public office by popular vote through the use of
the ballot, and the elected officials which are
determined through the will of the electorate. An
election is the embodiment of the popular will, the
expression of the sovereign power of the people.
- Purpose of election: give the voters a direct
participation in the affairs of their government,
either in determining who shall be their public
officials or in deciding some questions of public
interest.
POWER TO REGULATE ELECTION LAWS
ATTY. ROMULO MACALINTAL, petitioner vs. COMELEC,
HON. ALBERT ROMULO, in his official capacity as
Executive Secretary, and HON. EMILIA BONCODIN,
Secretary of DBM, respondents
FACTS:
1. Atty. Macalintal filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, seeking a declaration that certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from
constitutional infirmity. Petitioner filed the instant
petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
2. Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) of RA No. 9189,
which allows the registration of voters who are
immigrants or permanent residents in other
countries by executing an affidavit expressing the
intention to return to the Philippines, is
unconstitutional because it violates Section 1, Article
V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the
voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at
least one year and in the place where he proposes to
vote for at least six months immediately preceding
an election.
3. Solicitor General: All laws are presumed to be
constitutional; that the term "residence" has been
understood to be synonymous with "domicile" under
both Constitutions. He further argues that a person
can have only one "domicile" but he can have two
residences, one permanent (the domicile) and the
other temporary; that Filipinos who are immigrants
or permanent residents abroad may have in fact
never abandoned their Philippine domicile.
ISSUES:
A. WON Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 violate the
residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the
Constitution.
B. WON Section 18.5 of Rep. Act No. 9189 in relation to
Section 4 of the same Act in contravention of Section
4, Article VII of the Constitution.
C. WON Section 19 and 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189 violates
Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution.
RULING:
On petitioner’s legal standing:
R.A. No. 9189, entitled, "An Act Providing for A
System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of
the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and
for Other Purposes," appropriates funds under Section
29 thereof which provides that a supplemental budget on
the General Appropriations Act of the year of its
enactment into law shall provide for the necessary
amount to carry out its provisions. Taxpayers, such as
herein petitioner, have the right to restrain officials from
wasting public funds through the enforcement of an
unconstitutional statute. The Court has held that they may
assail the validity of a law appropriating public funds
because expenditure of public funds by an officer of the
State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act
constitutes a misapplication of such funds.
The challenged provision of law involves a public
right that affects a great number of citizens. The Court has
adopted the policy of taking jurisdiction over cases
whenever the petitioner has seriously and convincingly
presented an issue of transcendental significance to the
Filipino people. Indeed, in this case, the Court may set
aside procedural rules as the constitutional right of
suffrage of a considerable number of Filipinos is involved.
A. Section 1, Article V of the Constitution specifically
provides that suffrage may be exercised by (1) all
citizens of the Philippines, (2) not otherwise
disqualified by law, (3) at least eighteen years of age,
(4) who are residents in the Philippines for at least
one year and in the place where they propose to vote
for at least six months immediately preceding the
election. Under Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, one of
those disqualified from voting is an immigrant or
permanent resident who is recognized as such in the
host country unless he/she executes an affidavit
declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later
than three years from approval of his/her
registration under said Act.
Contrary to petitioner's claim that Section 5(d)
circumvents the Constitution, Congress enacted the
law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting
in compliance with the constitutional mandate.
Such mandate expressly requires that Congress
provide a system of absentee voting that necessarily
presupposes that the "qualified citizen of the
Philippines abroad" is not physically present in the
country. The provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are
components of the system of overseas absentee
voting established by R.A. No. 9189. The qualified
Filipino abroad who executed the affidavit is deemed
to have retained his domicile in the Philippines. He is
presumed not to have lost his domicile by his
physical absence from this country. His having
become an immigrant or permanent resident of his
host country does not necessarily imply an
abandonment of his intention to return to his
domicile of origin, the Philippines. Therefore, under
the law, he must be given the opportunity to express
that he has not actually abandoned his domicile in
the Philippines by executing the affidavit required by
Sections 5(d) and 8(c) of the law.
As the essence of R.A. No. 9189 is to enfranchise
overseas qualified Filipinos, it behoves the Court
to take a holistic view of the pertinent provisions of
both the Constitution and R.A. No. 9189. The intent
of the Constitution may be drawn primarily from the
language of the document itself. Should it be
ambiguous, the Court may consider the intent of its
framers through their debates in the constitutional
convention.
In the hearing of the Constitutional Commission, Fr.
Bernas discussed the meaning of residence in
Election Law, to wit:
“’Residence’ in this provision refers to two residence
qualifications: "residence" in the Philippines and
‘residence’ in the place where he will vote. As far as
residence in the Philippines is concerned, the word
‘residence’ means domicile, but as far as residence in
the place where he will actually cast his ballot is
concerned, the meaning seems to be different. He
could have a domicile somewhere else and yet he is a
resident of a place for six months and he is allowed to
vote there. So that there may be serious constitutional
obstacles to absentee voting, unless the vote of the
person who is absent is a vote which will be considered
as cast in the place of his domicile.”
Constitutional Commission: “The reason we want
absentee voting to be in the Constitution as a
mandate to the legislature is that there could be
inconsistency on the residence rule if it is just a
question of legislation by Congress. So, by
allowing it and saying that this is possible, then
legislation can take care of the rest.”
Thus, Section 2, Article V of the Constitution came
into being to remove any doubt as to the
inapplicability of the residency requirement in
Section 1. It is precisely to avoid any problems that
could impede the implementation of its pursuit to
enfranchise the largest number of qualified Filipinos
who are not in the Philippines that the Constitutional
Commission explicitly mandated Congress to
provide a system for overseas absentee voting.
R.A. No. 9189 was enacted in obeisance to the
mandate of the first paragraph of Section 2, Article
V of the Constitution that Congress shall provide a
system for voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. It
must be stressed that Section 2 does not provide for
the parameters of the exercise of legislative
authority in enacting said law. Hence, in the absence
of restrictions, Congress is presumed to have duly
exercised its function as defined in Article VI (The
Legislative Department) of the Constitution.
The intent of the Constitutional Commission is to
entrust to Congress the responsibility of devising a
system of absentee voting. The qualifications of
voters as stated in Section 1 shall remain except for
the residency requirement. This is in fact the reason
why the Constitutional Commission opted for the
term qualified Filipinos abroad with respect to the
system of absentee voting that Congress should
draw up. As stressed by Commissioner Monsod, by
the use of the adjective qualified with respect to
Filipinos abroad, the assumption is that they have
the "qualifications and none of the disqualifications
to vote."
It is clear from these discussions of the members of
the Constitutional Commission that they intended to
enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens
abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of
origin. The Commission even intended to extend to
young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose
parents' domicile of origin.
It is in pursuance of that intention that the
Commission provided for Section 2 immediately
after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the
doctrine of necessary implication in statutory
construction, which may be applied in construing
constitutional provisions, the strategic location of
Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional
Commission provided for an exception to the actual
residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to
qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission
has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are
not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even
though they do not satisfy the residency
requirement in Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution.
Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of
the affidavit itself is not the enabling or
enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section
5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the
immigrant or permanent resident to go back and
resume residency in the Philippines, but more
significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that
he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin.
Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of the
affidavit under Section 5(d) violates the Constitution
that proscribes "provisional registration or a
promise by a voter to perform a condition to be
qualified to vote in a political exercise."
To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants and
permanent residents abroad because by their status
in their host countries, they are presumed to have
relinquished their intent to return to this country;
thus, without the affidavit, the presumption of
abandonment of Philippine domicile shall remain.
As to the eventuality that the Filipino abroad would
renege on his undertaking to return to the
Philippines, the penalty of perpetual
disenfranchisement provided for by Section 5(d)
would suffice to serve as deterrence to non-
compliance with his/her undertaking under the
affidavit. The votes cast by qualified Filipinos abroad
 who failed to return within three years shall not be
invalidated because they were qualified to vote on
the date of the elections, but their failure to return
shall be cause for the removal of the names of the
immigrants or permanent residents from the
National Registry of Absentee Voters and their
permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
The right of absentee and disabled voters to cast their
ballots at an election is purely statutory; the privilege
of absentee voting may flow from constitutional
provisions or be conferred by statutes. Such statutes
are regarded as conferring a privilege and not a right,
or an absolute right. When the legislature chooses to
grant the right by statute, it must operate with
equality among all the class to which it is granted; but
statutes of this nature may be limited in their
application to particular types of elections. The
statutes should be construed in the light of any
constitutional provisions affecting registration and
elections
Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice
versa; a person cannot be at the same time, both a
resident and an absentee. However, under our
election laws and the countless pronouncements of
the Court pertaining to elections, an absentee
remains attached to his residence in the Philippines
as residence is considered synonymous with
domicile.
B. Petitioner claims that the provision of Section 18.5 of
R.A. No. 9189 empowering the COMELEC to order
the proclamation of winning candidates insofar as it
affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of
winning candidates for president and vice-president,
is unconstitutional because it violates the provisions
of paragraph 4, Section 4 of Article VII of the
Constitution which gives to Congress the duty to
canvass the votes and proclaim the winning
candidates for president and vice-president.
Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 appears to be
repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution
only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the
authority given to Congress by the Constitution to
proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of
president and vice-president.
Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to
usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or,
as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach "on the
power of Congress to canvass the votes for president
and vice-president and the power to proclaim the
winners for the said positions." The provisions of the
Constitution as the fundamental law of the land
should be read as part of The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of the
votes and the proclamation of the winning
candidates for president and vice-president for the
entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.
C. The Court has no general powers of supervision over
COMELEC which is an independent body "except
those specifically granted by the Constitution," that
is, to review its decisions, orders and rulings. In the
same vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its
recognized extensive legislative power to enact
election laws, Congress may intrude into the
independence of the COMELEC by exercising
supervisory powers over its rule-making authority.
By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9189, Congress has
empowered the COMELEC to "issue the necessary
rules and regulations to effectively implement the
provisions of this Act within sixty days from the
effectivity of this Act." This provision of law follows
the usual procedure in drafting rules and regulations
to implement a law – the legislature grants an
administrative agency the authority to craft the rules
and regulations implementing the law it has enacted,
in recognition of the administrative expertise of that
agency in its particular field of operation. Once a law
is enacted and approved, the legislative function is
deemed accomplished and complete. The legislative
function may spring back to Congress relative to the
same law only if that body deems it proper to review,
amend and revise the law, but certainly not to
approve, review, revise and amend the IRR of the
COMELEC.
By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review,
amend, and revise the IRR for The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope
of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled
upon the constitutional mandate of independence of
the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is
left with no option but to withdraw from its usual
reticence in declaring a provision of law
unconstitutional.
PURPOSE OF ELECTION LAW
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, petitioner vs. COMELEC,
ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, and LINOG G. BALUA,
respondents
FACTS:
1. Respondent Rommel Arnado is a natural born
Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his
subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United
States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship.
Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the
Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10
July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of
his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was
issued in his favour.
2. On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte,
which contains, among others, the following
statements: “I am a natural born Filipino citizen /
naturalized Filipino citizen; I am not a permanent
resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.”
3. On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua),
another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to
disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of
 candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local
and national elections.
4. Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a
resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he
is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued
by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010
indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-
American."To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s
US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum
a computer-generated travel record dated 03
December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been
using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and
departing the Philippines.
5. On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division)
issued an Order requiring the respondent to
personally file his answer and memorandum within
three (3) days from receipt thereof.
6. After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua
moved to declare him in default and to present
evidence ex-parte.
7. Neither motion was acted upon, having been
overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado
garnered the highest number of votes and was
subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate
for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
ISSUE: WON the use of a foreign passport after
renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s qualification
to run for public office.
COMELEC 1st Division: Instead of treating the Petition
as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy based on misrepresentation, the COMELEC
First Division considered it as one for disqualification.
The First Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim that he
is a Filipino citizen. “We find that although Arnado
appears to have substantially complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnado’s act of consistently
using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship
on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of
Renunciation. Arnado’s continued use of his US passport
is a strong indication that Arnado had no real intention to
renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to run for office.”
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling),
another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who
garnered the second highest number of votes in the
2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed
before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for
Reconsideration together with an Opposition to
Arnado’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration.
Maquiling claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s
candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation,
Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained
the highest number of lawful votes, should be
proclaimed as the winner.
COMELEC en banc: agreed with the treatment by the First
Division of the petition as one for disqualification.
However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside
the ruling of the First Division and granted Arnado’s
Motion for Reconsideration, on the following premises:
By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No.
9225, the respondent embraced his Philippine citizenship
as though he never became a citizen of another country. It
was at that time, April 3, 2009, that the respondent
became a pure Philippine Citizen again. The use of a US
passport … does not operate to revert back his status as a
dual citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no law
saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does
not operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on
renounced.
“The application of the more assimilative principle of
continuity of citizenship is more appropriate in this case.
Under said principle, once a person becomes a citizen,
either by birth or naturalization, it is assumed that he
desires to continue to be a citizen, and this assumption
stands until he voluntarily denationalizes or expatriates
himself. Thus, in the instant case respondent after
reacquiring his Philippine citizenship should be
presumed to have remained a Filipino despite his use of
his American passport in the absence of clear,
unequivocal and competent proof of expatriation.
Accordingly, all doubts should be resolved in favor of
retention of citizenship."
Supreme Court: The use of foreign passport after
renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and
voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and
citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained
by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation
required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to
run for a public office. He took the Oath of Allegiance and
renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question
that after performing these twin requirements required
under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became
eligible to run for public office. By renouncing his foreign
citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen,
regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the
laws of the foreign country. However, this legal
presumption does not operate permanently and is open
to attack when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship,
the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued
possession of a foreign citizenship
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow
oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be
violated the next day. It requires an absolute and
perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and
a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by
the foreign country which granted the citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the
acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63
constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine
citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the
very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino
citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be
qualified to run for a local elective position.
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of
using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his
Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation.
However, by representing himself as an American citizen,
Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his
earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not
retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented
himself as an American citizen by using his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s
foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office,
as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run
for an elective local position.
With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes
the winner in the election as he obtained the highest
number of votes from among the qualified candidates.
Resolution: The renunciation of foreign citizenship must
be complete and unequivocal. The requirement that the
renunciation must be made through an oath emphasizes
the solemn duty of the one making the oath of
renunciation to remain true to what he has sworn to.
Allowing the subsequent use of a foreign passport
because it is convenient for the person to do so is
rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues the act of
taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial
formality.
ISIDRO MILLARE, petitioner vs. HON. LEOPOLDO
GIRONELLA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Abra,
HON. ADRIANO BERNARDINO, Acting Municipal Circuit
Judge of Tayum, Abra, and ALFREDO ELVEÑA
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Isidro Millare ran for the position of
Barangay Captain of Barangay Budac, Tayum, Abra,
against private respondent Alfredo Elveña during
the barangay election held on May 17, 1982
2. On May 10, 1982, Elveña filed in the Municipal
Circuit Court of Tayum, Abra, a petition for the
exclusion and disqualification of Millare, on the
ground that he was not an actual resident of the said
barangay for at least six months prior to the
elections, as required by Section 7 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 222.
3. At the hearing of the said petition, Millare failed to
appear and, after receiving the evidence of Elveña,
the respondent Municipal Circuit Judge of
Tayum, Judge Adriano Bernardino, issued an
order striking out Millare's name from the voters' list
and declaring him disqualified to run as barangay
captain of barangay Budac. (He received the notice
the day before the election day).
4. Despite the declaration as to his disqualification,
Millare ran just the same in the election held on May
17, 1982. It appears undisputed that he garnered
more votes than Elveña. His votes, however, were
not considered by the barangay board of tellers, they
having been declared as stray.
5. The barangay board of canvassers proclaimed
Elveña as the duly elected Barangay Captain of
barangay Budac. He took his oath of office as such.
6. Millare did not appeal the orders disqualifying him
from running as Barangay Captain. Instead, on May
20, 1982, Millare filed with the respondent
Municipal Circuit Court Election Protest No. 49
against Elveña, praying for the annulment of the
proclamation of Elveña and for a declaration that he
(Millare) was the duly elected Barangay Captain of
barangay Budac.
7. Judge Bernardino dismissed the election protest for
lack of merit. He reasoned out that the election
protest may not be availed of as a means of appealing
the decision which declared Millare as disqualified
as a candidate and which had already become final
and executory, there having been no appeal taken
from the same.
ISSUE: WON the election protest was the proper action.
RULING:
We have repeatedly ruled that "the purpose of election
laws is to give effect to rather than frustrate, the will of
the voters."
Under the undisputed facts, Millare could not have
appealed the order disqualifying him as a candidate
before the election. The order denying his motion for
reconsideration of the order dated May 13, 1982 in
Election Case No. 48 was received by Millare only at 3:00
o'clock in the afternoon of May 16, 1982, a Sunday, or only
a few hours before the openingof the polling places.
However, as to whether Millare should have appealed the
said order of disqualification after election day, more
particularly when his votes, which were more than those
of his opponents, were not credited to him, they having
been considered stray due to the aforementioned
disqualification, was not plain nor certain enough as the
proper course of action to take.
The quandary in the mind of Millare as to what course of
action to take after Elveña was proclaimed the winner
despite his having received less votes than Millare was
not helped any by the state of the law and of the applicable
decisions on the matter. As aforesaid, there is no express
legal provision or pertinent jurisprudence which
indicates whether, under such a situation, Millare should
have appealed the order of his disqualification, or file an
election protest. Existing provisions seemingly indicate
that the appropriate step to take is to file an election
contest.
The propriety of Millare's filing a separate election
contest in lieu of appealing the order of disqualification in
Election Case No. 48 could have been induced also by the
need to raise issues in the election contest other than the
sole question of the alleged non-residence of Millare in
Barangay Budac; such as, the denial of due process
consisting in the lack of opportunity to present evidence
in his behalf, the propriety of declaring the votes cast in
his favor as stray, and the refusal of Judge Bernardino to
allow the reopening of the ballot boxes for a recanvassing
of the votes.
Whatever procedural misstep may have been committed
in this regard may not override the paramount
consideration of upholding the sovereign will of the
people expressed through the democratic process of
suffrage. Millare may not be faulted for sleeping on his
rights. He had insisted on his qualification for the position
he ran for, and took determined and seasonable steps to
assert the same.
Millare was never afforded the chance to prove that he
was an actual resident of Barangay Budac (where,
according to him, he has been residing for the last twenty
years in a big house of strong materials) for at least six
months prior to the elections, and as such qualified to run
for the position of Barangay Captain thereof. The least
that he is entitled to is to be given that chance, if only to
give satisfaction to those who voted for him.
CONSTRUCTION OF ELECTION LAWS
SALVADOR D. VIOLAGO, SR. petitioner, vs . COMELEC IN
ELECTIONS and JOAN V. ALARILLA, respondents.
FACTS:
1. Herein petitioner and private respondent were
candidates for the mayoralty race during the May 10,
2010 elections in the City of Meycauayan, Bulacan.
Private respondent was proclaimed the winner.
2. On May 21, 2010, petitioner Violago filed a Petition
with the COMELEC questioning the proclamation of
private respondent on the following grounds: (1)
massive vote-buying; (2) intimidation and
harassment; (3) election fraud; (4) non-appreciation
by the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines
of valid votes cast during the said election; and, (5)
irregularities due to non-observance of the
guidelines set by the COMELEC.
3. On June 15, 2010, private respondent filed her
Answer with Motion to Set for Hearing Affirmative
Defenses in the Nature of a Motion to Dismiss for
Being Insufficient in Form and Substance.
4. Thereafter, on July 16, 2010, the COMELEC 2nd
Division issued an Order setting the preliminary
conference on August 12, 2010 and directing the
parties to file their Preliminary Conference Briefs at
least one (1) day before the scheduled
conference.
5. Petitioner, however, filed his brief on the day of the
scheduled preliminary conference. He likewise filed
an Urgent Motion to Reset Preliminary Conference
on the ground that he did not receive any notice and
only came to know of it when he inquired with the
COMELEC a day before the scheduled conference.
6. Subsequently, petitioner and his counsel failed to
appear during the actual conference on August 12,
2010. On even date, private respondent's counsel
moved for the dismissal of the case.
7. On August 12, 2010, the COMELEC 2nd Division
dismissed petitioner's protest on the ground that
the latter belatedly filed his Brief in violation of the
COMELEC rule on the filing of briefs.
8. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with
COMELEC en banc, but the latter denied petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that
petitioner failed to file a verified motion in violation
of Section 3, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.
ISSUE: WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing Petitioner’s electoral protest and
in denying his motion for reconsideration.
RULING: YES.
The Court finds no justifiable reason why the COMELEC
2nd Division hastily dismissed petitioner's election
protest. Petitioner should not be penalized for belatedly
filing his Preliminary Conference Brief.
While it may be argued that petitioner acquired actual
knowledge of the scheduled conference a day prior to the
date set through means other than the official notice sent
by the COMELEC, the fact remains that, unlike his
opponent, he was not given sufficient time to thoroughly
prepare for the said conference. A one-day delay, as in
this case, does not justify the outright dismissal of the
protest based on technical grounds where there is no
indication of intent to violate the rules on the part of
petitioner and the reason for the violation is
justifiable. Thus, the COMELEC 2nd Division committed
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner's
protest.
An election contest, unlike any other civil action, is
clothed with public interest. Hence, the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure are subject to liberal construction. This
liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and
efficient implementation of the objectives of ensuring the
holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections and for achieving just, expeditious and
inexpensive determination and disposition of every
action and proceeding brought before the COMELEC.