People vs Obsania

Facts:
Accused Willy Obsania was charged and convicted of rape of Erlinda Dollente, the 14-year old
victim.
The accused maintains that "assuming, arguendo, that the argument is right that the court a quo
has jurisdiction, the appeal of the Government constitutes double jeopardy.
Issue:
Won there is double jeopardy.
Ruling:
No.

Same; Double jeopardy; Requisites.—In order that the protection against double jeopardy may
inure in favor of an accused, the following requisites must have obtained in the original
prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court: (c) the defendant had
pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against
him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

Same; Same; Waiver of double jeopardy; Dismissal with express consent of defendant constitutes
waiver.—When the case is dismissed with the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal
will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense because his action in having the
case dismissed prevents the court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a
judgment of conviction against him.

Same; Same; Provisional dismissal with express consent of defendant; Salico case.—Where a
criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only with express consent of the accused but even
upon the urging of his counsel, there can be no double jeopardy under section 9, Rule 113, if the
indictment against him is revived by the fiscal. This decision subscribes substantially to the
doctrine on waiver established in People vs. Salico, 84 Phil. 722.

Here the controverted dismissal was predicated on the erroneous contention of the accused that
the complaint was defective and such infirmity affected the jurisdiction of the court a quo, and
not on the right of the accused to a speedy trial and the failure of the Government to prosecute.
The appealed order of dismissal in this case now under consideration did not terminate the action
on the merits, whereas in Cloribel and in the other related cases the dismissal amounted to an
acquittal because the failure to prosecute presupposed that the Government did not have a case
against the accused, who, in the first place, is presumed innocent.
People vs Yorac
Facts:
Rodrigo Yorac. was prosecuted for frustrated murder arising allegedly from having assaulted,
attacked, and hit with a piece of wood the offended party, for which he had been previously tried
and sentenced for slight physical injuries.
Issue:
The sole issue in this case is whether the defendant, who had already been convicted of slight
physical injuries, and had served sentence therefore, may be prosecuted for frustrated murder
for the same act committed against the same person."

Ruling: No. there is double jeopardy

Constitutional law; Criminal procedure; Rule in double jeopardy.—–As explained in Melo vs.
People (85 Phil. 766:1950) which re-examined and set aside the ruling in People vs. Tarok (73
Phil. 260:1941), the rule of identity does not apply when the second offense was not in existence
at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility
for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then
inexistent. Thus, where the accused as charged with physical injuries and after conviction the
injured person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in
jeopardy.

Same; Same; Same.—–For double jeopardy not to exist, there is then the indispensable
requirement of the existence of a new fact which supervenes for which the defendant is
responsible changing the character of the crime imputed to him and together with the facts
existing previously constituting a new and distinct offense.
People vs. Hon. Juan Bocar
Facts:
The accused is charged in a criminal case for theft of logs where both parties in the case claim
ownership.
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal order of the respondent judge in conducting a summary
investigation constituted double jeopardy
Ruling:
Yes.
Same; Same; Double Jeopardy; No claim for double jeopardy will prosper where the judge’s
dismissal order is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.—Respondent’ Judge’s dismissal order
dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for lack of jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a
proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy (Serino vs. Zosa, supra).

Same; Same; Same; Requisites for double jeopardy to exist.—Thus, apparently, to raise the
defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have
attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3)
the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.

Same; Same; Same; Requisites for legal jeopardy to attach.—Legal jeopardy attaches only (a)
upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea
having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
express consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court was not
competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due
process.
People vs Hon Benjamin Relova
Facts:
An information for theft was filed against private respondent Manuel Opulencia for installing in
his premises, electric wiring, devices and contraptions without necessary permit from the
government.
He filed a motion to quash alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the offense charged
and that the filing was violative of his right against double jeopardy.
Issue:
WoN there is double jeopardy

Ruling: Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; When the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy is not available.—The basic difficulty with the petitioner's position is that it must
be examined, not under the terms of the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution,
but rather under the second sentence of the same section. The first sentence of Article IV (22)
sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available
where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the
first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the
same act or set of acts.

Same; Same; Claim of double jeopardy is available even if prior offense charged under an
ordinance is different from subsequent offense charged in a statute where both offenses spring
from the same set of acts.—The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the
general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although
the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged
subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both
offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. This was made clear sometime ago in Yap vs.
Lutero.

Same; Same; Where an offense is punished by different sections of a statute or different statutes,
the inquiry, for purposes of double jeopardy, is on identity of offenses charged. In contrast, where
an offense is penalized by an ordinance and a statute, the inquiry is on the identity of acts.—Put
a little differently, where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the
same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses
charged: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only-where an identity
is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where
one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the
critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed and which
are alleged to have given rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy is available so long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense
under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have given rise to the of fense
charged under a statute

Same; Same; For double jeopardy to be available, not all 'the technical elements of the first
offense need be present in the definition of the second offense.—lt is perhaps important to note
that the rule limiting the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense is not to be understood with absolute literalness. The identity
of offenses that must be shown need not be absolute identity: the first and second offenses may
be regarded as the "same offense" where the second offense necessarily includes the first
offense or is necessarily included in such first offense or where the second offense is an attempt
to commit the first or a frustration thereof. Thus, for the constitutional plea of double jeopardy
to be available, not all the technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in
the technical definition of the second offense. The law here seeks to prevent harrassment of an
accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another
are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements.