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U P & E S School OF LAW: Ba - Llb. (H .) E L
U P & E S School OF LAW: Ba - Llb. (H .) E L
U P & E S School OF LAW: Ba - Llb. (H .) E L
SCHOOL OF LAW
DRAFT SUBMISSION
SUBMITTED BY:
NAME: - DHARMENDRA KUMAR LAMBHA
ROLL NO.:- R450216030
SAP ID: - 500054559
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA AT NEW DELHI
……….PETITIONER
VERSUS
……..RESPONDENT
WITH
S.L.P(CRL.) NO.2524/2014
W.P.(CIVIL) NO.37/2015
W.P.(CIVIL) NO.220/2015
IN W.P.(C) NO.829/2013
T.P.(CIVIL)NO.921/2015
CONMT.PET.(C)NO.470/2015
IN W.P.(C) NO.494/2012
CONMT.PET.(C)NO.444/2016
IN W.P.(C) NO.494/2012
CONMT.PET.(C)NO.608/2016
CONMT.PET.(C)NO.844/2017
IN W.P.(C) NO.494/2012
AND
……….PETITIONER
VERSUS
……..RESPONDENT
NOTICE OF MOTION
To,
Please take note that the above noted matter will be listed on ___________ of 2017 before
the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi. It is, therefore, requested to you to please enter your
appearance on the said date.
PETITIONER
Through
(ADITI SHARMA)
ADVOCATE FOR THE PETITIONER
21, Sharma Chambers, Baird Place,
New Delhi.
Date: 01.10.2017
SYNOPSIS
That this Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution has been filed by the Petitioner
against the Central Government for infringement of Article 14, 19 and 21 of the Indian
Constitution by giving them excessive authority. The said action has been taken by the
Government of India had introduced the Aadhaar card scheme according to the Aadhar
Act, 2016 according to which the Government will collect and compiles both demographic
and biometric data of the residents of this country.
The Petitioner thereby raises several substantial questions of law of constitution and public
importance as the question in hand is concerning the fundamental rights of the individuals.
The petitioners sort to raise concern in regards to the impugned section 5 of the Aadhar
Act, 2016 which is in violation of right to privacy as it sorts to collect and compile both
demographic and biometric data without the consent of the said individuals.
The Petitioner also seeks from this honorable court to look into the compiled writ petitions
to answer the question, whether our Constitution Protects Privacy as an elemental principal
and whether the privacy is included under part III of the constitution as a Fundamental
Right.
LISTOFDATES
S. Date Particulars Page
No
No.
families.
2 4th Constitution of an Empowered Group of
information.
Constitution.
2014)
(W.P.(C)247/2017), S.G.
3. QUESTIONS OF LAW
3. GROUNDS
5. AVERTMENT
6. AFFIDAVIT
……….PETITIONER
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
……..RESPONDENT
TO,
ABOVENAMED
(1) That the present petition is filed in the Public Interest for considering the
constitutional validity to the Aadhaar Act and the Aadhar scheme of the union government
and whether this scheme is in violation of Article 14, 19 and 21 of the Indian Constitution.
(2) That in the present petition the petitioner will be assisted by Mr.
GopalSubramanium, Mr. KapilSibal, Mr. ArvindDatar, Mr. Shyam Divan, Mr. Anand
Grover, Ms. MeenakshiArora, Mr. SajanPoovayya and Mr. JayantBhushan, learned senior
counsel.
(3) That on order dated 11 August, 2015 the government of India had introduced the
Aadhaar card scheme as per which the Government of India will collect and compiles both
demographic and biometric data of the residence of this country, i.e. India to be used for
various purposes.
(4) That earlier this petition was before the three judge bench of this court but now a
nine judge bench of this court assembled to determine this question.
BRIEF FACTS
1. The Government of India, by way of the Aadhar Act, 2016 have made Aadhar mandatory
for social welfare benefits, infringement of right to privacy, making Aadhaar mandatory
for filing income tax returns (ITRs) as well as for obtaining and retaining PAN.
2. Section 5 and Section 6 of the Aadhar Act were questioned for being in violation of Article
14, 19 and 21.
3. The language of the said impugned section have been questioned in the light of right to
privacy and mandating the parting of one’s biometrics without the consent of the said
person.
4. The case also raised questions on government’s relentless power in regards to the Aadhar
Card Scheme.
QUESTION OF LAW
The petition raises several substantial questions of law of constitutional and public
importance as the concern the protection of fundamental rights, encompassing human
dignity, privacy and personhood, which may be summarized as follows:
(1) That it might be broadly necessary to determine the nature and content of privacy in order
to consider the extent of its constitutional protection. As in the case of ‘life’ under Article
21, a precise definition of the term ‘privacy’ may not be possible.
(2) That the existence of zones of privacy is felt instinctively by all civilized people, without
exception. The best evidence for this proposition lies in the panoply of activities through
which we all express claims to privacy in our daily lives. We lock our doors, clothe our
bodies and set passwords to our computers and phones to signal that we intend for our
places, persons and virtual lives to be private. An early case in the Supreme Court of
Georgia in the United States describes the natural and instinctive recognition of the need
for privacy in the following terms:
“The right of privacy has its foundation in the instincts of nature. It is recognized
intuitively, consciousness being the witness that can be called to establish its existence.
Any person whose intellect is in a normal condition recognizes at once that as to each
individual member of society there are matters private and there are matters public so far
as the individual is concerned. Each individual as instinctively resents any encroachment
by the public upon his rights which are of a private nature as he does the withdrawal of
those of his rights which are of a public nature”.
(3) That ‘Privacy’ is “the condition or state of being free from public attention to intrusion into
or interference with one's acts or decisions”. The right to be in this condition has been
described as ‘the right to be let alone’. What seems to be essential to privacy is the power
to seclude oneself and keep others from intruding it in any way. These intrusions may be
physical or visual, and may take any of several forms including peeping over one's
shoulder to eavesdropping directly or through instruments, devices or technological aids.
(4) That every individual is entitled to perform his actions in private. In other words, one is
entitled to be in a state of repose and to work without being disturbed, or otherwise
observed or spied upon. The entitlement to such a condition is not confined only to
intimate spaces such as the bedroom or the washroom but goes with a person wherever he
is, even in a public place.
(5) That privacy, that is to say, the condition arrived at after excluding other persons, is a basic
pre-requisite for exercising the liberty and the freedom to perform that activity. The
inability to create a condition of selective seclusion virtually denies an individual the
freedom to exercise that particular liberty or freedom necessary to do that activity.
(6) That a Bench of three judges of this Court, while considering the constitutional challenge
to the Aadhaar card scheme of the Union government noted in its order, dated 11 August
2015, that the norms for and compilation of demographic biometric data by government
was questioned on the ground that it violates the right to privacy. That during the argument
of that case the Attorney General for India urged that the existence of a fundamental right
of privacy is in doubt in view of two decisions: the first - M P Sharma v. Satish Chandra,
District Magistrate, Delhi, which was rendered by a Bench of eight judges and the second
was in the case of Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, which was rendered by a
Bench of six judges. Each of these decisions, in the submission of the Attorney General,
contained observations that the Indian Constitution does not specifically protect the right to
privacy. It is submitted that M P Sharma and Kharak Singh were founded on principles
expounded in A K Gopalan v. State of Madras., which construed each provision contained
in the Chapter on fundamental rights as embodying a distinct protection, was held not to be
good law by an eleven-judge Bench in R.C Cooper v. Union of India. Hence the
petitioners submitted that the basis of the two earlier decisions is not valid. Moreover, it
was also urged that in the seven-judge Bench decision in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of
India, the minority judgment of Justice SubbaRao in Kharak Singh was specifically
approved of and the decision of the majority was overruled.
(7) That while addressing these challenges, the Bench of three judges of this Court took note
of several decisions of this Court in which the right to privacy has been held to be a
constitutionally protected fundamental right. Those decisions include Gobind v. State of
Madhya Pradesh, R Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, and People's Union for Civil
Liberties v. Union of India.
(8) That the question of whether Article 21 encompasses a fundamental right to privacy did
not fall for consideration before the 8 Judges in the M.P. Sharma Court. Rather, the
question was whether an improper search and seizure operation undertaken against a
company and its directors would violate the constitutional bar against testimonial
compulsion contained in Article 20(3) of the Constitution. This Court held that such a
search did not violate Article 20(3). Its reasoning proceeded on the footing that the absence
of a fundamental right to privacy analogous to the Fourth Amendment to the United States’
constitution in our own constitution suggested that the Constituent Assembly chose not to
subject laws providing for search and seizure to constitutional limitations.
(9) That M.P. Sharma is unconvincing not only because it arrived at its conclusion without
enquiry into whether a privacy right could exist in our Constitution on an independent
footing or not, but because it wrongly took the United States Fourth Amendment - which in
itself is no more than a limited protection against unlawful surveillance - to be a
comprehensive constitutional guarantee of privacy in that jurisdiction.
(10) That neither does the 4:2 majority in Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh furnish a
basis for the proposition that no constitutional right to privacy exists.
(11) That, nothing in M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh supports the conclusion that there is
no fundamental right to privacy in our Constitution. These two decisions and their
inconclusiveness on the question before the Court today have been discussed in great detail
in the opinions of Chelameswar J., Nariman J., and Chandrachud J., and they agree with
their conclusion in this regard. To the extent that stray observations taken out of their
context may suggest otherwise, the shift in our understanding of the nature and location of
various fundamental rights in Part III brought about by R.C. Cooper and Maneka
Gandhi has removed the foundations of M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh.
(12) That the judgments contained in M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. which
was by a Bench of 6 learned Judges, should be overruled as they do not reflect the correct
position in law. In any case, both judgments have been overtaken by R.C. Cooper v. Union
of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248, and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248,
and therefore require a revisit at our end.
(13) That the right to privacy is very much a fundamental right which is co-terminus with the
liberty and dignity of the individual. This right is found in Articles 14, 19, 20, 21 and 25
when read with the Preamble of the Constitution. Further, several international covenants
have stated that the right to privacy is fundamental to the development of the human
personality and that these international covenants need to be read into the fundamental
rights chapter of the Constitution. Also, the right to privacy should be evolved on a case to
case basis, and being a fundamental human right should only yield to State action if such
State action is compelling, necessary and in public interest. That this Court alsopronounce
upon the fact that the right to privacy is an inalienable natural right which is not conferred
by the Constitution but only recognized as such.
(14) That the 8-Judge Bench and the 6-Judge Bench decisions have ceased to be relevant in
the context of the vastly changed circumstances of today. Further, State action that violates
the fundamental right to privacy must contain at least four elements, namely:
• The extent of such interference must be proportionate to the need for such
interference;
(15) That the constitutional right to privacy very much exists in Part III of the Constitution.
(16) That in a case that it is found that a claim for privacy is protected by Article 21 of the
Constitution, the test should be following:—
(iii) That the legislation should be reasonable and have nexus with the public interest.
(iv) Thatthe State would be entitled to adopt that measure which would most efficiently
achieve the objective without being excessive.
(v)That if apart from Article 21, the legislation infringes any other specified Fundamental
Right then it must stand the test in relation to that specified Fundamental Right.
(17) That Right to Privacy is also associated with Right to Dignity under Article 21 of the
Constitution.
GROUNDS
(I) That Aadhar Card scheme cannot be made mandatory and that the giving of biometrics
during the issue of the Aadhar card without the consent of the individual is violating right
to privacy
(II) That the right to privacy is very much a fundamental right which is co-terminus with the
liberty and dignity of the individual. This right is found in Articles 14, 19, 20, 21 and 25
when read with the Preamble of the Constitution.
(III) That the infringement of rights was made by the executive which has no authority to do so.
(IV) That the legislation is not in the interest of the public and reasonable
(V) That the legislation should be reasonable and have nexus with the public interest.
AVERTMENT
That the present petitioner has not filed any other petition in any High Court or the
Supreme Court of India on the subject matter of the present petition.
PRAYER
……….PETITIONER
VERSUS
……..RESPONDENT
AFFIDAVIT
I, the above named deponent, solemnly affirm and state on oath as under:
1. That I am the Petitioner in the above mentioned writ petition and am fully conversant
with the facts deposed to in the Writ Petition.
2. That the contents of paragraphs 1 to 5 of the accompanying writ petition are true to my
personal knowledge. No material has been concealed and no part is false.
DEPONENT
Signed at New Delhi, 28th September, 2017.
VERIFICATION
I, Puttuswamy the above named deponent do hereby verify on oath that the contents of the
affidavit above are true to my personal knowledge and nothing material has been concealed
or falsely stated. Verified at New Delhi this Spetember day of 28
DEPONENT