SITE VISIT REPORT: 4100-FOM-40

CLIENT Haya Water DATE 4/12/18

SITES Iseki Vacuum Networks AREA Seeb C3
SUBJECT Network Surveys – Draft COPY ONLY BY N.Bostock

O&M – Haya Water Projects – Haya Water AM – Haya Water

Mahmoud Abu El Soud – O&M General Amit Gupta – Project Jagan Mohan Reddy –
Manager Senior Area Manager Engineering Manager
Abdulkarim Hinai – Acting Senior Area Manager Venkata Ramesh –
Nick Bostock – Commissioning Manager Project Manager
Bazli Hamza – Head of Small STPs
Vincent Mondigo – Site Supervisor
Ram Kumar Muniasamy - Small STP and PS
Supervisor

ITEM DESCRIPTION
No RESP

Introduction
Vacuum Network Inspection
There exists a clear directive from the CEO of Haya Water for the following to be
achieved before handover;

1) Works are completed to our satisfaction

2) Documents are in place
3) Snag items are done
4) Wet connections are completed

The above considered it was agreed at the end of October 2018 that the Haya Water
Vacuum Operations Team would perform a 100% inspection of the Vacuum Network
after completing their training.

The Vacuum Network has been in operation since 2014. Galfar LCC have been
operating and maintaining the vacuum stations and vacuum networks since 2014. The
project is currently in the 1 year O&M period by the contractor due to end on the 11th
January 2019 after the completion of the wet connections. The defects liability period
(DLP) also started at the same time as the 1 year O&M period on the 11th January
2018.

Page 1 of 24
ITEM DESCRIPTION
No RESP

Iseki Vacuum Network – Inspection Objectives

To carry out a 100% inspection of the Iseki vacuum network to establish the integrity
and functionality of the operational system.

Vacuum Network – Technical Data

Area Isolation Interface Valve Single Double Unknown

Valves Valves Loops Chambers Chambers Chamber
Installed - Installed - Type
Actual Actual
2.1
2.2 28 351` 170 182 0
4 70 511 TBA 236 275 0
5 28 435 TBA 84 351 0
5A 29 199 TBA 63 123 16
7 30 209 7 105 89 15
10 14 130 7 78 42 10
Totals

Inspection start date

Monday 4th November 2018

Inspection completion date

13th December 2018 – VS 2 started pending report

Inspection Personnel

Haya Water Supervisor : 1

Haya Water Teams : 6
Other Attendees: 6 The Contractor helpers
Vehicles: 6 (2 on loan from Project Division)
2
ITEM DESCRIPTION
No RESP

Inspection Location – Areas 2, 5, 5A, 7 & 10

As built inspection maps (A0 size) to be provided by the contractor

1. Meeting point – Al Khoud TE Pumping Station Offices

1 Inspection Objectives
.
The following checks to be made;

1. External Inspection – Manhole covers, breather posts

2. Internal Inspection – Chamber construction
3. Internal Inspection – Chamber equipment
4. Functional checks – Manual function

The following checks not made;

1. Functional check - Automatic operation – No O&M communication system
in place
2. Manhole cover manufacturer – No information to record correctly
3. Buried chambers – No Access
4. Flooded chambers – No means to empty and inspect the chamber
5. Obstructed chambers – Parked vehicles restricting access
6. Cause of flooding – No means to empty and inspect the chamber
7. Isolation Valve - Operation

3
2
A. External Inspection Work
Unlike gravity sewer system manholes, which can accept large volumes of surface
water, the vacuum valve operates to remove 40 litres at any one time only. The system
is designed to accept sewage from a connected property only, not any other source.
Excess surface water flow in to the valve chamber via surface ingress means that the
interface valve may become flooded and damaged. A single point of failure stopping an
interface valve from operating will also affect downstream valves on the same loop,
creating a much bigger problem. It is important therefore that surface water flow be
prevented from entering the interface valve chamber from all external sources.

The external section of the manhole chambers provides the water ingress integrity to
the vacuum valve interface valve. The manholes are required to have a good concrete
slab finish to prevent water ingress under the manhole cover. The manhole covers are
supplied with a large rubber O-ring, which when the manhole lock is applied, creates a
watertight seal thus preventing water ingress from the top of the manhole cover. In
addition locks also provide security to valuable equipment contained within the
manhole itself such as the interface valve and controller. Missing locks prevent a good
seal and also compromise the security of the chamber and vacuum network. There are
several manhole types used from different manufacturers, the reason for inconsistency
is not known.

A breather post is supplied to allow air in to the interface valve which permits the valve
to stroke to its open and closed positions. Blocking the breather pipe will cause the
interface valve not to operate correctly. Removing the post may also permit surface
water in to the interface valve controller chamber via the breather pipe. Removing the
breather pipe within the interface valve chamber may permit sewage in to the interface
valve rather than air, thus stopping the valve from operating correctly. Ingress of
sewage or surface water in to the breather pipe will also potentially damage the internal
mechanism of the interface valve controller.

Required manhole cover checks

All of the chambers were inspected externally for;

1. Manhole O' Ring fitted – Prevents water ingress to the chamber

2. Rubber Bush - Prevents water ingress to the chamber
3. Locking System – Seals the manhole O ring correctly to the manhole
cover / provides system security
4. Paint Coating – Longer term, the paint coating offers protection
5. Slab Finishing – Prevents water ingress under the manhole cover
6. Breather Post – Allows the interface valve to operate
7. Buried Manhole – Prevents access to the interface valve

4
Findings:

Area Manhole Manhole Rubber Locking Coating Concrete Damaged Buried

O' Ring Cover Bush System Damaged Finishing Breather MH
Not Wrong Not Missing Issues Posts /
Fitted Type Fitted / Not Issues
Working
2.1
2.2 182 0 288 106 227 8 15 20
4 183 10 181 96 335 16 14 35
5 330 6 351 145 302 48 69 19
5A 151 0 199 111 191 40 15 10
7 126 5 216 107 125 30 43 3
10 26 0 101 40 59 5 11 7
Total

Example Photos:

Fig 2.1 O-Ring Not Fitted

5
Fig 2.2 Wrong Type Cover

Fig 2.3 Rubber Bushes Not Fitted

6
Fig 2.4 Locks Missing

Fig 2.5 Coating Damaged

7
Fig 2.6 Concrete Finishing / Cracked Slab

Fig 2.7 Damaged Breather Posts

8
Fig 2.8 Buried Manhole

Agreed Actions:

1. Manhole O' Ring fitted – The Contractor to replace

2. Rubber Bush – The Contractor to replace
3. Locking System – The Contractor to replace locks at the same time as
they fit O-rings and rubber bushes.
4. Coating – Fair wear and tear / to be rectified by HW
5. Slab Finishing – Slabs require concrete repairs / damaged by others
Haya Water to rectify / Failed repairs The Contractor to rectify. PICL to
identify repaired slabs.
6. Damaged Breather Posts – Damaged by the public / to be rectified by
HW
7. Buried manholes – Buried chambers to be rectified by The Contractor
8. Manhole cover – Fibre optic covers to be removed and replaced by The
Contractor

Conclusions:

Breather Post

So long as no anti-collision measures were required to protect the breather post, then
the breather post pipe damage is beyond the control of The Contractor. The removal of
the breather pipe at the interface valve is required to make the interface valve work if
the breather post is damaged. Any subsequent damage to the interface valve after the
removal of the breather pipe at the interface valve would also be beyond the control of
9
 The Contractor.
In light of the quantity of breather pipes damaged it must be concluded that the design
of the breather post is not fit for purpose. A new design should be found and
implemented.

Manhole Covers

Until to date The Contractor are still wholly responsible for operating and maintaining
the vacuum system. Any damaged caused to the interface valves as a direct result of
failing to maintain the integrity of the vacuum chamber from surface water ingress via
the manhole covers is the responsibility of The Contractor.

3. B. Internal Inspection Work

Following the external inspection an internal inspection of the chamber was made;

1. Chamber Structure
2. Internal Equipment

1. Chamber Structure Inspection

The vacuum chamber structure is an integral part of the vacuum system. There are 3
chamber types, single chamber single valve (SCSV), double chamber single valve
(DCSV) and double chamber double valve (DCDV). All chambers are manufactured
from HDPE plastic based on a contract specific design. It is to be noted that no
chambers have been supplied by the vacuum technology supplier. Only the internal
equipment within the vacuum chamber is supplied by the vacuum technology supplier in
the vacuum sewerage network.

Chamber selection is based on three simple requirements;

1. Depth – To give the required slope for gravity flow. The greater the property
elevation the shallower the depth of the chamber & vice versa.
2. Water table depth – To allow for easier installation
3. Flow volume – To select the DCDV chambers where required

As a rule, single chambers are installed where greater depth is required to achieve
gravity flow from a property (slope). Double chambers are installed at shallower depth to
reduce the gravity flow where properties are elevated or high water table exists.

Single chamber

The single chamber design is essentially a corrugated HDPE plastic cylinder divided in
to 2 equal sections, separated vertically. The lower section has the gravity intake from
the connected properties and the upper section contains the interface valve and
associated equipment to operate it.

10
All single chambers are installed at a predetermined depth to allow gravity flow of
sewage from the connected properties. The lower the property the deeper the manhole
depth and vice versa. A cover slab is fitted directly on top of the HDPE chamber, and
sealed to prevent infiltration. The cover slab has one standard manhole cover opening
just large enough for a person to access.

All connections to the chamber are fusion welded HDPE. The volume of storage is
limited in the lower wet well section to approximately 800 litres.

The current disadvantage of the single chamber design is that is possible to flood the
dry well section as it does not have a watertight seal from the wet well. The reason it is
not water tight is because there is a small round access bung installed on the dividing
section to allow for the chamber to be emptied with a suction pump. If an interface valve
fails locally or on a valve on the same loop, the sewage level will raise vertically in the
chamber until it reaches the level of the connected properties. In the majority of cases
this is above the level of the interface valve itself.

Fig 3.1 Single Chamber – No Seal between the Wet Well and Dry Well

The method of direct separation between the wet well and the dry well sections should
have been considered as the first priority in the initial design stage.

It is clear from the examples of chambers at the demonstration rig at VS3 than no

11
sealing flange has been designed on the single chamber where the top of the chamber
meets the cover slab. It is unclear how an effective seal has been achieved to prevent
water ingress from under the cover slab.

Double chamber

The double chamber design is rectangular box HDPE chamber divided in to 2 non -
equal sections. The smaller section is the wet well and the larger section is the dry well.
Unlike the single chamber which has 2 sections separated vertically, the double
chamber is separated horizontally, or side by side. The wet well contains the level
sensor pipe which penetrates through the wet well section to the dry well section via the
dividing wall. The dry well section contains the interface valve and associated
equipment to operate it. Some of the double chambers have 1 vacuum valve and some
have 2 vacuum valves, depending on the expected flow volume.

All double chambers are installed at a predetermined depth to allow gravity flow of
sewage from the connected properties (slope). As the arrangement is side by side, the
depth of the double chamber is reduced thus achieving the correct gravity pipe slope.
The lower the property the deeper the manhole depth and vice versa. A cover slab is
fitted directly on top of the HDPE chamber, and sealed to prevent infiltration. The cover
slab has one standard manhole cover opening to access the interface valve section and
one small manhole opening to access the wet well section.

All connections to the chamber are fusion welded HDPE. The volume of storage is
limited in the wet well section to approximately 500 litres.

The advantage of the side by side design is that it is not possible to flood the dry well
with sewage as it completely sealed from the wet well, except for the 20mm diameter
sensor pipe penetration, which should be made with a water tight mechanical seal.

The double valve chamber has a 20mm diameter hole between the dry well and wet
well section where the level sensor pipe passes through. This should have a proper
IP68 compression gland fitted rather than expanding foam, which does not offer any
water ingress protection.

The double valve chamber has a 50mm diameter hole between in the dry well where the
level cables passes through. This should have a proper IP68 mechanical fitted rather
than expanding foam, which does not offer any water ingress protection.

12
Fig 3.3 Double Chamber – No mechanical seal between the Wet Well and Dry Well

It is clear from the demonstration rig at VS3 than no sealing flange has been designed
on the double chamber where the top of the chamber meets the cover slab. It is unclear
how an effective seal has been achieved to prevent water ingress from under the cover
slab.

Fig 3.4 Double Chamber – No flange fitted to the top of the double chamber

13
Fig 3.5 Double Chamber – No mechanical seal at the cable entry point to the dry
well (Left side)

Operation – Single or Double

When the level rises to a predetermined depth in the wet well section the sensor pipe
pushes air in to the interface valve controller and triggers it to operate. The interface
valve operates to remove 40 litres of sewage in any one operation.

There is no automatic level detection applied in the design of the vacuum valve
chamber for monitoring or control purpose. The interface valve relies on the pneumatic
level sensor to trigger the operation of the interface valve via the valve controller.

An internal inspection was required to ensure that all of the installed equipment was in
place and available for normal use.

Required chamber checks

If either a single or double chamber is installed too deep the gravity volume may exceed
the 40 litre capacity of the interface valve in any one operation, thus flooding the wet
well section of the chamber. If the chamber is not deep enough then the gravity
connection will back up to the receiving manhole, potentially flooding the area upstream
of the interface valve.

1. Mid Landing Structure Depth (single) – To establish how deep the

interface valve is installed on a single type interface valve chamber
2. Chamber Structure Depth (double) – To check the depth of the structure
exceeds 1.5 meters
3. Gap Between the Chamber and Slab – To check if the manhole is sealed
between the cover slab and chamber (Flooded chambers not checked)

14
Findings:

Area Mid Landing Chamber Structure Gap Between MH

Structure Depth Depth (double) – cover and Slab (Not
(single) – Too Deep Deeper than 1.5mts flooded)

2.1
2.2 1 0 20
4 3 4 3
5 1 4 2
5A 0 0 5
7 17 4 0
10 2 0 4
Totals

Example Photos:

Fig 3.6 Double Chamber Too Deep

15
Fig 3.8 Gap Between MH cover and Slab (Double Chamber) - Infiltration

Agreed Actions:

Valve Chamber Depth

The Contractor claims that all manholes were installed at the correct depth and after the
installation was completed the local municipalities have installed asphalt increasing the
overall depth of the chamber.

Pending Agreements:
1. The Contractor is to rectify all of the double chambers by installing a mechanical
seal, such a compression gland, where the sensor pipe penetrates between the
dry well and wet well sections.

2. The Contractor is to rectify all of the chambers that are flooded due to infiltration.

Conclusions:

Valve Chamber Depth

If the valve chambers were installed at the correct depth then raising the gravity
manhole now would affect the gravity slope from the connected property. Unless the
Consultant has any records to suggest that the manholes were installed too deep in the
first instance then no further action is to be taken by Haya Water or The Contractor.

16
 2. Chamber Equipment Inspection
The Iseki interface valves have a guaranteed immersion time of 3 days provided that all
of the electro-mechanical parts are secured correctly to the valve.

Vacuum chambers are flooded by 4 possible causes only;

1. Surface water ingress via the manhole cover

2. Surface water ingress via cable or breather pipe penetrations
3. Infiltration from under the cover slab
4. Sewage entering the dry well from the wet well

Apart from the issues above that cause the flooding in the vacuum chamber, below is a
list of other known symptoms of dry chamber flooding;

1. Chamber flooding due to excessive flow from a connected property.

2. Failure of a vacuum valve in the open position results loss of vacuum on all
downstream valves on the same loop, thus flooding downstream chambers.
3. Failure of the proximity switch which was caused by flooding the dry well results
in 2 unwanted symptoms;
a. Closed signal failure – If the valve is reading closed position on the
monitoring system, but in fact the valve is open, then 1 or more chambers
are flooding that the operator is unaware of.
b. Open signal failure – If the valve is reading open position on the
monitoring system, but in fact the valve is closed then a spurious alarm is
generated.
4. The controllers can get flooded with water or sewage preventing in the operation
of the interface valve
5. The proximity switch on every Iseki vacuum interface valve has an ingress
protection less than IP68 which means that any flooding in the dry well section of
either single or double chamber will most likely damage the proximity switch
resulting in a loss of valve position signal.

Fig 3.9 Iseki proximity switch – Water / Sewage can ingress in to the top of the
switch via the threaded connection.

17
Possible solutions to the symptoms

1. The vacuum network chamber has no automatic level detection incorporated in to

the design to warn the operators if the level in the chamber is high. The operators
can only monitor the vacuum chambers for flooding by monitoring the valve
operation over a 24 hour period. This is becomes problematic if the flooding is via
infiltration or surface water ingress.
2. Install IP68 proximity switches so that they will work whilst submerged.

Solutions to the Causes

If the vacuum chambers are prevented from flooding in the first instance by providing
solutions to the 4 known causes, then installing solutions for the symptoms of the
flooding would not be required.

Required equipment checks

All electro-mechanical equipment contained within the vacuum chamber. If any of the
pneumatic pipes are removed then potentially the interface valve may become damaged
as a result.

Proximity Switch

The proximity switch located on every vacuum interface valve gives the open and
closed position signal to the vacuum network monitoring system. The switch can be
checked visually to see if it is connected properly.

Sensor Pipe

The level sensor pipe is connected to the interface valve controller via the level sensor
fitted to the wet well. The level sensor forces air in to the controller to pneumatically
operate the interface valve. If the sensor pipe is not secured correctly the interface will
simply not operate as there is no pneumatic pressure to operate the valve controller. It
is therefore critical that the level sensor pipe is secured well using the correct clips
provided.

Suction Pipe

The suction pipe is connected from interface valve to the discharge side of the vacuum
valve, via an in-line non-return valve. When the level in the wet will rises the controller
switches pneumatically open for 5 seconds permitting air from the breather pipe to the
vacuum side of the interface valve suction pipe. When air enters the discharge of the
valve this creates atmospheric pressure on one side of the valve allowing the vacuum
valve to open. It is therefore critical that the suction pipe is secured using the correct
clips provided.

Chamber Flooded

Flooded chambers could not be inspected internally or the reason for the flooding.

18
Findings:
Area Interface Controll Proximity Sensor Suction Pipe Chamber Equipment
Valve er Not Switch Pipe Pipe Clips Flooded Requires
Not Installe Not Fitted Secured Secured Not Cleaning
Installed d Fitted
2.1

2.2 1 0 6 0 0 71 91 245

4 25 12 13 0 1 210 152 307

5 4 6 3 0 0 126 173 197

5A 0 0 1 0 0 92 101 170

7 3 0 3 8 0 44 57 174

10 28 0 0 0 0 50 7 28

Totals

Example Photos:

Fig 3.11 Chambers Flooded

19
Fig 3.12 Equipment Cleanliness – Valve has been submerged in sewage / Reading
the valve operation counter is not possible

20
Agreed Actions:
1. Interface Valves Installed (Y/N) – Any missing interface valves to be
installed by The Contractor
2. Proximity Switch Connection Wire – Any missing proximity switches to be
installed by The Contractor
3. Sensor Pipe secured – All pipes to be secured by The Contractor
4. Suction Pipe secured – All pipes to be secured by The Contractor
5. Black clips installed on all tubing or otherwise – All clips to be fitted by The
Contractor
6. Chamber cleanliness – All chambers that have been flooded are to be
cleaned by The Contractor. Dusty chambers are to be left untouched.

Conclusions:

Valve chamber flooding causes

The fact that any interface valve chamber becomes flooded with sewage or via water
ingress is due to design. It should not be possible to flood a dry well from either the wet
well section, the cover slab or the manhole cover.

Flooding Cause #1– Dry Well / Wet Well.

The chamber design should have been such that it allowed for a water tight seal
between the dry well and wet well.

Flooding Cause #2 - Infiltration

One of the core reasons for selecting a vacuum system over a gravity system is
because the water table in the local area is high. The chamber design should have been
such that it allowed for a water tight seal between the valve chambers / cover slab and
all penetrations on the exteriors sections of the chamber where either cables or pipes
enter the chamber.

Flooding Cause #3 – Surface Water

Surface water flooding is totally avoidable and a result of lack of maintenance by The
Contractor. The Contractor is to rectify these issues.

Flooding Cause - Solution

The design solutions to solve all of the dry well flooding issues from the wet well and
flooding due to infiltration are to be reverted back to the consultant for their action.

Flooding Symptoms - Excess flow

Excessive flow from a connected property is not the cause of the flooding at the dry
chamber. Excess flow should simply back up the gravity network and not flood the
vacuum chamber itself. All claims by The Contractor regarding “labour camp
connections” are therefore refuted.

Flooding – Level Switches

21
 Installing a level switches will address the symptom but not cure the causes.

Proximity Switch Failure

Increasing the ingress protection of the proximity switches to IP68 will address the
symptom but not cure the causes.

4.
C. Functional Check
Following the internal inspection a functional check was made to establish if the valve
was operational in manual. Automatic checks were witnessed only when the chamber
filled with sewage. Where chambers were flooded no check was possible.

a. Interface valve counter readings – As described

b. Manual function of interface valve; working / or not workin

Findings:
Area Counter Readings Manual Function not
Not readable due to Working
flooding issues
2
2.2 245 41
4 307 72
5 197 34
5A 170 19
7 174 15
10 28 2
Totals

ITEM SUMMARY – KEY ISSUES ACTION

No
 External Inspection

1. Manhole cover integrity compromised

a. O-rings missing
b. Rubber bushes missing
c. Locks missing

2. Breather posts damaged or removed

a. Damage to equipment
i. Proximity switches damaged
ii. Controllers damaged
iii. Interface valve failure

22
ITEM SUMMARY – KEY ISSUES ACTION
No
 Internal Inspection

1. Interface valve chamber flooding

a. Surface water in ingress via the manhole cover
b. Infiltration from under the cover slab
c. Infiltration from cable entry / pipe entry
d. Sewage entering the dry well from the wet well

2. Effects of not sealing between the wet well and dry well
a. Excess flow from connected properties causing flooding in the dry
well
b. Valve failure causing flooding in the dry well

3. Effects of not sealing between the cover slab and the valve chamber
a. Flooding in the dry well

4. Effects of not installing equipment correctly

a) Flooding in the dry well

5. Interface valves although flooded do not alarm to SCADA

a. No high level alarm
i. Delayed response time to failure

6. Effects of flooding the dry well

a. Damage to equipment
i. Interface valve failure
ii. Proximity switches damaged
iii. Controllers damaged

 Functional Check

1. Manual operation
a. Numerous valves found not working in manual mode

ITEM RECOMENDATIONS ACTION

No
 External Inspections

1. Revisit the manholes to give 100% protection again surface water ingress
2. Redesign the breather posts as too many are damaged by the public
3. Make good any civil repairs as required

 Internal Inspections

1. Fit proper mechanical seals on all double chambers between the wet well
and dry well. This action will prevent flooding in the dry chamber and
therefore eliminate equipment failure
2. Redesign the single valve chamber so that the “bung” forms a water tight

23
ITEM RECOMENDATIONS ACTION
No
seal thus preventing flooding between the wet well and dry well and
therefore equipment failure
3. Any chamber that is leaking due to infiltration from under the cover slab or
via chamber penetrations where either cables or pipes enter the chamber
must be revisited and rectified.
4. Fit all the clips to establish full pneumatic integrity of the interface valves
5. Replace any faulty proximity switches

 Functional inspection

1. Replace all non-functional valves

2. Check function operation of every valve back to SCADA to ensure the
proximity switches are in good order
3. Clear all alarms off the monitoring system
4. High levels of water or sewage found in the valve chamber is a symptom of
flooding the chamber. The only solution is “cure the cause not the
symptom”. Failure to cure the 3 known causes will result in extremely high
Opex costs.

ITEM SUMMARY – CONCLUSIONS ACTION

No
 Conclusions

 It is clear from the findings that the Vacuum system has not been Gulfar
maintained as required by the Contractor
 There are many construction related defects that require rectification
 The vacuum chambers have not been designed to prevent flooding in the
dry chambers
 The breather post design is not fit for purpose in a built up area

PREPARED BY: SIGNED (CLIENT)

Mr Nicholas Bostock

24