EN BANC
The defendant entered upon the performance of his contract upon the
G.R. No. L-2935 March 23, 1909
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GEORGE I. FRANK, defendant-appellant.
Bishop and O'Brien for appellant.
Attorney-General Wilfley for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
Judgment was rendered in the lower court on the 5th day of September, 1905.
The defendant appealed. On the 12th day of October, 1905, the appellant filed
his printed bill of exceptions with the clerk of the Supreme Court. On the 5th day
of December, 1905, the appellant filed his brief with the clerk of the Supreme
Court. On the 19th day of January, 1906, the Attorney-General filed his brief in
said cause. Nothing further was done in said cause until on or about the 30th
day of January, 1909, when the respective parties were requested by this court
to prosecute the appeal under the penalty of having the same dismissed for
failure so to do; whereupon the appellant, by petition, had the caused placed
upon the calendar and the same was heard on the 2d day of February, 1909.
The facts from the record appear to be as follows:
First. That on or about the 17th day of April, 1903, in the city of Chicago, in the
state of Illinois, in the United States, the defendant, through a respective of the
Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, entered into a contract for a period
of two years with the plaintiff, by which the defendant was to receive a salary of
1,200 dollars per year as a stenographer in the service of the said plaintiff, and
in addition thereto was to be paid in advance the expenses incurred in traveling
from the said city of Chicago to Manila, and one-half salary during said period
of travel.
Second. Said contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of its
terms on the part of the defendant, he should become liable to the plaintiff for
the amount expended by the Government by way of expenses incurred in
traveling from Chicago to Manila and one-half salary paid during such period.
Third.
30th day of April, 1903, and was paid half-salary from that date until June 4,
1903, the date of his arrival in the Philippine Islands.
Fourth. That on the 11th day of February, 1904, the defendant left the service of
the plaintiff and refused to make further compliance with the terms of the
contract.
Fifth. On the 3d day of December, 1904, the plaintiff commenced an action in
the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to recover from the defendant the
sum of 269.23 dollars, which amount the plaintiff claimed had been paid to the
defendant as expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila, and as half
salary for the period consumed in travel.
Sixth. It was expressly agreed between the parties to said contract that Laws
No. 80 and No. 224 should constitute a part of said contract.
To the complaint of the plaintiff the defendant filed a general denial and a special
defense, alleging in his special defense that the Government of the Philippine
Islands had amended Laws No. 80 and No. 224 and had thereby materially
altered the said contract, and also that he was a minor at the time the contract
was entered into and was therefore not responsible under the law.
To the special defense of the defendant the plaintiff filed a demurrer, which
demurrer the court sustained.
Upon the issue thus presented, and after hearing the evidence adduced during
the trial of the cause, the lower court rendered a judgment against the defendant
and in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of 265.90 dollars. The lower court found
that at the time the defendant quit the service of the plaintiff there was due him
from the said plaintiff the sum of 3.33 dollars, leaving a balance due the plaintiff
in the sum of 265.90 dollars. From this judgment the defendant appealed and
made the following assignments of error:
1. The court erred in sustaining plaintiff's demurrer to defendant's special
defenses.
2. The court erred in rendering judgment against the defendant on the facts.
With reference to the above assignments of error, it may be said that the mere
fact that the legislative department of the Government of the Philippine Islands
had amended said Acts No. 80 and No. 224 by the Acts No. 643 and No. 1040 We believe that the above conclusions also dispose of the second assignment
did not have the effect of changing the terms of the contract made between the of error.
plaintiff and the defendant. The legislative department of the Government is
expressly prohibited by section 5 of the Act of Congress of 1902 from altering or For the reasons above stated, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with
changing the terms of the contract. The right which the defendant had acquired costs.
by virtue of Acts No. 80 and No. 224 had not been changed in any respect by
the fact that said laws had been amended. These acts, constituting the terms of
the contract, still constituted a part of said contract and were enforceable in favor
of the defendant.

The defendant alleged in his special defense that he was a minor and therefore
the contract could not be enforced against him. The record discloses that, at the
time the contract was entered into in the State of Illinois, he was an adult under
the laws of that State and had full authority to contract. The plaintiff [the
defendant] claims that, by reason of the fact that, under the laws of the Philippine
Islands at the time the contract was made, male persons in said Islands did not
reach their majority until they had attained the age of 23 years, he was not liable
under said contract, contending that the laws of the Philippine Islands governed.
It is not disputed — upon the contrary the fact is admitted — that at the time and
place of the making of the contract in question the defendant had full capacity
to make the same. No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon
the execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are determined by the law
of the place where the contract is made. (Scudder vs. Union National Bank, 91
U. S., 406.) Matters connected with its performance are regulated by the law
prevailing at the place of performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as
the bringing of suit, admissibility of evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend
upon the law of the place where the suit is brought. (Idem.)

The defendant's claim that he was an adult when he left Chicago but was a
minor when he arrived at Manila; that he was an adult at the time he made the
contract but was a minor at the time the plaintiff attempted to enforce the
contract, more than a year later, is not tenable.

Our conclusions with reference to the first above assignment of error are,
therefore:

First. That the amendments to Acts No. 80 and No. 224 in no way affected the
terms of the contract in question; and

Second. The plaintiff [defendant] being fully qualified to enter into the contract
at the place and time the contract was made, he can not plead infancy as a
defense at the place where the contract is being enforced.
SECOND DIVISION Due to the default in the payment of the loan amortizations, BANTSA and the
corporate borrowers signed and entered into restructuring agreements. As
additional security for the restructured loans, private respondent ARC as third
party mortgagor executed two real estate mortgages, 4 dated 17 February 1983
G.R. No. 133876 December 29, 1999 and 20 July 1984, over its parcels of land including improvements thereon,
located at Barrio Sto. Cristo, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, and which are
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-78759, T-78760, T-78761, T-
BANK OF AMERICA, NT and SA, petitioner,
78762 and T-78763.
vs.
AMERICAN REALTY CORPORATION and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents. Eventually, the corporate borrowers defaulted in the payment of the restructured
loans prompting petitioner BANTSA to file civil actions 5 before foreign courts for
the collection of the principal loan, to wit:

a) In England, in its High Court of Justice,

BUENA, J.:
Queen's Bench Division, Commercial Court
(1992-Folio No 2098) against Liberian Transport
Does a mortgage-creditor waive its remedy to foreclose the real estate mortgage Navigation S.A., Eshley Compania Naviera S.A.,
constituted over a third party mortgagor's property situated in the Philippines by El Challenger S.A., Espriona Shipping Company
filing an action for the collection of the principal loan before foreign courts? S.A., Eddie Navigation Corp., S.A., Eduardo
Katipunan Litonjua and Aurelio Katipunan
Sought to be reversed in the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule Litonjua on June 17, 1992.
45 of the Rules of Court are the decision 1 of public respondent Court of Appeals
in CA G.R. CV No. 51094, promulgated on 30 September 1997 and its b) In England, in its High Court of Justice,
resolution, 2 dated 22 May 1998, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Queen's Bench Division, Commercial Court
(1992-Folio No. 2245) against El Challenger
Petitioner Bank of America NT & SA (BANTSA) is an international banking and S.A., Espriona Shipping Company S.A.,
financing institution duly licensed to do business in the Philippines, organized Eduardo Katipuan Litonjua & Aurelio Katipunan
and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of California, United Litonjua on July 2, 1992;
States of America while private respondent American Realty Corporation (ARC)
is a domestic corporation. c) In Hongkong, in the Supreme Court of
Hongkong High Court (Action No. 4039 of 1992)
Bank of America International Limited (BAIL), on the other hand, is a limited against Eshley Compania Naviera S.A., El
liability company organized and existing under the laws of England. Challenger S.A., Espriona Shipping Company
S.A. Pacific Navigators Corporation, Eddie
As borne by the records, BANTSA and BAIL on several occasions granted three Navigation Corporation S.A., Litonjua Chartering
major multi-million United States (US) Dollar loans to the following corporate (Edyship) Co., Inc., Aurelio Katipunan Litonjua,
borrowers: (1) Liberian Transport Navigation, S.A.; (2) El Challenger S.A. and Jr. and Eduardo Katipunan Litonjua on
(3) Eshley Compania Naviera S.A. (hereinafter collectively referred to as November 19, 1992; and
"borrowers"), all of which are existing under and by virtue of the laws of the
Republic of Panama and are foreign affiliates of private d) In Hongkong, in the Supreme Court of
respondent. 3 Hongkong High Court (Action No. 4040 of 1992)
against Eshley Compania Naviera S.A., El
 Challenger S.A., Espriona Shipping Company,
S.A., Pacific Navigators Corporation, Eddie
Navigation Corporation S.A., Litonjua Chartering
(Edyship) Co., Jr. and Eduardo Katipunan
Litonjua on November 21, 1992.
In the civil suits instituted before the foreign courts, private respondent ARC,
being a third party mortgagor, was private not impleaded as party-defendant.
On 16 December 1992, petitioner BANTSA filed before the Office of the
Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, Philippines an application for extrajudicial
foreclosure 6 of real estate mortgage.
On 22 January 1993, after due publication and notice, the mortgaged real
properties were sold at public auction in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, with
Integrated Credit and Corporation Services Co (ICCS) as the highest bidder for
the sum of Twenty four Million Pesos (P24,000.000.00). 7
On 12 February 1993, private respondent filed before the Pasig Regional Trial
Court, Branch 159, an action for damages 8 against the petitioner, for the latter's
act of foreclosing extrajudicially the real estate mortgages despite the pendency
of civil suits before foreign courts for the collection of the principal loan.
In its answer 9 petitioner alleged that the rule prohibiting the mortgagee from
foreclosing the mortgage after an ordinary suit for collection has been filed, is
not applicable in the present case, claiming that:
a) The plaintiff, being a mere third party mortgagor and not a
party to the principal restructuring agreements, was never made
a party defendant in the civil cases filed in Hongkong and
England;
b) There is actually no civil suit for sum of money filed in the
Philippines since the civil actions were filed in Hongkong and
England. As such, any decisions (sic) which may be rendered in
the abovementioned courts are not (sic) enforceable in the
Philippines unless a separate action to enforce the foreign
judgments is first filed in the Philippines, pursuant to Rule 39,
Section 50 of the Revised Rules of Court.
c) Under English Law, which is the governing law under the
principal agreements, the mortgagee does not lose its security
interest by filing civil actions for sums of money.
On 14 December 1993, private respondent filed a motion for
suspension 10 of the redemption period on the ground that "it cannot exercise
said right of redemption without at the same time waiving or contradicting its
contentions in the case that the foreclosure of the mortgage on its properties is
legally improper and therefore invalid."
In an order 11 dated 28 January 1994, the trial court granted the private
respondent's motion for suspension after which a copy of said order was duly
received by the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan.
On 07 February 1994, ICCS, the purchaser of the mortgaged properties at the
foreclosure sale, consolidated its ownership over the real properties, resulting
to the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-18627, T-186272, T-
186273, T-16471 and T-16472 in its name.
On 18 March 1994, after the consolidation of ownership in its favor, ICCS sold
the real properties to Stateland Investment Corporation for the amount of Thirty
Nine Million Pesos (P39,000,000.00). 12 Accordingly, Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. T-187781(m), T-187782(m), T-187783(m), T-16653P(m) and T-16652P(m)
were issued in the latter's name.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision 13 in favor of private respondent
ARC dated 12 May 1993, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the
filing in foreign courts by the defendant of collection suits against
the principal debtors operated as a waiver of the security of the
mortgages. Consequently, the plaintiff's rights as owner and
possessor of the properties then covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-78759, T-78762, T-78763, T-78760
and T-78761, all of the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan,
Bulacan, Philippines, were violated when the defendant caused
the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgages constituted
thereon.
Accordingly, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff
the following sums, all with legal interest thereon from the date
of the filing of the complaint up to the date of actual payment:
 1) Actual or compensatory damages in the amount of Ninety
Nine Million Pesos (P99,000,000.00);
2) Exemplary damages in the amount of Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00); and
3) Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed decision of the lower court
prompting petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration which the appellate court
denied.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari where herein petitioner
14
BANTSA ascribes to the Court of Appeals the following assignment of errors:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals disregarded
the doctrines laid down by this Hon. Supreme
Court in the cases of Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Courtdocketed as G.R.
No. 74730 promulgated on August 25, 1989
and Philippine Commercial International Bank
vs. IAC, 196 SCRA 29 (1991 case), although
said cases were duly cited, extensively
discussed and specifically mentioned, as one of
the issues in the assignment of errors found on
page 5 of the decision dated September 30,
1997.
2. The Hon. Court of Appeals acted with grave
abuse of discretion when it awarded the private
respondent actual and exemplary damages
totalling P171,600,000.00, as of July 12, 1998
although such huge amount was not asked nor
prayed for in private respondent's complaint, is
contrary to law and is totally unsupported by
evidence (sic).
In fine, this Court is called upon to resolve two main issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioner's act of filing a
collection suit against the principal debtors for
the recovery of the loan before foreign courts
constituted a waiver of the remedy of
foreclosure.
2. Whether or not the award by the lower court
of actual and exemplary damages in favor of
private respondent ARC, as third-party
mortgagor, is proper.
The petition is bereft of merit.
First, as to the issue of availability of remedies, petitioner submits that a waiver
of the remedy of foreclosure requires the concurrence of two requisites: an
ordinary civil action for collection should be filed and subsequently a final
judgment be correspondingly rendered therein.
According to petitioner, the mere filing of a personal action to collect the principal
loan does not suffice; a final judgment must be secured and obtained in the
personal action so that waiver of the remedy of foreclosure may be appreciated.
To put it differently, absent any of the two requisites, the mortgagee-creditor is
deemed not to have waived the remedy of foreclosure.
We do not agree.
Certainly, this Court finds petitioner's arguments untenable and upholds the
jurisprudence laid down in Bachrach 15and similar cases adjudicated thereafter,
thus:
In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage
creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a
personal action or debt or a real action to foreclose the
mortgage. In other words, he may he may pursue either of the
two remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause of action
can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is
complete in itself. Thus, an election to bring a personal action
will leave open to him all the properties of the debtor for
attachment and execution, even including the mortgaged
property itself. And, if he waives such personal action and
pursues his remedy against the mortgaged property, an
unsatisfied judgment thereon would still give him the right to sue
 for a deficiency judgment, in which case, all the properties of the
defendant, other than the mortgaged property, are again open
to him for the satisfaction of the deficiency. In either case, his
remedy is complete, his cause of action undiminished, and any
advantages attendant to the pursuit of one or the other remedy
are purely accidental and are all under his right of election. On
the other hand, a rule that would authorize the plaintiff to bring a
personal action against the debtor and simultaneously or
successively another action against the mortgaged property,
would result not only in multiplicity of suits so offensive to justice
(Soriano vs. Enriques, 24 Phil. 584) and obnoxious to law and
equity (Osorio vs. San Agustin, 25 Phil., 404), but also in
subjecting the defendant to the vexation of being sued in the
place of his residence or of the residence of the plaintiff, and
then again in the place where the property lies.
In Danao vs. Court of Appeals, 16 this Court, reiterating jurisprudence enunciated
in Manila Trading and Supply Co vs. Co Kim 17 and Movido vs.
RFC, 18 invariably held:
. . . The rule is now settled that a mortgage creditor may elect to
waive his security and bring, instead, an ordinary action to
recover the indebtedness with the right to execute a judgment
thereon on all the properties of the debtor, including the subject
matter of the mortgage . . . , subject to the qualification that if he
fails in the remedy by him elected, he cannot pursue further the
remedy he has waived. (Emphasis Ours)
Anent real properties in particular, the Court has laid down the rule that a
mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal
action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. 19
In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed
alternative and not cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as
a waiver of the other. For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the
filing of the suit for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an action for
foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant to the provision of Rule 68 of the of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. As to extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is deemed
elected by the mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not with any court of
justice but with the Office of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is to be
made, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act
No. 4118.
In the case at bench, private respondent ARC constituted real estate mortgages
over its properties as security for the debt of the principal debtors. By doing so,
private respondent subjected itself to the liabilities of a third party mortgagor.
Under the law, third persons who are not parties to a loan may secure the latter
by pledging or mortgaging their own property. 20
Notwithstanding, there is no legal provision nor jurisprudence in our jurisdiction
which makes a third person who secures the fulfillment of another's obligation
by mortgaging his own property, to be solidarily bound with the principal obligor.
The signatory to the principal contract—loan—remains to be primarily bound. It
is only upon default of the latter that the creditor may have recourse on the
mortgagors by foreclosing the mortgaged properties in lieu of an action for the
recovery of the amount of the loan. 21
In the instant case, petitioner's contention that the requisites of filing the action
for collection and rendition of final judgment therein should concur, is untenable.
Thus, in Cerna vs. Court of Appeals, 22 we agreed with the petitioner in said case,
that the filing of a collection suit barred the foreclosure of the mortgage:
A mortgagee who files a suit for collection abandons the remedy
of foreclosure of the chattel mortgage constituted over the
personal property as security for the debt or value of the
promissory note when he seeks to recover in the said collection
suit.
. . . When the mortgagee elects to file a suit for collection, not
foreclosure, thereby abandoning the chattel mortgage as basis
for relief, he clearly manifests his lack of desire and interest to
go after the mortgaged property as security for the promissory
note . . . .
Contrary to petitioner's arguments, we therefore reiterate the rule, for clarity and
emphasis, that the mere act of filing of an ordinary action for collection operates
as a waiver of the mortgage-creditor's remedy to foreclose the mortgage. By the
mere filing of the ordinary action for collection against the principal debtors, the
petitioner in the present case is deemed to have elected a remedy, as a result
of which a waiver of the other necessarily must arise. Corollarily, no final
judgment in the collection suit is required for the rule on waiver to apply.
Hence, in Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs. Intermediate-Appellate Court, 23 a case
relied upon by petitioner, supposedly to buttress its contention, this Court had
occasion to rule that the mere act of filing a collection suit for the recovery of a
debt secured by a mortgage constitutes waiver of the other remedy of
foreclosure.
In the case at bar, petitioner BANTSA only has one cause of action which is non-
payment of the debt. Nevertheless, alternative remedies are available for its
enjoyment and exercise. Petitioner then may opt to exercise only one of two
remedies so as not to violate the rule against splitting a cause of action.
As elucidated by this Court in the landmark case of Bachrach Motor Co., Inc, vs.
Icarangal. 24
For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor
has a single cause of action against the debtor. This single
cause of action consists in the recovery of the credit with
execution of the security. In other words, the creditor in his action
may make two demands, the payment of the debt and the
foreclosure of his mortgage. But both demands arise from the
same cause, the non-payment of the debt, and for that reason,
they constitute a single cause of action. Though the debt and the
mortgage constitute separate agreements, the latter is
subsidiary to the former, and both refer to one and the same
obligation. Consequently, there exists only one cause of action
for a single breach of that obligation. Plaintiff, then, by applying
the rules above stated, cannot split up his single cause of action
by filing a complaint for payment of the debt, and thereafter
another complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so,
the filing of the first complaint will bar the subsequent complaint.
By allowing the creditor to file two separate complaints
simultaneously or successively, one to recover his credit and
another to foreclose his mortgage, we will, in effect, be
authorizing him plural redress for a single breach of contract at
so much cost to the courts and with so much vexation and
oppression to the debtor.
Petitioner further faults the Court of Appeals for allegedly disregarding the
doctrine enunciated in Caltex wherein this High Court relaxed the application of
the general rules to wit:
In the present case, however, we shall not follow this rule to the
letter but declare that it is the collection suit which was waived
and/or abandoned. This ruling is more in harmony with the
principles underlying our judicial system. It is of no moment that
the collection suit was filed ahead, what is determinative is the
fact that the foreclosure proceedings ended even before the
decision in the collection suit was rendered. . . .
Notably, though, petitioner took the Caltex ruling out of context. We must stress
that the Caltex case was never intended to overrule the well-entrenched doctrine
enunciated Bachrach, which to our mind still finds applicability in cases of this
sort. To reiterate, Bachrach is still good law.
We then quote the decision 25 of the trial court, in the present case, thus:
The aforequoted ruling in Caltex is the exception rather than the
rule, dictated by the peculiar circumstances obtaining therein. In
the said case, the Supreme Court chastised Caltex for making ".
. . a mockery of our judicial system when it initially filed a
collection suit then, during the pendency thereof, foreclosed
extrajudicially the mortgaged property which secured the
indebtedness, and still pursued the collection suit to the end."
Thus, to prevent a mockery of our judicial system", the collection
suit had to be nullified because the foreclosure proceedings
have already been pursued to their end and can no longer be
undone.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, it has not been shown whether the defendant
pursued to the end or are still pursuing the collection suits filed
in foreign courts. There is no occasion, therefore, for this court
to apply the exception laid down by the Supreme Court in Caltex
by nullifying the collection suits. Quite obviously, too, the
aforesaid collection suits are beyond the reach of this Court.
Thus the only way the court may prevent the spector of a creditor
having "plural redress for a single breach of contract" is by
holding, as the Court hereby holds, that the defendant has
waived the right to foreclose the mortgages constituted by the
plaintiff on its properties originally covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-78759, T-78762, T-78760 and T-
78761. (RTC Decision pp., 10-11)
In this light, the actuations of Caltex are deserving of severe criticism, to say the
least. 26
Moreover, petitioner attempts to mislead this Court by citing the case of PCIB
vs. IAC. 27 Again, petitioner tried to fit a square peg in a round hole. It must be
stressed that far from overturning the doctrine laid down in Bachrach, this Court
in PCIB buttressed its firm stand on this issue by declaring:
While the law allows a mortgage creditor to either institute a
personal action for the debt or a real action to foreclosure the
mortgage, he cannot pursue both remedies simultaneously or
successively as was done by PCIB in this case.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, when the PCIB filed Civil Case No. 29392 to enforce
payment of the 1.3 million promissory note secured by real
estate mortgages and subsequently filed a petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure, it violates the rule against splitting a
cause of action.
Accordingly, applying the foregoing rules, we hold that petitioner, by the
expediency of filing four civil suits before foreign courts, necessarily abandoned
the remedy to foreclose the real estate mortgages constituted over the
properties of third-party mortgagor and herein private respondent ARC.
Moreover, by filing the four civil actions and by eventually foreclosing
extrajudicially the mortgages, petitioner in effect transgressed the rules against
splitting a cause of action well-enshrined in jurisprudence and our statute books.
In Bachrach, this Court resolved to deny the creditor the remedy of foreclosure
after the collection suit was filed, considering that the creditor should not be
afforded "plural redress for a single breach of contract." For cause of action
should not be confused with the remedy created for its enforcement. 28
Notably, it is not the nature of the redress which is crucial but the efficacy of the
remedy chosen in addressing the creditor's cause. Hence, a suit brought before
a foreign court having competence and jurisdiction to entertain the action is
deemed, for this purpose, to be within the contemplation of the remedy available
to the mortgagee-creditor. This pronouncement would best serve the interest of
justice and fair play and further discourage the noxious practice of splitting up a
lone cause of action.
Incidentally, BANTSA alleges that under English Law, which according to
petitioner is the governing law with regard to the principal agreements, the
mortgagee does not lose its security interest by simply filing civil actions for sums
of money. 29
We rule in the negative.
This argument shows desperation on the part of petitioner to rivet its crumbling
cause. In the case at bench, Philippine law shall apply notwithstanding the
evidence presented by petitioner to prove the English law on the matter.
In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the well-imbedded principle in our
jurisdiction that there is no judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must
be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. 30 Thus, if the foreign law involved is
not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is
the same as our local or domestic or internal
law. 31 This is what we refer to as the doctrine of processual presumption.
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were
properly pleaded and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs.
Sy-Gonzales, 32 said foreign law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and
established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order
shall not be applied. 33
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs
shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. 34
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle
imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of
action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent —
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause
of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any
one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work
undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is
the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is
obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. 35
Clearly then, English Law is not applicable.
As to the second pivotal issue, we hold that the private respondent is entitled to
the award of actual or compensatory damages inasmuch as the act of petitioner
BANTSA in extrajudicially foreclosing the real estate mortgages constituted a
clear violation of the rights of herein private respondent ARC, as third-party
mortgagor.
Actual or compensatory damages are those recoverable because of pecuniary
loss in business, trade, property, profession, job or occupation and the same
must be proved, otherwise if the proof is flimsy and non-substantial, no damages
will be given. 36 Indeed, the question of the value of property is always a difficult
one to settle as valuation of real property is an imprecise process since real
estate has no inherent value readily ascertainable by an appraiser or by the
court. 37 The opinions of men vary so much concerning the real value of property
that the best the courts can do is hear all of the witnesses which the respective
parties desire to present, and then, by carefully weighing that testimony, arrive
at a conclusion which is just and equitable. 38
In the instant case, petitioner assails the Court of Appeals for relying heavily on
the valuation made by Philippine Appraisal Company. In effect, BANTSA
questions the act of the appellate court in giving due weight to the appraisal
report composed of twenty three pages, signed by Mr. Lauro Marquez and
submitted as evidence by private respondent. The appraisal report, as the
records would readily show, was corroborated by the testimony of Mr. Reynaldo
Flores, witness for private respondent.
On this matter, the trial court observed:
The record herein reveals that plaintiff-appellee formally offered
as evidence the appraisal report dated March 29, 1993 (Exhibit
J, Records, p. 409), consisting of twenty three (23) pages which
set out in detail the valuation of the property to determine its fair
market value (TSN, April 22, 1994, p. 4), in the amount of
P99,986,592.00 (TSN, ibid., p. 5), together with the
corroborative testimony of one Mr. Reynaldo F. Flores, an
appraiser and director of Philippine Appraisal Company, Inc.
(TSN, ibid., p. 3). The latter's testimony was subjected to
extensive cross-examination by counsel for defendant-appellant
(TSN, April 22, 1994, pp. 6-22). 39
In the matter of credibility of witnesses, the Court reiterates the familiar and well-
entrenched rule that the factual findings of the trial court should be
respected. 40 The time-tested jurisprudence is that the findings and conclusions
of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses enjoy a badge of respect for the
reason that trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of
witnesses as they testify. 41
This Court will not alter the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses, principally because they are in a better position to assess the same
than the appellate court. 42 Besides, trial courts are in a better position to
examine real evidence as well as observe the demeanor of witnesses. 43
Similarly, the appreciation of evidence and the assessment of the credibility of
witnesses rest primarily with the trial court. 44 In the case at bar, we see no
reason that would justify this Court to disturb the factual findings of the trial court,
as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, with regard to the award of actual damages.
In arriving at the amount of actual damages, the trial court justified the award by
presenting the following ratiocination in its assailed decision 45, to wit:
Indeed, the Court has its own mind in the matter of valuation.
The size of the subject real properties are (sic) set forth in their
individuals titles, and the Court itself has seen the character and
nature of said properties during the ocular inspection it
conducted. Based principally on the foregoing, the Court makes
the following observations:
1. The properties consist of about 39 hectares in Bo. Sto. Cristo,
San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, which is (sic) not distant from
Metro Manila — the biggest urban center in the Philippines —
and are easily accessible through well-paved roads;
2. The properties are suitable for development into a subdivision
for low cost housing, as admitted by defendant's own appraiser
(TSN, May 30, 1994, p. 31);
3. The pigpens which used to exist in the property have already
been demolished. Houses of strong materials are found in the
 vicinity of the property (Exhs. 2, 2-1 to 2-7), and the vicinity is a
growing community. It has even been shown that the house of
the Barangay Chairman is located adjacent to the property in
question (Exh. 27), and the only remaining piggery (named
Cherry Farm) in the vicinity is about 2 kilometers away from the
western boundary of the property in question (TSN, November
19, p. 3);
4. It will not be hard to find interested buyers of the property, as
indubitably shown by the fact that on March 18, 1994, ICCS (the
buyer during the foreclosure sale) sold the consolidated real
estate properties to Stateland Investment Corporation, in whose
favor new titles were issued, i.e., TCT Nos. T-187781(m); T-
187782(m), T-187783(m); T-16653P(m) and T-166521(m) by
the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan (sic), Bulacan;
5. The fact that ICCS was able to sell the subject properties to
Stateland Investment Corporation for Thirty Nine Million
(P39,000,000.00) Pesos, which is more than triple defendant's
appraisal (Exh. 2) clearly shows that the Court cannot rely on
defendant's aforesaid estimate (Decision, Records, p. 603).
It is a fundamental legal aphorism that the conclusions of the trial judge on the
credibility of witnesses command great respect and consideration especially
when the conclusions are supported by the evidence on record. 46Applying the
foregoing principle, we therefore hold that the trial court committed no palpable
error in giving credence to the testimony of Reynaldo Flores, who according to
the records, is a licensed real estate broker, appraiser and director of Philippine
Appraisal Company, Inc. since 1990. 47 As the records show, Flores had been
with the company for 26 years at the time of his testimony.
Of equal importance is the fact that the trial court did not confine itself to the
appraisal report dated 29 March 1993, and the testimony given by Mr. Reynaldo
Flores, in determining the fair market value of the real property. Above all these,
the record would likewise show that the trial judge in order to appraise himself
of the characteristics and condition of the property, conducted an ocular
inspection where the opposing parties appeared and were duly represented.
Based on these considerations and the evidence submitted, we affirm the ruling
of the trial court as regards the valuation of the property —
. . . a valuation of Ninety Nine Million Pesos (P99,000,000.00)
for the 39-hectare properties (sic) translates to just about Two
Hundred Fifty Four Pesos (P254.00) per square meter. This
appears to be, as the court so holds, a better approximation of
the fair market value of the subject properties. This is the amount
which should be restituted by the defendant to the plaintiff by
way of actual or compensatory damages . . . . 48
Further, petitioner ascribes error to the lower court awarding an amount
allegedly not asked nor prayed for in private respondent's complaint.
Notwithstanding the fact that the award of actual and compensatory damages
by the lower court exceeded that prayed for in the complaint, the same is
nonetheless valid, subject to certain qualifications.
On this issue, Rule 10, Section 5 of the Rules of Court is pertinent:
Sec. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of
evidence. — When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried
with the express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.
Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to
cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues
may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after
judgement; but failure to amend does not affect the result of the
trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the
court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so
with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and
the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby. The
court may grant a continuance to enable the amendment to be
made.
The jurisprudence enunciated in Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. vs. Asociacion de
Agricultures de Talisay-Silay, Inc. 49citing Northern Cement Corporation vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court 50 is enlightening:
There have been instances where the Court has held that even
without the necessary amendment, the amount proved at the
trial may be validly awarded, as in Tuazon v. Bolanos (95 Phil.
106), where we said that if the facts shown entitled plaintiff to
relief other than that asked for, no amendment to the complaint
was necessary, especially where defendant had himself raised
the point on which recovery was based. The appellate court
could treat the pleading as amended to conform to the evidence
although the pleadings were actually not amended. Amendment
is also unnecessary when only clerical error or non substantial
matters are involved, as we held in Bank of the Philippine
Islands vs. Laguna(48 Phil. 5). In Co Tiamco vs. Diaz (75 Phil.
672), we stressed that the rule on amendment need not be
applied rigidly, particularly where no surprise or prejudice is
caused the objecting party. And in the recent case of National
Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (113 SCRA 556), we
held that where there is a variance in the defendant's pleadings
and the evidence adduced by it at the trial, the Court may treat
the pleading as amended to conform with the evidence.
It is the view of the Court that pursuant to the above-mentioned
rule and in light of the decisions cited, the trial court should not
be precluded from awarding an amount higher than that claimed
in the pleading notwithstanding the absence of the required
amendment. But it is upon the condition that the evidence of
such higher amount has been presented properly, with full
opportunity on the part of the opposing parties to support their
respective contentions and to refute each other's evidence.
The failure of a party to amend a pleading to conform to the
evidence adduced during trial does not preclude an adjudication
by the court on the basis of such evidence which may embody
new issues not raised in the pleadings, or serve as a basis for a
higher award of damages. Although the pleading may not have
been amended to conform to the evidence submitted during trial,
judgment may nonetheless be rendered, not simply on the basis
of the issues alleged but also the basis of issues discussed and
the assertions of fact proved in the course of trial. The court may
treat the pleading as if it had been amended to conform to the
evidence, although it had not been actually so amended. Former
Chief Justice Moran put the matter in this way:
When evidence is presented by one party, with
the expressed or implied consent of the
adverse party, as to issues not alleged in the
pleadings, judgment may be rendered validly as
regards those issues, which shall be considered
as if they have been raised in the pleadings.
There is implied consent to the evidence thus
presented when the adverse party fails to object
thereto.
Clearly, a court may rule and render judgment on the basis of
the evidence before it even though the relevant pleading had not
been previously amended, so long as no surprise or prejudice is
thereby caused to the adverse party. Put a little differently, so
long as the basis requirements of fair play had been met, as
where litigants were given full opportunity to support their
respective contentions and to object to or refute each other's
evidence, the court may validly treat the pleadings as if they had
been amended to conform to the evidence and proceed to
adjudicate on the basis of all the evidence before it.
In the instant case, inasmuch as the petitioner was afforded the opportunity to
refute and object to the evidence, both documentary and testimonial, formally
offered by private respondent, the rudiments of fair play are deemed satisfied.
In fact, the testimony of Reynaldo Flores was put under scrutiny during the
course of the cross-examination. Under these circumstances, the court acted
within the bounds of its jurisdiction and committed no reversible error in
awarding actual damages the amount of which is higher than that prayed for.
Verily, the lower court's actuations are sanctioned by the Rules and supported
by jurisprudence.
Similarly, we affirm the grant of exemplary damages although the amount of Five
Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) awarded, being excessive, is subject to
reduction. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages. 51 Considering its purpose, it must be fair and
reasonable in every case and should not be awarded to unjustly enrich a
prevailing party. 52 In our view, an award of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages
in the present case qualifies the test of reasonableness.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION of the amount awarded as exemplary damages. According,
petitioner is hereby ordered to pay private respondent the sum of
P99,000,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary
damage and the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 137000 August 9, 2000
CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROSALIND YBASCO
LOPEZ, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated July 17, 1998
and January 15, 1999, respectively, of the Commission on Elections in SPA No.
98-336, dismissing the petition for disqualification filed by the herein petitioner,
Cirilo R. Valles, against private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May
1998 elections for governor of Davao Oriental.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome,
Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and
native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In 1949,
at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines.
On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the
Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since then, she has continuously participated
in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. She
served as Provincial Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao
Oriental. In 1992, she ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her
election was contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo
warranto, docketed as EPC No. 92-54, alleging as ground therefor her alleged
Australian citizenship. However, finding no sufficient proof that respondent had
renounced her Philippine citizenship, the Commission on Elections en
banc dismissed the petition, ratiocinating thus:
"A cursory reading of the records of this case vis-a-vis the impugned resolution
shows that respondent was able to produce documentary proofs of the Filipino
citizenship of her late father... and consequently, prove her own citizenship and
filiation by virtue of the Principle of Jus Sanguinis, the perorations of the
petitioner to the contrary notwithstanding.
On the other hand, except for the three (3) alleged important documents . . . no
other evidence substantial in nature surfaced to confirm the allegations of
petitioner that respondent is an Australian citizen and not a Filipino. Express
renunciation of citizenship as a mode of losing citizenship under Commonwealth
Act No. 63 is an equivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its
significance and consequence. The evidence adduced by petitioner are
inadequate, nay meager, to prove that respondent contemplated renunciation of
her Filipino citizenship".1
In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for re-
election as governor of Davao Oriental. Her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a
petition for disqualification, docketed as SPA No. 95-066 before the COMELEC,
First Division, contesting her Filipino citizenship but the said petition was
likewise dismissed by the COMELEC, reiterating substantially its decision in
EPC 92-54.
The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when
she ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998
elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the herein petitioner, Cirilo Valles,
in SPA No. 98-336.
On July 17, 1998, the COMELEC’s First Division came out with a Resolution
dismissing the petition, and disposing as follows:
"Assuming arguendo that res judicata does not apply and We are to dispose the
instant case on the merits trying it de novo, the above table definitely shows that
petitioner herein has presented no new evidence to disturb the Resolution of this
Commission in SPA No. 95-066. The present petition merely restates the same
matters and incidents already passed upon by this Commission not just in 1995
Resolution but likewise in the Resolution of EPC No. 92-54. Not having put forth
any new evidence and matter substantial in nature, persuasive in character or
sufficiently provocative to compel reversal of such Resolutions, the dismissal of
the present petition follows as a matter of course.
xxx xxx xxx
"WHEREFORE, premises considered and there being no new matters and
issues tendered, We find no convincing reason or impressive explanation to
disturb and reverse the Resolutions promulgated by this Commission in EPC
92-54 and SPA. 95-066. This Commission RESOLVES as it hereby RESOLVES
to DISMISS the present petition.
SO ORDERED."2
Petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution
but to no avail. The same was denied by the COMELEC in its en
banc Resolution of January 15, 1999.
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present petition;
questioning the citizenship of private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez.
The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a public office
because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of
the principle of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine
Constitution; (2) she was married to a Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino
citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she
renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the
Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her Australian
passport was accordingly cancelled as certified to by the Australian Embassy in
Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No.
92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a Filipino citizen duly qualified
to run for the elective position of Davao Oriental governor.
Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the private respondent is an
Australian citizen, placing reliance on the admitted facts that:
a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of
Immigration as an Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate
of Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988;
b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate
of Residence (ICR), and
c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.
Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts and circumstances, the
private respondent had renounced her Filipino citizenship. He contends that in
her application for alien certificate of registration and immigrant certificate of
residence, private respondent expressly declared under oath that she was a
citizen or subject of Australia; and said declaration forfeited her Philippine
citizenship, and operated to disqualify her to run for elective office.
As regards the COMELEC’s finding that private respondent had renounced her
Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and had her Australian passport
cancelled on February 11, 1992, as certified to by the Australian Embassy here
in Manila, petitioner argues that the said acts did not automatically restore the
status of private respondent as a Filipino citizen. According to petitioner, for the
private respondent to reacquire Philippine citizenship she must comply with the
mandatory requirements for repatriation under Republic Act 8171; and the
election of private respondent to public office did not mean the restoration of her
Filipino citizenship since the private respondent was not legally repatriated.
Coupled with her alleged renunciation of Australian citizenship, private
respondent has effectively become a stateless person and as such, is
disqualified to run for a public office in the Philippines; petitioner concluded.
Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on Elections erred in applying
the principle of res judicata to the case under consideration; citing the ruling
in Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration,3 that:
"xxx Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a
judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not
considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again
as the occasion may demand. xxx"
The petition is unmeritorious.
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.
Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents
regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus
soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier
Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a
Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an
Australian. Historically, this was a year before the 1935 Constitution took into
effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were
the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the country.
These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act
of August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens of the
Philippine islands. The Philippine Bill of 1902 defined Philippine citizens as:
SEC. 4 xxx all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein
who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and
ninety-nine, and then resided in the Philippine Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such
as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States
and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.
(underscoring ours)
The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides:
SEC. 2 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects
on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided
in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and
held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected
to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed
at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and except such
others as have since become citizens of some other country: Provided, That the
Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by
law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine
Islands who cannot come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the
insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the
Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become
citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States if residing
therein. (underscoring ours)
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish
subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are
deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondent’s father, Telesforo Ybasco,
was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced
by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be
a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at
the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the
principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, to
wit:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before
the adoption of this Constitution had been elected to public office in the
Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of
blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 19734 and
19875 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her
being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship.
If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can
also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.
Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private respondent
is a Filipino citizen, she has nonetheless renounced her Philippine citizenship.
To buttress this contention, petitioner cited private respondent’s application for
an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of
Residence (ICR), on September 19, 1988, and the issuance to her of an
Australian passport on March 3, 1988.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or
laws of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more;
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a
foreign country;
 (5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the
Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary
pardon or amnesty has been granted: and
(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of
the laws in force in her husband’s country, she acquires his nationality.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be
express. Petitioner’s contention that the application of private respondent for an
alien certificate of registration, and her Australian passport, is bereft of merit.
This issue was put to rest in the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC6 and in the more
recent case of Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC.7
In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmena
was a holder of a certificate stating that he is an American did not mean that he
is no longer a Filipino, and that an application for an alien certificate of
registration was not tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact that
respondent Manzano was registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation and was holding an American passport on April 22,
1997, only a year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of
Makati, were just assertions of his American nationality before the termination
of his American citizenship.
Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a
holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are
not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate
against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in
the loss of citizenship, the same must be express.8 As held by this court in the
aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of registration
does not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation of one’s citizenship.
The application of the herein private respondent for an alien certificate of
registration, and her holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado
vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before
she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had
dual citizenship - she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.
Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s
was born in another country has not been included as a ground for losing one’s
Philippine citizenship. Since private respondent did not lose or renounce her
Philippine citizenship, petitioner’s claim that respondent must go through the
process of repatriation does not hold water.
Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that the private
respondent had dual citizenship, still, she is disqualified to run for governor of
Davao Oriental; citing Section 40 of Republic Act 7160 otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991, which states:
"SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running
for any elective local position:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
xxx xxx xxx
Again, petitioner’s contention is untenable.
In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified "dual
citizenship" as used in the Local Government Code and reconciled the same
with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual
allegiance.9Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may, without
performing any act, and as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws
of different countries, be also a citizen of another state, the Court explained that
dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens with dual allegiance.
The Court succinctly pronounced:
"xxx the phrase ‘dual citizenship’ in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d) and in R.A. No.
7854, xxx 20 must be understood as referring to ‘dual allegiance’. Consequently,
persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification."
Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not
automatically disqualify her from running for a public office. Furthermore, it was
ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect
Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate
their status as persons with dual citizenship.10The filing of a certificate of
candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification as a dual citizen.11 This is so because in the certificate of
candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will
support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith
and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as an
effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private
respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated
her Australian citizenship.
Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private respondent
executed a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly
registered in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on
May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February 11, 1992, the Australian passport
of private respondent was cancelled, as certified to by Second Secretary
Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated by
the COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issue of the alleged
dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her renunciation was effective,
petitioner’s claim that private respondent must go through the whole process of
repatriation holds no water.
sufficient basis to rely on the prior rulings of the Commission on Elections in
SPA. No. 95-066 and EPC 92-54 which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor
of the herein private respondent. The evidence adduced by petitioner is
substantially the same evidence presented in these two prior cases. Petitioner
failed to show any new evidence or supervening event to warrant a reversal of
such prior resolutions. However, the procedural issue notwithstanding,
considered on the merits, the petition cannot prosper.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the COMELEC
Resolutions, dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, in SPA
No. 98-336 AFFIRMED.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby adjudged qualified to run
for governor of Davao Oriental. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial

or administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is generally not
considered res judicata in any subsequent proceeding challenging the same;
citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration.12 He insists
that the same issue of citizenship may be threshed out anew.

Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the principle
of res judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of
citizenship. However, in the case of Burca vs. Republic,13 an exception to this
general rule was recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in order that the
doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must
be present:

1) a person’s citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy

where said person is a party;

2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part

in the resolution thereof, and

3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.

Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case
did not foreclose the weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It elucidated that
reliance may somehow be placed on these antecedent official findings, though
not really binding, to make the effort easier or simpler.14 Indeed, there appears
EN BANC American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of
Immigration and misrepresented himself as a natural-born
Filipino citizen.

G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999 In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the
respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration No.
vs. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was
EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was
ELECTIONS, respondents. born in the United States, San Francisco, California, September
14, 1955, and is considered in American citizen under US Laws.
But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he
did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
MENDOZA, J.:
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that
respondent Manzano is born a Filipino and a US citizen. In other
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano words, he holds dual citizenship.
were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998
elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The results of the election were
The question presented is whether under our laws, he is
as follows:
disqualified from the position for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he seeks to be elected?
Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853
Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those
Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894 holding dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any
elective local position.
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,2751
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the
The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano DISQUALIFIED as
petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.
private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.3 The
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998,2 the Second Division of the COMELEC motion remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.
granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of
under §40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are the COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor
disqualified from running for any elective position. The COMELEC's Second of Makati City but suspended the proclamation of the winner.
Division said:
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for
What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification.4 Petitioner's motion was opposed by private respondent.
disqualification of Eduardo Barrios Manzano as candidate for the
office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998 elections.
The petition is based on the ground that the respondent is an
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en
banc rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining,
the COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared
private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May
11, 1998 elections.5 The pertinent portions of the resolution of the COMELEC en
banc read:
As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in
San Francisco, California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by
operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the
principle ofjus soli.
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the
1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother were
Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents
brought him to the Philippines using an American passport as
travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with
the Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien
certificate of registration. This, however, did not result in the loss
of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine
citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United
States.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of
majority, he registered himself as a voter, and voted in the
elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced
his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he
no longer had U.S. citizenship.
At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the
Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, was not yet final.
Respondent Manzano obtained the highest number of votes
among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering
one hundred three thousand eight hundred fifty three (103,853)
votes over his closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained
one hundred thousand eight hundred ninety four (100,894)
votes, or a margin of two thousand nine hundred fifty nine
(2,959) votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty four
thousand two hundred seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying
election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of the popular
choice than be embroiled in complex legal issues involving
private international law which may well be settled before the
highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257
SCRA 727).
WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES
the resolution of the Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998,
ordering the cancellation of the respondent's certificate of
candidacy.
We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be
QUALIFIED as a candidate for the position of vice-mayor of
Makati City in the May 11, 1998, elections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board
of Canvassers, upon proper notice to the parties, to reconvene
and proclaim the respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano as
the winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.
Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers,
on the evening of August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor
of the City of Makati.
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the
COMELEC en banc and to declare private respondent disqualified to hold the
office of vice mayor of Makati City. Petitioner contends that —
[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:
A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen
when he:
1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he
attained the age of majority when he was already
37 years old; and,
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he
(merely) registered himself as a voter and voted
in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office
of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati;
 C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of
the Second Division adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so
that, effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner even
assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the
elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.
We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent
Manzano — whether petitioner Mercado his personality to bring this suit
considering that he was not an original party in the case for disqualification filed
by Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioner's motion for leave to intervene granted.
I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT
Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of
Procedure of the COMELEC in support of his claim that petitioner has no right
to intervene and, therefore, cannot bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying
his motion for intervention:
Sec. 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene.
— Any person allowed to initiate an action or proceeding may,
before or during the trial of an action or proceeding, be permitted
by the Commission, in its discretion to intervene in such action
or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation,
or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by
such action or proceeding.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Discretion of Commission. — In allowing or disallowing
a motion for intervention, the Commission or the Division, in the
exercise of its discretion, shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenor's
rights may be fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.
Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the
matter in litigation nor an interest to protect because he is "a defeated
candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be
proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City if the private respondent be
ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment."
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to
intervene in the proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a
proclamation of the results of the election for the vice mayoralty contest for
Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only second to private
respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at that
time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private
respondent from the race at the time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v.
COMELEC,6 reiterated in several cases,7 only applies to cases in which the
election of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one who
placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the
present case, at the time petitioner filed a "Motion for Leave to File Intervention"
on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioner's
purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified "from running for
[an] elective local position" under §40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril
(who originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of
Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was petitioner since the latter
was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
Nor is petitioner's interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a
motion for intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been
shown to have garnered the highest number of votes among the candidates for
vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the
proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear from §6
of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which
provides:
Any candidate who his been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall
not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by
final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial
and hearing of action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for
disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment
rendered.
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner's motion for
intervention was tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing
the instant petition for certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead decided the
merits of the case, the present petition properly deals not only with the denial of
petitioner's motion for intervention but also with the substantive issues
respecting private respondent's alleged disqualification on the ground of dual
citizenship.
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent
Manzano possesses dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from
being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION
The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under §40
of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as
"disqualified from running for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual
citizenship." This provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati. 8
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General,
who sides with him in this case, contends that through §40(d) of the Local
Government Code, Congress has "command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility
of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local elective office."
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two
or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said
states.9 For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents
are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in
a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and
without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both
states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is
possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual
citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign
countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien
fathers if by the laws of their father's' country such children are
citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country
the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or
omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without
performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are
clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While
dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's
volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, §5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with
by law." This provision was included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of
Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as follows: 10
. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not
dual citizenship. I have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas
Committee according to which a dual allegiance — and I
reiterate a dual allegiance — is larger and more threatening than
that of mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and,
perhaps, never insidious. That is often a function of the accident
of mixed marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not
question double citizenship at all.
What we would like the Committee to consider is to take
constitutional cognizance of the problem of dual allegiance. For
example, we all know what happens in the triennial elections of
the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce
which consists of about 600 chapters all over the country. There
is a Peking ticket, as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is
the fact chat the Filipino-Chinese community is represented in
the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in Taiwan. And
until recently, sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the
People's Republic of China, they have the Associated
Legislative Council for overseas Chinese wherein all of
Southeast Asia including some European and Latin countries
were represented, which was dissolved after several years
 because of diplomatic friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese
were also represented in that Overseas Council.
When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this
unsettled kind of allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are
already Filipinos but who, by their acts, may be said to be bound
by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also took
close note of the concern expressed by some Commissioners
yesterday, including Commissioner Villacorta, who were
concerned about the lack of guarantees of thorough
assimilation, and especially Commissioner Concepcion who has
always been worried about minority claims on our natural
resources.
Dull allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to
Taiwan, Singapore, China or Malaysia, and this is already
happening. Some of the great commercial places in downtown
Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese — it is of
common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capital
outflow when we have to endure a capital famine which also
means economic stagnation, worsening unemployment and
social unrest.
And so, this is exactly what we ask — that the Committee kindly
consider incorporating a new section, probably Section 5, in the
article on Citizenship which will read as follows: DUAL
ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE
DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.
In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these
citizens with dual allegiance, thus: 11
. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their
concern about dual citizenship in the sense that it implies a
double allegiance under a double sovereignty which some of us
who spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought would be
repugnant to the sovereignty which pervades the Constitution
and to citizenship itself which implies a uniqueness and which
elsewhere in the Constitution is defined in terms of rights and
obligations exclusive to that citizenship including, of course, the
obligation to rise to the defense of the State when it is
threatened, and back of this, Commissioner Bernas, is, of
course, the concern for national security. In the course of those
debates, I think some noted the fact that as a result of the wave
of naturalizations since the decision to establish diplomatic
relations with the People's Republic of China was made in 1975,
a good number of these naturalized Filipinos still routinely go to
Taipei every October 10; and it is asserted that some of them do
renew their oath of allegiance to a foreign government maybe
just to enter into the spirit of the occasion when the anniversary
of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is commemorated. And so, I have
detected a genuine and deep concern about double citizenship,
with its attendant risk of double allegiance which is repugnant to
our sovereignty and national security. I appreciate what the
Committee said that this could be left to the determination of a
future legislature. But considering the scale of the problem, the
real impact on the security of this country, arising from, let us
say, potentially great numbers of double citizens professing
double allegiance, will the Committee entertain a proposed
amendment at the proper time that will prohibit, in effect, or
regulate double citizenship?
Clearly, in including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the
Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized
citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and
in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be
subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G.
Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission,
pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have
no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of
a Filipino mother. But whether she is considered a citizen of another country is
something completely beyond our control." 12
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear
allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby
terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of
the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced
his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the following discussion on
§40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows: 13
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask
clarification of line 41, page 17: "Any person with dual
citizenship" is disqualified to run for any elective local position.
Under the present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose
mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his father is a foreigner
is a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement
that such a natural born citizen, upon reaching the age of
majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports,
one belonging to the country of his or her father and one
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a
situation disqualify the person to run for a local government
position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only
means that at the moment when he would want to run for public
office, he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine
passport but the country of origin or the country of the father
claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can
renounce. There are such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for
public office would, in effect, be an election for him of his desire
to be considered as a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the
Constitution does not require an election. Under the
Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the
Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim the
citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President,
is: Under the Gentleman's example, if he does not renounce his
other citizenship, then he is opening himself to question. So, if
he is really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say
in the Certificate of Candidacy that: "I am a Filipino citizen, and
I have only one citizenship."
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of
Philippine law, Mr. President. He will always have one
citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her
in the Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he
exercises acts that will prove that he also acknowledges other
citizenships, then he will probably fall under this disqualification.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must
renounce "all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or
sovereignty" 14 of which at the time he is a subject or citizen before he can be
issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines. In Parado
v. Republic, 15 it was held:
[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes
an oath that he renounce, his loyalty to any other country or
government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law
is satisfied and compiled with. The determination whether such
renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our
Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive
prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly
enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign
law may or should interfere with its operation and application. If
the requirement of the Chinese Law of Nationality were to be
read into our Naturalization Law, we would be applying not what
our legislative department has deemed it wise to require, but
what a foreign government has thought or intended to exact.
That, of course, is absurd. It must be resisted by all means and
at all cost. It would be a brazen encroachment upon the
sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic.
III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California
on September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the
principle of jus sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli,
the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a national both of the Philippines
and of the United States. However, the COMELEC en banc held that, by OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES
participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent PROMULGATED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED
"effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law," so that now he AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES;
is solely a Philippine national. AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF
VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine PURPOSE OF EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE
elections is not sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY
alleged renunciation was made when private respondent was already 37 years OWN PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.
old, it was ineffective as it should have been made when he reached the age of
majority. The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was held: 17
his American citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind §349 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act of the United States, which provided that "A It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an
person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not
shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the
or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running for
foreign territory." To be sure this provision was declared unconstitutional by the any elective local position?" We answer this question in the
U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk 16 as beyond the power given to the U.S. negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was
Congress to regulate foreign relations. However, by filing a certificate of really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance
candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his
Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. Private Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had
respondent's certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the long abandoned his American citizenship — long before May 8,
following statements made under oath: 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim — when he
abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF repatriated to his Filipino citizenship."
"NATURAL-BORN" OR "NATURALIZED")
NATURAL-BORN On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated
December 19, 1995:
xxx xxx xxx
By the laws of the United States, petitioner
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he
BARANGAY SAN LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine
MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR. Government when he ran for Governor in 1988,
in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the
TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY. Philippine Government.

12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign
ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not been
CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such
TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL
 findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court,
absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner's contention that the oath of allegiance
contained in private respondent's certificate of candidacy is insufficient to
constitute renunciation that, to be effective, such renunciation should have been
made upon private respondent reaching the age of majority since no law
requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is
registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
and that he holds an American passport which he used in his last travel to the
United States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit in this. Until the filing of his
certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship. The acts
attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American
nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. What this Court
received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in
past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking
made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for
declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate
proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, 19 we sustained the denial of entry into
the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized
citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in
commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A
similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine
citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. 1âwphi1.nêt

said in Aznar v. COMELEC 18 applies mutatis mundatis to private respondent in

the case at bar: SO ORDERED.

. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a

Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate
staring he is an American does not mean that he is not still a
Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an American does not
mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both
nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express
renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is
even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We
consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine
citizenship must be "express," it stands to reason that there can
be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no
renunciation, either "express" or "implied."

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino

citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that
he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith
and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said
before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines,

when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood,