NOEL CARROLL Hume’s Standard of Taste Hume's “Of the Standard of Taste’’ is not only a philosophical classic but a classic of humane letters. Hume’s major statement on aesthetics, the essay wres- tles with the perennial question of the objectivity of judgments of taste. Hume's final proposal in this matter is to identify the standard of taste with the judgments of the best critics. Hume is led to this conclusion by both his characterization of the appreciative response and by his par- ticular way of drawing the distinction be- tween the subjective and the objective. In this essay, I shall examine problems that develop from both these areas while also considering the claim that there is a re- gress in Hume's theory of taste. The crux of Hume's “Of the Standard of Taste’ is an apparent paradox. Com- mon sense and philosophy tell us that aes- thetic taste, like gustatory taste—what Addison refers to as mental taste and sen- sitive taste'—is subjective, while common sense also tells us that some artworks are objectively better than others. Hume calls this a paradox but refers to it in weaker terms as well, noting that the second view “opposes” the first, or that the second view only modifies or restrains the first.” The opening of the essay is devoted to developing the de gustibus non est dispu- tandum flank of the paradox. Several con- siderations are brought forth in its favor. The first two are matters of observation: NOEL CARROLL is assistant professor of philosophy at Wesleyan University. a) even within a small ambit of acquain- tances, one can note different, conflicting aesthetic preferences; b) if one looks fur- ther afield, there are the facts of cultural relativity. Next, Hume argues that much of the apparent agreement in aesthetic dis- course is based on a linguistic mirage. That is, everyone appears to agree that, for example, elegance is good. Yet, when it comes to selecting the elegant objects, there is no consensus. It merely seems that people agree in matters of taste be- cause they use the same general terms for commendation and condemnation. “But when critics come to particulars, tl seeming uniformity vanishes . . . .’"* This is contrasted to science where Hume feels that disagreement rages over general terms and that once disagreements about such general terms are settled the appli- cation of said terms to particulars is straightforward. Hume also analogizes the behavior of aesthetic terms to that of moral terms. Everyone applauds virtue and abhors vice, but there is grand diver- sity in establishing who and what is virtu- ous and evil. The illusion of agreement in moral discourse, and by extension in aes- thetic discourse, is, in part, accounted for by Hume by the fact that such terms have commendation and condemnation as cen- tral elements of their meaning.’ Everyone uses the same terms to recommend or to praise certain actions and objects, but they differ on which actions and objects they single out for recommendation and blame. Hume does not dwell on this proto-emotivist interpretation in “Of the © 1984 The Journal of Aesthetics and Ant Criticism182 Standard of Taste’ but only briefly intro- duces it to explain away some of the apparent counter-evidence for the thesis that there is a wide diversity of taste.® The putatively incontrovertible evi- dence for the diversity of preferences makes us seek a standard of taste, a rule for determining the aptness or inappropri- ateness of some preferences over others. But Hume says that there are important philosophical considerations that suggest that it is impossible to arrive at such a standard. These philosophical con- siderations, moreover, can be seen as an explanation for the lack of common agreement in matters of taste. That is, Hume's key point here—that ‘‘a thousand different sentiments, excited by the same object, are all right; because no sentiment represents what is really in the object" — can be seen as an inductive leap following from the initial premises about the diver- sity of aesthetic preferences as the best explanation of that apparent diversity.” For Hume, following Hutcheson, aes- thetic responses, such as the intuition of beauty, are not perceptions of qualities in objects, but are subjective, i.e., in the subject. Beauty is literally in the eye of the beholder and not in external objects. Beauty is a feeling, Hume says ‘‘a senti- ment,” and not something in the fabric of the artwork. Thus, Beauty is no quality in things themselves; it ex- ists merely in the mind that contemplates them; and each mind perceives a different beauty.* and All sentiment is right; because sentiment has a reference to nothing beyond itself and is always real, wherever a man is conscious of it.’ In other words, we react to an artwork or a view of nature with a feeling of beauty. Our feelings, sentiments, are incorrigible. We have the reactions we have, and they are right in the sense that it is true that we respond as we respond. There are no facts of the matter apart from our liking or disliking what we apprehend. We sim- ply feel pleasure or we don't. Our praise of the object is immediately implied by our feeling of pleasure. Since there are no CARROLL facts to appeal to, each artgoer ‘‘ought to acquiesce in his own sentiment,” i.c., go with the inner flow. Furthermore, there may be as many different sentiments as there are spectators, each of whom can claim that it is true that they feel as they feel but each of whom may also feel dif- ferently than every other spectator. Be- cause the sentiments of beauty are inter- nal to the subject, we can each talk of “my feeling of beauty” but I cannot chal lenge “‘your feeling of deformity’ by it voking ‘‘my feeling of beauty.” Hume analogizes aesthetic feeling and taste to gustatory feeling and taste, and says that there is no disputing either because beauty as a sentiment, like my love of Burger King, is a matter of having an in- dividual subjective feeling rather than of observing an intersubjectively available property of objects. Hume immediately follows this with the other wing of the paradox: Even though there is a diversity of aesthetic prefer- ences and even though it seems, on e temological grounds, that there is a “natural equality of tastes,"” we don’t be- have as if we believe this. We discount many people's opinions about particular artworks as ridiculous. How can we do in the face of the evidence of subjec- tivism and relativism? And, can we ra- tionalize our behavior by reference to some standard of taste? Hume’s answers to these questions are not developed in the most perspicuous manner. Often, ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ seems to meander and repeat it- self. But the elements of Hume's answers to these questions are clear enough. They include: 1) There are rules of art. These are not discovered by reasoning a priori but by observation. Artworks are composed in accordance, defiance, or in ignorance of these rules. Artworks composed in accor- dance with these rules, as a matter of contingent fact, have ‘Some particular forms or qualities from the original fabric . calculated to please or displease.”"!! That is, artworks that are created accord- ing to the rules of art will, given the proper standing conditions, cause ap-Hume's Standard of Taste proximately equivalent sentiments of beauty across spectators because every- one is constituted in roughly the same way. Given the proper circumstances, the mobilization of the rules of art will set off so many “springs” in the spectator; the analogy to mechanical causation is quite explicit. Conformity to the rules of art causes a sensation of pleasure, and that feeling is an effect that is tantamount to our praise of the object. 2) The proper standing conditions for the operation of the rules of art, as ap- plied in a given artwork, are rarely satis- fied when most of us appraise artworks. Here the idea of standing conditions is quite important because it is the fact that the proper standing conditions are so rarely secured that accounts for the diver- sity of tastes. That is, the diversity of tastes can be explained by the fact that in most responses to artworks, personal and circumstantial factors interfere with the operation of the relevant features of the artwork in the production of the aesthetic sentiment. 3) If we wish to ascertain the standard of taste, we should observe those people who are expert in adjusting themselves to the aesthetic situation and in bracketing intrusive circumstances when they re- spond to artworks, Most of us are not ex- pert in this way; thus our reception of the aesthetic stimulus, so to speak, is fuzzy. Hume writes ‘‘. . . though the principles of taste be universal and nearly if not en- tirely, the same in all men; yet few are qualified to give judgment on any work of art, or establish their own sentiment as the standard of beauty.’? Some can, however, discipline themselves so that they are properly attuned to the aesthetic stimulus; such people, namely the critics, can erect ‘‘their own sentiment’’ as the standard of taste. Identifying these critics is a matter of fact.!? They have five di cernible characteristics and their pro- nouncements supply us with a standard of taste. Hume writes **. . . a strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison and cleared of all prejudice, can alone entitle critics to this valuable character; and the 183 joint verdict of such, wherever they are found, is the true standard of taste and beauty."""* This account is compatible with the idea that beauty is a sentiment. Beauty is a causal effect in the subject which arises when the proper standing conditions are secured. The diversity of taste is ex- plained by the fact that most of the time the proper standing conditions are not operative. But some people are adept at meeting the standing conditions so that they are maximally receptive to the pro- duction of the sentiment that the artwork is designed or fitted to evoke. The rest of us should follow the example of these critics and listen to their observations about how to attend to the artwork if we wish to have the appropriate sentiment raised in us. Thus, an attempt, at least, is made to bridge the gap between fact and value by making the standard of taste a matter of empirical discovery, viz., the identification of those who respond most sensitively to artworks. Most of Hume's essay is allocated to enumerating the ways that the conditions of reception of the artwork can go awry, and to listing the ways that such mishaps can be avoided. Our appraisal of an art- work will be dubious if our perception of it is not delicate; this could happen if there was some imperfection in our sen- sory reception of it, or if the circum- stances in which we view it are abnormal, e.g., the lighting is off, or if we inspect the artwork too hastily. At the very least, we should view the artwork with “‘A per- fect serenity of mind, a recollection of thought, a due attention to the object.” Though Hume does not say this, I sup- pose he would argue that we should also insure that we inspect the artwork under the proper conditions of presentation and that we don't confuse our appraisal of the object with some physical feature of our organism, for example, a fever, upset stomach, blurred eyesight, etc. Other fac- tors that can interfere with our response to the object include envy, jealousy, and the influence of fashion. The advice offered to guard against these interferences includes: