Quo Warranto

CITY UNIVERSITY OF PASAY SCHOOL OF LAW PAGE 1
THE WRIT OF QUO WARRANTO THAT OUSTED FORMER

SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE MA. LOURDES
SERENO AND ITS IMPLICATIONS AGAINST THE
DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY: AN
ANALYSIS.
A Thesis Proposal submitted to the

City University of Pasay
School of Law
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree of Bachelor of Laws
(with Thesis)
JUMEL B. MATEO
October 2018
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Title Page
Title Page i
Table of Contents ii
CHAPTER I : INTRODUCTION. 4
A. Background of the Study
B. Objectives of the Study 7
C. Statement of the Problem
D. Significance of the Study 8
E. Scope and Limitation 9
F. Methodology
G. Definition of Terms 11
H. Research Design 15
CHAPTER II : The existing Laws and Jurisprudence. 19
A. Jurisprudence on the Doctrine of
Constitutional Supremacy.
19
B. Constitutional provisions on Impeachment.
C. Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
23
Chapter III : The content of the petition, the gist of the En Banc
decision and the analysis from known legal experts. 32
A. Supreme Court’s Jurisdiction. 33
B. A summary of the decision of the Supreme Court En Banc on
Quo Warranto Petition against Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes Sereno.
C. Analysis of the decision compiled from published legal experts
opinions. 72
Chapter IV : Results and Discussion
A. Determination of possible legal implications
B. Legal remedies
Chapter V : Summary, Conclusion and Recommendation
A. Summary
B. Conclusion
C. Recommendation
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
The text of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which reads:

1
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the members
of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional
Commission, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not
by impeachment.
In interpreting the law, the specific prevails over the general. The
provisions on impeachment specify the powers of Congress to remove
specific officers. The provisions on Quo Warranto, however, confer a
general power over all officials. The Constitutional provision, therefore,
must prevail, not only because it is specific, but because the Rules of
Court, are subordinate to the highest law of the land.
1
The 1987 Philippine Constitution, Article XI, Section 2.
In a dissenting opinion of Justice Hugo E. Guttierez Jr., in the case Marcos
vs. Manglapus:3
“The Constitution… is a law for rulers and people, equally in war an
in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection to all classes of men,
at all times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine involving more
pernicious consequences was ever invented by the wit of man than that
any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies
of government.
From this shield springs the principle of constitutional supremacy, which
states that:
4
If a law or contract violates any norms of the constitution, the law
or the contract, whether promulgated by the legislature or by the executive
branch, or entered into by private persons for private purposes, is null and
void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the constitution is the
fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed
written in every statute and contract. (italics in the original:underscoring
supplied)
2
Marcos vs Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989.
4
Therefore, the will of the majority or the purported will of the people is
exigency which cannot negate the provisions of the Constitution. This is
where the legal crisis arose. If the Constitution is indeed supreme, the En
Banc decision of the Supreme Court removing its own Chief Justice is a
fatal attack against the supremacy of the Constitution.
Historically speaking, the Philippine Republic has survived
Ferdinand Marcos, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and Benigno Aquino III; all
Presidents, with almost limitless power. I am certain that it can survive the
term of an unqualified Chief Justice, especially because the Supreme
Court En Banc can effectively check her actions. But the Republic of the
Philippines cannot survive the erosion of Constitutional boundaries when a
Quo Warranto petition has removed the sitting Supreme Court Chief
Justice Ma. Lourdes Sereno in May 2018. This shortcut yields greater
mischief than any good that these people behind her ouster have sought
for. This action is an attack on Judicial Independence of the Supreme
Court.
In fact, the Chief Justice’ ouster also kicks open the door for wanton
removals of members of other constitutional bodies such as the
Commission on Human Rights, Commission on Elections, Civil Service
Commission and Commission on Audit. Ultimately, the rejection of
constitutional checks and balance concentrates power in the hands of the

Chief Executive and his allies, posing the greatest danger to democracy in
the Philippines.
This study will gather all existing laws and jurisprudence in relation
to the independence and supremacy of the Constitution. It likewise aims to
compile opinions of experts in the law profession with regard to the
removal of Supreme Court Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes Sereno from office
through a Writ of Quo Warranto. The researcher aims to identify problem
areas in the law, its implications and out from these references, the
researcher would like to draw legal analysis.
B. OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY
This study intends to identify, analyze and list down all legal
implications that may arise as a result of upholding Quo Warranto petition
as a means of removing a sitting Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
the Philippines who is considered an impeachable officer contradictory to
the provisions provided under Article XI, Section 2 of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution which provides specific Constitutional remedy in removing
these impeachable officers by way of an impeachment proceedings.

C. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The study intends to answer the following questions:
1. What are the legal implications when a Writ of Quo Warranto
under the Rules of Court takes over against specific
constitutional provisions under the Supreme Constitution in
removing an impeachable officer of the government?
2. Did the Supreme Court En Banc acquired legal jurisdiction over
Quo Warranto petition when it hears, tries and remove its own
sitting Chief Justice?
3. Does this action poses serious implications on accountability
among the three co-equal branches of the government?
4. What are other legal implications that endanger the rule of law?
5. What are legal remedies we may resort to?
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
Constitutional Supremacy is what makes democracy genuinely for
the people. This is the basic foundation of the premise that no one is
above the law as all of us including those in power such as the president
who occupies the highest position in government service is governed by
the Constitution. As a fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the

nation, the constitution shall always be over and above any other laws in
the Philippines.
Judicial Independence on the other hand, is the concept that the
judiciary should be independent from the other branches of the
government and should not be subject to improper influence from its co-
equal branch or from private or partisan interest. Additionally, this ensures
checks and balance between its co-equal branches through accountability.
As a researcher, this study is significant in the practice of law as it
determines various experts opinions about this recent decision so that we
will have a clearer picture and a holistic understanding of the legal effects
when a specific rule or statute go against the Supreme law.
As a law student, this study contributes inputs and additional
references which may be useful to other law students in understanding
further the pros and cons of the Supreme Court En Banc’s decision in
ousting former Chief Justice Sereno.
E. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
The study will focus on re-visiting and compiling existing laws and
jurisprudence to establish further the concept of constitutional supremacy

and the possible legal implications should this doctrine be under a fatal
attack.
The existing laws and jurisprudence including legal experts
opinions will form part the references needed in the study. These
references will help the researcher identify all possible legal implications
that may arise on the ouster of an impeachable officer by means different
from what the Constitutions has specifically provided.
The researcher also aims to conduct some interviews with some
respondents in the practice of law such as lawyers or judges to obtain
first-hand information relating to their opinions about the ouster of Chief
Justice Sereno.
From these legal implications and other related data, the
researcher intends to draft an analysis and conclusion and thereby
provide some legal remedies for the situation.
F. METHODOLOGY
This study will utilize descriptive, Interview as a form of qualitative
research and the analytical method of research.
Descriptive method is used to depict people, situations, events and
conditions as they currently exist.5
5
C.M. Charles and Craig A. Mertler, Introduction to Educational Research, 4th ed. (Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon,
2002), p. 32.
Interview on one hand is defined as a qualitative research
technique which involves conducting intensive individual interviews with a
small number of respondents to explore their perspective in a particular
idea, program or situation.
Analytical method, on the other hand, involves breaking down into
constituent parts in order to determine their composition, how they are
organized and how they function. 6 This approach usually involves three
steps, namely: (1) organizing the data; (2) description of data; and (3)
interpretation of data.7
In the present study, the researcher will gathered all existing laws
and jurisprudence for both Quo Warranto petition and the constitutional
remedies expressly provided under the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Printed copies of these laws are found in law books while electronic
copies can be downloaded from internet websites such as
www.lawphil.net, www.chanrobles.com and sc.judiciary.gov.ph.
The researcher will then examine and analyze these data. Opinions
from experts in the legal profession shall also be supplanted to augment to
the initial references purposely to come up a more comprehensive
analysis of a legal situation.

6
Ibid
7
From such analysis, the researcher will come up with
recommendations and suggests some legal remedies believed to address
the legal issue.
G. DEFINITION OF TERMS
Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy – Under this doctrine, if a
law or contract violates any norm of the Constitution, that law or contract,
whether promulgated by the executive branch or the legislative, or entered
into by private persons for private purposes, is null and void and without
any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every
statute and contract.8
Quo Warranto– a Quo Warranto (latin for “by authority or by what
warrant”) is a legal procedure used to challenge an individual’s right to or
authority over the position he or she holds. Under Rulee 66 of the Rules of
Court, a quo warranto petition maybe filed by the government or an
individual against “a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds
or exercise a public office, position or franchise”. 9
8
Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997.
9
Philippine Rules of Court, Rule 66.
Judicial Independence– is the concept that the judiciary should be
independent from the other branches of government. That is, courts
should not be subject to improper influence from th other branches of
government or from private or partisan interests. 10
Writ of Impeachment – is an expressed power of the Congress of
the Philippines to formally charge serving government official with an
impeachable offense. It is often used to refer to the entire process of
removing an official who are considered impeachable officers from his
office.11
Impeachable officers – section 2, The President, the Vice
President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the
Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman are expressly
determined by the Constitution as impeachable officers who can be
removed from office through an impeachment for and conviction of,
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes and betrayal of public trust. 12
Intervention - is a remedy by which a third party, not originally
impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein for a certain
10
Wikipedia, Free Encyclopedia < www.wikipedia.com> (10, December 2018)
11
12
The 1987 Philippine Constitution, Article XI, Section 2.
purpose: to enable the third party to protect or preserve a right or interest
that may be affected by those proceedings. The remedy of intervention is
not a matter of right but rests on the sound discretion of the court upon
compliance with the first requirement on legal interest and the second
requirement that no delay and prejudice should result.
Solicitor General- is the principal law officer and legal defender of
the Republic of the Philippines. He shall have the authority and
responsibility for the exercise of the Office's mandate and for the
discharge of its duties and functions, and shall have supervision and
control over the Office and its constituent units.[3] He also determines the
legal position that the government will take in the courts and argues in
virtually every case in which the government is a party. It is tasked to
represent the People of the Philippines, the Philippine Government, its
Agencies and Instrumentalities, Officials and Agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation before the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals.
[4] When authorized by the President, he shall also represent government
owned or controlled corporations.
Judicial and Bar Council- is a constitutionally-created body that
recommends appointees for vacancies that may arise in the composition
of the Supreme Court, other lower courts, and the Legal Education Board,
and in the offices of the Ombudsman, Deputy Ombudsman and the
Special Prosecutor. The Council is composed of a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired member of the Supreme Court,
and a representative of the private sector. They are the "regular"
members, as opposed to the Secretary of Justice and a representative of
Congress who are the ex officio members. The Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court is the ex officio chairman, while the Clerk of the Supreme
Court shall serve as the ex officio secretary.
Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth- commonly known
as SALN, is an annual document that all government workers in the
Philippines, whether regular or temporary, must complete and submit
attesting under oath to their total assets and liabilities, including
businesses and financial interests, that make up their net worth. The
assets and liabilities of the official, his or her spouse, and any unmarried
children under 18 who are living at home must be included. Real property
must be listed with the "description, kind, location, year and mode of
acquisition, assessed value, fair market value, acquisition cost of land,
building, etc. including improvements thereon." Any "co-mingled" assets,
such as a house co-owned by siblings, must also be listed.[3] Any gifts,
donations, inheritance, or other property received at no cost must be listed
at the fair market value and the assessed value.

The Statement is required by law under Article XI Section 17 of the
Philippine Constitution and Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6713, the “Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.” It
must be submitted upon assuming office and then every year thereafter on
or before April 30. SALNs must be made available for inspection at
reasonable hours and for copying by the public for a ten years after filing.
H. RESEARCH DESIGN
This study is consist of several chapters described as follows:
Chapter I is the Introduction which is divided into eight (8) parts:
background of the study, objective of the study, statement of the problem,
significance of the study, scope and limitation, methodology, definition of
terms and research design.
Chapter II is devoted solely to the existing laws and jurisprudence
relative to the Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy, Judicial
Independence, Quo Warranto petition or Rule 66 of the Rules of Court,
Impeachment provisions under the 1987 Philippine Constitution and other
related jurisprudence.
Chapter III focuses on the merit of the Quo Warranto petition
against former Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes Sereno, the determination of the
Supreme Court’s decision to hear such petition against its own member
and the text of the decision that removed Sereno from her office. It will
also quote some publicized opinion of some legal experts and their
analysis on the ouster of the former Chief Justice.
Chapter IV discloses the results of the study, particularly
highlighting some legal implications which may tend to occur as a result of
the Supreme Court’s decision.
Chapter V is the part where the researcher summarizes the results
of the study and makes his own conclusions based on these results.
Thereafter, the researcher formulates recommendations that may help
improve or remedy the legal situation.
The above-described chapters shall be presented as follows:
Chapter I – Introduction
A. Background of the Study
B. Objectives of the Study
C. Statement of the Problem
D. Significance of the Study

E. Scope and Limitation
F. Methodology
G. Definition of Terms
H. Research Design
Chapter II – The existing laws and jurisprudence
D. Jurisprudence on the Doctrine of
Constitutional Supremacy.
E. Constitutional provisions on Impeachment.
F. Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
Chapter III – The content of the petition, the gist of the En Banc
decision and the analysis from known legal experts.
A. Supreme Court’s Jurisdiction.
B. A summary of the decision of the Supreme Court
En Banc on Quo Warranto Petition against
Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes Sereno.
C. Analysis of the decision compiled from
published legal experts opinions.
Chapter IV – Results and Discussion
C. Determination of possible legal implications

D. Legal remedies
Chapter V – Summary, Conclusion and Recommendation
Chapter II
The existing Laws and Jurisprudence on Quo Warranto and the Writ
of Impeachment.
Jurisprudence on the Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy.
Under this doctrine, if a law or contract violates any norm of the
Constitution, that law or contract, whether promulgated by the legislative

or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private
purposes, is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since
the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the
nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. 13
Justice Isagani A. Cruz eloquently expound the essence of this
great doctrine in this wise:
“The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other
laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials
of the land, must defer. No act shall be valid, however nobly intentioned, if
it conflicts with the Constitution. The Constitution must ever remain
supreme. All must bow to the mandate of this law. Expediency must not be
allowed to sap its strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude. Right
or wrong, the Constitution must be upheld as long as it has not been
changed by the sovereign people lest its disregard result in the usurpation
of the majesty of the law by the pretenders to illegitimate power.” 14
Constitutional provisions on Impeachment.
Article XI: Accountability of Public Officers.
13
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, Feb. 3, 1997
14
Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law, Central Lawbook Publishing, Co., Inc. 1991 Ed., p. 11
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other
public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by
law, but not by impeachment.
Section 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to
the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The

Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall
submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral,
together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from
receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall
be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The
vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is
filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall
constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all
cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall
be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial,

the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote.
No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all
the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than
removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the
Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be
liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section.
The Impeachment process
Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution declares that “Public
office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.” These words echo loud and clear today as our country’s leaders
find themselves at the brink of conducting this constitutional process.

Impeachment has been defined as a national inquest into the
conduct of public men. It is a necessary safeguard to ensure that public
officers have the moral fitness and integrity to fulfill their mandate. The
provisions on impeachment are enshrined in Article XI of the 1987
Constitution.
Who may be impeached?
Under the Constitution only the following public officers may be
impeached: The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme
Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman. This list of officers is exclusive. All other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment.
Grounds for impeachment.
The grounds for impeachment are: culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or
betrayal of public trust. These grounds are exclusive and offenses not
falling within these parameters shall not be sufficient for impeachment
purposes.
Process at the House of Representatives.
The process begins at the House of Representatives, which has
the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. A verified
complaint must be filed by either a Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by
any Member thereof. Once the verified complaint has been filed it shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to
the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall
submit its report to the House
within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
In the committee hearings, a vote of at least one-third of all the Members
of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with
the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
If however, the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is
filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall
constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed.
Trial at the Senate of the Philippines.
The Senate has the sole power of sole power to try and decide all
cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall
be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote.
No
person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of
all the Members of the Senate.
Consequences of conviction.
The person impeached shall be removed from office and shall be
disqualified to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but
the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution,
trial, and punishment according to law. It is clear that the liability does not
end at the Senate, the person impeached shall also be held for
appropriate action as a result of his illegal and improper acts.

In addition, a limitation is set where no impeachment proceedings
shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period
of one year.
Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. — An
action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be
commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises a public office, position or franchise;
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the
provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or
(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the
Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so
to act. (1a)
Section 2. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor must
commence action. — The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when
directed by the President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or

otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the
preceding section can be established by proof, must commence such
action. (3a)
Section 3. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor may
commence action with permission of court. — The Solicitor General or a
public prosecutor may, with the permission of the court in which the action
is to be commenced, bring such an action at the request and upon the
relation of another person; but in such case the officer bringing it may first
require an indemnity for the expenses and costs of the action in an
amount approved by and to be deposited in the court by the person at
whose request and upon whose relation the same is brought. (4a)
Section 4. When hearing had on application for permission to
commence action. — Upon application for permission to commence such
action in accordance with the next preceding section, the court shall direct
that notice be given to the respondent so that he may be heard in
opposition thereto; and if permission is granted, the court shall issue an
order to that effect, copies of which shall be served on all interested
parties, and the petition shall then be filed within the period ordered by the
court. (5a)
Section 5. When an individual may commence such an action.
— A person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or
unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an action therefor in his
own name. (6)
Section 6. Parties and contents of petition against usurpation. —
When the action is against a person for usurping a public office, position
or franchise, the petition shall set forth the name of the person who claim
to be entitled thereto, if any, with an averment of his right to the same and
that the respondent is unlawfully in possession thereof. All persons who
claim to be entitled to the public office, position or franchise may be made
parties, and their respective rights to such public office, position or
franchise determined, in the same action. (7a)
Section 7. Venue. — An action under the preceding six sections
can be brought only in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or in the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area where
the respondent or any of the respondents resides, but when the Solicitor
General commences the action, it may be brought in a Regional Trial
Court in the City of Manila, in the Court of Appeals, or in the Supreme
Court. (8a)
Section 8. Period for pleadings and proceedings may be
reduced; action given precedence. — The court may reduce the period
provided by these Rules for filing pleadings and for all other proceedings
in the action in order to secure the most expeditious determination of the
matters involved therein consistent with the rights of the parties. Such
action may be given precedence over any other civil matter pending in the
court.
Section 9. Judgment where usurpation found. — When the
respondent is found guilty of usurping into, intruding into, or unlawfully
holding or exercising a public office, position or franchise, judgment shall
be rendered that such respondent be ousted and altogether excluded
therefrom, and that the petitioner or relator, as the case may be, recover
his costs. Such further judgment may be rendered determining the
respective rights in and to the public office, position or franchise of all the
parties to the action as justice requires. (10a)
Section 10. Rights of persons adjudged entitled to public office;
delivery of books and papers; damages. — If judgment be rendered in
favor of the person averred in the complaint to be entitled to the public
office he may, after taking the oath of office and executing any official
bond required by law, take upon himself the execution of the office, and
may immediately thereafter demand of the respondent all the books and
papers in the respondent's custody or control appertaining to the office to
which the judgment relates.

If the respondent refuses or neglects to deliver any book or paper
pursuant to such demand, he may be punished for contempt as having
disobeyed a lawful order of the court. The person adjudged entitled to the
office may also bring action against the respondent to recover the
damages sustained by such person by reason of the usurpation. (15a)
Section 11. Limitations. — Nothing contained in this Rule shall be
construed to authorize an action against a public officer or employee for
his ouster from office unless the same be commenced within one (1) year
after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such
office or position, arose, nor to authorize an action for damages in
accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section unless the
same be commenced within one (1) year after the entry of the judgment
establishing the petitioner's right to the office in question. (16a)
Section 12. Judgment for costs. — In an action brought in
accordance with the provisions of this Rule, the court may render
judgment for costs against either the petitioner, the relator, or the
respondent, or the person or persons claiming to be a corporation, or may
apportion the costs, as justice requires.

Chapter III
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018. Republic of the Philippines,
represented by Solicitor General Jose C. Calida versus Maria
Lourdes P.A. Sereno. The content of the petition, the gist of the
decision and the post analysis from constitutional experts.

The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided under Republic
Act number 5440 or an Act amending sections 9 and 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948.
Section 2. Section seventeen of the same Act, as amended, is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec. 17. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court shall have original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers, and consuls; and original and exclusive jurisdiction
in petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus against the Court of Appeals.
In the following cases, the Supreme Court shall exercise original
and concurrent jurisdiction with Courts of First Instance:
1. In petition for the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus; and
2. In actions brought to prevent and restrain violations of law
concerning monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade.

The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review,
revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, as the law or rules of court
may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts as herein
provided, in
 All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed
is death or life imprisonment; and those involving other offenses
which, although not so punished, arose out of the same occurrence
or which may have been committed by the accused on the same
occasion, as that giving rise to the more serious offense, regardless
of whether the accused are charged as principals, accomplices or
accessories, or whether they have been tried jointly or separately;
 All cases involving petitions for naturalization or denaturalization;
and
 All decisions of the Auditor General, if the appellant is a private
person or entity.
 The Supreme Court shall further have exclusive jurisdiction to
review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on certiorari as the law or
rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior
courts as herein provided, in

 All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question; 15
 All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment or
toil, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto;
 All cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue;
 All other cases in which only errors or questions of law are
involved: Provided, however, That if, in addition to constitutional,
tax or jurisdictional questions, the cases mentioned in the three
next preceding paragraphs also involve questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law, the aggrieved party shall appeal to the
Court of Appeals; and the final judgment or decision of the latter
may be reviewed, revised, reversed, modified or affirmed by the
Supreme Court on writ of certiorari; and
 Final awards, judgments, decisions, or orders of the Commission
on Elections, Court of Tax Appeals, Court of Industrial Relations,
15
https://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra1968/ra_5440_1968.html
the Public Service Commission and the Workmen's Compensation
Commission."16
Section 3. The Supreme Court shall provide by rule for the
procedure governing petitions for writs of certiorari to review judgments
mentioned in Section seventeen of Republic Act Numbered Two
hundred ninety-six, as amended by this Act and the effect of the filing
thereof on the judgment of or decree sought to be reviewed. Until the
Supreme Court provides otherwise, said petitions shall be filed within
the period fixed in the rules of court for appeals in criminal or civil
cases or special civil actions or special proceedings, depending upon
the nature of the case in which the judgment or decree sought to be
reviewed, was rendered; the filing of said petition shall stay the
execution of the judgment sought to be reviewed; and the aforesaid
petitions shall be filed and served in the form required for petitions for
review by certiorari of decisions of the Court of Appeals.
The Tijam En Banc decision.
Doctrine of the case:
16
REPUBLIC ACT No. 5440 An act amending sections 9 and 17 of THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1948.
Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may
be availed of when the subject act or omission was committed prior to or
at the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications
to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid.
Acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity
being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the
incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official cannot be
the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of impeachment if the public
official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an
mpeachable offense, or to disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if
otherwise.17
Facts:
From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the faculty of
the University of the Philippines-College of Law. While being employed at
the UP Law, or from October 2003 to 2006, Sereno was concurrently
employed as legal counsel of the Republic in two international arbitrations
known as the PIATCO cases, and a Deputy Commissioner of the
Commissioner on Human Rights.

17
G.R. No. 237428 Rebublic of the Philippines represented by Sol. Gen Jose Calida Jr. versus Ma. Lourdes
Sereno.
<http://www.dictionary.com/browse/integrity> (visited on March 19, 2018);
<https://www.thefreedictionary.com/integrity> (visited on March 19, 2018).
The Human Resources Development Office of UP (UP HRDO)
certified that there was no record on Sereno’s file of any permission to
engage in limited practice of profession. Moreover, out of her 20 years of
employment, only nine (9) Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth
(SALN) were on the records of UP HRDO. In a manifestation, she
attached a copy of a tenth SALN, which she supposedly sourced from the
“filing cabinets” or “drawers of UP”. The Ombudsman likewise had no
record of any SALN filed by Sereno. The JBC has certified to the
existence of one SALN. In sum, for 20 years of service, 11 SALNs were
recovered. On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice.
On 2012, the osition of Chief Justice was declared vacant, and the JBC
directed the applicants to submit documents, among which are “all
previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for those in the government
and “SALN as of December 31, 2011” for those from the private sector.
The JBC announcement further provided that “applicants with incomplete
or out-of-date documentary requirements will not be interviewed or
considered for nomination.” Sereno expressed in a letter to JBC that since
she resigned from UP Law on 2006 and became a private practitioner, she
was treated as coming from the private sector and only submitted three (3)
SALNs or her SALNs from the time she became an Associate Justice.
Sereno likewise added that “considering that most of her government

records in the academe are more than 15 years old, it is reasonable to
consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those files,” and that the clearance
issued by UP HRDO and CSC should be taken in her favor. There was no
record that the letter was deliberated upon. Despite this, on a report to the
JBC, Sereno was said to have “complete requirements.” On August 2012,
Sereno was appointed Chief Justice.
On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry
Gadon against Sereno, alleging that Sereno failed to make truthful
declarations in her SALNs. The House of Representatives proceeded to
hear the case for determination of probable cause, and it was said that
Justice Peralta, the chairman of the JBC then, was not made aware of the
incomplete SALNs of Sereno. Other findings were made: such as pieces
of jewelry amounting to P15,000, that were not declared on her 1990
SALN, but was declared in prior years’ and subsequent years’ SALNs,
failure of her husband to sign one SALN, execution of the 1998 SALN only
in 2003
On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the OSG, requesting
that the latter, in representation of the Republic, initiate a quo warranto
proceeding against Sereno. The OSG, invoking the Court’s original
jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution in relation to
the special civil action under Rule 66, the Republic, through the OSG filed
the petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to
declare as void Sereno’s appointment as CJ of the SC and to oust and
altogether exclude Sereno therefrom.
Capistrano, Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes, et. al., intervened.
Sereno then filed a Motion for Inhibition against AJ Bersamin, Peralta,
Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-De Castro, imputing actual bias for having
testified against her on the impeachment hearing before the House of
Representatives.
Contentions:
Office of the Solicitor General (petitioner):
OSG argues that the quo warranto is an available remedy because
what is being sought is to question the validity of her appointment, while
the impeachment complaint accuses her of committing culpable violation
of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust while in office, citing Funa v.
Chairman Villar, Estrada v. Desierto and Nacionalista Party v. De Vera.
OSG maintains that the phrase “may be removed from office” in Section 2,
Article XI of the Constitution means that Members of the SC may be
removed through modes other than impeachment.
OSG contends that it is seasonably filed within the one-year
reglementary period under Section 11, Rule 66 since Sereno’s

transgressions only came to light during the impeachment proceedings.
Moreover, OSG claims that it has an imprescriptible right to bring a quo
warranto petition under the maxim nullum tempus occurit regi (“no time
runs against the king”) or prescription does not operate against the
government. The State has a continuous interest in ensuring that those
who partake of its sovereign powers are qualified. Even assuming that the
one-year period is applicable to the OSG, considering that SALNs are not
published, the OSG will have no other means by which to know the
disqualification.
Moreover, OSG maintains that the SC has jurisdiction, citing A.M.
No. 10-4-20-SC which created a permanent Committee on Ethics and
Ethical Standards, tasked to investigate complaints involving graft and
corruption and ethical violations against members of the SC and
contending that this is not a political question because such issue may be
resolved through the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution,
laws, JBC rules, and Canons of Judicial Ethics. 18
OSG seeks to oust Sereno from her position as CJ on the ground
that Sereno failed to show that she is a person of proven integrity which is
an indispensable qualification for membership in the Judiciary under
18
Civil Service Commission v. Javier, 570 Phil. 89 (2008) citing Montesclaros v. Commission on Elections, 433
Phil. 620 (2002) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc
Section 7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution. According to the OSG,
because OSG failed to fulfill the JBC requirement of filing the complete
SALNs, her integrity remains unproven. The failure to submit her SALN,
which is a legal obligation, should have disqualified Sereno from being a
candidate; therefore, she has no right to hold the office. Good faith cannot
be considered as a defense since the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(RA No. 3019) and Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees (RA No. 6713) are special laws and are thus
governed by the concept of malum prohibitum, wherein malice or criminal
intent is completely immaterial.
Sereno (respondent):
Sereno contends that an impeachable officer may only be ousted
through impeachment, citing Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution, and
Mayor Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, Cuenca v. Hon. Fernan, In Re: First
lndorsement from Hon. Gonzales, and Re: Complaint-Affidavit for
Disbarment Against SAJ Antonio T. Carpio. Sereno contends that the clear
intention of the framers of the Constitution was to create an exclusive
category of public officers who can be removed only by impeachment and
not otherwise. Impeachment was chosen as the method of removing
certain high-ranking government officers to shield them from harassment
suits that will prevent them from performing their functions which are vital
to the continued operations of government. Sereno further argues that the
word “may” on Section 2 of Article XI only qualifies the penalty imposable
after the impeachment trial, i.e., removal from office. Sereno contends that
the since the mode is wrong, the SC has no jurisdiction.
Sereno likewise argues that the cases cited by OSG is not in all
fours with the present case because the President and the Vice President
may, in fact, be removed by means other than impeachment on the basis
of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution vesting in the Court the
power to be the “sole judge” of all contests relating to the qualifications of
the President and the Vice-President. There is no such provision for other
impeachable officers. Moreover, on the rest of the cases cited by the
OSG, there is no mention that quo warranto may be allowed.
Sereno also argues that since a petition for quo warranto may be
filed before the RTC, such would result to a conundrum because a judge
of lower court would have effectively exercised disciplinary power and
administrative supervision over an official of the Judiciary much higher in
rank and is contrary to Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII of the Constitution
which vests upon the SC disciplinary and administrative power over all
courts and the personnel thereof. 19
19
7 4 Id. at 943. 5 Rollo, pp. 3-44. 6 Id. at 172. 7 TSN, Oral Arguments on April 10, 2018.
Sereno likewise posits that if a Member of the SC can be ousted
through quo warranto initiated by the OSG, the Congress’ “check” on the
SC through impeachment would be rendered inutile.
Furthermore, Sereno argues that it is already time-barred. Section
11, Rule 66 provides that a petition for quo warranto must be filed within
one (1) year from the “cause of ouster” and not from the “discovery” of the
disqualification.
Moreover, Sereno contends that the Court cannot presume that she
failed to file her SALNs because as a public officer, she enjoys the
presumption that her appointment to office was regular. OSG failed to
overcome the presumption created by the certifications from UP HRDO
that she had been cleared of all administrative responsibilities and
charges. Her integrity is a political question which can only be decided by
the JBC and the President.
Regarding her missing SALNs, Sereno contends that the fact that
SALNs are missing cannot give rise to the inference that they are not filed.
The fact that 11 SALNs were filed should give an inference to a pattern of
filing, not of non-filing.

Intervenors’ arguments:
The intervenors argue that it is not incumbent upon Sereno to prove
to the JBC that she possessed the integrity required by the Constitution;
rather, the onus of determining whether or not she qualified for the post fell
upon the JBC. Moreover, submission of SALNs is not a constitutional
requirement; what is only required is the imprimatur of the JBC. The
intervenors likewise contend that “qualifications” such as citizenship, age,
and experience are enforceable while “characteristics” such as
competence, integrity, probity, and independence are mere subjective
considerations.
ISSUES:
Preliminary issues:
 Whether the Court should entertain the motion for intervention
 Whether the Court should grant the motion for the inhibition of
Sereno against five Justices
Main Issues:
 Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to
the instant petition for quo warranto.
 Whether Sereno may be the respondent in a quo warranto
proceeding notwithstanding the fact that an impeachment complaint
has already been filed with the House of Representatives.

 Whether Sereno, who is an impeachable officer, can be the
respondent in a quo warranto proceeding, i.e., whether the only
way to remove an impeachable officer is impeachment.
 Whether to take cognizance of the quo warranto proceeding is
violative of the principle of separation of powers
 Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of
prescription
 Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination
is the sole and exclusive function of the JBC and whether such
determination. partakes of the character of a political question
outside the Court’s supervisory and review powers;
 Whether the filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory
requirement for the position of Chief Justice.
 If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno failed
to file her SALNs as mandated by the Constitution and required by
the law and its implementing rules and regulations
 If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno filed
SALNs are not filed properly and promptly.
 Whether Sereno failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as
required by the JBC

 If answer to the twelfth issue is in the affirmative, whether the failure
to submit SALNs to the JBC voids the nomination and appointment
of Sereno as Chief Justice;
 In case of a finding that Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of
Chief Justice, whether the subsequent nomination by the JBC and
the appointment by the President cured such ineligibility.
 Whether Sereno is a de jure or a de facto officer.
HELD:
Anent the first issue:
The intervention is improper.
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally
impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein for a certain
purpose: to enable the third party to protect or preserve a right or interest
that may be affected by those proceedings. The remedy of intervention is
not a matter of right but rests on the sound discretion of the court upon
compliance with the first requirement on legal interest and the second
requirement that no delay and prejudice should result. The justification of
one’s “sense of patriotism and their common desire to protect and uphold
the Philippine Constitution”, and that of the Senator De Lima’s and
Trillanes’ intervention that their would-be participation in the impeachment

trial as Senators-judges if the articles of impeachment will be filed before
the Senate as the impeachment court will be taken away is not sufficient.
The interest contemplated by law must be actual, substantial, material,
direct and immediate, and not simply contingent or expectant. Moreover,
the petition of quo warranto is brought in the name of the Republic. It is
vested in the people, and not in any private individual or group, because
disputes over title to public office are viewed as a public question of
governmental legitimacy and not merely a private quarrel among rival
claimants.
Anent the second issue:
There is no basis for the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court
to inhibit in the case.
It is true that a judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision
and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to
its fairness and as to his integrity. However, the right of a party to seek the
inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly
free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case must
be balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to decide cases without fear of
repression. Bias must be proven with clear and convincing evidence.
Those justices who were present at the impeachment proceedings were
armed with the requisite imprimatur of the Court En Banc, given that the
Members are to testify only on matters within their personal knowledge.

The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for
inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. There must be acts
or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before it can
brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality. Sereno’s call for inhibition
has been based on speculations, or on distortions of the language, context
and meaning of the answers the Justices may have given as sworn
witnesses in the proceedings before the House.
Moreover, insinuations that the Justices of the SC are towing the
line of President Duterte in entertaining the quo warranto petition must be
struck for being unfounded and for sowing seeds of mistrust and
discordance between the Court and the public. The Members of the Court
are beholden to no one, except to the sovereign Filipino people who
ordained and promulgated the Constitution. It is thus inappropriate to
misrepresent that the SolGen who has supposedly met consistent
litigation success before the SG shall likewise automatically and positively
be received in the present quo warranto action. As a collegial body, the
Supreme Court adjudicates without fear or favor. The best person to
determine the propriety of sitting in a case rests with the magistrate sought
to be disqualified.
Anent the third issue:

A quo warranto petition is allowed against impeachable officials and
SC has jurisdiction.
The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to issue
the extraordinary writs, including quo warranto. A direct invocation of the
SC’s original jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there are
special and important reasons therefor, and in this case, direct resort to
SC is justified considering that the action is directed against the Chief
Justice. Granting that the petition is likewise of transcendental importance
and has far-reaching implications, the Court is empowered to exercise its
power of judicial review. To exercise restraint in reviewing an impeachable
officer’s appointment is a clear renunciation of a judicial duty. an outright
dismissal of the petition based on speculation that Sereno will eventually
be tried on impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court’s duty to settle
actual controversy squarely presented before it. Quo warranto
proceedings are essentially judicial in character – it calls for the exercise
of the Supreme Court’s constitutional duty and power to decide cases and
settle actual controversies. This constitutional duty cannot be abdicated or
transferred in favor of, or in deference to, any other branch of the
government including the Congress, even as it acts as an impeachment
court through the Senate.

To differentiate from impeachment, quo warranto involves a judicial
determination of the eligibility or validity of the election or appointment of a
public official based on predetermined rules while impeachment is a
political process to vindicate the violation of the public’s trust. In quo
warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by appointment, what is
determined is the legality of the appointment. The title to a public office
may not be contested collaterally but only directly, by quo warranto
proceedings. usurpation of a public office is treated as a public wrong and
carries with it public interest, and as such, it shall be commenced by a
verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines
through the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor. The SolGen is given
permissible latitude within his legal authority in actions for quo warranto,
circumscribed only by the national interest and the government policy on
the matter at hand.
Anent the fourth issue:
Simultaneous quo warranto proceeding and impeachment
proceeding is not forum shopping and is allowed.
Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of
each other as these remedies are distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds,
(3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal, and (4)
limitations. Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed
of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or
successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the
same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the
same issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by some
other court, to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not
in one court, then in another. The test for determining forum shopping is
whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties,
rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. The crux of the controversy
in this quo warranto proceedings is the determination of whether or not
Sereno legally holds the Chief Justice position to be considered as an
impeachable officer in the first place. On the other hand, impeachment is
for respondent’s prosecution for certain impeachable offenses. Simply put,
while Sereno’s title to hold a public office is the issue in quo warranto
proceedings, impeachment necessarily presupposes that Sereno legally
holds the public office and thus, is an impeachable officer, the only issue
being whether or not she committed impeachable offenses to warrant her
removal from office.
Moreover, the reliefs sought are different. respondent in a quo
warranto proceeding shall be adjudged to cease from holding a public
office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. Moreover, impeachment, a

conviction for the charges of impeachable offenses shall result to the
removal of the respondent from the public office that he/she is legally
holding. It is not legally possible to impeach or remove a person from an
office that he/she, in the first place, does not and cannot legally hold or
occupy.
Lastly, there can be no forum shopping because the impeachment
proceedings before the House is not the impeachment case proper, since
it is only a determination of probable cause. The impeachment case is yet
to be initiated by the filing of the Articles of Impeachment before the
Senate. Thus, at the moment, there is no pending impeachment case
against Sereno. The process before the House is merely inquisitorial and
is merely a means of discovering if a person may be reasonably charged
with a crime.
Anent the fifth issue:
Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly
appointed or invalidly elected impeachable official may be removed from
office.
The language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not
foreclose a quo warranto action against impeachable officers: “Section 2.
The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court,

the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman
may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of,
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.” The provision uses the
permissive term “may” which denote discretion and cannot be construed
as having a mandatory effect, indicative of a mere possibility, an
opportunity, or an option. In American jurisprudence, it has been held that
“the express provision for removal by impeachment ought not to be taken
as a tacit prohibition of removal by other methods when there are other
adequate reasons to account for this express provision.”
The principle in case law is that during their incumbency,
impeachable officers cannot be criminally prosecuted for an offense that
carries with it the penalty of removal, and if they are required to be
members of the Philippine Bar to qualify for their positions, they cannot be
charged with disbarment. The proscription does not extend to actions
assailing the public officer’s title or right to the office he or she occupies.
Even the PET Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an election
protest or a petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the
President and the Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable officers.

Further, that the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made
absolute, that is, only those enumerated offenses are treated as grounds
for impeachment, is not equivalent to saying that the enumeration likewise
purport to be a complete statement of the causes of removal from office. If
other causes of removal are available, then other modes of ouster can
likewise be availed. To subscribe to the view that appointments or election
of impeachable officers are outside judicial review is to cleanse their
appointments or election of any possible defect pertaining to the
Constitutionally-prescribed qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised
in an impeachment proceeding. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd
situation where the appointment of an impeachable officer cannot be
questioned even when, for instance, he or she has been determined to be
of foreign nationality or, in offices where Bar membership is a qualification,
when he or she fraudulently represented to be a member of the Bar.
Anent the sixth issue:
The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo
warranto petition is not violative of the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo
warranto involving a person who would otherwise be an impeachable
official had it not been for a disqualification, is not violative of the core
constitutional provision that impeachment cases shall be exclusively tried
and decided by the Senate. Again, the difference between quo warranto
and impeachment must be emphasized. An action for quo warranto does
not try a person’s culpability of an impeachment offense, neither does a
writ of quo warranto conclusively pronounce such culpability. The Court’s
exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does not
preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative of determining
probable cause for impeachment, to craft and transmit the Articles of
Impeachment, nor will it preclude Senate from exercising its
constitutionally committed power of impeachment.
However, logic, common sense, reason, practicality and even
principles of plain arithmetic bear out the conclusion that an unqualified
public official should be removed from the position immediately if indeed
Constitutional and legal requirements were not met or breached. To
abdicate from resolving a legal controversy simply because of perceived
availability of another remedy, in this case impeachment, would be to
sanction the initiation of a process specifically intended to be long and
arduous and compel the entire membership of the Legislative branch to
momentarily abandon their legislative duties to focus on impeachment
proceedings for the possible removal of a public official, who at the outset,
may clearly be unqualified under existing laws and case law.

For guidance, the Court demarcates that an act or omission
committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an
official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or
election invalid is properly the subject of a quo warranto petition, provided
that the requisites for the commencement thereof are present.
Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of
integrity, being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed
during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official,
cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of something
else, which may either be impeachment if the public official concerned is
impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense,
or disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.
Anent the seventh issue:
Prescription does not lie against the State.
The rules on quo warranto provides that “nothing contained in this
Rule shall be construed to authorize an action against a public officer or
employee for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced within
one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to
hold such office or position, arose”. Previously, the one-year prescriptive

period has been applied in cases where private individuals asserting their
right of office, unlike the instant case where no private individual claims
title to the Office of the Chief Justice. Instead, it is the government itself
which commenced the present petition for quo warranto and puts in issue
the qualification of the person holding the highest position in the Judiciary.
Section 2 of Rule 66 provides that “the Solicitor General or a public
prosecutor, when directed by the President of the Philippines, or when
upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case
specified in the preceding section can be established by proof must
commence such action.” It may be stated that ordinary statutes of
limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo warranto proceeding
brought to enforce a public right. There is no limitation or prescription of
action in an action for quo warranto, neither could there be, for the reason
that it was an action by the Government and prescription could not be
plead as a defense to an action by the Government.
That prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced from
the very purpose of an action for quo warranto. Because quo warranto
serves to end a continuous usurpation, no statute of limitations applies to
the action. Needless to say, no prudent and just court would allow an
unqualified person to hold public office, much more the highest position in
the Judiciary. Moreover, the Republic cannot be faulted for questioning
Sereno’s qualification· for office only upon discovery of the cause of ouster
because even up to the present, Sereno has not been candid on whether
she filed the required SALNs or not. The defect on Sereno’s appointment
was therefore not discernible, but was, on the contrary, deliberately
rendered obscure.
Anent the eighth issue:
The Court has supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring
that the JBC complies with its own rules.
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “A Judicial
and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme
Court.” The power of supervision means “overseeing or the authority of an
officer to see to it that the subordinate officers perform their duties.” JBC’s
absolute autonomy from the Court as to place its non-action or improper·
actions beyond the latter’s reach is therefore not what the Constitution
contemplates. What is more, the JBC’s duty to recommend or nominate,
although calling for the exercise of discretion, is neither absolute nor
unlimited, and is not automatically equivalent to an exercise of policy
decision as to place, in wholesale, the JBC process beyond the scope of

the Court’s supervisory and corrective powers. While a certain leeway
must be given to the JBC in screening aspiring magistrates, the same
does not give it an unbridled discretion to ignore Constitutional and legal
requirements. Thus, the nomination by the JBC is not accurately an
exercise of policy or wisdom as to place the JBC’s actions in the same
category as political questions that the Court is barred from resolving.
With this, it must be emphasized that qualifications under the
Constitution cannot be waived or bargained by the JBC, and one of which
is that “a Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven
competence, integrity, probity, and independence. “Integrity” is closely
related to, or if not, approximately equated to an applicant’s good
reputation for honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity
to sound moral and ethical standards.” Integrity is likewise imposed by the
New Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Court has always viewed integrity with a goal of
preserving the confidence of the litigants in the Judiciary. Hence, the JBC
was created in order to ensure that a member of the Supreme Court must
be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.
Anent the ninth issue:
The filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement.

Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution states that “A public officer
or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as
may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets,
liabilities, and net worth.” This has likewise been required by RA 3019 and
RA 6713. “Failure to comply” with the law is a violation of law, a “prima
facie evidence of unexplained wealth, which may result in the dismissal
from service of the public officer.” It is a clear breach of the ethical
standards set for public officials and employees. The filing of the SALN is
so important for purposes of transparency and accountability that failure to
comply with such requirement may result not only in dismissal from the
public service but also in criminal liability. Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713
even provides that non-compliance with this requirement is not only
punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine, it may also result in
disqualification to hold public office.
Because the Chief Justice is a public officer, she is constitutionally
and statutorily mandated to perform a positive duty to disclose all of his
assets and liabilities. According to Sereno herself in her dissenting opinion
in one case, those who accept a public office do so cum onere, or with a
burden, and are considered as accepting its burdens and obligations,
together with its benefits. They thereby subject themselves to all

constitutional and legislative provisions relating thereto, and undertake to
perform all the duties of their office. The public has the right to demand the
performance of those duties. More importantly, while every office in the
government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand
on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the
Judiciary.
Noncompliance with the SALN requirement indubitably·reflects on a
person’s integrity. It is not merely a trivial or a formal requirement. The
contention that the mere non-filing does not affect Sereno’s integrity does
not persuade considering that RA 6713 and RA 3019 are malum
prohibitum and not malum in se. Thus, it is the omission or commission of
that act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that
determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Malice or
criminal intent is completely immaterial.
Anent the tenth issue:
Sereno chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the
Constitution, the law, and the Code of Judicial Conduct.
In Sereno’s 20 years of government service in UP Law, only 11
SALNs have been filed. Sereno could have easily dispelled doubts as to
the filing or nonfiling of the unaccounted SALNs by presenting them before
the Court. Yet, Sereno opted to withhold such information or such
evidence, if at all, for no clear reason. The Doblada case, invoked by
Sereno, cannot be applied, because in the Doblada case, there was a
letter of the head of the personnel of the branch of the court that the
missing SALN exists and was duly transmitted and received by the OCA
as the repository agency. In Sereno’s case, the missing SALNs are neither
proven to be in the records of nor was proven to have been sent to and
duly received by the Ombudsman as the repository agency. The existence
of these SALNs and the fact of filing thereof were neither established by
direct proof constituting substantial evidence nor by mere inference.
Moreover, the statement of the Ombudsman is categorical: “based on
records on file, there is no SALN filed by [Sereno] for calendar years 1999
to 2009 except SALN ending December 1998.” This leads the Court to
conclude that Sereno did not indeed file her SALN.
For this reason, the Republic was able to discharge its burden of
proof with the certification from UP HRDO and Ombudsman, and thus it
becomes incumbent upon Sereno to discharge her burden of evidence.
Further, the burden of proof in a quo warranto proceeding is different when
it is filed by the State in that the burden rests upon the respondent.
In addition, contrary to what Sereno contends, being on leave does
not exempt her from filing her SALN because it is not tantamount to
separation from government service. The fact that Sereno did not receive
any pay for the periods she was on leave does not make her a
government worker “serving in an honorary capacity” to be exempted from
the SALN laws on RA 6713. [yourlawyersays]
Neither can the clearance and certification of UP HRDO be taken in
favor of Sereno. During the period when Sereno was a professor in UP,
concerned authorized official/s of the Office of the President or the
Ombudsman had not yet established compliance procedures for the
review of SALNs filed by officials and employees of State Colleges and
Universities, like U.P. The ministerial duty of the head of office to issue
compliance order came about only on 2006 from the CSC. As such, the
U.P. HRDO could not have been expected to perform its ministerial duty of
issuing compliance orders to Sereno when such rule was not yet in
existence at that time. Moreover, the clearance are not substitutes for
SALNs. The import of said clearance is limited only to clearing Sereno of
her academic and administrative responsibilities, money and property
accountabilities and from administrative charges as of the date of her
resignation.
Neither can Sereno’s inclusion in the matrix of candidates with
complete requirements and in the shortlist nominated by the JBC confirm
or ratify her compliance with the SALN requirement. Her inclusion in the
shortlist of candidates for the position of Chief Justice does not negate,
nor supply her with the requisite proof of integrity. She should have been
disqualified at the outset. Moreover, the JBC En Banc cannot be deemed
to have considered Sereno eligible because it does not appear that
Sereno’s failure to submit her SALNs was squarely addressed by the
body. Her inclusion in the shortlist of nominees and subsequent
appointment to the position do not estop the Republic or this Court from
looking into her qualifications. Verily, no estoppel arises where the
representation or conduct of the party sought to be estopped is due to
ignorance founded upon an innocent mistake
Anent the eleventh issue:
Sereno failed to properly and promptly file her SALNs, again in violation of
the Constitutional and statutory requirements .
Failure to file a truthful, complete and accurate SALN would
likewise amount to dishonesty if the same is attended by malicious intent
to conceal the truth or to make false statements. The suspicious
circumstances include: 1996 SALN being accomplished only in 1998;

1998 SALN only filed in 2003; 1997 SALN only notarized in 1993; 2004-
2006 SALNs were not filed which were the years when she received the
bulk of her fees from PIATCO cases, 2006 SALN was later on intended to
be for 2010, gross amount from PIATCO cases were not reflected,
suspicious increase of P2,700,000 in personal properties were seen in her
first five months as Associate Justice. It is therefore clear as day that
Sereno failed not only in complying with the physical act of filing, but also
committed dishonesty betraying her lack of integrity, honesty and probity.
The Court does not hesitate to impose the supreme penalty of dismissal
against public officials whose SALNs were found to have contained
discrepancies, inconsistencies and non-disclosures.
Anent the twelfth issue:
Sereno failed to submit the required SALNs as to qualify for
nomination pursuant to the JBC rules.
The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those
applicants who are incumbent Associate Justices, absent which, the
applicant ought not to have been interviewed, much less been considered
for nomination. From the minutes of the meeting of the JBC, it appeared
that Sereno was singled out from the rest of the applicants for having
failed to submit a single piece of SALN for her years of service in UP Law.
It is clear that JBC did not do away with the SALN requirement, but still
required substantial compliance. Subsequently, it appeared that it was
only Sereno who was not able to substantially comply with the SALN
requirement, and instead of complying, Sereno wrote a letter containing
justifications why she should no longer be required to file the SALNs: that
she resigned from U.P. in 2006 and then resumed government service
only in 2009, thus her government service is not continuous; that her
government records are more than 15 years old and thus infeasible to
retrieve; and that U.P. cleared her of all academic and administrative
responsibilities and charges.
These justifications, however, did not obliterate the simple fact that
Sereno submitted only 3 SALNs to the JBC in her 20-year service in U.P.,
and that there was nary an attempt on Sereno’s part to comply. Moreover,
Sereno curiously failed to mention that she did not file several SALNs
during the course of her employment in U.P. Such failure to disclose a
material fact and the concealment thereof from the JBC betrays any claim
of integrity especially from a Member of the Supreme Court.
Indubitably, Sereno not only failed to substantially comply with the
submission of the SALNs but there was no compliance at all. Dishonesty
is classified as a grave offense the penalty of which is dismissal from the

service at the first infraction. A person aspiring to public office must
observe honesty, candor and faithful compliance with the law. Nothing less
is expected. Dishonesty is a malevolent act that puts serious doubt upon
one’s ability to perform his duties with the integrity and uprightness
demanded of a public officer or employee. For these reasons, the JBC
should no longer have considered Sereno for interview.
Moreover, the fact that Sereno had no permit to engage in private
practice while in UP, her false representations that she was in private
practice after resigning from UP when in fact she was counsel for the
government, her false claims that the clearance from UP HRDO is proof of
her compliance with SALNs requirement, her commission of tax fraud for
failure to truthfully declare her income in her ITRs for the years 2007-
2009, procured a brand new Toyota Land Cruiser worth at least
P5,000,000, caused the hiring of Ms. Macasaet without requisite public
bidding, misused P3,000,000 of government funds for hotel
accommodation at Shangri-La Boracay as the venue of the 3rd ASEAN
Chief Justices meeting, issued a TRO in Coalition of Associations of
Senior Citizens in the Philippines v. COMELEC contrary to the Supreme
Court’s internal rules, manipulated the disposition of the DOJ request to
transfer the venue of the Maute cases outside of Mindanao, ignored
rulings of the Supreme Court with respect to the grant of survivorship

benefits which caused undue delay to the release of survivorship benefits
to spouses of deceased judges and Justices, manipulated the processes
of the JBC to exclude then SolGen, now AJ Francis Jardeleza, by using
highly confidential document involving national security against the latter
among others, all belie the fact that Sereno has integrity.
Anent the thirteenth issue:
Sereno’s failure to submit to the JBC her SALNs for several years
means that her integrity was not established at the time of her application
The requirement to submit SALNs is made more emphatic when
the applicant is eyeing the position of Chief Justice. On the June 4, 2012,
JBC En Banc meeting, Senator Escudero proposed the addition of the
requirement of SALN in order for the next Chief Justice to avoid what CJ
Corona had gone through. Further, the failure to submit the required
SALNs means that the JBC and the public are divested of the opportunity
to consider the applicant’s fitness or propensity to commit corruption or
dishonesty. In Sereno’s case, for example, the waiver of the confidentiality
of bank deposits would be practically useless for the years that she failed
to submit her SALN since the JBC cannot verify whether the same
matches the entries indicated in the SALN.

Anent the fourteenth issue:
Sereno’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be cured by
her nomination and subsequent appointment as Chief Justice.
Well-settled is the rule that qualifications for public office must be
possessed at the time of appointment and assumption of office and also
during the officer’s entire tenure as a continuing requirement. The
voidance of the JBC nomination as a necessary consequence of the
Court’s finding that Sereno is ineligible, in the first place, to be a candidate
for the position of Chief Justice and to be nominated for said position
follows as a matter of course. The Court has ample jurisdiction to do so
without the necessity of impleading the JBC as the Court can take judicial
notice of the explanations from the JBC members and the OEO. he Court,
in a quo warranto proceeding, maintains the power to issue such further
judgment determining the respective rights in and to the public office,
position or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires.
Neither will the President’s act of appointment cause to qualify
Sereno. Although the JBC is an office constitutionally created, the
participation of the President in the selection and nomination process is
evident from the composition of the JBC itself.

An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of
whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. While the Court
surrenders discretionary appointing power to the President, the exercise of
such discretion is subject to the non-negotiable requirements that the
appointee is qualified and all other legal requirements are satisfied, in the
absence of which, the appointment is susceptible to attack.
Anent the fifteenth issue:
Sereno is a de facto officer removable through quo warranto
The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is
ineligible therefor is that his presumably valid appointment will give him
color of title that confers on him the status of a de facto officer. For lack of
a Constitutional qualification, Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of
Chief Justice and is merely holding a colorable right or title thereto. As
such, Sereno has never attained the status of an impeachable official and
her removal from the office, other than by impeachment, is justified. The
remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at the instance of the State is proper
to oust Sereno from the appointive position of Chief Justice.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo Warranto is GRANTED.
Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged
GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY HOLDING and EXERCISING the OFFICE OF
THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly, Sereno is OUSTED and EXCLUDED
therefrom.
The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared
vacant and the Judicial and Bar Council is directed to commence the
application and nomination process.
This Decision is immediately executory without need of further
action from the Court.
Sereno is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof why she should not be sanctioned for violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct for
transgressing the sub judice rule and for casting aspersions and ill motives
to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Dissenting opinion:
A transcript of an interview with Supreme Court Justice Marvic
Leonen in a question-and-answer format who dissented the decision of
the En Banc regarding Sereno’s ouster.
Q: Why is granting a quo warranto petition unconstitutional against a
sitting impeachable official like the Chief Justice?
Quo warranto, as used in this case, will amount to a “removal” of an
impeachable public officer. The only constitutional way to remove an
impeachable public officer is through impeachment.
Q: But the PET rules provide that the President and the Vice President,
both impeachable officials, may be removed by quo warranto as well. How
do you reconcile this?
This is only an exception. It is true that a verified petition for quo warranto
contesting the election of the President or Vice-President on the ground of
ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines may be filed by
any registered voter who has voted in the election concerned within ten
days after the proclamation of the winner. 20
20
J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Jardeleza v. Sereno, 741 Phil. 460 (2014)
However, being the exception, this does not mean that it is applicable to
all impeachable officials.
First, among the impeachable officers, the President and the Vice
President are the only ones elected by the public. The rest are appointed
officials. The reason behind allowing quo warranto against the President
and the Vice President within ten days is that an impeachment proceeding
is highly politicized, and therefore, it may be more difficult to initiate
proceedings against elective officials who are members of the ruling
political party in Congress. Therefore, a quo warranto may prosper which
may be heard by a non-political court.
Second, the process of presenting a protest against the President
and Vice President is uniquely provided by the Constitution: “The
Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.” [ii] There is no
such provision for members of the Court nor of the Constitutional
Commissions.
Third, we consider the vast difference in the qualifications required
of each office.
Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and
write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident
of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such
election.
Section 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same
qualifications and term of office and be elected with and in the same
manner as the President. He may be removed from office in the same
manner as the President.21
The Constitution does not provide any other qualifications. Thus,
any person who fulfills these minimum requirements will be considered a
candidate, and such qualifications are easily discernible by the Court, and
In contrast, Members of the Supreme Court and the Ombudsman
must not only possess the minimum requirements under the Constitution,
but must also undergo a rigorous vetting process by the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC).
Under the Rules, an applicant must submit an application to the
JBC within 90 days from a vacancy. The applications are then thoroughly
examined by the Council, which looks into the candidates’ “educational

21
The Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (2016)
CONST., art. IX (B), sec. I (2); art. IX (C), sec. I (2); and art. IX (0), sec. I (2).
preparation, relevant experience, work performance and performance
ratings.” The Council then deliberates and conducts a final voting on
nominations.
Members of Constitutional Commissions, on the other hand, are
appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Therefore, any judicial re-evaluation is not warranted considering
the already stringent requirements put forth by the Constitution as already
evaluated and screened by the JBC and the Commission on
Appointments, as the case may be.
Q: The Constitution provides that the SC has the power of supervision
over JBC. Therefore, it can review decisions by the JBC, perhaps via quo
warranto. Is this stand correct?
No. The stand is not correct.
The Judicial and Bar Council has the sole constitutional mandate of
preparing a short list of nominees for the President. Once a candidate has
undergone the rigorous application process of the JBC, the candidate is
considered qualified for the position. To hold otherwise would be to render
inutile the constitutional mandates of the JBC. The removal of an

impeachable officer was meant to be difficult and cumbersome since it will
only be on the basis of impeachable offenses committed while in office,
not any disqualification prior to appointment.
The JBC is a separate constitutional organ, invested with the
necessary authority in the performance and execution of the limited and
specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. The grant of power is
intended to be complete and unimpaired.
Moreover, the power of supervision is the authority to ensure that
the rules are followed, but without the power to lay down rules nor the
discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, the
power of supervision involves the authority to order the work done or re-
done. Supervising officials may not prescribe the manner by which an act
is to be done. They have no judgment on that matter except to see that
the rules are followed.
In the same manner that the Court cannot dictate on the lower
courts on how they should decide cases except through the appeal and
review process provided by the Rules of Court, so also cannot the Court
intervene in the JBC ‘s authority to discharge its principal function.[viii]

Q: What is the intention behind making JBC an independent constitutional
body?
By constitutional design, the Supreme Court should wisely resist
temptations to participate, directly or indirectly, in the nomination and
appointment process of any of its members. In reality, nomination to this
court carries with it the political and personal pressures from the
supporters of strong contenders. This court is wisely shaded from these
stresses. We know that the quality of the rule of law is reduced when any
member of this court succumbs to pressure.
The separation of powers inherent in our Constitution is a rational
check against abuse and the monopolization of all legal powers. The
Supreme Court should not nullify any act of any constitutional organ
unless there is grave abuse of discretion. The breach of a constitutional
provision should be clearly shown and the necessity for the declaration of
nullity should be compelling.
Therefore, in order to come within the scope of judicial review, the
Constitution requires not merely abuse of discretion but grave abuse of
discretion. The constitutional transgression must be nothing less than
“arbitrary, capricious and whimsical,”[xi] which is not present in this case.

Q: Didn’t the Constitution use the word “may be removed” under Article XI,
Section 2?
Yes. The Constitution used the word “may be removed”, to wit:
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and
conviction of; culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft,
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other
public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by
law, but not by impeachment.
However, when construing the meaning of the Constitution, it is not
only the literal meaning of words and phrases that should be taken into
consideration. What must be included in the consideration are the context
of the words and phrases (1) within the entire document, (2) in the light of
the textual history as seen in past Constitutions ratified by our people, (3)
within the meaning of precedents of this Court, and (4) in the light of
contemporary circumstances, which may not have been in the
contemplation of those who ratified the Constitution. The Constitution

should, therefore, be appreciated and read as a singular, whole unit – ut
magis valeat quam pereat.
Note that the framers did not use “SHALL be removed” because
removal is not mandatory; the framers did not likewise use “MAY ALSO be
removed” to denote that other processes are available. Admittedly, the
framers also did not use the phrase “may ONLY be removed from office”
However, the absence of the word “only” should not immediately lead to
the conclusion that another process – like quo warranto -was possible.
To focus on the dictionary meaning of the word “may” precludes the
importance of the entire document. It supplants sovereign intent to the
linguistic whims of those who craft dictionaries.
Q: What then is the sovereign intent?
The sovereign intent is to make impeachment the exclusive way of
removing a sitting impeachable official.
Q: Prove that it is the sovereign intent.

First, we consider who are the impeachable officials in the
Constitution. The process of removal through impeachment and conviction
is reserved only for some officials, notably: (1) The President; (2) The Vice
President; (3) Members of the Supreme Court; (4) Members of the
Constitutional Commissions; and (5) The Ombudsman.
The officers enumerated head significant Constitutional organs,
hence, the need to be independent of other Constitutional organs. They
play vital functions in the government that the Constitution must enable
him to exercise his duties and functions without any hindrance or
distraction, thereby giving his office and the country the undivided
attention that they deserve.
Second, we consider the processes involved. The removal of an
impeachable officer is achieved by providing a deliberately cumbersome
and tedious procedure of removal, and that is, impeachment. The
Constitution provides the vote required: One-third of all the members of
the House of Representatives is required to impeach, and thus, to file the
Articles of Impeachment. Two-thirds of all the members of the Senate are
required to convict. A time limit is even provided: No impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.

The tediousness of the process and the time limit provided is
intended not only to avoid harassment suits against the impeachable
officer, i.e., that numerous suits will be thrown against an officer no matter
how baseless, but also to prevent the disruption of public service. Imagine:
if numerous impeachment complaints are filed after the other,
impeachable officers would be unable to do their official functions and
duties. In addition, the numbers required from a collective body (House of
Representatives and Senate) were clearly designed to ensure that the
removal of the impeachable public officers requires a modicum of political
will from the elected representatives in both Congressional chambers.
This, again, was a process to shield the heads of the Constitutional
departments, Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman with an
added layer of assurance against suits that could be maliciously filed by
disgruntled parties, and therefore, diminish the independence and resolve
of the impeachable officers.[yourlawyersays]
Third, we consider the offenses involved. the grounds for
impeachment are weighty and serious, thus: (1) Culpable violation of the
Constitution; (2) Treason; (3) Bribery; (4) Graft and Corruption; and (5)
Betrayal of the Public Trust[xv]. The list is exclusive. In excluding other
crimes, the intent to shield the impeachable officers from malicious or
bothersome suits is palpable. Clearly, mistakes will be made by public

officials. But, while in office, it is indisputable that some level of immunity is
given to the official, that is why impeachment is the most difficult and
cumbersome mode of removing a public officer from office[xvi].
Q: Why is this level of immunity given to impeachable officials?
Difficult decisions will be made by the President, members of the
Supreme Court, members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman. In their decisions, there will be powerful perhaps even
moneyed individuals who will be affected adversely. Certainly, the ideal
should be that all the impeachable officers will decide on the basis of both
principle and public good without fear of the detriment that will be felt by
the losing parties. Structurally, the Constitution should be read as
providing the incentive for them to do their duties.
If Justices may be removed by any other way aside from impeachment,
Members of the Supreme Court would be vulnerable to all manner of
charges which might be brought against them by unsuccessful litigants or
their lawyers or by other parties who, for any number of reasons might
seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the Court[xvii] A “simpler
process for judicial removal, even one under the control of judges
themselves, would eviscerate the independence of the individuals on the
bench.”
Q: Why is independence important in the Judiciary?
Judges should be free to render unpopular decisions without fear
that the same may threaten his or her term of office. Removal from office
through other lesser means may stifle the quality of judgments and judicial
conduct. Members of the judiciary, in order to be truly independent and to
be able to fully discharge their functions, ought to be protected in terms of
their tenure.
For courts to be able to discharge their functions, impartiality is
required. Impartiality demands freedom from coercion. This requires
judicial independence.
Judicial independence has been described as a “vital mechanism
that empowers judges to make decisions that may be unpopular but
nonetheless correct.”[xx] It is necessary “that there should be a judiciary
endowed with substantial and independent powers and secure against all
corrupting or perverting influences; secure, also, against the arbitrary
authority of the administrative heads of the government.”

Q: What is the purpose of the Judiciary in the first place that it is important
that they be independent?
Courts are the sanctuaries of rights. Courts clarify the content of
governmental powers most especially in the context of our fundamental
rights. They are the sanctuaries for law. Courts are the soul of the
government.
The Judiciary is the final arbiter of conflicts between and among the
branches and different instrumentalities of the government. It has the duty
to determine the proper allocation of governmental power and to
guarantee “that no one branch or agency of the government transcends
the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.”[xxii] Moreover, the
Judiciary acts as the guardian of the fundamental rights and freedoms
guaranteed under the Bill of Rights.
Therefore, considering the Judiciary is publicly perceived “as the
authority of what is proper and just, and taking into account its vital role in
protecting fundamental freedoms, both decisional independence and
institutional independence must be preserved.[xxv]
Q: How is judicial independence achieved by the current Constitution?

The Constitution vests the power to promulgate rules regarding
pleading, practice, and procedure, and rules concerning admission to the
Bar exclusively on the Supreme Court. This is in stark contrast with the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions[xxvi], which granted Congress the authority
to “repeal, alter or supplement” such rules.
The grant of fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary and the prohibition on
Congress from diminishing the scope of the Supreme Court’s
constitutionally defined jurisdiction and from passing a law that would, in
effect, undermine the security of tenure of its Members are among the
other constitutional guarantees of judicial independence.
The selection and appointment process to the Judiciary is an
appropriate measure by which judicial independence may be advanced. It
must be noted that before the 1987 Constitution, it is both the Congress
and the President which appoints justices of the Supreme Court. Under
our current Constitution, it is the Judicial and Bar Council, an independent
Constitutional creation, which makes a shortlist of appointees from which
the President will choose. The Judicial and Bar Council’s creation under
the 1987 Constitution was revolutionary as it was seen as a way to
“insulate the process of judicial appointments from partisan politics”[xxix]
and “de-politicize” the entire Judiciary.[xxx] [T]he intervention of the JBC

eliminates the danger that appointments to the Judiciary can be made for
the purpose of buying votes in a coming presidential election, or of
satisfying partisan considerations.
Q: How is entertaining and granting a petition for quo warranto against a
member of the Supreme Court an impairment of judicial independence?
First, it impairs the independence of a justice vis-a-vis another
justice and even against the Court’s majority.
The heart of judicial independence, it must be understood, is
judicial individualism. The judiciary, after all, is not a disembodied
abstraction. It is composed of individual men and women who work
primarily on their own. The mental processes of the judges, then, are
those of individuals and not of cogs in a vast machine.[xxxi] Judges are
required “to be independent from judicial colleagues in respect of
decisions which the judge is obliged to make independently.”[xxxii]
Dissent is likewise welcomed. For the law to progress it must
occasionally adopt views that were previously in disfavor, and the
intellectual foundations are often laid by the opinions of dissenting judges.
A dissent, said Hughes, “is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to
the intelligence of a future day.

Allowing a judicial mechanism for investigating judicial colleagues
suppresses candor and undermines the spirit and practice of collegiality
that has been so entrenched in the Supreme Court. A judge might see
across the table not merely a working partner but a potential adversary.
The dialogue would continue, of course. In most cases no change would
be detectable. But there would be an inevitable loss of frankness if each
participant feared that candor might one day build a case against him.
A judge who feels threatened by the perception that other judges
are looking over his shoulder, not to decide whether to reverse him but to
consider the possibility of discipline, will perform his work with a timidity
and awkwardness damaging to the decision process. Judicial
independence, like free expression, is most crucial and most vulnerable in
periods of intolerance, when the only hope of protection lies in clear rules
setting for the bright lines that cannot be traversed.
What happens in a petition for quo warranto? We witness a spectacle
where a Justice votes for the ouster of her follow Justice. Therefore, the
quo warranto must, in the very first place, not have been entertained.
Second, it impairs the independence of the Supreme Court and the
Judiciary as an institution.
We differentiate the tenure of government officials. The Executive
and Legislative departments are constitutional departments, but they are
also political for being elected. The Constitutional Commissions and the
Ombudsman have fixed terms, and therefore, are subject to the choices of
a political administration. On the other hand, the justices of the Supreme
Court serve under good behavior and are to serve until the age of 70
years old.
Political departments respond to majorities. That is in their nature
since they act with the next elections in mind. On the other hand, the
Supreme Court is not political in that way. By providing for a term until the
age of 70, the Constitution ensures that the vision of each member of the
Court is for the longer term, and therefore, that decisions are made, not
merely to address pragmatic needs, but long term principles as well. The
Court is expected to be the last resort even in determining whether a
political majority has transgressed its constitutional power or a
fundamental right of the minority. In doing so, the Court may be counter-
majoritarian but pro-Constitution or pro-principle.

Therefore, if we allow an easier way to remove a member of the
Supreme Court, they will necessarily yield to politics, rendering the
Supreme Court a political body as well.
Third, it creates an imbalance of power. the Solicitor General, who
is not even a constitutional officer, is given awesome powers to remove
impeachable officers – the Ombudsman, the heads of Constitutional
Commissiions, and the justices of the Supreme Court.
Fourth, it creates instability even among lower courts. Since quo
warranto is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court, we will be ushering
in the phenomena of a trial court judge ousting a colleague from another
branch or another judicial region or a Court of Appeals division ousting
another justice belonging to another division or working in another region.
The logical consequence is to diminish the concept of professional
collegiality and independence also among lower courts.
Fifth, this will take away this Court’s sole constitutional domain to
discipline lower court judges. To grant the petition for quo warranto would
inexorably empower appellate court judges to exercise discipline and
control over lower courts through acting on Petitions for Quo Warranto
against other lower court judges.

Q: Is there any jurisprudential basis which states that it is only through
impeachment that an impeachable official may be removed?
Yes. In many cases, the SC dismissed disbarment cases against
members of the Court and those of the Constitutional Commissions who
are required to be members of the Bar. Cuenco v. Fernan is even explicit
in stating: “Members of the Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1)
of the Constitution, be members of the Philippine Bar and may be
removed from office only by impeachment. To grant a complaint for
disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member’s incumbency,
would in effect be to circumvent and hence to ran afoul of the
constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from
office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in
Article XI (2) of the Constitution.”
Therefore, the rule is that impeachable officers are only removable
by impeachment and no other proceeding.
Q: Assuming that we can allow quo warranto can be allowed, is it still
within the prescriptive period?
No. Rule 66, Section 11 of the Rules of Court is clear and leaves no
room for interpretation: Nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed

to authorize an action against a public officer or employee for his ouster
from office unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after the
cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or
position, arose.
The reason behind this is that it is in the public’s best interest that
questions regarding title to public office be resolved and laid to rest as
soon as possible. Public service demands stability and consistency. In the
same manner, public officers cannot rest easy with the threat of being
unseated at any time looming over their heads. It is not proper that the title
to a public office be subjected to continued uncertainty for the people’s
interest requires that such right be determined as speedily as possible. A
public officer cannot afford to be distracted from his or her duties. There
must be stability in the service so that public business may be unduly
retarded; delays in the statement of the right to positions in the service
must be discouraged. When public officers cannot do their work
effectively, it is not just the office that deteriorates. The nature of the office
is such that it is the public that is inconvenienced and ultimately suffers.
Q: However, it has been established that prescription does not run against
the State. How do you counter this?

The majority refers to Article 1108(4) of the Civil Code to support
their stand that the prescriptive period for filing the quo warranto petition
has not yet prescribed and will never prescribe because prescription does
not lie against the State. Such is false.
Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, runs against juridical
persons, except the State and its subdivisions.[xxxix] However, Article
1108(4) refers to acquisitive and extinctive prescription as regards the
acquisition or ownership of real rights, and not prescription in general.
Article 1108 can be found in Book III of the Civil Code which relates to the
different modes of acquiring ownership. It is preposterous to include the
position of Chief Justice within the coverage of Book III of the Civil Code,
since a public office is not a property right, hence, no proprietary title can
attach to it. Furthermore, a quick review of jurisprudence[xli] shows that
the phrase “Prescription does not lie against the State” was limited to
actions of reversion to the public domain of lands which were fraudulently
granted to private individuals and not in all actions instituted by the State.
Q: It is still in the best interest of the State to remove an improperly
appointed official even beyond one year. How do you counter this?
In this particular instance, the act complained of was allegedly
committed by the Council six (6) years ago. Allowing an agent of the
current administration to now question the previous administration’s
appointee would set a dangerous precedent. The current administration
can just as easily undo all judicial appointments made by a previous
administration. This will not inspire public trust and confidence in our
institutions. The security of tenure of magistrates insulate them from the
changing political winds. Removing that security renders members of the
Judiciary vulnerable to currying favor with whichever political entity is in
power, if only to guarantee that they remain in office until retirement. The
immeasurable repercussions of this will corrode the foundations of our
institution, to the ultimate detriment of the people.
Q: Does the non-submission of Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net
Worth conclusively mean a lack of integrity on the part of Sereno?
No. The Constitution provides the qualifications of the members of
the Judiciary, but it also gives the Judicial and Bar Council the latitude to
promulgate its own set of rules and procedures to effectively ensure its
mandate to recommend only applicants of “proven competence, integrity,
probity and independence.[xlii] JBC-009, the rule in place during Sereno’s
application and appointment, shows that the determination of integrity is
so much more nuanced than merely submitting documents like SALN or
clearances from government agencies.

It is true that the submission of a Statement of Assets and Liabilities
may be implied from Article XI, Section 17. This finds its implementation in
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6713, or the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees, and Section 7 of Republic
Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. However, a
closer reading of the provision, however, reveals that the constitutional
requirement is for the submission of a Statement of Assets and Liabilities
upon assumption of office. On the other hand, RA No. 6713 and RA No.
3019 statutorily require government employees to submit their Statements
of Assets and Liabilities on an annual basis.
As practiced however, the JBC did not always require the
submission of SALN as part of the documentary requirements for
applicants or recommendees to the Judiciary. It was only during the
vacancy left by Chief Justice Corona’s impeachment that the JBC required
the submission of all previous SALN for applicants in government service.
Clearly, the Judicial and Bar Council recognized that the SALN is merely a
tool in determining if an applicant possesses integrity and is not the actual
measure of integrity. As a qualification, the term is taken to refer to a
virtue, such that, “integrity is the quality of person’s character.”[xliii]

The Supreme Court has likewise ruled before that mere
misdeclaration of the SALN does not automatically amount to dishonesty.
Only when the accumulated wealth becomes manifestly disproportionate
to the employee’s income or other sources of income and the public
officer/employee fails to properly account or explain his other sources of
income, does he become susceptible to dishonesty because when a
public officer takes an oath or office, he or she binds himself or herself to
faithfully perform the duties of the office and use reasonable skill and
diligence, and to act primarily for the benefit.
To grant this petition is to effectively include another requirement for
the selection of judges and justices even though we are not
constitutionally mandated to do so. Through this case, we now require the
submission of all the Statements of Assets and Liabilities of a candidate.

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CITY UNIVERSITY OF PASAY SCHOOL OF LAW PAGE 1

THE WRIT OF QUO WARRANTO THAT OUSTED FORMER

A Thesis Proposal submitted to the

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

A. Background of the Study

B. Objectives of the Study 7

C. Statement of the Problem

D. Significance of the Study 8

E. Scope and Limitation 9

CHAPTER II : The existing Laws and Jurisprudence. 19

A. Jurisprudence on the Doctrine of

B. Constitutional provisions on Impeachment.

C. Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.

decision and the analysis from known legal experts. 32

A. Supreme Court’s Jurisdiction. 33

B. A summary of the decision of the Supreme Court En Banc on

Quo Warranto Petition against Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes Sereno.

C. Analysis of the decision compiled from published legal experts

Chapter IV : Results and Discussion

A. Determination of possible legal implications

Chapter V : Summary, Conclusion and Recommendation

A. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

The text of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which reads:

of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional

Commission, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on

impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the

Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high

crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and

employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not

provisions on impeachment specify the powers of Congress to remove

specific officers. The provisions on Quo Warranto, however, confer a

general power over all officials. The Constitutional provision, therefore,

Court, are subordinate to the highest law of the land.

In a dissenting opinion of Justice Hugo E. Guttierez Jr., in the case Marcos

“The Constitution… is a law for rulers and people, equally in war an

at all times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine involving more

From this shield springs the principle of constitutional supremacy, which

or the contract, whether promulgated by the legislature or by the executive

fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed

written in every statute and contract. (italics in the original:underscoring

exigency which cannot negate the provisions of the Constitution. This is

fatal attack against the supremacy of the Constitution.

Historically speaking, the Philippine Republic has survived

Ferdinand Marcos, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and Benigno Aquino III; all

term of an unqualified Chief Justice, especially because the Supreme

Philippines cannot survive the erosion of Constitutional boundaries when a

for. This action is an attack on Judicial Independence of the Supreme

removals of members of other constitutional bodies such as the

Commission on Human Rights, Commission on Elections, Civil Service

Commission and Commission on Audit. Ultimately, the rejection of

constitutional checks and balance concentrates power in the hands of the

to the independence and supremacy of the Constitution. It likewise aims to

compile opinions of experts in the law profession with regard to the

through a Writ of Quo Warranto. The researcher aims to identify problem

researcher would like to draw legal analysis.

B. OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

implications that may arise as a result of upholding Quo Warranto petition

as a means of removing a sitting Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of

the Philippines who is considered an impeachable officer contradictory to

Constitution which provides specific Constitutional remedy in removing

these impeachable officers by way of an impeachment proceedings.

C. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The study intends to answer the following questions: