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Un-Copy-Edited Pre-Print First Revision of "Goldstein's Self-Actualization: A Biosemiotic View"
Un-Copy-Edited Pre-Print First Revision of "Goldstein's Self-Actualization: A Biosemiotic View"
*Un-copy-edited pre-print
Abstract
The author revisits neuropsychiatrist Kurt Goldstein’s (1934/1995, 1963) concept of self-
actualization. It is argued that the interdisciplinary field of biosemiotics (Emmeche and Kull,
Goldstein’s concept, and expands the breadth of its application to include all living things (not
only humans). The introduction to biosemiotics also provides an opportunity for humanistic
individuation or the process of becoming a self. The second is that of holism, or the recognition
that the organism and environment comprise a meaningful whole. Finally, the third is that self
actualization is the only motivating drive. With the expansion of application that a biosemiotic
holism]
Goldstein’s Self-actualization 2
Introduction
While humanistic psychologists and therapists have popularized the term “self-actualization” in
the 1960s (most notably Maslow, 1968/1999), it was originally used by neuropsychiatrist Kurt
Goldstein (1934/1995, 1963) to describe a biological tendency that typifies all organisms. Self-
actualization is an element that is integral to both humanistic psychology and biology, and
through it the possible relationships between these two areas of inquiry may be examined more
closely.
The field of biosemiotics (Emmeche & Kull, 2011; Hoffmeyer, 2008) is helpful for
biosemiotics and humanistic psychology share much in common. Like humanistic psychology,
biosemiotic study begins with the assumptions that behavioral phenomena cannot, in principle,
be reduced to simpler and still more fundamental elements (i.e., mechanisms); context, situation,
and organism must each be considered as integral to an organism’s behavior. Furthermore, life
intersubjectively.
contribution. Morley explains that Goldstein has been misinterpreted by Maslow (1968/1999),
who has introduced a foreign notion of teleology into Goldstein’s self-actualization. This has led
Morley (1995) is confident that Goldstein’s holism “effectively integrates biological constructs
with a non-mechanistic, non-reductionistic understanding of life” and that it “points the way of
Goldstein’s Self-actualization 3
the future development of humanistic thought in psychology” (p. 363). This article reflects
Morley’s vision.
The present analysis begins where Morley’s has ended by more carefully articulating the
process of individuation—i.e., the emergence of a self; (2) that it must be holistically observed—
i.e., that the total organism and environment must be taken into consideration; and (3) that it is
the single and only impetus or drive of an organism—i.e., all behavior can be understood in
examples of brain-damaged patients and, in some cases, in non brain-damaged persons as well.
and the motivating forces behind behavior. It is akin to an organizing principle of human being:
Thus after having reviewed all the facts in this field, one reaches the following
When viewed from the vantage point of biosemiotics, this organizing principle extends to all life.
In section 1, it is argued that individuation does not only belong to the humans, but occurs within
and without humans as well. Danish biosemiotician Jesper Hoffmeyer (2015) describes organic
humans. In section 2, the organism-environment whole is turned inside out. Instead of dissolving
the organism-environment dividing line only through the process of organismic self-
actualization, American theoretical biologist Howard H. Pattee argues that this dissolution may
Goldstein’s Self-actualization 4
occur at any level of examination: the precise location of division is arbitrary. Indeed, the
phenomenologists and physicists are beginning to share the same language when making their
observations. Finally, in section 3, it is argued that semiosis describes the fundamental drive of
all life in the same way that self-actualization describes the fundamental drive of human being.
As an example of this, both Goldstein and biosemiotics reject the assumption that there is a
superordinate law governing behavior (survival for Goldstein and natural selection for the
biosemioticians). Instead of being determined by biological law, life may be understood through
Kurt Goldstein
Kurt Goldstein is a familiar figure in the history of Humanistic Psychology. Not only has
he supplied some of the familiar vernacular, he has also inspired many notable figures in the
history of humanistic psychology (Maslow, 1968/1999; Perls, 1972, 1974; May, 1968, 1977; and
Fromm, 1968; among others). Goldstein was also on the founding editorial board of the Journal
scientific and academic life (Ulich, 1968), his social and personal life (Simmel, 1968), as well as
those chronicling the impact he has had on the field of rehabilitation (Goldberg, 2009). He is a
figurehead of the holistic bent of the early to mid twentieth century in Germany (Harrington,
1999) and has been a powerful influence over the qualitative, humanistic phenomenology of
Merleau-Ponty (1942/1963, 1945/1962). Many articles and book chapters have been written
Biosemiotics
While Goldstein’s holism emerges out of the scientific and medical influence of Smuts
(1926) and Driesch (1929; in Morley, 1995), biosemiotics has emerged primarily out of two
alternative ontologies of the early and mid 20th century. The first is the semiotic theory of
Charles Sanders Peirce, and the second is the life-world (Umwelt) investigation of animals by
Peircean Triad. Peircean semiotics may be understood through the triadic relationship
between sign, signified, and interpretant (i.e., that for which the sign-signified relationships is
registered and interpreted as meaningful). For Peirce, everything can, and must, be viewed
through such relations. However, this is not to say that everything in nature is a sign as Saussure
(1916) has done. While Saussurian semiology enjoyed popularity in the middle part of the
twentieth century, drawing the attention of Merleau-Ponty (1964), it does not typify the entire
field of semiotics. Deely (2008) provides a careful description of the difference between Peirce
and Saussure for those still troubled by the continued practice of semiotics. “To say that all
knowledge is by way of semiosis,” Deely writes, “is not the same as to say that there are nothing
but signs in the universe. […] [T]here is more to being than the being of signs” (pp. 440-441).
example of the famous gestalt image in Sandro del Prete’s (1987) “Message d’Amour les
Dauphines” (in Kull, 2011, pp. 117-119). In one sense, the image is nothing but black
scratchings on a white background. This is a sign. To college students, “Message d’Amour les
Dauphines” reliably signifies sensuality. That is, in the adult observer, this image evokes
Goldstein’s Self-actualization 6
sensuality. The sign itself is not in possession of its meaning; the meaning takes place in-between
the sign and the subject. To an adult, the “Message d’Amour les Dauphines” sign becomes a
signifier of sensuality. The sensual possibility of “Message d’Amour les Dauphines” does not
the sign-subject relationship, between whom the meaning emerges. According to Peirce, a sign is
anything that stands for something other than itself. Also, a sign is an irreducible triad, i.e., this
“something other” cannot be isolated without destroying the sign (Kull, 2015, p. 3). Emmeche
and Kull (2011) explain that in biosemiotics, “Meaning is not a molecule, but a relation.
make, communication, plurality of meaning, and so forth” (p. ix). And they continue,
Our path in this search to understand the life processes has led us, as biologists, to
a semiotic view. Life processes are not only significant for the organisms they
conclude that life processes themselves, by their very nature, are meaning-
making, informational processes, that is, sign processes (semioses), and thus can
Jakob von Uexküll’s Umwelt. Like Charles Sanders Peirce, Jakob von Uexküll is
recognized as one of the most important figures in biosemiotics in the first half of the 20th
century (Kull, 2010). Uexküll was “a biologist who was not content with the commonly used
level of scientific argumentation, and who thus decided to place biology on a solid philosophical
In his formulation of organic functioning, von Uexküll (1913) presents what amounts to
The organic factors that we have studied in development so far—genes, plan, and
protoplasm—are thus notes, melody, and piano. Genes and plan always seem to
be quite perfect, only at their influence on the protoplasm disturbances can occur,
paper, but in their execution on piano often leaves much to be desired. (p. 175;
Like Goldstein (1934/1995), Uexküll argues that organisms can only be understood
within their milieu—i.e., within their environment of meaning. Uexküll calls this an animal’s
umwelt. “The umwelt,” Kull, Deacon, Emmeche, Hoffmeyer, and Stjernfelt (2011) explain, “is
the set of features of the environment as distinguished by the organism, or the self-centered
In addition to its useful application to biosemiotics, Uexküll’s theoretical biology has also
of animal lifeworlds.
Self-actualization
organism-environment whole, and the singular role played in motivating an organism. Goldstein
will be consulted for a description and, where applicable, examples. This will be followed by a
biosemiotic description. The aim in their comparison is not to conflate biosemiotics with
humanistic psychology, but to demonstrate how biosemiotics might be an insightful route for
humanistic psychologists who wish to examine still deeper recesses of complexity of life,
Goldstein’s Self-actualization 8
neuroscience with human experience (Roy, Varela, Pachoud, & Petitot, 1999; Thompson, 2004;
1. Individuation
The first axiom of self-actualization concerns the definition of self. An implication that
accompanies self-definition is one of individuation—that is, a self that is distinct from other
becoming.
When Goldstein uses the term organism, he recognizes that there is an invariant structure
of becoming that remains despite changes to environment, behavior, and organism proper.
There is no question that, in spite of its changing in time and under varying
the fluctuations of the behavior of a human being in varying situations, and the
unfolding and decline that occur in the course of his life, the individual organism
maintains a relative constancy. If this were not the case, the individual would not
experience himself as himself, nor would the observer be able to identify a given
organism as such. It would not even be possible to talk about a definite organism.
without—in negotiating and understanding its environment. This is always a process. Varela
(1997) prefers the term “emergence” to describe this. He explains that an organism “is not
the constantly emerging properties of the agent itself and in terms of the role such running
Goldstein’s Self-actualization 9
redefinition plays in the system’s entire coherence” (pp. 83-84). Emergence is also the term that
stable being but rather a constant becoming. (p. 28, italics original)
Like Goldstein has discussed with self-actualization, Hoffmeyer recognizes that the self is an
emergent property that has some degree of authority or autonomy. Humanistic psychologists and
biosemioticians alike reject the assumption that life is determined by biological law. However,
this is not to say that life ignores biological law. In his paper that defines “individuation” as a
biosemiotic activity, Hoffmeyer (2015) uses the example of the genotype-phenotype distinction
to demonstrate how life occurs within, but is never in principle caused by, biological law.
A genotype is the hereditary information that is present in the zygote. This hereditary
information contributes the greatest influence on the development of the organism, but it does
factors … are waiting to interfere with the mechanisms whereby this genetic set-
For example, American psychologist Gilbert Gottlieb (1981, in Hoffmeyer, 2015) has
found that newborn ducklings develop a preference for their mother’s species-specific call from
birth. However, this only works when the duckling embryos were exposed to their own prenatal
call sounds. If this prenatal interaction had been prohibited, the ducklings will not develop the
Goldstein’s Self-actualization 10
preference. The duckling genotype provides the ability to develop the species-specific call
preference, but the preference itself—the phenotype or the organism’s expression of that trait—
can only emerge as a product of the environment. More accurately, in this example it can only
to all life. “If, then, by the term individuation we understand the series of stages (morphological
and/or cognitive) that an organism passes through during its lifespan, we can conclude that
individuation is a general trait pertaining to life” (p. 608). This process, no longer unique to
humans, also carries with it a definition of self. For biosemiotics, “self” or “soul” is “an
everyday language attempt to name that innermost agency that springs from the life-history of an
organism, human or non-human” (p. 611). For Gottlieb’s duckling, the species-specific call
preference is the potential of the individual genotype. This potential actualizes when the prenatal
Goldstein (1963) is able to describe the meaning behind behavior (pp. 120-149), pathology (pp.
34-68), personality (pp. 171-200), motivation (pp. 150-170), and emotion (pp. 85-119), among
others. An organism can never be viewed in isolation from its environment if its behavior is to be
meaningfully understood. Viewing behavior in isolation risks missing out on its significance.
Goldstein’s Self-actualization 11
Moreover, since the entire organism (and its milieu) is a coordinated affair, as the
previous section has described it, then the entire coordinated affair must be examined. For
instance, Goldstein (1934/1995) explains how “Even such an apparently simple reaction as the
response of the eye to light is by no means limited to the contraction of the iris.” And he
continues,
Although they are perhaps of as much importance for the organism as the
contraction of the iris, we usually overlook them because the examination of the
pupillary reflex is the purpose of the stimulation. The effect of light on the
In order to understand the range of influence or the unexpected lack thereof, Goldstein maintains
that the entire patient (and not just the region of interest) must be considered. This is because
“[t]he more carefully we investigate […], the more we find that, whenever a change is induced in
one region, we can actually observe simultaneous changes in whatever part of the organism we
may test” (p. 174). Finally, the changes induced in the organism are not easily circumscribed to
the organism proper either. “Each organism lives in a world,” Goldstein explains, and that world
is “by no means something definite and static but is continuously forming commensurably with
The organism can never be viewed independently from its environment, for it is
dependent on the latter to supply its needs. Indeed, the very process of semiosis—sign
end-means relationship of a self-propagating dynamical system” (Kull et al, 2011, p. 35). The
Goldstein’s Self-actualization 12
“Message d’Amour les Dauphines” gestalt image discussed earlier has the potential of signifying
dolphins or lovers, but never both simultaneously. The actualization of the event and its meaning
depends on the sign-interpreter relationship. With the dolphins, lovers are a null possibility. With
Lovers, dolphins are a null possibility. The meaning of this event of perception depends on the
possibility of more than one outcome (Kull, 2015). Otherwise, the image is a causal mechanism
that brings about a definite behavioral change (e.g. the perception of dolphins). Meaning depends
on semiosis.
Prioritizing mechanism over meaning and substance over process is precisely what
humanistic psychology has historically found so irksome about the biological analyses of
behavior (Morley, 1995). It is this aspect of biomedical science that humanistic psychologists
find themselves “up against” (Schneider, 2005, p. 168). Biosemiotics has similarly reacted
against the mechanized approach to biology (Kull, 2014, 2015; Hoffmeyer, 2009, 2014).
The world around us reaches us through sign processes, semiosis, i.e. our lives do
not play out in a mechanical body but in a semiotic body. Biosemiotics, the sign-
theoretic or semiotic approach to the study of life and evolution is based on the
logic. Molecular structures are not just chemical entities; they are also potential
sign vehicles mediating communicative activity between cells, tissues, and organs
Meaning isn’t ignored in the semiotic body; it is the central concern. Hoffmeyer continues,
I do not just sense the pencil mechanically, for my knowing the pencil does not
start in the retina, and it does not end up in the brain, rather it flows back and forth
through an indefinite number of loops where the pencil is integrated into the
memorized bodily experiences and back again to neuronal circuits in the brain
forming a continuous and branched set of loops. My interaction with the pencil is
The meaning explored by biosemioticians is not divergent from the meaning explored by
humanistic psychologists: they are convergent. There is really no need to draw a line in-between
self and other or organism and environment provided the two are reciprocally intertwined.
In the course of the process, comprising not only the now-and-here (impulses
from other senses) but also memorized material (the girl’s former experiences
calibrated according to new visual, olfactory, auditory, or touch inputs that she
might receive, and also according to her own motoric interaction with the objects
of her field of vision (even if she does not move, small involuntary movements of
organism-environment whole. Their significance deepens further when considered within the
context of the final aspect through which Goldstein describes self-actualization: that it is the only
subject and object (organism and environment), and use subjective experience to demonstrate
this collapse. Biosemiotics accomplishes the same collapse between subject and object but does
so from the description of the biological processes. Instead of describing two distinct
phenomena—one phenomenological and the other biological, this may be seen as one
spectral image “Message d’Amour les Dauphines” is seen as either dolphins or lovers, but never
both simultaneously, and neither incorrect, so too do phenomenology and biology converge on
Pattee (2015) describes what he has termed the epistemic cut (e.g. between object and
subject; observed and observer). Pattee is clear that this is not a Cartesian separation, but an
arbitrary point of separation between the action of the observer and action of the object observed.
He argues that semiosis may be used to distribute responsibility for the observation between the
object (sign vehicle) and observer (interpretant), rather than collapsing this into the
Another way of stating this is that the dissolution of the dividing line is not only meaningful to
Pattee argues that the precise location of the dividing line between observer and observed
is arbitrary, and he uses von Neumann’s (1955) example of vision to demonstrate this. Von
Neumann writes of the boundary between observer and object in the act of perception:
But in any case, no matter how far we calculate—to the mercury vessel, to the
scale of the thermometer, to the retina, or into the brain, at some time we must
say: and this is perceived by the observer. That is, we must always divide the
world into two parts, the one being the observed system, the other the observer.
[…] The boundary between the two is arbitrary to a very large extent. […] In one
instance in the above example, we included even the thermometer in it, while in
another instance, even the eyes and optic nerve tract were not included. (p. 465)
In von Neumann’s description, the division between observer and observed is not definite but
arbitrary. Pattee finds it fitting to refer to this as an epistemic cut because it more closely
describes an epistemological position being taken with regards to the phenomenon of perception,
and not an ontological observation. The epistemic cut that one chooses to make is consequential,
Goldstein and biosemiotics agree that behavior may be understood only when organism
and environment are taken into consideration. Humanistic psychologists customarily collapse
this division into the lifeworld of the human subject, but following Pattee (2015), it has been
argued that the location of this collapse is arbitrary—i.e., the collapse of subject-object duality
may also be examined at the level of biology or chemistry without ignoring the individual and
In understanding an organism or person, Goldstein is very clear that there is only one
drive. He writes,
We assume only one drive, the drive of self-actualization, but are compelled to
concede that under certain conditions the tendency to actualize one potentiality is
so strong that the organism is governed by it. […] [T]he theory of separate drives
can never comprehend normal behavior without positing another agency which
makes the decision in the struggle between the single drives. This means that any
Here Goldstein differentiates the drive toward self-actualization from the drive-theory of
there is but one drive. Any sense of competition between drives thus ignores their inter-
connectedness—namely, that they are in service to the same coordinated effect. In another effort
to distinguish the drive for self-actualization from psychoanalytic drives, Goldstein also
maintains that the “tendency to actualize itself is the motive which sets the organism going; it is
preoccupied with a pre-potent single drive (e.g. physical needs, safety needs, and so on), but he
is also clear that each of these are instances of self-actualization. Even satisfying one’s physical
one’s self-esteem needs. This problematizes Maslow’s (1968/1999) motivational hierarchy that
peaks in self-actualization.
Goldstein’s Self-actualization 17
(1963) explains:
We have learned that man is a being who does not merely strive for self-
has the capacity of separating himself from the world and of experiencing the
only when an organism is at death’s door that behavior is organized in service to self-
preservation. But even in this circumstance (which is by no means typical of all organisms) we
opportune and best expression of an organism given the particular context in that moment of
expression. The system is not guided, for example, by pain reduction or self-preservation, but by
self-actualization. To be sure, both pain reduction and self-preservation can be in service to self-
person “must choose between a greater lack of freedom and greater suffering” (p. 341). This is
precisely what complicates treatment of disease and psychopathology. Goldstein reminds doctors
and therapists that “medical decision always requires an encroachment on the freedom of the
other person” (p. 341). Such an encroachment may prohibit or, at least, constrict the available
biological imperative of ‘survival’, is also a notion that biosemioticians reject (Kull, Emmeche,
mechanically bent on survival. “Living creatures are not just senseless units in the survival
game” Hoffmeyer (2009) explains, “they also experience life (and perhaps even ‘enjoy’ it as we
say when human animals are concerned)” (p. xviii). And he continues, capturing the difference
There [in the natural world], organisms never “try to survive”—for the simple
reason that they cannot know they are going to die. […] In brief: Organisms
strive, and this striving […] cannot be set aside in any genuine attempt to
Striving captures the organic process of individuation present in life in all of its forms.
concept of self-actualization, but the same may be found in prenatal ducklings, sea-sponges, and
unicellular organisms. To be sure, the processes are not identical across each of these
between organism and environment. Hoffmeyer (2015, section 5) calls this breadth of awareness
“semiotic freedom,” and describes the evolution from the first instance of organic individuation
(flatworms 550 million years ago) through the centralized system of nerve-cells in the human
brain today. In his summary, Hoffmeyer is careful to maintain that the mind is not unique to
humans, but its breadth of semiotic freedom is. “The semiotization of biology implies a shift in
focus from life as narrowly bound to certain privileged and distinct structures (such as genomes
In sum, a biosemiotic view of self-actualization sees in the human being a process that
unfolds within and between all living things. This is important for contemporary humanistic
psychologists who are interested in exploring the meaningful insights that the cognitive sciences
and neurosciences bring because it opens these worlds up to a familiar method of examination.
“Molecular structures are not just chemical entities; they are also potential sign vehicles
mediating communicative activity between cells, tissues, and organs of our body or between
In reviewing Goldstein’s (1934/1995, 1963) introduction and use of the concept self-
actualization, three distinct but interrelated aspects have been presented: invariance, holism, and
that it is the fundamental motivating force. Each has emphasized the similarity between
humanistic psychology and biosemiotics. Both disciplines are interested in life and all of the
complicated meanings this generates. This realization might justify a reconsideration of the
continued insistence that humanistic psychology must resist biology (lest they risk sacrificing its
rich history and tradition that has been devoted to emphasizing the awe-inspiring aspects of
being human; Schneider, 2005). One option could be a holistic biological investigation in the
context of a biosemiotic framework, something that Goldstein would surely have encouraged
(Gurwitsch, 1966).
to all life. “Life” is the quality that accompanies meaningful being in the world—that quality that
humanistic psychologists have made it their business to examine and understand in humans for
over half a century, as well as the “magnificence and mystery of living” that has been studied by
the humanities for over 5,000 years” (Schneider, 2005, p. 167). It would not be unfair or even
Goldstein’s Self-actualization 20
unhumanistic to equate “being human” (or, less anthropocentrically, “being”) with self-
actualization. It may not even be blasphemous to define “being human” as “the ability to create
and take part in meaning-generating processes […]” as Kull, Deacon, et al, (2011, p. 69) have
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