YUSI VS MORALES

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

May persons who apply for the benefits of the Probation Law withdraw their application during the period for filing an appeal and ask that their appeal from the judgment of conviction be given
due course?
The petitioners are spouses who were convicted for estafa in Criminal Case No. 2260 in a decision of the respondent court dated May 20, 1982. The court sentenced the petitioners ". . . to suffer
an indeterminate sentence of FOUR (4) MONTHS of arresto mayor as minimum to ONE (1) YEAR and SIX (6) MONTHS of prision correccional as maximum, to pay P5,400.00 to Naty V. Pagdanganan
for the value of the piano, and to pay the costs of the suit."

On June 22, 1982, when the decision dated May 20, 1982 was promulgated, the petitioners appeared in court without their counsel of record. The respondent court appointed a certain Atty.
Cesar Villar who happened to be in court to act as petitioners' counsel de oficioduring the promulgation. On that occasion, the petitioners through their counsel de oficio manifested that ". . . they
are going to avail of the benefits of the Probation Law and prayed that they be released under the same bond." (Annex "B", Rollo p. 14) The court immediately granted the petitioners' prayer ". . .
with a condition that the accused will submit within this day a certification from the bonding company that it is willing to accommodate the accused under the same bond for a period of five (5)
days beginning today."

On June 23, 1982, the petitioners filed with the respondent court an application for probation under Presidential Decree No. 968 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1257 (Annex "C", Rollo, p.
15).

Acting on the petitioners' application for probation, the respondent court on the same day, June 23, 1982, issued an Order directing the probation officer of Cabanatuan City to conduct an
investigation on the application for probation and to submit his report on the matter within sixty (60) days from receipt in accordance with Sections 5 and 7 of Presidential Decree No. 968 as
amended. (Annex "A", Rollo, p. 18).

On June 28, 1982, or seven (7) days from the date of promulgation of the decision and within the reglementary period to file an appeal, the petitioners filed with the respondent court their Notice
of Appeal (Annex "E", Rollo, p. 19).

On July 6, 1982, the respondent court issued an Order denying the notice of appeal on the ground that the petitioners waived their right to appeal the decision when they filed their application
for probation (Annex "F", Rollo, P. 20).

On July 16, 1982, Atty. Antero Torres filed with the court an appearance as counsel in collaboration with the petitioners' counsel of record, and on behalf of the petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the July 6, 1982 order. On July 24, 1982, the petitioners filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration. (Annexes "G" and "H", Rollo, pp. 21-24).

On August 19, 1982, the respondent court issued an order denying both the motion for reconsideration and the supplemental motion for reconsideration (Annex "J", Rollo, p. 28).

Hence, this petition was filed to set aside the above orders.

In a resolution dated October 11, 1982, we considered the People of the Philippines impleaded and required the Solicitor General to comment on the petition.

Upon the filing of the Solicitor General's comments, which we treated internally as an answer, and dispensing with the filing of briefs or memoranda, we resolved to declare the case submitted
for decision.

The only issue is whether or not the petitioners whose application for probation was granted after conviction of the crime of estafa may still withdraw such application for probation and within
the reglementary period appeal the judgment of conviction.

In not giving due course to the petitioners' notice of appeal the respondent court relied on paragraph 3, Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (ESTABLISHING A PROBATION SYSTEM,
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES) as amended which considers an application for probation of a convicted accused to be a waiver of his right to appeal or an
automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal.

And now, the question before us is whether or not such a waiver or withdrawal is irrevocable.

We rule that it is not. We find the strict and unyielding application of the "waiver rule" under the Probation Law unwarranted.

Under the factual circumstances of the instant case, the respondent court in granting the application for probation and denying the prayer to withdraw, failed to take into account the fact that
the petitioners' counsel of record was not present when the petitioners applied for probation. True, they were represented by a counsel de oficio appointed by the court on the spot but the
counsel de oficio was not fully acquainted with their case. He could not have considered fully the strength of a possible appeal when he advised them about the effects of the application for
probation. More so when we consider the thin line that divides a criminal case for estafa and a civil case for collection of a debt.

And this fact surfaced when, on June 28, 1982 after the petitioners discussed their case with a brother-in-law, Judge Eladio C. Sequi of the Municipal Court of Carranglaan, Nueva Ecija, the
petitioners filed their notice of appeal upon the Judge's advice. It must be noted that the notice of appeal was filed just seven (7) days after the promulgation of the decision.

Considering that the application for probation is an admission of guilt on the part of an accused for the crime which led to the judgment of conviction and that the application for probation is
considered a waiver upon his part to file an appeal, it is in the best interests of justice that the court should take the necessary steps to insure that the accused has been fully apprised of the full
import of his application before the court acts on it.

In the case at bar, the respondent court hastily granted the manifestation and application for probation on June 22, 1982, the same day that the decision was promulgated and approved the
formal application the following day without taking steps to be informed that the petitioners were aware of the full import of their application.

Furthermore, Presidential Decree No. 968 which established the Probation System was envisioned among other things, "to provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which
might be less probable if he were to serve a prison sentence" (Section 2[b], Presidential Decree No. 968).

Under the facts of this case, the petitioners cannot be considered "penitent offenders." They appeared to have improvidently filed their application for probation and should be allowed to
withdraw it and to appeal the decision.

We agree with the Solicitor General when he observes that:

"There can be no real reformation of a wrongdoer which is the reason for probation unless there is a willingness on his part to right the wrong he has committed. Probation is envisioned for the
accused. He may or may not avail of its benefits. Although probation is founded on consent, waiver and/or contract, public policy requires that interpretational objectives set forth in Section 2 of
Presidential Decree No. 968 be given full effect. Probation cannot therefore be forced or compelled on a convict. To permit this would only serve to invite its violation. Instead, a greater emphasis
should be exerted in securing the probationer's effective participation in society's major social institution.

"Since 'probation is an island of technicalities surrounded by sea of discretion' (Carl H. Imlay & Charles R. Galsheen, 'See What Condition Your Condition Are In,' Federal Probation, XXXV (June
1971)', it should, therefore, be liberally construed in favor of the accused (herein petitioners). Having opted to discontinue with the application for probation in its initial stages and prior to the
submission of a post sentence investigation report and within the period interposed an appeal from the adverse decision, petitioners should be allowed to withdraw their application for
probation and pursue their right to appeal therefrom."

The underlying philosophy of probation is indeed one of liberality towards the accused. It is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions. Probation is a major step
taken by our Government towards the deterrence and minimizing of crime and the humanization of criminal justice. In line with the public policy behind probation, the right of appeal should not
be irrevocably lost from the moment a convicted accused files an application for probation. Appeal and probation spring from the same policy considerations of justice, humanity, and
compassion.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is hereby GRANTED. The Orders dated June 23, 1982, July 6, 1982 and August 19, 1982 of the respondent court are nullified and set aside.
The respondent court is directed to give due course to the petitioners' notice of appeal.

SO ORDERED. Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and Relova, JJ., concur.

Colinares,vs .People of the Philippines

Facts: Arnel Colinares was charged and found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide by the RTC of Camarines Sur. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment from two years and
four months of prison correccional, as minimum, to six years and one day of prison mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to six years,
Arnel did not qualify for probation. On appeal by Colinares, the Court of Appeals sustained the RTC’s decision. Unsatisfied with the Court of Appeal’s decision, petitioner then appealed to the
Supreme Court and took the position that he should be entitled to apply for probation in case the Court metes out a new penalty on him that makes his offense probationable, which was strongly
opposed by the Solicitor General reiterating that under the Probation Law, no application for probation can be entertained once the accused has perfected his appeal from the judgment of
conviction. The Supreme Court, however, found that Colinares is guilty of attempted homicide and not of frustrated homicide.

Issue: Whether or not Arnel Colinares may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court

Ruling: Yes, The Supreme Court ruled that Colinares may apply for probation upon remand of his case to the RTC. Ordinarily, an accused would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he
having appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide. But in this case the Supreme Court ruled to set aside the judgment of the RTC and found him only liable for
attempted homicide, if the Supreme Court follows the established rule that no accused can apply for probation on appeal, the accused would suffer from the erroneous judgment of the RTC with
no fault of his own, therefore defying fairness and equity.

IMPERIAL INSURANCE v. EULALIO D. ROSETE

GANCAYCO, J.:

Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides for the basic rule of thumb that said "rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote its objective and to assist the parties in obtaining just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." Its application is put into test in the present case.

The antecedent facts are undisputed. Private respondent filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against petitioner dated April 11, 1980 in the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Oriental, docketed as Civil Case No. 7072. After receipt of service of summons petitioner filed an answer with counterclaim within the reglementary period.

The case was set for pre-trial conference on August 5, 1980 of which the parties and their counsel were duly notified. At said pre-trial conference petitioner was represented by Atty. Arturo A.
Magallanes who presented a special power of attorney executed by Bernardito R. Pulvera, regional branch manager of petitioner for Mindanao and Visayas, authorizing said counsel to represent
petitioner at the pre-trial conference, to enter into any amicable settlement and to do such other acts as may be necessary to implement the authority. The presiding judge refused to honor the
same and observed that it is only the Board of Directors of the petitioner who may authorize the appearance of the regional manager in behalf of petitioner and that he cannot delegate his
functions. Counsel for private respondent stated he was willing to give petitioner a chance to produce the appropriate authority. Nevertheless, the respondent judge declared the petitioner in
default in an order dated August 5, 1980 and set the reception of the evidence for the private respondent on August 12, 1980.[1]

A motion to set aside the said order of default was filed by petitioner, stating therein that the rules of court should be liberally construed, that the special power of attorney was submitted in
good faith and that there are meritorious and good defenses as shown in the attached affidavit showing that as early as June 1980 Pulvera had asked for such a special power of attorney from the
main office in Manila but the same had not yet arrived and will be submitted upon receipt. The motion was denied in an order dated August 27, 1980.

A motion for reconsideration of the denial was filed by petitioner alleging that it is within the implied powers and duties of the regional branch manager of petitioner to represent the petitioner
and in the process to settle claims against petitioner as this has been done in a similar case that was amicably settled before the same court docketed as Civil Case No. 6316; and that the special
power of attorney of Atty. Arturo Magallanes to represent the petitioner was executed in good faith. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied for lack of merit on October 17, 1982.

Hence, the herein petition for cetiorari and/or mandamus wherein petitioner alleges that the respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and in grave abuse of discretion in declaring
petitioner in default and in denying the motion for reconsideration of the order of default.

The petition is impressed with merit.

In Civil Case No. 6316 entitled "Heirs of Ruiz Dosdos, et al. vs. Andres Tan; and Andres Tan as third party plaintiff vs. Imperial Insurance, third party defendant", filed in the Court of First Instance
of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, presided by the respondent Judge, a special power of attorney was presented dated June 20, 1979 executed by the same regional manager of petitioner
in favor of Carmelito Gaburno, production manager of sales of petitioner, to appear in behalf of petitioner in all stages of the case and to enter into any stipulation of facts.[2] A compromise
agreement was entered into by the parties assisted by their respective counsel and the same was submitted for approval of the court wherein Carmelito Gaburno signed for and in behalf of
petitioner. In an order dated November 27, 1979 the respondent judge approved the compromise agreement by rendering judgment in accordance therewith.[3]

Thus, when at the pre-trial conference of Civil Case No. 7072 before the same respondent judge a special power of attorney executed by Pulvera on July 31, 1980 in favor of Atty. Magallanes to
appear in behalf of petitioner and to enter into any amicable settlement[4] was presented, the court finds no cogent reason why the respondent judge refused to honor the said special power of
attorney for purposes of the pre-trial and instead declared the petitioner to be in default.

Obviously in the earlier case, Civil Case No. 6316, the respondent judge accepted and/or acknowledged the authority of Pulvera as regional branch manager of the petitioner to represent the
petitioner, to enter into a compromise agreement and as such to execute a special power of attorney in favor of another person to act in his place and to represent the petitioner in the litigation.

Indeed, in another case docketed as Civil Case No. 2899 entitled Gil Ecleo vs. Lydia Sacal and Imperial Insurance, Inc., in the Court of First Instance of Surigao del Norte, Surigao City a similar
special power of attorney for purposes of pre-trial was executed by regional branch manager Pulvera in favor of Atty. Magallanes dated December 9, 1980.[5] A compromise agreement was
entered into by Magallanes in behalf of petitioner which was duly approved by the trial court on January 13, 1981.[6]

There can be no doubt therefore that regional branch manager Pulvera, as regional manager for Visayas and Mindanao of petitioner, was authorized to represent petitioner in any litigation and in
the process to enter into a compromise agreement or settlement thereof. As such agent of petitioner he may appoint a substitute as he was not prohibited from doing so by his principal.[7]

Moreover, even assuming for the sake of argument that the observations of the respondent judge is correct in that a board resolution of the petitioner is required for the purposes of authorizing
Pulvera and/or Magallanes to bind the petitioner, the counsel for the private respondent manifested to the respondent judge his willingness to give the petitioner an opportunity to comply with
the requirement of the court. Just the same, the respondent judge declared petitioner to be in default. No doubt, the respondent judge was unnecessarily harsh when the Rules call for liberality
in such cases.

This is a case where petitioner filed an answer with counterclaim and advanced apparently a meritorious and valid defense. It should be given its day in court and the opportunity to prove its
assertions. This is the situation contemplated by the Rules. The courts must lean in favor of affording substantial justice as against a technical requirement.

WHEREFORE, the questioned orders of the respondent judge dated August 6, 1980, August 27, 1980 and October 17, 1980 are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and the record of this case is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No costs in this instance.

SO ORDERED. Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

 Spouses Bello Vs. CA, Hon. Francisco Llamas, Judge of Pasay City Court and Republic of the Philippines Respondents

Facts: On August 25, 1970, spouses Bello were charged with estafa for allegedly having misappropriated a lady’s ring with a value of P1, 000.00 received from them from Atty.
Prudencio De Guzman for sale on commission basis. After trial, they were convicted and sentenced. They then filed an appeal to the Court of First Instance and after that to the respondent city
court which was also dismissed and ordered for execution of judgment “for having been erroneously addressed to this court”. Petitioner spouses then filed for prohibition and mandamus against
the People and respondent city court to elevate their appeal to the Court of Appeals which was again dismissed after finding that the city court’s judgment was directly appealable to it. Still, the
couple moved for reconsideration and stressing the merits of their appeal and of their defense but was again denied “for lack of sufficient merit”.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the case due to wrong procedure.

Whether or not the execution of judgment will be issued a mandamus

Ruling: Decision of CA to dismiss petition is set aside. Mandamus is issued for the execution of its judgment of conviction. And, said city court is commanded to elevate petitioner’s
appeal from its judgment to the Court of Appeals for the disposition on the merits.

The Court of Appeals should have not dismissed the appeal but should have certified the case to the proper court. It is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such
deplorable result of injustice and absurdity and that a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results.

City Of Manila vs. Chinese Community Of Manila, 40 Phil. 349 (1919)

FACTS: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion private cemetery for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that
such public improvement be made in the said portion of the private cemetery and that the said lands are within their jurisdiction.

Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other routes were available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would create
irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in the graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed.

The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of
eminent domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation.

HELD:The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. The moment the
municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a
municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a
particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts have the right to inquire to.

Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GMRC), Petitioner Vs. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and Imelda Salazar, Respondents

Facts: Private Respondent, "Imelda Salazar" was employed as general systems analyst of Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. (GMRC) While Delfin Saldivar, her close friend, was employed as
technical operations' support manager in May 1982.

Petitioner GMRC investigated Saldivar's activities due to the reports indicating that the company equipment and spare parts were in custody of Saldivar. The internal audit report also indicated
that Saldivar entered into a partnership with Richard A. Yambao, owner and manager of Eledon Engineering Services (Elecon), a supplier often recommended by Saldivar to the petitioner. It also
appeared in the course of Maramara's investigation that Imelda Salazar violated company regulations by involving herself in transactions with conflict of interest with the company. Evidence
showed that she signed as a witness to the articles of partnership between Yambao and Saldivar, and that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of the missing air conditioner but
she failed to inform her employer.

The Company placed Salazar under 1 month preventive suspension, allowing her 30 days within which to explain her side. However, Salazar instead filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal
suspension, which was later modified to illegal dismissal.

The Labor arbiter ordered the company to reinstate Salazar to her former and equivalent position and to pay her full back wages and benefits, plus moral damages. National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) affirmed the labor arbiter's decision but limited back wages for only two years and deleted the award of moral damages.

Issue: Whether or Not the action of dismissal would constitute a violation of Art. 279 of the Labor Code, which protects the security of tenure of an employee.

Held: Positive. The Court did not agree on the petitioner's action of suspension and eventual dismissal of Salazar due to lack of evidence to show that Salazar was involved with the malicious
activities of Saldivar.

The wordings of the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous "An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement and full back wages." Under the principle of
Statutory Construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. The plain meaning rule or Verba Legis
derived from the maxim "Speech is the index of intention" should be applied in this case.

Since there is no evidence to show an authorized or legal dismissal, and GMRC only relied to an internal audit findings, Salazar, according to the Labor Code, is entitled to reinstatement and full
back wages allowed by the Court.

Victoria vs. Comelec [299 SCRA 269]

(Local Government, Succession, Ranking in the Sanggunian)

Facts: Under the LGC, the position of vice-governor should be occupied by the highest ranking Sanggunian member, and for purposes of succession, ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined
on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district.

In the Elections, petitioner candidate Victoria from the 2nd district garnered 32, 918 votes and respondent candidate Calisin from the 1st district garnered 28, 335 votes.

The COMELEC issued a resolution certifying respondent as 1st in the order of ranking with petitioner as 2nd ranking member pursuant to the provisions above.

Petitioner claims that the ranking should not only be based on the number of votes obtained in relation to the total number of registered voters, but also on the number of voters in the district
who actually voted therein.

Issue: Whether or not the proportion of the votes obtained to the number of registered voters of each district shall be factored to the number of voters who actually voted in determining the
ranking in the Sanggunian.
Held: No. The law is clear that the ranking in the Sangguninan shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of the votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of
registered voters of each district.

COMELEC came up with the following ranking of the top 3:

District Registered Voters Votes Obtained Percent Rank

Calisin 1st 130,085 28,335 21.78 1st

Victoria 2nd 155.318 32,918 21.19 2nd

Marcellana 2nd 155.318 26,030 16.76 3rd

MARIA ANGELA S. GARCIA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE ALEJANDRE P. PAYUMO III, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Nature of the Case

Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in conjunction with Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, praying for the annulment of the September 10, 20141 and January 29, 20152 Resolutions of
public respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec), acting through its First Division and En Banc, respectively, in Case No. EAC [AEL] 11-2014. The assailed rulings reinstated the election
protest of private respondent Jose Alejandre Payumo III (Payumo) and effectively reversed the trial court’s ruling that it was filed out of time.

The Facts

Petitioner Maria Angela S. Garcia (Garcia) and Payumo were candidates for the mayoralty race of Dinalupihan, Bataan during the May 13, 2013 national and local elections. In the poll’s
conclusion, Garcia was proclaimed winner for having garnered 31,138 votes as against Payumo’s 13,292. The Office of the Election of Dinalupihan then released to Payumo a certified copy of the
printed Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation (printed COCP), bearing May 15, 2013 as the date of proclamation of the winning mayoralty candidate. As per the records, the printed
COCP reflected the signatures and thumbprints of the members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC).3

On May 27, 2013, Payumo lodged an election protest4 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5 in Balanga, Bataan (RTC), docketed as Election Protest No. DH-001-13, citing the alleged prevalence
of fraud and irregularities in all the clustered precincts of Dinalupihan, heightened by the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines’ unreliability, casting doubt on the results of the counting
and canvassing of votes.5 Anent the timeliness of the recourse, Payumo claimed that from May 15, 2013, the proclamation date appearing on the printed COCP, he had ten (10) days, or until May
25, 2013, within which to challenge the election results. He added that since May 25, 2913 falls on a Saturday, he filed his protest on the immediately succeeding working day, Monday, May 27,
2013.6

In answer,7 Garcia belied the allegations of fraud and urgently moved for the dismissal of Payumo’s protest. She claimed that she was proclaimed mayor on May 14, not May 15, 2013, as
indicated in the manual Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation (manual COCP)8 issued by Dinalupihan’s MBOC. She, thus, argued that the election protest was filed beyond the
mandatory ten-day (10-day) reglementary period for filing an election protest, which, as she claimed in this case, lasted only until May 24, 2013, a Friday. On the ground of belated filing, Garcia
urged the RTC to dismiss the election protest outright.9

On July 1, 2013, the RTC heard the motion for preliminary determination of the affirmative defense of prescription. Members of the MBOC of Dinalupihan took the witness stand and testified that
Garcia was proclaimed on May 14, 2013 at around 5:00PM.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Giving credence to petitioner’s assertion, the RTC, through its Order10 dated February 18, 2014, dismissed Payumo’s protest for being barred by the statue of limitations. The fallo of the Order
reads.11

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the election protest filed by protestant Jose Alejandre P. Payumo III on May 27, 2013 is hereby DISMISSED for having been filed one day beyond the non-extendible
period provided under Rule 2, Section 7, in relation to Rule 2, Section 12 (c), of A.M. No. 10-4-1-SC, the 2010 Rules of Procedure in Election Contests before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal
Officials.

SO ORDERED.

In disposing the case, the trial court cited and relied on the individual declarations of the Chairman and the two members of the MBOC of Dinalupihan, Bataan, as well as on the manual COCP, as
sufficient proof that Garcia’s proclamation took place on May 14, 2013.12

Undaunted, Payumo appealed the dismissal with the Comelec, docketed as EAC (EAL) No. 11-2014, alleging that he cannot be faulted for relying on the May 15, 2013 date indicated in the printed
COCP since it was the official Comelec document signed by all the members of Dinalupihan’s MBOC; that the manual COCP was only received by Garcia, and no one else; and that he had no
representative when Garcia was allegedly proclaimed the winner.

Rulings of the COMELEC

The Comelec First Division, by its September 10, 2014 Resolution, granted Payumo’s appeal thusly:13

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is GRANTED. The Order dated February 17, 2014 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Regional Trial Court of Balanga, Bataan, Branch 5 is
hereby ordered to proceed with the adjudication of RTC-EP Case No. DH-001-13 and resolve the same with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

Ratiocinating in the following wise:14

Evidently, appellant could not be faulted for not relying on the COCP dated May 15, 2013 because that was the only document officially furnished him. He was unaware of the alleged Manual
COCP dated May 14, 2013. The election officer himself admitted to the trial court that he could not remember if he had posted a copy of the May 14, 2013 Manual COCP on the bulletin board of
the Sangguniang Bayan as required by Comelec Resolution No. 9648. Neither did he furnish a copy thereof to the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan and the Municipal Treasurer.

Additionally, the Comele First Division relied on the case of Federico v. Comelec15 (Federico) and held that the 10-day reglementary period ought to be reckoned from the time a party became in
good faith of the issuance of the COCP, which in this case, according to public respondent, is May 15, 2013, as indicated in the printed COCP Payumo received.16

On reconsideration, the Comelec En Banc, by its assailed Resolution dated January 29, 2015, affirmed the holding of the First Division and disposed Garcia’s motion in the following wise.17

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission En Ban RESOLVES to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Protestee-Appellee Maria Angela S. Garcia for failing to show any reversible
error on the part of the First Division UPHOLD its Resolution dated 10 September 2014 granting Protestant-Appellant Payumo’s Appeal.
SO ORDERED.

As held by the En Banc:

It would be tantamount to injustice should the 10-day period to file the Election Protest in this case be reckoned or counted from May 14, 2013, the date indicated in the Manual COCVP as
Protestee-Appelle Garcia’s proclamation as winner since its copy was not even furnished to Protestant-Appellant Payumo. Clearly, Protestant-Appellant Payumo’s only source of information as to
the date of the proclamation of Protestess-Appelle Garcia was the printed COCVP. It indicated 15 May 2013 as the date of Protestee-Appellee Garcia’s proclamation as winner. Thus, his reliance
on 15 May 2013, as the reckoning date of the 10-day period to file his Election Protest was in good faith.18

Hence, the instant recourse.

The Issue

Succinctly put, the issue in extant case boils down to whether or not Payumo’s election protest was filed out of time. On the main, Garcia contends that the reckoning date of the 10-day
reglementary period is from the actual date of proclamation, which is May 14, 2013. Meanwhile, Payumo counters that Garcia was proclaimed on May 15, 2013, and assuming arguendo that it
was done on May 14, 2013, as Garcia insists the proclamation date to be, he cannot be faulted for relying on the date appearing on the printed COCP he received.

Respondent Comelec’s Consolidated Comment, filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, echoes the sentiment of Payumo that the latter could not have known that Garcia was proclaimed on
May 14, 2015 because the printed COCP, which was furnished him, stated otherwise. The Comelec likewise alleged that Garcia failed to establish that Payumo had a representative present at the
exact moment Garcia was proclaimed winner and, thus, assuming that it were true, he could not have known that Garcia was already declared winner on May 14, 2015.

The Court's Ruling

We grant the petition.

Garcia’s Proclamation Date

Pivotal in resolving whether or not Payumo’s election protest is barred by the statute of limitations is ascertaining when the MBOC proclaimed Garcia as the winning mayoralty candidate. The
significance of verifying this proclamation date is underscored by Rule 2, Section 12 (c), in relation to Sec. 7 of the same rule, A.M. No. 10-4-1 SC,19 otherwise known as the 2010 Rules of
Procedure in Election Contests before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal Officials, which provisions pertinently state:

Section 12. Summary dismissal of election contest. – the court shall summarily dismiss, motu proprio, an election protest, counter-protest or petition for quo warranto on any of the following
grounds:
(a) The court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(b) The petition is insufficient in form and content as required under Section 10;
(c) The petition is filed beyond the period prescribed in these Rules;
(d) The filling fee is not paid within the period for filling the election protest or petition for quo warranto; and
(e) In a protest case where cash deposit is required, the deposit is not paid within five (5) days from the filling of the protest.
Section 7. Period to file protest or petition; non-extendible. – The election protest or petition for quo warranto shall be filed within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days counted from the date
of proclamation.

Jurisprudence teaches that the rule prescribing the 10-day reglementary period is mandatory and jurisdictional, and that the filing of an election protest beyond the period deprives the court of
jurisdiction over the protest. Violation of this rule should neither be taken lightly nor brushed aside as a mere procedural lapse that can be overlooked. The rule is not a mere technicality but an
essential requirement, the non-compliance of which would oust the court of jurisdiction over the case.20
Aware of the repercussions that befall an election protest belatedly filed, the private parties herein advance two conflicting dates whence the reglementary period should reckon. But between
the two proposed reckoning date, May 14, 2013, as claimed by petitioner, appears to be the correct date of proclamation.

As can be recalled, the RTC, on July 1, 2013, conducted a motion hearing to determine the timeliness of the election protest. Records reveal that during the said proceeding, the members of the
MBOC testified in the following manner:21

Court: Please take your seats. So, Election Officer Leonilo Miguel, Municipal Treasurer Lani Penaflor. Ms. Socorro Sacdalan, the resolution of the Motion to Resolve Affirmative Defense on the
ground that the protest was filed out of time will be resolved base on the answers that you will give this afternoon. So, the first question of the Court is that, when did you officially proclaim the
winning candidate, the protestee, Maria Angela S. Garcia? You give your answers one by one. So, for Election Officer Mr. Miguel, what is your answer?
Leonilo Miguel: Sir, we proclaimed Maria Angela Garcia on May 14.
Court: What time?
Leonilo Miguel: At almost 5:00 o’clock, sir.
Court: So, take your seat first. And then Municipal Treasurer Lani Penaflor, as part of the members of the [MBOC] of Dinalupihan, when did you officially proclaim Maria Angela Garcia as the
winning mayor of Dinalupihan, Bataan?
Lani Penaflor: Can I give my statement, sir?
Court: Please give up (sic).
Lani Penaflor: I, Lani Penaflor, vice-chairman of the [MBOC], do hereby certify that our functions based on general instructions and minutes on the consolidation, canvass and transmission of
votes cannot proceed on the second step due to the problem occurred on the memory card of precinct No. 15 of Brgy. Bangal, we resulted to only 98.75% of votes canvass as of May 14, 2013.
Due to this situation, the legal counsel of candidate Herminia Roman and Renato Matawaran cited Resolution 9700 and used it as basis to proclaim the winner since votes cast on precinct no. 15,
Brgy, Bangal, will not affect the result and raking of local candidates. The members who waited for the instructions of Atty. Rafael Olano, Regional Election Director who will proceed to the
process of Resolution 9700 and request threshold that this group canvass to be used for the preparation of Manual Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the winning candidate. I do
also certify the I signed last May 14, 2013 the Manual Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation of the winning candidates pursuant to Comelec Resolution No. 9700. On May 15, 2013 the password
has been received and the CCS will then proceed to the second step of the general instruction and steps presented on the CCS laptop. Afterwhich the CCS then automatically proceed on the
generation and printing of CEF No. 29, COCP and other documents related thereto. I again certify that last May 15, 2013, signed the generated reports by the CCS, one of which is CEF No. 29,
Certificate of Cancass and Proclamation of winning candidates in compliance with the general instruction. Then we proceed on electronically transmitting the result after signing all the documents
as prescribed by the GI and generated by the CCS. I assumed that our Election Officer strictly follows the rule on the investigation of Comelec election forms and reports set forth by the
Commission on Elections. Thank you.
Court: Okay, thank you. Ms. Socorro Sacdalan, again, as a member of the [MBOC], Dinalupihan, Bataan, when did you proclaim Maria Angela Garcia as the winning mayor for Dinalupihan, Bataan?
Socorro Sacdalan: We proclaimed the winning candidate, Maria Angela S. Garcia, on May 14, 2013. Sir.
Court: What time, if you recall?
Socorro Sacdalan: At around 5:oo o’clock p.m., sir.

As the members of the MBOC individually declared, Garcia was proclaimed winner of the mayoralty race on May 14, 2013, not on May 15, 2013 as what erroneously appears on the printed COCP.

What is more, the testimony of municipal treasurer Lani Penaflor (Penaflor), vice-chairperson of the MBOC, conveys an explanation for the discrepancy between the dates appearing on the
manual and printed COCP’s- that on May 14, 2013, at around 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Garcia was proclaimed the winner after 98.75% of votes were already canvassed; that the
proclamation was done in light of the fact that the number of voters in the unaccounted clustered precinct could no longer affect the result of the recently concluded polls; that the lowering of
the threshold was approved by the Regional Election Director; and that the manual COCP was prepared reflecting the result of the elections.

The procedure followed by the MBOC, as outlined by Penaflor, is consistent with Comelec Resolution No. 9700,22 wherein the Commission resolved, among others, that:

1. The Municipal, City. Provincial, District, and Regional Boards of Canvassers shall proclaim the winning candidates on the basis of the last "Group Canvass Report" generated by the CCS. By
manually preparing a Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation of Winning Candidates. supported by a copy of the last generated "Grouped Canvass Report", even if not all results are received by
their respective CCS: Provided, That, the standing of the candidates will not be affected by the results not yet transmitted to, and received by, the CCS, without prejudice to the ranking of the
winning candidates. For this purpose, attached as Annex "A" is the format of the Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation to be manually prepared by the boards of canvassers;
2. The Regional Election Directors are approve requests of boards of canvassers in their respective regions to lower the canvassing threshold to enable said boards to generate the certificate of
canvass for transmission to the next level of canvassing, For this purpose, the National Support Center shall provide all Regional Election Directors with the "ADMIN USERNAME" and
corresponding "PASSWORD" needed to lower canvassing threshold, and the appropriate instructions on how to set the lowered coming from the said board.

Apparently, contrary to Payumo’s assertion, the manual COCP is the official Comelec document in cases wherein the canvassing threshold is lowered, In fact, clear from the language of the
Resolution is that the winners, in such instances, are proclaimed "by manually preparing a Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation of Winning Candidate," the format for which is appended to
Comelec Resolution No. 9700. It is incorrect to state, therefore, that only the printed COCP can serve as basis for ascertaining the date of Garcia’s proclamation. As in this case, it is the manual
COCP which contains the true and exact date of Garcia’s proclamation – May 14, 2013, not the printed COCP.

Payumo’s reliance on the date appearing on the printed COCP is misplaced. To be sure, Comelec Resolution No. 9700 is explicit that the printed COCP becomes necessary only for purposes of
transmitting the results to the next level canvassing, and not for proclaiming the winning candidates, insofar as local government units whose canvassing thresholds have been lowered are
concerned. The manual COCP, in such cases, are more controlling. Furthermore, it appears that May 15, 2013 is the date the printed COCP was generated, which, as the members of the MBOC
claimed, the Comelec-issued laptop does not allow to be modified.23 And as justified by the MBOC, they were only able to produce the printed COCP on May 15, 2013, the day after the actual
proclamation, because that was only when they were able to retrieve from the Regional Election Director the username and password for generation the document, denominated as CEF 29.24

As aptly concluded by the RTC.25

The declaration made by the individual members of the MBOC that the proclamation of protestee [herein private respondent] was done on May 14, 2013, coupled with the issuance of the
manual certificate of canvass and proclamation on the same date, is sufficient proof that protestee’s proclamation was in fact done on May 14, 2013 and not on May 15, 2013. The printed
certificate of canvass and proclamation already on May 15, 2013 was not meant to supersede the proclamation already been done on May 14, 2013, but only to comply with the "official format"
of the COMELEC, according to Municipal Election Officer Miguel. The printed document merely affirmed what had already been accomplished with the manally written document.

Having established that Garcia was proclaimed the winning mayoralty candidate on May 14, 2013, it is then plain to see that Payumo’s election protest, dated May 27, 2013, was filed beyond the
10-day reglementary period and ought to be dismissed outright.

The ruling Federico v. Comelec is not a precedent to the instant case

Payumo next seeks refuge under the case of Federico, in which the Court indeed nullified the proclamation of therein petitioner Renato Federico (Federico) as mayor of Santo Tomas, Batangas
even though private respondent Osmundo Maligaya (Maligaya) filed the election protest more than ten (10) days after such fact. There, the Court reckoned the 10-ady prescriptive period not
from the date of proclamation but from the date of proclamation but from the date Maligaya received notice of the event, rendering the actual date of proclamation immaterial. It is this holding
in Federico that Payumo adamantly urges that We apply.

The argument is specious.

Guilty of reiteration, Rule 2, Sec. 7 of A.M. No. 10-4-1 SC provides:

Section 7. Period to file protest or petition; non-extendible. – The election protest or petition for quo warranto shall be filed within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days counted from the date
of proclamation.

The above provision is the procedural equivalent of Sec. 251 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, which states:

Sec. 251. Election contests for municipal offices. – A sworn petition contesting the election of a municipal officer shall be filed with the proper regional trial court by any candidate who has duly
filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within ten days after proclamation of the results of the election.

As can be gleaned, Sec. 251 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that the 10-day period ought to be reckoned from the date of proclamation and not from the date of notice. As the elementary
rule in statutory construction goes, when the words and phrases of a statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be
taken to mean exactly what is says.26 This is known as the plain-meaning or verbal egis rule, expressed in the Latin maxim "verba legis non est recedendum," or "from the words of a statute there
should be no departure."27 Since the afore-quoted provision, as couched, us clear and free from ambiguity, its literal meaning must be applied without attempted interpretation.28

The rationale behind the non-extendible 10-day prescriptive period is not difficult to deduce – every candidate interested in the outcome of the election is expected to be vigilant enough in
protecting his or her votes and would, therefore, enlist the aid of volunteer pool watchers in every clustered precinct to guard against or document possible irregularities, or that the candidate
would personally be present at or, at the very least, would send representatives to the to the canvassing areas to ensure the proper tallying of votes and to monitor the real-time results of the
elections as they are electronically transmitted. Consequently, they are expected to know of the exact moment the winning candidate is proclaimed by the board of canvassers concerned.

True, Federico appears to have deviated from the wording of Sec. 251 of the Omnibus Election Code but that is only due to the peculiarities of the said case. It must be stressed that Our ruling in
Federico was based on considerations not in all fours with the case at bar.

Recapitulating Federico, the MBOC of Santo Tomas, Bantangas, on May 11, 2010, printed a COCP showing "SANCHEZ Edna P." (Edna) as the winning mayoralty Candidate. The prompted Maligaya
to file a Petition to Annul Proclamation against Edna Sanchez on May 20, 2010. However, the petition was later withdrawn, as agreed upon by the parties, leading to the case’s dismissal.
Unknown to Maligaya, a second print-out of the COCP was then issued by the MBOC, bearing the same date "May 11, 2010," crediting the same number of votes garnered by Edna to Federico
after the latter allegedly substituted Edna as mayoralty candidate. Federico, through the second print-out, was then declared the winning mayoralty candidate. Claiming that Maligaya only found
out this fact on May 27, 2010, he filed an election protest against Federico on June 1, 2010.

Affirming the Comelec’s ruling that the election protest against Federico was timely filed, the Court ratiocinated thusly:29

It has been argued that there is no evidence that Maligaya became aware of the issuance of the second COCVP in favor of Federico only on May 27, 2010. In this regard, the Court believes that
the actions taken by Maligaya after the elections and the separate proclamations of Edna and Federico strongly indicate that he was telling the truth. Indeed, there is no rhyme or reason why he
should file a petition questioning the proclamation of Edna if he had knowledge of the subsequent proclamation of Federico. The Court ado pts with approbation his reasoning on the matter.
Thus:

5.35. Private respondent pursued and prosecuted this case with the knowledge that it was Edna Sanchez who was proclaimed, until he came to know of the alleged proclamation of respondent
Federico on May 27, 2010. Consequently, he filed another petition on June 1, 2010, this time against Federico, to annul his proclamation. The June 1, 2010 petition was filed within ten days from
the knowledge of the alleged proclamation of Federico.

5.36. The filing of SPC NO. 10-022 demonstrates that private respondent Maligaya believed in good faith that it was Edna Sanchez that was proclaimed and that he did not initially know that there
was a COCVP in the name of Federico. SPC No. 10-022 is also a proof that petitioner did not dilly daily in protecting his rights. There simply is no reason and it runs counter to human conduct for
Maligaya to file a petition for annulment of proclamation of Edna Sanchez if he knew all along that it was Federico who was proclaimed.

5.37. In the same manner, the filing of the present petition against Federico shows that the proclamation of Federico was fraudulent or at least made surreptitiously.1âwphi1 Had Maligaya known
of the proclamation of Federico, he should have outrightly filed the petition for annulment of proclamation against Federico. But because it was made without any notice to the herein private
respondent, he only knew of it on May 27, 2010, thus, the petition on June 1, 2010. Private respondent did not certainly sleep on his rights as he filed the proper petition within the prescribed
period. He could not be penalized for belated filing when, as shown above, the COCVP of Federico was surreptitiously accomplished. Thus, the Comelec En Banc did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in upholding the interest of herein private respondent Maligaya.

To begin with, we have considered in Federico the fact that petitioner Federico therein could not have validly substituted Edna as mayoralty candidate in Santo Tomas, Batangas, and that as a
non-candidate in the mayoralty race, he cannot legally be declared and proclaimed the winner. Thus, the nullity of the substitution consequently led to the nullity of the proclamation.30 Here lies
the difference.

More importantly, the circumstances in Federico that (1) there were actually two different proclamations made by the MBOC, and (2) that the second proclamation was surreptitiously made were
essential in Our ruling therein. This is in stark contrast with the case at bench where there was only one proclamation, which was, by no means, clandestinely made. Here, there is no dispute that
there was only one mayoralty candidate proclaimed winner. Thus, the only issues pertain to when such proclamation was done, and which document accurately reported the same. In addition,
there was no allegation whatsoever of a surreptitious proclamation for Garcia’s proclamation was, in fact, publicly announced. As culled from the records, the members of the MBOC testified that
Garcia was proclaimed on May 14, 2013 in a well-attended ceremony.31

Atty. Pomer: When you said you raised the hand of the winning candidate, protestee, Maria Angela Garcia, at 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of May 14, 2013, were there persons present?
Leonilo Miguel: Yes, sir/
Atty. Pomer: Would you know if among those who were present there was a representative from the protestant, Payumo?
Socorro Sacdalan: I am not aware if there are representatives of the protestant because there were many persons, people inside the center.
Court: Question from the Court. Which exact place you said you proclaimed Maria Angela Garcia at 5:00p.m. on May 14?
Leonilo Miguel: At the session hall of the Sangguniang Bayan of Dinalupihan, Bataan.
Court: So, Atty. Pomer, do you have any other questions?
Atty. Pomer: Yes, Your Honor. Were there other winning candidates that you proclaimed on that occasion aside from the protestee?
Leonilo Miguel: Yes, sir. We proclaimed the vice-mayor and the eight (8) councilors.
Court: Same, May 14, 5:00 o’clock?
Leonilo Miguel: Yes, sir.
Atty. Pomer: So, the proclamation tool placed (sic) in the session hall. Was that in the same place the canvassing took placed (sic)?
Leonilo Miguel: Yes, sir.
Atty. Pomer: And that during the canvassing, there were watchers and lawyers of the candidates present, is it not?
Leonilo Miguel: Yes, sir.

Indeed, there is a substantial distinction between the extant case and Federico which, in the latter, prevented Maligaya, through no fault of his own, from filing an election protest within the
period prescribed.
Petitioner Payumo cannot be deemed to have acted in good faith

Further constrasting the case at bar with Federico, herein petitioner Payumo’s claim of good faith in relyin on the printed COCP fails to persuade.

"Good faith" is an intangible and abstract quality with no techinal meaning or statutory definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the
absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. It implies honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon
inquiry.32

Here, knowledge of Garcia’s May 14, 2013 proclamation is attributable to Payumo since he was represented by one Fernando Manalili (Manalili) during the canvassing proceeding, as per the
minutes prepared by the MBOC.33 Hornbook doctrine is that notice to the agent is notice to the principal.34 And as appearing in the minutes, several representatives were fielded by the Liberal
Party, the political banner under which Payumo filed his candidacy, to monitor the results real-time.35

May 13-14, 2013

1. Atty. Mary Kristine Reyes Chu NUP/Ma. Angela Garcia – Albert Garcia
2. Atty. Lowell John J. Fetizanan Nationalist Peoples Coalition Party
3. Atty. Norby Caparas Herminia B. Roman
4. Atty. Honey Lynco Liberal Party
5. Fernando P. Manalili Liberal Party (Jojo Payumo)
6. Ramon Alfonso T. Munez Liberal Party
7. Bohjee Bobby A. Yap Liberal Party
8. Bro. Roy Quiambao PPCRV
9. Reymond Fontailla Paralegal
10. Janette Oftana Watcher
11. Harold Cacacho Watcher
12. Carlos Caringal Lawyer
Noteworthy is that apart from Manilili, Payumo had other representatives present during the canvassing on May 13-14, 2013. Thus, even if we entertain Payumo’s postulation that Manilili did not
stay long enough to witness the canvassing proceedings from start to finish, and that he was allegedly not present at least during Garcia’s proclamation, we, nevertheless, still cannot give
credence to petitioner’s claim of good faith. Payumo cannot plausibly feign ignorance of Garcia’s proclamation since knowledge of such fact is attributable to him not only through Manalili, but
also through the other party representatives. Consequently, Payumo is then barred from otherwise claiming that Garcia was proclaimed mayor on May 14, 2013.
Moreover, the fact that Payumo only received a copy of the printed, and not the manual COCP, is of no moment. For as the losing candidate, he is not, under the Comelec rules, even entitled to
be furnished a copy of the COCP. Section 30 of Comelec Resolution No. 964836 provides that insofar as the electoral candidates are concerned, only the winners are entitled to a copy of the
COCP, viz:

Sec. 30. Distribution of COCP and SOVs. – The Board shall generate and print sufficient copies of the COCP and one (1) copy of the SOV to be distributed as follows:
a. MBOC/CBOC
1. To the Election Records and Statistics Department (ERSD) of the commission;
2. To be posted on the bulletin board of the municipal hall, supported by SOVP;
3. To the Chairman, MBOC/CBOC;
4. To the Secretary, Sangguniang Bayan/Panlungsod;
5. To the Municipal Treasurer;
6. To a winning Candidate for Mayor; Winning Candidate for Vice- Mayor; and
7. To each winning Candidate for members of the Sangguniang Bayan/Panlungsod.
The wording of the afore-quoted rule is pregnant with meaning. First, its literal interpretation is that only the winning candidates have the demandable right to be furnished a copy of the COCP.
Second, it amplifies the general rule that the prescriptive period ought to be reckoned from the actual date of proclamation, not from notice through service of a COCP, since the losing candidates
are not even required to be served a copy of the COCP in the first place. Lastly, it warns the candidates to be more vigilant in monitoring the results of the elections for them to be conscious of
the deadline for filing an election protest, should they opt to contest the results.
In sum, the Court maintains the general rule that the reglementary period for instituting an election period should be reckoned from the actual date of proclamation, not from the date of notice.
Absent any circumstances analogous to the factual milieu of Federico, a relaxation of the rules will not be warranted.

Finally, as regards the MBOC’s alleged disregard of the requirement under Comelec Resolution No. 9648 to post copies of the COCP in the designated areas, and to serve them to the other
winning candidates, needless to say that they do not and could not invalidate Garcia’s proclamation. Neither do they toll the 10-day period to file an election protest in this case since Payumo is
still deemed aware of the results by way of notice to his agent or agents. Instead, these alleged omissions merely expose the members of the MBOC to possible liability should it be proven that
they deviated from procedure, which issue is not yet ripe for Us to decide.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed September 10, 2014 and January 29, 2015 Resolutions of the Commission on Elections in Case No. EAC [AEL]
11-2014 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the February 17, 2014 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5 in Balanga, Bataan, dismissing Petitioner Jose Alejandre Payumo III’s
election protest for being barred by the statute of limitations is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

PARAS v COMELEC

Facts: Petitioner is an elected barangay chairman of Pula, Cabanatuan City in 1994. Sometime in October 1995, A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by his constituents. Public
respondent COMELEC resolved to approve the petition and set the recall election on November 13. In view of the petitioner’s opposition, COMELEC deferred the election and rescheduled it on
December 16, 1995. To prevent the recall election from taking place, the petitioner filed a petition for injunction before the RTC. The trial court issued a TRO. After conducting a summary hearing,
the court dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order. The public respondent on a resolution date January 5, 1996, rescheduled the recall election to be held January 13, 1996. Hence,
this petition for certiorari. The petitioner argues the pursuant to Section 74b of the Local Government code: “no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred (SK) election was set on
the first Monday of May 1996.
Issue: Whether or not the recall election in question is in violation to the provisions of Section 74b of the Local Government Code.

Held: It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that every part of the statute must be considered together with the
other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Paras’ interpretation of the law is too literal that it does not accord with the intentions of the authors of the law.
The spirit rather that the letters of a law determines its construction. Hence, it was held that the “regular local election” refers to an election where the office held by the local elective official
sought to be recalled.

CORNELIA MATABUENA v. PETRONILA CERVANTES, GR No. L-28771, 1971-03-31

Facts: The plaintiff, now appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a sister of the deceased Felix Matabuena, maintains that a donation made while he was living maritally without benefit of marriage to
defendant, now appellee

Petronila Cervantes, was void. Defendant would uphold its validity. The lower court, after noting that it was made at a time before defendant was married to the donor, sustained the latter's
stand. Hence... this appeal. The question, as noted, is novel in character, this Court not having had as yet the opportunity of ruling on it. A 1954 decision of the Court of Appeals, Buenaventura v.
Bautista,[2] by the then Justice J. B. L. Reyes, who was appointed to this Court later that year, is indicative of the appropriate response that should be given. The conclusion reached therein is that
a donation between common-law spouses falls... within the prohibition and is "null and void as contrary to public policy."[3] Such a view merits fully the acceptance of this Court. The decision
must be reversed.

Issues: whether the ban on a donation between the spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship.

Ruling: The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to defendant Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior to
the death of Felix

Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by their marriage on March 28, 1962. She is therefore his widow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to
one-half of the inheritance and the... plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the other half

WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November 23, 1965 dismissing the complaint with costs is reversed. The questioned donation is declared void, with the rights of plain-tiff and defendant
as pro indiviso heirs to the... property in question recognized. The case is remanded to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in accordance with the above opinion. Without
pronouncement as to costs.

Principles:

A donation under the terms of Article 133 of the Civil Code is void if made between the spouses during the marriage.

When the donation was made by Felix Matabuena in favor of the defendant on February 20, 1956, Petronila Cervantes and Felix Matabuena were not yet married. At that time they were not
spouses. They... became spouses only when they married on March 28, 1962, six years after the deed of donation had been executed

While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a "donation between the spouses during the marriage", policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality
require that the... same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship.

Prasnik v. Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-8639 (March 23, 1956)

FACTS: Petitioner seeks to adopt four children which he claims to be his and Paz Vasquez’ children without the benefit of marriage. The Solicitor General opposed this stating that Art. 338 of
the Civil Code allows a natural child to be adopted by his father refers only to a child who has not been acknowledged as natural child. It maintains that in order that a natural child may be
adopted by his natural father or mother there should not be an acknowledgment of the status of the natural child for it will go against Art. 335.

ISSUE: W/N the Civil Code allows for the adoption of acknowledged natural children of the father or mother.

HELD: The law intends to allow adoption whether the child be recognized or not. If the intention were to allow adoption only to unrecognized children, Article 338 would be of no useful purpose.
The rights of an acknowledged natural child are much less than those of a legitimated child. Contending that this is unnecessary would deny the illegitimate children the chance to acquire these
rights. The trend when it comes to adoption of children tends to go toward the liberal. The law does not prohibit the adoption of an acknowledged natural child which when compared to a
natural child is equitable. An acknowledged natural child is a natural child also and following the words of the law, they should be allowed adoption.

PEOPLE VS MACARANDANG

PARAS, C.J.:

Moro Sumaguina Macarandang was accused and, after trial, convicted of the crime of illegal possession of firearms in the Court of First Instance of Lanao under the following information:

"That on or about June 8, 1954, in the Municipality of Marantao, Province of Lanao, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep and have in his custody and control one Riot Gun, Winchester, 12 GA. SN-942131 and (8) rounds of ammunitions, without first having
obtained the proper license or permit therefor from competent authority."

In the present appeal the accused, admitting the ownership and possession of the firearm and ammunitions in question, invokes as his legal excuse or authority therefor, the appointment issued
him by Governor Dimakuta as secret agent on October 1, 1953, which reads as follows:

"To Whom it May Concern:

"For having shown good faith by previously surrendering to this Office a firearm, Datu Sumaguina Macarandang of Kamalig, Marantao, Lanao, has been appointed SECRET AGENT of this Office
without compensation, to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes. Accordingly, he is hereby authorized to hold and carry in his possession one (1) Riot
Winchester Shotgun, 12 GA. Serial No. 942131 with twenty (20) rounds of ammunitions for the successful execution of his hazardous missions.

"Datu Sumaguina Macarandang shall personally report to me from time to time all activities and whereabouts of lawless and wanted elements roaming in the Municipal District of Marantao, as
well as all matters affecting tranquility therein existing."

It may be true that, as held by the trial court, the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit, but section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides, as shown at least
by the subject matter thereof, that "peace officers" are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. The appointment of the accused as secret agent
to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal
police expressly covered by section 879.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and the accused acquitted, with costs de oficio. So ordered.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

People of the Philippines vs. M. Mapa

Facts: The accused was convicted in violation of Sec. 878 in connection to Sec. 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and further amended by R.A. 4.
On August 13, 1962, the accused was discovered to have in its possession and control a home-made revolver cal. 22 with no license permit. In the court proceeding, the accused admitted that he
owns the gun and affirmed that it has no license. The accused further stated that he is a secret agent appointed by Gov. Leviste of Batangas and showed evidences of appointment. In his defense,
the accused presented the case of People vs. Macarandang, stating that he must acquitted because he is a secret agent and which may qualify into peace officers equivalent to municipal police
which is covered by Art. 879.

Issue: Whether or not holding a position of secret agent of the Governor is a proper defense to illegal possession of firearms.

Ruling: The Supreme Court in its decision affirmed the lower court’s decision. It stated that the law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . .
. possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or
ammunition." The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine
Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and
guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties.

The Court construed that there is no provision for the secret agent; including it in the list therefore the accused is not exempted.

PEOPLE v. JESUS SANTAYANA Y ESCUDERO, GR No. L-22291, 1976-11-15

Facts: Accused, Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year and one (1) day to two
(2) years and to pay the costs.

On Feb-ruary 19, 1962, accused Jesus Santayana, was appointed as "Special Agent"[1] by then Colonel Jose C. Maristela, Chief of the CIS. On March 9, 1962, a Memorandum Receipt[2] for
equipment was issued in the name of the accused regarding one pistol Melior SN-122137 with one (1) mag and stock. Col. Maristela likewise issued an undated certification[3] to the effect that
the accused was an... accredited member of the CIS and the pistol described in the said Memorandum Receipt was given to him by virtue of his appointment as special agent and that he was
authorized to carry and possess the same in the performance of his official duty and for his personal... protection. On October 29, 1962, the accused was found in Plaza Miranda in possession of
the above-described pistol with four rounds of ammunition, cal. 25, without a license to possess them. An investigation was conducted and thereupon, a cor-responding complaint... was filed
against the accused. The case underwent trial after which the accused was convicted of the crime charged with its corresponding penalty. Hence, the case was appealed to US and the accused
assigned three errors allegedly committed by the trial court in... disposing of this case.

Issues: whether or not the present subject matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court pursuant to Republic Act No. 2613... whether or not the appointment of the
appellant as special agent of the CIS... which apparently authorizes him to carry and possess firearms exempts him from securing a license or permit corresponding thereto

Ruling: Resolving the issue of jurisdiction, there is no doubt that under Section 87 of Republic Act No. 286, as amended by Republic Act No. 2613, the justice of the peace and mu-nicipal courts
have original jurisdiction over cases of illegal possession of firearms. But equally... the Court of First Ins-tance of Manila, which took cognizance of this case had juris-diction over the offense
charged because under Section 44 of Republic Act No. 296, Court of First Instance have original jurisdiction "in all criminal cases in which the penalty pro-vided by law... is imprisonment for more
than six (6) months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos (P200.00)"; and the offense charged in the information is punishable by imprison-ment for a period of not less than one (1) year and
one (1) day nor more than five (5) years, or both such... imprisonment and a fine of not less than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or more than five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).

As to the second issue to be resolved, there is no question that appellant was appointed as CIS secret agent[4] with the authority to carry and possess firearms. Indeed, appellant was issued a
firearm in the performance of his official duties... and for his personal protection.[5] It also appears that appellant was informed by Col. Maristela that it was not necessary for him to apply for a
license or to register the said firearm because it was government property and therefore could not legally be... registered or licensed in appellant's name.[6] Capt. Adolfo M. Bringas from whom
appellant received the firearm also informed the latter that no permit to carry the pistol was necessary "because you are already appointed as CIS agent."

WHEREFORE , and conformably with the recommend-ation of the Solicitor General, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and appellant Jesus Santayana y Escudero is hereby acquitted.
The bond for his provisional release is cancelled. Costs... de officio.