Manila Railroad Company v. Insular Collector of CustomsCase No. 167G.R. No.
CA
30264 (March 12, 1929)Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No. 84
FACTS: Appellee Manila Railroad Company used dust shields made of wool on all
of its railway wagons to cover the axle box which protects from dust the oil
deposited therein which serves as lubricant of the bearings of the wheel. Under par.
141 of Sec. 8 of the Tariff Law of 1909, manufactures of wool, not otherwise
provided for are subject to 40% ad valorem. On the other hand, under par. 197 of
same law, vehicles for use on railways and tramways, and detached parts thereof are
subject to10% ad valorem. Appellant Insular Collector of Customs classified dust
shields as “manufactures of wool, not otherwise provided for.” Upon appeal,
however, the CFI overruled the decision and classified dust shields as “detached
parts” of vehicles for use on railways
ISSUE: Whether dust shields should be classified as manufactures of wool or as
detached parts of vehicles for use on railways.
HELD: Dust shields are classified for the purposes of tariff as detached parts of
vehicles under par. 197. It is a general rule in the interpretation of statutes levying
taxes not to extend their provisions beyond the clear import of the language used. In
case of doubt, they should be construed strictly against the government and in favor
of the citizen. And when there is in the same statute a particular enactment and a
general one which in its comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the
former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general one must be
taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the
provisions of the particular enactment.
Serfino v.
(GR L-40858, 15 September 1987)
Ponente
: Paras, J.
Facts:
On 25 August 1937, a parcel of land was patented in pthe name of Pacifico
Casamayor (OCT 1839). On 14 December 1945, he sold said land in favor of
Nemesia D. Balatazar (TCT No. 57-N, 18 January 1946). OCT 1839 was lost during
the war and upon petition of Nemesia Baltazar, the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental ordered the reconstitution thereof. Pursuant thereto, OCT 14-R (1839)
was issued on 18 January 1946 in the name of Pacifico Casamayor. On that same
day, TCT 57-N was issued in the name of Nemesia Baltazar but after the cancellation
of OCT 14-R (1839). On 15 August 1951, Nemesia Baltazar, sold said property to
Lopez Sugar Central Mill Co., and the latter did not present the documents for
registration until 17 December 1964 to the Office of the Registry of Deeds. Said
office refused registration upon its discovery that the same property was covered by
another certificate of title, TCT 38985, in the name of Federico Serfino. On 19
November 1964, the spouses Serfinos mortgaged the land to the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) to secure a loan in the amount of P5,000.00; which was inscribed in
TCT No. 38985. The Lopez Sugar Central instituted an action to recover said land;
and the lower court rendered a decision ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 38985;
issuance of a new TCT in the name of plaintiff; and the payment of the plaintiff PNB
the loan of spouses Serfinos secured by said land. Both parties appealed from this
decision of the trial court. Ruling on the assignment of errors, the appellate court
affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification in its decision setting
aside the decision of the trial court declaring plaintiff liable to PNB for payment,
however, ordering the plaintiff to reimburse the Serfino spouses of the sum
P1,839.49, representing the unpaid taxes and penalties paid by the latter when they
repurchased the property. Hence, the appeal by the spouses Serfino and PNB to the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the auction sale of the disputed property was null and void.
Held:
The assailed decision of the appellate court declares that the prescribed procedure in
auction sales of property for tax delinquency being in derogation of property rights
should be followed punctiliously. Strict adherence to the statutes governing tax sales
is imperative not only for the protection of the tax payers, but also to allay any
possible suspicion of collusion between the buyer and the public officials called upon
to enforce such laws. Notice of sale to the delinquent land owners and to the public
in general is an essential and indispensable requirement of law, the non-fulfillment of
which vitiates the sale. In the present case, Lopez Sugar Central was not entirely
negligent in its payment of land taxes. The record shows that taxes were paid for the
years 1950 to 1953 and a receipt therefor was obtained in its name. The sale
therefore by the Province of Negros Occidental of the land in dispute to the spouses
Serfinos was void since the Province of Negros Occidental was not the real owner of
the property thus sold. In turn, the spouses Serfinos title which has been derived from
that of the Province of Negros Occidental is likewise void. However, the fact that the
public auction sale of the disputed property was not valid cannot in any way be
attributed to the
mortgagee’s fault. The inability of the Register of Deeds
to notify the actual owner or Lopez Sugar Central of the scheduled public auction
sale was partly due to the failure of Lopez Sugar Central to declare the land in its
name for a number of years and to pay the complete taxes thereon. PNB is therefore
entitled to the payment of the mortgage loan as ruled by the trial court and exempted
from the payment of costs. The Supreme Court affirmed the assailed decision, with
modification that PNB mortgage credit must be paid by Lopez Sugar Central.
ALEJANDRA PABLO
vs.
HON. SILVERIO Q. CASTILLO, Presiding Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial Court,
First Judicial Region, Dagupan City and PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 12510: August 3, 2000FACTS: Alejandra Pablo was convicted of a
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. She applied for probation and was later
denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the he should be denied probation on the ground of
disqualification from probation under Section 9 of P.D. 968.HELD: The Court ruled
that under Section 9 of the Probation Law, P.D. 968, the following offenders cannot
avail of the benefits of probation: a) those sentenced to serve a maximum term of
imprisonment of more than six years; b) those convicted of subversion or any crime
against the national security or the public order;
c) those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense
punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or fine of not
less than two hundred pesos
;d) those who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree; and
e) those who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of
this Decree became applicable pursuant to Section 33 thereof. The National
Probation Office denied petitioners application for probation under Section 9
paragraph (c) P.D. 968 because a prior conviction was entered against the petitioner
on June 21, 1995 in Criminal Case No. 94-0199, penalizing her with a fine of
P4,648.00; there by placing her within the ambit of disqualification from probation
under Section 9 paragraph (c) of P.D. 968.It is a basic rule of statutory construction
that if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without any interpretation. Not only that; in the matter of
interpretation of laws on probation, the Court has pronounced that "the policy of
liberality of probation statutes cannot prevail against the categorical provisions of the
law. "Section 9 paragraph (c) is in clear and plain language, to the effect that a
person who was previously convicted by final judgment of an offense punishable by
imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than
two hundred pesos, is disqualified from applying for probation. This provision of law
is definitive and unqualified. There is nothing in Section 9, paragraph (c) which
qualifies "previous conviction" as referring to a conviction for a crime which is
entirely different from that for which the offender is applying
for probation or a crime which arose out of a single act or transaction as petitioner
would have the court to understand. It is well-settled that the probation law is not a
penal statue; and therefore, the principle of liberal interpretation is inapplicable. And
when the meaning is clearly discernible from the language of the statue, there is no
room for construction and interpretation.
 Issue: whether in claiming death benefits of an employee in GSIS, the causal
connection of occupational disease that caused death and the nature of work should
be clearly established?

G.R. No. L-48605 December 14, 1981DOMNA N. VILLAVERT, Held: As stated by the Medico Legal Officer of NBI that although the cause of acute
petitioner,vs.EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION & hemorrhagic pancreatitis is unknown, researches points out that physical and mental
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Philippine Constabulary), stresses are strong causal factors in the development of the disease. And it was
respondents. clearly established based on evidence presented by the petitioner that the nature of
the work of that deceased directly caused or at least aggravates his disease. This was
Facts: Marcellino N. Villavert, son of the petitioner, was an employee in the supported by the fact that he never drinks nor smoke nor engages on immoral habits.
Philippine Constabulary as a code verifier. In addition to his duties, he also And as mandated in Art. 4 of the Labor Code, “All doubts in the implementation and
performed the duties of a computer operator and clerk typist. He performed his duties interpretation of this Code, including its rules and implementation shall be resolved
not only as code verifier but also handled administrative functions, computer in favor of the labor”.
operation and typing jobs due to the shortage of civilian personnel. On December 11,
1975, Marcelino reported to his work as usual. He was complaining chest pain and Ruling: the assailed decision was set aside and GSIS was ordered to pay petitioner
headache in the late afternoon but because of the voluminous work, he was still death benefits. different from that for which the offender is applying for probation or
required to render overtime service for computing allowance and preparing checks a crime which arose out of a single act or transaction as petitioner would have the
for the salary of the Philippine Constabulary and Integrated National Police court to understand. It is well-settled that the probation law is not a penal statute; and
personnel throughout the country on or before December 15, 1975. When he came therefore, the principle of liberal interpretation is inapplicable. And when the
home due to fatigue he went to his bed as he arrived without taking his meal. Shortly meaning is clearly discernible from the language of the statute, there is no room for
after, his mother, the petitioner, noticed that Marcellino was grasping for breath, construction or interpretation.
perspiring profusely and mumbling incoherent words. Petitioner tried to wake him
but failed to do so. She therefore rushed him to the hospital but he never regained
consciousness and pronounced that the case of death was acute hemorrhagic
pancreatitis. Petitioner filed claim for the death benefits of Marcelino to the
Government Service Insurance System together with the affidavit of Lt. Colonel
Felino C. Pacheco attesting that he worked as code verifier and performed other
additional duties. Inter alia, he testified that the deceased was computer operator
consequently subject to excessive heat and cold. He also testified that the deceased
never drinks alcohol liquor nor smokes nor engages on immoral habits. To
corroborate Pacheco’s affidavit, Rustico P. Valenzuela, Chief Clerk of the
Constabulary Computer Center certified that indeed the deceased was performing
additional work load due to the shortage of qualified civilian personnel. He also
certified that on the said date, the deceased was complaining of chest pain and
headache but he was obligated to carry on work because of the said deadline. He also
pointed out that Marcelino was not able to consult for his routine physical check-up
due to the rotation of his duties. The petition was denied by GSIS on the ground that
acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis is not an occupational disease and the petitioner failed
to show that there was causal connection between the fatal ailment of Marcellino and
the nature of his work. On the hand, Medico-Legal of the National Bureau of
Investigation stated that the exact cause of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis is still
unknown although the most research data are agreed that physical and mental
stresses are strong casual factors in the development of the disease.
Maria Manahan vs ECC
Facts:
Nazario Manahan, the deceased husband of the petitioner, died of “Enteric Fever”
while employed as classroom teacher in Las Piñas Municipal High School.
The petitioner for a claim with the Government Service Insurance for death benefit
under PD 626. The GSI denied the claim on a finding that the ailment of the
deceased is not an occupational disease on the ground that enteric fever is similar in
effect to typhoid fever, in the sense that both are produced by Salmonella organisms.
The Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) affirmed the decision of the GSI
on a finding that the ailment of the deceased was not aggravated by the nature of the
latter’s duties as a teacher.
Issues:
The issue is whether or not the Workmen’s Compensation should be resolved in
favor of the worker?
Ruling:
The SC held that compensability subsits in favor of the claimant. It has set aside the
decition of the ECC and ordered the GSIS to pay petitioner the death compensation
benefit due to the deceased.
Although enteric fever is not an occupational disease, considering the cause of the
illness, the risk contracting it could have been increased by the working conditions of
the deceased, a teacher, who used to eat his meals at the school canteen and used the
comfort room and other facilities of the school.
Under the third paragraph of art. 292 of the of the New Labor Code, workmen’s
compensation claims accruing prior to the effectivity of this code and during the
period from November 1, 1974 up to December 31, 1974 shall be processed and
adjudicated in accordance with the law and rules at the time their causes of action
accrued.
In the case at bar, the Supreme Court maintained that it should be resolved in favor
of the worker, and that social legislations – like the workmen’s compensation act and
the labor code should be liberally construed to attain their laudable objective, i.e., to
give relief to the workman and/or his dependents in the event that the former should
die or sustain an injury.
G.R. No. L-12150 May 26, 1960
BENJAMIN CO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
Ernesto P. Parel, Daniel Z. Velasco and Herculano C. Beronilla for appellee.
Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for
appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is a petition for naturalization which, after hearing was granted, the court
ordering that after the lapse of two years from the date the decision becomes final
and all the requisites provided for in Republic Act No. 503 have been complied with,
a certificate of naturalization be issued to petitioner.
Petitioner was born on March 13, 1931 in Bangued, Abra. He is the son of Go Cham
and Yu Suan, both Chinese. He owes his allegiance to the Nacionalist Government
of China. He is married to Leonor Go, the marriage having been celebrated in the
Catholic church of Bangued, Abra. He speaks and writes English as well as the
Ilocano and Tagalog dialects. He graduated from the Abra Valley College, and
finished his primary studies in the "Colegio" in Bangued, Abra, both schools being
recognized by the government. He has a child two months old. He has never been
accused of any crime involving moral turpitude. He is not opposed to organized
government, nor is he a member of any subversive organization. He does not believe
in, nor practice, polygamy. Since his birth, he has never gone abroad. He mingles
with the Filipinos. He prefers a democratic form of government and stated that if his
petition is granted he would serve the government either in the military or civil
department.
He is a merchant dealing in the buy and sell of tobacco. He also is part owner of a
store known as "Go Tian Store" in Bangued, Abra. In his tobacco business, he has a
working capital of P10,000.00 which he claims to have been accumulated thru
savings. He contributes to civic and charitable organizations like the Jaycees, Rotary,
Red Cross and to town fiestas. He likes the customs of the Filipinos because he has
resided in the Philippines for a long time. During the year 1956, he claims to have
earned P1,000.00 in his tobacco business. He expects to make P2,000.00 more from
the same business without however specifying to what years said income would
correspond. With respect to the store of which he claims to be a part owner, he stated
that his father gave him a sum of less than P3,000.00 representing one-fourth of the
sales. Aside from being a co-owner of said store, he receives a monthly salary of
P120.00 as a salesman therein.
He took a course in radio mechanics and completed the same in 1955. He has no vice
of any kind. He claims that he has never been deliquent in the payment of taxes. But
he admitted that he did not file his income tax return when he allegedly received an
amount of not less than P3,000 from his father which he claims to have invested in
his tobacco business. On cross-examination, when the fiscal asked him if he believed
in the principle underlying the Philippine constitution, he answered that "he believes
in the laws of the Philippines." However, he did not state what principles of the
Constitution he knew, although when asked what laws of the Philippines he believes
in, he answered "democracy". Asked why he did not file his income tax return, he
stated that his father had already filed his income tax return. He merely promised,
that he would file his. He presented his alien certificate of registration, but did not
present the alien certificates of registration of his wife and child.
The government is now appealing the decision of the trial court on the ground that it
erred in finding that petitioner has all the qualifications for naturalization and none of
the disqualifications mentioned in the law.
The government contends that from the evidence itself introduced by petitioner it
would appear that he failed to comply with some of the requirements prescribed by
law in order to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen. Thus, it is claimed, he has
not stated that he believes in the principles underlying the constitution and that it was
only on cross-examination, when the fiscal asked him whether he believed in the
principles underlying the constitution, that he answered that "He believes in the laws
of the Philippines", and that when he was asked what those laws he believes in, he
gave an answer which conveys the meaning that he believes in democracy or in a
democratic form of government. It is contended that such belief is not sufficient to
comply with the requirement of the law that one must believe in the principles
underlying our constitution.
Our law also requires that petitioner must have conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in
his relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which
he is living. It is contended that petitioner has also failed to comply with this legal
requirement for he failed to register his wife and child with the Bureau of
Immigration as required by the Alien Registration Act. He has, therefore, failed to
conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner in his relation with our
government.
It furthermore appears that he failed to file his income tax return despite the fact that
he has a fixed salary of P1,440.00 a year and made a profit of P1,000.00 in his
tobacco business, and received an amount less than P3,000 from his father as one-
fourth of the proceeds of the sale of the store, the total of which is more than what is
required by law for one to file an income tax return, a fact which indicates that he has
not also conducted himself properly in his relation with our government. His
reasoning that he made that earning during the year in which this case was being
heard is not convincing.
Considering that "naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly
construed in favor of the government and against the applicant" (Co Quing Reyes vs.
Republic, 104 Phil., 889), we are constrained to hold that the trial court erred in
granting the petition for naturalization.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed, without pronouncement as to
costs.

There is merit in this claim. Indeed, the scope of the word law in ordinary legal
parlance does not necessarily include the constitution which is the fundamental law
of the land, nor does it cover all the principles underlying our constitution. Thus, our
constitution expressly declares as one of its fundamental policies that the Philippines
renounces war as an instrument of national policy, that the defense of the State is the
prime duty of the government, that the duty and right of the parents to rear their
children for civic efficiency shall receive the support of the State, and that the
promotion of social justice shall be its main concern. In so stating that he believes
merely in our laws, he did not necessarily refer to those principles embodied in our
constitution which are referred to in the law.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-16980. November 29, 1961.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF ARSENIO G. PE TO BE
ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. ARSENIO G.
PE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-
Appellee.
R. Gerochi for Petitioner-Appellant.
Solicitor General for Oppositor-Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CITIZENSHIP; ENGAGING IN PUBLIC SERVICE; CONSIDERED
APPLICANT’S FAILURE TO CONDUCT HIMSELF IN PROPER AND
IRREPROACHABLE MANNER. — Applicant being an alien, his ownership and
operation of a public utility vehicle, in violation of the Public Service Act, is
evidence that he has not conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner in
his relations with the constituted government of the Philippines as well as with the
community in which he is living. (Sec. 2, C.A. 473).
2. ID.; BURDEN OF PROOF IN NATURALIZATION CASES; STRICT
CONSTRUCTION AGAINST APPLICANT. — In naturalization cases, the burden
is on the applicant to prove by competent and satisfactory evidence that he has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications specified by law, and that in case of
doubt, the naturalization law should be construed strictly against the applicant (Yap
Joco v. Com. 40 Off. Gaz., 1235; Cho v. Republic, 106 Phil., 775; 57 Off. Gaz., [47]
8477; Karam Singh v. Republic, 97 Phil., 622; 51 Off. Gaz., [10] 5172.)
3. ID.; COURT MAY MOTU PROPRIO DENY APPLICATION. — Even without
written opposition by the Government, the Court may motu proprio deny an
application for naturalization if the evidence fails to prove that all requirements have
been met (Yap Chin v. Republic, 93 Phil., 215; Singh v. Republic, supra).
DECISION
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Antique denying the
petition of Arsenio Go Pe for naturalization.
The ground upon which the trial court disapproved the petition was brought to light
in the course of petitioner’s presentation of evidence, when one of his own character
witnesses testified that the applicant owns a public utility passenger truck plying
from Guisijan to Iloilo. Later, this witness amended his testimony and said that the
truck belongs to Arsenio’s father, and that petitioner only manages it. Applicant, for
his part, belied both versions, asserting that the public utility truck is owned by one
Zacarias Sarabia; that because its owner usually borrows tools from them, said truck
is frequently seen in their premises.
From the circumstances elicited, the trial court has found that the truck in question is
definitely owned either by petitioner or his father; and since applicant admitted
knowing that ownership of a public utility vehicle by him or his father violates the
Public Service Act, he cannot claim to have "conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in
his relations with the constituted government as well as with the community in which
he is living" (Sec. 2, C.A. 473).
Said the trial court —
"The explanation offered by Pe fails to convince the Court that neither he nor his
father owns the truck. Baylon’s testimony, replete as it is with particulars as to where
the truck is kept, its route, the fare charged, and who actually operates it, leaves no
doubt in the mind of the Court that the truck is owned by either the petitioner or his
father.
"Baylon is a close neighbor and friend of Pe and his family. Pe said that he choose
Baylon out of his many acquaintances in Laua-an to be one of his character witnesses
because he knew him to be truthful. Later, when he remembered that Baylon’s
testimony on the matter of the truck may be damaging, he said that sometimes, he
misinterpreted things." (p. 24, Record on Appeal)."cralaw virtua1aw library
A review of the record fails to disclose anything that warrants a reversal of this
finding. This fact was brought out no less than by the applicant’s own witness in a
tenor that was distinctly intended to draw a favorable inference on the civic spirit of
the applicant by the latter’s act of even offering "the services of their truck freely
whenever it is needed by the municipality . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioner in this appeal suggests alternative explanations as to the ownership of the
truck: It was just left in petitioner’s premises for lack of parking space; it was left in
the place to load it with petitioner’s cargo to Iloilo; it could even be owned by the
applicant’s own brother who is already a naturalized Filipino. But then, the burden of
proof was on the applicant, and it does not appear that he has adduced sufficient
proof to overcome what his own witness spontaneously declared, not even the
testimony of the alleged registered owner, Sarabia. Not impugned by the record, the
trial court’s findings in this regard should not be disturbed.
Moreover, petitioner’s claim that he earns P250 a month is not supported by the
evidence. Conveniently, this income allegedly represents applicant’s salary as
manager in his father’s business, and aside from Arsenio himself, was averred only
by his father in a statement that is not even sworn to (Exhibit O). Both this salary and
applicant’s alleged income from farming as reported in his tax returns for 1958 and
1959 (Exhibit P; P-1) do not appear in the returns for the previous years (Exhibit P-2;
P-3), during which, in fact, petitioner was exempted from tax on the basis of an
income of only P1,800 per annum. His increased income as shown in the tax returns
for 1958 and 1959 deepens its dubious tint considering further that his petition for
naturalization was instituted on May 26, 1958, the same year that his income
suddenly increased. Consequently, petitioner has also failed to prove satisfactorily
that he has a lucrative trade, profession or occupation, which is another ground for
denying his petition, since he does not appear to own real state worth P5,000.
In naturalization cases, the burden is on the applicant to prove by competent and
satisfactory evidence that he has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications specified by law. The naturalization law should be strictly
construed, and doubts resolved, against the applicant (Yap Joco v. Com. 40 Off.
Gaz., 1235; Cho v. Republic, L-12408, Dec. 28, 1959; Karam Singh v. Republic, L-
7567, Sept. 29, 1955). Without objection by the government, the court may motu
proprio deny the application if the evidence fails to prove that all requirements have
been met (Yap Chin v. Republic, L-4177, May 29, 1953; Singh v. Republic, supra).
Accordingly, there is no merit to the contention that a written opposition must be
filed by the government before the petition could be denied.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs
against Petitioner-Appellant.
GR No. L-14214, May 25, 1960 ]
RICHARD VELASCO v. REPUBLIC
108 Phil. 234
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is a petition for naturalization filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila
which, after trial, was denied for failure of petitioner to meet the requirements of the
law. Petitioner has appealed.
Petitioner was born in the Philippines on May 12, 1932 of spouses Peter Velasco and
Miguela Tiu who became naturalized citizens in 1956. He alleges that since his birth
in Manila on May 12, 1932 he continuously resided in the Philippines, particularly at
1441 Magdalena St., Manila; that he finished his elementary education at the
Francisco Balagtas Elementary School, and his high school at the Arellano
University; that he pursued his collegiate studies at the University of the East where
he graduated in dentistry in 1954; that he is a citizen of the Republic of China in
Formosa; that he has not followed the citizenship of his father when the latter
became naturalized as he was then already 23 years old; that he is single, although he
is engaged to be married to a Filipino girl by the name of Noemi Eugenio; that he is
at present employed at the Wilson Drug Store since February, 1957 with a monthly
salary of P150.00; that previously he worked as a salesman of his father with a salary
of P2,400.00 per annum, even. if his father was only an agent of Elizalde and Co.;
that he knows how to speak and write English and Tagalog; that he is a Catholic by
faith; and he has never been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; that
he does not believe in polygamy or in anarchy or the use of violence for the
predominance of men's ideas; that he does not own any real property although he
allegedly has cash savings amounting to P3,500.00 at the Republic Savings Bank,
P1,000.00 worth of shares of stocks of the Far Eastern University, P2,000.00 shares
of stock of the Marinduque Iron Mines, and P1,000.00 in cash; that he is not
suffering from any contagious disease; that he has mingled socially with the
Filipinos; that he has shown a desire to embrace the customs and traditions of the
Filipinos; and that he desires to become a Filipino citizen because he considered the
Philippines as his country and the Filipinos as his countrymen.
His qualifications as to moral character were attested by Santiago Mariano, a
sergeant of the Manila Police Department, and Mrs. Paz J. Eugenio, a housekeeper,
who admitted that she is the prospective mother-in-law of petitioner.
The trial court found that there are three names mentioned in the petition and in the
documentary evidence submitted in support thereof, namely, Richard Velasco,
Richard C. Velasco, and Richard Chua Velasco, and that while petitioner states in his
petition that his full name is Richard Velasco, the signature thereon is Richard C.
Velasco. Again, the court found that the joint affidavit of said witnesses states that
the affiants personally know and are acquainted with Richard Velasco while the
documentary evidence shows that his name is Richard Chua Velasco. On the other
hand, petitioner testified that he has no alias nor other names and has always been
known as Richard Velasco. No evidence was submitted to prove that they are one
and the same person.
The trial court likewise found that Mrs. Paz J. Eugenio, a character witness, is the
prospective mother-in-law of petitioner, and as such her testimony is biased. It also
found that she and her companion witness Santiago Mariano were also the character
witnesses of a brother of petitioner in his petition for naturalization, a circumstance
which in its opinion indicates that petitioner has a limited circle of Filipino friends.
The court finally found that the present income of petitioner is only P150.00 a month
which, considering the present high cost of living and the low purchasing power of
our peso, is neither lucrative nor substantial to meet the requirement of the law.
Because of the above facts and circumstances, the trial court declared petitioner not
qualified to become a Filipino citizen.
We agree to the foregoing finding. Indeed, it appears from the evidence that
petitioner was employed at the Wilson Drug Store only on February, 1957 with a
salary of P150.00 a month, or barely a month before he filed the instant petition, and
that said store is partly owned by his mother who has one-fifth capital investment
therein. This leads one to believe that petitioner's employment, even if true, is but a
convenient arrangement planned out by him and his family in order to show a token
compliance with the requirement of the law that to become a Filipino citizen one
must have a lucrative income or occupation.
Considering that "naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly
construed in favor of the government and against the applicant" (Co Quing y
Reyes vs. Republic, 104 Phil., 889), we are constrained to hold that the trial court did
not err in denying the petition for naturalization.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
G.R. No. L-61958 April 28, 1983
PLUTARCO YUSI and DAISY YUSI, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE LETICIA P. MORALES, COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF NUEVA ECIJA, respondent.
Antero B. Tomas for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J:
May persons who apply for the benefits of the Probation Law withdraw their
application during the period for filing an appeal and ask that their appeal from the
judgment of conviction be given due course?
The petitioners are spouses who were convicted for estafa in Criminal Case No. 2260
in a decision of the respondent court dated May 20, 1982. The court sentenced the
petitioners "... to suffer an indeterminate sentence of FOUR (4) MONTHS of arresto
mayor as minimum to ONE (1) YEAR and SIX (6) MONTHS of prision
correccional as maximum, to pay P5,400.00 to Naty V. Pagdanganan for the value of
the piano, and to pay the costs of the suit."
On June 22, 1982, when the decision dated May 20, 1982 was promulgated, the
petitioners appeared in court without their counsel of record. The respondent court
appointed a certain Cesar Villar who happened to be in court to act as petitioners'
counsel de oficio during the promulgation. On that occasion, the petitioners through
their counsel de oficio manifested that "... they are going to avail of the benefits of
the Probation Law and prayed that they be released under the same bond." (Annex
"B", Reno p. 14) The court immediately granted the petitioners' prayer "... with a
condition that the accused will submit within this day a certification from the
bonding company that it is willing to accommodate the accused under the same bond
for a period of five (5) days beginning today."
On June 23, 1982, the petitioners filed with the respondent court an application for
probation under Presidential Decree No. 968 as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1257 (Annex "C", Rollo, P. 15).
Acting on the petitioners' application for probation, the respondent court on the same
day, June 23, 1982, issued an Order directing the probation officer of Cabanatuan
City to conduct an investigation on the application for probation and to submit his
report on the matter within sixty (60) days from receipt in accordance with Sections
5 and 7 of Presidential Decree No. 968 as amended. (Annex "A", Rollo, P. 18).
On June 28, 1982, or seven (7) days from the date of promulgation of the decision
and within the reglementary period to file an appeal, the petitioners filed with the
respondent court their Notice of Appeal (Annex "E ", Rollo, p. 19).
On July 6, 1982, the respondent court issued an Order denying the notice of appeal
on the ground that the petitioners waived their right to appeal the decision when they
filed their application for probation (Annex " F ", Rollo, p. 20).
On July 16, 1982, Atty. Antero Torres filed with the court an appearance as counsel
in collaboration with the petitioners' counsel of record, and on behalf of the
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the July 6, 1982 order. On July 24,
1982, the petitioners filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration. (Annexes "G"
and "H", Rollo, pp. 21-24).
On August 19, 1982, the respondent court issued an order denying both the motion
for reconsideration and the supplemental motion for reconsideration (Annex "J",
Rollo, p. 28).
Hence, this petition was filed to set aside the above orders.
In a resolution dated October 11, 1982, we considered the People of the Philippines
impleaded and required the Solicitor General to comment on the petition.
Upon the filing of the Solicitor General's comments, which we treated internally as
an anwer, and dispensing with the filing of briefs or memoranda, we resolved to
declare the case submitted for decision.
The only issue is whether or not the petitioners whose application for probation was
granted after conviction of the crime of estafa may still withdraw such application
for probation and within the reglementary period appeal the judgment of conviction.
In not giving due course to the petitioners' notice of appeal the respondent court
relied on paragraph 3, Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (ESTABLISHING A
PROBATION SYSTEM, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFORE, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES) as amended which considers an application for probation of a
convicted accused to be a waiver of his right to appeal or an automatic withdrawal of
a pending appeal.
And now, the question before us is whether or not such a waiver or withdrawal is
irrevocable.
We rule that it is not. We find the strict and unyielding application of the "waiver
rule" under the Probation Law unwarranted.
Under the factual circumstances of the instant case, the respondent court in granting
the application for probation and denying the prayer to withdraw, failed to take into
account the fact that the petitioners' counsel of record was not present when the
petitioners applied for probation. True, they were represented by a counsel de oficio
appointed by the court on the spot but the counsel de oficio was not fully acquainted
with their case. He could not have considered fully the strength of a possible appeal
when he advised them about the effects of the application for probation. More so
when we consider the thin line that divides a criminal case for estafa and a civil case
for collection of a debt.
And this fact surfaced when, on June 28, 1982 after the petitioner discussed their
case with a brother-in-law, Judge Eladio C. Sequi of the Municipal Court of
Carranglaan, Nueva Ecija, the petitioners filed their notice of appeal upon the Judge's
advice. It must be noted that the notice of appeal was filed just seven (7) days after
the promulgation of the decision.
Considering that the application for probation is an admission of guilt on the part of
an accused for the crime which led to the judgment of conviction and that the
application for probation is considered a waiver upon his part to file an appeal, it is
in the best interests of justice that the court should take the necessary steps to insure
that the accused has been fully apprised of the full import of his application before
the court acts on it.
In the case at bar, the respondent court hastily granted the manifestation and
application for probation on June 22, 1982, the same day that the decision was
promulgated and approved the formal application the following day without taking
steps to be informed that the petitioners were aware of the full import of their
application.
Furthermore, Presidential Decree No. 968 which established the Probation System
was envisioned among other things, "to provide an opportunity for the reformation of
a penitent offender which might be less probable if he were to serve a prison
sentence" (Section 2(b), Presidential Decree No. 968).
Under the facts of this case, the petitioners cannot be considered "penitent
offenders." They appeared to have improvidently filed their application for probation
and should be allowed to withdraw it and to appeal the decision.
We agree with the Solicitor General when he observes that:
 xxx xxx xxx
There can be no real reformation of a wrongdoer which is the
reason for probation unless there is a willingness on his part to
right the wrong he has committed. Probation is envisioned for the
accused. He may or may not avail of its benefits. Although
probation is founded on consent, waiver and/or contract, public
policy requires that interpretational objectives set forth in Section 2
of Presidential Decree No. 968 be given full effect. Probation
cannot therefore be forced or compelled on a convict. To permit
this would only serve to invite its violation. Instead, a greater
emphasis should be exerted in securing the probationer's effective
participation in society's major social institution.
Since 'probation is an island of technicalities surrounded by sea of
discretion' (Carl H. Imlay & Charles R. Galsheen, 'See What
Condition Your Condition Are In,' Federal Probation, XXXV (June
1971)', it should, therefore, be liberally construed in favor of the
accused (herein petitioners). Having opted to discontinue with the
application for probation in its initial stages and prior to the
submission of a post sentence investigation report and within the
period interposed an appeal from the adverse decision, petitioners
should be allowed to withdraw their application for probation and
pursue their right to appeal therefrom.
The underlying philosophy of probation is indeed one of liberality towards the
accused. It is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory
provisions. Probation is a major step taken by our Government towards the
deterrence and minimizing of crime and the humanization of criminal justice. In fine
with the public policy behind probation, the right of appeal should not be irrevocably
lost from the moment a convicted accused files an application for probation. Appeal
and probation spring from the same policy considerations of justice, humanity, and
compassion.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is hereby GRANTED. The
Orders dated June 23, 1982, July 6, 1982 and August 19, 1982 of the respondent
court are nullified and set aside. The respondent court is directed to give due course
to the petitioners' notice of appeal.
SO ORDERED
Colinares
vs.
People of the Philippines
Facts:
Arnel Colinares was charged and found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated
homicide by the RTC of Camarines Sur. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment
from two years and four months of prison correccional, as minimum, to six years and
one day of prison mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum probationable
imprisonment under the law was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for
probation. On appeal by Colinares, the Court of Appeals sustained the RTC’s
decision. Unsatisfied with the Court of Appeal’s decision, petitioner then appealed to
the Supreme Court and took the position that he should be entitled to apply for
probation in case the Court metes out a new penalty on him that makes his offense
probationable, which was strongly opposed by the Solicitor General reiterating that
under the Probation Law, no application for probation can be entertained once the
accused has perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction. The Supreme
Court, however, found that Colinares is guilty of attempted homicide and not of
frustrated homicide.
Issue:
Whether or not Arnel Colinares may still apply for probation on remand of the case
to the trial court
Ruling:
Yes, The Supreme Court ruled that Colinares may apply for probation upon remand
of his case to the RTC. Ordinarily, an accused would no longer be entitled to apply
for probation, he having appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for
frustrated homicide. But in this case the Supreme Court ruled to set aside the
judgment of the RTC and found him only liable for attempted homicide, if the
Supreme Court follows the established rule that no accused can apply for probation
on appeal, the accused would suffer from the erroneous judgment of the RTC with
no fault of his own, therefore defying fairness and equity.
 by the Rules. The courts must lean in favor of affording substantial justice as against
a technical requirement.

DECISION

GANCAYCO, J.:
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 55630. March 6, 1990.]

Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides for the basic rule of thumb that said
"rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote its objective and to assist the
IMPERIAL INSURANCE, INC. represented by the IMPERIAL INSURANCE,
parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
INC., Cagayan de Oro Branch Office Manager BERNARDITO R.
proceeding." Its application is put into test in the present case.
PULVERA, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE EULALIO D. ROSETE, Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, Branch V, and CHIU ENG
The antecedent facts are undisputed. Private respondent filed a complaint for specific
HUA, Respondents.
performance and damages against petitioner dated April 11, 1980 in the Court of
First Instance of Misamis Oriental, docketed as Civil Case No. 7072. After receipt of
Ariston M. Magallanes and Jesus Ma. Jajalla for Petitioner.
service of summons petitioner filed an answer with counterclaim within the
reglementary period.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
Quimpo, Willkom, Dadole & Mutia for Private Respondent.
The case was set for pre-trial conference on August 5, 1980 of which the parties and
their counsel were duly notified. At said pre-trial conference petitioner was
SYLLABUS
represented by Atty. Arturo A. Magallanes who presented a special power of
attorney executed by Bernardito R. Pulvera, regional branch manager of petitioner
for Mindanao and Visayas, authorizing said counsel to represent petitioner at the pre-
1. REMEDIAL LAW; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; RULES SHALL BE
trial conference, to enter into any amicable settlement and to do such other acts as
LIBERALLY CONSTRUED TO PROMOTE SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE; CASE
may be necessary to implement the authority. The presiding judge refused to honor
AT BAR. — Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides for the basic rule of
the same and observed that it is only the Board of Directors of the petitioner who
thumb that said "rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote its objective
may authorize the appearance of the regional manager in behalf of petitioner and that
and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
he cannot delegate his functions. Counsel for private respondent stated he was
every action and proceeding." There can be no doubt therefore that regional branch
willing to give petitioner a chance to produce the appropriate authority. Nevertheless,
manager Pulvera, as regional manager for Visayas and Mindanao of petitioner, was
the respondent judge declared the petitioner in default in an order dated August 5,
authorized to represent petitioner in any litigation and in the process to enter into a
1980 and set the reception of the evidence for the private respondent on August 12,
compromise agreement or settlement thereof. As such agent of petitioner he may
1980. 1
appoint a substitute as he was not prohibited from doing so by his principal.
Moreover, even assuming for the sake of argument that the observations of the
A motion to set aside the said order of default was filed by petitioner, stating therein
respondent judge is correct in that a board resolution of the petitioner is required for
that the rules of court should be liberally construed, that the special power of
the purposes of authorizing Pulvera and/or Magallanes to bind the petitioner, the
attorney was submitted in good faith and that there are meritorious and good
counsel for the private respondent manifested to the respondent judge his willingness
defenses as shown in the attached affidavit showing that as early as June 1980
to give the petitioner an opportunity to comply with the requirement of the court. Just
Pulvera had asked for such a special power of attorney from the main office in
the same, the respondent judge declared petitioner to be in default. No doubt, the
Manila but the same had not yet arrived and will be submitted upon receipt. The
respondent judge was unnecessarily harsh when the Rules call for liberality in such
motion was denied in an order dated August 27, 1980.
cases. This is a case where petitioner filed an answer with counterclaim and
advanced apparently a meritorious and valid defense. It should be given its day in
A motion for reconsideration of the denial was filed by petitioner alleging that it is
court and the opportunity to prove its assertions. This is the situation contemplated
within the implied powers and duties of the regional branch manager of petitioner to
represent the petitioner and in the process to settle claims against petitioner as this
has been done in a similar case that was amicably settled before the same court
docketed as Civil Case No. 6316; and that the special power of attorney of Atty.
Arturo Magallanes to represent the petitioner was executed in good faith. The motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied for lack of merit on October 17, 1982.
Hence, the herein petition for certiorari and/or mandamus wherein petitioner alleges
that the respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and in grave
abuse of discretion in declaring petitioner in default and in denying the motion for
reconsideration of the order of default.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
The petition is impressed with merit.
In Civil Case No. 6316 entitled "Heirs of Ruiz Dosdos, Et. Al. v. Andres Tan; and
Andres Tan as third party plaintiff v. Imperial Insurance, third party defendant", filed
in the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, presided by
the respondent Judge, a special power of attorney was presented dated June 20, 1979
executed by the same regional manager of petitioner in favor of Carmelito Gaburno,
production manager of sales of petitioner, to appear in behalf of petitioner in all
stages of the case and to enter into any stipulation of facts. 2 A compromise
agreement was entered into by the parties assisted by their respective counsel and the
same was submitted for approval of the court wherein Carmelito Gaburno signed for
and in behalf of petitioner. In an order dated November 27, 1979 the respondent
judge approved the compromise agreement by rendering judgment in accordance
therewith. 3
Thus, when at the pre-trial conference of Civil Case No. 7072 before the same
respondent judge a special power of attorney executed by Pulvera on July 31, 1980
in favor of Atty. Magallanes to appear in behalf of petitioner and to enter into any
amicable settlement 4 was presented, the court finds no cogent reason why the
respondent judge refused to honor the said special power of attorney for purposes of
the pre-trial and instead declared the petitioner to be in default.chanrobles lawlibrary
: rednad
behalf of petitioner which was duly approved by the trial court on January 13, 1981.
6
There can be no doubt therefore that regional branch manager Pulvera, as regional
manager for Visayas and Mindanao of petitioner, was authorized to represent
petitioner in any litigation and in the process to enter into a compromise agreement
or settlement thereof. As such agent of petitioner he may appoint a substitute as he
was not prohibited from doing so by his principal. 7
Moreover, even assuming for the sake of argument that the observations of the
respondent judge is correct in that a board resolution of the petitioner is required for
the purposes of authorizing Pulvera and/or Magallanes to bind the petitioner, the
counsel for the private respondent manifested to the respondent judge his willingness
to give the petitioner an opportunity to comply with the requirement of the court. Just
the same, the respondent judge declared petitioner to be in default. No doubt, the
respondent judge was unnecessarily harsh when the Rules call for liberality in such
cases.
This is a case where petitioner filed an answer with counterclaim and advanced
apparently a meritorious and valid defense. It should be given its day in court and the
opportunity to prove its assertions. This is the situation contemplated by the Rules.
The courts must lean in favor of affording substantial justice as against a technical
requirement.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders of the respondent judge dated August 6, 1980,
August 27, 1980 and October 17, 1980 are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE
and the record of this case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No
costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.

Obviously in the earlier case, Civil Case No. 6316, the respondent judge accepted
and/or acknowledged the authority of Pulvera as regional branch manager of the
petitioner to represent the petitioner, to enter into a compromise agreement and as
such to execute a special power of attorney in favor of another person to act in his
place and to represent the petitioner in the litigation.

Indeed, in another case docketed as Civil Case No. 2899 entitled Gil Ecleo v. Lydia
Sacal and Imperial Insurance, Inc., in the Court of First Instance of Surigao del
Norte, Surigao City a similar special power of attorney for purposes of pre-trial was
executed by regional branch manager Pulvera in favor of Atty. Magallanes dated
December 9, 1980. 5 A compromise agreement was entered into by Magallanes in

Civil Code Article 10: In case of doubt in the interpretation and application of laws,
it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
Spouses Bello Petitioners
Vs.
CA, Hon. Francisco Llamas, Judge of Pasay City Court and Republic of the
Philippines Respondents
Facts: On August 25, 1970, spouses Bello were charged with estafa for
allegedly having misappropriated a lady’s ring with a value of P1, 000.00 received
from them from Atty. Prudencio De Guzman for sale on commission basis. After
trial, they were convicted and sentenced. They then filed an appeal to the Court of
First Instance and after that to the respondent city court which was also dismissed
and ordered for execution of judgment “for having been erroneously addressed to
this court”. Petitioner spouses then filed for prohibition and mandamus against the
People and respondent city court to elevate their appeal to the Court of Appeals
which was again dismissed after finding that the city court’s judgment was directly
appealable to it. Still, the couple moved for reconsideration and stressing the merits
of their appeal and of their defense but was again denied “for lack of sufficient
merit”.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the case
due to wrong procedure.
Whether or not the execution of judgment will be issued a
mandamus
Ruling: Decision of CA to dismiss petition is set aside. Mandamus is
issued for the execution of its judgment of conviction. And, said city court is
commanded to elevate petitioner’s appeal from its judgment to the Court of Appeals
for the disposition on the merits.
The Court of Appeals should have not dismissed the appeal but
should have certified the case to the proper court. It is of the essence of judicial duty
to construe statutes so as to avoid such deplorable result of injustice and absurdity
and that a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd
results.
City Of Manila vs. Chinese Community Of Manila, 40 Phil. 349 (1919)
CASE DIGEST
FACTS: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a
portion private cemetery for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue.
Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such public improvement be made in the said
portion of the private cemetery and that the said lands are within their jurisdiction.
Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because
other routes were available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the
cemetery would create irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons
owing and interested in the graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed.
The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the
particular-strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to
exercise the power of eminent domain and that the courts have no right to inquire
and determine the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity
of the expropriation.
HELD: The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to
the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the
law. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the
authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority.
The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise
the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But
whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a
particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question
that the courts have the right to inquire to.