Namita Virmani

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Egypt: Era of Dawn or Drain?

Mystic Egypt: The legends of pyramids is not the only story of Egypt, add to that riches of Cairo, few
tales of changing times for better and plight of nearly 45% of less fortunate, or what can be easily
put as ‘Poor’ Egyptians and the story of Egypt begins to take a more real shape. And the trend that is
followed across the globe, poor become poorer and rich become richer, does not fail itself in Egypt.
But any day the poor here are more generous than the rich ones – as it has been said about them
‘Egypt may be chaotic, but it is often joyfully so’. They are more willing to share exchange and help
from their own small pie than the one who owns a Pie Factory. Despite this contrast and adversity,
crime rate in Africa is surprisingly low, may be people understand what it is like to be without money
and commiserate.
But now conditions are said to be improving, atleast again for Cairo, while others are more or less
dragging along. And rich ones seem to be more ‘Cheap’ then the poor one in helping the out the less
fortunate ones. The article ‘The rich are different from you and me – they are more selfish’ throws
light on attitude of Rich ones. With Egypt facing such plight can this be termed as Development?

The rosy picture: Cairo is progressing well; it has been growing to

become the private, industrial hub. It is also in every respect the
center of Egypt. With a population of 18.8 million, almost 25% of all
Egyptians live there. The majority of the nation's commerce is
generated there, or passes through the city. This astonishing growth
until recently surged well ahead of city services.
Analysts termed this magnitude of change as ‘hyper-urbanization’1
The tourists who came here, say, 20 years ago, tend to delight in the sleeker look of the place, the
surprisingly efficient and still friendly service, the far better quality and variety of goods in the
markets, and the fact that some taxis now actually have functioning meters. The talk will be of beach
houses and yachts on the Red Sea, of hot stocks on the Cairo exchange, and of Egypt’s delightfully
low-cost labor. It is possible to live a comfortable rich-world sort of life in Egypt, and many people
do; in some ways it is easier than in well-off countries because maids and cooks and drivers are
cheap (Excerpts from articles).

The contrast and the concern: Little of this prosperity has rubbed on to the neighboring states.
Descend to the Nile valley and be jolted by rutted roads lined with rubbish and packed with crowded
jitney cabs, ferrying the working poor from their cramped and airless dwellings to insecure jobs and
run-down schools (Excerpts from articles). While for many less fortunate households, electricity or
ration for next day is a concern, others are pining over no electricity or water; few are even devoid
from the basic facility of proper sewage system and sanitation. Nearly 45% of Egypt’s Population
(source: Wikipedia) falls in category of extremely poor, poor and nearly poor; people struggling to
make both ends meet with average monthly salary of 200$; the life hasn’t really improved for them.
But no one raises much concern

From Pages of History: Egypt was one of those few countries which fell prey to the trade and
monetary ambitions of the first Capitalist Power of world, Britain. What started off as a trade

1
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Egypt
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alliance of the spices and trade routes, over the decades turned into Power Seizing battle descending
an era of loss, agony and pain on Egyptians from the hands of British Empire! Egypt had not been
discovered by the British, but France and technically it wasn’t British’ colony. After much tiff about
who will rule Egypt, French and British decided that they needed each other and formed the Entente
Cordiale that they decided to come to agreement over the status of Egypt. They basically agreed that
Britain should be paramount in Egypt, and France should have a free hand in Morocco, Tunisia and
Algeria. Educated Egyptians were less convinced of the merits of European control as they saw all
the most important decisions and jobs remaining in British hands. A growing tide of nationalism was
beginning to find its leaders2. Egypt, rich in natural resources, pool of cheap labor and strategically
beneficial location, with the direct sail routes around the Cape of Good Hope, providing the quickest
way of maintaining communications with India; was used as the backyard to provide resources to
the Charging British Economy.  
The British did very little to improve the way of life for the Egyptian people. They never drilled an
artesian well that could pump pure water to a village or set up medical services for Egyptians. They
didn't even try to educate or improve the conditions of the majority of the population. They
weren't brutal occupiers, but they failed miserably at making the conditions livable to the citizens
of Egypt. The Europeans that were born in Cairo were not directly to blame for the situation, but
they did contribute to it. They lived, ate and slept well and they thought this was all that was
expected of them.
 Because the English were unable to ship all of their supplies in from Britain, they trained and
employed thousands of Egyptians in various trades. Some were mechanics, electricians, drivers,
engineers and even lens grinders. They repaired military equipment and even built trains and
machinery. Egypt started to weave its own cloth out of silk and wool. Advances were made in
mining, cement, petroleum refining and chemical industries. In Egypt, the British spent over ten
million pounds every year 3.Any improvements made were not for the Egyptians however, but for
the traders and merchants which stayed in Egypt while crossing the Suez Canal. Although the
Egyptians did not benefit from these improved resources, they were still expected to pay for it in
the form of taxes4. All and all it was place to provide resources to British, to continue its spree for
reaching Maturely Charged state.
In 1922, Egypt was given ‘Technical Independence’ but Britain still had the real power. Britain still
reserved four matters to their own discretion: the security of imperial communications, defense, the
protection of foreign interests and of minorities, and the Sudan. It was not until 1955 when Egypt
was able to take administration reins of the economy in its own hands.
But problems were not over, with Israel being formed. The Gaza Strip was the vulnerable target of
attacks of Israelis, as a result the economy which should invest in it charging – firms, improving living
standards etc were forced to invest more and more on war-fare goods. Therefore, security system
improved while citizens starved for bread. The fault was Britain’s to create Israel which was later
pumped and boosted by America under their operation DISOG, to continue misunderstandings and
suppress rise of any other capitalist economy and hence stay supreme – avert World War III
In 1971, with change in leadership the privatization was brought in, with vast economic reforms that
ended the socialistic controls of Nasserism. Sadat introduced greater political freedom and a new
economic policy, the most important aspect of which was the infitah or "open door". This relaxed
2
http://www.britishempire.co.uk/maproom/egypt.htm
3
http://www.touregypt.net/hbritish.htm
4
http://www.essaychief.com/free_essays.php?essay=1913886&title=Colonization-Of-Egypt
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government controls over the economy and encouraged private investment. While the reforms
created a wealthy and successful upper class and a small middle class, these reforms had little effect
upon the average Egyptian who began to grow dissatisfied with Sadat's rule 5 . Later Egypt was
wracked by violence arising from discontent with Sadat's rule and sectarian tensions and finally he
was assassinated in 1981. After a decade of political turmoil, 1991 brought era of changing reforms
and privatization. Ambitious domestic economic programs were incepted to reduce the size of the
public sector and expand the role of the private sector. There has been less progress in political
reform. The progress has been on since then. But things are changing again.

Progress or Crisis: Egypt’s progress relies mainly on foreign investment, service industry and
tourism. The in-house capabilities were never built to support the economy internally, and it will
now forever stay in the pre-charged state. The efficiency and ωe was achieved by harnessing on low
cost labour instead of building their purchasing power to keep resilient constraint from choking ωe
in long run. Overall Egypt is highly dependent on tourism for foreign exchange and it is its main
engine of growth. Although article ‘The long wait -After three decades of economic progress but
political paralysis, change is in the air, says Max Rodenbeck’ claims winds of change and good times
ahead, conditions have not been good after September 11 chapter in US. There has been an
estimated loss in tourism sector range from $2-3 billion. Airline and shipping: besides the decline of
passengers, primarily tourists, the industry was hit by 50% increase in insurance premiums.
Revenues from Suez Canal have also declined especially after the escalation of piracy in the Red Sea
that made many shipping companies take safer routes. Remittances from Egyptians working abroad
have declined from $3.8 billion in 2000 to $3 billion, and further declines are projected.  The foreign
exchange reserves have declined from $30 billion to $15 billion and the biggest challenge facing
policy makers in is creating jobs and kills the high rate of youth unemployment, estimated at 25.6
percent in 2003, which is the highest in the world 6. These really don’t show signs of a good progress

The Cross-roads: Can a correct assessment of Egypt’s economical state be done. While certain
economist conceive it as beginning of new era of economical growth of the country. Others clearly
see its falling in the pit of economic crisis. British left behind a huge lot of untrained population with
political issue and no strong leadership. With political turmoil and enemy at fence, whole
concentration was on defense rather than growth. Growth which was later given consideration
confined to handful of worthy and already fortunate lot with poor ones swarming around.
Purchasing power being low, and high dependency on foreign investments, ωe is far from being
stable and sometimes is generated by self-cannibalization of further suppress of poor, costing them
their salary. With progress of Cairo being considered as progress of Egypt, the crash of its economy
with any slump US’s economy it will be unavoidable.

The plight is that in midst of acquiring power, GDP, status and wealth leaders forget that its human
beings with right to live dignity is what they are dealing with, who have learn to smile in adversity.
But they just don’t understand that ‘They LAUGH with the People, but leave the CRYING for Home!’

5
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_modern_Egypt
6
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/aladdin-elaasar/is-egypts-economy-in-cris_b_507782.html
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Article I - A special report on Egypt
‘The long wait - After three decades of economic progress but political paralysis,
change is in the air, says Max Rodenbeck’

TRAVELLING into Cairo, Egypt’s monster-sized but curiously intimate capital, it is hard to
tell if these are the best of times or the worst. Visitors who have long known the city are
in two minds. Egyptian expatriates returning home are liable to cringe at the worse-
than-ever traffic, the ever-louder noise, the fervid religiosity, and what they often
bemoan as a new aggressiveness that spoils their nostalgia for a sweeter, cheerier
Egypt. But tourists who came here, say, 20 years ago, tend to delight in the sleeker look
of the place, the surprisingly efficient and still friendly service, the far better quality and
variety of goods in the markets, and the fact that some taxis now actually have
functioning meters.

Both impressions are right. The new World Bank-funded, Turkish-built terminal at Cairo
International airport is as blandly functional as Cincinnati’s or Stockholm’s. Gone are the
sweaty officials and greasy baggage handlers of yore, the taxi touts and shoving crowds.
A businessman arriving here may be whisked in an Egyptian-built car to the cigar bar at
one of Cairo’s dozens of swish hotels—perhaps one at City Stars, a commercial complex
on the scale and in the style of Las Vegas. Or perhaps to another fancy hotel in one of
the burgeoning gated exurbs in the desert, surrounded by the lavishly watered greenery
of a designer golf course. There, the talk will be of beach houses and yachts on the Red
Sea, of hot stocks on the Cairo exchange, and of Egypt’s delightfully low-cost labour.

A less lucky traveller, however, might instead see these things as most Egyptians do: in
the giant backlit billboards that clutter Cairo’s roadsides and rooftops, vividly flaunting
the unattainable. The consumer paradise they display, with perfect hair, light-skinned
children and men in pinstripe suits, stands in stark contrast to the harried, shuffling
crowds below. Such sights will probably be accompanied by an earful of complaint from
the driver stuck in a jam: about corrupt traffic cops and the absurd impossibility of
feeding and schooling the kids on $150 a month, but above all about politics, the staple
of all Middle Eastern conversationalists.

Political talk in Egypt has always been acidly cynical, but now a new bitterness has crept
in. This has not been prompted by any change from above, since little has really
changed in Egyptian politics since President Hosni Mubarak came to office 29 years ago.
The sour mood is informed instead by the contrast between rising aspirations and
enduring hardships; by a growing sense of alienation from the state; and by the unease
of anticipation as the end of an era inevitably looms ever closer.

It is not surprising that Egyptians should feel rather like driftwood on the Nile,
accelerating towards one of the great river’s cataracts. Their current pharaoh is 82 years
old, visibly ailing, and has no anointed successor. Most of his people have known no
other leader. The vast majority have grown so inured to having no say in the course of
events that the reflex is to float patiently rather than try to paddle. Parliamentary
elections are scheduled for November this year and presidential ones for September
next. As usual, few citizens are likely to take part. They will watch from the sidelines and
accept the preordained results with grim humour.
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Losing patience
Nevertheless, the expectation of a seismic shift is almost tangible in the air, and not just
because of Mr Mubarak’s health. Egyptians may be renowned for being politically
passive, but the rising generation is very different from previous ones. It is better
educated, highly urbanised, far more exposed to the outside world and much less
patient. Increasingly, the whole structure of Egypt’s state, with its cumbersome
constitution designed to disguise one-man rule, its creaky centralised administration, its
venal, brutal and unaccountable security forces and its failure to deliver such social
goods as decent schools, health care or civic rights, looks out of kilter with what its
people want.

For some time Egyptian commentators have been noting resemblances between now and
the years before Egypt’s previous seismic shift. That happened in 1952, when a group of
army officers rolled their tanks up to King Farouk’s palaces and tossed him out. The coup
was wildly popular at the time. It had followed a period of drift and growing tension,
marked by strikes, assassinations, riots and intrigues between Communists, Muslim
Brothers and the king. Egypt was thriving economically, but the spoils flowed mostly to a
cosmopolitan elite that was out of tune with the street. It had a functioning democracy,
but ever-squabbling politicians seemed unable to get things done. To general chagrin
they could not shake off the lingering influence of Britain, whose soldiers refused to
budge from the Suez Canal where they had been encamped since 1882.

The officers’ coup replaced this genteel but dysfunctional constitutional monarchy with
one-party rule, fronted by a strongman and backed by secret police, with the tanks
idling nearby. Republican Egypt became a model for other Arab dictatorships and forced
wrenching changes at home. Its promises of free health and education, land reform and
jobs in state factories and offices did lift millions out of misery to mere poverty. The
ideology of pan-Arabism trumpeted by the coup leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, gave
Egyptians a place of pride in the world, even if his boldness brought ruinous wars in
Yemen and against Israel.

Six decades and four presidents on, the revolutionary regime has metamorphosed into
one that encourages private business and allows for some pluralism. Yet it looks to many
Egyptians like a waning dynasty—the 45th in the long line of houses that have ruled the
world’s most enduring nation since 3000BC. Its promises are largely in tatters. Schools
and hospitals are indeed free to enter, but they are grim, bare, crowded places where
getting learning or treatment requires cash that many still do not have. The lower middle
class of army officers and bureaucrats who rose in the revolution have joined the gentry
they were supposed to have ousted, adopted their haughty ways and now share Egypt’s
spoils with them. The poor still queue for government-subsidised bread and must scrimp
and save to buy a pair of shoes.

The government’s plan to perpetuate itself in office, via the traditional electoral
rigmarole, is likely to go ahead. Predictions of change in Egypt have almost always
proved wrong; generally it bumbles along much as usual. This time may just be
different. The country now faces three main possibilities. It could go the way of Russia
and be ruled by a new strongman from within the system. It might, just possibly, go the
way of Iran, and see that system swept away in anger. Or it could go the way of Turkey,
and evolve into something less brittle and happier for all concerned.
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Article II - A special report on Egypt
‘No paradise Most Egyptians put up with a lot’

FOR all of Egypt’s abundant riches, the plain fact is that most Egyptians remain poor.
The government insists that less than a fifth of the population (and falling) subsists
below the global poverty threshold of $2 a day. Yet household expenditure surveys show
that four-fifths of families have less than $3,000 a year to spend. That sounds about
right: $200 a month is considered a good salary for an Egyptian. A rookie policeman or
newly trained teacher makes less than half that. And the pay of Cairo street-sweepers on
make-work government programmes is so low that they often beg from passing cars.
Official figures claim a slow decline in unemployment, to around 9%. But for Egypt’s
armies of day labourers, street vendors and domestics, employment is pretty tenuous;
and only a third of women of working age are in the labour force.

It is possible to live a comfortable rich-world sort of life in Egypt, and many people do; in
some ways it is easier than in well-off countries because maids and cooks and drivers
are cheap. On the desert outskirts of Cairo you can cruise palm-lined boulevards leading
to gated compounds with names like Beverly Hills, Dreamland and Mayfair, with ranks of
porticoed villas, mirror-clad office blocks, hypermarkets, private clinics and schools with
emerald-green playing fields. Here you can forget you are in the old Egypt.

But not for long. Descend to the Nile valley and be jolted by rutted roads lined with
rubbish and packed with crowded jitney cabs, ferrying the working poor from their
cramped and airless dwellings to insecure jobs and run-down schools. Among the
wealthiest fifth of Egyptians, some 82% say they are generally satisfied with their living
standards; among the poorest fifth only 29% do. Nearly all rich kids but scarcely a
quarter of poor ones brush their teeth, largely because toothpaste is an unaffordable
luxury. The poorest are also more than twice as likely to die as infants, or to suffer from
hepatitis C. Egypt has led the world in infection rates since a 1970s campaign to combat
another chronic malady, bilharzia, inadvertently spread hepatitis C through the reuse of
needles.

According to government statistics Egypt remains a largely rural country, but that is
because villages that have expanded, some to over 100,000 inhabitants, have not been
reclassified as towns. Demographers reckon that at least three-quarters of Egyptians
actually live in urban areas. Census figures show that four in five people inhabit flats
rather than houses. Those flats tend to be tiny. The 2007 census shows that in every
one of Egypt’s 29 governorates there are fewer rooms than people. Families often share
beds in shifts.

Nearly all Egyptian homes have piped water and electricity, but away from Cairo the
power is often cut and taps often produce mere dribbles of water whose poor quality
explains high levels of kidney disease. Nationwide, less than half the homes (and less
than a third in the poor south) are connected to public sewage systems. In a survey of
Egypt’s poorest villagers 91% said the service they needed most urgently was sewers.
Visitors to Egypt invariably remark on the grubbiness of its streets. Statistics show that
among the poorest fifth of Egyptians 85% of households have no proper means of
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rubbish disposal, so they burn it, dump it by the side of roads, tip it into canals or feed it
to wandering goats and chickens. Some 16m Egyptians, according to the World Bank,
inhabit informal and squatter settlements. That may equal the population of Cairo,
though because of a muddle of overlapping administrative districts no one is really sure
how many people the sprawling capital packs in.

Even Egyptian government economists admit that even as the rich get much richer and
Egypt’s small middle class is expanding somewhat, the rest have struggled to keep up
with an inflation rate that is far higher than in most comparable countries. The private
planes, holiday homes, new highways, airports and supermarkets remain out of their
reach. That may help to explain why recently Egypt has seen an uncharacteristic flaring
up of strikes and protests of every kind. For the first few months of this year the streets
around the parliament were occupied around the clock by angry factory workers,
disgruntled tax inspectors or junior doctors, all protesting against their miserable pay.
Nor is the disillusion just about money. At least in spirit, more and more Egyptians have
joined the small core of political activists, many of them Islamists or leftists, who
insistently demand civil rights and an end to police brutality and sham democracy. They
are fed up and want the government to know it.

Egypt’s colossal state, with its 8m employees and army of security agents, is in no
danger at all of losing physical control. Yet its grip on the media has weakened. Until ten
years ago the press was dominated by the state broadcasting monopoly and a range of
state-owned newspapers, magazines and publishing houses. Private-sector television
and newspapers are still subject to government pressure, and independent bloggers risk
arbitrary arrest. But their audiences far outstrip those of the state media, and they now
set the agenda.

By and large, though, poor Egyptians grumble surprisingly little. There are some positive
reasons for their forbearance. Strong bonds among extended families, neighbourly
solidarity and the Muslim tradition of charity support many of the needy. Egypt has very
low crime rates, and it is the poorest who feel most secure in their homes. With their
street life and intimacy under year-round sunshine, Egypt’s slums are often less grim
than those in other countries. Sociologists have long noted the knack of Egypt’s poor to
appropriate things they lack, such as space and freedom, by nimbly skirting the rules.
Egypt may be chaotic, but it is often joyfully so.

However, there are also less attractive reasons for public passivity. One of them is fear.
Corporal punishment and physical violence persist in Egyptian homes and schools and,
most notoriously, in police custody. “Systematic” is how Amnesty International has
described the use of torture by Egyptian security forces in annual reports for the past
two decades. In 2007 it reported “beatings, electric shocks, prolonged suspension by the
wrists and ankles in contorted positions, death threats and sexual abuse”. In 2008 it
suggested that as many as 20 people had died in Egypt from the effects of torture. In
2009 it said that impunity “continued for most perpetrators, exacerbated by police
threatening victims with rearrest or the arrest of relatives if they lodged complaints”.
There was good reason why under the Bush administration Egypt was a favoured
destination for “rendition” of terrorist suspects.
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Keep your head down

Clearly not all of the estimated 3m people employed, in one way or another, by security
agencies are bullies. Many are hard-working, professional and courteous. Yet the
pervasiveness and lack of accountability of the security apparatus has had a smothering
effect. This is amplified by the government’s insistence, for all but brief gaps in the past
six decades, on maintaining emergency laws that allow arbitrary arrest and, in effect,
indefinite detention without trial. The law is renewed every two years, most recently in
May this year, and always with the promise it will be applied only to terrorists and drug
dealers. That promise is never kept.

It is true that Egypt has suffered from bouts of terrorism, though mercifully not much in
recent years. Nevertheless, for a state as strong as Egypt’s the concern with security
appears excessive. “State security” can be cited as a reason to stop publication of
academic research, to block a film script or ban a troublesome person from the airwaves.
Mosque preachers, airport workers and people seeking jobs in tourist resorts, even as
street-sweepers, find they need clearance from State Security Investigations, the
thuggish plainclothes branch of the Ministry of Interior.

The security services look after their own very well. Businessmen report getting phone
calls from security officials to “recommend” that they hire security veterans. Some pre-
empt such recommendations by putting officers on their payroll from the start. Others
curry favour by handing contracts to companies run by former policemen. Former police,
intelligence and army officers hold many of the most lucrative posts in state companies
and the bureaucracy. Traditionally they make up the majority of Egypt’s provincial
governors. These are appointed by the president, as are all 4,000 village headmen, the
presidents of state universities, top judges and prosecutors, a third of the members of
the toothless upper house of parliament, and so on.

Such levers of control operate in tandem with the ruling National Democratic Party,
which Mr Mubarak also heads. The party is not especially democratic but it is ubiquitous,
with branches in every village and on every college campus. Its ideology bends to the
changing whims of national leaders. It does contain some idealists who believe in
working from within to make such improvements as they can. It also has a record of
trying to care for the poor by subsidising some goods and maintaining at least the
promise if not the reality of government welfare services.

But inevitably the party also includes opportunists, including millionaires who owe their
fortunes to sweetheart loans from state-owned banks, bargain-basement sales of state
land or no-bid contracts from state agencies. “Our system is a pyramid of mafias,”
snorts one disgruntled businessman.

All of this provides another reason why so many Egyptians have, for so long, shied away
from voicing complaints. In their experience no one is likely to listen unless they are a
relative, a friend, or amenable to a bribe. In theory citizens are represented by their
MPs, but all too many people enter parliament for perks such as immunity from
prosecution. Litigation is possible but unattractive because the courts are slow,
capricious and open to corruption.
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Saad Zaghloul, the leader who brought Egypt independence from Britain in 1922, and
whose statue conducts traffic over Cairo’s Qasr al Nil Bridge, is said to have muttered
the dying words “mafeesh fayda” (it is hopeless). He probably meant his own struggle
with death, but naysayers ever since have taken those words as a commentary on
Egypt’s condition.
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Article III - Wealth, poverty and compassion
‘The rich are different from you and me - They are more selfish’

LIFE at the bottom is nasty, brutish and short. For this reason, heartless folk might
assume that people in the lower social classes will be more self-interested and less
inclined to consider the welfare of others than upper-class individuals, who can afford a
certain noblesse oblige. A recent study, however, challenges this idea. Experiments by
Paul Piff and his colleagues at the University of California, Berkeley, reported this week
in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, suggest precisely the opposite. It is
the poor, not the rich, who are inclined to charity.
In their first experiment, Dr Piff and his team recruited 115 people. To start with, these
volunteers were asked to engage in a series of bogus activities, in order to create a
misleading impression of the purpose of the research. Eventually, each was told he had
been paired with an anonymous partner seated in a different room. Participants were
given ten credits and advised that their task was to decide how many of these credits
they wanted to keep for themselves and how many (if any) they wished to transfer to
their partner. They were also told that the credits they had at the end of the game would
be worth real money and that their partners would have no ability to interfere with the
outcome.

A week before the game was run, participants were asked their ethnic backgrounds, sex,
age, frequency of attendance at religious services and socioeconomic status. During this
part of the study, they were presented with a drawing of a ladder with ten rungs on it.
Each rung represented people of different levels of education, income and occupational
status. They were asked to place an “X” on the rung they felt corresponded to where
they stood relative to others in their own community.

The average number of credits people gave away was 4.1. However, an analysis of the
results showed that generosity increased as participants’ assessment of their own social
status fell. Those who rated themselves at the bottom of the ladder gave away 44%
more of their credits than those who put their crosses at the top, even when the effects
of age, sex, ethnicity and religiousness had been accounted for.

The prince and the pauper

In follow-up experiments, the researchers asked participants to imagine and write about
a hypothetical interaction with someone who was extremely wealthy or extremely poor.
This sort of storytelling is used routinely by psychologists when they wish to induce a
temporary change in someone’s point of view.

In this case the change intended was to that of a higher or lower social class than the
individual perceived he normally belonged to. The researchers then asked participants to
indicate what percentage of a person’s income should be spent on charitable donations.
They found that both real lower-class participants and those temporarily induced to rank
themselves as lower class felt that a greater share of a person’s salary should be used to
support charity.
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Upper-class participants said 2.1% of incomes should be donated. Lower-class
individuals felt that 5.6% was the appropriate slice. Upper-class participants who were
induced to believe they were lower class suggested 3.1%. And lower-class individuals
who had been “psychologically promoted” thought 3.3% was about right.

A final experiment attempted to test how helpful people of different classes are when
actually exposed to a person in need. This time participants were “primed” with video
clips, rather than by storytelling, into more or less compassionate states. The
researchers then measured their reaction to another participant (actually a research
associate) who turned up late and thus needed help with the experimental procedure.

In this case priming made no difference to the lower classes. They always showed
compassion to the latecomer. The upper classes, though, could be influenced. Those
shown a compassion-inducing video behaved in a more sympathetic way than those
shown emotionally neutral footage. That suggests the rich are capable of compassion, if
somebody reminds them, but do not show it spontaneously.

One interpretation of all this might be that selfish people find it easier to become rich.
Some of the experiments Dr Piff conducted, however, sorted people by the income of the
family in which the participant grew up. This revealed that whether high status was
inherited or earned made no difference—so the idea that it is the self-made who are
especially selfish does not work. Dr Piff himself suggests that the increased compassion
which seems to exist among the poor increases generosity and helpfulness, and
promotes a level of trust and co-operation that can prove essential for survival during
hard times.