36.

RE: COA OPINION ON THE COMPUTATION OF THE APPRAISED VALUE OF

THEPROPERTIES PURCHASED BY THE RETIRED CHIEF/ ASSOCIATE
JUSTICES OFTHE SUPREME COURT
A.M. NO. 11-7-10-SC JULY 31, 2012

FACTS:
 Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on Audit found that an underpayment
amounting to P221,021.50 resulted when five (5) retired Supreme Court justices purchased from
the Supreme Court the personal properties assigned to them during their incumbency in the
Court.
 The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of the Supreme
Court of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of the purchased vehicles.
According to the COA, the Property Division erroneously appraised the subject motor vehicles
by applying Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35 dated
April 23, 1997 and its guidelines, in compliance with the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated
March 23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01,3 when it should have applied the formula found in
COA Memorandum No. 98-569-A4 dated August 5, 1998.
 Atty. Candelaria recommended that the Court advise the COA to respect the in-house
computation based on the CFAG formula.
 More importantly, the Constitution itself grants the Judiciary fiscal autonomy in the handling of
its budget and resources.

ISSUE:
Whether or not COA’s interference, in this case, violates the judiciary’s autonomy.

HELD:
Yes.
The COA's authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional bodies granted
fiscal autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. The
Constitution mandates that, in relation to judicial independence, the judiciary shall enjoy fiscal
autonomy and grants the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and judicial
personnel. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
doctrine of separation of powers. Thus, any form of interference by the Legislative or the Executive
on the Judiciary's fiscal autonomy amounts to an improper check on a co-equal branch of
government.
37. RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND
NETWORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA SHEET ORCURRICULUM VITAE OF
THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF
THE JUDICIARY.
A. M. No. 09-8-6-SC June 13, 2012.

FACTS:
 Rowena C. Paraan, Research Director of the Philippine Center for Investigative
Journalism (PCIJ), sought copies of the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and
Networth (SALN) of the Justices of this Court for the year 2008. She also
requested for copies of the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) or the Curriculum
Vitae (CV) of the Justices of this Court for the purpose of updating their database
of information on government officials.
 Karol M. Ilagan, a researcher-writer also of the PCIJ, likewise sought for copies
of the SALN and PDS of the Justices of the Court of Appeals (CA), for the same
above-stated purpose.
 The special committee created by the Supreme Court to review the request issued a
Memorandum recommending the creation of a Committee on Public Disclosure to take over the
functions of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) with respect to requests for copies of
SALN and other personal documents of members of the Judiciary.
 Several requests for copies of the SALN and other personal documents of the
Justices of this Court, the CA and the Sandiganbayan (SB) were also filed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the SALN of Supreme Court Justices can be released to the public.

HELD:
Yes.
Article 3, Section 7 of the Constitution states that the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
In the case at bar, the Court held that as custodians of public documents, they
must not concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and objects of the person
seeking access to the records. However, public officers in the custody or control of
public records have the discretion to regulate the manner in which records may be
inspected, examined or copied by interested persons, such discretion does not carry
with it the authority to prohibit access, inspection, examination, or copying of the
records.

38. Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services-Office of the

Court Administrator (OCA)vs. Heusdens
A. M. No. P-11-2927 December 13, 2011

FACTS:
This was an administrative matter arising from the leave application for foreign
travel sent through mail by respondent, Wilma Salvacion P. Heusdens, Staff Clerk IV
of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Tagum City, Davao del Norte. Heusdens left
without waiting for the results of her application. The Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) found respondent to have violated OCA Circular No. 49-2003
for failing to secure the approval of her application for travel authority. It
recommended that the administrative complaint be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter and that be reprimanded with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar offense in the future would be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent violated OCA Circular No. 49-2003.

HELD:
Yes.
Article 8, Section 5, paragraph 6 of the 1987 Constitution states that the Supreme
Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.
This provision empowers the Court to oversee all matters relating to the effective
supervision and management of all courts and personnel under it. Recognizing this
mandate, Memorandum Circular No. 26 of the Office of the President considers the
Supreme Court exempt and with authority to promulgate its own rules and regulations
on foreign travels. Thus, the Court came out with OCA Circular No. 49-2003.
In the case at bar, the Supreme Court admonished respondent for traveling abroad
without any travel authority in violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense would be dealt with more
severely. The Leave Division, OAS-OCA, is hereby directed to act upon applications
for travel abroad at least five working days before the intended date of departure.
39. RUBY C. CAMPOMANES vs. NANCY S. VIOLON, Clerk of Court IV, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Oroquieta City
A. M. No. P-11-2983 July 25,
2012

FACTS:

 Respondent Nancy Violon holds the position of Clerk of Court IV, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Office of the Clerk of Court in Oroquieta City.
 Respondent borrowed P50,000 from the bank, payable in 12 monthly installments
of P3,500 for each installment. The agreement was evidenced in a Disclosure
Statement executed between the parties .
 Respondent also signed a Promissory Note undertaking to pay the obligation on
or before 25 January 2006.
 Ruby C. Campomanes, complainant and Loan Officer I of the Panguil Bay Rural
Bank in Ozamiz City wrote a letter to Office of the Deputy Court Administrator
with attached Affidavit of Complaint against Nancy Violon for failure to pay an
overdue loan contracted in favor of Panguil Bay Rural Bank.
 Violon purportedly failed to pay this amount because of financial crises in her
family and the hospitalization of her son.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Violon violated Rule 14, Section 22 of the Revised Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
HELD:

Yes.
The Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
penalizes the willful failure to pay just debts or to pay taxes to the government.
Section 22, Rule XIV thereof defines just debts as applying only to claims adjudicated
by a court of law, or to claims the existence and justness of which are admitted by the
debtor. Considering respondent’s admission of the loan, the offense in the present
case falls under the latter category. A first-time violation of Rule XIV warrants the
penalty of reprimand.
The Supreme Court reprimanded respondent for willful failure to pay a just debt.
Additionally, the Court warned the respondent that a commission of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

40. JORGE B. VARGAS vs.EMILIO RILLORAZA, JOSE BERNABE, MANUEL

ESCUDERO, Judges of the People's Court, and THE SOLICITOR GENERAL OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G. R. No. L-1612 February 26 1948

FACTS:
 Petitioner assails the validity of Sec. 14 of the The People's Court Act,
Commonwealth Act 682, which provided that the President could designate
Judges of First Instance, Judges-at-large of First Instance or Cadastral Judges to
sit as substitute Justices of the Supreme Court in treason cases without them
necessarily having to possess the required constitutional qualifications of a
regular Supreme Court Justice.
 Paragraph 2 of Section 14 of The People’s Court Act states that:
“ If, on account of such disqualification, or because of any of the grounds or
disqualification of judges, in Rule 126, section 1 of the Rules of Court, or on account
of illness, absence of temporary disability the requisite number of Justices necessary
to constitute a quorum or to render judgment in any case is not present, the President
may designate such number of Judges of First Instance, Judges-at-large of First
Instance, or Cadastral Judges, having none of the disqualifications set forth in said
section one hereof, as may be necessary to sit temporarily.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 14 of CA 682 is constitutional.

RULING:
No. Sec. 14 of CA 582 is unconstitutional.
Article VIII, sections 4 and 5, of the Constitution do not admit any composition
of the Supreme Court other than the Chief Justice and Associate Justices therein
mentioned appointed as therein provided. And the infringement is enhanced and
aggravated where a majority of the members of the Court — as in this case — are
replaced by judges of first instance. It is distinctly another Supreme Court in addition
to this. And the constitution provides for only one Supreme Court. Grounds for
disqualification added by section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 to those already
existing at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and continued by it is not only
arbitrary and irrational but positively violative of the organic law. Constitutional
requirement (Art. VIII Sec 5) provides that the members of the Supreme Court should
be appointed by the President with the consent of the CoA, "Unless provided by
law" in Sec 4 cannot be construed to authorize any legislation which would alter the
composition of the Supreme Court, as determined by the Constitution.
However temporary or brief may be the participation of a judge designated under
Sec. 14 of PCA, there is no escaping the fact the he would be participating in the
deliberations and acts of the SC, as the appellate tribunal, and his vote would count as
much as that any regular Justice of the Court. "A temporary member" therefore would
be a misnomer, as that position is not contemplated by the Constitution, where Sec.4
of Art. VIII only provides A Chief Justice and Associate Justices who have to be thus
appointed and confirmed (Sec5).

41. Judge David Nitafan vs Commissioner of Internal Revenue

G. R. No. 78780 July 23 1987

FACTS:
Nitafan and some others, duly qualified and appointed judges of the RTC, NCR,
all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court,
from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.

They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as
judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the
provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that during
their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema
to the Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."

ISSUE:
Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes.

HELD:
No. The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income
tax applied to all taxpayers. Although such intent was somehow and inadvertently not
clearly set forth in the final text of the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations of the1986
Constitutional Commission negate the contention that the intent of the framers is to
revert to the original concept of non-diminution of salaries of judicial officers.
Justices and judges are not only the citizens whose income has been reduced in
accepting service in government and yet subject to income tax. Such is true also of
Cabinet members and all other employees.