Shaylie Green

March 20, 2019

ENGL 2100

Operation: Rio Grande

Homelessness is a crisis that Utah has been actively battling for more than a decade—

yet the numbers continue to rise. For nearly a decade, the state implemented the “Housing

First” Initiative, which proved to be highly ineffective (Dean, 2018). By 2015, the U.S. Housing

and Urban Development Department was reporting 3,025 homeless in the state of Utah

(Comprehensive Report, 2015). With homelessness being looked at as a nationwide epidemic,

Utah decided it was time to make a change. In 2017, they announced Operation Rio Grande.

The operation was pushed in order to shorten the length of time people need shelter, and

create more successful transitions from shelter to housing. It specifically targeted the Rio

Grande area of Salt Lake, an area that is often seen as toxic for its prevalence of homelessness,

drugs, and violent crimes. This project has been running for nearly two years, and it’s time to

ask: has it made a difference?

Phase 1

Operation Rio Grande was planned to release in three main phases. Phase one launched

in August of 2017, and aimed to reduce the crime rate in Utah: particularly near Pioneer Park,

and the surrounding neighborhoods. Despite the police station nearby, drug crimes in the park

had been described as a game of “cat and mouse (Piper, 2017).” As police attempted to crack

down on the problem, dealers would adapt. Often, people dealt in plain site, with the police
being able to do little to nothing to curb the problem. Phase one of the operation aimed to

increase patrol and arrests, and get dealers off the streets.

Since the beginning of the project, approximately 4,700 arrests have been made, with a

44% decline in Rio Grande’s crime rate (Operation, n.d.). On the outside this is a staggering

number, but it doesn’t quite tell the whole story. With the high number of arrests, jail capacity

has been reached in many cities, forcing many dealers to be sentenced with nothing more than

a fine. It seems these dealers have continued this game of cat and mouse, adapting by moving

cities. As crime rates have decreased in the heart of Salt Lake, issues have increased in the

surrounding cities. For phase one of the initiative to be a success, it’s important that the state

addresses the issue of overcrowded jails.

Phase 2

In the past, our jail system has not followed much of a “rehabilitation” focus for the

incarcerated. Phase Two of the initiative aims to address this: focusing on rehabilitation of

those arrested in Phase one. The second aspect of the Rio Grande project is crucial in creating

a long-term solution to the problem. According to a 2009 study, up to 40% of those suffering

from chronic homelessness struggle with a substance abuse disorder, or a major mental illness

(Who Is Homeless, 2007). To assume we can leave these problems untreated, and expect

someone to become self-reliant is naïve at best.

The states efforts to address this issue have proven to be successful so far. The state has

increased it’s number of beds for residential treatment by over 250, and with these changes,

they have been able to enroll 1,810 people into treatment programs (Operation, n.d.). While
this is less than half of the arrests that have been made, it is a dramatic improvement to the

state’s previous response to drug arrests.

Many previously homeless addicts have praised the state’s approach to the issue. In an

interview given to Amy Daeschel, a heroin addict and homeless resident of Salt Lake, she states,

“I would not be alive if it wasn’t for Operation Rio Grande.” She was put through drug

treatment after her arrest, and given sober living arrangements. She explained how crucial this

treatment program was in her ability to stay clean, and get off the streets (Winslow, B).

Phase 3

Phase three of the initiative could be argued as the most important, but also faces some

of the greatest barriers: connecting individuals to sustainable income and housing. Since the

beginning of the project, 397 people were given placement into sustainable jobs. Currently, 144

of those individuals are still active in the program (Operation, n.d.). It seems that the

Operation’s success rate drops significantly with each phase. Although each active job

placement is one worth celebrating, it’s worth evaluating what is causing this drop.

One of the biggest obstacles I see in Operation Rio Grande is a lack of resources. We saw

it in phase one, as jail capacity was reached, and many of those arrested were not able to

continue through the program. We see it in phase two, as many spend months or even years

waitlisted for residential treatment, due to inadequate number of beds. And it’s evident

especially in phase three, as even those who have been treated and given an income struggle to

stay self-reliant. Many are falling back into their old ways, returning to addictions, and cycling

into another episode of homelessness. Let me share a story that may give insight as to why this

might be:
 In 2017, a housing voucher was awarded to Ron and Katherine Barrett, a couple that

had been struggling with homelessness since 2008. Ron was diagnosed with cancer, Katherine

had Multiple Sclerosis, and the medical bills became too much to handle. They were left

homeless for over a decade, and were thrilled to be given a voucher for rental assistance.

However, after two months of searching, they were unable to find affordable housing that

would accept their voucher, and was within their price range. Their assistance expired, and Ron

and Katherine remain homeless (Stevens, 2019).

In 2010, the average cost of rent in Utah was approximately $720. As of 2018, it has

risen to approximately $1,072 (Stevens, 2019). Affordable housing has become incredibly hard

to access, and it’s been estimated that we have a deficit of about 7,500 affordable housing units

in the state. Those who are placed in jobs and can receive a steady income still face being

denied due to bad or no credit, or for having drug charges on their records.

The lack of affordable and transitional housing in the valley, along with the lack of

residential treatment available will continue to cause barriers to Operation Rio Grande. We

need to make rehabilitating the homeless a priority, rather than a nuisance.

Works Cited:

Comprehensive Report on Homelessness: State of Utah 2015[Pamphlet]. (2015). UT:

Department of Workforce Services.

Dean, T. (2018, December 10). Auditors can't tell if $100M spent on Utah homeless services
made a difference. Retrieved from https://www.ksl.com/article/46445514/auditors-
cant-tell-if-100m-spent-on-utah-homeless-services-made-a-difference

McKellar, K. (2018, August 14). No 'mission accomplished,' but Operation Rio Grande successes
celebrated. Retrieved from https://www.ksl.com/article/46376048/no-mission-
accomplished-but-operation-rio-grande-successes-celebrated

Operation Rio Grande. (n.d.). Retrieved March 20, 2019, from

https://operationriogrande.utah.gov/

Piper, M. (2017, October 18). Operation Rio Grande disrupts drug dealers, but it hasn't put
them out of business. Retrieved from
https://www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2017/10/18/operation-rio-grande-disrupts-drug-
dealers-but-it-hasnt-put-them-out-of-business/

Stevens, T. (2019, February 3). A homeless Salt Lake City couple have had a housing voucher for
weeks but can't find an apartment. They remain living on the street. Retrieved from
https://www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2019/02/03/homeless-salt-lake-city/

Who Is Homeless? NCH Fact Sheet #3, National Coalition for the Homeless, 2007.

Winslow, B. (2018, August 15). The success of 'Operation Rio Grande' one year later depends on
who you ask. Retrieved from https://fox13now.com/2018/08/14/the-success-of-
operation-rio-grande-one-year-later-depends-on-who-you-ask/