1.

Judicial Review of, or Relief Against, Administrative Actions (De Leon 2016 Edition)

2. Macailing, et al vs. Andrada, et al (January 30, 1970, G.R. No. L-21607)

3. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Lopez (A.M. no. p-10-2788, 18 January 2011)

4. Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs.CA 184 SCRA 426

5. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, et al. vs. Senate Committee of the Whole represented by Senate
President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011

6. Book VII, Administrative Code of 1987 (Read Section 1 - Section 25)

7. Law on Public Officers

8. Laurel v. Desierto, 381 SCRA 48

Facts:
Petitioner Vice-President Salvador Laurel was appointed as the head of the National Centennial
Commission, a body constituted for the preparation of the National Centennial celebration in
1998. He was subsequently appointed as the Chairman of ExpoCorp., and was one of the nine
(9) incorporators. A controversy erupted on the alleged anomalies with the bidding contracts to
some entities and the petitioner was implicated. By virtue of an investigation conducted by the
Office of the Ombudsman, the petitioner was indicted for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019). The petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss questioning the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman, which was denied. He further filed a motion for
reconsideration which was also denied, hence this petition for certiorari.

The petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and contended that he is not a public
officer since ExpoCorp is a private corporation.

Issue: W/N the petitioner is a public officer

Yes, the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case of the petitioner since he is a public officer.
The NCC is an office performing executive functions since one of its mandate is to implement
national policies. Moreover, the said office was established by virtue of an executive order. It is
clear that the NCC performs sovereign functions, hence it is a public office. Since petitioner is
chair of the NCC, he is therefore a public officer. The fact that the NCC was characterized by EO
 128 as an 'ad-hoc body' make it less of a public office. Finally, the fact that the petitioner did not
receive any compensation during his tenure is of no consequence since such is merely an
incidence and forms no part of the office.

9. Veterans Federation of the Phils. v. Reyes, 483 SCRA 526

FACTS:

The Veterans Federation of the Philippines was created under Rep. Act No. 2640. The
DND Secretary issued the assailed DND Department Circular No. 04 entitled, "Further
Implementing the Provisions of Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 2640.

Pursuant to the assailed Circular, the DND sought to audit VFP. The VFP complained
about the alleged broadness of the scope of the management audit and requested its
suspension. This was denied.

VFP argued that it is a private non-government organization. To support its argument, it

contended: (1) that it does not possess the elements of a public office, particularly the
possession/delegation of a portion of sovereign power of government; (2) that its funds are not
public funds because it receives no government funds as its funds come from membership
dues, and the lease rentals; (3) that it retains its essential character as a private, civilian
federation of veterans voluntarily formed by the veterans themselves where membership is
voluntary and is governed by the Labor Code and SSS law; (4) that the Administrative Code of
1987 does not provide that the VFP is an attached agency; and (5) that the DBM declared that
the VFP is a non-government organization and issued a certificate that the VFP has not been a
direct recipient of any funds released by the DBM.

ISSUES:

Central Issue: Whether or not the Veterans Federation of the Philippines is a private
corporation.

 Whether or not the challenged department circular passed in the valid exercise of the
respondent Secretary’s "control and supervision."
  Whether or not the challenged department circular validly lay standards classifying the
VFP, an essentially civilian organization, within the ambit of statutes only applying to
government entities.
 Whether or not the department circular unduly encroached on the prerogatives of VFP’s
governing body.

RULING:

The Court ruled the following: (1) assailed DND Department Circular No. 04 does not
supplant nor modify and is, on the contrary, perfectly in consonance with Rep. Act No. 2640;
and (2) that VFP is a public corporation. As such, it can be placed under the control and
supervision of the Secretary of National Defense, who consequently has the power to conduct
an extensive management audit of VFP.

The functions of the VFP are executive functions

The delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government is

"[t]he most important characteristic" in determining whether a position is a public office or not.

In several cases, the Court has dealt with this issue which deals with activities not
immediately apparent to be sovereign functions. It upheld the public sovereign nature of
operations needed either to promote social justice or to stimulate patriotic sentiments and
love of country.

In the case at bar, the functions of the VFP fall within the category of sovereign
functions. The protection of the interests of war veterans is not only meant to promote social
justice, but is also intended to reward patriotism.

The functions of the VFP are executive functions to provide immediate and adequate
care, benefits and other forms of assistance to war veterans and veterans of military campaigns,
their surviving spouses and orphans.

VFP funds are public funds

The fact that no budgetary appropriations have been released to the VFP by the DBM
does not prove that it is a private corporation. Assuming that the DBM believed that the VFP is a
private corporation, it is an accepted principle that the erroneous application of the law by public
officers does not bar a subsequent correct application of the law.

The funds in the hands of the VFP from whatever source are public funds, and can be
used only for public purposes. As the Court ruled in Republic v. COCOFED, "(e)ven if the
money is allocated for a special purpose and raised by special means, it is still public in
character." There is nothing wrong, whether legally or morally, from raising revenues through
non-traditional methods.

Membership of the VFP is not the individual

membership of the affiliate organizations

VFP claims that the Secretary of National Defense "historically did not indulge in the
direct or ‘micromanagement’ of the VFP. This reliance of petitioner on what has "historically"
been done is erroneous, since laws are not repealed by disuse, custom, or practice to the
contrary.

Neither is the civilian nature of VFP relevant because the Constitution does not contain
any prohibition against the grant of control and/or supervision to the Secretary of National
Defense over a civilian organization.

The Administrative Code did not

repeal or modify RA 2640

The Administrative Code, by giving definitions of the various entities covered by it,
acknowledges that its enumeration is not exclusive. The Administrative Code could not be said
to have repealed nor enormously modified RA 2640 by implication, as such repeal or enormous
modification by implication is not favored in statutory construction.

DBM opinion is not persuasive

VFP’s claim that the supposed declaration of the DBM that petitioner is a non-
government organization is not persuasive, since DBM is not a quasi-judicial agency. The
persuasiveness of the DBM opinion has, however, been overcome by all the previous
explanations we have laid so far.
The fate of Department Circular No. 04

The Court has defined the power of control as "the power of an officer to alter or modify
or nullify or set aside what a subordinate has done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former to that of the latter." The power of supervision, on the
other hand, means "overseeing, or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties."

Since the Court has also previously determined that VFP funds are public funds, there is
likewise no reason to declare this provision invalid. Having in their possession public funds, the
officers of the VFP, especially its fiscal officers, must indeed share in the fiscal responsibility to
the greatest extent.

10. Santos vs Secretary of Labor, 22 SCRA 848

11. Abeja v. Tanada 236 SCRA 60

FACTS

In 1992, Rosauro Radovan was declared the winner of the mayoralty elections in Pagbilao,
Quezon. His rival, Evelyn Abeja, filed an election protest where she questioned the results in 22
precincts. Radovan filed a counter protest where he questioned the results in 36 precincts with
counterclaim for damages. Abeja then caused the revision of the ballots covering the 22
precincts and paid the expenses therefor. Abeja then urged Radovan to cause the revision of the
36 precincts he is questioning. Radovan however refused and so Abeja filed a motion that a
judgment be rendered based on the results from the 22 precincts. The original judge did not rule
on the motion before he was transferred. Before the judge could be replaced, Radovan died.
Radovan was then substituted by the vice mayor (Conrado de Rama) and Radovan’s wife,
Ediltrudes. Ediltrudes substituted his deceased husband I nsofar as the latter’s counterclaim for
damages is concerned.
In 1993, the new judge, Federico Tañada ruled that Abeja’s motion is premature because the 36
precincts are not yet revised. Tañada agreed with Radovan that the 36 precincts may only be
revised if Abeja can show that she (Abeja) leads by at least one point vote over Radovan.

ISSUE & RULING

Whether or not the judge is correct

NO

Considering that this petition involves an election protest heard by a regional trial court, the
Comelec Rules of Procedure are controlling.

There is no rule in election protests cases which states that a protestant (Abeja) must first
shownthat she won in the precincts she is contesting before evidence on the protestee’s
(Radovan) counter-protest can be had. This will re nder the protestant’s case to be at the mercy
of the protestee who can just prolong the case until his term is over.

Consequently, private respondent must be deemed to have waived or abandoned his counter-
protest. The applicable Comelec rules provide for the presentation of evidence by the parties in
succession in the order or sequence provided under Sec. 2, rule 17 (Comelec Rules) which must
be submitted within a reasonable time, if not immediately after the revision of the precincts
covered by the protest proper. By insisting that the counter-protested precincts should be
revised only if it is shown after the revision of the protested precincts that petitioner, his
opponent, leads by at least one (1) vote, private respondent is adopting a selfserving rule
without legal sanction calculated to unduly prolong the litigaton.

Furthermore, it is readily apparent from the provisions of the applicable Comelec Rules that the
court shall render its decision after both parties shall have presented their respective evidence.
Nowhere in the said provisions is it indicated that presentation of evidence by the protestee
may continue after the court has ruled on the evidence of the protestant and determine the
number of votes obtained by the latter. Otherwise, it would be possible for the protestee to
prolong the protest and render it moot by expiration of the term of office contested.

Also, the Supreme Court ruled that the substitution of Ediltrudes for her deceased husband is
erroneous. This is notwithstanding the counter-claim for damages in the counter protest. Public
office is personal to the incumbent and is not a property which passes to his heirs. The heirs may
no longer prosecute the deceased protestee’s counter
-claim for damages against the protestant for that was extinguished when death terminated his
right to occupy the contested office.
12. National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration v. CSC, 221 SCRA 145

FACTS:

 Garcia was an LLB grad and a first grade civil service.

 She was appointed Deputy Register of Deeds VII.

 She was later appointed as Deputy Register of Deeds III, upon reclassification of the
position.

 She was designated as Acting Branch Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan.

 Executive Order No. 649 was enacted.

 It authorized the restructuring of the Land Registration Commission to National Land

Titles and Deeds Registration Administration, and it regionalized the offices of the
registers therein.

 The law imposed a new requirement of BAR membership to qualify for permanent
appointment as Deputy Register od Deeds II or higher.

 Garcia issued an appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II on temporary status for

not being a member of the Philippine Bar.

 Sec. of Justice notified Garcia of the termination of her services on the ground that she
was receiving Bribe Money.

 Garcia appealed, but the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) dropped her appeal on
the ground that the termination of her services was due to the expiration of her
temporary appointment.

 The CSC issued a resolution, directing that Garcia be restored to her position.
  According to the CSC, under the vested right theory the new requirement of the BAR
membership will not apply to her but only to the filling up of vacant lawyer position on
or after Feb 9, 1981, the date the order took effect.

NALTDRA assailed the validity of the CSC Resolution

ISSUE
: WON membership in the bar, which is a qualification requirement prescribed for appointment
to the position of Deputy Register of Deeds under EO. No. 649, Section 4, should be applied only
to new applicants and not to those who were already in service of the LRC as deputy register of
deeds at the time of the issuance and implementation of the EO.

HELD:
No. The requirement shall also apply to those already in service.
RATIO

EO No. 649, in express terms, provided for the abolition of existing positions:

Section 8.

Abolition of Existing Positions

All structural units in the LRC and in the registries of deeds, and all positions therein shall cease
to exist from the date specified in the implementing order to be issued by the president
pursuant to the preceding par. The pertinent functions, applicable appropriations, records,
equipment and property shall be transferred to the appropriate staff or offices therein created