PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD

9. PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS vs

DESIERTO (363 SCRA 489, AUGUST 22, 2001)
FACTS: Calinog applied to the PNB for a stand-by irrevocable confirmed letter of credit to cover
importation of sugar machinery and equipment on turn-key basis, construction, plantation and
money loans in connection with its proposed 4,000 TCD Sugar Central. The PNB approved the
loan and was increased.
Later, Atty. Orlando Salvador filed with the Ombudsman a complaint against Calinog-
Lambunao Sugar Mills, Inc. (Calinog) for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019 (Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription. The loan transactions
subject of this complaint occurred in the years 1968, 1978, 1979 and 1982, respectively. The said
loan transactions disclose the fact that the fifteen (15) year prescriptive period for offenses
punishable under R.A. 3019, as amended has already passed from the time the alleged offenses
were committed. The prescriptive period of fifteen (15) years shall commence to run from the date
of commission. Hence, the subject offenses have already prescribed following the pronouncement
of the Court in the foregoing case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prescriptive period begins to run on the date of the commission of
the offense.
HELD: In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following shall be
considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of
prescription started to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.
However, since R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is a special law, the applicable rule in the
computation of the prescriptive period is provided in Act No. 3326, Section 2 as amended, which
implies that if the commission of the crime were known, the prescriptive period shall commence
to run on the day the crime was committed. However, if the violation of the special law was not
known at the time of its commission, the prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof.
In cases involving violations of R.A. No.3019 committed prior to the February 1986 Edsa
Revolution, the Court ruled that the government as the aggrieved party, could not have known of
the violations at the time the questioned transactions were made. Moreover, no person would have
dared to question the legality of those transactions. Thus, the counting of the prescriptive period
commenced from the date of discovery of the offense in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation by
the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans.
In this case, the prescriptive period was interrupted upon the filing of the complaint with the
Ombudsman on March 24, 1997, five (5) years from the time of discovery in 1992.
Thusly, the filing of the complaint was well within the prescriptive period.
10. ZALDIVIA vs REYES, JR. (211 SCRA 277, 3 JULY 1992)
FACTS: Petitioner Zaldivia is charged with quarrying for commercial purpose without a
mayor’s permit in the municipality of province of Rizal.
She moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed but it
was denied. She appealed to the RTC and denial was sustained by the respondent judge.
Petitioner filed for a petition for review on certiorari arguing that the case filed against
her is govern by the provisions on the Rules of Summary Procedure. She contends that criminal
cases like violations of municipal or city ordinances does not require preliminary investigation
and shall be filed directly to the court and not in the Prosecutor’s office. She also invoke Act No.
3226 “An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and
Municipal Ordinances and to Provide when Prescription Shall Begin to Run.” Concluding that
the case should have been dismissed since the case against her was being filed in the court way
beyond the 2 months statutory period.
The prosecutor contends that when the case was filed on the Prosecutor’s office, it
suspends the prescriptive period.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prescription of period ceases to run when the case was filed on the
prosecutor’s office.
HELD: As a general rule, the filing of the case in the prosecutor’s office is sufficient to interrupt
the running of the prescriptive period except when the case is covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure. If it is any crime, you file it in the fiscal’s office; the running of the prescriptive
period is interrupted. But in the case at bar, having only a penalty of arresto menor, it therefore
falls under the provisions of the Rules on Summary Procedure. If it is covered by the Summary
Rules, the period continues. It must be the filing of the case in court which will interrupt the
period from running.
Petition granted. Case dismissed on the ground of prescription.
11. JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEM CORPORATION VS LIDUA, SR (706 SCRA 724, 7
OCTOBER 2013)
FACTS: Jadewell, pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000, was authorized to render any motor
vehicle immobilized by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked. Balajadia
and the other respondents dismantled, took and carried away the clamps attached to the wheel of
the vehicles, which took place on May 7, 2003. Jadewell filed acomplaint for robbery against the
respondents with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23,2003. However, the Informations
were filed with the MTC on October 2, 2003. Balajadia filed amotion to quash.
The MTC granted the motion to quash and dismissed the case and Jadewell subsequent
motion for reconsideration. Jadewell’s petition for certiorari with RTC was likewise denied.
Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.
They argued that the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Baguio City, not the filing of the criminal information before Court, is the
reckoning point in determining whether or not the criminal action had prescribed.
Respondents argued that Zaldivia v. Reyes held that the proceedings mentioned in
Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, refer to judicial proceedings. Thus, the SC, in Zaldivia
held that the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor was not a
judicial proceeding. The prescriptive period commenced from the alleged date of the commission
of the crime on May 7, 2003 and ended two months after on July 7, 2003.
ISSUE: Whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May
23,2003 tolled the prescription period of the commission of the offense
HELD: No. As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an
Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance.
It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia is applicable to ordinances and their prescription
period. It also upholds the necessity of filing the Information in court in order to toll the period.
Zaldivia also has this to say concerning the effects of its ruling: The Court realizes that under the
above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the
prosecutor’s office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial
proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the
applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language.
The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the
problem here sought to be corrected.
FAILURE TO IMPEAD PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
12. MADARANG vs COURT OF APPEALS (463 SCRA 318, 14 JULY 2005)
FACTS: Private respondent Spouses Chua filed a complaint for replevin and damages against
petitioner Madarang in the RTC of Quezon City. The complaint alleged that private respondent
is the owner of a 1990 dark gray Kia Pride car, evidenced by Certificate of Registration; and that
petitioners, through force and intimidation, took possession of the subject car by virtue of a
falsified Deed of Sale allegedly executed by private respondent in favor of petitioner.
Upon complaint of private respondent, petitioner was charged with Falsification of Public
Document in the MeTC. On the same date, petitioners were charged with Grave Coercion in the
same MeTC. The cases were consolidated and jointly tried.
Motion to Suspend Criminal Proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question was filed
by petitioner in the MeTC, claiming that the issues presented in the replevin case pending in
RTC are intimately related to the issues pending before the MeTC, the resolution of which would
necessarily determine the guilt of the accused in the criminal case for falsification.
The MeTC denied petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings on the ground that the
decision in the civil case for replevin will not be determinative of the guilt of the accused in the
criminal charge for falsification.
RTC dismissed the complaint for replevin upon finding that the deed of sale is genuine
and that private respondent voluntarily surrendered possession of the car to the petitioners.
Private respondent filed a timely appeal with the CA.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the falsification case on the ground that the decision
dismissing the replevin suit in RTC involving the same parties absolved him of criminal liability
in the falsification case. The MeTC granted the Motion to Dismiss of petitioner. A Motion for
Reconsideration was filed by the prosecution on the ground that the dismissal was unwarranted
since the decision dismissing the replevin suit in RTC is not yet final and executory, as it is
pending appeal before the CA and the accused deliberately omitted to send the private prosecutor
a copy of said Motion to Dismiss. The MeTC recalled the dismissal of the case for falsification.
Petitioners filed a Second Omnibus Motion to on the ground that the findings of RTC,
that the signature of private respondent in the deed of sale is not falsified and that private
respondent voluntarily surrendered possession of the car to the petitioners bar the prosecution for
falsification and grave coercion. Petitioners alleged that the findings of the RTC are binding and
must be given due respect by the MeTC notwithstanding the appeal taken by private respondent.
In its Opposition, the prosecution alleged that: the motion to quash is a mere scrap of
paper as it is contrary to Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court that a Motion to Quash must
be filed before arraignment of accused and such failure to move to quash before entering his
plea, accused is deemed to have waived his right to file the same; and, the replevin suit is an
independent civil action, separate and distinct from these cases for falsification of public
document and grave coercion.
 The MeTC denied petitioners motion to quash, ruling that the decision rendered by the
RTC, in the replevin case cannot absolve petitioners of the charges in the criminal cases as said
decision has not attained finality since it is pending appeal before the CA; and that petitioners
waived any grounds of a Motion to Quash pursuant to Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC. They assailed the MeTC’s
denial of their motion to quash the information for falsification of public document and grave
coercion and alleged that the MeTC should have adopted the factual findings of RTC in the
Decision in the replevin case as res judicata.
The RTC, dismissed petitioners petition for certiorari upon holding that: res judicata
cannot be invoked considering that the Decision dated of RTC, Branch 84 in the replevin case is
not yet a final and executory judgment, being on appeal; in any event, a final judgment rendered
in a civil action absolving the defendant from civil liability is not a bar to criminal action; the
issues of falsification and coercion were not made the subject of a full-dressed hearing in the
replevin case; and, the motion to quash was filed only after their arraignment in violation of the
well-settled doctrine that a motion to quash may be filed only before the accused has entered his
plea to the accusatory pleading.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Undaunted, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which was dismissed.
In dismissing the petition, the CA held that the writ of certiorari is not the proper remedy where a
motion to quash an information is denied. It further held that the People of the Philippines was
not impleaded as a respondent in the case nor was the Office of the Solicitor General furnished a
copy of the petition when the Informations were filed in the name of the People of the
Philippines and necessarily it is the party interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA is correct in dismissing petitioners petition for certiorari.
HELD: The Court note that the petitions for certiorari in the RTC and CA are defective since
petitioners failed to implead the People of the Philippines as respondent therein. As provided in
Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, all criminal actions are prosecuted under
the direction and control of the public prosecutor. The prosecution of offenses is thus the concern
of the government prosecutors. It behooved the petitioners to implead the People of the Philippines
as respondent in the RTC and in the CA to enable the public prosecutor or Solicitor General, as
the case may be, to comment on the petitions. The failure to implead is fatal to petitioner’s cause.