ARTEMIO ENDAYA, complainant, vs. ATTY. WILFREDO OCA, respondent.

The law is no brooding omnipresence in the sky, so spoke Justice Holmes. He must have made the statement because invariably
the legal system is encountered in human form, notably through the lawyers. For practical purposes, the lawyers not only represent the
law; they are the law.[1] With their ubiquitous presence in the social milieu, lawyers have to be responsible. The problems they create in
lawyering become public difficulties. To keep lawyers responsible underlies the worth of the ethics of lawyering. Indeed, legal ethics is
simply the aesthetic term for professional responsibility.
The case before us demonstrates once again that when a lawyer violates his duties to his client, the courts, the legal profession and
the public, he engages in conduct which is both unethical and unprofessional.
This case unfolded with a verified Complaint[2] filed on January 12, 1993 by complainant Artemio Endaya against respondent Atty.
Wifredo Oca for violation of the lawyers oath and what complainant termed as professional delinquency or infidelity.[3] The antecedents
are:
On November 7, 1991, a complaint for unlawful detainer docketed as Civil Case No. 34-MCTC-T was filed with the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Taysan-Lobo, Batangas by Apolonia H. Hornilla, Pedro Hernandez, Santiago Hernandez and Dominador Hernandez against
complainant and his spouse Patrosenia Endaya.[4]
On December 13, 1991, the complainant and his wife as defendants in the case filed their answer which was prepared by a certain
Mr. Isaias Ramirez. A preliminary conference was conducted on January 17, 1992, which complainant and his wife attended without
counsel. During the conference, complainant categorically admitted that plaintiffs were the declared owners for taxation purposes of the
land involved in the case. Continuation of the preliminary conference was set on January 31, 1992. Thereafter, complainant sought the
services of the Public Attorneys Office in Batangas City and respondent was assigned to handle the case for the complainant and his
wife.[5]
At the continuation of the preliminary conference, respondent appeared as counsel for complainant and his spouse. He moved for
the amendment of the answer previously filed by complainant and his wife, but his motion was denied.[6] Thereafter, the court, presided
by Acting Trial Court Judge Teodoro M. Baral, ordered the parties to submit their affidavits and position papers within ten days from receipt
of the order. The court also decreed that thirty days after receipt of the last affidavit and position paper, or upon expiration of the period
for filing the same, judgment shall be rendered on the case.[7]
Respondent failed to submit the required affidavits and position paper, as may be gleaned from the Decision dated March 19, 1992
of the MCTC where it was noted that only the plaintiffs submitted their affidavits and position papers.[8]
Nonetheless, the court dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer principally on the ground that the plaintiffs are not the real
parties-in-interest. The dispositive portion of the Decisionreads:

WHEREFORE, this case is hereby dismissed on the ground that the plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue as they are not the real party
(sic) in interest, in addition to the fact that there is no privity of contract between the plaintiffs and the defendants as to the verbal lease
agreement.

SO ORDERED.[9]

Plaintiffs appealed the Decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City, Branch 1, where the case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 3378. On April 10, 1992, the RTC directed the parties to file their respective memoranda. [10] Once again, respondent failed the
complainant and his wife. As observed by the RTC in its Decision[11] dated September 7, 1992, respondent did not file the memorandum
for his clients, thereby prompting the court to consider the case as submitted for decision.[12]
In its Decision, the RTC reversed the decision appealed from as it held that plaintiffs are the co-owners of the property in dispute and
as such are parties-in-interest.[13] It also found that the verbal lease agreement was on a month-to-month basis and perforce terminable
by the plaintiffs at the end of any given month upon proper notice to the defendants.[14] It also made a finding that defendants incurred
rentals in arrears.[15] The decretal portion of the Decision reads, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Taysan-Lobo dated March 19, 1992, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and new one entered, to wit:

Defendants ARTEMIO ENDAYA and PATROSENIA ENDAYA and all persons claiming under them are hereby ordered to vacate and
dismantle their house on the land subject of the verbal lease agreement at their own expense. The defendants are likewise ordered to
pay the monthly rental of P25.00 from the month of January 1991 to November 1991 and ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS
monthly from December 1991 until the defendants finally vacate and surrender possession of the subject property to the plaintiffs and to
pay attorneys fee in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS.

No pronouncement as to cost.[16]

Complainant received a copy of the Decision on October 7, 1992. Two days later, or on October 9, 1992, complainant confronted
respondent with the adverse decision but the latter denied receipt of a copy thereof. Upon inquiry with the Branch Clerk of Court, however,
complainant found out that respondent received his copy back on September 14, 1992.[17]
 Having lost the unlawful detainer case, on January 12, 1993 complainant filed the present administrative complaint against the
respondent for professional delinquency consisting of his failure to file the required pleadings in behalf of the complainant and his spouse.
Complainant contends that due to respondents inaction he lost the opportunity to present his cause and ultimately the case itself.[18]
In his Comment[19] dated March 17, 1993, respondent denies that he committed professional misconduct in violation of his oath,
stressing that he was not the original counsel of complainant and his spouse.[20] He further avers that when he agreed to represent
complainant at the continuation of the preliminary conference in the main case, it was for the sole purpose of asking leave of court to file
an amended answer because he was made to believe by the complainant that the answer was prepared by a non-lawyer. Upon discovering
that the answer was in fact the work of a lawyer, forthwith he asked the court to relieve him as complainants counsel, but he was denied.
He adds that he agreed to file the position paper for the complainant upon the latters undertaking to provide him with the documents which
support the position that plaintiffs are not the owners of the property in dispute. As complainant had reneged on his promise, he claims
that he deemed it more prudent not to file any position paper as it would be a repetition of the answer. He offers the same reason for not
filing the memorandum on appeal with the RTC. Finally, respondent asserts that he fully explained his stand as regards Civil Case No.
34-MCTC-T to the complainant.[21]
Pursuant to our Resolution[22] dated May 10, 1993, complainant filed his Reply[23] to respondents Comment wherein he merely
reiterated his allegations in the Complaint.
On July 28, 1993, this Court directed respondent to file his rejoinder within ten days from notice of our Resolution.[24] But he failed to
do so despite the lapse of a considerable period of time. This prompted the Court to require respondent to show cause why he should not
be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt and to file his rejoinder, both within ten (10) days from notice. [25]
In his Explanation[26] dated February 28, 1997, respondent admits having received a copy of the resolution requiring him to file a
rejoinder. However, he asserts that he purposely did not file a rejoinder for he believed in good faith that a rejoinder to complainants reply
is no longer necessary.[27] He professes that in electing not to file a rejoinder he did not intend to cast disrespect upon the Court.[28]
On June 16, 1997, we referred this case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for evaluation, report and recommendation.[29]
In its Report[30] dated February 6, 2001, the Office of the Bar Confidant found respondent negligent in handling the case of
complainant and his wife and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for one month. The pertinent portions of
the Report read, thus:

It is to be noted that after appearing at the preliminary conference before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, respondent was never heard
from again. Respondents seeming indifference to the cause of his client, specially when the case was on appeal, caused the defeat of
herein complainant. Respondent practically abandoned complainant in the midst of a storm. This is even more made serious of the fact
that respondent, at that time, was assigned at the Public Attorneys Office- a government entity mandated to provide free and competent
legal assistance.

A lawyers devotion to his clients cause not only requires but also entitles him to deploy every honorable means to secure for the client
what is justly due him or to present every defense provided by law to enable the latters cause to succeed. (Miraflor vs. Hagad, 244
SCRA 106)

....

The facts, however, do not show that respondent employed every legal and honorable means to advance the cause of his client. Had
respondent tried his best, he could have found some other defenses available to his client; but respondent was either too lazy or too
convinced that his client had a losing case.

....

For intentionally failing to submit the pleadings required by the court, respondent practically closed the door to the possibility of putting
up a fair fight for his client. As the Court once held, A client is bound by the negligence of his lawyer. (Diaz-Duarte vs. Ong, 298 SCRA
388)[31]

However, the Bar Confidant did not find complainant entirely faultless. She observed, viz:

Respondents allegation that complainant failed in his promise to submit the documents to support his claim was not denied by
complainant; hence, it is deemed admitted. Complainant is not without fault; for misrepresenting that he could prove his claim through
supporting documents, respondent was made to believe that he had a strong leg to stand on. A party cannot blame his counsel for
negligence when he himself was guilty of neglect. (Macapagal vs. Court of Appeals, 271 SCRA 491)[32]

On April 18, 2001, we referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.
Several hearings were set by the IBP but complainant did not appear even once. Respondent attended five hearings, but he failed
to present evidence in support of his defense, as required by Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez. This compelled the latter
to make his report on the basis of the pleadings and evidence forwarded by the Office of the Bar Confidant.
On October 11, 2002, Commissioner Fernandez issued his Report[33] wherein he concurred with the findings and recommendation
of the Office of the Bar Confidant.
In a Resolution[34] dated April 26, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the Report of Commissioner Fernandez.
 The Court is convinced that respondent violated the lawyers oath not only once but a number of times in regard to the handling of
his clients cause. The repeated violations also involve defilement of several Canons in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Right off, the Court notes that respondent attributes his failure to file the required pleadings for the complainant and his wife invariably
to his strong personal belief that it was unnecessary or futile to file the pleadings. This was true with respect to the affidavits and position
paper at the MCTC level, the appeal memorandum at the RTC level and the rejoinder at this Courts level. In the last instance, it took
respondent as long as three years, under compulsion of a show cause order at that, only to manifest his predisposition not to file a rejoinder
after all. In other words, at the root of respondents transgressions is his seeming stubborn mindset against the acts required of him by the
courts. This intransigent attitude not only belies lack of diligence and commitment but evinces absence of respect for the authority of this
Court and the other courts involved.
The lawyers oath embodies the fundamental principles that guide every member of the legal fraternity. From it springs the lawyers
duties and responsibilities that any infringement thereof can cause his disbarment, suspension or other disciplinary action.[35]
Found in the oath is the duty of a lawyer to protect and safeguard the interest of his client. Specifically, it requires a lawyer to conduct
himself to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients.[36] This duty is further stressed
in Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that (A) lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence.
In this case, evidence abound that respondent failed to demonstrate the required diligence in handling the case of complainant and
his spouse. As found by the Office of the Bar Confidant,[37] after appearing at the second preliminary conference before the MCTC,
respondent had not been heard of again until he commented on the complaint in this case. Without disputing this fact, respondent reasons
out that his appearance at the conference was for the sole purpose of obtaining leave of court to file an amended answer and that when
he failed to obtain it because of complainants fault he asked the court that he be relieved as counsel. [38] The explanation has undertones
of dishonesty for complainant had engaged respondent for the entire case and not for just one incident. The alternative conclusion is that
respondent did not know his procedure for under the Rules on Summary Procedure[39] the amended answer is a prohibited pleading.
Even assuming respondent did in fact ask to be relieved, this could not mean that less was expected from him. Once a lawyer takes
the cudgels for a clients case, he owes it to his client to see the case to the end. This, we pointed out in Legarda v. Court of Appeals,[40] thus:

It should be remembered that the moment a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will exert all effort for its prosecution until
its final conclusion. A lawyer who fails to exercise due diligence or abandons his clients cause make him unworthy of the trust reposed
on him by the latter.[41]

Also, we held in Santiago v. Fojas,[42] every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill, and competence,
regardless of its importance and whether he accepts if for a fee or for free. In other words, whatever the lawyers reason is for accepting a
case, he is duty bound to do his utmost in prosecuting or defending it.
Moreover, a lawyer continues to be a counsel of record until the lawyer-client relationship is terminated either by the act of his client
or his own act, with permission of the court. Until such time, the lawyer is expected to do his best for the interest of his client [43]
Thus, when respondent was directed to file affidavits and position paper by the MCTC, and appeal memorandum by the RTC, he
had no choice but to comply. However, respondent did not bother to do so, in total disregard of the court orders. This constitutes negligence
and malpractice proscribed by Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that (A) lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Respondents failure to file the affidavits and position paper at the MCTC did not actually prejudice his clients, for the court
nevertheless rendered a decision favorable to them. However, the failure is per se a violation of Rule 18.03.
It was respondents failure to file appeal memorandum before the RTC which made complainant and his wife suffer as it resulted in
their loss of the case. As found by the Office of the Bar Confidant, to which we fully subscribe, in not filing the appeal memorandum
respondent denied complainant and his spouse the chance of putting up a fair fight in the dispute. Canon 19prescribes that (A) lawyer
shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law. He should exert all efforts to avail of the remedies allowed under the
law. Respondent did not do so, thereby even putting to naught the advantage which his clients apparently gained by prevailing at the
MCTC level. Verily, respondent did not even bother to put up a fight for his clients. Clearly, his conduct fell short of what Canon 19 requires
and breached the trust reposed in him by his clients.
We cannot sustain respondents excuse in not filing the affidavits and position paper with the MCTC and the appeal memorandum
with the RTC. He claims that he did not file the required pleadings because complainant failed to furnish him with evidence that would
substantiate complainants allegations in the answer. He argues that absent the supporting documents, the pleadings he could have filed
would just be a repetition of the answer. However, respondent admits in his comment that complainant furnished him with the affidavit of
persons purporting to be barangay officials attesting to an alleged admission by Felomino Hernandez, the brother of the plaintiffs in the
unlawful detainer case, that he had already bought the disputed property.[44] This did not precipitate respondent into action despite the
evidentiary value of the affidavit, which was executed by disinterested persons. Said affidavit could have somehow bolstered the claim of
complainant and his wife which was upheld by the MCTC that plaintiffs are not the real parties-in-interest. While respondent could have
thought this affidavit to be without probative value, he should have left it to the sound judgment of the court to determine whether the
affidavit supports the assertions of his clients. That could have happened had he filed the required position paper and annexed the affidavit
thereto.
Further, notwithstanding his belief that without the supporting documents filing the required pleadings would be a futile exercise, still
respondent should have formally and promptly manifested in court his intent not to file the pleadings to prevent delay in the disposition of
the case.[45] Specifically, the RTC would not have waited as it did for the lapse of three months from June 5,1992, the date when plaintiffs-
appellants submitted their appeal memorandum, before it rendered judgment. Had it known that respondent would not file the appeal
memorandum, the court could have decided the case much earlier.
For his failure to inform the court, respondent violated Canon 12, to wit:

Canon 12: A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

Respondent likewise failed to demonstrate the candor he owed his client. Canon 17 provides that (A) lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. When complainant received the RTC decision, he
talked to respondent about it.[46] However, respondent denied knowledge of the decision despite his receipt thereof as early as September
14, 1992. Obviously, he tried to evade responsibility for his negligence. In doing so, respondent was untruthful to complainant and
effectively betrayed the trust placed in him by the latter.
On top of all these is respondents employment as a lawyer of the Public Attorneys Office which is tasked to provide free legal
assistance for indigents and low-income persons so as to promote the rule of law in the protection of the rights of the citizenry and the
efficient and speedy administration of justice.[47] Against this backdrop, respondent should have been more judicious in the performance
of his professional obligations. As we held in Vitriola v. Dasig[48] lawyers in the government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity
to the public service. Furthermore, a lawyer from the government is not exempt from observing the degree of diligence required in the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Canon 6 of the Code provides that the canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge
of their official tasks.
At this juncture, it bears stressing that much is demanded from those who engage in the practice of law because they have a duty
not only to their clients, but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. The lawyers diligence and dedication to his work and profession
not only promote the interest of his client, it likewise help attain the ends of justice by contributing to the proper and speedy administration
of cases, bring prestige to the bar and maintain respect to the legal profession.[49]
The determination of the appropriate penalty to be imposed on an errant attorney involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion
based on the facts of the case.[50] In cases of similar nature, the penalty imposed by this Court consisted of reprimand, [51] fine of five
hundred pesos with warning,[52] suspension of three months,[53] six months,[54] and even disbarment in aggravated cases.[55]
The facts and circumstances in this case indubitably show respondents failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with
the strictures of the lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby warranting his suspension from the practice of
law. At various stages of the unlawful detainer case, respondent was remiss in the performance of his duty as counsel.
To reiterate, respondent did not submit the affidavits and position paper when required by the MCTC. With his resolution not to file
the pleadings already firmed up, he did not bother to inform the MCTC of his resolution in mockery of the authority of the court. His
stubbornness continued at the RTC, for despite an order to file an appeal memorandum, respondent did not file any. Neither did he
manifest before the court that he would no longer file the pleading, thus further delaying the proceedings. He had no misgivings about his
deviant behavior, for despite receipt of a copy of the adverse decision by the RTC he opted not to inform his clients accordingly. Worse,
he denied knowledge of the decision when confronted by the complainant about it.
At this Courts level, respondents stubborn and uncaring demeanor surfaced again when he did not file a rejoinder to complainants
reply.
Respondents story projects in vivid detail his appalling indifference to his clients cause, deplorable lack of respect for the courts and
a brazen disregard of his duties as a lawyer.
However, we are not unmindful of some facts which extenuate respondents misconduct. First, when complainant sought the
assistance of respondent as a PAO lawyer, he misrepresented that his answer was prepared by someone who is not a lawyer. Second,
when complainant showed respondent a copy of their answer with the MCTC, he assured him that he had strong evidence to support the
defense in the answer that plaintiffs were no longer the owners of the property in dispute. However, all that he could provide respondent
was the affidavit of the barangay officials. Last but not least, it is of public knowledge that the Public Attorneys Office is burdened with a
heavy caseload.
All things considered, we conclude that suspension for two (2) months from the practice of law is the proper and just penalty.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Wilfredo Oca is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) months from notice, with
the warning that a similar misconduct will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondents personal
record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and to all the
courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6408 August 31, 2004

ISIDRA BARRIENTOS, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ELERIZZA A. LIBIRAN-METEORO, respondent.
Before this Court is a complaint for disbarment filed against Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro for deceit and non-payment of debts.

A letter-complaint dated May 21, 2001 was filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) under the names of Isidra Barrientos and
Olivia C. Mercado, which was signed, however, by Isidra only. It states that: sometime in September of 2000, respondent issued several
Equitable PCIBank Checks in favor of both Isidra and Olivia, amounting to P67,000.00, and in favor of Olivia, totaling P234,000.00, for
the payment of a pre-existing debt; the checks bounced due to insufficient funds thus charges for violation of B.P. 22 were filed by Isidra
and Olivia with the City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan; respondent sent text messages to complainants asking for the deferment of the
criminal charges with the promise that she will pay her debt; respondent however failed to fulfill said promise; on May 16, 2001,
respondent, through her sister-in-law, tried to give complainants a title for a parcel of land in exchange for the bounced checks which
were in the possession of complainants; the title covered an area of 5,000 square meters located at Bantug, La Torre, Talavera, Nueva
Ecija, registered in the name of Victoria Villamar which was allegedly paid to respondent by a client; complainants checked the property
and discovered that the land belonged to a certain Dra. Helen Garcia, the sole heir of Victoria Villamar, who merely entrusted said title to
respondent pursuant to a transaction with the Quedancor; complainants tried to get in touch with respondent over the phone but the
latter was always unavailable, thus the present complaint.1

On July 13, 2001, in compliance with the Order2 of the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), respondent filed her Answer alleging
that: she issued several Equitable PCIBank checks amounting to P234,000.00 in favor of Olivia but not to Isidra; said checks were
issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation but said amount had already been paid and replaced with new checks; Isidra signed a
document attesting to the fact that the subject of her letter-complaint no longer exists;3 she also issued in favor of Olivia several
Equitable PCIBank checks amounting to P67,000.00 for the payment of a pre-existing obligation; the checks which were the subject of
the complaint filed at the City Prosecutor’s Office in Cabanatuan City are already in the possession of respondent and the criminal case
filed by complainants before the Municipal Trial Court of Cabanatuan City Branch 3 was already dismissed; the Informations for Violation
of B.P. 22 under I.S. Nos. 01-14090-034 were never filed in court; Olivia already signed an affidavit of desistance; respondent did not
send text messages to Isidra and Olivia asking for deferment of the criminal complaints neither did she present any title in exchange for
her bounced checks; she never transacted with Isidra since all dealings were made with Olivia; and the present complaint was initiated
by Isidra only because she had a misunderstanding with Olivia and she wants to extract money from respondent.5

Attached to said Answer is an affidavit signed by Olivia C. Mercado which states as follows:

1. That I am one of the complainants for the Disbarment of Atty. Elerizza Libiran-Meteoro filed before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines National Office in Pasig City, Philippines docketed as CBD case no. 01-840;

2. That the filing of the said complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines was brought about by some
misunderstanding and error in the accounting of the records of the account of Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro;

3. That I was the one who transacted with Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro and not my co-complainant Isidra Barrientos;

4. That all the pieces of jewelry were taken from me by Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro and the corresponding checks were given to
Isidra Barrientos through me;

5. That my name was indicated as co-complainant in a letter-complaint filed by Ms. Isidra Barrientos against Atty. Elerizza L.
Meteoro but I am not interested in pursuing the complaint against Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro since the complaint was brought
about by a case of some mistakes in the records;

6. That I, together with Isidra Barrientos had already signed an affidavit of desistance and submitted the same before the
Municipal Trial Court Branch III of Cabanatuan City w(h)ere Criminal Case Nos. 77851 to 56 for violation of BP 22 were filed
against Atty. Meteoro;

7. That with respect to I.S. nos. 03-01-1356 to 1361 the case was not filed in court and I have also executed an affidavit of
desistance for said complaint;

8. That I am executing this affidavit to attest to the truth of all the foregoing and to prove that I have no cause of action against
Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro.6

On August 9, 2001, the IBP-CBD issued a Notice of Hearing requiring both parties to appear before it on September 6, 2001. On said
date, both parties appeared and agreed to settle their misunderstanding.7

On November 27, 2001, the parties agreed that the balance of P134,000.00 which respondent acknowledged as her indebtedness to
complainant will be settled on a staggered basis. Another hearing was then set for February 5, 2002. Respondent failed to appear in
said hearing despite due notice. It was then reset to February 28, 2002 with the order that should respondent fail to appear, the case
shall already be submitted for resolution.8

Respondent appeared in the next two hearings. However, this time, it was complainant who was unavailable. In the hearing of July 31,
2002, respondent was absent and was warned again that should she fail to appear in the next hearing, the Commissioner shall resolve
the case. On said date, respondent did not appear despite due notice.9
On August 1, 2002, respondent filed with the Commission a motion for reconsideration of the July 31 order stating that: she got sick a
few days before the scheduled hearing; she had already paid complainant the amount of P64,000.00; in March of 2002, respondent’s
father was admitted to the Intensive Care Unit of the University of Santo Tomas Hospital thus she was not able to settle her remaining
balance as planned; and because of said emergency, respondent was not able to fully settle the balance of her debt up to this date.
Respondent prayed that she be given another 60 days from August 1,2002 to finally settle her debt with complainant.10

On April 30, 2003, the IBP-CBD issued an order granting respondent’s motion and setting aside the order dated July 31, 2002. It noted
that while respondent claims that she already paid complainant P64,000.00, the photocopies of the receipts she submitted evidencing
payment amount only to P45,000.00.11 A hearing was then set for May 28, 2003 at which time respondent was directed to present proof
of her payments to the complainant. The hearing was however reset several times until August 20, 2003 at which time, only complainant
appeared. Respondent sent somebody to ask for a postponement which the commission denied. The commission gave respondent a
last opportunity to settle her accounts with complainant. The hearing was set for October 7, 2003 which the commission said was
"intransferrable."12

On October 7, 2003, only complainant appeared. The commission noted that respondent was duly notified and even personally received
the notice for that day’s hearing. The case was thereafter submitted for resolution.13

On October 24, 2003, the Investigating IBP Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan submitted his report pertinent portions of which read as
follows:

The issue to be resolved is whether or not Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro has committed a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. This Office holds that she has. More particularly, the respondent, by initially and vehemently
denying her indebtedness to herein complainant and then subsequently admitting liability by proposing a staggered settlement
has displayed a glaring flaw in her integrity. She has shown herself to possess poor moral characters. In her motion for
reconsideration, seeking the reopening of this case, the respondent made a false assertion that she had settled up
to P64,000.00 of her indebtedness but the receipts she submitted total only P50,000.00. What is more disconcerting is that
while she is aware and duly notified of the settings of this Office respondent has seemingly ignored the same deliberately.
Finally, the respondent has not offered any satisfactory explanation for, nor has she controverted the complainant’s charge that
she (respondent) had tried to negotiate a transfer certificate of title (TCT) which had been entrusted by a certain Dra. Helen
Garcia to her relative to a transaction which the former had with the Quedancor where respondent was formerly employed.
Based on all the foregoing findings and the deliberate failure of the respondent to come forward and settle her accountabilities,
inspite of several warnings given her by the undersigned, and her failure to attend the scheduled hearings despite due notice,
this Office is convinced that Atty. Elerizza Libiran-Meteoro has committed a glaring violation not only of her oath as a lawyer but
also the dictates of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 which mandates that a worthy member of the Bar must constantly be of good moral
character and unsullied honesty.14

He then recommended that Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro be suspended from the practice of law for two years and meted a fine of
twenty thousand pesos.15

On October 29, 2003, respondent filed another motion for reconsideration stating that: she was not able to receive the notice for the
October 7 hearing because she was in Bicol attending to pressing personal problems; she only arrived from the province on October 25,
2003 and it was only then that she got hold of the Order dated October 7; from the very beginning, respondent never intended to ignore
the Commission’s hearings; as much as she wanted to pay complainant in full, the financial crisis which hit her family since 2001 has
gravely affected her ability to pay; until that day, the expenses incurred by respondent due to the hospitalization of her father has not
been paid in full by her family; the family home of respondent in Cabanatuan has already been foreclosed by the bank; respondent’s
husband has been confined recently due to thyroid problems and respondent herself had sought medical help on several occasions due
to her inability to conceive despite being married for more than five years; if not for said reasons, respondent could have already paid
the complainant despite respondent’s knowledge that the amount complainant wanted to collect from her is merely the interest of her
debt since she already returned most of the pieces of jewelry she purchased and she already paid for those that she was not able to
return. Respondent prays that the resolution of the case be deferred and that she be given another 90 days from said date or until
January 19, 2003 to settle whatever balance remains after proper accounting and presentation of receipts.16

On February 27, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution as follows:

RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2003-67

CBD Case No. 01-840

Isidra Barrientos vs. Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and
considering respondent’s glaring violation not only of her oath as a lawyer but of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months
and Restitution of P84,000.00 to complainant.17
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP except as to the alleged matter of respondent offering a transfer certificate of
title to complainants in exchange for the bounced checks that were in their possession.

We have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a
lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law.18 Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and
vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured.19 They must at all times faithfully
perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They
must conduct themselves in a manner that reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.20 Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 explicitly states that:

CANON 1 -- A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal
processes.

Rule 1.01 -- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

In this case, respondent in her answer initially tried to deny having any obligation towards Isidra Barrientos. Upon appearing before the
IBP-CBD, however, respondent eventually acknowledged her indebtedness to Isidra in the amount of P134,000.00, promising only to
pay in a staggered basis. Her attempt to evade her financial obligation runs counter to the precepts of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, above quoted, and violates the lawyer’s oath which imposes upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for
money or malice.21

After respondent acknowledged her debt to complainant, she committed herself to the payment thereof. Yet she failed many times to
fulfill said promise. She did not appear in most of the hearings and merely submitted a motion for reconsideration on August 1, 2002
after the IBP-CBD Commissioner had already submitted the case for resolution. She claimed that she got sick days before the hearing
and asked for sixty days to finally settle her account. Again, she failed to fulfill her promise and did not appear before the Commission in
the succeeding hearings despite due notice. After the case was submitted anew for resolution on October 6, 2003, respondent filed
another motion for reconsideration, this time saying that she was in the province attending to personal matters. Again she asked for
another ninety days to settle her entire debt. This repeated failure on her part to fulfill her promise puts in question her integrity and
moral character. Her failure to attend most of the hearings called by the commission and her belated pleas for reconsideration also
manifest her propensity to delay the resolution of the case and to make full use of the mechanisms of administrative proceedings to her
benefit.

She also could not deny that she issued several checks without sufficient funds, which prompted Isidra and Olivia to file complaints
before the prosecutor’s office in Cabanatuan City. Her only excuse is that she was able to replace said checks and make arrangements
for the payment of her debt, which led to the dismissal of the criminal complaints against her.

We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a
lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to
render her unworthy of public confidence.22 The issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude of
respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and public order.23 It also manifests a lawyer’s low
regard to her commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the
profession she should hold in high esteem.24

Mere issuance of worthless checks by a lawyer, regardless of whether or not the same were issued in his professional capacity to a
client, calls for appropriate disciplinary measures. As we explained in Co vs. Bernardino:25

The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to
discipline him for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity. Where, however, the misconduct outside of the
lawyer’s professional dealings is so gross a character as to show him morally unfit for the office and unworthy of the privilege
which his licenses and the law confer on him, the court may be justified in suspending or removing him from the office of
attorney.

The evidence on record clearly shows respondent’s propensity to issue bad checks. This gross misconduct on his part, though
not related to his professional duties as a member of the bar, puts his moral character in serious doubt…26 (Citations omitted).

She also claims that her father was hospitalized in March 2002 and that she and her husband also had to seek medical help which
greatly affected her ability to pay. She however did not present any proof to substantiate such claims. She also did not appear
personally before the complainant and the commission, in spite of the many opportunities given her, to make arrangements for the
payment of her debt considering the circumstances that befell her family. Instead, she waited until the case was submitted for resolution
to allege such facts, without presenting any proof therefor.

We cannot uphold the IBP in finding that since respondent has not offered any explanation for, nor has she controverted the
complainants’ charge that she tried to negotiate with them a transfer certificate of title that had been entrusted to her by a client, she
should be held liable therefor. Basic is the principle that if the complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving her cause of action,
fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which she bases her claim, the respondent is under no obligation to prove her
exception or defense.27 Simply put, the burden is not on the respondent to prove her innocence but on the complainants to prove her
guilt. In this case, complainants submitted a photocopy of a TCT in the name of Victoria Villamar together with their letter-complaint,
which according to complainants was the title respondent tried, through her sister-in-law, to negotiate with them in exchange for the
bounced checks in their possession.28 No other evidence or sworn statement was submitted in support of such allegation. Respondent in
her answer, meanwhile, denied having any knowledge regarding such matter and no further discussion was made on the matter, not
even in the hearings before the commission.29 For this reason, we hold that respondent should not be held liable for the alleged
negotiation of a TCT to complainants for lack of sufficient evidence, but only for the non-payment of debts and the issuance of worthless
checks which were sufficiently proved and which respondent herself admitted.

We reiterate that membership in the legal profession is a privilege and demands a high degree of good moral character, not only as a
condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law.30

Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by respondent’s misconduct. The IBP Board of Governors recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months. In Lao vs. Medel,31 which also involved non-payment of debt and
issuance of worthless checks, the Court held that suspension from the practice of law for one year was appropriate. Unlike in
the Lao case however, respondent is this case paid a portion of her debt, as evidenced by receipts amounting to P50,000.00. Thus we
deem that six months suspension from the practice of law and the restitution of P84,000.00 to complainant Isidra Barrientos would be
sufficient in this case.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED for six months from the
practice of law, effective upon her receipt of this Decision, and is ordered to pay complainant Isidra Barrientos the amount
of P84,000.00, as balance of her debt to the latter, plus 6% interest from date of finality of herein decision.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the record of respondent and served on the IBP as well as the court administrator who shall
circulate herein Resolution to all courts for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 4256 February 13, 2004

JOVITA BUSTAMANTE-ALEJANDRO, complainant

vs.
ATTYS. WARFREDO TOMAS ALEJANDRO and MARICRIS A. VILLARIN, respondents.

This is an administrative case filed in 1994 by Jovita Bustamante-Alejandro charging respondents Atty. Warfredo Tomas Alejandro and
Atty. Maricris A. Villarin with bigamy and concubinage.

Complainant alleged that respondent, Atty. Warfredo Tomas Alejandro, is her husband; that they were married on March 3, 1971 at
Alicia, Isabela, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract;1 that she bore him three (3) sons, namely, Dino, Eric, and Carlo, born in 1971,
1973, and 1978, respectively, as evidenced by their respective Certificates of Live Birth;2 that respondent abandoned her and their
children in 1990 to live with his mistress, respondent Atty. Ma. Cristina Arrieta Villarin,3 at 27-C Masbate St., Quezon City; that
respondents have since then been publicly representing themselves as husband and wife; that respondent Atty. Villarin gave birth to
Paolo Villarin Alejandro on January 17, 1992 as a result of her immoral and scandalous relationship with complainant’s husband whom
she named as the father of her son in the latter’s Certificate of Live Birth;4 and, that in said Certificate of Live Birth, respondent Atty.
Villarin identified herself as "Ma. Cristina V. Alejandro" having been married to Atty. Alejandro on May 1, 1990 at Isabela Province.
Complainant alleged that she filed this administrative complaint when she learned that her husband has been nominated as a regional
trial court judge. She insists that he is not fit to be a judge considering that he, and co-respondent Atty. Villarin, do not even possess the
basic integrity to remain as members of the Philippine Bar.

We required respondent to comment on the administrative complaint in our Resolution dated July 4, 1994. When copies of our resolution
and of the complaint and its annexes addressed to respondent Atty. Alejandro at 27-C Masbate St., Quezon City were returned
unserved with notation "moved," we required complainant to submit the correct and present address of her husband.5 No similar return
of service with respect to respondent Atty. Villarin appears on the record.

In an Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion dated December 5, 1994, complainant insisted that her husband’s correct address remains to
be 27-C Masbate St., Quezon City; that it was him who told the postman that he had already moved; and, that any subsequent service
by mail will result in the same failure as respondent will either refuse service or misrepresent a change of address again. Complainant
therefore asked that copies of the complaint and Court resolution requiring comment be served personally upon her husband by the
Court’s process servers. We noted and granted the prayer.6 However, when the Court’s process server attempted to effect personal
service on February 16, 1995, respondent Atty. Alejandro was allegedly out of the house and his house helper refused to accept service.
Consequently we considered the copies as having been served upon respondent Atty. Alejandro in our Resolution of July 31, 1996,7 and
required him to show cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt with or held in contempt for his continued failure to file comment, and
to file such comment, considering the considerable length of time that has lapsed since he has been first required to do so. Respondent
Atty. Alejandro failed to comply. Hence, we fined him ₱1,000.00 and directed that he file the required explanation and comment on the
administrative complaint.8

When copies of both resolutions were again returned unserved with postal notations "moved," we required complainant anew to submit
the correct and present address of respondents, within ten (10) days from notice, under pain of dismissal of her administrative
complaint.9 In a handwritten letter dated September 10, 1998, complainant disclosed respondents’ present address as "12403 Dunlop
Drive, Houston, Texas."10

We referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation, within ninety (90) days
from notice, in our Resolution of March 17, 2003.

In a Report dated August 26, 2003, IBP Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan recommended that both respondents be disbarred on the
following rationalization:

In its Resolution dated 31 July 1996, the Supreme Court (Second Division) ruled that respondent Atty. Alejandro was deemed served a
copy of the instant administrative complaint and of the Court’s Resolution dated 4 July 1994, by substituted service pursuant to Rule 1,
Section 6 of the Rules of Court.

In the earlier Resolution of the Supreme Court dated 4 July 1994, respondents Atty. Alejandro and Atty. Villarin were directed to file their
Comment on the instant Complaint within ten (10) days from notice of said Resolution. To date, no Comment has been filed by either
respondent Atty. Alejandro or Atty. Villarin. x x x

Complainant submitted a photocopy of the Marriage Contract (Annex A of the letter-complaint) between herself and respondent Atty.
Alejandro executed on 3 March 1971. Complainant also submitted photocopies of the Birth Certificates (Annexes B to D of the letter-
complaint) of the children born out of her marriage to respondent Atty. Alejandro. These documentary evidence submitted by
complainant clearly show that there was and is a valid and subsisting marriage between herself and respondent Atty. Alejandro at the
time she filed the instant administrative complaint against said respondent, her husband.

In support of her charge of bigamy and concubinage against respondents Alejandro and Villarin, complainant submitted a photocopy of
the Birth Certificate (Annex E of the letter-complaint) of one Paolo Villarin Alejandro. The said Birth Certificates states that the mother of
said Paolo Villarin Alejandro is "Ma. Cristina Arrieta Villarin", while his father is one "Warfredo Tomas Alejandro". Said Birth Certificate
also states that the parents of Paolo Villarin Alejandro were married on May 1, 1990 in Isabela Province.

Given the Birth Certificate of Paolo Villarin Alejandro (Annex E of the letter-complaint), and considering the failure of respondents Atty.
Alejandro and Atty. Villarin to deny the charges of complainant, it is submitted that there is sufficient evidence on record which
establishes the immoral/illicit relationship between respondents Atty. Alejandro and Atty. Villarin. However, there is no evidence on
record which would establish beyond doubt that respondent Atty. Alejandro indeed contracted a second marriage with Atty. Villarin while
his marriage to herein complainant was subsisting. Thus, it is recommended that as prayed for by complainant, respondents Atty.
Alejandro and Atty. Villarin be disbarred for willful violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline adopted and approved the above report and recommendation in its Resolution No. XVI-2003-169
dated September 27, 2003.

We agree with the IBP recommendation with respect to respondent Atty. Alejandro.

Indeed Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides –

A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Thus we have in a number of cases11 disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of misconduct which demonstrated a lack of
that good moral character required of them not only as a condition precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their
continued membership therein. No distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyer’s professional
capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere
citizen at another.12 He is expected to be competent, honorable and reliable at all times since he who cannot apply and abide by the
laws in his private affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his professional dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional honesty
and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations.13 The administration of justice, in
which the lawyer plays an important role being an officer of the court, demands a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on
his part so that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in him.14

In the instant case, sufficient evidence was presented to show that respondent Atty. Alejandro, while being lawfully married to
complainant, carried on an illicit relationship with another woman, co-respondent Atty. Villarin. Although the evidence presented was not
sufficient to prove that he contracted a subsequent bigamous marriage with her, the fact remains that respondent Atty. Alejandro
exhibited by his conduct a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. We have already held that
disbarment proceedings is warranted against a lawyer who abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with another
woman15 who had borne him a child.16 We can do no less in the instant case where respondent Atty. Alejandro made himself unavailable
to this Court and even fled to another country to escape the consequences of his misconduct.
The same penalty however cannot be imposed on respondent Atty. Villarin. I is noted that our Resolution dated July 4, 1994 requiring
comment on the administrative complaint was never "deemed served" upon her, in the same way that it was upon Atty. Alejandro. In
fact, it does not appear that copies of the administrative complaint, its annexes, and of our resolution requiring comment were even sent
to her. Although sent at the address she allegedly shared with co-respondent Atty. Alejandro, the envelope bearing the copies was
addressed to the latter only.17 That was why when both service by registered mail and personal service failed, the copies were deemed
served solely upon Atty. Alejandro.18

The IBP for its part attempted to serve copy of the complaint upon Atty. Villarin with directive for her to file answer. It is noted however
that the same was sent to respondent’s old address at 27-C Masbate St., Quezon City, not "12403 Dunlop Drive, Houston, Texas,"
which was respondents’ new address on record supplied by the complainant. The return of service therefore showed the postal notation
"moved." Considering the serious consequences of disbarment proceedings, full opportunity upon reasonable notice must have been
given respondent to answer the charge and present evidence in her behalf. It is only in clear cases of waiver that an administrative case
be resolved sans respondent’s answer.

WHEREFORE, for Gross Immorality, respondent Atty. Warfredo Tomas Alejandro is DISBARRED from the practice of law, to take effect
immediately upon his receipt of this Decision. Let copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Alejandro’s personal record in the Office of
the Bar Confidant and a copy thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

The complaint against respondent Atty. Maricris A. Villarin is REFERRED BACK to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for further
appropriate proceedings. SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. AC 4762 June 28, 2004

LINDA VDA. DE ESPINO, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. PEPITO C. PRESQUITO, respondent.

On June 9, 1997, Linda Vda. de Espino wrote a letter-complaint1 with the then Court Administrator Alfredo Benipayo, charging
respondent Atty. Pepito C. Presquito, a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Misamis Oriental Chapter, for "having
employed fraud, trickery and dishonest means in refusing to honor and pay [her] late husband Virgilio Espino, when he was still alive,
the sum of ₱763,060.00." According to complainant, respondent’s unlawful refusal and dilatory tactics partly triggered the death of her
husband, who died "disillusioned and embittered."2 The letter-complaint and affidavit also alleged that notwithstanding the numerous oral
demands by Mr. Espino and complainant (after the death of Mr. Espino), respondent still refused to pay the amount represented by the
eight checks which had all been dishonored. Complainant surmised that Atty. Presquito’s refusal to pay may be due to his reliance on
the influence of his father-in-law, a former Executive Judge of the RTC (Cagayan de Oro), and of his uncle, an RTC judge (Cagayan de
Oro).

The records show that sometime in September 1995, respondent was introduced to complainant’s late husband, Mr. Virgilio M. Espino.
Mr. Espino, a resident of Davao City, had sought the assistance of respondent, a resident of Cagayan de Oro, regarding the sale of his
piece of land with an area of 11,057.59 sq.m. situated in Misamis Oriental. The discussion between Mr. Espino and the respondent
resulted in the sale of the property to respondent.3Under the terms of the agreement between Mr. Espino and respondent,4 the purchase
price of the land was ₱1,437,410.00, payable on a staggered basis and by installments.5 Pursuant to the terms of payment in the
agreement, respondent issued eight post-dated checks, totaling ₱736,060.00.6 Respondent then entered into a joint venture or
partnership agreement with Mrs. Guadalupe Ares for the subdivision of the land into home-size lots and its development, with a portion
of the land retained by respondent for his own use.7 The land was eventually titled in the name of respondent and Mrs. Ares, and
subdivided into 35 to 36 lots.

Meanwhile, the eight post-dated checks issued by respondent were all dishonored. Mr. Espino made repeated demands for payment
from respondent but the latter refused. Mr. Espino died in December 1996. His widow, complainant, then tried to collect from respondent
the value of the eight checks. When complainant’s numerous pleas remained unheeded, she filed the complaint in June 1997.

In his comment dated September 22, 1997, respondent denied any wrongdoing, and said that the allegations that he had employed
"fraud, trickery and dishonest means" with the late Mr. Espino were totally false and baseless. The complaint, according to respondent,
stemmed from complainant’s lack of knowledge as to "the real story" of the transaction between complainant’s husband and respondent.
He also vehemently took exception to the imputation that he was banking on the influence of his father-in-law and uncle-in-law.

Respondent does not deny the issuance of the eight checks. What respondent claims, however, is that the nonpayment was justified by
the unresolved problems he and Mrs. Ares have with respect to the right-of-way of the land. He alleged that Mr. Espino had made
assurances that the land had a right-of-way required for its development, but respondent later found out that such road-right-of-way
required the consent of four other land owners, and the expense would be considerably more than he was made to believe. According to
respondent, he and Mr. Espino had agreed that the latter would not encash the checks or demand the equivalent of the same until the
right-of-way problem of the land had been resolved.8 Respondent’s position is that until the problem of obtaining a right-of-way to the
land has been resolved, nothing has yet accrued against him or Mrs. Ares (his partner), as it would be "very unfair and unjust" for them
to pay Mr. Espino when the land could not be developed and sold.9

Respondent also alleged that he was entitled to set-off against the amount he owes Mr. Espino or his heirs from the purchase of the
land, the advances he made to Mr. Espino, and the cost he incurred when he defended Mr. Espino’s son in a criminal case. He later on
manifested that he has fully paid the portion of the land which had been titled in his name through the same advances and incurred
expenses.10

In a resolution dated November 26, 1997,11 the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation/decision, and assigned to the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).

In the IBP-CBD report dated November 12, 2002,12 Investigating Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay found that "the facts and credible
evidence made available in this case indubitably establish respondent’s failure to live up to the demands of the Lawyers Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics." For having failed to act with candor and fairness toward
complainant, Commissioner Dulay recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months, and ordered
to immediately account with complainant regarding the sale of the piece of land which had been subdivided in the name of respondent
and his business partner. On June 21, 2003, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a Resolution adopting/approving the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner Dulay, finding that "respondent’s lack of fairness and candor and honesty [was] in violation of Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility."

After a careful consideration of the record of the instant case, we agree that respondent was wanting in fairness, candor and honesty
demanded of him by the Lawyers’ Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics. We find, however, the
recommended penalty of six (6) months suspension too light considering respondent’s gross misconduct.

Complainant’s testimony and exhibits have clearly established that: (1) there was an agreement between respondent and complainant’s
late husband for the sale of the latter’s land; (2) respondent had issued the eight checks in connection with said agreement; (3) these
checks were dishonored and remain unpaid; and (4) the land sold had an existing road-right-of-way. Complainant’s exhibits were
formally offered as early as January 6, 1999,13and were admitted without objections from respondent.14

In the face of these uncontroverted facts, it was incumbent upon respondent to prove a legal excuse or defense for nonpayment of the
eight checks.

Respondent utterly failed in this regard.

From the termination of complainant’s presentation of evidence on December 1998 until Commissioner Dulay’s report on November 12,
2002, the records show that respondent was unable to present evidence - either testimonial or documentary - to prove that he had legal
cause to refuse payment, or that he was entitled to legal compensation. Even respondent’s own statements - which, without
corroborating evidence, remain mere self-serving allegations - fall short of testimony, as he failed to submit to cross-examination by
opposing counsel or for clarificatory questions by the IBP-CBD. Worse, respondent attached eighteen documents to his comment, but
only went so far as to mark (without a formal offer) the agreement between him and Mr. Espino (for the sale of the land), and the
partnership agreement between him and Mrs. Ares. Thus, respondent had no evidence other than his own allegations.

Respondent’s failure to present evidence is a breach of Rule 12.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,15especially in the light of
the numerous postponements and resettings he requested for and was granted with, on the ground that he needed more time to prepare
his evidence. We note that respondent was first scheduled to present his evidence on December 14, 1998. Two years - five resettings,
and three orders submitting the case for resolution - later, respondent still had not proffered testimonial or documentary evidence.

Respondent claims that his failure to present evidence was due to his financial difficulties, i.e., he could not afford to spend for travel
expenses of his witnesses.16 We are not persuaded. First, it boggles the mind how financial constraints could have prevented
respondent from presenting the originals of the documents attached to his comment, proving, among others, the alleged advances and
costs on Mr. Espino’s behalf. The originals of these documents are presumably in his possession. Second, with respect to the absence
of testimony, respondent could have submitted the affidavits of his witnesses - the taking of which he could have done himself in
Cagayan de Oro to keep down the cost. The records are clear that he was allowed this option.17 But he did neither.

All these circumstances lead us to the ineluctable conclusion that respondent could not present evidence because there really was
none to justify his nonpayment.18

Even if we were to excuse respondent’s procedural lapse and consider his written pleadings as testimony, we agree with Commissioner
Dulay that respondent’s problems with respect to the right-of-way or his partnership with Mrs. Ares do not excuse his nonpayment. As
stated in the IBP-CBD report:

[T]he solution to the right-of-way problem however clearly lies in the hands of respondent….We note that respondent has
already taken title over the property together with Guadalupe Ares by making complainant’s late husband, sign over the
property by way of the Deed of Sale. We therefore find respondent’s position vis-à-vis the widowed complainant sneaky and
unfair. We reiterate that respondent has assumed responsibility for the negotiations on the road-right-of-way and was aware of
the problem. To [sic] our mind he has used the alleged road-right-of-way problem only as an afterthought and a reason to delay
and in fact deny the complainant payment of what is due her. Respondent also alleges and blames the deceased husband of
complainant for the failed project but the facts show otherwise. They are just bare allegations and remain unsubstantiated.
Besides, respondent and Ares took risks in the business venture and are now the titled owners of the property. The seller
cannot be blamed for any failure in the project. Respondent’s actuations in the whole transaction is [sic] not at par with the
standards demanded of him as a member of the bar. Respondent is lacking in fairness and candour [sic] and honesty. The fact
 that he has unreasonably delayed and failed to account with complainant for a long time and the fact of his having allowed the
checks he issued to bounce is [sic] unacceptable and censurable behavior for a member of the bar.19 [citations omitted]

Having no legal defense to refuse payment of the eight dishonored checks, respondent’s indifference to complainant’s entreaties for
payment was conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar and an officer of the court. Respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by his unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct towards complainant and her late husband,20 first by allowing the eight
(8) checks he issued to bounce, then by ignoring the repeated demands for payment until complainant was forced to file this complaint,
and finally by deliberately delaying the disposition of this case with dilatory tactics. Considering that the property of complainant and her
late husband is already in respondent and Mrs. Ares’ name, the injustice of respondent’s different maneuvers to evade payment of the
eight checks - due and unpaid since 1996 - becomes more manifest.

It should be stressed that respondent issued eight (8) worthless checks, seemingly without regard to its deleterious effects to public
interest and public order. We have already declared, most recently in Lao v. Medel,21 that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes
gross misconduct, and puts the erring lawyer’s moral character in serious doubt, though it is not related to his professional duties as a
member of the bar.22 He not only sets himself liable for a serious criminal offense under B.P. Blg. 22, but also transgresses the Code of
Professional Responsibility, specifically the mandate of Canon 1 to obey the laws of the land and promote the respect for law.

It behooves respondent to remember that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his
private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession of good
moral character is not only a good condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar.23 A
lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the
court.24 Thus, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxx xxx xxx

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Given the foregoing, and in line with jurisprudence involving lawyers who issued worthless checks - Lao v. Medel,25Co v.
Bernardino,26 and Ducat v. Villalon, Jr.,27 - we find respondent’s reprehensible conduct warrants suspension from the practice of law
for one (1) year.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. PEPITO C. PRESQUITO is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby suspended from the
practice of law for one (1) year, and ordered to immediately account with complainant regarding the sale of the piece of land, which has
been subdivided in the name of respondent and his business partner.

Let a copy of this decision be spread in his file at the Office of the Bar Confidant and of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7136 August 1, 2007

JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, respondent.

Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment1 before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and
unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."

In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:

He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to him as her
friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled "Mary Ann") Tantoco with whom he had three children.

After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January to March 2001, Irene had been receiving from
respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read "I love you," "I miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall."

Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes
did not go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents' house in Binangonan,
Rizal or she was busy with her work.

In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted
them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.
On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday celebration at which he saw her and respondent celebrating with her
family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to
the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances.

Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words "I Love You" on its face, which card when
unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene, reading:

My everdearest Irene,

By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I will say a prayer for you that you may find
meaning in what you're about to do.

Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness but experience eternal pain? Is it only for us to
find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because there's a bigger plan for the two of us?

I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything humanly possible to love you. And today, as
you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!

I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the time we spent together, up to the
final moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will love you until the life in me is gone and until we are together again.

Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last me a lifetime. Always remember though
that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS

. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!

BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!

I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M LIVING MY TWEETIE YOU'LL BE!"2

Eternally yours,
NOLI

Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th Street, New Manila where, as he was to
later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on or about
January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert, she was pregnant.

In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the above-quoted letter was handwritten.

On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:

14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they attended social functions
together. For instance, in or about the third week of September 2001, the couple attended the launch of the "Wine All You Can"
promotion of French wines, held at the Mega Strip of SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in
Section B of the Manila Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page 21. Respondent and Irene were photographed
together; their picture was captioned: "Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala." A photocopy of the report is attached as Annex
C.4 (Italics and emphasis in the original; CAPITALIZATION of the phrase "flaunting their adulterous relationship" supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph 14 of the
Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their relationship was low profile and known only to the immediate members of
their respective families, and that Respondent, as far as the general public was concerned, was still known to be legally
married to Mary Anne Tantoco.5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:

15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's wife and his apparent abandoning or neglecting of his own family,
demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted his aversion to
the institution of marriage, calling it a "piece of paper." Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainant's
bride on the very day of her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her "until we are together again," as now they
are.6 (Underscoring supplied),

respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:

 5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding his adulterousrelationship and
that his acts demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit to keep his membership in the bar, the reason being
that Respondent's relationship with Irene was not under scandalous circumstances and that as far as his relationship with
his own family:

5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as in fact they still
occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware of Respondent's special friendship with Irene.

xxxx

5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage by calling the institution of marriage
a mere piece of paper because his reference [in his above-quoted handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage between
Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to the formality of the marriage contract.7 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Respondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:

18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. The Constitution regards marriage as an
inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec. 2).9

And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:

19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to
uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the complainant's wife, he mocked the institution of marriage, betrayed his
own family, broke up the complainant's marriage, commits adultery with his wife, and degrades the legal
profession.10 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the reason being that under the
circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to his purely personal and low profile special relationship with Irene is
neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as would be a ground for
disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.11(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,12 alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene named respondent in the
Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father. Complainant attached to the Reply, as Annex "A," a copy of a Certificate of Live
Birth13 bearing Irene's signature and naming respondent as the father of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on
February 14, 2002 at St. Luke's Hospital.

Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS14 dated January 10, 2003 from respondent in which he
denied having "personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth attached to the complainant's Reply."15 Respondent moved to dismiss
the complaint due to the pendency of a civil case filed by complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal
complaint for adultery against respondent and Irene which was pending before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.

During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's Complaint-Affidavit and Reply to Answer were adopted as his testimony on
direct examination.16 Respondent's counsel did not cross-examine complainant.17

After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION18 dated October 26, 2004, found the charge against respondent sufficiently proven.

The Commissioner thus recommended19 that respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility reading:

Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied),

and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Underscoring supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and accordingly
dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006 briefly reading:

RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06

 CBD Case No. 02-936
Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala

RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit.20 (Italics and
emphasis in the original)

Hence, the present petition21 of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule 13922 of the Rules of Court.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and dismissing the
case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its above-quoted 33-word Resolution shows.

Respondent contends, in his Comment23 on the present petition of complainant, that there is no evidence against him.24 The contention
fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:

While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. "C") and the news item published in the Manila
Standard (Exh. "D"), even taken together do not sufficiently prove that respondent is carrying on an adulterous relationship with
complainant's wife, there are other pieces of evidence on record which support the accusation of complainant against
respondent.

It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent through counsel made the following
statements to wit: "Respondent specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in
paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being [that] their relationship was low profile and known only to
immediate members of their respective families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the
complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect to his purely personal and
low profile relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct . . ."

These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there is indeed a "special" relationship between
him and complainant's wife, Irene, [which] taken together with the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene
Moje (Annex "H-1") sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit relationship between respondent and Irene which
resulted in the birth of the child "Samantha". In the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it should be noted that
complainant's wife Irene supplied the information that respondent was the father of the child. Given the fact that the
respondent admitted his special relationship with Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or make any
misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It should be underscored that respondent has not categorically
denied that he is the father of Samantha Louise Irene Moje.25 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous relationship with Irene, "adultery" being defined under
Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that "committed by any married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her
husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared
void."26 (Italics supplied) What respondent denies is havingflaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it was "low profile and known
only to the immediate members of their respective families."

In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant,

a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was
in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative
expression which carries with it in affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial
pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying
language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying
circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.27 (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal knowledge" of Irene's daughter Samantha Louise Irene Moje's
Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent – a "lawyer," 38 years old – as the child's father. And the phrase
"NOT MARRIED" is entered on the desired information on "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A comparison of the signature
attributed to Irene in the certificate28 with her signature on the Marriage Certificate29 shows that they were affixed by one and the same
person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being the father of the child.

Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical Center, in his January 29, 2003 Affidavit30 which he identified at the
witness stand, declared that Irene gave the information in the Certificate of Live Birth that the child's father is "Jose Emmanuel Masacaet
Eala," who was 38 years old and a lawyer.31
Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been sufficiently proven by more than
clearly preponderant evidence – that evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other party
and, therefore, has greater weight than the other32 – which is the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against a
lawyer.

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil
and criminal cases.

. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative
case for disbarment or suspension, "clearly preponderant evidence" is all that is required.33 (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship with Irene was not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court, reading:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. ─ A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a
foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of
such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for
disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

under scandalous circumstances.34

The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the phrase "grossly immoral conduct,"
not "under scandalous circumstances." Sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances is, following Article 334 of the Revised
Penal Code reading:

ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse,
under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be
punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.

x x x x,

an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with a woman elsewhere.

"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as 'grossly
immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding circumstances."35 The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a
married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement
of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:36

On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit brief and
discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree" in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.

xxxx

While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarriedadults is not sufficient
to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity.
Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered
disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by
the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:38

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did contract a bigamous marriage . . . It is enough
that the records of this administrative case substantiate the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP
Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly
immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable
 behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license confers
upon him.39 (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law which goes:

I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the
supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution andobey the laws as well as the legal orders
of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for
money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity
as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading:

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.

In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the
wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support."40

Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from
engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer
from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law."

Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the case before the IBP Commissioner, filed a
Manifestation41 on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that complainant's petition for nullity of his (complainant's) marriage to Irene
had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed
against respondent and Irene "based on the same set of facts alleged in the instant case," which was pending review before the
Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn.

The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainant's Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review reads:

Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the petition for review, we are inclined to grant the
same pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which provides that "notwithstanding the
perfection of the appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the same at any time before it is finally resolved, in which case the
appealed resolution shall stand as though no appeal has been taken."42 (Emphasis supplied by complainant)

That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is immaterial. The acts complained of took
place before the marriage was declared null and void.43 As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.44 In
carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and void, and
despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness
to be a lawyer.

As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted to state that before complainant
filed his December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution
on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office of complainant's complaint for adultery. In
reversing the City Prosecutor's Resolution, DOJ Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:

Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the fair estimation of the Department, sufficiently
establish all the elements of the offense of adultery on the part of both respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje
conceded to complainant that she was going out on dates with respondent Eala, and this she did when complainant confronted
her about Eala's frequent phone calls and text messages to her. Complainant also personally witnessed Moje and Eala having
a rendezvous on two occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje to be married to complainant[.] In
fact, he (Eala) himself was married to another woman. Moreover, Moje's eventual abandonment of their conjugal home, after
complainant had once more confronted her about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit relationship involving both respondents.
This becomes all the more apparent by Moje's subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11thStreet, New Manila, Quezon City, which
was a few blocks away from the church where she had exchange marital vows with complainant.

It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially since Eala's vehicle and that of Moje's were always
seen there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said address whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held
office. The happenstance that it was in that said address that Eala and Moje had decided to hold office for the firm that both
had formed smacks too much of a coincidence. For one, the said address appears to be a residential house, for that was where
Moje stayed all throughout after her separation from complainant. It was both respondent's love nest, to put short; their illicit
affair that was carried out there bore fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby hospital of St. Luke's
Medical Center. What finally militates against the respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth of the girl,
Moje furnished the information that Eala was the father. This speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful and damning nature
 of the adulterous acts of the respondents. Complainant's supposed illegal procurement of the birth certificate is most
certainly beside the point for both respondents Eala and Moje have not denied, in any categorical manner, that Eala is the
father of the child Samantha Irene Louise Moje.45(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant
complainant's motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if
the Information for adultery were filed in court, the same would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.

Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,46 viz:

x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these [administrative] proceedings. The
standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal
law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in
trying criminal case47 (Italics in the original),

this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,48 held:

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed
independently of civil and criminal cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28, 2006 by the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant,
Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all
courts.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 8392 June 29, 2010

[ Formerly CBD Case No. 08-2175 ]

ROSARIO T. MECARAL, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DANILO S. VELASQUEZ, Respondent.

Rosario T. Mecaral (complainant) charged Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD)1 with Gross Misconduct and Gross Immoral Conduct which she detailed in her Position Paper2 as
follows:

After respondent hired her as his secretary in 2002, she became his lover and common-law wife. In October 2007, respondent brought
her to the mountainous Upper San Agustin in Caibiran, Biliran where he left her with a religious group known as the Faith Healers
Association of the Philippines, of which he was the leader. Although he visited her daily, his visits became scarce in November to
December 2007, prompting her to return home to Naval, Biliran. Furious, respondent brought her back to San Agustin where, on his
instruction, his followers tortured, brainwashed and injected her with drugs. When she tried to escape on December 24, 2007, the
members of the group tied her spread-eagled to a bed. Made to wear only a T-shirt and diapers and fed stale food, she was guarded 24
hours a day by the women members including a certain Bernardita Tadeo.

Her mother, Delia Tambis Vda. De Mecaral (Delia), having received information that she was weak, pale and walking barefoot along the
streets in the mountainous area of Caibiran, sought the help of the Provincial Social Welfare Department which immediately dispatched
two women volunteers to rescue her. The religious group refused to release her, however, without the instruction of respondent. It took
PO3 Delan G. Lee (PO3 Lee) and PO1 Arnel S. Robedillo (PO1 Robedillo) to rescue and reunite her with her mother.

Hence, the present disbarment complaint against respondent. Additionally, complainant charges respondent with bigamy for contracting
a second marriage to Leny H. Azur on August 2, 1996, despite the subsistence of his marriage to his first wife, Ma. Shirley G. Yunzal.

In support of her charges, complainant submitted documents including the following: Affidavit3 of Delia dated February 5, 2008; Affidavit
of PO3 Lee and PO1 Robedillo4 dated February 14, 2008; photocopy of the Certificate of Marriage5 between respondent and Leny H.
Azur; photocopy of the Marriage Contract6 between respondent and Shirley G. Yunzal; National Statistics Office Certification7 dated April
23, 2008 showing the marriage of Ma. Shirley G. Yunzal to respondent on April 27, 1990 in Quezon City and the marriage of Leny H.
Azur to respondent on August 2, 1996 in Mandaue City, Cebu; and certified machine copy of the Resolution8 of the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Naval, Biliran and the Information9 lodged with the RTC-Branch 37-Caibiran, Naval, Biliran, for Serious Illegal
Detention against respondent and Bernardita Tadeo on complaint of herein complainant.

Despite respondent’s receipt of the February 22, 2008 Order10 of the Director for Bar Discipline for him to submit his Answer within 15
days from receipt thereof, and his expressed intent to "properly make [his] defense in a verified pleading,"11 he did not file any
Answer.1avvphi1

On the scheduled Mandatory Conference set on September 2, 2008 of which the parties were duly notified, only complainant’s counsel
was present. Respondent and his counsel failed to appear.

Investigating Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III of the CBD, in his Report and Recommendation12 dated September 29, 2008, found
that:

[respondent’s] acts of converting his secretary into a mistress; contracting two marriages with Shirley and Leny, are grossly immoral
which no civilized society in the world can countenance. The subsequent detention and torture of the complainant is gross misconduct
[which] only a beast may be able to do. Certainly, the respondent had violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
reads:

CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.

xxxx

In the long line of cases, the Supreme Court has consistently imposed severe penalty for grossly immoral conduct of a lawyer like the
case at bar. In the celebrated case of Joselano Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose Manuel Eala, the [Court] ordered the disbarment of the
respondent for maintaining extra-marital relations with a married woman, and having a child with her. In the instant case, not only did the
respondent commit bigamy for contracting marriages with Shirley Yunzal in 1990 and Leny Azur in 1996, but the respondent also made
his secretary (complainant) his mistress and subsequently, tortured her to the point of death. All these circumstances showed the moral
fiber respondent is made of, which [leave] the undersigned with no choice but to recommend the disbarment of Atty. Danilo S.
Velasquez.13 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors of Pasig City, by Resolution14 dated December 11, 2008, ADOPTED the Investigating Commissioner’s
findings and APPROVED the recommendation for the disbarment of respondent.

As did the IBP Board of Governors, the Court finds the IBP Commissioner’s evaluation and recommendation well taken.

The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the state upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess,
the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.15 When a lawyer’s moral character is assailed, such that his right
to continue

practicing his cherished profession is imperiled, it behooves him to meet the charges squarely and present evidence, to the satisfaction
of the investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to keep his name in the Roll of Attorneys.16

Respondent has not discharged the burden. He never attended the hearings before the IBP to rebut the charges brought against him,
suggesting that they are true.17 Despite his letter dated March 28, 2008 manifesting that he would come up with his defense "in a verified
pleading," he never did.

Aside then from the IBP’s finding that respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he also violated the
Lawyer’s Oath reading:

I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme
authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or
sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my
clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God,
(underscoring supplied),

and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

The April 30, 2008 Resolution18 of the Provincial Prosecutor on complainant’s charge against respondent and Bernardita Tadeo for
Serious Illegal Detention bears special noting, viz:
[T]he counter-affidavit of x x x Bernardita C. Tadeo (co-accused in the complaint) has the effect of strengthening the allegations against
Atty. Danilo Velasquez. Indeed, it is clear now that there was really physical restraint employed by Atty. Velasquez upon the person of
Rosario Mecaral. Even as he claimed that on the day private complainant was fetched by the two women and police officers,
complainant was already freely roaming around the place and thus, could not have been physically detained. However, it is not really
necessary that Rosario be physically kept within an enclosure to restrict her freedom of locomotion. In fact, she was always
accompanied wherever she would wander, that it could be impossible for her to escape especially considering the remoteness and the
distance between Upper San Agustin, Caibiran, Biliran to Naval, Biliran where she is a resident. The people from the Faith Healers
Association had the express and implied orders coming from respondent Atty. Danilo Velasquez to keep guarding Rosario Mecaral and
not to let her go freely. That can be gleaned from the affidavit of co-respondent Bernardita Tadeo. The latter being reprimanded
whenever Atty. Velasquez would learn that complainant had untangled the cloth tied on her wrists and feet.19 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

That, as reflected in the immediately-quoted Resolution in the criminal complaint against respondent, his therein co-respondent
corroborated the testimonies of complainant’s witnesses, and that the allegations against him remain unrebutted, sufficiently prove the
charges against him by clearly preponderant evidence, the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.20

In fine, by engaging himself in acts which are grossly immoral and acts which constitute gross misconduct, respondent has ceased to
possess the qualifications of a lawyer.21

WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez, is DISBARRED, and his name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
This Decision is immediately executory and ordered to be part of the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme
Court of the Philippines.

Let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7494 June 27, 2008

WILSON CHAM, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA, respondent.

Before Us is a Complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainant Wilson Cham against respondent Atty. Eva Paita-Moya, who he alleged
committed deceit in occupying a leased apartment unit and, thereafter, vacating the same without paying the rentals due.

According to the Complaint, on 1 October 1998, respondent entered into a Contract of Lease2 with Greenville Realty and Development
Corp. (GRDC), represented by complainant as its President and General Manager, involving a residential apartment unit owned by
GRDC located at No. 61-C Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon City, for a consideration of P8,000.00 per month for a term of one year.

Upon the expiration of said lease contract, respondent informed the complainant that she would no longer renew the same but
requested an extension of her stay at the apartment unit until 30 June 2000 with a commitment that she would be paying the monthly
rental during the extension period. Complainant approved such request but increased the rental rate to P8,650.00 per month for the
period beginning 1 October 1999 until 30 June 2000.

Respondent stayed at the leased premises up to October 2000 without paying her rentals from July to October 2000. She also failed to
settle her electric bills for the months of September and October 2000. The Statement of Account as of 15 October 20043 shows that
respondent’s total accountability is P71,007.88.

Sometime in October 2000, a report reached complainant’s office that respondent had secretly vacated the apartment unit, bringing
along with her the door keys. Also, respondent did not heed complainant’s repeated written demands for payment of her obligations
despite due receipt of the same, compelling complainant to file the present Complaint.

In her Answer,4 respondent alleged that she had religiously paid her monthly rentals and had not vacated the apartment unit
surreptitiously. She also averred that she transferred to another place because she was given notice by the complainant to vacate the
premises to give way for the repair and renovation of the same, but which never happened until presently. Respondent actually wanted
to ask that complainant to account for her deposit for the apartment unit, but she could not do so since she did not know complainant’s
address or contact number. For the same reason, she could not turn over to the complainant the door keys to the vacated apartment
unit.

After the mandatory preliminary conference conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) at the IBP Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, the parties were given time to submit their respective Position Papers per
Order5 dated 17 February 2006. On 29 March 2006, complainant filed his Position Paper.6 Respondent, despite the extension given, did
not file hers. Hence, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.
On 8 September 2006, Investigating Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco submitted his Report and Recommendation, 7 recommending the
imposition of the penalty of three-month suspension on respondent for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that herein respondent be held guilty of having violated the aforequoted
provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and imposed upon her the penalty of three (3) months suspension from the
practice of law.

The IBP Board of Governors, however, passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-5858 dated 15 December 2006, amending the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and approving the dismissal of the Complaint, thus:

RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE
the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit.

We do not agree with the foregoing Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors. The Complaint should not be dismissed and respondent
must face the consequences of her actions.

It is undisputed that by virtue of a lease contract she executed with GRDC, respondent was able to occupy the apartment unit for a
period of one year, from 1 October 1998 to 30 September 1999, paying a monthly rental of P8,000.00. Upon the expiration of the lease
contract9 on 30 September 1999, the same was renewed, but on a month-to-month basis at an increased rental rate of P8,650.00.
Under such an arrangement, respondent was able to stay at the leased premises until October 2000, undoubtedly incurring electric bills
during the said period.

A review of the records would reveal that respondent is, indeed, guilty of willful failure to pay just debt. Complainant is able to fully
substantiate that respondent has existing obligations that she failed to settle.

Annex "D"10 of the Complaint is a letter dated 11 September 2000 signed by complainant and addressed to respondent demanding that
she settle her unpaid rentals for the period of three months, particularly, from 1 July to 30 September 2000. The letter appears to have
been received by one Purificacion D. Flores. Annex "H" of the same Complaint is another letter dated 30 August 2004 by complainant
reiterating his earlier demand for respondent to settle her unpaid rentals, as well as her unpaid Meralco bills. This second letter of
demand was sent through registered mail and received by one Nonie Catindig. Respondent did not expressly deny receipt of both letters
of demand in her Answer to the Complaint. Having failed to rebut the foregoing allegations, she must be deemed to have admitted them.
Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, provides:

SECTION 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted. – Material averment in the complaint, other than those as to
the amount of unliquidated damage, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied.

Moreover, a settled rule of evidence is that the one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even where it is the plaintiff
(complainant herein) who alleges non-payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant (respondent herein) to prove
payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. The debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation
has been discharged by payment.11

Apropos is another well-settled rule in our jurisprudence that a receipt of payment is the best evidence of the fact of
payment.12 In Monfort v. Aguinaldo,13 the receipts of payment, although not exclusive, were deemed to be the best evidence. A receipt is
a written and signed acknowledgment that money or goods have been delivered. In the instant case, the respondent failed to discharge
the burden of proving payment, for she was unable to produce receipts or any other proof of payment of the rentals due for the period of
1 July to 20 September 2000.

It is thus evident to this Court that respondent willfully failed to pay her just debts. Her unpaid rentals and electric bills constitute "just
debts," which could be any of the following: (1) claims adjudicated by a court of law; or (2) claims the existence and justness of which
are admitted by the debtor.14

Having incurred just debts, respondent had the moral duty and legal responsibility to settle them when they became due. Respondent
should have complied with just contractual obligations, and acted fairly and adhered to high ethical standards to preserve the court’s
integrity, since she is an employee thereof. Indeed, when respondent backtracked on her duty to pay her debts, such act already
constituted a ground for administrative sanction.

Respondent left the apartment unit without settling her unpaid obligations, and without the complainant’s knowledge and consent.
Respondent’s abandonment of the leased premises to avoid her obligations for the rent and electricity bills constitutes deceitful conduct
violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Canon I and Rule 1.01 thereof, which explicitly state:

"CANON 1- A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.

"Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

Respondent’s defense that she does not know where to find the complainant or his office is specious and does not inspire belief
considering that she had been occupying the apartment unit and paying the rents due (except for the period complained of) for almost
two years. How she could have dealt with complainant and GRDC for two years without at all knowing their office address and contact
numbers totally escapes this Court. This is only a desperate attempt to justify what is clearly an unjustifiable act.

Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only legal
proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.15 In so doing, the people’s faith and confidence in the
judicial and legal system is ensured.

Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to their clients. As part of those
duties, they must promptly pay their financial obligations. Their conduct must always reflect the values and norms of the legal profession
as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any
professional or private misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor -- or to be
unworthy to continue as officers of the Court.16

The Court stresses that membership in the legal profession is a privilege.17 It demands a high degree of good moral character, not only
as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law.18 In this case, respondent fell short of
the exacting standards expected of her as a guardian of law and justice.19

Any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his or her professional or private capacity is a ground for the imposition of the penalty
of suspension or disbarment because good character is an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for the
continuance of such privilege.20 The Court has held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks
constitute gross misconduct,21 for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one year’s suspension from the practice of law,22 or a
suspension of six months upon partial payment of the obligation.23

Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by respondent’s gross misconduct. The case at bar merely involves the respondent’s
deliberate failure to pay her just debts, without her issuing a worthless check, which would have been a more serious offense. The
Investigating Commissioner of the IBP recommended that she be suspended from the practice of law for three months, a penalty which
this Court finds sufficient.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Eva Paita-Moya is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED for one month from the practice of
law, effective upon her receipt of this Decision. She is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more
severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the record of respondent and served on the IBP, as well as on the court administrator who
shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 8382 April 21, 2010

ALFREDO B. ROA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JUAN R. MORENO, Respondent.

The Case

This complaint, filed by Alfredo B. Roa (complainant) against Atty. Juan R. Moreno (respondent), stemmed from a transaction involving
the sale of a parcel of land. Complainant asks that respondent be disciplined and ordered to return the amount of money paid for the
sale.

The Antecedent Facts

Sometime in September 1998, respondent sold to complainant a parcel of land located along Starlite Street in Cupang, Antipolo.
Complainant paid respondent ₱70,000 in cash as full payment for the lot. Respondent did not issue a deed of sale. Instead, he issued a
temporary receipt1 and a Certificate of Land Occupancy2 purportedly issued by the general overseer of the estate in which the lot was
located. Respondent assured complainant that he could use the lot from then on.

Complainant learned, not long after, that the Certificate of Land Occupancy could not be registered in the Register of Deeds. When
complainant went to see respondent, the latter admitted that the real owner of the lot was a certain Rubio. Respondent also said there
was a pending legal controversy over the lot. On 25 February 2001, complainant sent a letter3 to respondent demanding the return of the
₱70,000 paid for the lot.

Complainant then filed a criminal case against respondent in the Municipal Trial Court (Branch 2) of Antipolo City. On 26 September
2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 convicting respondent of the crime of other forms of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code. The MTC sentenced respondent to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for one month and one day and ordered
him to return the amount of ₱70,000 to complainant.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (Branch 74) of Antipolo City set aside the lower court’s ruling. For lack of evidence establishing
respondent’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC acquitted respondent in a decision5dated 20 December 2005. The decision further
stated that the remedy of complainant was to institute a civil action for the recovery of the amount he paid to respondent.

On 23 February 2006, complainant filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) an Affidavit-Complaint6against respondent.

In his Answer,7 respondent explained that what he sold to complainant was merely the right over the use of the lot, not the lot itself.
Respondent maintained he never met the complainant during the negotiations for the sale of said right. Respondent claimed it was a
certain Benjamin Hermida who received the purchase price. Respondent further alleged that it was one Edwin Tan, and not the
complainant, who paid the purchase price.

At the hearing set on 14 October 2008, complainant narrated that respondent personally sold to him the lot in question. Complainant
stated respondent assured him that the papers would be processed as soon as payment was made. Complainant claimed he duly paid
respondent ₱70,000, but when he followed up the sales documents, respondent just dismissed him and denied any transaction between
them. For his part, respondent did not appear at the hearing despite receipt of notice.

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation8 dated 17 October 2008, the IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found respondent guilty
of violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three months and ordered to immediately deliver
the amount of ₱70,000 to complainant, thus:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that Respondent is GUILTY of violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and should be given the penalty of THREE (3) MONTHS SUSPENSION.

Respondent is hereby ORDERED to immediately deliver the amount of Seventy Thousand Pesos (₱70,000.00) to herein complainant.9

In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-63210 passed on 11 December 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification
the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The IBP Board of Governors suspended respondent from the practice of law for
three months and ordered him to return the amount of ₱70,000 to complainant within 30 days from receipt of notice. Thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and finding Respondent guilty of violating
Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Juan R. Moreno is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for three (3) months and Ordered to Return the Seventy Thousand Pesos (₱70,000.00) to complainant within thirty (30) days from
receipt of notice. (Underscoring supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the present case to this Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B11 of the Rules of
Court.

The Ruling of this Court

We sustain the findings of the IBP and adopt its recommendation in part.

Complainant and respondent presented two different sets of facts. According to complainant, respondent claimed to be the owner of the
lot and even offered to be his lawyer in case of any legal problem that might crop up from the sale of the lot. On the other hand,
respondent denied ever meeting complainant, much less selling the lot he insisted he did not even own. In his answer, he presented the
affidavits of Benjamin and Cepriano Hermida who claimed that upon receipt of the payment for the right to use the lot, they immediately
removed the improvements on the lot. The Hermidas also claimed they received the payment from one Mr. Edwin Tan, not from
complainant.

After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court gives credence to complainant’s version of the facts.

Respondent’s credibility is highly questionable. Records show that respondent even issued a bogus Certificate of Land Occupancy to
complainant whose only fault was that he did not know better. The Certificate of Land Occupancy has all the badges of intent to defraud.
It purports to be issued by the "Office of the General Overseer." It contains a verification by the "Lead, Record Department" that the lot
plan "conforms with the record on file." It is even printed on parchment paper strikingly similar to a certificate of title. To the unlettered, it
can easily pass off as a document evidencing title. True enough, complainant actually tried, but failed, to register the Certificate of Land
Occupancy in the Register of Deeds. Complainant readily parted with ₱70,000 because of the false assurance afforded by the sham
certificate.
The innocent public who deal in good faith with the likes of respondent are not without recourse in law. Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Further, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.

Conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined to the performance of a lawyer’s professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for
misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.12

In the present case, respondent acted in his private capacity. He misrepresented that he owned the lot he sold to complainant. He
refused to return the amount paid by complainant. As a final blow, he denied having any transaction with complainant. It is crystal-clear
in the mind of the Court that he fell short of his duty under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We cannot,
and we should not, let respondent’s dishonest and deceitful conduct go unpunished.

Time and again we have said that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is enjoyed only by those who continue to display
unassailable character. Thus, lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, not just in their dealings with their clients
but also in their dealings with the public at large, and a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the
imposition of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and even disbarment.13

Respondent’s refusal to return to complainant the money paid for the lot is unbecoming a member of the bar and an officer of the court.
By his conduct, respondent failed to live up to the strict standard of professionalism required by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent’s acts violated the trust and respect complainant reposed in him as a member of the Bar and an officer of the court.

However, we cannot sustain the IBP’s recommendation ordering respondent to return the money paid by complainant. In disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar.
Our only concern is the determination of respondent’s administrative liability. Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial
action which the parties may choose to file against each other.141avvphi1

That said, we deem that the penalty of three-month suspension recommended by the IBP is insufficient to atone for respondent’s
misconduct in this case. We consider a penalty of two-year suspension more appropriate considering the circumstances of this case.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Juan R. Moreno GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years effective upon finality of this Resolution.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all over the
country. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7022 June 18, 2008

MARJORIE F. SAMANIEGO, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ANDREW V. FERRER, respondent.

For resolution is the Complaint of Marjorie F. Samaniego against respondent Atty. Andrew V. Ferrer for immorality, abandonment and
willful refusal to give support to their daughter, filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and docketed as CBD Case No.
04-1184.

The facts are as follows:

Early in 1996, Ms. Samaniego was referred to Atty. Ferrer as a potential client. Atty. Ferrer agreed to handle her cases1 and soon their
lawyer-client relationship became intimate. Ms. Samaniego said Atty. Ferrer courted her and she fell in love with him.2 He said she flirted
with him and he succumbed to her temptations.3 Thereafter, they lived together as "husband and wife" from 1996 to 1997,4 and on
March 12, 1997, their daughter was born.5 The affair ended in 20006 and since then he failed to give support to their daughter.7
Before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Ms. Samaniego presented their daughter's birth and baptismal certificates, and the
photographs taken during the baptism. She testified that she knew that Atty. Ferrer was in a relationship but did not think he was already
married. She also testified that she was willing to compromise, but he failed to pay for their daughter's education as agreed upon.8 Atty.
Ferrer refused to appear during the hearing since he did not want to see Ms. Samaniego.9

In his position paper,10 Atty. Ferrer manifested his willingness to support their daughter. He also admitted his indiscretion; however, he
prayed that the IBP consider Ms. Samaniego's complicity as she was acquainted with his wife and children. He further reasoned that he
found it unconscionable to abandon his wife and 10 children to cohabit with Ms. Samaniego.

In Resolution No. XVII-2005-13811 dated November 12, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the report and recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner, and imposed upon Atty. Ferrer the penalty of six (6) months suspension from the practice of law for his
refusal to support his daughter with Ms. Samaniego. The IBP also admonished him to be a more responsible member of the bar and to
keep in mind his duties as a father.

On February 1, 2006, Atty. Ferrer filed a Motion for Reconsideration12 with prayer for us to reduce the penalty, to wit:

Without passing judgment on the correctness or incorrectness of the disposition of the Honorable Commission on Bar
Discipline, herein respondent most humbly and respectfully begs the compassion of the Honorable Court and states that the
gravity of the penalty imposed and meted out, depriving herein respondent to earn a modest living for a period of six (6)
months, will further cause extreme hardship to his family of ten (10) children.13

We referred the motion to the Office of the Bar Confidant for evaluation. Upon finding that Atty. Ferrer lacked the degree of morality
required of a member of the bar for his illicit affair with Ms. Samaniego, with whom he sired a child while he was lawfully married and
with 10 children, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that we affirm Resolution No. XVII-2005-138 and deny the prayer for
reduced penalty.14

We agree with the IBP on Atty. Ferrer's failure to give support to his daughter with Ms. Samaniego. We also agree with the Office of the
Bar Confidant that Atty. Ferrer's affair with Ms. Samaniego showed his lack of good moral character as a member of the bar. We
dismiss, however, Ms. Samaniego's charge of abandonment since Atty. Ferrer did not abandon them. He returned to his family.

Atty. Ferrer admitted his extra-marital affair; in his words, his indiscretion which ended in 2000. We have considered such illicit relation
as a disgraceful and immoral conduct subject to disciplinary action.15 The penalty for such immoral conduct is disbarment,16 or
indefinite17 or definite18 suspension, depending on the circumstances of the case. Recently, in Ferancullo v. Ferancullo, Jr.,19 we ruled
that suspension from the practice of law for two years was an adequate penalty imposed on the lawyer who was found guilty of gross
immorality. In said case, we considered the absence of aggravating circumstances such as an adulterous relationship coupled with
refusal to support his family; or maintaining illicit relationships with at least two women during the subsistence of his marriage; or
abandoning his legal wife and cohabiting with other women.20

In this case, we find no similar aggravating circumstances. Thus we find the penalty recommended by the IBP and Office of the Bar
Confidant as adequate sanction for the grossly immoral conduct of respondent.

On another point, we may agree with respondent's contention that complainant was not entirely blameless. She knew about his wife but
blindly believed him to be unmarried. However, that one complicit in the affair complained of immorality against her co-principal does not
make this case less serious since it is immaterial whether Ms. Samaniego is in pari delicto.21 We must emphasize that this Court's
investigation is not about Ms. Samaniego's acts but Atty. Ferrer's conduct as one of its officers and his fitness to continue as a member
of the Bar.22

Finally, it is opportune to remind Atty. Ferrer and all members of the bar of the following norms under the Code of Professional
Responsibility:

xxxx

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxxx

Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities
of the integrated bar.

xxxx

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

xxxx
Needless to state, respondent ought always to keep in mind the responsibilities of a father to all his children. If there be a resultant
hardship on them because of this case, let it be impressed on all concerned that the direct cause thereof was his own misconduct.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Andrew V. Ferrer GUILTY of gross immorality and, as recommended by the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant, SUSPEND him from the practice of law for six (6) months effective upon notice
hereof, with WARNING that the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

To enable us to determine the effectivity of the penalty imposed, the respondent is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this
Decision to this Court.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the courts all over the
country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be attached to the personal records of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 9608 November 27, 2012

MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON, Respondent.

The Court has often reminded members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms of the legal profession by upholding the ideals
and principles embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. Lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful public eye and
community approbation. Needless to state, those whose conduct – both public and private – fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and,
after appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized.1

Complainant Maria Victoria B. Ventura filed on July 29, 2004 a Complaint2 for Disbarment or Suspension before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline against respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson for "grossly immoral conduct."

In her complaint, complainant alleged that

2. The herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA executed a Sworn Statement dated 19 April 2002 and a
Supplemental-Complaint dated 10 May 2002 stating therein that the crime of RAPE was committed against her person
sometime in December, 2001 and on 19 March 2002 when she was merely thirteen (13) years of age by herein Respondent
ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON, then thirty eight (38) years old, married to Teresita B. Samson, Filipino and resident of Barangay
5, San Francisco, Agusan Del Sur, Philippines….

3. In his Counter-Affidavit, herein Respondent ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON admitted that sexual intercourse indeed transpired
between the herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA and himself….

4. After the conduct of preliminary investigation, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan Del Sur, Philippines issued a
RESOLUTION dated 10 June 2002 dismissing the charge of RAPE and finding the existence of probable cause for the crime of
QUALIFIED SEDUCTION and issued the corresponding INFORMATION for QUALIFIED SEDUCTION on 04 July 2002….

5. Thereafter, the herein Complainant filed a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION dated 26 August 2002 which was denied in
the RESOLUTION dated 02 October 2002 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan Del Sur….

6. The aforesaid RESOLUTION dated 02 October 2002 was elevated to the Department of Justice, by way of a PETITION FOR
REVIEW, and is pending resolution by the Department of Justice.

xxxx

8. The act/s committed by the herein Respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson against the herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B.
VENTURA as hereinbefore stated clearly constitute … "grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court of the Philippines which provides for a penalty of "DISBARMENT or SUSPENSION of an Attorney by the SUPREME
COURT."

Complainant narrated in her Sworn Statement3 that sometime in December 2001, at around midnight, she was sleeping in the maid’s
room at respondent’s house when respondent entered and went on top of her. Respondent kissed her lips, sucked her breast, and
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. She felt pain and found blood stain in her panty. She stated that another incident
happened on March 19, 2002 at respondent’s poultry farm in Alegria, San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. Respondent asked her to go with
him to the farm. He brought her to an old shanty where he sexually abused her. Thereafter, respondent gave her five hundred pesos
and warned her not to tell anyone what had happened or he would kill her and her mother.
In her Supplemental-Complaint,4 complainant averred that respondent allowed her to sleep in his house after her mother agreed to let
her stay there while she studied at the Agusan National High School. She further stated that on the night she was sexually abused, she
was awakened when respondent went on top of her. She struggled to free herself and shouted, but respondent covered her mouth and
nobody could hear as nobody was in the house. Complainant also claimed that on March 19, 2002, between 5:00 p.m. to 6:00 pm,
respondent forced her to ride a multi-cab. When they arrived at his poultry farm in Alegria, respondent dragged her to a dilapidated
shack. She resisted his advances but her efforts proved futile.

Respondent alleged in his Answer5 that

2. Respondent admits the allegations in paragraph 2 of the complaint to the effect that Maria Victoria Ventura filed a complaint
against him for Rape at the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office with qualification that the said complaint for Rape was dismissed.
Respondent, however, has no knowledge or information as to the truth of the allegation that she was 13 years….

xxxx

5. Respondent vehemently denies the truth of the allegations in paragraph 8 of the complaint to the effect that the acts of
respondent in having sex with complainant constitute … grossly immoral conduct. The truth is that the act of respondent in
having sex with complainant was done with mutual agreement after respondent gave money to complainant. Respondent
respectfully submits that his act of having sex with complainant once does not constitute… grossly immoral conduct.

There is no human law that punishes a person who has sex with a woman with mutual agreement and complainant accepts
compensation therefore. Having sex with complainant once with just compensation does not amount to immoral conduct….

xxxx

6. The complaint is instigated by Corazon Ventura who was an employee at the Law Office of respondent herein. The said
Corazon Ventura entertained hatred and had a grudge against the herein respondent who terminated her services due to
misunderstanding….

7. The filing of the Criminal Case against respondent as well as this Administrative Case is a well orchestrated and planned act
of Corazon Ventura as vengeance against respondent as a result of her separation from the employment in the Law Office of
the respondent. This claim is supported by the Affidavit of Natividad Ruluna, the former Office Clerk at the Law Office of
respondent….

8. To show that Corazon Ventura desires to get back at respondent, she demanded from respondent to settle with her and
demanded the payment of the amount of P2,000,000.00; otherwise she will file a case against him in Court for Rape and for
disbarment. Respondent did not come across with Corazon Ventura, the latter made good her threats and filed the criminal
case for Rape. [sic] When the case for rape did not prosper because the Prosecutor dropped the Rape Case, Corazon Ventura
sent word to respondent that she is amenable for the amount of P400,000.00. In effect, Corazon Ventura wanted to extort from
respondent so that she can get even with him and his wife for separating her from the employment;

9. Complainant is a woman of loose moral character. This is supported by the Affidavit of Patronio Punayan, Jr. which is hereto
attached as Annex "3". And Corazon Ventura can afford to utilize Maria Victoria Ventura as her instrument in putting down the
respondent herein because Maria Victoria Ventura is not her biological daughter and she knows before hand that her ward has
a questionable reputation. The fact that Corazon Ventura is not the biological mother of Maria Victoria Ventura is shown by the
pre-trial order in Criminal Case No. 5414….

xxxx

Respondent has not violated any grounds mentioned in this rule. Respondent respectfully submits that his having sex with complainant
with just compensation once does not amount to immoral conduct. For who among men will not yield to temptation when a woman shall
invite him for sex?

Attached to respondent’s Answer is his Counter-Affidavit6 which he submitted to the Provincial Prosecutor. He alleged therein that
complainant usually stayed late at night with her male friends when her mother was out of the house. He claimed that he heard rumors
that complainant had sexual affairs with different boys. Respondent narrated that on March 19, 2002, he saw complainant with some of
her classmates near their rented house. Complainant told him that they wanted to go out to swim but they did not have money. When
she asked if he could spare some amount, he gave her money. He told her in jest that he wanted to see her that afternoon and go to a
place where they could be alone, and he was surprised when she agreed. He just thought that for complainant, sex is a common thing
despite her age. At around 5:00 p.m., he fetched complainant at her house. She casually walked towards the car and boarded it. He told
her that they will not check in a lodging house because people might recognize him. Upon reaching his poultry farm, respondent met his
farm worker and asked him if he could use the latter’s hut. The farm worker agreed and they went straight to the hut.

Inside the farm worker’s hut, complainant did not hesitate in entering the room. Respondent did not notice any involuntariness on her
part as she undressed herself. He asserted that they had sexual intercourse based on their mutual understanding. Thereafter, the
complainant dressed up and walked back to the multi-cab where she waited for him. He told her not to tell anyone about what had
happened, to which she replied "natural buang kay motug-an" meaning, she’s not crazy as to tell anyone. He alleged that she accepted
the money he gave because she needed to buy some things but her mother did not give her any allowance. Respondent insisted that
what happened between them was the first and the last incident. He claimed that he was able to confirm that complainant is no longer a
virgin.

It likewise appears that the Investigating Prosecutors found that probable cause exists for respondent to stand trial for qualified
seduction.7 The charge of rape, however, was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. An Information was filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Agusan del Sur, Branch 6, but complainant who was not satisfied with the dismissal of the rape charge, filed a motion for
reconsideration. When said motion was denied, complainant filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ). However,
the DOJ sustained the findings of the prosecutor.

Then, on December 14, 2006, complainant and her mother appeared before the public prosecutor and executed their respective
Affidavits of Desistance.8 Complainant stated that what happened between respondent and her in March 2002 was based on mutual
understanding. Thus, she was withdrawing the complaint she filed against respondent before the RTC as well as the one she filed
before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. Accordingly, the criminal case against respondent was dismissed.9

In its Report and Recommendation10 dated October 10, 2007, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended that respondent be
suspended for a period of one year from the practice of law for immorality with the warning that repetition of the same or similar act will
merit a more severe penalty.

On November 10, 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVIII-2007-237, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that
respondent is found guilty of immorality, the victim is a minor, respondent and his wife was victim’s guardians and for being a married
man, Atty. Danilo S. Samson is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for five (5) years with Stern Warning that repetition of the
same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.11

Complainant now moves to reconsider the IBP Resolution. She argues that the penalty imposed by the IBP is not commensurate to the
gravity and depravity of the offense. She contends that respondent committed grossly immoral conduct by forcing himself to have sexual
intercourse with a young and innocent lass of 13 years of age. He also took advantage of his moral ascendancy over complainant
considering that she was then staying at respondent’s residence. Moreover, there was a betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity
considering that respondent was a married man. She insists that this detestable behavior renders respondent unfit and undeserving of
the honor and privilege which his license confers upon him.Thus, complainant prays that the penalty of disbarment be imposed.12

Meanwhile, respondent also filed a Motion for Reconsideration13 of the IBP Resolution. He asserts that complainant has not presented
any proof of her minority. Likewise, during the sexual encounter, complainant was not under their custody. He contends that
complainant’s mother even testified that her daughter stayed at respondent’s house only until February 2002. He further stresses that
because of his admission and remorse, and since this is the first time he has been found administratively liable, he is entitled to a
reduction of the penalty to one year suspension from the practice of law.

The pertinent provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxxx

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

xxxx

Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,14 the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing
requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of members of the
bar to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the integrity of the Bar.15 Consequently, any errant behavior on the
part of a lawyer, be it in the lawyer’s public or private activities, which tends to show said lawyer deficient in moral character, honesty,
probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment.
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and
respectable members of the community.16 Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock
the community’s sense of decency.17

From the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of respondent himself, we find that respondent’s act of
engaging in sex with a young lass, the daughter of his former employee, constitutes gross immoral conduct that warrants sanction.
Respondent not only admitted he had sexual intercourse with complainant but also showed no remorse whatsoever when he asserted
that he did nothing wrong because she allegedly agreed and he even gave her money. Indeed, his act of having carnal knowledge of a
woman other than his wife manifests his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. Moreover,
the fact that he procured the act by enticing a very young woman with money showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the
dignity of the human person and the ethics of his profession.

In Cordova v. Cordova,18 we held that the moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes
conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the
inviolable social institution of marriage.

Respondent has violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by complainant, then a 13-year-old minor,19 who for a time was under
respondent’s care. Whether the sexual encounter between the respondent and complainant was or was not with the latter’s consent is of
no moment. Respondent clearly committed a disgraceful, grossly immoral and highly reprehensible act. Such conduct is a transgression
of the standards of morality required of the legal profession and should be disciplined accordingly.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for, among others, any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required to take
before admission to the practice of law. It bears to stress that membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a
privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show
the lawyer’s lack of the essential qualifications required of lawyers.20

Likewise, it was held in Maligsa v. Cabanting21 that a lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an
officer of the court. Similarly, in Dumadag v. Lumaya,22 the Court pronounced:

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the
highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a
member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law.

The fact that complainant filed an Affidavit of Desistance during the pendency of this case is of no moment. Complainant’s Affidavit of
Desistance cannot have the effect of abating the instant proceedings in view of the public service character of the practice of law and the
nature of disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern. A case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant
relief to a complainant as in a civil case, but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order
to protect the public and the courts.1âwphi1 A disbarment case is not an investigation into the acts of respondent but on his conduct as
an officer of the court and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar.23

Illicit sexual relations have been previously punished with disbarment, indefinite or definite suspension, depending on the
circumstances.24 In this case, respondent’s gross misbehavior and unrepentant demeanor clearly shows a serious flaw in his character,
his moral indifference to sexual exploitation of a minor, and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could not but put the
legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate
disciplinary action.25

The Court is mindful of the dictum that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct
that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Thus, where a
lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed. 26 However, in
the present case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate
penalty.27

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson is hereby DISBARRED for Gross Immoral Conduct, Violation of his oath of office,
and Violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of respondent in the Office of the. Bar
Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
circulated to all courts.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.
ADM. CASE No. 5364 August 20, 2008

JUANITA MANAOIS, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE, respondent.

Before this Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Juanita Manaois (complainant) against Atty. Victor V. Deciembre
(respondent) for willful and deliberate falsification and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar.

Complainant gave the following account of the facts that spawned the present administrative Complaint.1

Complainant is a government employee working as a mail sorter at the Manila Central Post Office. Sometime in 1998, she applied for a
loan of P20,000 from Rodella Loans, Inc., through respondent. As security for the loan, respondent required her to issue and deliver to
him blank checks that he would fill out according to their agreed monthly installments. Notwithstanding the full payment of the loan,
respondent allegedly failed to return the remaining blank checks. Respondent told complainant that the loan had not yet been paid and
that the payments had been credited to the interest on the loan. Respondent threatened complainant with a lawsuit in the event of
nonpayment. Respondent allegedly filled out the blank checks with different amounts and made it appear that complainant had them
exchanged them for cash in the total amount of P287,500.00 for use in her business venture. Using these checks as basis, respondent
filed several cases against complainant for estafa and for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the City Prosecutor’s Office of
Quezon City and Pasig City.2

Complainant contended that no man of respondent’s stature would be too foolish to extend a P287,500.00 loan to a mere mail sorter
earning barely P6,000.00 a month on the bare assurance that her postdated checks would be encashed on their due dates.3

In his Comment4 dated 20 March 2001, respondent countered that complainant’s allegations are devoid of any truth and merit. He
maintained that it was in fact complainant who deceived him by not honoring her commitment under the transactions. Those transactions
had allegedly been covered by the postdated checks which were subsequently dishonored due to "ACCOUNT CLOSED." Thus, he filed
the criminal cases against her. He also claimed that the checks had already been fully filled out when complainant affixed her signature
thereon in his presence. Respondent further asserted that he had given complainant the amount of money indicated in the checks
because he was convinced, based on their previous transactions, that complainant had capacity to pay.

In a Resolution5 dated 17 October 2001, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation or decision within 90 days from notice.

Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes conducted hearings on the matter. In his Report and Recommendation6 dated 7 August 2007, he
found complainant’s version of the facts more credible than that of respondent and, accordingly, found respondent guilty of tampering
with the checks of complainant. He likewise noted that this is not just an isolated case as several of complainant’s officemates had also
fallen prey to respondent’s cunning scheme. Thus, he recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for five (5) years.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Commissioner’s report and recommendation in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-133
dated 28 September 2007.

The Court sustains the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the recommended penalty.

Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

The Code of Professional Responsibility likewise mandates that "a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession."7 To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the
confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession.8

Evidently, respondent failed to comply with the foregoing canons. As shown by the records and as found by the Commissioner,
complainant had supplied respondent with blank personal checks as security for the P20,000 loan she had contracted and which
respondent subsequently deceitfully filled out with various amounts they had not agreed upon and with full knowledge that the loan had
already been paid. After the filled-out checks had been dishonored upon presentment, respondent even imprudently filed multiple
lawsuits against complainant. Verily, respondent is guilty of serious dishonesty and professional misconduct. He committed an act
indicative of moral depravity not expected from and highly unbecoming of a member of the Bar.9 The fact that the conduct pertained to
respondent’s private dealings with complainant is of no moment. A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it
pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
Possession of good moral character is not only a good condition precedent to the practice of law, but also a continuing qualification for
all members of the Bar.10
For the record, respondent has already been indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in A.C. No. 5365 entitled Olbes v.
Deciembre,11 a case involving an offense and a set of facts similar to the case at bar. In the said case, the Court notes that complainants
therein averred that "many of their officemates—among them, Juanita Manaois, Honorata Acosta and Eugenia Mendoza—had suffered
the same fate in their dealings with respondent (Deciembre)."12 This demonstrates respondent’s propensity to employ deceit and
misrepresentation. As such, following our ruling in Olbes, the Court hereby imposes the same penalty upon respondent in the present
case.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is found guilty of gross misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED indefinitely from the practice of law.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts, as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant which is directed to append a copy hereof
to respondent’s personal record. Let another copy be furnished the National Office of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6288 June 16, 2006

MARILI C. RONQUILLO, ALEXANDER RONQUILLO and JON ALEXANDER RONQUILLO, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact
SERVILLANO A. CABUNGCAL, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. HOMOBONO T. CEZAR, Respondent.

Complainants seek the disbarment or suspension of respondent from the practice of law for unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful
conduct. They allege that respondent sold them a piece of property over which he has no right nor interest, and that he refuses to return
to them the amount they have paid him for it.

Complainant Marili C. Ronquillo is a Filipino citizen currently residing in Cannes, France, together with her minor children, Alexander and
Jon Alexander.

In May 1999, complainants and respondent entered into a Deed of Assignment.1 For the price of P1.5M, respondent transferred, in favor
of the complainants, his rights and interests over a townhouse unit and lot, located at 75 Granwood Villas Subd., BF Homes, Quezon
City. Respondent also obligated himself to deliver to complainants a copy of the Contract to Sell he executed with Crown Asia, the
townhouse developer, dated April 19, 1996. Upon full payment of the purchase price, respondent further undertook to have Crown Asia
execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in favor of the complainants.

Respondent received from complainants P750,000.00 upon execution of the Deed of Assignment. The balance was to be paid by
complainants in four equal quarterly installments of P187,500.00 each. Thus, complainants issued in favor of respondent four postdated
checks in the amount of P187,500.00 each. Respondent was able to encash the first check dated August 17, 1999.2

Complainants subsequently received information from Crown Asia that respondent has not paid in full the price of the townhouse at the
time he executed the Deed of Assignment. Respondent also failed to deliver to complainants a copy of the Contract to Sell he allegedly
executed with Crown Asia. For these reasons, complainant Marili Ronquillo ordered the bank to stop payment on the second check she
issued to respondent in the amount of P187,500.00.

On March 6, 2000, complainants, through their counsel, wrote respondent, informing him that they were still willing to pay the balance of
the purchase price of the townhouse on the condition that respondent work on Crown Asia’s execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in
their favor. In the alternative, complainants demanded the return of the amount of P937,500.00, plus legal interest, within ten days.3 The
amount of P937,500.00 represents the P750,000.00 down payment and the first quarterly installment of P187,500.00 which
complainants paid respondent.

In a letter dated May 2, 2000, addressed to complainants,4 respondent claimed that he was "working now on a private project which
hopefully will be realized not long from now," and requested for "a period of twenty days from May 15, 2000 within which to either
completely pay Crown Asia or return the money at your (complainants’) option." The period lapsed but respondent did not make good
his promise to pay Crown Asia in full, or return the amount paid by complainants.

On February 21, 2002, complainants’ counsel sent respondent a second letter5 demanding the return of the amount of P937,500.00,
including legal interest, for failing to comply with his promise. The demand was unheeded.

Hence, this administrative complaint6 that respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Allegedly,
respondent violated his oath under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and he ought to be disbarred or
suspended from the practice of law.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, to whom the instant disciplinary case was
assigned for investigation, report and recommendation, found respondent guilty of dishonest and deceitful conduct proscribed under
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In her Report dated October 9, 2003, she recommended that respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years. The IBP Board of Governors, through Resolution No. XVI-2003-
226, dated October 25, 2003, approved the recommendation of Commissioner San Juan.

We agree.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on any of the following
grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party without authority. Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." "Conduct," as used in this rule, does not refer
exclusively to the performance of a lawyer’s professional duties. This Court has made clear in a long line of cases 7 that a lawyer may be
disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

In the instant case, respondent may have acted in his private capacity when he entered into a contract with complainant Marili
representing to have the rights to transfer title over the townhouse unit and lot in question. When he failed in his undertaking, respondent
fell short of his duty under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It cannot be gainsaid that it was unlawful for
respondent to transfer property over which one has no legal right of ownership. Respondent was likewise guilty of dishonest and
deceitful conduct when he concealed this lack of right from complainants. He did not inform the complainants that he has not yet paid in
full the price of the subject townhouse unit and lot, and, therefore, he had no right to sell, transfer or assign said property at the time of
the execution of the Deed of Assignment. His acceptance of the bulk of the purchase price amounting to Nine Hundred Thirty-Seven
Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P937,500.00), despite knowing he was not entitled to it, made matters worse for him.

Respondent’s adamant refusal to return to complainant Marili Ronquillo the money she paid him, which was the fruit of her labor as an
Overseas Filipino Worker for ten (10) years, is morally reprehensible. By his actuations, respondent failed to live up to the strict standard
of morality required by the Code of Professional Responsibility and violated the trust and respect reposed in him as a member of the
Bar, and an officer of the court.

Respondent’s culpability is therefore clear. He received a letter from complainants’ counsel demanding the execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of the complainants, or, in the alternative, the return of the money paid by complainants. In reply to said letter,
respondent acknowledged his obligation, and promised to settle the same if given sufficient time, thus:

xxx

I am working now on a private project which hopefully will be realized not long from now but I need a little time to fix some things over.
May I please request for a period of 20 days from May 15, 2000 within which to either completely pay Crown Asia or return the money
at your option. (Emphasis supplied)

In no uncertain terms, respondent admitted not having full ownership over the subject townhouse unit and lot, as he has yet
to completely pay Crown Asia. Respondent even failed to produce the Contract to Sell he allegedly executed with Crown Asia over the
subject unit, which would show the extent of his right of ownership, if any, over the townhouse unit and lot in question.

To be sure, complainants gave respondent sufficient time to fulfill his obligation. It was only after almost two years had passed, after
respondent promised to pay Crown Asia or return to complainants the amount they paid him, that complainants sent respondent a
second letter8 demanding solely the return of the amount of P937,500.00, including legal interest. By this time, it was indubitable that
respondent would not be able to perform his end of their agreement.

The practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is granted only to those of good moral character.9 The Bar must maintain a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing.10 Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are dealing with
their clients or the public at large,11 and a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the
appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment.12

Be that as it may, we cannot grant complainants’ prayer that respondent be directed to return the money he received from them in the
amount of P937,500.00. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers do not involve a trial of an action, but rather investigations by the court
into the conduct of one of its officers. The only question for determination in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still fit to
be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar.13 Thus, this Court cannot rule on the issue of the amount of money that should be
returned to the complainants.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Homobono T. Cezar is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) YEARS,
effective immediately. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
all courts for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.

Johnson Lee vs. respondent Judge Renato E. Abastillas

A.M. No. RTJ-92-863 and A.C. No. 3815

Johnson Lee and Sonny Moreno filed with this Court a verified complaint dated June 8, 1992, docketed as Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-853,
charging respondent Judge Renato E. Abastillas with a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for soliciting a bribe in
Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 pending in his sala entitled "People vs. Johnson Lee and Sonny Moreno", serious misconduct
and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bench, gross ignorance of the law, rendering unjust interlocutory orders and manifest
partiality, oppression and inordinate delay in the administration of justice "which may result or has resulted in falsification of public
documents or in the commission of falsehood."

In his comment dated September 28, 1992, Judge Abastillas vehemently denied the charges against him. He averred that Atty. Chua
had an axe to grind against him because of a prior incident between them. Judge Abastillas pointed out that on September 28, 1992,
Atty. Chua as counsel for the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011, filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration where he
made statements which were highly contemptuous of Judge Abastillas. Hence, according to Judge Abastillas, he issued an order on
March 2, 1993 requiring Atty. Chua to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court and recommended for suspension
from the practice of law. After due proceedings, Judge Abastillas issued an order on March 11, 1993 finding Atty. Chua guilty of
contempt of court and imposing upon him a fine in the amount of P500.00. Judge Abastillas then recommended to this Court that Atty.
Chua be suspended from the practice of law. This order of March 11, 1993 became the basis of Adm. Case No. 3815 entitled "Judge
Renato Abastillas vs. Enrique Chua."

The two administrative cases were consolidated and referred to Associate Justice Alfredo J. Laganon of the Court of Appeals for
investigation, report .and recommendation in a resolution of this Court dated May 6, 1993.

After hearing of the two cases, Justice Laganon submitted his report recommending the dismissal of the administrative complaint against
Judge Abastillas in Adm. Matter No. RTJ-92-863 and the imposition of appropriate disciplinary measures against Atty. Enrique S. Chua
in Adm. Case No. 3815.

Evidence in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863.

Complainants in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-8 63 sought to prove their charges of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and
gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming a magistrate against Judge Abastillas, through the affidavits and testimonies of Johnny K.H.
Uy, Johnson Lee and Atty. Enrique S. Chua.

The testimony of Atty. Chua who claimed to have delivered the bribe money of P20,000.00 to Judge Abastillas on May 2 or 3, 1991 as
down payment of the consideration for the dismissal of the criminal cases against his clients, is summarized in the report of Justice
Lagamon, to wit:

"Atty. Enrique S. Chua as counsel for the complainants and also as their principal witness declared in his Affidavit that when criminal
cases nos. 10010 and 10011 were raffled to RTC, Br. 50, Bacolod City, presided by the respondent, he was heartened because the
respondent was among the few judges he was comfortable with. Consequently, Atty. Chua allegedly approached the respondent in his
chambers and apprised him of the background of the cases and requested that the warrants of arrest be held in abeyance because of
the irregularity in the conduct of the preliminary investigation. That the respondent accordingly instructed the docket clerk not to release
the warrants of arrest. After the clerk left, the respondent allegedly said, 'Ike, don't worry too much, anyway, that is not your personal
problem. They are just cases of your clients. What is important is that you are assured of your attorney's fees. Why, how much is your
fee there? P50,000.00? Make it-double, so that I can have a share there and I will take care of everything' (.Affidavit of Atty. Chua; Exh.
'H').

Atty. Chua then apprised his client Johnson Lee of what happened and told him not to worry but at the same time informed him 'that the
judge is asking for P50,000.00 to take care of everything. Johnny K.H. Uy advised Atty. Chua that they are willing to give P50,000.00 to
the respondent because of their sad experience with the Department of Justice and insisted that the amount be given over the
objections of Atty. Chua. That Mr. Uy sent a check in the amount of P20,000.00 to Atty. Chua, which the latter should in turn give to
respondent as initial payment for the bribe. In the meantime, Atty. Chua deposited the check in his account.

Sometime in the second week of April, 1991, the criminal docket clerk of the respondent informed Atty. Chua that the bail bond for his
clients was increased from P18,000.00 to P100,000.00 each, upon ex-parte motion filed by the private prosecutor. Aware of the adverse
development, Johnny Uy blamed Atty. Chua for not giving the money yet to the respondent; Atty. Chua again went to the chambers of
the respondent where accordingly he was advised by the latter to file a motion to strike out the ex-parte motion for the reduction of the
bail and at the same time moved for the reduction of the bail provided it shall be in cash. The motion was filed and the respondent
granted it the following day. The respondent instructed Atty. Chua that the bail bond should be in cash to facilitate the collection of his
attorney's fees so that both of them can receive their respective compensation for their efforts (Exh. 'H', par. 9).

Again, in his Affidavit Atty. Chua stated that on May 2, 1991 at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon he delivered P20,000.00 to the
respondent and before he left the chambers, the respondent jestingly said where will they celebrate that evening.

Moreover, he indicated therein that on January 29, 1992, Johnson Lee and Atty. Chua appeared before the Judicial and Bar Council and
briefly related the delivery of the P20,000.00 to the respondent where he was rebuked by Dean Palma for allowing himself to be used as
a conduit for illegal and immoral act. Dean Palma asked Atty. Chua if he was not guilty as the respondent (Affidavit, par. 16).
During the cross examination of Atty. Chua, he affirmed, that his first meeting with the respondent was between April 10 to 15, 1991 in
his chambers when the criminal docket clerk was instructed not to release the warrants of arrest (p. 52, TSN, Sept. 16, 1993; p. 41,
TSN, Sept. 15, 1993). He further testified that it was also at that time when the respondent solicited P50,000.00 when he said, 'Why,
how much is your fees there? You double it.' (p. 54, TSN, Sept. 16, 1993). The second meeting was when Atty. Chua discussed the
reduction of the bail bond which he said could be on April 17, 18 and 19, 1991, but most probably on the 18th (pp. 85, 86, TSN, Sept.
15, 1993), and the: third meeting was when he delivered the P20,000.00 which he said was on May 2, 1991 but which he rectified during
cross examination that he withdrew the amount or. May 2, 1991 and the delivery of P20,000.00 to the respondent was on May 3, 1991
at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon (pp. 63-64, TSN, Sept. 15, 1993).

"In the Memorandum filed by Atty. Chua on Dec. 28, 1993, he pointed out the following facts which were either admitted or undisputed
and which he believes established the misconduct and the impropriety of the respondent as follows:

a) Respondent Judge's admission that he met complainant Lee ahead of witness Johnny Uy, whom he tagged as the 'financier' of the
herein complainants on May 29, 1991; 'while he met Uy only on October 7, 1991' (p. 11, Comment dated September 28, 1992 of
respondent).

b) Respondent Judge's admission that, indeed, on May 29, 1991, he and complainant Lee saw each other at the Quezon City Sports
Center, during the meeting of the Philippine Judges' Association (p. 11, Comment, supra).

c) As to witness Uy, respondent Judge admitted that 'it is true that respondent met with Johnny K.H. Uy on October 7, 1991 at the
residence of respondent at Unit A-2, 157 Katipunan Road Quezon City x x x' (p. 7, Comment, supra).

Atty. Chua is of the opinion that the meeting of the respondent with the accused who were charged with two (2) criminal cases before his
sala will render him liable for gross misconduct or conduct unbecoming of (sic) a magistrate."
Atty. Chua further declared that after he delivered the P20,000.00 to Judge Abastillas, the latter told him that the accused (in Criminal
Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011) could see the Judge at the forthcoming convention of Philippine Judges' Association to be held at the
Quezon City Sports Center.

Johnson Lee, one of the accused in the Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011, narrated on the witness stand that he received a long
distance call from Atty. Chua advising him that Judge Abastillas wanted to see him (Johnson Lee) at the Quezon City Sports Center on
May 29, 1991 where the Philippine Judges' Association was to hold a convention. Johnson Lee went to the place on said date. After
introducing himself to Judge Abastillas, they repaired to a function room where they had a private conversation for about twenty minutes.
During the meeting, Johnson Lee asked Judge Abastillas if he had received what they sent to Atty. Chua. Judge Abastillas said yes, but
added, "I cannot give you what you .are asking. It will take a little time to study." Johnson Lee responded by saying, "Judge, the balance
later on na lang." Judge Abastillas replied, "Okay, okay. Anyway, I know they have no case against you."

On the same occasion, Johnson Lee took the opportunity to ask Judge Abastillas why he approved three ex-parte motions of the private
prosecutor in the criminal cases, one, for issuance of a warrant of arrest of the accused and, another, for increase of their bail bond,
without giving the "accused an opportunity to oppose; the same. Judge Abastillas assured Johnson Lee that there was nothing to worry
"because that is my style. I will just give them a little favor. Anyway, the case will be decided in your favor."

Before they parted, Johnson Lee told Judge Abastillas that one Johnny Uy a brother of Ban Hua Flores, who had a hand in the filing of
the criminal cases, wanted to see the judge. Judge Abastillas said yes. "You just give him my telephone number and call me." Judge
Abastillas had earlier given Johnson Lee his calling card bearing his telephone number 7222968.

The meeting of Judge Abastillas with Johnson Lee at the Quezon City Sports Center became the basis for the charges of "gross
misconduct and conduct unbecoming of (sic.) a magistrate."

Johnny K.H. Uy testified that he was concerned with the two cases pending before Judge Abastillas where the accused were charged
with embezzlement of the funds of Neugene Marketing Corporation. According to Uy, he was interested in the outcome of the cases,
more particularly in the acquittal of the accused, for the reason that the pendency of the criminal cases had adversely affected the
operation of the corporation, 75% of which stocks had been assigned to him. Uy declared that he visited Judge Abastillas at his
residence in St. Ignatius Village, Quezon City, on October 7, 1991 at about 11:30 in the morning. Before going to Judge Abastillas'
house, Uy called him by telephone and Judge Abastillas gave him the direction of his place." During that visit, where the background
and merits of the criminal cases were discussed, Judge Abastillas assured Uy that he would take care of the cases. Before they parted
Judge Abastillas told Uy to ask Johnson Lee if he could help Judge Abastillas with 5,000 U.S. dollars. Uy replied that he would talk to
Johnson Lee about the matter and would inform Judge Abastillas .by telephone.of the result. On October 16, 1991 at about 7:00 o'clock
in the evening, Uy called up Judge Abastillas telling him that there will be no problem about the 5T (meaning US $5,000.00) as long as
the cases of Johnson Lea will be cleared first. Judge Abastillas told Uy to take up the matter with Al Simbulan. Al Simbulan, a lawyer,
was a mutual friend of Uy and Judge Abastillas. The telephone, conversation was taped by Uy (Exh. "D").

Going back to the testimony of Johnson Lee, said witness further declared that sometime in the middle of June, 1991, Atty. Simbulan
called his office and left a note that they would have a dinner with Judge Abastillas at six o'clock in the evening at Manila Hotel. Johnson
Lee obliged. Towards the end of the dinner, Judge Abastillas told Johnson Lee and Atty. Simbulan .in a low voice: "Johnson, don't worry.
Huwag kang mag-alala. Nakatimbre na ang kaso n'yo sa akin."
After some waiting and obviously realizing that Judge Abastillas was giving the accused a runaround, not having done anything relative
to the criminal proceedings to indicate that he would perform his part of the bargain, Johnson Lee appeared before the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC) sometime in the middle of 1992 to oppose Judge Abastillas' application for transfer to Manila, as RTC Judge on the
ground of his lack of good moral character. Johnson Lee saw Justice Lorenzo Relova to whom he cited the incidents where the Judge
allegedly solicited money in the sums of P50,000.00 and $5,000.00 and accepted the amount of P20,000.00 in connection with Criminal
Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011. Justice Relova advised him to come back together with Johnny Uy and bring with them the tape
containing the conversation between Johnny Uy and Judge Abastillas in the evening of October 16, 1991. A week later or on January
29, 1991 Johnson Lee, together with Johnny Uy and Atty. Chua, returned to JBC's office where the tape was replayed before then JBC
member Calcetas-Santos. Atty. Calcetas-Santos obtained an English translation of the taped conversation and gave it to Justice Relova
and Dean Rodolfo Palma, another JBC member. Both extensively interrogated Johnson Lee, Johnny Uy and Atty. Chua. At one point,
Dean Palrna sternly reprimanded Atty. Chua for having allowed himself to be a conduit in the bribery, pointedly reminding Chua that by
delivering himself the advance payment of P20,000.00 to Judge Abastillas, he was as guilty as the judge.

As specifics, in support of their other charges against Judge Abastillas, complainants in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863 averred and sought
to prove the following:

1.) When complainants filed a Consolidated Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011, Judge
Abastillas, instead of acting on the same, issued an order for their arrest and confiscation of their bailbonds in view of their failure to
appear at the arraignment scheduled for that day;

2.) Likewise, although complainants had already posted bail, Judge Abastillas still insisted that they be present at their arraignment.
Judge Abastillas gave preferential treatment to some cases, particularly Criminal Cases Nos. 8846 and 8847, entitled "People vs.
Espinosa" for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Acts and for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions, which were heard and the
accused acquitted in just five (5) months, and in which the accused were not required to be. present at the hearing of the Motion to
Quash the Information; whereas in connection with complainants' Consolidated Motion to Quash the Information, their presence was
required in a "full-blown type of hearing" and the motion was denied in open court in a "trifling manner."

3.) Complainants' Urgent Motion to Reset Arraignment and to Set Arraignment, Pre-trial and Continuous Trial dated June 2, 1991 was
arbitrarily denied, their bonds were declared forfeited and the bondsmen were asked to show cause why no judgment shall be rendered
against them for the amount of their bonds. In addition, Judge Abastillas issued an order for complainants' arrest and fixed an excessive
bond of P50,000.00 each for their provisional liberty.

4.) In Criminal Case No. 8847, Judge Abastillas issued an order posthaste requiring the delivery to court of the illegally possessed
firearm and ammunition, which order was not necessary because the items should have been forfeited in favor of the Government and
deposited in Camp Crame.

5.) Two of complainants' motions in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 had remained unresolved beyond the 90-day reglementary
period.

In his verified Comments dated September 28, 1992 and Sworn Affidavit of October 22, 1993, as well as in his testimony in his own
behalf, Judge Abastillas denied having solicited P50,000.00 from Atty. Chua or having received P20,000.00 from him as initial payment
at 4:00 p.m. on May 2 or May 3, 1991. To prove his defense, Judge Abastillas obtained a joint affidavit from the personnel of his sala,
namely, Pablo D. Juguan (Branch Clerk of Court), Estanes A. Alvior (Legal Researcher), Aurora Leda S. Exito, Alma M. Ronato, Wilma
B. Cepeda and Julieta D. Jarce (Stenographers), Diana B. Lamur (Interpreter), Armando N. Eso (Deputy Sheriff), Maribec B. Alvior (Staff
Asst. 2) and Edwin O. Navaja (RTC Aide) stating, in essence, that during the incumbency of Judge Abastillas of RTC Branch 50 in
Bacolod City, they had never seen Atty. Chua enter the judge's chamber.

While on direct examination, Atty. Chua declared that he delivered the P20,000.00 to Judge Abastillas either on May 2 or May 3 of 1991,
on cross-examination Atty. Chua at one point adverted when pressed to give the exact date that:

Now, we go back to your allegation that sometime either on May 2 or the next day, you delivered P20,000.00 to Judge
"Q
Abastillas?

"A Yes. Correct.

"Q Can you please be a little bit more specific. Was it May 2 or May 3?

Because as far as I can recall, when I appeared before the JBC I had then with me my old bank passbook. I traced the
"A deposit and withdrawal in that passbook. There was a withdrawal on May 2, 1991 of the sum of P20,000.00. So most
probably, it's either on that very same day or immediately the next day that I delivered the money.

I think most probably it would be May 3 because if I am not mistaken, the next day is either a non-working, day or a
Saturday and I remember that. Yes, yes. Correct. When I placed the P20,000.00 in my attache case, I remember my kid
"A
commenting that 'Papa, you have so much money in your attache case'. So the money stayed overnight with me. Yes.
Correct. It was May 3." (TSN, p. 11, .Sept. 15, 1993.)'

Seizing upon Atty. Chua's above-quoted assertion that the delivery of the money "most probably" was on May 3, 1991, Judge Abastillas
argued that he could not have received the money in the afternoon of May 3 as he left Bacolod City early in the morning of that day by
ferry boat for Iloilo City and then .proceeded by car to Roxas City where he stayed up to the following day to attend a testimonial in
honor of Justice Bellosillo who was appointed as Court Administrator. To prove his alibi, Judge Abastillas submitted an affidavit of Judge
Bernardo T. Ponferrada (then Presiding Judge of Branch 42, RTC, Bacolod City) certifying that he and his wife were with Judge
Abastillas in their journey to Roxas City. Judges Sergio Pestano, Ramon B. Berjamin and Jose V. Alovera of the Regional Trial Court at
Roxas City also executed a joint affidavit to the effect that Judge Abastillas arrived at Roxas City just before noon of May 3, 1991 where
he stayed up to the following day.

Judge Abastillas admitted that he met Johnson Lee on May 29, 1991 at the Quezon City Sports Center during the convention of the
Philippine Judges' Association. But he denied having asked Johnson for a meeting there or having talked to him privately regarding the
criminal cases. Judge Abastillas said that RTC Judge Joselito de la Rosa of Manila was introduced to him by Judge Ponferrada. Judge
de la Rosa, a friend of Johnson Lee, in turn introduced Lee to him. According to Judge Abastillas, he gave his calling card to Judge de la
Rosa who must have handed it to Johnson Lee afterward. This was the same calling card that was introduced as evidence by the
complainants in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-8 53.

Judge Abastillas, likewise, confirmed the fact that he met Johnson Lee at the Manila Hotel in the evening of June 7, 1991 but that the
latter was never invited by him to be there on that occasion. This is the account of Judge Abastillas in his sworn affidavit (Exh. "27") of
the meeting:

"23. It is true that Lee attended the dinner which I and my wife had with my cousin and his wife, Mr. and Mrs. Arturo Sena, at the Manila
Hotel on the evening of June 7, 1991. He was a gatecrasher on that occasion. What happened was this: My cousin and I agreed to a
foursome at the Manila Hotel on June 7, 1991. When my wife and I were already on our way to the Manila Hotel, Atty. Simbulan called
me up and said he wanted to see me. I told him that I was going to a dinner at the Manila Hotel. He insisted in seeing me; and I had an
inkling it was because of the above-mentioned criminal cases, so I told him, I was willing to see him as long as he did not bring along
either or both Lee or Moreno. (Prior to this, he informed me that Lee and Moreno were clients of his partner, Atty. Pineda), and I made
this condition because I did not want to meet Lee and/or Moreno outside of the court and especially not during a social occasion; I was
willing to see Atty. Simbulan because his brother is a friend of mine, and he was my counsel for one of my brothers-in law ('bilas
husband of my wife's sister). Atty Simbulan agreed that he would not take with him either of his clients, so I told him to join us at the
Manila Hotel. Much to my surprise and anger, Lee was at the Manila Hotel Lobby, when he reached the place. So, when I saw Atty.
Simbulan, I asked him: 'Bakit ba nandito iyan?' (Why is that person here?). Atty. Simbulan answered: 'Ewan ko ba diyan. Pasensiya ka
na; Huwag ka nang magalit. Hayaan mo na siya' (I don't know. Please be patient; don't get angry. Let him join us). I contained my
irritation. My cousin and his wife, and my wife were civil and hospitable. We, Filipinos, are a hospitable people. Unlike Americans, we
tolerate gatecrashers, as in this instance of gatecrashing by Johnson Lee, who is a very pushy person, as indeed he also gatecrashed
during the Judges' Convention. Furthermore, as indicated by their attempts to see and talk to Justice Alfredo Lagamon, the Investigating
Justice in this proceeding.

"24. During the dinner, altho my wife, my cousin and his wife tried to be cordial to Lee, I showed my displeasure by not addressing him.
It is not true that I told him I will take care of the two criminal cases." (At pp. 13 and 14.)
Again, Judge Abastillas did not deny that Johnson Lee, one of the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011, went to his
residence at Quezon City on October 7, 1991. But the visit, according to Judge Abastillas, was not at his own initiative and the amount
of $5,000.00 was never discussed on that occasion. This is his version of the meeting:

"25. It is not true that on October 7, 1991 that I asked for $5,000.00 from Johnny Uy. He did come to my residence on that date, but that
was not on my initiative. Prior to October 7, 1991, I had been getting word from our maid and from my son, that a certain Mr. Uy had
been calling up asking for me, but refused to leave any message. And then on October 7, 1991, just as I was preparing to go out for a
luncheon meeting, our maid informed me a certain Mr. Uy wanted to talk to me over the phone. When I answered the phone Johnny Uy
introduced himself and insisted that I let him come over to my house; he said he wanted to talk to me and explain his S.E.C. Case where
his sister Banhua is opposing party. He did not say outright that he was going to discuss the Criminal Cases against Lee and Moreno; if
he had, I would have-refused to see him, because I did not want to talk with or about Lee, at this time, I was getting fed up with the
pushiness and aggressive behavior of Uy, who plainly wanted to establish a close relationship with me. Uy was very insistent that I see
him, so just to accommodate him, I agreed to see him. And he came to my house on said date, October 7, 1991. He did talk about the
S.E.C. case and also about Commissioners. I never asked him for $5,000.00. I never asked him for money, Philippine or American
currency, on that occasion, or over the phone. Uy was lying when he testified, that when he came to see me at home, I asked for
$5,000.00 from him and/or Lee. He was likewise lying when he said that in a telephone conversation with me on October 16, 1991, said
$5,000.00 was discussed. That is not true. It is possible I may have talked with him over the phone, but I categorically declare that I
have never mentioned, nor have we ever discussed $5,000.00. Also, I have never consented to the taping of any conversation, with him,
or with anybody else." (Sworn Statement, Exh. "27", pp. 14 and 15.)
Evidence in Adm. Case No. 3815.

The offending statements of Atty. Chua that were the subject of the March 11, 1993 contempt order were contained in the Urgent Motion
for Reconsideration dated February 21,1992 he filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011, to wit:

1. 1. 'And at the risk of incurring the ire of the Court, defense counsel regrets to say that in denying the six (6) incidents in the
manner above-described, the Court acted no better than a pre-school kid who murmurs a favorite nursery rime (sic)' (Page 3,
 par. 5 of the Motion).

2. 2. 'To put it bluntly, accused have the feeling that these cases are being railroaded against them' (Page 5, 2nd par. of the
Motion).

3. 3. 'Inasmuch as this motion not only seeks to reconsider the various palpable erroneous actuations of the Court, which have
gone so far out of hand, but also cries for prompt extraordinary remedies or corrective disciplinary sanctions urgently required,
so as to restore order and sanity in the entangled situations created by the series of plainly and outrageously, if not maliciously,
erroneous orders of His Honor, which are highly prejudicial to the rights of the accused and injurious to the administration of
justice and in effect, constitute a desecration of our entire judicial system, which have therefore rendered the President Judge
RENATO E. ABASTILLAS unfit to continue wearing the judicial robe and sitting any second longer in the Bench, a copy of this
Motion is made under oath and furnished the Supreme Court thru the Hon. Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa; Judicial and Bar
Council and the Court Administrator, without prejudice to the impending formal administrative complaint the accused will in due
time institute with the Supreme Court (Page 12, No. (7) of the Motion)."

In the course of the joint hearing of the administrative cases, Judge Abastillas expanded his charges against Atty. Chua to include the
following:

A.) Atty. Chua does not have the good moral character required of a member of the Bar and he violated his oath of office for the reason
that:

1. 1. He admitted during cross-examination that in his conspiracy with Lee, Moreno and Uy, he committed the crime of bribery
which is penalized in Articles 210 and 212 of the Revised Penal Code;

2. 2. He has been charged with the crime of Falsification of Public Document in People of the Philippines versus Enrique S. Chua,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 12036 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Bacolod City;

3. 3. An administrative case has been filed against him in Adm. Case No. 1425, entitled "J. Bautista Rabago vs. Atty. Enrique S.
Chua;"

4. 4. Atty. Chua committed perjury in conspiracy with Lee, Moreno and Uy, by testifying in the proceedings under oath that he
gave P20,000.00 as a bribe to Judge Abastillas on May 3, 1991, when he knew that he never gave any bribe money to Judge
Abastillas; and that Atty. Chua also made other false statements in the proceedings to harass Judge Abastillas.

B. Atty. Chua violated the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as follows:

1. 1. Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 for falsely testifying under oath that he gave P20,000.00 bribe money to Judge Abastillas on
May 3, 1991;

2. 2. Canon 8, Rule 0.01 for using abusive and offensive language in his pleadings and memoranda against Undersecretary Bello
of the Department of Justice;

3. 3. Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03, for not only by perjuring himself in declaring that he gave P20,000.00 bribe money
to Judge Abastillas, but also by offering false evidence in the form of a taped conversation, indicating lack of candor, fairness
and good faith with the Court, and which acts of Atty. Chua violate his duties not to do any falsehood to mislead or allow the
court to be misled by any artifice; and

4. 4. Canon 12, Rule 12.04 for advising his clients - the two (2) accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 not to attend
the scheduled arraignment.

Atty. Chua categorically testified on cross-examination during the proceedings before Justice Lagamon that he gave P20,000.00 as
bribe to Judge Abastillas. Thus:

In this particular case, with a solicitation bribe allegedly made by Judge Abastillas, what was your advise to your clients?
"Q

I admonished them that the defense in these two cases are intrinsically rneritorious. So I do not see any reason, giving
"A
money or bribing any Judge. And that I am not in the habit doing that.

"Q Did you agree with your clients that you would not give the bribe?

"A That is what I told them.

"Q What did your client tell you?

They are so insistent and finally they prevailed upon me. Because their reason is the sad experience they had undergone
with the Dept. of Justice. And according to Mr. Uy he told me, he said you just cannot underestimate my sister Banua and
"A
perhaps you do not know her. And he said giving of money is not in reality a bribe because we are in effect buying justice.
And he told me I have to be practical about the whole thing.

"Q So you were convinced by your clients that this was not really a bribe but you were only 'buying justice.'

I still have reservation. Actually, up to this date I do not as a way of life approach such practice but I really do not know why
"Q
I gave in to their constant persistent pleadings.

"Q Was it because as you said you emotionally identified yourself to your clients?

"A Partly maybe.

"Q So you agreed that you are going to give what Judge Abastillas was allegedly asking from you?

"A That was the effect because finally I delivered P20,000.00 to him." (TSN, Oct. 27, 1993, pp. 7-3.)

Findings in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863

We find no sufficient proof to sustain the charge that Judge Abastillas accepted the amount of P20,000.00 in view of Atty. Chua's
uncertainty as to the date he delivered the money. His final estimate of the date on cross-examination May 3, 1993--had afforded Judge
Abastillas a credible defense of alibi.

However, there is strong and convincing evidence that Judge Abastillas had willingly and knowingly discussed with interested parties
with whom he met at least three (3) times, the possible dismissal of the criminal cases for a certain consideration.

Judge Abastillas made no denial that he met and talked with Johnson Lee, one of the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011
on May 29, 1991 at the Philippine Judges' convention at the Quezon City Sports Center on May 29, 1991 and at the Manila Hotel on
June 7, 1991. Also, he did not deny that he accepted as visitor in his house at St. Ignatius Village, Quezon City, on October. 7, 1991
Johnny K.H. Uy, a party interested in the outcome of the criminal cases. This meeting was followed by a telephone call made by Uy to
Judge Abastillas on October 16, 1991 wherein the former informed the latter that there will be no problem about the 5T (meaning
US$5,000.00) as long as the cases of Johnson Lee would be cleared first, to which Judge Abastillas suggested to Uy to take up the
matter with Al Simbulan, a mutual friend to both.

Judge Abastillas cleverly hedged in answering whether or not he talked to Johnny Uy on the phone on October 16, 1991, except to say,
"It is possible I may have talked with him over the phone, but I categorically declare that I have never mentioned, nor have we even
discussed $5,000.00" (p. 16, Sworn Statement, Exh. "27"). Judge Abastillas also declared on cross-examination that "it is possible (that.
Johnny Uy talked to him over the phone on October 16) but I cannot remember exactly the caller, maybe one of the callers might be a
certain Uy but I cannot recognize because I have never heard his voice." (TSN, p. 25, November 11, 1993.) Yet, in his verified comment
dated September 28, 1992 (Exh. 4), Judge Abastillas declared he had telephone conversation with Johnny Uy just before Uy went to his
house on October 7,1991. Thus:

"Then in (sic) October 7, 1991 in the morning, our aforesaid maid Beth informed me that Mr. Johnny Uy wanted to talk to me. When
respondent answered the phone, Mr. Uy introduced himself and asked that he be allowed to see respondent in his house. Respondent
demurred because he was in a hurry because he had a 2 p.m. appointment in the Court of Appeals. But Uy was very insistent, so, just to
get rid of him, respondent agreed to see Uy for a few minutes. So Uy went to see respondent at the latter's house. After introducing
himself, Uy started discussing the criminal cases against complainants herein.

"'What respondent repeatedly told Uy is that he (Uy) should rely on the counsel of Lee and Moreno to do all that need to be done in the
case." (pp. 6-7.)

Since judge Abastillas had already heard Johnny Uy's voice on the phone and in fact they had a face-to-face conversation on October 7,
1991 in the Judge's house, it is highly unbelievable that Judge Abastillas could not say definitely whether he had a talk with Johnny Uy
on the phone on October 16, 1991. His lame and shallow stance only serves to emphasize the obvious.

There is no doubt in the mind of the Court that the voices in the telephone conversation as recorded in the tape by Johnny Uy on
October 16, 1991 were those of Uy and Abastillas. The taped conversation was replayed at the hearing before Justice Lagamon with the
consent of both parties. Johnny Uy identified and recognized the, voices in tape as belonging to him and Judge Abastillas.

In the taped conversation already adverted to, Johnny Uy told Judge Abastillas that there will be no problem about the 5T (meaning US
$5,000.00) as long as the (criminal) cases of Johnson Lee will be cleared first. Judge Abastillas' response was to advise Uy to take up
the matter with Al Simbulan.

It may be argued that that would not prove that Judge Abastillas solicited US $5,000.00. However, the taped conversation as the
evidence of the complainants in Adm. Case No. RTJ-93-863 would show, was just a sequel of a series of interlinked events that had
earlier taken place, starting with the solicitation by Judge Abastillas of P50,000.00 of which he received P20,000.00 as initial payment,
followed by the meeting between Judge Abastillas and Johnson Lee at the Quezon City Sports Center and at the Manila Hotel, and the
meeting between Johnny Uy and Judge Abastillas at the latter's house at St. Ignatius Village, Quezon City where the judge asked for US
$5,000.00. All the interrelated events ineluctably point to the conclusion meant that Judge Abastillas knew that the $5,000.00 he tried to
solicit.

Besides, if Judge Abastillas during the telephone conversation had no idea at all about the "5T" mentioned by Johnny Uy, he should
have expressed surprise and inquired from Uy what he meant by it. He did not, which goes to show he fully understood what the "5T"
stood for.

It is, likewise, suggested that when Johnny Uy mentioned "5T" to Judge Abastillas, the latter's reply did not appear to be responsive
because he mentioned something like "Take up the matter with Al Simbulan." The theory is advanced that it would be illogical for a
person who is soliciting a bribe to involve a third party and a lawyer at that referring to Atty. Al Simbulan. We do not agree. Atty.
Simbulan is a mutual friend of Judge Abastillas and Johnny Uy. He could serve as a convenient conduit between the two, thus avoiding
the direct personal involvement of the taker in the payoff.

In this connection, Judge Abastillas cannot now question the admissibility of the taped conversation (Exh. 13) as evidence. He offered
no objection to its replay at the hearing before Justice Lagamon.

We do not believe that Judge Abastillas' meeting with Johnson Lee at the Quezon City Sports Center was not pre-arranged. Neither do
we accept his explanation that Johnson Lee was a "gate crasher" at the judge's party at Manila Hotel. On this point, we find the
discussion in complainants' memorandum in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863 dated December 3, 1993 convincing. We quote:

"2. The circumstances as narrated by respondent Judge under which he first met complainant Lee by way of his justification in meeting
the said Complainant, should be taken with a grain of salt, so to speak. Respondent Judge seems to heap the blame on his fellow
Judges Ponferrada and de la Rosa, as being instrumental in paving the way for his meeting complainant Lee, but neither of these two
judges was presented by him to substantiate his version. Worse, if respondent was able to secure the affidavit of Judge Ponferrada
(Annex '4' of his sworn affidavit dated 27th October, 1993) to support the fact that on May 3, 1991, he was in Roxas City, then, there is
no reason why he cannot at least secure a similar affidavit from Judge Ponferrada to bolster the circumstances under which he met
complainant Lee.

Hence, that respondent Judge and complaint Lee met under mutually conducive and cordial circumstances which subsequently led to
the latters (sic) solicitation of bribe from witness Uy, is very probable.

3. Moreover, the pretension of the respondent Judge that after the meeting of May 29, 1991 with complainant Lee at the Judges'
convention, he 'did not give him the opportunity to see respondent again' and that 'he took all steps necessary so that he could not have
to talk again to Lee', is a pure lie, and thus cannot be believed, because when respondent Judge, without his slightest expectation, was
confronted with a calling card (EXH. 'D') of his own cousin Mr. Arturo Sena, given by said Mr. Sena to complainant Lee, in the presence
of respondent. Judge and his wife, at a dinner at the Manila Hotel on June 7, 1991 or barely a week after respondent Judge, realizing
that he could no longer pretend to be that 'resolute' in avoiding complainant Lee, vainly set up the pretext that complaint (sic) Lee was
a gatecrasher on that occasion'. This, by itself, is extremely difficult to believe.

Even respondent Judge's explanation about the presence of complainant Lee at that Manila Hotel dinner is silly, if not childish and
ridiculous. According to respondent Judge, he already 'had an inkling' on what was in Atty Simbulan's mind when the latter 'insisted in
seeing him' at the time he and his wife were already on their way to the Manila Hotel for a 'foursome' dinner. That 'inkling' according to
respondent Judge, are the two criminal cases where complainant Lee is one of the accused, but respondent Judge nonetheless willingly
allowed Atty. Simbulan to join them in the dinner, notwithstanding the fact that, in his own words, 'prior to this, he (Atty. Simbulan)
informed me that Lee and Moreno were clients of his partner, Atty. Pineda'. Thus if indeed respondent Judge is so determined in not
seeing complainant Lee again and so resolute in avoiding at all costs complainant Lee as what he wants to impress upon the
Investigating Justice, then, he could, have easily set up an alibi to mislead Atty. Simbulan.

Thus, there was indeed a prior understanding on where and when to meet Lee again after their meeting at the Judge's convention.

Besides, why did not respondent call on his own cousin Mr. Sena to prove that complainant Lee was really a 'gatecrasher' or request
Atty. Simbulan to substantiate his version that Lee was the most unwanted guest during that Manila Hotel dinner. Worse, respondent
Judge did not offer an explanation regarding Lee's having his calling card (EXH. 'C'), which witness Uy subsequently used in calling him
up by telephone prior to their seeing each other on October 7, 1991 at the residence of respondent Judge."
The three (3) meetings by Judge Abastillas with interested parties who had a stake in the outcome of Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and
10011 and the recorded telephone conversation where said cases were discussed manifested Judge Abastillas' willingness, nay,
propensity to enter into deals with motivations incongruous to the merits of the cases pending before him. Judge Abastillas committed
serious misconduct no less.
The Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence (Rule 1.01).
He should administer justice impartially and without delay (Rule 1.02). He should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary (Rule 2.01)

It is peculiarly essential that the system for establishing and dispensing justice be developed to a high degree of proficiency, to gain the
absolute confidence of the public in the integrity and impartiality of its administration, because appearance is as important as reality, so
much so that a judge, like Cesar's wife, must not only be pure but beyond suspicion. The actuations of Judge Abastillas transgressed
against the high standard of moral ethics required of judges.

We find, however, the rest of charges of the complainants in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863 against Judge Abastillas without merit. We
quote with approval the pertinent portions of Justice Lagamon's report relative to said accusations:

"The undersigned finds nothing irregular when the Court issued an Order of Arrest when the accused Johnson Lee and Sonny Moreno
failed to appear during the scheduled arraignment on Sept. 26, 1991. Atty. manifested that he instructed his clients not to appear in
Court because a day before the date set for arraignment he allegedly filed a consolidated motion to quash which he requested that the
same be heard on Oct. 11, 1991. Both accused and counsel were duly notified of the arraignment. They should have displayed their
respect for the Court by appearing personally and prayed for the deferment of the arraignment. There was nothing that could have
prevented the Court from orally denying the motion to quash and proceeding with the arraignment. It appears that the motion which was
filed only one day before the scheduled date of hearing was intended to delay and derail the speedy trial of the case, taking into account
that the Sept. 16, 1991 date of arraignment was originally agreed in open court in the presence of Atty. Chua as early as August 5, 1991
and set for Sept. 3, 1991 but reset to Sept. 26.

The undersigned finds nothing untoward in the proceedings of People vs. Espinos (Crim. Cases 8846 and 8847) where the respondent
ordered that the firearms involved in the case be delivered to the custody of the Court for proper disposition.

The complainants maintain that the respondent treated the cases in a favored manner just because counsel for the accused Atty. Roger
Z. Reyes is close to him. Accordingly, a 'full-blown trial type hearing' was conducted in a motion to quash and, eventually, the case was
dismissed. Whereas, in the cases of the complainants the accused were ordered arrested upon their failure to appear on Sept. 26, 1991
arraignment notwithstanding the pendency of a motion to quash. It is our observation that the two cases cannot be equated because in
the first place the complainants failed or refused to appear in court notwithstanding notice to them and counsel. In the Espinos case the
accused consistently appeared in court. Moreover, the Order of the Court directing the delivery of the firearms in the custody of the
police is properly and in order. , We are fully aware of the evil practice of irresponsible policemen who hold on to the possession of the
firearms for their personal use. The Court, therefore, has to issue an Order for the delivery of the firearms for proper disposal. In fact,
Atty. Chua is guilty of deliberately misquoting the Order of the Court changing the phrase 'to this Court' to 'to him', thereby creating an
implication that the respondent entertained personal interest in the firearms.

The records show that the public prosecutor also moved that the firearm in question be delivered to the court and after an Order of
Forfeiture be forwarded and deposited with the Firearms and Explosives Unit, PC Headquarters, Bacolod City (Exh. '15', p. 143,
records).

The charge that the respondent failed to decide Civil Case No. 2423 (Susana Lim vs. Lim) within 90 days cannot be given much
consideration taking into account the Certification issued by the Clerk of Court of the branch to the effect that the case was partially tried
by the respondent and that the stenographer who took down the stenographic notes left for the United States without transcribing the
same. There is, therefore, a need for the retaking of the testimonies of the witnesses.

The failure of the respondent to resolve the motion to disqualify private prosecutor dated April 20, 1991 as well as the motion for
reinvestigation dated July 3, 1991 which were resolved in open court only on February 5, 1992 is rather a minor violation in the face of
the series of motions filed by Atty. Enrique S. Chua. Respondent lost track of what motions are due for resolution until he was reminded
on January 20, 1992 through a supplemental motion filed by Atty. Chua, however, sixteen days thereafter the pending motions were all
resolved."
Findings in Adm. Case No. 3815.

Undoubtedly, Atty. Chua is guilty of violating Rule 1.01, canon 1, of the Code of Professional Responsibility in view of his admission that
he allegedly delivered P20,000.00 as bribe money to Judge Abastillas, thereby allowing himself to be used as a conduit for an illegal and
immoral act. Rule 1.01 provides that "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

However, we take note that Atty. Chua during the investigation before Justice Lagamon humbly expressed his genuine regrets for
having acted the way he did. He said: "I considered that, particular moment of my life as one of the human weaknesses." He felt sorry
for "a lapse in my life." "I was not strong enough to resist," he added (TSN, Oct. 27, 1983, pp. 11-12).

Atty. Chua declared that while he believed that his clients' case was meritorious, his clients prevailed upon him to offer bribe money as
the practical way to obtain justice.

Under the circumstances, and in addition to Atty. Chua's profound expression of remorse, we do not find it difficult to mitigate his liability
when we consider his willingness to come forward, at the risk of being administratively penalized himself, to expose what he considered
illegal and immoral acts perpetrated by the very ones tasked with the sacred duty to uphold the law and dispense justice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Renato E. Abastillas, Regional Trial Court, Branch 50, Bacolod City, is hereby found GUILTY of
serious misconduct in Adm. Matter No. RTJ-92-863 for having met with persons involved and/or interested in Criminal Cases Nos.
10010 and 10011 entitled "People vs. Johnson Lee and Sonny Moreno" of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, for the purpose of
discussing or soliciting bribe in connection with said cases and is hereby DISMISSED from office, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits
and accrued leave credits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality or government, including government
owned or controlled corporations.

This Court holds Atty. Enrique S. Chua administratively liable in Adm. Case No. 3815 for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for allegedly bribing Judge Abastillas.

Respondent Atty. Enrique S. Chua is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar act or acts or violation committed by him in the
future will be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6313 September 7, 2006

CATHERINE JOIE P. VITUG, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DIOSDADO M. RONGCAL, respondent.

The allegations raised in this complaint for disbarment are more sordid, if not tawdry, from the usual. As such, close scrutiny of these
claims is called for. Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should be imposed
with great caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar is
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.1

Under consideration is the administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Catherine Joie P. Vitug (complainant) against Atty. Diosdado
M. Rongcal (respondent). A classic case of "he said, she said," the parties' conflicting versions of the facts as culled from the records are
hereinafter presented.

Complainant narrates that she and respondent met sometime in December 2000 when she was looking for a lawyer to assist her in
suing Arnulfo Aquino ("Aquino"), the biological father of her minor daughter, for support. Her former classmate who was then a Barangay
Secretary referred her to respondent. After several meetings with complainant, respondent sent a demand letter2 in her behalf to Aquino
wherein he asked for the continuance of the monthly child support Aquino used to give, plus no less than P300,000.00 for the surgical
operation their daughter would need for her congenital heart ailment.

At around this point, by complainant's own admission, she and respondent started having a sexual relationship. She narrates that this
twist in the events began after respondent started calling on her shortly after he had sent the demand letter in her behalf. Respondent
allegedly started courting her, giving her financial aid. Soon he had progressed to making sexual advances towards complainant, to the
accompaniment of sweet inducements such as the promise of a job, financial security for her daughter, and his services as counsel for
the prospective claim for support against Aquino. Complainant acknowledges that she succumbed to these advances, assured by
respondent's claim that the lawyer was free to marry her, as his own marriage had already been annulled.

On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced complainant to sign an Affidavit of Disclaimer3 ("Affidavit") categorically stating that
even as Aquino was denoted as the father in the birth certificate4 of her daughter, he was, in truth, not the real father. She was not
allowed to read the contents of the Affidavit, she claims. Respondent supposedly assured her that the document meant nothing,
necessary as it was the only way that Aquino would agree to give her daughter medical and educational support. Respondent
purportedly assured complainant that despite the Affidavit, she could still pursue a case against Aquino in the future because the
Affidavit is not a public document. Because she completely trusted him at this point, she signed the document "without even taking a
glance at it."5

On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised complainant that Aquino gave him P150,000.00 cash and P58,000.00 in two (2)
postdated checks to answer for the medical expenses of her daughter. Instead of turning them over to her, respondent handed her his
personal check6 in the amount of P150,000.00 and promised to give her the balance of P58,000.00 soon thereafter. However, sometime
in April or May 2001, respondent informed her that he could not give her the said amount because he used it for his political campaign
as he was then running for the position of Provincial Board Member of the 2nd District of Pampanga.

Complainant maintains that inspite of their sexual relationship and the fact that respondent kept part of the money intended for her
daughter, he still failed in his promise to give her a job. Furthermore, he did not file the case against Aquino and referred her instead to
Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr. ("Atty. Tolentino").

Sometime in 2002, assisted by Atty. Tolentino, complainant filed a criminal case for child abuse as well as a civil case against Aquino.
While the criminal case was dismissed, the civil case was decided on 30 August 2004 by virtue of a compromise agreement.7 It was only
when said cases were filed that she finally understood the import of the Affidavit.

Complainant avers that respondent failed to protect her interest when he personally prepared the Affidavit and caused her to sign the
same, which obviously worked to her disadvantage. In making false promises that all her problems would be solved, aggravated by his
assurance that his marriage had already been annulled, respondent allegedly deceived her into yielding to his sexual desires. Taking
advantage of the trust and confidence she had in him as her counsel and paramour, her weak emotional state, and dire financial need at
that time, respondent was able to appropriate for himself money that rightfully belonged to her daughter. She argues that respondent's
aforementioned acts constitute a violation of his oath as a lawyer as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code"),
particularly Rule 1.01, Rule 1.02, Rule 16.01, Rule 16.02, and Canon 7.8 Hence, she filed the instant complaint9 dated 2 February 2004.

Expectedly, respondent presents a different version. According to him, complainant needed a lawyer who would file the aforementioned
action for support. Complainant's former high school classmate Reinilda Bansil Morales, who was also his fellow barangay official,
referred her to him. He admits sending a demand letter to her former lover, Aquino, to ask support for the child.10 Subsequently, he and
Aquino communicated through an emissary. He learned that because of Aquino's infidelity, his relationship with his wife was strained so
that in order to settle things the spouses were willing to give complainant a lump sum provided she would execute an affidavit to the
effect that Aquino is not the father of her daughter.

Respondent relayed this proposal to complainant who asked for his advice. He then advised her to study the proposal thoroughly and
with a practical mindset. He also explained to her the pros and cons of pursuing the case. After several days, she requested that he
negotiate for an out-of-court settlement of no less than P500,000.00. When Aquino rejected the amount, negotiations ensued until the
amount was lowered to P200,000.00. Aquino allegedly offered to issue four postdated checks in equal amounts within four months.
Complainant disagreed. Aquino then proposed to rediscount the checks at an interest of 4% a month or a total of P12,000.00. The
resulting amount was P188,000.00.

Complainant finally agreed to this arrangement and voluntarily signed the Affidavit that respondent prepared, the same Affidavit
adverted to by complainant. He denies forcing her to sign the document and strongly refutes her allegation that she did not know what
the Affidavit was for and that she signed it without even reading it, as he gave her the draft before the actual payment was made. He
notes that complainant is a college graduate and a former bank employee who speaks and understands English. He likewise
vehemently denies pocketing P58,000.00 of the settlement proceeds. When complainant allegedly signed the Affidavit, the emissary
handed to her the sum of P150,000.00 in cash and she allegedly told respondent that he could keep the remaining P38,000.00,
not P58,000.00 as alleged in the complaint. Although she did not say why, he assumed that it was for his attorney's fees.

As regards their illicit relationship, respondent admits of his sexual liaison with complainant. He, however, denies luring her with sweet
words and empty promises. According to him, it was more of a "chemistry of (sic) two consensual (sic) adults,"11 complainant then being
in her thirties. He denies that he tricked her into believing that his marriage was already annulled. Strangely, respondent devotes
considerable effort to demonstrate that complainant very well knew he was married when they commenced what was to him, an extra-
marital liaison. He points out that, first, they had met through his colleague, Ms. Morales, a friend and former high school classmate of
hers. Second, they had allegedly first met at his residence where she was actually introduced to his wife. Subsequently, complainant
called his residence several times and actually spoke to his wife, a circumstance so disturbing to respondent that he had to beg
complainant not to call him there. Third, he was the Punong Barangay from 1994 to 2002, and was elected President of the Association
of Barangay Council ("ABC") and as such was an ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Guagua, Pampanga. He ran for the
position of Provincial Board Member in 2001. Thus, he was known in his locality and it was impossible for complainant not to have
known of his marital status especially that she lived no more than three (3) kilometers away from his house and even actively helped him
in his campaign.

Respondent further alleges that while the demand for support from Aquino was being worked out, complainant moved to a rented house
in Olongapo City because a suitor had promised her a job in the Subic Naval Base. But months passed and the promised job never
came so that she had to return to Lubao, Pampanga. As the money she received from Aquino was about to be exhausted, she allegedly
started to pester respondent for financial assistance and urged him to file the Petition for Support against Aquino. While respondent
acceded to her pleas, he also advised her "to look for the right man"12 and to stop depending on him for financial assistance. He also
informed her that he could not assist her in filing the case, as he was the one who prepared and notarized the Affidavit. He, however,
referred her to Atty. Tolentino.

In August 2002, respondent finally ended his relationship with complainant, but still he agreed to give her monthly financial assistance
of P6,000.00 for six (6) months. Since then, they have ceased to meet and have communicated only through an emissary or by
cellphone. In 2003, complainant begged him to continue the assistance until June when her alleged fiancé from the United States would
have arrived. Respondent agreed. In July 2003, she again asked for financial assistance for the last time, which he turned down. Since
then he had stopped communicating to her.

Sometime in January 2004, complainant allegedly went to see a friend of respondent. She told him that she was in need of P5,000.00
for a sari-sari store she was putting up and she wanted him to relay the message to respondent. According to this friend, complainant
showed him a prepared complaint against respondent that she would file with the Supreme Court should the latter not accede to her
request. Sensing that he was being blackmailed, respondent ignored her demand. True enough, he alleges, she filed the instant
complaint.

On 21 July 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") for investigation, report and
recommendation.13 After the parties submitted their respective position papers and supporting documents, the Investigating
Commissioner rendered his Report and Recommendation14 dated 2 September 2005. After presenting the parties' conflicting factual
versions, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to that of complainant and concluded that respondent clearly violated the
Code, reporting in this wise, to wit:
 Respondent, through the above mentioned acts, clearly showed that he is wanting in good moral character, putting in doubt his
professional reputation as a member of the BAR and renders him unfit and unworthy of the privileges which the law confers to
him. From a lawyer, are (sic) expected those qualities of truth-speaking, high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty
and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which throughout the passage of time have been compendiously
described as MORAL CHARACTER.

Respondent, unfortunately took advantage and (sic) every opportunity to entice complainant to his lascivious hungerness (sic).
On several occasions[,] respondent kept on calling complainant and dropped by her house and gave P2,000.00 as aid while
waiting allegedly for the reply of (sic) their demand letter for support. It signals the numerous visits and regular calls all because
of [l]ewd design. He took advantage of her seeming financial woes and emotional dependency.

xxxx

Without doubt, a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the impositions (sic) of the appropriate
penalty, including suspension and disbarment. x x x15

It was then recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months and that he be ordered to return to
complainant the amount of P58,000.00 within two months. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said Report and
Recommendation in a Resolution16 dated 17 December 2005, finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and "considering Respondent's obviously taking advantage of the lawyer-client relationship and the financial
and emotional problem of his client and attempting to mislead the Commission,"17 respondent was meted out the penalty of suspension
for one (1) year with a stern warning that a repetition of similar acts will merit severe sanctions. He was likewise ordered to
return P58,000.00 to complainant.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory Questioning18 ("Motion") dated 9 March 2006
with the IBP and a Motion to Reopen/Remand Case for Clarificatory Questioning dated 22 March 2006 with the Supreme Court. He
reiterates his own version of the facts, giving a more detailed account of the events that transpired between him and complainant.
Altogether, he portrays complainant as a shrewd and manipulative woman who depends on men for financial support and who would
stop at nothing to get what she wants. Arguing that the IBP based its Resolution solely on complainant's bare allegations that she failed
to prove by clear and convincing evidence, he posits the case should be re-opened for clarificatory questioning in order to determine
who between them is telling the truth.

In a Resolution19 dated 27 April 2006, the IBP denied the Motion on the ground that it has no more jurisdiction over the case as the
matter had already been endorsed to the Supreme Court.

While we find respondent liable, we adjudicate the matter differently from what the IBP has recommended.

On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and
which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree"20 in order
to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.

One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. Said requirement persists as
a continuing condition for the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such
privilege.21 As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral
character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community.22 The Court has held that to justify
suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral.23 A grossly immoral act is one that is so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.24 It is a willful,
flagrant, or shameless act that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.25

While it is has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to
warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior,26 it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity.27 Even if not all
forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral
as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our
laws.28

By his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code which states that a lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The next question to consider is whether this act is aggravated by his
alleged deceitful conduct in luring complainant who was then in low spirits and in dire financial need in order to satisfy his carnal desires.
While the IBP concluded the question in the affirmative, we find otherwise.

Complainant's allegations that she succumbed to respondent's sexual advances due to his promises of financial security and because of
her need for legal assistance in filing a case against her former lover, are insufficient to conclude that complainant deceived her into
having sexual relations with her. Surely, an educated woman like herself who was of sufficient age and discretion, being at that time in
her thirties, would not be easily fooled into sexual congress by promises of a job and of free legal assistance, especially when there is
no showing that she is suffering from any mental or physical disability as to justify such recklessness and/or helplessness on her
part.29Respondent's numerous visits and regular calls to complainant do not necessarily prove that he took advantage of her. At best, it
proves that he courted her despite being a married man, precisely the fact on which the finding of immorality is rooted. Moreover, the
circumstance that he gave her P2,000.00 as aid does not induce belief that he fueled her financial dependence as she never denied
pleading with, if not badgering, him for financial support.

Neither does complainant's allegation that respondent lied to her about his marital status inspire belief. We find credence in respondent's
assertion that it was impossible for her not to have known of his subsisting marriage. She herself admitted that they were introduced by
her friend and former classmate, Ms. Morales who was a fellow barangay official of respondent. She admitted that she knew his
residence phone number and that she had called him there. She also knew that respondent is an active barangay official who even ran
as Provincial Board Member in 2001. Curiously, she never refuted respondent's allegations that she had met and talked to his wife on
several occasions, that she lived near his residence, that she helped him in his campaign, or that she knew a lot of his friends, so as not
to have known of his marital status. Considering that she previously had an affair with Aquino, who was also a married man, it would be
unnatural for her to have just plunged into a sexual relationship with respondent whom she had known for only a short time without
verifying his background, if it were true that she preferred "to change [her] life for the better,"30 as alleged in her complaint. We believe
that her aforementioned allegations of deceit were not established by clear preponderant evidence required in disbarment cases.31 We
are left with the most logical conclusion that she freely and wittingly entered into an illicit and immoral relationship with respondent sans
any misrepresentation or deceit on his part.

Next, complainant charged respondent of taking advantage of his legal skills and moral control over her to force her to sign the clearly
disadvantageous Affidavit without letting her read it and without explaining to her its repercussions. While acting as her counsel, she
alleged that he likewise acted as counsel for Aquino.

We find complainant's assertions dubious. She was clearly in need of financial support from Aquino especially that her daughter was
suffering from a heart ailment. We cannot fathom how she could abandon all cares to respondent who she had met for only a couple of
months and thereby risk the welfare of her child by signing without even reading a document she knew was related to the support case
she intended to file. The Affidavit consists of four short sentences contained in a single page. It is unlikely she was not able to read it
before she signed it.

Likewise obscure is her assertion that respondent did not fully explain to her the contents of the Affidavit and the consequences of
signing it. She alleged that respondent even urged her "to use her head as Arnulfo Aquino will not give the money for Alexandra's
medical and educational support if she will not sign the said Affidavit of Disclaimer."32 If her own allegation is to be believed, it shows
that she was aware of the on-going negotiation with Aquino for the settlement of her claim for which the latter demanded the execution
of the Affidavit. It also goes to show that she was pondering on whether to sign the same. Furthermore, she does not deny being a
college graduate or that she knows and understands English. The Affidavit is written in short and simple sentences that are
understandable even to a layman. The inevitable conclusion is that she signed the Affidavit voluntarily and without any coercion
whatsoever on the part of respondent.

The question remains as to whether his act of preparing and notarizing the Affidavit, a document disadvantageous to his client, is a
violation of the Code. We rule in the negative.

It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in entering into a settlement with Aquino after explaining all available options to her.
The law encourages the amicable settlement not only of pending cases but also of disputes which might otherwise be filed in
court.33 Moreover, there is no showing that he knew for sure that Aquino is the father of complainant's daughter as paternity remains to
be proven. As complainant voluntarily and intelligently agreed to a settlement with Aquino, she cannot later blame her counsel when she
experiences a change of heart. Besides, the record is bereft of evidence as to whether respondent also acted as Aquino's counsel in the
settlement of the case. Again, we only have complainant's bare allegations that cannot be considered evidence. 34 Suspicion, no matter
how strong, is not enough. In the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the respondent has regularly
performed his duty in accordance with his oath.35

Complainant further charged respondent of misappropriating part of the money given by Aquino to her daughter. Instead of turning over
the whole amount, he allegedly issued to her his personal check in the amount of P150,000.00 and pocketed the remaining P58,000.00
in violation of his fiduciary obligation to her as her counsel.

The IBP did not make any categorical finding on this matter but simply ordered respondent to return the amount of P58,000.00 to
complainant. We feel a discussion is in order.

We note that there is no clear evidence as to how much Aquino actually gave in settlement of complainant's claim for support. The
parties are in agreement that complainant received the amount of P150,000.00. However, complainant insists that she should have
received more as there were two postdated checks amounting to P58,000.00 that respondent never turned over to her. Respondent
essentially agrees that the amount is in fact more than P150,000.00 – but only P38,000.00 more – and complainant said he could have it
and he assumed it was for his attorney's fees.

We scrutinized the records and found not a single evidence to prove that there existed two postdated checks issued by Aquino in the
amount of P58,000.00. On the other hand, respondent admits that there is actually an amount of P38,000.00 but presented no evidence
of an agreement for attorney's fees to justify his presumption that he can keep the same. Curiously, there is on record a photocopy of a
check issued by respondent in favor of complainant for P150,000.00. It was only in his Motion for Reconsideration where respondent
belatedly proffers an explanation. He avers that he cannot recall what the check was for but he supposes that complainant requested for
it as she did not want to travel all the way to Olongapo City with a huge sum of money.
We find the circumstances rather suspicious but evidence is wanting to sustain a finding in favor of either party in this respect. We
cannot and should not rule on mere conjectures. The IBP relied only on the written assertions of the parties, apparently finding no need
to subject the veracity of the assertions through the question and answer modality. With the inconclusive state of the evidence, a more
in-depth investigation is called for to ascertain in whose favor the substantial evidence level tilts. Hence, we are constrained to remand
the case to the IBP for further reception of evidence solely on this aspect.

We also are unable to grant complainant's prayer for respondent to be made liable for the cost of her child's DNA test absent proof that
he misappropriated funds exclusively earmarked for the purpose.

Neither shall we entertain complainant's claim for moral damages and attorney's fees. Suffice it to state that an administrative case
against a lawyer is sui generis, one that is distinct from a civil or a criminal action.36 It is an investigation by the Court into the fitness of a
lawyer to remain in the legal profession and be allowed the privileges as such. Its primary objective is to protect the Court and the public
from the misconduct of its officers with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men and
women in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.37 As such, it involves no private interest and affords no redress for private
grievance.38 The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the lawyer's alleged misconduct is in no sense a
party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.39

Respondent's misconduct is of considerable gravity. There is a string of cases where the Court meted out the extreme penalty of
disbarment on the ground of gross immorality where the respondent contracted a bigamous marriage,40 abandoned his family to cohabit
with his paramour,41 cohabited with a married woman,42 lured an innocent woman into marriage,43 or was found to be a
womanizer.44 The instant case can be easily differentiated from the foregoing cases. We, therefore, heed the stern injunction on
decreeing disbarment where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired.45 In Zaguirre v.
Castillo,46 respondent was found to have sired a child with another woman who knew he was married. He therein sought understanding
from the Court pointing out the polygamous nature of men and that the illicit relationship was a product of mutual lust and desire.
Appalled at his reprehensible and amoral attitude, the Court suspended him indefinitely. However, in Fr. Sinnott v. Judge Barte,47 where
respondent judge consorted with a woman not his wife, but there was no conclusive evidence that he sired a child with her, he was
fined P10,000.00 for his conduct unbecoming a magistrate despite his retirement during the pendency of the case.

We note that from the very beginning of this case, herein respondent had expressed remorse over his indiscretion and had in fact ended
the brief illicit relationship years ago. We take these as signs that his is not a character of such severe depravity and thus should be
taken as mitigating circumstances in his favor.48 Considering further that this is his first offense, we believe that a fine of P15,000.00
would suffice. This, of course, is without prejudice to the outcome of the aspect of this case involving the alleged misappropriation of
funds of the client.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal GUILTY of immorality and impose on him a FINE
of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

The charge of misappropriation of funds of the client is REMANDED to the IBP for further investigation, report and recommendation
within ninety (90) days from receipt of this Decision.

Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney and as a member of the Bar, and furnished
the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Adm. Case No. 7332 June 18, 2013

EDUARDO A. ABELLA, Complainant,

vs.
RICARDO G. BARRIOS, JR., Respondent.

Far the Court's resolution is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by Eduardo A. Abella (complainant) against Ricardo G.
Barrios, Jr. (respondent) based on the latter's violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Rule 6.Q2, Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code).

The Facts

On January 21, 1999, complainant filed an illegal dismissal case against Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (PT&T) before
the Cebu City Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), docketed as RAB-VII-01-0128-
99. Finding merit in the complaint, Labor Arbiter (LA) Ernesto F. Carreon, through a Decision dated May 13, 1999,2 ordered PT&T to pay
complainant ₱113,100.00 as separation pay and ₱73,608.00 as backwages. Dissatisfied, PT&T appealed the LA’s Decision to the
NLRC. In a Decision dated September 12, 2001,3 the NLRC set aside LA Carreon’s ruling and instead ordered PT&T to reinstate
complainant to his former position and pay him backwages, as well as 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay, including moral
damages and attorney’s fees. On reconsideration, it modified the amounts of the aforesaid monetary awards but still maintained that
complainant was illegally dismissed.4 Consequently, PT&T filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA).

In a Decision dated September 18, 2003 (CA Decision),5 the CA affirmed the NLRC’s ruling with modification, ordering PT&T to pay
complainant separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. Complainant moved for partial reconsideration, claiming that all his years of service
were not taken into account in the computation of his separation pay and backwages. The CA granted the motion and thus, remanded
the case to the LA for the same purpose.6 On July 19, 2004, the CA Decision became final and executory.7

Complainant alleged that he filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution before the Cebu City RAB on October 25, 2004. At this
point, the case had already been assigned to the new LA, herein respondent. After the lapse of five (5) months, complainant’s motion
remained unacted, prompting him to file a Second Motion for Execution on March 3, 2005. Eight (8) months thereafter, still, there was no
action on complainant’s motion. Thus, on November 4, 2005, complainant proceeded to respondent’s office to personally follow-up the
matter. In the process, complainant and respondent exchanged notes on how much the former’s monetary awards should be; however,
their computations differed. To complainant’s surprise, respondent told him that the matter could be "easily fixed" and thereafter, asked
"how much is mine?" Despite his shock, complainant offered the amount of ₱20,000.00, but respondent replied: "make it ₱30,000.00."
By force of circumstance, complainant acceded on the condition that respondent would have to wait until he had already collected from
PT&T. Before complainant could leave, respondent asked him for some cash, compelling him to give the latter ₱1,500.00.8

On November 7, 2005, respondent issued a writ of execution,9 directing the sheriff to proceed to the premises of PT&T and collect the
amount of ₱1,470,082.60, inclusive of execution and deposit fees. PT&T moved to quash10the said writ which was, however, denied
through an Order dated November 22, 2005.11 Unfazed, PT&T filed a Supplemental Motion to Quash dated December 2, 2005,12 the
contents of which were virtually identical to the one respondent earlier denied. During the hearing of the said supplemental motion on
December 9, 2005, respondent rendered an Order13 in open court, recalling the first writ of execution he issued on November 7, 2005.
He confirmed the December 9, 2005 Order through a Certification dated December 14, 200514 and eventually, issued a new writ of
execution15 wherein complainant’s monetary awards were reduced from ₱1,470,082.60 to ₱114,585.00, inclusive of execution and
deposit fees.

Aggrieved, complainant filed on December 16, 2005 a Petition for Injunction before the NLRC. In a Resolution dated March 14,
2006,16 the NLRC annulled respondent’s December 9, 2005 Order, stating that respondent had no authority to modify the CA Decision
which was already final and executory.17

Aside from instituting a criminal case before the Office of the Ombudsman,18 complainant filed the instant disbarment complaint19 before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), averring that respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility for (a) soliciting
money from complainant in exchange for a favorable resolution; and (b) issuing a wrong decision to give benefit and advantage to
PT&T.

In his Comment,20 respondent denied the abovementioned accusations, maintaining that he merely implemented the CA Decision which
did not provide for the payment of backwages. He also claimed that he never demanded a single centavo from complainant as it was in
fact the latter who offered him the amount of ₱50,000.00.

The Recommendation and Action of the IBP

In the Report and Recommendation dated May 30, 2008,21 Investigating Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco (Commissioner Limpingco)
found that respondent tried to twist the meaning of the CA Decision out of all logical, reasonable and grammatical context in order to
favor PT&T.22 He further observed that the confluence of events in this case shows that respondent deliberately left complainant’s efforts
to execute the CA Decision unacted upon until the latter agreed to give him a portion of the monetary award thereof. Notwithstanding
their agreement, immoral and illegal as it was, respondent later went as far as turning the proceedings into some bidding war which
eventually resulted into a resolution in favor of PT&T. In this regard, respondent was found to be guilty of gross immorality and therefore,
Commissioner Limpingco recommended that he be disbarred.23

On July 17, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-345 (IBP Resolution),24 adopting and approving
Commissioner Limpingco’s recommendation, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for Respondent’s violation of the
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Code of Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees, Atty. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. is hereby DISBARRED.25

Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of gross immorality for his violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Rule
6.02, Canon 6 of the Code.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court concurs with the findings and recommendation of Commissioner Limpingco as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.

The pertinent provisions of the Code provide:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxxx

Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s cause.

CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL
TASKS.

xxxx

Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the
latter to interfere with his public duties.

The above-cited rules, which are contained under Chapter 1 of the Code, delineate the lawyer’s responsibility to society: Rule 1.01
engraves the overriding prohibition against lawyers from engaging in any unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct; Rule 1.03
proscribes lawyers from encouraging any suit or proceeding or delaying any man’s cause for any corrupt motive or interest; meanwhile,
Rule 6.02 is particularly directed to lawyers in government service, enjoining them from using one’s public position to: (1) promote
private interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interests to interfere with public duties. 26 It is well to note that a lawyer
who holds a government office may be disciplined as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his
oath as a lawyer.27

In this light, a lawyer’s compliance with and observance of the above-mentioned rules should be taken into consideration in determining
his moral fitness to continue in the practice of law.

To note, "the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to
the Bar and to retain membership in the legal profession."28 This proceeds from the lawyer’s duty to observe the highest degree of
morality in order to safeguard the Bar’s integrity.29 Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer, be it in the lawyer’s public
or private activities, which tends to show deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant
suspension or disbarment.30

In this case, records show that respondent was merely tasked to recompute the monetary awards due to the complainant who sought to
execute the CA Decision which had already been final and executory. When complainant moved for execution – twice at that –
respondent slept on the same for more than a year. It was only when complainant paid respondent a personal visit on November 4,
2005 that the latter speedily issued a writ of execution three (3) days after, or on November 7, 2005. Based on these incidents, the Court
observes that the sudden dispatch in respondent’s action soon after the aforesaid visit casts serious doubt on the legitimacy of his
denial, i.e., that he did not extort money from the complainant.

The incredulity of respondent’s claims is further bolstered by his complete turnaround on the quashal of the November 7, 2005 writ of
execution.

To elucidate, records disclose that respondent denied PT&T’s initial motion to quash through an Order dated November 22, 2005 but
later reversed such order in open court on the basis of PT&T’s supplemental motion to quash which was a mere rehash of the first
motion that was earlier denied. As a result, respondent recalled his earlier orders and issued a new writ of execution, reducing
complainant’s monetary awards from ₱1,470,082.60 to ₱114,585.00, inclusive of execution and deposit fees.

To justify the same, respondent contends that he was merely implementing the CA Decision which did not provide for the payment of
backwages. A plain and cursory reading, however, of the said decision belies the truthfulness of the foregoing assertion. On point, the
dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated
September 12, 2001 and October 8, 2002 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION, ordering petitioner PT&T to pay private respondent
Eduardo A. Abella separation pay (as computed by the Labor Arbiter) in lieu of reinstatement.31

Noticeably, the CA affirmed with modification the NLRC’s rulings dated September 12, 2001 and October 8, 2002 which both explicitly
awarded backwages and other unpaid monetary benefits to complainant.32 The only modification was with respect to the order of
reinstatement as pronounced in both NLRC’s rulings which was changed by the CA to separation pay in view of the strained relations
between the parties as well as the supervening removal of complainant’s previous position.33 In other words, the portion of the NLRC’s
rulings which awarded backwages and other monetary benefits subsisted and the modification pertained only to the CA’s award of
separation pay in lieu of the NLRC’s previous order of reinstatement. This conclusion, palpable as it is, can be easily deduced from the
records.

Lamentably, respondent tried to distort the findings of the CA by quoting portions of its decision, propounding that the CA’s award of
separation pay denied complainant’s entitlement to any backwages and other consequential benefits altogether. In his Verified Motion
for Reconsideration of the IBP Resolution,34 respondent stated:

From the above quoted final conclusions, the Court is very clear and categorical in directing PT&T to pay complainant his separation pay
ONLY in lieu of reinstatement. Clearly, the Court did not direct the PT&T to pay him his backwages, and other consequential benefits
that were directed by the NLRC because he could no longer be reinstated to his previous position on the ground of strained relationship
and his previous position had already gone, and no equivalent position that the PT&T could offer. x x x.

Fundamental in the realm of labor law is the rule that backwages are separate and distinct from separation pay in lieu of reinstatement
and are awarded conjunctively to an employee who has been illegally dismissed.35 There is nothing in the records that could confound
the finding that complainant was illegally dismissed as LA Carreon, the NLRC, and the CA were all unanimous in decreeing the same.
Being a labor arbiter, it is hardly believable that respondent could overlook the fact that complainant was entitled to backwages in view
of the standing pronouncement of illegal dismissal.1âwphi1 In this regard, respondent’s defense deserves scant consideration.

Therefore, absent any cogent basis to rule otherwise, the Court gives credence and upholds Commissioner Limpingco’s and the IBP
Board of Governor’s pronouncement of respondent’s gross immorality. Likewise, the Court observes that his infractions constitute gross
misconduct.

Jurisprudence illumines that immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to
the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community.36 It treads the line of grossness when it is so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency.37 On the other hand, gross misconduct constitutes "improper or
wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in
character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment."38

In this relation, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct or gross
misconduct, he may be suspended or disbarred:

SEC. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar may be removed or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, as respondent’s violations clearly constitute gross immoral conduct and gross misconduct, his disbarment should come as a
matter of course.1âwphi1 However, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that he had already been disbarred in a previous
administrative case, entitled Sps. Rafols, Jr. v. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr.,39 which therefore precludes the Court fromduplicitously decreeing
the same. In view of the foregoing, the Court deems it proper to, instead, impose a fine in the amount of ₱40,000.0040 in order to
penalize respondent’s transgressions as discussed herein and to equally deter the commission of the same or similar acts in the future.

As a final word, the Court staunchly reiterates the principle that the practice of law is a privilege41 accorded only to those who continue to
meet its exacting qualifications. Verily, for all the prestige and opportunity which the profession brings lies the greater responsibility to
uphold its integrity and honor. Towards this purpose, it is quintessential that its members continuously and unwaveringly exhibit,
preserve and protect moral uprightness in their activities, both in their legal practice as well as in their personal lives. Truth be told, the
Bar holds no place for the deceitful, immoral and corrupt.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of gross immoral conduct and gross misconduct in violation
of Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is ordered to pay a
FINE of ₱40,000.00.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6107 January 31, 2005

BEL-AIR TRANSIT SERVICE CORPORATION (DOLLAR RENT-A-CAR), Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ESTEBAN Y. MENDOZA, Respondent.

In a verified Complaint1 dated June 11, 2003, Bel-Air Transit Service Corporation (Dollar Rent-A-Car) charged Atty. Esteban Y. Mendoza
with grossly immoral and unethical conduct, praying for his disbarment and that his name be stricken-off from the Roll of Attorneys.

The complainant narrated that, on September 19, 2001, the respondent rented a car from it, a Toyota Camry with Plate No. WMK 232,
for the amount of ₱5,549.00. Under the terms of the Rental Agreement No. 97206,2 which the respondent personally signed, the latter
was to be fetched at his residence at No. 483 Northwestern Street, East Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. The respondent rented another
Toyota Camry from the complainant on September 28, 2001, this time with Plate No. WRT 557, and was, likewise, fetched at his
residence in accordance with the Rental Agreement No. 97420.3 This second contract was also personally signed by the respondent.
The statements of account4 were, thereafter, sent to the respondent at his office and business address at Martinez & Mendoza Law
Office, Cityland Show Tower, Mandaluyong City. Despite repeated demands for payment, the respondent refused to pay his account,
which constrained the complainant to send a formal and final demand for payment through counsel.5 This formal demand was, likewise,
ignored by the respondent, further compelling the complainant to resort to filing a complaint6 for recovery of money on March 12, 2003
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 65, docketed as Civil Case No. 81392.

According to the complainant, the respondent’s refusal to pay for the complainant’s car rental services constitutes deceit and grossly
immoral and unethical conduct, which violates the Canons of Professional Ethics and Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code on Human
Relations. The complainant further alleged that this is a sufficient ground for the respondent’s disbarment, considering that the
respondent even ignored the complainant’s repeated demands for payment.7

In his Comment, the respondent denied the allegations against him. He averred that it was the law firm of Martinez & Mendoza which
engaged the services of the complainant, and that all the trips undertaken were for an out-of-town engagement in Lucena City. To
support his claim, the respondent incorporated a letter8 addressed to the Chief Operations Manager of the complainant requesting for
the latter’s services.1a\^/phi1.net

The respondent alleged that the driver assigned to him by the complainant during the trip from Lucena City on September 19, 2001 did
not exercise extraordinary diligence. He averred that they almost figured in an accident, and when he inquired as to why the said driver
was not cautious with his driving, the latter replied that he had just been on another out-of-town trip driving for another client and only
had three hours of sleep the night before. The respondent decided not to report the incident to the complainant, thinking that it was
going to be the first and last incident. However, during the trip of September 28, 2001, the respondent again almost figured in an
accident, prompting the respondent to contact the complainant to complain as to why the latter was providing drivers to their law firm
who had not had enough sleep. No one from the complainant’s staff could provide him with a decent answer, merely "Pasensiya
na." The respondent then demanded a meeting with the complainant’s president in order to resolve the matter, but despite repeated
requests, the latter refused to meet with him. The respondent further averred, thus:

14. It is not only inaccurate but also unfair for the complainant to baselessly accuse the respondent or M&M of refusing to pay
their claims. As shown above, M&M immediately paid all of complainant’s billings for August 2001. It was only the billings for
September 2001 that remained unpaid because M&M and respondent first wanted to meet with the President of the
complainant to resolve their complaint. M&M and respondent do not have a history of not honoring their obligations. As officers
of the court, it is cognizant that [they] should conduct [themselves] properly so as not to do injustice to anyone, including the
complainant.

14.1. Respondent almost met an accident because the complainant provided him with drivers that did not have enough rest and
sleep before they drove for him. It is the respondent who is the aggrieved party here and not the complainant. Thus, it is very
unfortunate that it is the respondent who is slapped with a disbarment case. M&M did not even file a complaint with the
Department of Trade and Industry for violation of the Consumers Act of the Philippines because it wanted to resolve its
complaint amicably.

14.2 Respondent respectfully manifests that, only to buy peace, the questioned billings of the complainant which [were] made
the subject of a complaint they filed against him had already been fully satisfied.

A copy of Official Receipt No. 52095 dated 4 September 2003 in the name of "Martinez & Mendoza Law Office" is attached hereto and
made an integral part hereof as Annex "H."9

The respondent concluded that the complainant did not have a cause of action for disbarment against him, as he was merely exercising
his right to contest its questionable billings.

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation and was assigned to
IBP Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay. During the hearing of March 1, 2004, the counsel for the complainant manifested that although the
respondent had already paid his account, such payment was made only after the court had already decided the case against the
respondent and after the filing of a motion for execution,10which the respondent admitted. Thus, the parties agreed during the hearing
that as far as the monetary obligation was concerned, the said judgment had already been satisfied by the respondent. The parties were
then required to file their respective position papers, which were basically reiterations of their previous allegations.
In his Report and Recommendation dated April 19, 2004, Commissioner Dulay made the following findings:

Respondent offers two reasons for non-payment: First, that the obligation was incurred not by him but by his law office Martinez &
Mendoza. Second, that the respondent almost met an accident on the two occasions he used the services of the complainant and
therefore "he should not be penalized for exercising its right to contest complainants’ questionable billings."

...

As to the first reason, we reiterate that as decided by the Metropolitan Trial Court, respondent was liable for the obligation to the
complainant. Indeed, respondent cannot avoid the obligation and pass it on to his law firm and just make a complete denial considering
that he is a name partner in the firm and law partnership of Martinez and Mendoza. The Metropolitan Trial Court, therefore, ruled that
respondent was, nevertheless, liable for the obligation of his law partnership. Independent of the said decision, we find that the
documents attached as Annexes "A" and "B" to the complaint appear to have been signed by the respondent and even assuming that it
was the law firm that was liable, there is nothing on record to show that the law firm questioned the billings of the complainant or that the
respondent referred the same to the law firm for proper disposition.

As to the second reason, respondent admits that there was no written demand made for the complainant to account and answer for the
"near accidents" alleged by respondent, which "near accidents" as we understand are his reasons for not immediately paying. We find
the absence of a written demand from the respondent quite odd especially in the case of a lawyer who is seeking to exercise his "right to
contest complainant’s questionable billings" or otherwise hold complainant accountable for the said "near accidents." It would perhaps
be understandable if the omission was made by a layman; but for a lawyer not to put his demand in writing, it would be uncharacteristic
to say the least. Neither was a demand made by the law firm of Martinez and Mendoza as a basis for non-payment. We are, therefore,
inclined to look at this reason, (near accident) as a mere afterthought and would not justify respondent in not paying for two (2) years
what appears to be a clear and simple obligation to complainant. As pointed out by complainant, it was only after a writ of execution was
issued when payment was made.

The reason offered by respondent for not paying complainant particularly the alleged "near accident" is, therefore, not justifiable. The
said reason appears to us trite and contrived. Lack of funds to pay an obligation may perhaps be a good reason but to use as a reason
the said "near accident" on the bare assertion of respondent alone and not supported by any corroborating evidence may not be readily
acceptable. We are, on the other hand, also not convinced that respondent was deceitful or grossly negligent by his actions. There is no
evidence to show that respondent was acting with deceit in not paying for the obligation incurred. However, we find respondent lacking
in probity and forthrightness in dealing with the complaint and quite simply negligent in the handling of this particular obligation to
complainant. Taken in the light of the circumstances presented, we believe respondent should be admonished and warned to avoid such
similar conduct in the future.

It was, thus, recommended that the respondent be admonished and advised to be more forthright in the handling of his monetary
obligations in the future. On July 30, 2004, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline then issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-378, adopting
and approving the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, considering that there was no evidence to show that the
respondent had acted with deceit in not paying for the questioned obligation.1awphi1.nét

It is settled that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which
shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court.11 A lawyer must, at all times, uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.l^vvphi1.net Indeed, a lawyer brings honor to
the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end, a member of the
legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the
fidelity, honesty and integrity in the legal profession.12 Thus, lawyers must promptly pay their financial obligations.13 Their conduct must
always reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.14

In this case, the respondent refused to pay for the services of the complainant, constraining the latter to file charges in order to collect
what was due to it under the contracts, in which the respondent himself was the signatory. Moreover, as pointed out by IBP
Commissioner Dulay, the respondent’s claim that he almost twice figured in accidents due to the negligent drivers employed by the
complainant and that he intended to question the company’s billings (which he also posited was a valid excuse for non-payment),
appears to have been concocted as a mere afterthought.

Verily, the respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and should be admonished for his actuations.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Esteban Y. Mendoza is hereby ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in his financial obligations and
his dealings with the public. He is STERNLY WARNED that similar conduct in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be included in the respondent’s files which are with the Office of the Bar Confidant, and circularized to all
courts and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5299 August 19, 2003

ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 157053 August 19, 2003

ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and
Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents.

This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily
Inquirer, which reads: "ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667."1

Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court, called up the published telephone
number and pretended to be an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was
an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided the case will not involve
separation of property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is
payable at the time of filing of the case and the other half after a decision thereon has been rendered.

Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office revealed that similar advertisements were
published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.2

On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public Information
Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in
violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.3

In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts;
that the time has come to change our views about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the public is not
served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale
behind the decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges against him and
that the Court promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public
order as long as it is dignified.4

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.5 On June 29, 2002, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-2002-306,6 finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for one
(1) year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court
on November 11, 2002.7

In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,8 which was denied by the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606
dated October 19, 20029

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, "Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office,
Respondents." This petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Court’s Resolution dated March 4, 2003.

In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or not they were willing to submit the case for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings.10 Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not submitting any
additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its early resolution on the basis of pleadings and records
thereof. 11 Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.

We agree with the IBP’s Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.

Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.

Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.12 It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money,
is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits.13 The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration.14 The duty to public service and to the
administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe
to themselves.15 The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the highest eminence without
making much money;

2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;

3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;

4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods
of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.16

There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits that he caused the publication of the
advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the Court’s indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the fact that
he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules.
Eight months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads
Newspaper.17 Ten months later, he caused the same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell.18 Such
acts of respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Court’s authority.

What adds to the gravity of respondent’s acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled "Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he
wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct
despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be
obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of the case,19 he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been
disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.

Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible
with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the
bar.20 Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as
well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now
acceptable.21 Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief
biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:22

Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer’s name and the names of his professional associates;
addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools
attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal
authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific
societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their
written consent, the names of clients regularly represented.

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper,
magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly
publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit
his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the
public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the profession.

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the
law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple
announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the
convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a
designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics supplied)

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in
the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6622 July 10, 2012

MIGUEL G. VILLATUYA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS, Respondent.

In this Complaint for disbarment filed on 06 December 2004 with the Office or the Bar Confidant, complainant Manuel G. Villatuya
(complainant) charges Atty. Bcde S. 'L1halingcos (resrondent) with unlawful solicitation of cases, violation of the ('ode or Professional
Responsibility for nonpayment of fees to complainant, and gross immorality for marrying two other women while respondent’s first
marriage was subsisting.1

In a Resolution2 dated 26 January 2005, the Second Division of this Court required respondent to file a Comment, which he did on 21
March 2005.3 The Complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation
within sixty (60) days from receipt of the record.4

On 23 June 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP (Commission) issued a Notice5 setting the mandatory conference of the
administrative case on 05 July 2005. During the conference, complainant appeared, accompanied by his counsel and respondent. They
submitted for resolution three issues to be resolved by the Commission as follows:

1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by nonpayment of fees to complainant

2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation, and

3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married thrice.6

The Commission ordered the parties to submit their respective verified Position Papers. Respondent filed his verified Position Paper,7 on
15 July 2005 while complainant submitted his on 01 August 2005.8

Complainant’s Accusations

Complainant averred that on February 2002, he was employed by respondent as a financial consultant to assist the latter on technical
and financial matters in the latter’s numerous petitions for corporate rehabilitation filed with different courts. Complainant claimed that
they had a verbal agreement whereby he would be entitled to ₱ 50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the cases they would
handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients. He alleged that, from February to December 2002, respondent
was able to rake in millions of pesos from the corporate rehabilitation cases they were working on together. Complainant also claimed
that he was entitled to the amount of ₱ 900,000 for the 18 Stay Orders issued by the courts as a result of his work with respondent, and
a total of ₱ 4,539,000 from the fees paid by their clients.9 Complainant appended to his Complaint several annexes supporting the
computation of the fees he believes are due him.

Complainant alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases in violation of Section 27 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Allegedly respondent set up two financial consultancy firms, Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. and Christmel Business
Link, Inc., and used them as fronts to advertise his legal services and solicit cases. Complainant supported his allegations by attaching
to his Position Paper the Articles of Incorporation of Jesi and Jane,10 letter-proposals to clients signed by respondent on various
dates11 and proofs of payment made to the latter by their clients.12

On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of committing two counts of bigamy for having married two
other women while his first marriage was subsisting. He submitted a Certification dated 13 July 2005 issued by the Office of the Civil
Registrar General-National Statistics Office (NSO) certifying that Bede S. Tabalingcos, herein respondent, contracted marriage thrice:
first, on 15 July 1980 with Pilar M. Lozano, which took place in Dasmarinas, Cavite; the second time on 28 September 1987 with Ma.
Rowena Garcia Piñon in the City of Manila; and the third on 07 September 1989 with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso in Ermita, Manila.13

Respondent’s Defense

In his defense, respondent denied the charges against him. He asserted that complainant was not an employee of his law firm –
Tabalingcos and Associates Law Office14 – but of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., where the former is a major
stockholder.15 Respondent alleged that complainant was unprofessional and incompetent in performing his job as a financial consultant,
resulting in the latter’s dismissal of many rehabilitation plans they presented in their court cases.16 Respondent also alleged that there
was no verbal agreement between them regarding the payment of fees and the sharing of professional fees paid by his clients. He
proffered documents showing that the salary of complainant had been paid.17
As to the charge of unlawful solicitation, respondent denied committing any. He contended that his law firm had an agreement with Jesi
and Jane Management, Inc., whereby the firm would handle the legal aspect of the corporate rehabilitation case; and that the latter
would attend to the financial aspect of the case’ such as the preparation of the rehabilitation plans to be presented in court. To support
this contention, respondent attached to his Position Paper a Joint Venture Agreement dated 10 December 2005 entered into by
Tabalingcos and Associates Law Offices and Jesi and Jane Management, Inc.;18 and an Affidavit executed by Leoncio Balena, Vice-
President for Operations of the said company.19

On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit submitted by William Genesis, a dismissed messenger of Jesi and
Jane Management, Inc., as having no probative value, since it had been retracted by the affiant himself.20 Respondent did not
specifically address the allegations regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with two other women.

On 09 January 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage Contracts.21 To the said Motion, he attached the certified
true copies of the Marriage Contracts referred to in the Certification issued by the NSO.22 The appended Marriage Contracts matched
the dates, places and names of the contracting parties indicated in the earlier submitted NSO Certification of the three marriages
entered into by respondent. The first marriage contract submitted was a marriage that took place between respondent and Pilar M.
Lozano in Dasmarinas, Cavite, on 15 July 1980.23 The second marriage contract was between respondent and Ma. Rowena G. Piñon,
and it took place at the Metropolitan Trial Court Compound of Manila on 28 September 1987.24 The third Marriage Contract referred to a
marriage between respondent and Mary Jane E. Paraiso, and it took place on 7 September 1989 in Ermita, Manila. In the second and
third Marriage Contracts, respondent was described as single under the entry for civil status.

On 16 January 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit filed by complainant, claiming that the document was
not marked during the mandatory conference or submitted during the hearing of the case.25 Thus, respondent was supposedly deprived
of the opportunity to controvert those documents.26 He disclosed that criminal cases for bigamy were filed against him by the
complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Respondent further informed the Commission that he had filed a Petition
to Declare Null and Void the Marriage Contract with Rowena Piñon at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Biñan, Laguna, where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. B-3270.27 He also filed another Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage Contract with Pilar Lozano at
the RTC-Calamba, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-3271.28 In both petitions, he claimed that he had recently discovered that
there were Marriage Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing his name and allegedly executed with Rowena Piñon and Pilar Lozano
on different occasions. He prayed for their annulment, because they were purportedly null and void.

On 17 September 2007, in view of its reorganization, the Commission scheduled a clarificatory hearing on 20 November 2007.29 While
complainant manifested to the Commission that he would not attend the hearing,30respondent manifested his willingness to attend and
moved for the suspension of the resolution of the administrative case against the latter. Respondent cited two Petitions he had filed with
the RTC, Laguna, seeking the nullification of the Marriage Contracts he discovered to be bearing his name.31

On 10 November 2007, complainant submitted to the Commission duplicate original copies of two (2) Informations filed with the RTC of
Manila against respondent, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos."32The first criminal case, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 07-257125, was for bigamy for the marriage contracted by respondent with Ma. Rowena Garcia Piñon while his
marriage with Pilar Lozano was still valid.33 The other one, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-257126, charged respondent with having
committed bigamy for contracting marriage with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was still
subsisting.34 Each of the Informations recommended bail in the amount of P24,000 for his provisional liberty as accused in the criminal
cases.35

On 20 November 2007, only respondent attended the clarificatory hearing. In the same proceeding, the Commission denied his Motion
to suspend the proceedings pending the outcome of the petitions for nullification he had filed with the RTC–Laguna. Thus, the
Commission resolved that the administrative case against him be submitted for resolution.36

IBP’s Report and Recommendation

On 27 February 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and

Recommendation addressing the specific charges against respondent.37 The first charge, for dishonesty for the nonpayment of certain
shares in the fees, was dismissed for lack of merit. The Commission ruled that the charge should have been filed with the proper courts
since it was only empowered to determine respondent’s administrative liability. On this matter, complainant failed to prove dishonesty on
the part of respondent.38 On the second charge, the Commission found respondent to have violated the rule on the solicitation of client
for having advertised his legal services and unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended that he be reprimanded for the violation. It failed,
though, to point out exactly the specific provision he violated.39

As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty of gross immorality for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. It found that complainant was able to prove through
documentary evidence that respondent committed bigamy twice by marrying two other women while the latter’s first marriage was
subsisting.40 Due to the gravity of the acts of respondent, the Commission recommended that he be disbarred, and that his name be
stricken off the roll of attorneys.41

On 15 April 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-154, adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.42 On 01 August 2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that
the recommendation to disbar him was premature. He contends that the Commission should have suspended the disbarment
proceedings pending the resolution of the separate cases he had filed for the annulment of the marriage contracts bearing his name as
having entered into those contracts with other women. He further contends that the evidence proffered by complainant to establish that
the latter committed bigamy was not substantial to merit the punishment of disbarment. Thus, respondent moved for the reconsideration
of the resolution to disbar him and likewise moved to archive the administrative proceedings pending the outcome of the Petitions he
separately filed with the RTC of Laguna for the annulment of Marriage Contracts.43

On 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for Reconsideration and affirmed their Resolution dated 15 April 2008
recommending respondent’s disbarment.44

The Court’s Ruling

The Court affirms the recommendations of the IBP.

First Charge:

Dishonesty for nonpayment of share in the fees

While we affirm the IBP’s dismissal of the first charge against respondent, we do not concur with the rationale behind it.

The first charge of complainant against respondent for the nonpayment of the former’s share in the fees, if proven to be true is based on
an agreement that is violative of Rule 9.0245 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the Code to divide or
agree to divide the fees for legal services rendered with a person not licensed to practice law. Based on the allegations, respondent had
agreed to share with complainant the legal fees paid by clients that complainant solicited for the respondent. Complainant, however,
failed to proffer convincing evidence to prove the existence of that agreement.

We ruled in Tan Tek Beng v. David46 that an agreement between a lawyer and a layperson to share the fees collected from clients
secured by the layperson is null and void, and that the lawyer involved may be disciplined for unethical conduct. Considering that
complainant’s allegations in this case had not been proven, the IBP correctly dismissed the charge against respondent on this matter.

Second Charge:

Unlawful solicitation of clients

Complainant charged respondent with unlawfully soliciting clients and advertising legal services through various business entities.
Complainant submitted documentary evidence to prove that Jesi & Jane Management Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc. were
owned and used as fronts by respondent to advertise the latter’s legal services and to solicit clients. In its Report, the IBP established
the truth of these allegations and ruled that respondent had violated the rule on the solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the
specific provision that was breached.

A review of the records reveals that respondent indeed used the business entities mentioned in the report to solicit clients and to
advertise his legal services, purporting to be specialized in corporate rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts of the case, he violated
Rule 2.0347 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit.

A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises, though, when the business is of such
a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency
arises when the business is one that can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional employment for the lawyer; or that can be
used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the
practice of law.48

It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., which purports to be a financial
and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle used by respondent as a means to procure professional employment; specifically for
corporate rehabilitation cases. Annex "C"49 of the Complaint is a letterhead of Jesi & Jane

Management, Inc., which proposed an agreement for the engagement of legal services. The letter clearly states that, should the
prospective client agree to the proposed fees, respondent would render legal services related to the former’s loan obligation with a bank.
This circumvention is considered objectionable and violates the Code, because the letter is signed by respondent as President of Jesi &
Jane Management, Inc., and not as partner or associate of a law firm.

Rule 15.0850 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether the former is acting as a lawyer or in another
capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations related to the practice of law. The reason is that certain ethical considerations
governing the attorney-client relationship may be operative in one and not in the other.51 In this case, it is confusing for the client if it is
not clear whether respondent is offering consultancy or legal services.

Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of this practice by respondent, we affirm the
recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating Rules 2.03 and 15.08 of the Code.
Third Charge:

Bigamy

The third charge that respondent committed bigamy twice is a serious accusation. To substantiate this allegation, complainant submitted
NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts entered into by respondent with three (3) different women. The latter objected to the
introduction of these documents, claiming that they were submitted after the administrative case had been submitted for resolution, thus
giving him no opportunity to controvert them.52 We are not persuaded by his argument.

We have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue
membership in the bar and not the procedural technicalities in filing the case. Thus, we explained in Garrido v. Garrido:53

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure — such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case,
prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant — do not apply in the determination of a lawyer's
qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling. First,
admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves
service to the public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law.
Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern
that the State may inquire into through this Court.

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant.1âwphi1 For the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the
case against the respondent must be established by convincing and satisfactory proof.54 In this case, complainant submitted NSO-
certified true copies to prove that respondent entered into two marriages while the latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. While
respondent denied entering into the second and the third marriages, he resorted to vague assertions tantamount to a negative pregnant.
He did not dispute the authenticity of the NSO documents, but denied that he contracted those two other marriages. He submitted
copies of the two Petitions he had filed separately with the RTC of Laguna – one in Biñan and the other in Calamba – to declare the
second and the third Marriage Contracts null and void.55

We find him guilty of gross immorality under the Code.

We cannot give credence to the defense proffered by respondent. He has not disputed the authenticity or impugned the genuineness of
the NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts presented by complainant to prove the former’s marriages to two other women aside
from his wife. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Contracts bearing the name of respondent are competent and
convincing evidence proving that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the bar. The documents
were certified by the NSO, which is the official repository of civil registry records pertaining to the birth, marriage and death of a person.
Having been issued by a government agency, the NSO certification is accorded much evidentiary weight and carries with it a
presumption of regularity. In this case, respondent has not presented any competent evidence to rebut those documents.

According to the respondent, after the discovery of the second and the third marriages, he filed civil actions to annul the Marriage
Contracts. We perused the attached Petitions for Annulment and found that his allegations therein treated the second and the third
marriage contracts as ordinary agreements, rather than as special contracts contemplated under the then Civil Code provisions on
marriage. He did not invoke any grounds in the Civil Code provisions on marriage, prior to its amendment by the Family Code.
Respondent’s regard for marriage contracts as ordinary agreements indicates either his wanton disregard of the sanctity of marriage or
his gross ignorance of the law on what course of action to take to annul a marriage under the old Civil Code provisions.

What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage twice while his first marriage was still
subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro,56 we held thus:

We have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that
good moral character required of them not only as a condition precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued
membership therein. No distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyer’s professional capacity or
in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at
another. He is expected to be competent, honorable and reliable at all times since he who cannot apply and abide by the laws in his
private affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his professional dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional honesty and honor
are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. The administration of justice, in which the
lawyer plays an important role being an officer of the court, demands a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part so
that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in him.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar. He made a mockery of
marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.57 His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct
and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.58

Thus, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and order that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

WHEREFORE, this Court resolves the following charges against Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos as follows:
 1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal advertisement and solicitation.

3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in bigamy, a grossly immoral conduct.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and
another copy furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the name of Bede S. Tabalingcos from the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.