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Domingo 2004
Domingo 2004
Democratization
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To cite this article: Pilar Domingo (2004) Judicialization of politics or politicization of the judiciary?
Recent trends in Latin America, Democratization, 11:1, 104-126, DOI: 10.1080/13510340412331294152
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PILAR DOMINGO
This article examines the judicialization of politics in Latin America with particular
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Key words: judiciary; judicialization; rule of law; Latin America; Argentina; Mexico
Two decades into the restoration of democracy in most of Latin America, many
unresolved issues still hold the new regimes in a state of fragility and
vulnerability. In the early years of democratization, the prevailing political (and
academic) concerns revolved around how to secure a smooth transition from
authoritarian rule, and how to put in place a framework of competitive electoral
politics which would determine political outcomes and lead to the stabilization
of representative democracies. Questions about how to deal with human rights
abuses of the past varied in intensity, or at least with regard to how far political
elites were willing to address these issues without endangering the transition
process itself. At the same time, the pressing problems created by the
persistence of deep-rooted economic crises, and the growing pressures for the
region to conform to the orthodoxy of market rule, focused the attention of
policy makers on the onerous task of securing economic stability.
economic rights. At the same time, concerns about public security and
growing crime rates signal a widespread perception of the state’s dramatic
incapacity to secure law and order. There is still little sense, then, that the
fragile democracies in much of the region have moved significantly towards
more credible regimes based on rule of law and the advancement of
democratic citizenship.
At the same time, promoting rule of law has become widely accepted
throughout the region as a necessary aspiration for the consolidation of
democracy, and is very much part of the remit of state reform and quest for
‘good governance’. It is within this context that the courts and judicial
systems have acquired an unprecedented centrality in political life in several
countries in the region. It is now common to hear that the polities of the
region are undergoing a process of judicialization of politics. But the other
side of the coin has been an increasing politicization of the judicial branch.
The article addresses issues raised by this apparent judicialization of
politics. The discussion will draw mostly on Mexico and Argentina. While
it makes no claim that these two countries are representative of the entire
region they do illustrate some of the recurrent political and institutional
dilemmas and tensions that have emerged through the re-positioning of
judicial institutions, in the context of democratization, and the parallel
development of a rule of law and rights-based discourse of regime
legitimation. First, judicial reform processes have become a common
feature of wider state reform, in recent years. Second, typically, courts have
come into the public limelight for a range of reasons, notably with regard to
corruption scandals, but also concerning judicial review decisions, and
human rights issues. Third, throughout the region, issues of rule of law,
legal accountability and law and order are high on the political and more
narrowly electoral agendas. Finally, concerns about rights and access to
justice are becoming more widespread among civil society.
However, it is pertinent to stress the differences that separate Latin
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primarily at a discursive level initially. This can have more than a purely
tangential effect on political decisions about rights issues and on the legal
culture more generally. Linked to this is the emergence of international legal
frameworks and treaties about human rights, which although still in their
infancy are no longer purely tokenistic or irrelevant at the national level. On
the commercial side, also, trade agreements generate complex webs of
dispute resolution mechanisms which also promote judicial activism.
Moreover, globalization and the transnationalization of political, social
and economic relations both within states and between states is
transforming the ways in which social, political and economic actors relate
to the law and use legal mechanisms to advance certain interests, protect
certain rights or challenge policy decisions.13 Slaughter in particular
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presents the argument about the need to rethink the legal dimension of the
state both in terms of its relationship with non-state actors – at the national,
international and transnational level – and also in terms of the internal
dynamics of state structures as a result of a changing international
environment.14
Judicialization of Politics
In sum, a myriad of factors converge in complex ways towards what might
be termed a general process of judicialization of politics and society. It
would appear that this is an inevitable outgrowth of the expansion and
development of the modern state organized around and premised upon
democratic principles of rule of law and rights.
Thus, the judicialization of politics is understood as, first, the process by
which there is an increase in the impact of judicial decisions upon political
and social processes. Second, it refers to the process by which political
conflict is increasingly resolved at the level of the courts. Third, at a
discursive level, judicialization of politics reflects the degree to which
regime legitimacy is increasingly constructed upon the public perception of
the state’s capacity and credibility in terms of delivering on rule of law, and
rights protection. Finally, it refers also to the growing trend by different
political actors and groups within society to use law and legal mechanisms
to mobilize around specific policies, social and economic interests and
demands.15
The judicialization of politics suggests that several inter-acting
processes are taking place. Judges are becoming more involved in law
making. Also, they are willing to play the role of political and social
brokers. Political elites are allowing this to happen, and indeed may be
facilitating this through the passage of reforms that broaden the scope of
powers of the courts. Politicians see some advantage in passing on to the
courts the treatment of politically divisive issues (although this is not a risk-
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Social Actors, and Civil Society Mobilization around the Law. In the
immediate years of transition, the issue of how to deal with human rights
violations under military rule pushed the new democracies’ commitment to
enforcing the rule of law and due process onto the political agenda. Overall
there was widespread application of official amnesties, or silently pacted
pardons for the perpetrators of human rights violations, and even, in the case
of Uruguay, a referendum on the issue. What prevailed was the view, as
perceived at the time, that it was better to secure regime stability against the
threat of military destabilization of the uncertain process of democratization.
Nonetheless, the mobilization of human rights movements forced the issues
of rights, justice and rule of law into the public limelight. Nowhere was this
more vibrantly so than in Argentina in 1983. But more particularly, what
distinguished the Argentina case was that the issue was both initially
supported from above by the first democratic government and was well
received by the judges, who proved to be willing protagonists in the trials
against members of the armed forces. Smulovitz speaks of the ‘discovery’ of
the law by civil society resulting in part form the drama of the military trials
in the 1980s.27 On the one hand the law and recourse to the judicial system
came to be perceived as a potentially empowering instrument for civil
society. On the other, the experience of the trials facilitated a process of self-
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The ‘discovery’ of the law by civil society has contributed in part to the
process of judicialization of conflict within society and in state-society
relations beyond the realm of human rights violations. This is evident from
an increase in litigious activity and recourse to the justice system across a
range of activities and types of conflict.31 Smulovitz in part attributes this to
the mediatic discovery of the law which brings into play a different set of
problems for due process and rule of law. Impartial adjudication is
potentially endangered by unrestrained media coverage of cases.32
Societal mobilization around the law has also been the work of advocacy
groups, new social movements and non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) that represent group interests, or that seek to advance the protection
of specific rights. In some cases this has gone hand in hand with the
development of transnational networks of NGOs or associative
organizations that not only use the law to articulate demands upon the state,
but also develop transnational strategies to challenge state compliance with
existing domestic and international law, on the international stage.33
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Judicial processes must now enter into the calculations of the different
political, social and economic actors.
Political liberalization opens up new institutional and legal spaces for
the expression of political and social conflict, as courts and judicial
decisions became politically relevant. But this will inevitably unsettle elite
groups and public officials who will be wary of the move towards greater
judicial scrutiny or legal accountability of their acts, especially where
strongly embedded illiberal attitudes prevail. Compliance with the logic of
separation of powers seems an inevitable corollary of democratization – and
not one that is wholly unwelcomed by governing elites, as it provides the
opportunity to ‘check’ the acts of political opponents. However, pockets of
resistance to rule of law are likely to persist. Moreover the temptations to
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seek to control the judicial branch (for example through court ‘packing’)
may imperil rule of law construction.
Judicial reform has been undertaken with singular enthusiasm
throughout Latin America, but with disappointing results. Reform
objectives have been a mixed bag, with varying degrees of political
commitment and consensus, and different emphases on the range of issues
that have been brought under the umbrella of judicial reform. These include:
measures to increase judicial independence and judicial review powers, in
some cases through the creation of constitutional courts; measures that
address administrative inefficiencies, in many cases through the creation of
judicial councils which have undertaken the bulk of administrative and
budgetary management; problems of access to justice, in part addressed
through the promotion of ADR mechanisms; and reform of the criminal
system and penal codes to improve transparency and speed. This by no
means exhaustive list it indicates the ambitious nature of judicial reform
efforts, and the degree to which rule of law issues are being taken seriously
by governing elites. Moreover, these reforms, however incomplete and
flawed, will have some (long-term) impact on reshaping judicial processes
and their place in democratic rule.
In Mexico the judicial reforms of the 1990s significantly contributed to
a re-accommodation of the judiciary in terms of its position within the
Mexican political system.34 The reforms were very important in propelling
greater judicial activism and a more politically assertive and independent
judiciary. But the changes in the political standing of the courts have also
been a consequence of a changing political environment, where successive
electoral defeats reduced the former political dominance of the PRI. Judicial
decisions since 1994 show a growing – and unprecedented – willingness by
the courts to confront the executive, even on potentially sensitive issues in
political and economic matters.
The Supreme Court is now a relevant political actor that must be taken
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rulings may be becoming more prominent this does not mean that judges are
indeed acting independently and in impartial fulfilment of their role as
adjudicators. For another reason, whether judges act in good faith or not,
public opinion is not always willing to give them the benefit of the doubt.
Unpopular court rulings will be assumed to be politically motivated and
controlled. In addition, early signs of political independence at the top level
of judicial hierarchies may prove to be conjunctural rather than a true
reflection of any systemic change within the judicial branch more generally.
And they may prompt a defensive reaction by incumbent power holders in
the executive branch unwilling to make long-term concessions to judicial
scrutiny and independence. Thus the balance of power between branches is
continually shifting and being tested. The competing political actors in a
transition moment will flex their muscles and experiment with the rules of
constitutional government. There is then, a complex process of interaction
between short-term political calculations and institutional rules, which are
still not fixed, as the constitutional framework is still the object of reform
and transformation. Again, there are significant variations across the region.
Democratization has led to processes of reform which have signified
important gains on the judicial front. Despite the limited success of these
reforms in the region, their incomplete nature and uneven implementation,
we should be careful not to be too dismissive of their potential (if still
unfulfilled) contribution towards rule of law enhancement. At the same time
courts have in some cases become more self-assertive in their relationship
with other branches of power. Judges are now political actors to be reckoned
with. This has further contributed to the notion that politics is indeed being
judicialized. However, the public prominence of judicial processes that has
characterized some of the experiences of democratization in Latin America
tells us little about judicial independence and impartiality in the task of
adjudication. These are contested issues even in consolidated democracies
with long-standing traditions of rule of law. In recent post-transition
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Some Conclusions
The judicialization of politics may indeed be a feature of the modern
democratic state. It appears also to be a phenomenon within the younger
democracies of Latin America. Moreover, with democratization it would
seem that regime legitimacy is increasingly tied to the effective delivery of
the rule of law as a matter of rights protection, and also as a mechanism of
constitutional and judicial check on political power and public office. The
reality, however, is that the judicialization of politics in Latin America is
taking place at a time when the state of rule of law and justice system
presents a far from encouraging picture.
Some judicial reforms have in some cases considerably altered the
political powers and standing of the judiciary in its relationship with the
executive and the legislative. This has further encouraged a process of self-
assertion of the judicial function, as judges moved from a position of
obscurity and marginality to becoming central actors in the resolution of a
range of political and social conflicts. Democratization itself produces
expectations upon the judiciary to begin to fulfil its role of constitutional
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there is little sense of progress. The hope is that over time some of the
judicial reforms that are being legislated, when combined with changing
political attitudes will generate valuable shifts in the legal culture, towards
strengthening the rule of law.
The judicialization of politics is by no means merely a top–down
process. It is also the result of legal mobilization from below. In some
respects the law is being reclaimed or appropriated by ‘civil society’ as a
means to advance certain issues and contest government policy.
It is important to emphasise, though, that it does not follow that a
judicialization of politics means that principles of rule of law and due
process are necessarily being strengthened. A judicialization of politics may
take place despite the fragility of rule of law. Moreover, failure to live up to
the expectations of rule of law that it reflects places yet another burden on
the embattled democracies of the region.
In important respects the international context of the 1980s and 1990s
has served to re-enforce a discourse of rights and rule of law. At the same
time, though, neo-liberalism has perpetuated patterns of exclusion and
marginality that undermine the development of citizenship. Finally, the
developments in international politics following the terrorism events of
‘9/11’, and growing concerns with public security issues and crime, are now
prompting a far from liberal international agenda of law and order that may
seriously undermine the prospects for a rights-based development in
democratic polities, old as well as new.
NOTES
1. For instance, the reactivation of old constitutions, as in Argentina, will leave intact the
general framework of the judicial branch; by contrast, the constituent process in Brazil in
1988 established a range of new judicial rules and institutions.
2. Herbert Jacob, Erhard Blankkenburg, Herbert Kritzer, Doris Marie Provine, Joseph Sanders,
Courts, Law and Politics in Comparative Perspective (New Haven, CT: Yale University
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124 D E M O C R AT I Z AT I O N
Press, 1996), Mauro Cappelletti, The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1989).
3. Civil law judges are increasingly taking on a more ‘interpretative’ role, and begin to cite their
own decisions as precedent: in common law countries, growing segments of the law are
codified, the application of which is less open to interpretation and discretion. See Herbert
Jacob, ‘Introduction’, in Jacob et al., pp.1–17.
4. See for instance Cappelletti; Jacob; Charles Epp, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists
and Supreme Courts in Comparative Perspective (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press,
1998); Catalina Smulovitz, ‘The Discovery of Law: Political Consequences in the Argentine
Case’, in Yves Dezalay and Garth Bryant (eds), Global Prescriptions: The Production,
Exportation, and Importation of a New Legal Orthodoxy (Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan
University Press, 2002), pp.249–75; Neal Tate and Torbjörn Vallinder (eds), The Global
Expansion of Judicial Power, (New York: New York University Press, 1995); T. Vallinder,
‘The Judicialization of Politics – A World-Wide Phenomenon: Introduction’, International
Political Science Review, Vol.15, No.2 (1994), pp.91–100; J.L Waltman and K.M.Holland,
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The Political Role of Law in Modern Democracies (London: Macmillan Press, 1988); M.
Volcansek (ed.), Judicial Politics and Policy-Making in Western Europe (London: Frank
Cass Publishers, 1992). Martin Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative Political Analysis,
(Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1981) represents a pioneer work in the study of the
political role of judges.
5. J.L. Waltman, ‘The Courts and Political Change in Post-Industrial Society’, in Waltman and
Holland, pp.216–17.
6. Juan Mendez, Guillermo O’Donnell and Paulo Sergio Pinheiro (eds), The Unrule of Law and
Democracy in Latin America (Notre Dame, IL: The University of Notre Dame Press, 1998).
7. Cappelletti.
8. P. Pederzoli and C. Guarnier, ‘The Judicialization of Politics, Italian Style,’ Journal of
Modern Italian Studies, Vol.2, No.3 (1997), pp.321–36.
9. For instance, European Union human rights obligations.
10. See Smulovitz ‘The Discovery of Law’.
11. See Cappelletti.
12. Epp.
13. See Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Transnational Advocacy Networks and the Social Construction of
Legal Rules’, in Dezalay and Bryant, pp.37–64; Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink,
Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1998).
14. Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Breaking Out: the Proliferation of Actors in the International
System’, in Dezalay and Bryant, pp.12–36.
15. See Vallinder, Volcansek; Epp.
16. See Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual Problems:
A Latin American View with Glances at Some Post-Communist Countries’, in World
Development, Vol.21, No.8 (1993), pp.1355–70, and Laurence Whitehead, ‘State
Organization in Latin America since 1930’, in Leslie Bethell (ed.), Latin America: Economy
and Society since 1930 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp.381–411.
17. See Jeremy Adelman and Miguel Angel Centeno, ‘Between Liberalism and Neo-liberalism:
Law’s Dilemma in Latin America’, in Dezalay and Bryant, pp.139–61.
18. To the extent that rule of law was part of the liberal discourse of nineteenth-century oligarchic
constitutionalism it was conceived of in a restricted manner, with limited relevance for the
majority of the population other than as a measure of social control. At the same time, though,
it is important to note the existence of long-standing juridical traditions and centralized legal
systems in a formal sense, however problematic their insertion in society.
19. The amparo suit as the main form of judicial review, the principle of non-intervention in
political and electoral matters by the courts, weak separation of powers were all firmly in
place by the end of the nineteenth century.
20. State corporatism and the social pact that underpinned the relative pax priista of the regime
at least until the 1960s or 1970s (if not until the 1980s) had been part of the revolutionary
discourse of legitimation.
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of rights and law and community based notions of justice. See Rachel Sieder, ‘Recognizing
Indigenous Law and the Politics of State Formation in Mesoamerica’, in Rachel Sieder (ed.),
Multiculturalism in Latin America: Indigenous Rights, Diversity and Democracy (London:
Palgrave, 2002), pp.184–207.
27. See Smulovitz, ‘The Discovery of Law’ for an insightful discussion of the judicialization of
politics in Argentina.
28. See Carlos Acuña and Catalina Smulovitz, , ‘How to Guard the Guardians: Feasibility, Risks
and Benefits of Judicial Punishment of Past Rights Violations in New Democracies (Some
Lessons from the Argentine Experience)’, in James McAdams (ed.), Transitional Justice and
the Rule of Law in New Democracies (Notre Dame, IL: University of Notre Dame, 1995),
Smulovitz, ‘The Discovery Of Law’; Peruzzotti; Prillamen.
29. Until recently, there was little sense that human rights abuses which have been committed in
Mexico either by state agencies, public officials, or on their behalf, would be held up to any
kind of systematic truth-telling process or judicial scrutiny, as part of the transition process.
It seemed that the peculiarities of authoritarianism a la mexicana meant that the state could
hide behind the shield of constitutional rule and the discourse of rule of law. Moreover,
human rights abuses and political violence were never in the hands of a centralized or easily
identifiable machine of repression. At the same time, the undercurrent of political violence
has rarely been absent from Mexican politics, at times reaching quite alarming proportions.
30. Christopher Welna, ‘Reform of Justice and the Proliferation of Human Rights Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Mexico (1977–1994)’, CIDE Working Paper
(Mexico DF: CIDE, 1997).
31. Catalina Smulovitz, ‘Judicialización y Accountability Social en Argentina’, unpublished
manuscript, 2001.
32. Smulovitz, ‘The Discovery of Law’, p.259.
33. See Sikkink; Keck and Sikkink; Slaughter.
34. The constitutional reform of 1994 reform increased judicial independence from the executive
(although President Zedillo packed the court in 1995) through a new appointments system;
it increased the review powers of the court which can now act in some instances as a
constitutional court; greater financial autonomy was granted; a judicial council was created.
The creation of the Comision Nacional de Derechos Humanos in 1992 (with all its
limitations) provided a new institutional space for human rights denunciation. Finally, the
1996 constitutional reform significantly extended the review powers of the judicial branch to
electoral matters, overturning a long-standing tradition of non-intervention by the courts in
electoral conflicts. See for a discussion of the reform in Mexico, Pilar Domingo, ‘Judicial
Independence: The Politics of the Supreme Court in Mexico’, Journal of Latin American
Studies, Vol.32, No.3 (2000), pp.705–35; Todd Eisenstad, ‘Off the Streets and into the
Courtrooms: Resolving Post-electoral Conflicts in Mexico’, in Andreas Schedler, Larry
Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner (eds), The Self Restraining State: Power and Accountability
in New Democracies (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), pp.83–104; Hector Fix Fierro,
‘Judicial Reform and the Supreme Court of Mexico: The Trajectory of Three Years’,
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126 D E M O C R AT I Z AT I O N
US–Mexico Law Journal, Vol.6 (1998), pp.1–21; Jorge Vargas, ‘The Rebirth of the Supreme
Court of Mexico: An Appraisal of President Zedillo’s Judicial Reform of 1995’, The
American University Journal of International Law and Policy, Vol. 11 (1996), pp.295–341.
35. The reforms consisted essentially of the following. In 1990, the number of supreme court
members was increased from five to nine. Following the resignation of two members of the
supreme court, this measure effectively allowed President Menem to pack the court,
appointing six out of the nine members. The Olivos Pact and the 1994 constitutional reforms
led to the establishment of the judicial council and to changes in the appointments methods
for supreme court judges. Oral proceedings were introduced in criminal justice mechanisms.
See Catalina Smulovitz, ‘Constitución y Poder Judicial en la Nueva Democracia Argentina.
La Experiencia de las Instituciones’, in Acuña et al.
36. Precisely because policy decisions are in important ways decided at the level of the courts,
all the more reason for Menem to want to control the courts (as applied also to his successor,
President Duhalde). This has led to the charge that courts were being politicized, following
a number of dubious judicial rulings on the constitutionality of governmental decrees and
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economic measures under Menem. Although constitutional norms have not been subverted
in an outright fashion - an improvement on the military regimes of the past – the Menem
administration went to a great deal of effort to secure the loyalty and support of the judicial
branch. See Roberto Gargarella, ‘Después del Diluvio. El Perfeccionismo Conservador en la
Nueva Jurisprudencia de la Corte Suprema (1990–1997)’, Desarrollo Económico: Revista de
Ciencias Sociales, Vol.38 (1998), pp.439–56; Gretchen Helmke, Ruling Against the Rulers:
Insecure Tenure and Judicial Independence in Argentina, 1975–1995, University of Chicago
working paper, 1999; Horacio Verbitsky, Hacer la Corte: La Creación de un Poder sin
control ni justicia (Buenos Aires, 1993); E. Zaffaroni, ‘Independencia Judicial en la
Argentina en el momento actual,’ unpublished paper given at the conference on Judicial
reform in Argentina, at Institute of Latin American Studies, London, January 1998.
37. See Keck and Sikkink; Sikkink.
38. See Slaughter, p.19.
39. See Pilar Domingo and Rachel Sieder (eds), Rule of Law in Latin America: The International
Promotion of Judicial Reform (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 2001).
Address for correspondence: Pilar Domoingo, Instituto de Iberoamérica y Portugal, C/San Pablo
26, Torre de Abrantes, 37001 Salamance, Spain.