International Interactions

Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations

ISSN: 0305-0629 (Print) 1547-7444 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/gini20

Useful ignorance: The benefits of uncertainty

during power shifts

Kyle Haynes

To cite this article: Kyle Haynes (2018): Useful ignorance: The benefits of uncertainty during
power shifts, International Interactions, DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1554572

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2019.1554572

Published online: 26 Dec 2018.

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INTERNATIONAL INTERACTIONS
https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2019.1554572

Useful ignorance: The benefits of uncertainty during

power shifts
Kyle Haynes
Purdue University

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
This paper develops a formal model exploring how declining Game theory; power shift;
reassurance; signaling;
states allocate scarce military resources across multiple commit- uncertainty
ments under uncertainty. The model reveals that under certain
conditions, states might actually benefit from their own uncer-
tainty. In the model, a declining state’s uncertainty creates incen-
tives for a revisionist rising power to misrepresent its intentions.
But importantly, this misrepresentation requires the rising state
to act cooperatively, implementing policies that immediately
benefit the declining state. The model reveals how declining
states can exploit these incentives in order to maximize the short-
term benefits of their counterpart’s cooperation. Under some
conditions, the benefits of this deceptive cooperation can out-
weigh the long-term costs of being deceived. These dynamics do
not operate when the declining state is certain of the rising state’s
type. I illustrate this logic through a case study of Great Britain’s
pre-WWI naval withdrawal from East Asia.

In international politics, information is often extremely valuable. Conversely,

uncertainty is generally seen as highly pernicious, as it can prevent states
from recognizing the constraints they face and types of actors with which
they interact. This can undermine the pursuit of core interests, and in some
cases, result in hostility spirals and even war (Fearon 1995; Jervis 1978; Kydd
2000, 2005; Mearsheimer 2001; Yarhi-Milo 2013). The conventional wisdom
holds that if policymakers were better able to infer other actors’ intentions,
they could more effectively pursue their own interests, while avoiding tragic
hostility spirals and bargaining failures.
This paper argues to the contrary that under some conditions, uncertainty
can actually prove beneficial. To be sure, uncertainty often generates very real
problems. Power shifts can exacerbate these problems by producing incen-
tives for rising states to misrepresent their intentions, thereby deepening
informational asymmetries. But this paper shows that uncertainty can also
present states with potentially valuable opportunities. Below, I flesh out
precisely how uncertainty might prove beneficial, and the conditions under
which these dynamics operate.

CONTACT Kyle Haynes kylehaynes@purdue.edu

© 2018 Taylor & Francis
2 K. HAYNES

The paper focuses on situations of interstate reassurance during power shifts,

where a declining state seeks to determine whether a rising state holds compa-
tible preferences. Successful reassurance is difficult, as incompatible rising states
might feign compatibility in order to avoid containment or other preventive
actions while still weak (Copeland 2000; Kydd 2005; Yoder forthcoming, 2019).
This paper’s central intuition turns on the fact that in a reassurance context,
when hostile or incompatible rising states misrepresent themselves as friendly
and compatible, they do so by behaving cooperatively. This cooperation is
immediately beneficial to the declining state, despite the deceptive intent
behind it. I show that even when we consider the long-term consequences,
a declining state can actually do better when rising adversaries temporarily
conceal their hostile intentions rather than immediately revealing them. Under
certain conditions, the short-term gains of inducing incompatible states to
cooperate can outweigh the long-term risks of accommodating them. And
importantly, incompatible rising states will only behave cooperatively in order
to conceal their intentions if the declining state is uncertain of them in the first
place.1
Although this logic cuts against the conventional scholarly wisdom on
uncertainty and power shifts, I argue that the dynamics described here help
shed light on important elements of recent US foreign policy. Throughout
the post-Cold War period, scholars and policymakers debated whether to use
America’s “unipolar moment” to establish more cooperative relationships
with Russia and China, its most likely future great power adversaries, or to
establish containment regimes designed to limit their ability to compete with
the United States. This was particularly evident in the “engagement vs.
containment” debate regarding China (Christensen 2006; Friedberg 1993;
Johnston 2003; Shambaugh 1994; Shirk 2007). These debates, in turn, hinged
on American assessments of China’s and Russia’s long-term intentions.
Many observers suspected that, despite their efforts to integrate into the
global economic order, Russian and Chinese leaders ultimately held prefer-
ences that were inimical to many fundamental tenets of the US-led interna-
tional order (Friedberg 2011; Mearsheimer 2010). If Russian or Chinese
leaders were irretrievably hostile to the United States and its preferred
international order, then implementing a robust containment regime would
have been the United States’ best option. Alternatively, if Russian and
Chinese leaders held more compatible preferences, and were amenable to
operating within the status-quo western order, a strategy of cooperation and
accommodation would have been preferable (Christensen 2011). Uncertainty

I define “preferences” as the basic goals that states seek to achieve. “Intentions” refer to the actions that states
1

may take in the future in order to maximize their utility, given both their preferences and external constraints.
Preferences are thus entirely private information, but may be revealed through a state’s actions. Intentions,
because they depend in part on external constraints that are common knowledge, are not purely private
information.
 INTERNATIONAL INTERACTIONS 3

regarding Russian and Chinese preferences meant that these debates never
really concluded, and American policy largely muddled through.
China’s recent “assertive shift” and Russia’s renewed aggression in its near
abroad indicate that their relatively cooperative policies in the early post-
Cold War period may have been, at least in part, concealing an underlying
hostility toward important elements of the US-led global order (Mead 2014).
An emerging narrative suggests that these deeply hostile states exploited
American uncertainty, duping the United States into an inappropriately
cooperative policy (Campbell and Ratner 2018). I argue below that this
narrative, while consistent with how IR scholars typically think of uncertainty
and reassurance, is at best incomplete.
In reality, the United States reaped enormous short-term benefits from
Chinese and Russian misrepresentation. If China under Hu Jintao, or Russia
during Vladimir Putin’s first term were concealing more deeply revisionist
intentions, their quiescence afforded the United States enormous strategic
flexibility and allowed Washington to more forcefully pursue its perceived
interests elsewhere. Most obviously, Chinese and Russian restraint allowed
the United States to divert military resources from East Asia and Europe in
order to deal with more immediate threats following the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks. Had Beijing or Moscow directly pursued a more revisionist
policy, which their leadership’s true preferences would likely have dictated,
the United States would have had to divert substantial resources from the
War on Terror in order to deter or defend against their aggression.2
This paper presents a novel theoretical model that highlights this pre-
viously unrecognized dynamic. The model illustrates one particular manifes-
tation of a broader theoretical claim – that under some conditions,
uncertainty can prove beneficial, as states reap substantial benefits from the
deceptive cooperation of hostile or incompatible actors. When declining
states with multiple competing commitments face severe resource con-
straints, other states’ cooperation can be disproportionately beneficial, as it
allows the declining state to concentrate its limited resources in pursuit of its
most important objectives. Even if the rising state’s cooperation is misrepre-
senting its true preferences, the short-term benefits the declining state derives
from this cooperation can offset the long-term costs. The declining state’s
uncertainty plays a central causal role here, as it is necessary for incompatible
rising states to behave cooperatively in an attempt to conceal their intentions.
In brief, I argue that any time states face trade-offs regarding resource
allocations across multiple commitments, uncertainty may prove subjectively
beneficial as it induces otherwise hostile states to cooperate in ways that ease

2
To be sure, the United States largely squandered the strategic flexibility that resulted from Chinese and Russian
restraint, as the War on Terror eventually devolved into a massive drain on American power. Nevertheless,
Chinese and Russian deceptive cooperation allowed the United States to focus a disproportionate share of
American resources on what the Bush administration perceived to be more pressing security concerns.
4 K. HAYNES

its resource shortages. The paper demonstrates these theoretical dynamics at

work during Great Britain’s pre-WWI naval withdrawal from East Asia, and
concludes by deriving implications for the ongoing rise of China to super-
power status.

Uncertainty in International Politics

International relations scholarship generally argues that uncertainty regard-
ing others’ preferences undermines a state’s ability to effectively achieve its
goals. As David Edelstein (2002: 4) summarizes,
Confident beliefs about future intentions are desirable because they allow for better
policymaking. A government that can distinguish states with malign intentions from
states with benign intentions can focus its military resources on those countries that
have the capability and desire to harm it and can engage in mutually beneficial
cooperation with those states with benign intentions.… Uncertainty about inten-
tions, on the other hand, increases the likelihood of misdirected policies.

In effect, more information allows for better policymaking. Uncertainty, on

the other hand, undermines a state’s ability to effectively pursue its interests.
Uncertainty can also cause various collectively suboptimal outcomes, such as
security dilemma spirals and bargaining failures that lead to costly conflict
(Fearon 1995; Glaser 1997; Jervis 1978; Kydd 1997).
The harmful effects of uncertainty, and states’ incentives to exacerbate this
uncertainty by misrepresenting their intentions, are magnified by power
shifts. Two mutually reinforcing dynamics produce this effect. First, decline
creates future vulnerability which leaves states fearful of rising competitors,
especially those with opaque intentions (Copeland 2000; Edelstein 2017; Levy
1987; Powell 1996; Yoder 2019). Under static conditions, a state can tolerate
uncertainty and adopt a “wait-and-see” strategy because temporary inaction
does not increase its vulnerability. During power shifts, however, increasing
vulnerability can induce a declining state to take preventive action even
against states that exhibit cooperative behavior (Debs and Monteiro 2014;
Powell 1999; Wolford, Reiter, and Carrubba 2011). Second, power shifts
increase a declining state’s level of uncertainty by inducing incompatible
rising states to misrepresent their true preferences (Copeland 2000; Rosato
2015). A revisionist rising state faces strong incentives to behave coopera-
tively in order to avoid preventive action by the declining state. Doing so
allows it to make a stronger bid for revision in the future. Essentially, shifting
power increases a declining state’s level of uncertainty while decreasing the
amount of uncertainty it is willing to tolerate.
There are important exceptions, however, to the conventional argument that
uncertainty is invariably harmful. The game theoretic literature in economics
has long recognized that, under specific circumstances, actors may suffer from
 INTERNATIONAL INTERACTIONS 5

acquiring additional information (Bassan, Gossner, Scarsini, and Zamir 2003;

Kamien, Tauman, and Zamir 1990). Nevertheless, applications of this finding
in the context of international politics remain limited.
Arena and Wolford (2012) show that the pacifying effect of information
depends on a state’s prior beliefs. Previously pessimistic states who acquire
new information about an opponent’s relative weakness may make stronger
demands, thus increasing the probability of war. Wolford et al. (2011) like-
wise show that revealing certain types of information can prompt states to
issue stronger demands, thus prolonging war. Debs and Weiss (2016) show
that public signals can reveal information to domestic audiences in ways that
create incentives for “grandstanding” and increase the likelihood of war.
These works importantly qualify the prevailing wisdom that uncertainty is
invariably harmful. But their claims are fundamentally distinct from those
I develop below. Wolford, Reiter, and Carrubba and Arena and Wolford
convincingly demonstrate that information revelation can increase the prob-
ability or duration of conflict. They do not show that the acquisition of new
information is ex ante harmful to the actor that acquires it. Indeed, in their
models, new information induces conflict by revealing that incurring
a heightened risk of war is actually preferable to the bad bargain they
would have accepted under uncertainty. These models show that more
information can prompt states to engage in riskier or more aggressive
behavior which sometimes results in a war that leaves them worse off. But
ex ante, the risks and potential losses of these gambles are offset by the
prospective gains. Conversely, I show that greater certainty can be subjec-
tively harmful to a state, even in expectation.
Furthermore, Arena and Wolford’s result is based at least in part on the
assumption that acquiring information requires costly intelligence gathering
rather than simply observing another actor’s behavior. Thus, the costs of
greater information actually consist largely of opportunity costs from forgone
expenditures elsewhere. Finally, Debs and Weiss’s result derives primarily
from public actions revealing information to domestic audiences, who in turn
impose additional constraints on the leadership. Conversely, I show below
how states might actually suffer from acquiring more information about the
other state in the signaling interaction.
In short, despite important recent research qualifying this claim, uncertainty
about another actor’s preferences is widely seen as harmful to states in inter-
national politics. I argue below that under some conditions, uncertainty can
actually produce significant benefits that leave uncertain states better off than
fully informed ones, even in expectation. Most fundamentally, I claim that the
existing literature on reassurance overlooks a simple but important fact – that
uncertainty is necessary for incompatible states to misrepresent their future
intentions, and this misrepresentation necessarily entails implementing coop-
erative policies that yield immediate benefits for the deceived state.
6 K. HAYNES

Formal Model
This section presents a formal model examining an overextended declining
state deciding whether to retrench from a peripheral region while it remains
uncertain of the true preferences held by that region’s emerging power. The
game models two actors, a declining state D and rising state R, operating in
the context of an exogenous power shift.3 D maintains military commitments
upholding order in both a “core” region mc and a “peripheral” region mp . For
D, the core region is more important, so mc > mp . The rising state is located
in mp , and its utility depends on this region alone.4 In both stages of the
game, D decides whether to redeploy its resources to mc , or maintain its
presence in mp and directly uphold its preferred regional order there.5
I assume one-sided incomplete information such that D is unaware of
whether R’s preferences for the peripheral region’s order are compatible or
incompatible with its own. For simplicity, a compatible Rc holds preferences
for the peripheral order that are identical to D’s. The incompatible Ri is
assumed to be wholly incompatible such that D receives a peripheral utility of
zero when the regional order matches Ri ’s its ideal point.
Nature moves first, choosing Rc with probability p1 and Ri with probability
ð1  p1 Þ. The value of p1 is common knowledge, but only R knows its actual
type. At its first information set, D decides whether to withdraw from the
periphery w1 or remain engaged ,w1 . In Round 1, D is strong enough to
completely impose its preferred order in mc if all its resources are committed
there. But by retaining a presence in mp , D’s capacity in the core is dimin-
ished by λ, which represents the resources diverted to mp . If D retrenches, R
then decides to either maintain the peripheral status quo by playing q or
revise regional order to its ideal point, playing ,q.6
In Round 2, D decides again whether to support a military presence in mp ,
but it has declined such that its capacity to impose order is now π < 1.7 If D
retrenched in Round 1, it observes R’s action and decides to either stay out of
the periphery (s) or come back and reestablish its preferred order (c).
Choosing c ensures D its favored peripheral order, but reduces its capacity
in the core by λ and incurs an exogenous re-engagement cost χ. D observes
R’s first round action and updates its beliefs according to Bayes’ rule. p1
refers to D’s prior beliefs, and p2 its posterior beliefs after observing R’s

3
This assumption accurately captures many real-world power shifts, including the ongoing rise of China. See
Chadefaux (2011) and Debs et al. (2014) on the distinct dynamics of endogenous power shifts.
4
Consider, for example, that even contemporary China, although it has important interests outside of East Asia, is
several decades away from being able to challenge American dominance in its core regions of Europe or Latin
America.
5
The game models two “goods,” rather than a single bargaining space, in order to directly capture the competing
demands on D’s resources.
6
I thus make several simplifying assumptions in order to derive interpretable results. Subsequent formal work can
refine these conclusions by relaxing some of the model’s more restrictive assumptions.
7
Note that π represents D’s second round power, so higher values of π represent lower levels of decline.
 INTERNATIONAL INTERACTIONS 7

Figure 1. Game tree.

action. If D did not retrench in Round 1, the game moves immediately to

D’s second round decision where it chooses again whether to retrench w2 or
not retrench ,w2 . Both types of R are assumed to impose their preferred
order in Round 2 if D is withdrawn.8 The game tree is presented in Figure 1.
In order to capture the long-term implications of power shifts, I assume the
players discount their first round payoffs by the discount parameter δ.
The rising state’s payoffs are extremely simple. In the first round, R
receives a payoff of one if the peripheral order matches its ideal point and
a payoff of zero otherwise. In Round 1, applying the discount parameter, R
receives δ if the peripheral order matches its ideal point, and zero otherwise.
I thus assume that R only values the peripheral region, does not pay any costs
for upholding regional order, and its capacity to uphold order remains
constant. These assumptions do not meaningfully affect the key results.9
Furthermore, I assume that regional order in the periphery is indivisible
such that D and Ri cannot agree to a mutually beneficial settlement to share
the spoils of regional order. This assumption is of course unrealistic, but
relaxing it would strengthen the main findings described later.

8
This assumption is inconsequential, and allowing R to act in the final round produces identical results. Because D
cannot retaliate, R simply behaves honestly in Round 2.
9
Importantly, the assumption that R pays no costs for upholding order is inconsequential, and is equivalent to
assuming R pays equal costs to uphold both types of order. Indeed, assuming that revision is costly would only
expand the parameter space supporting the theoretically important pooling equilibrium.
8 K. HAYNES

The declining state’s payoffs are a function of both mc and mp . In Round 1, if D

chooses not to retrench, it receives the full benefit of the peripheral order, mp . Its
power in the core, however, is diminished by λ and its core utility is ð1  λÞmc .10
If D retrenches, λ ¼ 0 and it receives its maximum core utility, mc . But D’s
peripheral payoff then depends on R. If R maintains the peripheral status quo,
D gets its full peripheral utility mp . If Ri revises, D’s first round peripheral utility is
zero. The discount parameter δ is applied to D’s entire first round payoff.
D’s second round payoff depends heavily on π, its second round power. If D
deploys forces to mp in Round 2, its peripheral payoff is πmp , but its core payoff
is severely diminished, ðπ  λÞmc . If it opts not to deploy forces to the periphery,
D’s core utility increases to πmc , but its peripheral utility then depends again on
R. Rc gives D its full peripheral utility mp , while Ri gives D a second round
peripheral utility of zero. If D moves back into mp after withdrawing in Round 1,
it must pay the reengagement cost χ. Table 1 summarizes the model’s notation.

Equilibria with Complete Information

In order to later isolate the effect of uncertainty, I first solve the game with
complete information, using subgame perfection as the solution concept.
When certain that R is compatible (p1 ¼ 1), D retrenches in Round 1, Rc
maintains the status quo, and D remains withdrawn in Round 2. This holds
across the entire parameter space. Because maintaining peripheral order
diminishes D’s capacity in the core, it immediately and permanently
retrenches when certain that R is compatible. Rc then maintains the sta-
tus quo.
The results are only marginally more complicated when D is certain that R
is incompatible. When p1 ¼ 0, D will remain engaged in the periphery across
both rounds any time π  λm mp . When D’s decline is more severe such that
c

λmc
π< mp , its decision hinges on the relative weight of the core and periphery.
When λmc  mp , D will withdraw in Round 1 and remain withdrawn after Ri
revises. When λmc  mp , D will remain engaged in the periphery in Round 1,
but then withdraw in Round 2.
With complete information, Ri will always revise the peripheral order
if D retrenches in Round 1. Even if D’s decline is shallow enough that it
can return to the periphery in Round 2, Ri cannot be deterred from
revising. D already knows with certainty that Ri will revise in Round 2,
and will come back into the periphery if it is powerful enough to do so
irrespective of Ri ’s first round action. Knowing that its own actions have

10
The model thus assumes some exogenous factor that erodes regional order in the core when D fails to retrench.
This could imply either a third-party challenger or simply a deterioration in D’s ability to provide public goods.
 INTERNATIONAL INTERACTIONS 9

Table 1. Notation.
Term Constraint Meaning
D – Declining state
R – Rising state
p 2 ð0; 1Þ Probability that R is compatible
mc 2 ð12 ; 1Þ; ð¼ 1  mp Þ Importance of core region
mp 2 ð0; 12Þ; ð¼ 1  mc Þ Importance of peripheral region
π 2 ð0; 1Þ D’s power in Round 2
δ 2 ð0; 1Þ Round 1 discount parameter
λ 2 ð0; 1Þ D’s costs for maintaining peripheral order
χ 2 ð0; 1Þ D’s costs for returning to the periphery
w – D’s retrenchment strategy
,w – D’s non-retrenchment strategy
q – R maintains peripheral status quo
,q – R revises peripheral order
c – D returns to periphery in Round 2
s – D stays out of the periphery in Round 2

no effect on D’s second round strategy, Ri simply pursues its true,

revisionist preferences.

Equilibria with Incomplete Information

I now examine the game when D is uncertain of R’s type, using Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium as the solution concept. This section focuses on the
theoretically relevant pooling equilibria, which I label the “misrepresen-
tation equilibria.” I describe the remaining equilibria and offer proofs in
the supplemental appendix.
Examining D’s second round information sets reveals the range of para-
meters under which D’s second round action is fully conditional on R’s first
round behavior. Define
 
λmc þ χ λmc þ χ
^g;
π 2 fπ ; p1 þ (1)
mp mp

When π 2 fπ ^g, if R upholds the peripheral status quo following D’s with-
drawal, D will remain withdrawn in Round 2. But if R revises the peripheral
order, D will move back into the periphery and reestablish its preferred
order. When π < π ^, D’s decline is too severe and it cannot credibly threaten
to move back into the periphery even if Ri revises and reveals its type.
Conversely, when π  π ^, D is too powerful to credibly condition its second
round strategy on R’s action. Under these conditions, D’s decline is so
minimal (and its prior estimate of R’s compatibility so low) that it will
come back into the periphery even if the rising state maintains the peripheral
status quo. Therefore, under certain circumstances, D’s relative strength
actually prevents it from conditioning its strategy on R’s first round behavior.
10 K. HAYNES

The π ^ range consists of two pooling equilibria wherein D withdraws in

Round 1, both Ri and Rc maintain the peripheral status quo by playing q, and
D remains withdrawn in Round 2.11 Because π 2 fπ ^g, D’s second round
decision is conditional on R’s first round action. As such, Ri knows that
revising the peripheral order will prompt D to move back into mp , while
maintaining the status quo would induce D to remain withdrawn. Ri could
then revise mp to its ideal point in Round 2. And because the first round
payoffs are discounted, Ri will pool with Rc by playing q, thus sacrificing its
first round payoff. D then withdraws in Round 1, knowing for certain that it
will be able to reap the benefits of retrenchment while also seeing the
peripheral status quo maintained. Because Ri and Rc pool, D is unable to
update its posterior beliefs. In Round 2, D then remains withdrawn and R
subsequently imposes its preferred order.
When π > fπ ^g, D will not retrench in either round. Conversely, when π < fπ ^g,
Ri cannot be induced to play q because D is will have declined too far to threaten
to move back into the periphery. Under these conditions, D’s strategy is largely
a function of p1 . At the highest values of p1 , D will withdraw in Round 1 and Ri
and Rc will behave honestly. D will then stay out of the periphery regardless of R’s
action. At moderate values of p1 , D will remain engaged in the periphery in Round

Figure 2. Misrepresentation equilibria as a function of π and p1 .

11
The difference between these two equilibria exists only off path.
 INTERNATIONAL INTERACTIONS 11

1 and then withdraw in Round 2. At the lowest values of p1 , D will again not
retrench in either round. Figure 2 maps these equilibria as a function of p1 and π.

Discussion
The conventional wisdom holds that D’s dilemma hinges on its uncertainty
regarding R’s type. With complete information, D could accurately assess the
costs and benefits of accommodation versus containment. But by increasing
the likelihood that it will inappropriately accommodate Ri or contain Rc , D’s
uncertainty is inescapably harmful. The model presented above challenges
this wisdom. This section lays out the basic logic underlying the model’s key
finding that under a wide range of conditions, declining states can actually
earn a higher payoff when they are uncertain of a rising state’s type.
Given parameters supporting the misrepresentation equilibria, D’s second
round strategy is fully conditional on R’s first round action. As a result,
incompatible rising states are induced to behave cooperatively in order to
maximize their long-term utility. While Ri ’s pooling behavior prevents D
from updating its beliefs, it also presents D an opportunity. Fundamentally,
Ri ’s misrepresentation entails supporting D’s preferred peripheral order,
which is immediately beneficial to D. Knowing that even Ri will initially
maintain the peripheral status quo, D retrenches in Round 1 even if it
strongly believes R is incompatible. Indeed, as Figure 2 shows, this behavior
can occur in equilibrium even as p1 ! 0. In equilibrium, D exploits Ri ’s
incentives to misrepresent and seizes the opportunity to redeploy its forces to
mc . D is guaranteed to receive its full peripheral utility in Round 1, but runs
the risk that R is incompatible and will revise the periphery in Round 2. The
short-term benefits of having R maintain the peripheral order simply make
this risk worthwhile.
This highlights the crucial difference between the complete and incom-
plete information games. When D is fully informed of Ri ’s incompatibility, it
cannot retrench in Round 1 without Ri overturning the peripheral order.
Because D already knows R’s preferences, Ri has no incentive to conceal its
type and will thus immediately revise the regional order. Ri knows that
D’s second round action will be driven entirely by its capabilities, irrespective
of its first round action. Conversely, when D is uncertain of Ri ’s incompat-
ibility, Ri wants to sustain that uncertainty so it can revise the peripheral
order in Round 2. In order to deceive D, however, Ri must maintain the
peripheral status quo in Round 1. In the short term, this benefits D by freeing
it to redeploy its resources to the core region.
Critically, under conditions that support the misrepresentation equili-
brium and facing an incompatible rising state, D’s payoff under incomplete
information exceeds its payoff under complete information so long as it does
not discount its first round payoff beyond a certain threshold. Holding other
12 K. HAYNES

parameters constant, the short-term benefit of having Ri maintain the per-

ipheral status quo outweighs the long-term costs of its second round revision.
D’s payoff under uncertainty will exceed its payoff with complete informa-
^ range when:
tion across the entire π
πmp
δ 1 (2)
λmc

For lower values of δ, D’s uncertainty payoff will still exceed its certainty
payoff across some range of π ^.12 The size of this range is decreasing as D
further discounts its first round payoff.
Figures 3 and 4 show D’s payoffs with both complete and incomplete
information, when dealing with an incompatible (Figure 3) and compatible
(Figure 4) rising state. Figure 3 shows that when facing an incompatible
rising state, information is inconsequential at both very low and very high
levels of decline. At low levels of decline, the incentives for retrenchment are
so minor that D remains engaged in the periphery in both periods irrespec-
tive of its beliefs. At very high levels of decline, the incentives for retrench-
ment are so severe that D withdraws in Round 2 even when certain that R is
incompatible.
But at moderate levels of decline, information is highly consequential.
When π 2 fπ ^g, that is, when the misrepresentation equilibria obtain, D’s
payoff under uncertainty exceeds its payoff when fully informed. Under these
conditions, D is able to induce Ri to behave cooperatively in Round 1, which
Ri will never do when D is aware of its type. And importantly, the benefits D
reaps from Ri ’s cooperative behavior in Round 1 outweigh the costs of Ri ’s
later revision, so long as δ exceeds the threshold defined in Equation 2. But
when facing deeper decline, in the space to the right of π ^, the conventional

Figure 3. D’s payoffs facing incompatible R.

12
See Appendix.
 INTERNATIONAL INTERACTIONS 13

Figure 4. D’s payoffs facing compatible R.

wisdom is correct and D suffers from its uncertainty. Under these conditions,
D’s decline is too severe to credibly threaten to move back into mp in
response to Ri ’s revision. D therefore cannot induce Ri to behave coopera-
tively, and thus will not retrench in Round 1. D then retrenches in Round 2
based in part on the possibility that R is compatible. Had D known Ri ’s type
with certainty, it would have remained engaged in the periphery across both
rounds and received a higher payoff.
It is important to clarify how uncertainty benefits D in this interaction.
The key result is not that D’s ex ante expected utility increases as the prior
probability of R’s compatibility increases. It is true that the declining state’s
expected payoff grows as the probability that R is compatible increases. This
is also trivial. I show that even if we assume a world where R is incompatible,
under certain conditions, D is better off not knowing about it. Given para-
meters supporting π ^, D’s ex ante expected utility under uncertainty exceeds
its expected utility when fully informed of Ri ’s type, holding other parameters
constant, including the actual probability of R’s compatibility.
What about when D faces a compatible rising state? Figure 4 shows that
uncertainty may actually be more consistently harmful to D under these condi-
tions. Indeed, when facing a compatible riser, D never does better under uncer-
tainty than it does with complete information, holding all else constant. Recall that
when D is certain of R’s compatibility, it always withdraws from the periphery in
Round 1, permanently devolving regional authority to Rc . This allows D to
strengthen its position in the core while also securing its full peripheral payoff.
But under uncertainty, D often fails to take advantage of this opportunity. On the
far left side of Figure 4, when D suffers only shallow decline, its uncertainty
prevents it from achieving the benefits of retrenchment across both rounds. On
the far right side of the graph, D remains engaged in the periphery in Round 1 but
14 K. HAYNES

belatedly reaps the benefits of retrenchment in Round 2. If D were certain of R’s

compatibility, it would have withdrawn Round 1.
But crucially, Figure 4 also shows that D does not suffer from its uncer-
tainty when facing a compatible riser under π ^. In this range, D’s payoffs are
equal under complete and incomplete information. Recall that given π ^, under
uncertainty, D withdraws in Round 1 and then conditions its second round
behavior on R’s action. In this case, because Rc maintains the peripheral
status quo in Round 1, D remains withdrawn in Round 2 and thus continues
to benefit from Rc ’s cooperation. In short, although uncertainty is often
harmful to D when it is dealing with a compatible rising state, it is actually
payoff-neutral when π 2 fπ ^g. Under these conditions, D thus does better
under uncertainty when facing Ri , and when facing Rc it fares equally well
under complete and incomplete information.
Looking at Figures 3 and 4 in combination reveals that when π 2 fπ ^g, D’s
payoff under uncertainty is at least as high as the payoff it would receive
when completely informed, provided δ exceeds a minimal threshold. Thus,
under π^, as long as there is a nonzero probability that R is incompatible, D’s
uncertainty is profitable in expectation.
Result 1: Given parameters that support the misrepresentation equilibria,
D’s ex ante expected payoff under uncertainty is greater than its expected
payoff when fully informed so long as D values its first round payoffs beyond
a minimal threshold.
Proof: See Appendix.

Additional Results
Figures 2 and 3 reveal two additional results regarding the interaction of
uncertainty and power shifts. First, Figure 3 shows that across the π ^
range, the benefits of uncertainty actually increase with deeper decline.
The vertical gap between the solid and dashed lines expands as decline
deepens across the π ^ range. The deleterious effects of uncertainty are
typically thought to worsen with greater levels of decline. Conversely,
the model here shows that the benefits D reaps from inducing Ri to
misrepresent also increase with the extent of its decline. This effect
emerges because, in the non-retrenchment equilibrium which obtains
under complete information, D must maintain peripheral order across
both rounds. As D’s capacity to effectively impose order decreases, the
utility it derives from providing for peripheral order itself also
diminishes. In effect, the marginal benefits of uncertainty increase as
D’s decline deepens because its own capacity diminishes, increasing the
relative benefit of having Ri do the work for it.
 INTERNATIONAL INTERACTIONS 15

Result 2: Within the misrepresentation equilibria

’s expected marginal benefit from uncertainty is increasing in the extent of
its decline.
Proof: See Appendix.
Lastly, Figure 2 shows that higher levels of uncertainty expand the
range of conditions under which D profits from uncertainty. When D’s
initial estimate of R’s compatibility is low (p1 < 12 ), an increase in p leaves
it less certain of R’s type. But as Figure 2 illustrates, this increasing
uncertainty allows the declining state to enjoy the benefits of Ri ’s mis-
representation across a wider range of π values. Visually, the height of the
vertical “wedge” of the misrepresentation equilibrium expands as p1
increases from zero. In effect, this means that as D becomes less certain
of the rising state’s type, it can induce Ri into short-term cooperation
under smaller relative power shifts. Under these circumstances, not only is
uncertainty better than certainty, but more uncertainty is better than less.
Result 3: When D holds a low prior estimate of R’s compatibility, greater
degrees of uncertainty expand the range of π values at which D profits from
its own uncertainty.
Proof: See Appendix.
In sum, the model yields three interesting results. First, declining
states can benefit from their own uncertainty because it induces incom-
patible rising states to misrepresent their preferences. In misrepresent-
ing, incompatible rising states undertake cooperative actions that allow
the decliner to concentrate its scarce resources in pursuit of core inter-
ests. Importantly, when these dynamics operate the declining state is
better off in expectation under uncertainty, not just when the rising state
is actually incompatible. Second, the marginal benefit the declining state
reaps from uncertainty increases as its decline becomes more severe. As
decline deepens and its own ability to maintain order deteriorates, the
benefit of having the rising state take over peripheral governance
increases. Third, greater uncertainty increases the range of conditions
that allow the declining state to profit from the riser’s deception. When
the declining state is less certain of the rising state’s incompatibility, the
riser can misrepresent its intentions and convince the declining state to
remain withdrawn even when its decline is relatively shallow. But impor-
tantly, this outcome is mutually profitable. The declining state enjoys the
short-term benefits of the rising state’s cooperative first round behavior,
and the rising state is able to reap the long-term benefits of eventually
establishing control over the periphery.
16 K. HAYNES

Assumptions and Scope Conditions

The model’s conclusions are important, but rest upon a set of assumptions that
potentially bound its applicability. Some of these assumptions are relatively
restrictive, others less so. First, the existence of the misrepresentation equilibria
fundamentally depends on rising states having sufficiently long time horizons that
they will forgo the immediate benefits of revising the peripheral order in order to
achieve a greater payoff in the future. Conversely, the finding that the declining
state actually benefits from its uncertainty (Result 1) depends on the declining state
having sufficiently short time horizons that the first round benefits of the rising
state’s cooperation outweigh the long-term costs of its revision. The model does
not assume asymmetric time horizons: a wide range of conditions support both the
misrepresentation equilibria and Result 1. But as a matter of comparative statics,
rising states are more likely to misrepresent when they have longer time horizons,
while declining states are more likely to benefit from this misrepresentation when
they have shorter time horizons.
Second, the model assumes the declining state weights the core region more
heavily than the periphery. In itself, this is a completely intuitive assumption. But
the model’s basic logic only requires the declining state to have multiple commit-
ments of asymmetric importance. If circumstances changed such that the periph-
eral region became more important than the core – say a rising power in the
peripheral region began directly threatening the declining power – then the
model’s logic would simply operate in reverse. In short, the logic here only assumes
that declining states face salient resource constraints and have multiple, asymme-
trically weighted commitments.

How Uncertainty Can Ameliorate Commitment Problems

The results above present an important puzzle. The misrepresentation equilibria
that occur under uncertainty yield a higher payoff for D than the non-
retrenchment equilibrium that obtains under the same conditions when it is
fully informed of Ri ’s type. The misrepresentation equilibria also yields a greater
payoff for Ri . Essentially, in the misrepresentation equilibria, D benefits from Ri ’s
cooperative first round behavior, and Ri benefits from its ability to secure its
preferred order in Round 2. The outcome is mutually beneficial. So why can the
two states not strike this mutually profitable deal when D is fully informed of Ri ’s
incompatibility? Rather than remaining stuck paying the costs of peripheral order,
why would D not retrench early and promise to remain withdrawn in Round 2 if Ri
behaves cooperatively in Round 1?
The answer lies in the commitment problem facing the declining state. The
literature on power shifts typically emphasizes the problems resulting from a rising
state’s inability to make credible commitments.13 But this model illustrates how
13
For an important exception, see Chapman, McDonald, and Moser (2015).
 INTERNATIONAL INTERACTIONS 17

commitment problems can go both ways. Under π ^, the declining state is able to
credibly promise that it will stay out of the periphery if R maintains the status quo
in Round 1, while also credibly threatening to come back if it revises. But this
promise is simply not credible when D is fully aware of Ri ’s incompatibility – it
requires uncertainty. If the declining state were certain of Ri ’s type, it could not
simultaneously threaten to move back into the periphery in response to revision
and promise to remain withdrawn in response to Ri maintaining the status quo in
Round 1.
λm þχ
In equilibrium, when p1 ¼ 0 and π > mc p , D will come back into the
periphery even if Ri behaves cooperatively in Round 1. It cannot credibly
promise to stay out in return for the R’s cooperation, and Ri will therefore
revise the peripheral order if D retrenches in Round 1. Knowing D will come
back in Round 2 regardless of R’s first round behavior, Ri simply has no
incentive to cooperate. Under uncertainty, however, D can credibly commit
to remaining withdrawn in response to R’s cooperation precisely because this
cooperation entails some possibility that R is actually compatible. This
possibility is necessary in order for D to remain withdrawn. Essentially,
both sides would benefit by striking a deal where D retrenches early, Ri
maintains the status quo in Round 1 in return for D’s promise to remain
withdrawn in Round 2. But when fully informed of Ri ’s incompatibility, the
declining state cannot make this promise credible, and both players suffer.
In effect, the declining state benefits from uncertainty because its ignor-
ance mitigates its commitment problem. When D is fully aware of the rising
state’s incompatibility, it is unable to credibly promise to remain withdrawn
in the second round when it suffers only shallow decline. But as D becomes
progressively less certain of the rising state’s incompatibility, there emerges
a range of parameters where D makes its second round strategy conditional
on R’s first round behavior. D can thus credibly commit to remaining with-
drawn only if R maintains the peripheral status quo in Round 1. By opening
up the possibility that R is actually compatible, uncertainty causes D to
remain withdrawn after R behaves cooperatively, effectively resolving its
commitment problem and allowing both states to profit. Under these con-
ditions, uncertainty, far from exacerbating commitment problems, can actu-
ally ameliorate them.

British Pre-WWI Retrenchment from East Asia

In order to illustrate the model’s dynamics in operation, this section offers
a case study of Great Britain’s naval withdrawal from East Asia and accom-
modation of Japan after 1900. As Goemans and Spaniel (2016) argue, case
studies are uniquely well-suited for empirically evaluating formal models. In
accordance with Goemans and Spaniel’s advice, I first describe the
18 K. HAYNES

equilibrium behavior captured by the case and demonstrate that historical

conditions match up with parameters that would produce that outcome.
I then trace out the incentives driving important decisions throughout the
case, highlighting the ways in which these dynamics are captured by the
model presented above.
This case reflects the misrepresentation equilibria upon which the previous
discussed focused. In this context, Great Britain is the declining state, and
Japan is the rising state. This equilibrium obtains when a declining state is
suffering low to moderate levels of decline, and is more likely to occur as the
prior probability of the rising state holding compatible preferences increases.
And as described above, the equilibrium requires the rising state to have
sufficiently long time horizons that it values the long-term gains of revision
over the short-term opportunity costs of misrepresentation.
All of these conditions are supported here. British decline around the turn
of the century, while substantial, was far from precipitous. Indeed, the Royal
Navy remained the most powerful in the world up through WWI.
Furthermore, as described in more detail below, the British were somewhat
uncertain of Japan’s true long-term intentions. But as a result of the Anglo-
Japanese alliance, the British also believed there was a reasonably high like-
lihood that Japan had truly compatible preferences. Finally, given the poten-
tial long-term payoffs of achieving regional hegemony, Japan’s leaders clearly
had the long time horizons necessary to incur the short-term costs of
misrepresentation. As such, the conditions for the misrepresentation equili-
brium to occur were present.
This case study’s objectives are limited. I do not purport to offer a true
“test” of the model, and do not discuss most of the model’s equilibria. I only
seek to show that the logic of “beneficial uncertainty,” as depicted in the
misrepresentation equilibria, actually operated in an important historical
case. More specifically, I make three key claims. First, Japan’s support for
the Open Door in China after 1895 largely misrepresented its leaders’ true
intentions. Second, this misrepresentation was facilitated by, indeed it
required British uncertainty regarding Japan’s intentions. Third, Japan’s
misrepresentation yielded significant short-term benefits for British policy-
makers before and even during WWI. Despite the case study’s limited aims,
it nevertheless reveals a declining state (Britain) reaping significant short-
term benefits from the deceptive cooperation of a largely incompatible rising
state (Japan).

Overview and Background

After decades of British economic and naval preponderance, at the turn of
the twentieth century the Pax Britannica was gradually eroding. In 1904, the
Royal Navy began concentrating its scattered fleets in home waters to
 INTERNATIONAL INTERACTIONS 19

counter Germany’s growing naval power. In doing so, the British were forced
to accommodate various rising powers, relying on their good will to protect
British interests in peripheral areas. Admiral Sir John Fisher’s naval redis-
tribution strategy explicitly relied on the United States to prevent European
incursions into the Western Hemisphere and Japan to protect British inter-
ests in East Asia (Marder 1961).
Following Britain’s withdrawal, Japan upheld key elements of the status quo
regional order and helped protect British interests in China. But these actions
concealed the Japanese leadership’s true preferences, which inclined toward an
exclusive regional sphere of influence. Having observed Japan oscillate between
cooperative and revisionist policies since 1895, British policymakers were quite
uncertain of Japan’s longer term intentions. Despite this uncertainty, after the
1902 Anglo-Japanese alliance formalized Japan’s promise to uphold the Open
Door in China, Britain withdrew its naval forces from the region, allowing
Japan to take responsibility for maintaining regional order.
I argue that Great Britain reaped substantial short-term benefits from
Japan’s cooperative behavior in supporting the Open Door in China.
Absent Japan’s support, Britain would of course have still balanced against
Germany’s rising power. But it would have incurred substantially greater
costs in order to do so, as its trading interests in East Asia would have
suffered greatly if Japan had actively pursued its true regional preferences.
And it probably would not have done so until further into its decline, as
captured by the “late retrenchment equilibrium” described above.
Importantly, I also argue that Japan’s cooperative behavior was generally
misrepresentative of its leaders’ true preferences. Japan’s maintenance of the
Open Door was largely driven by an attempt to conceal their long-term
regional ambitions and avoid British containment. If British leaders had
been fully informed of Japan’s true preferences, Japanese leaders would
have had little incentive to conceal their revisionism. This may have
prompted an earlier Japanese push for a regional sphere of influence,
which would in turn have significant raised Britain’s costs of balancing
against Germany. So while uncertainty about Japan’s preferences was not
a necessary condition for Britain’s retrenchment, it was a necessary condition
for Japan’s cooperative behavior during WWI, from which the British greatly
benefited.

British Uncertainty
Great Britain’s primary interest in East Asia was maintaining the “Open Door”
for trade in China (Gooch and Temperley 1927). But at the turn of the century,
the Open Door was threatened by competing great powers seeking to carve
China into exclusive spheres of influence. The scramble for concessions began
with the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 when Japan annexed the Liaodong
20 K. HAYNES

Peninsula and several offshore islands following its victory. Japan was forced to
forfeit these spoils by the Triple Intervention of France, Germany, and Russia,
all of whom sought their own spheres of influence in China. Russia’s particu-
larly expansive ambitions eventually resulted in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of
1902 and Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. Following Japan’s victory over
Russia in 1905, Britain renewed the Anglo-Japanese alliance and redeployed its
Far Eastern Battlefleet to home waters, explicitly devolving care of the region to
Japan (Chang 1929; Nish 1966).
British policymakers had strong reason to believe that Japan had compa-
tible interests. Both Britain and Japan clearly sought to contain Russian
expansion into East Asia. Furthermore, there was evidence that Japanese
leaders genuinely supported the Open Door. Most importantly, the text of
the 1902 Anglo-Japanese alliance explicitly committed both parties to uphold
open trade in China (Gooch and Temperley 1929). But importantly, the
Sino-Japanese War and subsequent Japanese waffling over the Open Door
in China indicated that at a more fundamental level, Japan may have been
ambivalent toward Britain’s key regional economic interests. As such, Japan’s
underlying, longer term compatibility was somewhat uncertain. The Sino-
Japanese War indicated that Japan, given the option, might have preferred to
establish an exclusive sphere of influence in Northeast China. British Prime
Minister Lord Salisbury remarked in August 1895 that Japan’s behavior
“confirms the suspicion that in the end [Japan] will be convinced that it is
rather their interest to join with Russia, and perhaps with France in cutting
up China” (Nish 1966: 40). During the Russo-Japanese War, even as an
extension to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was being negotiated, Britain’s
ambassador worried about the “possibility of an understanding between
Japan and Russia after the war with a view to eventually isolate Great
Britain in the Far East” (Gooch et al. 1929). British leaders thus suspected
that Japan adopted an Open Door policy only after the Triple Intervention in
1895 had thwarted its true ambitions. The Anglo-Japanese alliance then “was
not a love match, but a marriage of convenience” whose long-term sustain-
ability was somewhat doubtful (Ferris 2012: 24).

Japanese Revisionism
Despite Britain’s uncertainty, Japanese leaders’ true preferences were actu-
ally starkly incompatible with Britain’s. Japan’s leaders almost uniformly
desired an expansive, and exclusive, Japanese sphere of influence in East
Asia. These preferences were simply concealed in an effort to deceive the
European powers and avoid containment while its military power was still
growing.
Japan’s expansive territorial demands following the Sino-Japanese War
indicated a deeper desire to establish exclusive control over significant
 INTERNATIONAL INTERACTIONS 21

portions of the Chinese market (Nish 1966: 373). And Japanese leaders later
negotiated to exclude Korea and Manchuria from the Open Door clauses of
the Alliance in 1905 (Gooch et al. 1929). In 1907, Japan even concluded
a secret agreement with France establishing exclusive spheres of influence in
Southern China (Nish 1966: 359). In short, whenever Japan was granted
a free hand in China after 1895, its behavior indicated a preference for
exclusionary economic practices. Indeed, a sizable hardline coalition was
pushing a more assertive, and exclusive, Japanese strategy in China. This
militaristic faction would eventually win out after 1914, but it was already
a significant force in Japanese politics by 1905 (Pyle 2007: chapter 5).
Importantly, in 1905 the militarists in Japan differed from the moderate
majority primarily in terms of tactics, not goals. Moderates in Japan promoting
adherence to an Open Door policy did so not because they saw these principles
as directly promoting Japan’s true national interests. Rather, they sought to
avoid “provoking Britain and the United States, who had furnished wartime
loans on the understanding that there was a firm Japanese commitment to the
Open Door” (Beasley 1990: 152). Ian Nish writes that the moderates won
the day by arguing that “Britain was being alienated by Japan’s commercial
aggressiveness” and could only be assuaged by stricter adherence to Open Door
principles in China. “If Japan was to avoid being isolated,” Nish continued, “she
must take care of the interests of the other powers in China” (Nish 1966: 362).
But absent such constraints, even the moderates would have preferred to push
for an exclusive regional sphere of influence that was directly contrary to British
interests. Only once WWI began and British policymakers were focused
entirely on European affairs did Japan’s moderates feel sufficiently uncon-
strained that they joined the militarists in advocating a more exclusionary
policy in China. No longer concerned about the consequences of alienating
Britain, Japanese leaders were free to pursue the exclusive regional sphere of
influence that most of them had long desired.

British Withdrawal
Despite its uncertainty regarding Japan’s preferences, British leaders decided
in 1905 to withdraw the Royal Navy from East Asia, devolving regional
hegemony to Japan. Some British leaders initially argued that allowing the
Anglo-Japanese alliance to lapse would have required the Royal Navy to
deploy a fleet capable of containing Japanese expansion (Gooch and
Temperley 1932; Marder 1961). Absent the restraining influence of the
alliance, they were simply unwilling to entrust Britain’s trading interests in
China to a partner whose intentions remained opaque. The British thus
insisted on an alliance text that committed Japan to a regional economic
strategy that supported British interests. The Royal Navy also retained a small
22 K. HAYNES

squadron of cruisers at Singapore, a strategic choke point, ensuring the

capacity to reengage if Japan overturned the regional order (Marder 1961).
Following the Russo-Japanese War and renewal of the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance, the Royal Navy promptly redeployed its entire Far Eastern
Battlefleet to the North Sea. British policymakers were consciously ceding
regional hegemony to a rising power that, despite having compatible short-
term threat perceptions, had indicated a long-term desire to carve out an
exclusive sphere of influence in northeast China. The Anglo-Japanese
Alliance effectively committed Japan to maintaining the Open Door, thus
guaranteeing Britain’s core interests in East Asia while allowing it to redeploy
its naval assets closer to home. The security of Britain’s home islands was
significantly enhanced by the alliance and consequent redeployment of its
Pacific Fleet, as the British were able to dominate the European naval race
and eventually impose a strict naval blockade against Germany during WWI.
To be clear, I am not arguing that Britain’s retrenchment depended on its
uncertainty. Even if British policymakers were certain of Japan’s revisionism,
the German naval threat would eventually have compelled Britain to con-
centrate its naval resources in Europe. Indeed, the complete information
model reveals that retrenchment can occur in equilibrium even when
a declining state is certain of a rising state’s incompatibility. I do claim,
however, that Britain benefited from its leaders’ uncertainty over the short
term, as it induced Japan to behave more cooperatively than it otherwise
would have in the wake of Britain’s withdrawal. Had Japan’s revisionist
preferences been common knowledge, it would have had no reason to
restrain itself from exploiting Britain’s weakened position in East Asia prior
to and during the war. To be sure, Japan did greatly expand its regional
footprint during WWI. But it held off from more far-reaching expropriations
of British and French concessions in China, which it was more than capable
of executing. Japan’s restraint was based on a desire to avoid provoking
British, American and French retaliation and containment after the war
(Nish 1966: 362). As such, Britain’s uncertainty induced Japan to continue
misrepresenting itself as largely supportive of the Open Door. Japan’s mis-
representation dramatically reduced the costs of Britain’s naval retrenchment
after 1905, providing enormous short-term benefits for Great Britain com-
pared to the counterfactual scenario in which Japan simply pursued its true
preferences following British withdrawal.
It was only later, during the interwar period that the full costs of Britain’s
accommodation of Japan became clear. But from 1905 to 1918, British
security was significantly enhanced by its retrenchment from East Asia.
This retrenchment was predicated on Japanese support for a regional eco-
nomic order that was largely inimical to its leaders’ true preferences. And
Japan’s strategy of misrepresentation, in turn, fundamentally depended on
British uncertainty regarding Japan’s long-term intentions. In short, Great
 INTERNATIONAL INTERACTIONS 23

Britain profited handsomely from Japan shouldering the costs of maintaining

East Asian regional order after 1905. That Japan may have been doing so
dishonestly was a risk the British were willing to take, and an opportunity
they were eager to exploit.

Conclusion
This paper argues that the existing literature on interstate reassurance has
overlooked the potential benefits a state can reap from its own uncertainty.
Such uncertainty can induce an incompatible state to misrepresent its pre-
ferences and intentions by behaving cooperatively. And while this uncer-
tainty and the resulting deception impose serious costs, it also presents
uncertain states with an opportunity to profit from an incompatible state’s
dishonest cooperation. The model does not just show that declining states are
more likely to cooperate with incompatible rising states when they are
uncertain of the rising state’s type. It shows that declining states can actually
benefit from this uncertainty, achieving a higher payoff than would be
possible if they were fully informed of the rising state’s revisionist intentions.
In the model, a declining state’s uncertainty provides incompatible rising
states with a clear incentive to misrepresent their intentions by behaving
cooperatively. Under specific conditions, the declining state can exploit this
misrepresentation and profit by retrenching early in its decline. For the rising
state, the long-term benefits of guaranteeing future regional hegemony out-
weigh the short-term opportunity costs of forgone revision. For the declining
state, the short-term benefits of the rising state providing regional order
outweigh the long-term informational costs of misrepresentation. The
model thus highlights a previously unexplored trade-off involved in making
foreign policy under uncertainty.
This paper indicates important directions for future theoretical and
empirical research on interstate signaling and reassurance. Systematic and
sustained empirical research on reassurance has been relatively sparse, due in
large part to the difficulty of accurately measuring cognitive constructs like
beliefs and preferences. Nevertheless, important qualitative work has fleshed
out the ways in which uncertain states assess others’ intentions (Kydd 2005).
Empirical work on reassurance generally focuses on first-order effects of how
uncertainty directly impacts state actions. This paper demonstrates the
importance of examining the second and even third order effects of uncer-
tainty – how actors’ beliefs about another’s uncertainty affect their strategic
decision making, and how uncertain states can exploit these incentives.
I demonstrated above that incompatible rising states might react to
a declining state’s uncertainty by behaving cooperatively in order to conceal
their hostile long-term intentions. But the paper’s most important insight is
that uncertain declining states might, under certain conditions, profitably
24 K. HAYNES

exploit this misrepresentation in order to maximize short-term payoffs.

Recognizing these important second- and third-order effects is important
to understanding the complex and multifaceted effects of uncertainty in
interstate power shifts.
Beyond its scholarly implications, this argument helps shed light on
important dynamics between the United States and China in the post-Cold
War period. Many American policymakers worry that China’s integration
into the global economy and general adherence to core norms of liberal
order are simply a form of misrepresentation preceding an attempted
revision of East Asian regional order (Friedberg 2011). This is
a legitimate concern. But even if China is in fact misrepresenting, its
doing so serves immediate American interests. Thus, while the United
States is again preoccupied by events in Europe and the Middle East,
Chinese cooperation in East Asia would be enormously beneficial to the
United States.
In short, even if China harbors revisionist intentions, it could potentially
be induced to support the status quo regional order in East Asia over the
short term. Although the United States would of course incur serious risks by
accommodating China, the immediate benefits of Chinese cooperation may
outweigh these potential costs. At the very least, American policymakers
should be cognizant of these potential benefits and consider exploiting
China’s incentives to misrepresent by tying regional force deployments
directly to China’s behavior. Although doing little to impede China’s rise,
such a strategy would strongly incentivize cooperative Chinese behavior that
serves America’s immediate interests in the region.

Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Dale Copeland, Deborah Larson, Jim Morrow, Craig Volden,
Jack Paine, and especially Brandon Yoder for helpful comments on prior drafts and related
projects.

ORCID
Kyle Haynes http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2713-6827

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