JUDICIAL ETHICS CASES

1. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS JUDGE YU (MARCH 2017)

We hereby consider and resolve respondent Eliza B. Yu's Motion for Reconsideration with
Explanation for the Show Cause Order filed vis-a-vis the decision promulgated on November
22, 2016 disposing against her as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES respondent JUDGE ELIZA B. YU

GUILTY of GROSS INSUBORDINATION; GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW; GROSS
MISCONDUCT; GRAVE ABUSE OF AUTHORITY; OPPRESSION; and CONDUCT
UNBECOMING OF A JUDICIAL OFFICIAL; and, ACCORDINGLY, DISMISSES her from the
service EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, with FORFEITURE OF ALL HER BENEFITS, except
accrued leave credits, and further DISQUALIFIES her from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office or employment, including to one in any government-owned or government-
controlled corporations.

Respondent JUDGE ELIZA B. YU is directed to show cause in writing within ten (10) days from
notice why she should not be disbarred for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics as outlined herein.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator for its
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.1

In her motion, the respondent repeatedly denies committing all the administrative offenses for
which she was held guilty, and insists on the absence of proof to support the findings against
her. She pleads that the Court reconsiders based on the following:

1. Noncompliance with A.O. No. 19-2011

The complaint against her was premature because of the pendency of her protest against night
court duty. A.O. No. 19-2011 did not carry a penal provision, and was only directory because of
the use of the permissive word may. In addition to A.O. No. 19-2011 being noncompliant with
the requirements of a valid administrative order, the requirement of night court duty violated
Section 5, Rule XVII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code,2
which limited the working hours for government officials and employees. It was also not illegal to
write to the Secretary of the Department of Tourism (DOT) considering that he was the
requesting authority regarding the rendering of the night court duty. She did not publicly
broadcast her disobedience to A.O. No. 19-2011 when she wrote the letter to the Secretary.
There was no law prohibiting her from writing the protest letters. At any rate, she had the right to
do so under the Freedom of Speech Clause. She did not refuse to obey A.O. No. 19-2011
because she actually allowed her staff to report for night duty. She did not willfully and
intentionally disobey because her protest had legal basis. She would also violate Section 3(a)3
of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) if she would comply with the
patently illegal A.O. No. 19-2011.4

2. Refusal to honor the appointments of Ms. Mariejoy P. Lagman and Ms. Leilani Tejero-Lopez

The respondent claims that she did not refuse to honor the appointment because rejection was
different from protesting the appointment. She merely exercised her statutory right as a judge to
question the appointment of the branch clerk of court assigned to her sala. Under Canon 2,
Section 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,5 she was mandated
to bring to the proper authorities the irregularities surrounding the appointments. Moreover, the
contents of the complaint letter and the protest could not be used against her pursuant to the
constitutional right against self-incrimination. She did not also commit any act of cruelty against
Ms. Tejera-Lopez; on the contrary, it was Ms. Tejero-Lopez who "went beyond the norms of

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decency by her persistent and annoying application in my court that it actually became a
harassment." Her opposition against the appointment of Ms. Lagman was meritorious. She only
employed the wrong choice of words with her choice of the term privileged communication that
was viewed negatively. There was no proof of the alleged verbal threats, abuse, misconduct or
oppression committed against Ms. Tejero-Lopez. It was not proper to penalize a judge based on
a "letter with few words that other people find objectionable."6

3. Show-cause order respondent issued against fellow judges

The respondent posits that the show-cause order she issued to her fellow judges had legal
basis because "anything that is legal cannot be an assumption of the role of a tyrant wielding
power with unbridled breath."7 It was premature to rule that she thereby abused and committed
misconduct because she did not issue any ruling on the explanation by the other judges.8 She
did not violate Section 5, Canon 3 and Section 8, Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
What the other judges should have done was to avail themselves of the appropriate remedy.9

4. Refusal to sign the leave of absence of Mr. Noel Labid

The refusal to sign the application for leave of absence had factual and legal bases.10
Moreover, she should be presumed to have acted in good faith if she misconstrued the rules on
approval of application of leave.11

5. Allowing on-the-job trainees

The respondent claims that she did not order the trainees to perform judicial tasks. She asserts
that she could not remember their affidavit. She had no personal knowledge that the trainees
were made to serve as assistant court stenographers. Based on what she heard, the trainees
were only in the premises of her court for a few hours. She reminds that she allowed the
trainees to merely observe proceedings. OCA Circular No. 111-2005 was impliedly amended
when paralegals and law students were allowed to be trained under the Hustisyeah Project.12

6. Designation of an officer-in-charge and ordering reception of evidence by a non-lawyer

The respondent denies having violated CSC Memorandum Circular No. 06-05 when she
designated an officer-in-charge. There was no proof showing that she willfully and deliberately
intended to cause public damage. In fact, the OCA recognized Mr. Ferdinand Santos as the OIC
of her branch in several letters. There was no proof that she violated Section 9, Rule 30 of the
Rules of Court. The ex parte reception of evidence by a non-lawyer clerk of court was allowed
under the Rules of Court, as well as by Section 2l(e), Administrative Circular No. 35-2004, and
Administrative Circular No. 37-93.13

7. Allowing criminal proceedings to continue despite the absence of counsel

The respondent merely followed the Rules of Criminal Procedure in allowing criminal
proceedings despite absence of counsel. In so doing, she relied in good faith on the rulings in
People v. Arcilla,14 Bravo v. Court of Appeals,15 and People v. Malinao.16 Under Section l(c),
Rule 115 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in
person without the assistance of counsel.17

8. Sending of inappropriate email messages

The respondent maintains that the e-mail messages were hearsay because the certification by
the SC-MISO was not presented to her, depriving her of the opportunity to object. Her granting
access by the MISO to her private e-mails was conditional to prove tampering. Her

Lycos e-mail account was hacked. She did not completely waive her right to privacy.
Considering that she did not authenticate said e-mail messages, the same were inadmissible for
being hearsay. The e-mail messages with her full name written in capital letters as the sender

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did not emanate from her because her Yahoo! and MSN accounts carried her name with only
the first letters being capitalized. The e-mails reproduced in the decision were not the same
messages that she had requested Judge San Gaspar-Gito to delete. There were words that she
did not write on the e-mail messages pertaining to her demand for reimbursement of $10.00.
Her writing style was different from what appeared in the e-mail messages. She denies having
opened the "Rudela San Gaspar" account. It was wrong to penalize her based on assumptions
and speculations. She did not commit electronic libel. Her funny and innocent comments were
not actionable documents. The certification by the SC MISO was not an authentication as to the
truthfulness of the contents of the e-mail messages and as to the identification of the sender or
author of the messages. It was wrong and unjust to impute wrongdoing to her when there was
no proof that she had sent the inappropriate messages. The disclaimer in the e-mails were not
printed in the decision; hence, the messages were inadmissible. The presentation of the
messages without her consent as the sender was covered by the exclusionary rule. Letters and
communications in writing were guaranteed and protected by Sections 2,18 3(1),19 Article III of
the 1987 Constitution, and Article 723 of the Civil Code,20 Articles 22621 and 22822 of the
Revised Penal Code, Section 2756 of the Revised Administrative Code,23 Sections 3224 and
3325 of the R.A. No. 8792. There was no proof that she had apologized through e-mail, and had
sent messages with sexual undertones and lewd graphics. Judge Gita had a dirty mind because
nothing was wrong with the 69 image by Felicien Raps. She (respondent) did not commit
internet stalking. She had difficulty in remembering the private communications, which were
taken out of context. It was Judge Gita who must have a problem because she had kept the
trash messages. She (respondent) did not transgress any law. The allegations against her were
hearsay. She submitted a letter proposal for a "winwin" solution so that she would not pursue
any criminal action against Judge Gito. She did not violate Section 8, Canon 4 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct because it was one of her staff who had typed the letter addressed to Atty.
San Gaspar. To find her to have abused her power and committed impropriety was
unwarranted. Her absence from the investigation conducted by Justice Abdulwahid could not be
taken against her and could not be construed as her admission of wrong doing or as an evasion
of truth. There was no proof that she had used the phrase our court to advance her personal
interest.26

Ruling of the Court

We deny the respondent's Motion for Reconsideration with Explanation for the Show Cause
Order for the following reasons.

1.

The respondent's Motion for Reconsideration is denied for lack of merit

The submissions tendered in the respondent's Motion for Reconsideration with Explanation for
the Show Cause Order were matters that the Court had already exhaustively considered and
fully resolved in the decision of November 22, 2016. We deem it unnecessary to dwell at length
on such submissions. We still hold and declare that the respondent flagrantly and blatantly
violated the Lawyer's Oath, and several canons and rules of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canon of Judicial Ethics and the New Judicial Code of Conduct.

Nonetheless, we propose to expound on some points for greater enlightenment on the issues
and grounds taken into consideration in removing the respondent from the Judiciary, and for
purposes of providing the requisite predicate to the ruling on the directive for her to show
sufficient cause in writing why she should not also be disbarred from the Roll of Attorneys.

The respondent insists that there was no proof to support the adverse findings of the Court. She
is absolutely mistaken. The records involved in these cases were voluminous, because they
consisted of the affidavits and other evidence submitted by the several complainants as well as
her own pleadings and motions, most of which constituted proof of her administrative
wrongdoings. As the per curiam decision of November 22, 2016 indicated, her explanations vis-
a-vis the complaints often backfired against her, and all the more incriminated her by

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systematically exposing her personal and professional ineptitude and stilted logic. In short, the
evidence against her was too compelling to ignore, and sufficed to warrant the supreme action
of her removal from the Judiciary. She was more than aware that the quantum of evidence
required in administrative proceedings like these was substantial evidence, or that amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.27

The respondent's argument that she was deprived of the guarantee against self-incrimination
has no basis. As a judge, she was quite aware that the constitutional guarantee only set the
privilege of an individual to refuse to answer incriminating questions that may directly or
indirectly render her criminally liable. The constitutional guarantee simply secures to a witness -
whether a party or not - the right to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question.28
The privilege did not prohibit legitimate inquiry in non-criminal matters. At any rate, the rule only
finds application in case of oral testimony and does not apply to object evidence. As the Court
has pointed out in People v. Malimit:29

[The right against self-incrimination], as put by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United States, "x x
x is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him
x x x" It is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the [accused] 's own lips,
against his will, admission of his guilt. It docs not apply to the instant case where the evidence
sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement but an object evidence. Wigmore,
discussing the question now before us in his treatise on evidence, thus, said:

If, in other words (the rule) created inviolability not only for his [physical control of his] own vocal
utterances, but also for his physical control in whatever form exercise, then, it would be possible
for a guilty person to shut himself up in his house, with all the tools and indicia of his crime, and
defy the authority of the law to employ in evidence anything that might be obtained by forcibly
overthrowing his possession and compelling the surrender of the evidential articles - a clear
reduction ad absurdum. In other words, it is not merely compulsion that is the kernel of the
privilege, x x x but testimonial compulsion.30

The respondent's correspondences were outside the scope of the constitutional proscription
against self-incrimination. She had not been subjected to testimonial compulsion in which she
could validly raise her right against self-incrimination. Worthy to recall is that she had herself
voluntarily waived her right to be present and to confront the complainant and her witnesses and
evidence during the administrative investigation conducted by CA Associate Justice Hakim
Abdulwahid. She was emphatically granted the opportunity to confront the complainant and her
witnesses but the voluntary and knowing waiver of her presence divested her of the right to
insist on the right to confrontation, if any.

The respondent contends that she was not given the opportunity to raise her objection to the
certification issued by the SC-MISO. This contention is dismissed also because of the same
voluntary waiver of her presence from the proceedings held before Justice Abdulwahid.

At any rate, the respondent alternatively pleads for compassion and mercy, and vows not to
repeat the same transgressions. In this connection, she would have the Court consider in her
favor the following mitigating circumstances pursuant to Section 48, Rule 10 of the Revised
Rules of Administrative Cases in Civil Service,31 which provides thus:

1. Medications on allergies as analogous circumstance to an unsubstantiated charge;

2. Good faith on each the unsubstantiated charge xxx;

3. First time offense of the unsubstantiated charge;

4. Lack of education or lack of experience on administrative matters as analogous circumstance

to the unsubstantiated charge;

5. Newness or short number in the judicial service as analogous circumstance to the

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unsubstantiated charge;

6. Very different work culture from previous employment as unsubstantiated charge;

7. Lack of prejudice to the public as analogous circumstance to the unsubstantiated charge;

8. Remorse for not listening to the unsolicited advices of Court Administrator Jose Midas
Marquez and Assistant Court Administrator Thelma Bahia as analogous circumstance to the
unsubstantiated charge;

9. Lack of intent to commit any wrong as analogous circumstance to the unsubstantiated

charge;

10. Previously received awards in the performance of his duties to the unsubstantiated charge;
and

11. Outstanding court performance as to cases disposal for year to the unsubstantiated
charge.32

The respondent's pleading is unworthy of sympathy.

Firstly, the respondent does not thereby present any compelling argument on how her having
medications for allergies was analogous to physical illness under Section 48(a) of the Revised
Rules of Administrative Cases in Civil Service. Although the list of circumstances in Section 48
is not exclusive because the provision expressly recognizes other analogous circumstances,
she cannot simply state any situation without pointing out why it would be analogous to the
listed circumstances. The Court is unable to appreciate how her consumption of medications for
allergies could generate arrogance, insubordination, gross ignorance of laws, and offensive
conduct that manifested themselves in the periods material to the administrative complaints.

Secondly, the respondent's overall conduct negated her allegation of good faith. Good faith
implies the lack of any intention to commit a wrongdoing. Based on the totality of her acts and
actuations, her claims of good faith and lack of intent to commit a wrong cannot be probable.
According to Civil Service Commission v. Maala,33 good faith as a defense in administrative
investigations has been discussed in this wise:

In common usage, the term "good faith" is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind
denoting "honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to
put the holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious
advantage of another, even through technicalities of law, together with absence of all
information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render transaction unconscientious."

In short, good faith is actually a question of intention. Although this is something internal, we can
ascertain a person's intention by relying not on his own protestations of good faith, which is self-
serving, but on evidence of his conduct and outward acts. (bold emphasis supplied)

The respondent is reminded that her removal from the Judiciary by reason of her gross
insubordination and gross misconduct did not proceed only from her non-compliance with A.O.
No. 19-2011. Other acts and actuations were also efficient causes, namely: (1) her refusal to
abide by the directive of MeTC Executive Judge Bibiano Colasito that resulted in the disruption
of orderliness in the other Pasay City MeTCs to the prejudice of the public service and public
interest; (2) her direct communications to the DOT Secretary and other agencies that seriously
breached established protocols, thereby opening an irregular avenue to publicly broadcast her
defiance to the directive of the Court itself; and (3) her willful disregard of the direct advice by
the Court Administrator despite the latter being the official expressly authorized by law to assist
the Court in exercising administrative supervision over all lower courts and personnel.34

Furthermore, we emphatically observed and pointed out in the decision of November 22, 2016

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the following:

In all, Judge Yu exhibited an unbecoming arrogance in committing insubordination and gross

misconduct. By her refusal to adhere to and abide by A.O. No. 19-2011, she deliberately
disregarded her duty to serve as the embodiment of the law at all times. She thus held herself
above the law by refusing to be bound by the issuance of the Court as the duly constituted
authority on court procedures and the supervision of the lower courts. To tolerate her
insubordination and gross misconduct is to abet lawlessness on her part. She deserved to be
removed from the service because she thereby revealed her unworthiness of being part of the
Judiciary. (Bold emphasis supplied)

We have stated in the decision of November 22, 2016 that the respondent's recalcitrant streak
did not end with her unbecoming repudiation of and defiance to A.O. No. 19-2011. To recall, she
also exhibited extreme arrogance in rejecting the valid appointments of Ms. Lagman and Ms.
Tejero-Lopez despite being fully aware that the appointing powers pertained to and were being
thereby exercised by the Court, and that she was bereft of any discretion to control or reject the
appointments. Under no circumstance could she be justified in draping herself with the mantle of
good faith in regard to her insubordination and arrogance.

We also reject the respondent's appeal for relief based on her supposed lack of experience as a
neophyte judge, and her previously received awards and outstanding court performance. Lack
of experience had no relevance in determining her administrative liabilities for acts and
actuations fundamentally irregular or contrary to judicial ethical standards. We even believe that
her being a novice in the Judiciary, instead of mitigating her liability, could have aggravated her
offense, for her being a neophyte judge should have impelled her instead to practice greater
prudence and caution in her daily actuations and performance. But instead of pausing and
hesitating, she acted rashly and imprudently by condescendingly asserting herself over her
peers, by flagrantly disobeying her superiors, including this Court, and by ignoring obvious
boundaries that should have kept her in check or reined her in. On the other hand, the awards
for outstanding performances as a professional and as a judge, far from accenting her good
qualities as a person, rather highlighted her unworthiness to remain on the Bench by showing
that her misconduct and general bad attitude as a member thereof has put the awards and
recognitions in serious question.

2. Disbarment is also to be imposed on the respondent

The respondent's accountability did not end with her removal from the Judiciary. In the decision
of November 22, 2016, we declared that her misdemeanor as a member of the Bench could
also cause her expulsion from the Legal Profession through disbarment. Consequently, we
directed her to show good and sufficient cause why her actions and actuations should not also
be considered grounds for her disbarment, justifying our directive in the following manner, viz.:

The foregoing findings may already warrant Judge Yu's disbarment.

A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, dated September 17, 2002 and entitled Re: Automatic Conversion of
Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan;
Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary

Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar,
relevantly states:

Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan;
judges of regular and special courts; and court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds
which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the
Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics,
or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as
grounds for the discipline of lawyers.

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In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary
action against the respondent Justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar.
The respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why
he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinarily sanctioned as a member
of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, an attorney may be disbarred on the ground
of gross misconduct and willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court. Given her
wanton defiance of the Court's own directives, her open disrespect towards her fellow judges,
her blatant abuse of the powers appurtenant to her judicial office, and her penchant for
threatening the defenseless with legal actions to make them submit to her will, we should also
be imposing the penalty of disbarment.1âwphi1 The object of disbarment is not so much to
punish the attorney herself as it is to safeguard the administration of justice, the courts and the
public from the misconduct of officers of the court. Also, disbarment seeks to remove from the
Law Profession attorneys who have disregarded their Lawyer's Oath and thereby proved
themselves unfit to continue discharging the trust and respect given to them as members of the
Bar.

The administrative charges against respondent Judge Yu based on grounds that were also
grounds for disciplinary actions against members of the Bar could easily be treated as justifiable
disciplinary initiatives against her as a member of the Bar. This treatment is explained by the
fact that her membership in the Bar was an integral aspect of her qualification for judgeship.
Also, her moral and actual unfitness to remain as a Judge, as found in these cases, reflected
her indelible unfitness to remain as a member of the Bar. At the very least, a Judge like her who
disobeyed the basic rules of judicial conduct should not remain as a member of the Bar because
she had thereby also violated her Lawyer's Oath.

Indeed, respondent Judge Yu's violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct embodied
in the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary would constitute a breach of the
following canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:

CANON 1 - A LA WYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.

CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN

THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL TASKS.

Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or
advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE
COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY
OTHERS.

Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts.

The Court does not take lightly the ramifications of Judge Yu's misbehavior and misconduct as a
judicial officer. By penalizing her with the supreme penalty of dismissal from the service, she
should not anymore be allowed to remain a member of the Law Profession.

However, this rule of fusing the dismissal of a Judge with disbarment does not in any way
dispense with or set aside the respondent's right to due process. As such, her disbarment as an
offshoot of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC without requiring her to comment on the disbarment would be
violative of her right to due process. To accord due process to her, therefore, she should first be

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afforded the opportunity to defend her professional standing as a lawyer before the Court would
determine whether or not to disbar her.

In her comment, the respondent reiterates her submissions in the Motion for Reconsideration
with Explanation for the Show Cause Order. Considering that we have dismissed her pleadings
altogether for the reasons given earlier, her disbarment is now inevitable.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court reads:

Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. - A member of
the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Accordingly, gross misconduct, violation of the Lawyer's Oath, and willful disobedience of any
lawful order by the Court constitute grounds to disbar an attorney. In the respondent's case, she
was herein found to have committed all of these grounds for disbarment, warranting her
immediate disbarment as a consequence.

We deem it worthwhile to remind that the penalty of disbarment being hereby imposed does not
equate to stripping the respondent of the source of her livelihood. Disbarment is intended to
protect the administration of justice by ensuring that those taking part in it as attorneys should
be competent, honorable and reliable to enable the courts and the clients they serve to rightly
repose their confidence in them.35

Once again, we express our disdain for judges and attorneys who undeservedly think too highly
of themselves, their personal and professional qualifications and qualities at the expense of the
nobility of the Law Profession. It is well to remind the respondent that membership in the Law
Profession is not like that in any ordinary trade. The Law is a noble calling, and only the
individuals who are competent and fit according to the canons and standards set by this Court,
the law and the Rules of Court may be bestowed the privilege to practice it.36

Lastly, every lawyer must pursue only the highest standards in the practice of his calling. The
practice of law is a privilege, and only those adjudged qualified are permitted to do so.37 The
respondent has fallen short of this standard thus meriting her expulsion from the profession.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration with Explanation for the Show
Cause Order with FINALITY; DISBARS EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY respondent ELIZA B. YU
pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics; and

ORDERS the striking off of respondent ELIZA B. YU's name from the Roll of Attorneys.

Let copies of this resolution be furnished to: (a) the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their information and guidance; (b) the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and (c) the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to the
respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.

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2. ANTONIO M. LORENZANA, Complainant, vs Judge Austria
BRION, J.:

We resolve in this Decision the administrative complaints1 filed by Antonio M. Lorenzana

(complainant) against Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria (respondent), Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 2, Batangas City.

The records show that the administrative complaints arose from the case "In the Matter of the
Petition to have Steel Corporation of the Philippines Placed under Corporate Rehabilitation with
Prayer for the Approval of the Proposed Rehabilitation Plan," docketed as SP. Proc. No. 06-
7993, where the respondent was the presiding judge. The complainant was the Executive Vice
President and Chief Operating Officer of Steel Corporation of the Philippines (SCP), a company
then under rehabilitation proceedings.

i. Complaint

In his verified complaint dated January 21, 2008, the complainant alleged that in the course of
SP. Proc. No. 06-7993, the respondent committed Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of
Authority, Gross Misconduct, Grave Incompetence, Irregularity in the Performance of Duty,
Grave Bias and Partiality, Lack of Circumspection, Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, Failure to
Observe the Reglementary Period and Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as
shown by the following instances:

1. The respondent appointed Atty. Santiago T. Gabionza, Jr. as rehabilitation receiver over
SCP’s objections and despite serious conflict of interest in being the duly appointed
rehabilitation receiver for SCP and, at the same time, the external legal counsel of most of
SCP’s creditors; he is also a partner of the law firm that he engaged as legal adviser.

2. The respondent conducted informal meetings (which she termed as "consultative meetings"
in her Order2 dated May 11, 2007) in places outside her official jurisdiction (i.e., a first class golf
club, a hotel and sports club facilities in Metro Manila) and where she arbitrarily dictated the
terms, parameters and features of the rehabilitation plan she wanted to approve for SCP. She
also announced in the meetings that she would prepare the rehabilitation plan for SCP.

3. The modified rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza is a replica of what the
respondent dictated to him. Thus, the respondent exceeded the limits of her authority and
effectively usurped and pre-empted the rehabilitation receiver’s exercise of functions.

4. The respondent ordered that the proceedings of the informal meetings be off-record so that
there would be no record that she had favored Equitable-PCI Bank (EPCIB).

5. The respondent had secret meetings and communications with EPCIB to discuss the case
without the knowledge and presence of SCP and its creditors.

6. The respondent appointed Gerardo Anonas (Anonas) as Atty. Gabionza’s financial adviser
and, at the same time, as her financial adviser to guide her in the formulation and development
of the rehabilitation plan, for a fee of ₱3.5M at SCP’s expense. Anonas is also the cousin-in-law
of the managing partner of Atty. Gabionza’s law firm.

7. The respondent encouraged EPCIB to raise complaints or accusations against SCP, leading
to EPCIB’s filing of a motion to create a management committee.

8. When requested to conduct an evidentiary meeting and to issue a subpoena (so that SCP
could confront EPCIB’s witnesses to prove the allegation that there was a need for the creation
of a management committee), the respondent denied SCP’s requests and delayed the issuance
of the order until the last minute.

9. At the hearing of September 14, 2007, the respondent intimidated SCP’s counsel, Atty.

9|Page
Ferdinand Topacio; blocked his every attempt to speak; refused to recognize his appearances
in court; and made condescending and snide remarks.

10. The respondent failed to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Interim Rules of
Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (Rules). She approved the rehabilitation plan beyond the
180 days given to her in the Rules, without asking for permission to extend the period from the
Supreme Court (SC).

11. The respondent erroneously interpreted and applied Section 23, Rule 4 of the Rules (the
court’s power to approve the rehabilitation plan) to include the power to amend, modify and alter
it.

12. The respondent took a personal interest and commitment to decide the matter in EPCIB’s
favor and made comments and rulings in the proceedings that raised concerns regarding her
impartiality.

13. The respondent adamantly refused to inhibit herself and showed special interest and
personal involvement in the case.

ii. Supplemental Complaint

The complainant likewise filed a supplemental complaint3 dated April 14, 2008 where he
alleged that the respondent committed an act of impropriety when she displayed her
photographs in a social networking website called "Friendster" and posted her personal details
as an RTC Judge, allegedly for the purpose of finding a compatible partner. She also posed with
her upper body barely covered by a shawl, allegedly suggesting that nothing was worn
underneath except probably a brassiere.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in its 1st Indorsement4 dated March 18, 2008,
referred the complaints to the respondent for comment.

a. Comment to January 21, 2008 Complaint

The respondent vehemently denied the allegations against her. While she admitted that she
crafted a workable, feasible rehabilitation plan best suited for SCP, she maintained that she did
so only to render fairness and equity to all the parties to the rehabilitation proceedings. She also
submitted that if indeed she erred in modifying the rehabilitation plan, hers was a mere error of
judgment that does not call for an administrative disciplinary action. Accordingly, she claimed
that the administrative complaints were premature because judicial remedies were still
available.5

The respondent also argued that the rules do not prohibit informal meetings and conferences.
On the contrary, she argued that informal meetings are even encouraged in view of the
summary and non-adversarial nature of rehabilitation proceedings. Since Section 21, Rule 4 of
the Rules6 gives the rehabilitation receiver the power to meet with the creditors, then there is all
the more reason for the rehabilitation judge, who has the authority to approve the plan, to call
and hold meetings with the parties. She also pointed out that it was SCP which suggested that
informal meetings be called and that she only agreed to hold these meetings on the condition
that all the parties would attend.

As to her alleged failure to observe the reglementary period, she contended that she approved
the rehabilitation plan within the period prescribed by law. She argued that the matter of
granting extension of time under Section 11, Rule 4 of the Rules7 pertains not to the SC, but to
the rehabilitation court.

The respondent likewise refuted the allegations of bias and partiality. First, she claimed that her
denial of the complainant’s motion for inhibition was not due to any bias or prejudice on her part
but due to lack of basis. Second, she argued that her decision was not orchestrated to favor

10 | P a g e
EPCIB, as evidenced by the fact that EPCIP itself (as some other creditors did) promptly
appealed her decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). Third, she did not remove Atty. Gabionza
as SCP’s rehabilitation receiver because she disagreed that the grounds the complainant raised
warranted his removal.

She also found no merit to the allegation of conflict of interest. Lastly, she maintained that the
rest of the complainant’s allegations were not substantiated and corroborated by evidence.

The respondent further alleged that she did not gravely abuse her authority in not issuing a
subpoena as Section 1, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation of the Rules
specifically states that the court may decide matters on the basis of affidavits and other
documentary evidence.

On the allegation of conflict of interest, she maintained that the allegations were not proven and
substantiated by evidence. Finally, the respondent also believed that there was nothing
improper in expressing her ideas during the informal meetings.

b. Comment to April 14, 2008 Supplemental Complaint

In her comment8 on the supplemental complaint, the respondent submitted that the photos she
posted in the social networking website "Friendster" could hardly be considered vulgar or lewd.
She added that an "off-shouldered" attire is an acceptable social outfit under contemporary
standards and is not forbidden. She further stated that there is no prohibition against attractive
ladies being judges; she is proud of her photo for having been aesthetically made. Lastly, she
submitted that the ruling of the Court in the case of Impao v. Judge Makilala9 should not be
applied to her case since the facts are different.

On July 4, 2008, the complainant filed a reply,10 insisting that the respondent’s acts of posting
"seductive" pictures and maintaining a "Friendster" account constituted acts of impropriety, in
violation of Rules 2.01,11 2.0212 and 2.03,13 Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

In a Resolution14 dated September 9, 2009, the Court re-docketed the complaints as regular
administrative matters, and referred them to the CA for investigation, report and
recommendation.

The CA’s Report and Recommendation

On November 13, 2009, Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, the Investigating Justice, conducted a
hearing, followed by the submission of memoranda by both parties. In her January 4, 2010
Report and Recommendation,15 Justice Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complaints were partly
meritorious. She found that the issues raised were judicial in nature since these involved the
respondent’s appreciation of evidence.

She also added that while the CA resolved to set aside the respondent’s decision in the
rehabilitation proceedings, it was not by reason of her ignorance of the law or abuse of
authority, but because the rehabilitation plan could no longer be implemented in view of SCP’s
financial predicament.

On the allegation of grave bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation proceedings, Justice
Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complainant failed to present any clear and convincing proof that
the respondent intentionally and deliberately acted against SCP’s interests; the complaint
merely relied on his opinions and surmises.

On the matter of the respondent’s inhibition, she noted that in cases not covered by the rule on
mandatory inhibition, the decision to inhibit lies within the discretion of the sitting judge and is
primarily a matter of conscience.

With respect to the respondent’s informal meetings, Justice Gonzales-Sison found nothing

11 | P a g e
irregular despite the out-of-court meetings as these were agreed upon by all the parties,
including SCP’s creditors. She also found satisfactory the respondent’s explanation in approving
the rehabilitation plan beyond the 180-day period prescribed by the Rules.

The foregoing notwithstanding, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the respondent’s unnecessary

bickering with SCP’s legal counsel and ruled that her exchanges and utterances were reflective
of arrogance and superiority. In the words of the Justice Gonzales-Sison:

Rather than rule on the manifestations of counsels, she instead brushed off the matter with what
would appear to be a conceited show of a prerogative of her office, a conduct that falls below
the standard of decorum expected of a judge. Her statements appear to be done recklessly and
were uncalled for. xxx. Section 6[,] Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary states that: judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings
before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses,
lawyers and others whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judicial decorum requires
judges to be temperate in their language at all times. Failure on this regard amounts to a
conduct unbecoming of a judge, for which Judge Austria should be held liable.16

On the respondent’s Friendster account, she believes that her act of maintaining a personal
social networking account (displaying photos of herself and disclosing personal details as a
magistrate in the account) – even during these changing times when social networking websites
seem to be the trend – constitutes an act of impropriety which cannot be legally justified by the
public’s acceptance of this type of conduct. She explained that propriety and the appearance of
propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge and that judges shall
conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

Finally, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the CA’s May 16, 2006 Decision17 in CA-G.R. SP No.
100941 finding that the respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the creation
of a management committee without first conducting an evidentiary hearing in accordance with
the procedures prescribed under the Rules. She ruled that such professional incompetence was
tantamount to gross ignorance of the law and procedure, and recommended a fine of
₱20,000.00. She also recommended that the respondent be admonished for failing to observe
strict propriety and judicial decorum required by her office.

The Action and Recommendation of the OCA

In its Memorandum18 dated September 4, 2013, the OCA recommended the following:

RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended for the consideration of the Honorable

Court that:

1) the Report dated January 4, 2010 of Investigating Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison be

NOTED;

2) respondent Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, Branch 2, Regional Trial Court, Batangas City,
Batangas, be found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming a judge and for violation of Section 6,
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct;

3) respondent Judge Austria be FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos

(Php20,000.00); and

4) respondent Judge Austria be ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of impropriety with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or any similar act will be dealt with more severely.19

In arriving at its recommendation the OCA found that the respondent was not guilty of gross
ignorance of the law as the complainant failed to prove that her orders were motivated by bad
faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.

12 | P a g e
The OCA also found that the charges of bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation
proceedings were not supported by evidence. It accepted the respondent’s explanation in the
charge of failure to observe the reglementary period.

Lastly, the OCA maintained that the allegations of grave abuse of authority and gross
incompetence are judicial in nature, hence, they should not be the subject of disciplinary action.
On the other hand, on allegations of conduct unbecoming of a judge, violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code), lack of circumspection and impropriety, the OCA shared
Justice Gonzales-Sison’s observations that the respondent’s act of posting seductive photos in
her Friendster account contravened the standard of propriety set forth by the Code.

The Court’s Ruling

We agree with the recommendation of both Justice Gonzales-Sison and the OCA for the
imposition of a fine on the respondent but modify the amount as indicated below. We sustain
Justice Gonzales-Sison’s finding of gross ignorance of the law in so far as the respondent
ordered the creation of a management committee without conducting an evidentiary hearing.
The absence of a hearing was a matter of basic due process that no magistrate should be
forgetful or careless about.

On the Charges of Grave Abuse of Authority;

Irregularity in the Performance of Duty; Grave
Bias and Partiality; and Lack of Circumspection

It is well settled that in administrative cases, the complainant bears the onus of proving the
averments of his complaint by substantial evidence.20 In the present case, the allegations of
grave abuse of authority, irregularity in the performance of duty, grave bias and partiality, and
lack of circumspection are devoid of merit because the complainant failed to establish the
respondent’s bad faith, malice or ill will. The complainant merely pointed to circumstances
based on mere conjectures and suppositions. These, by themselves, however, are not sufficient
to prove the accusations. "[M]ere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof."21

"[U]nless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith,
or deliberate intent to do an injustice, [the] respondent judge may not be held administratively
liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of official acts in the exercise
of judicial functions and duties, particularly in the adjudication of cases."22

Even granting that the respondent indeed erred in the exercise of her judicial functions, these
are, at best, legal errors correctible not by a disciplinary action, but by judicial remedies that are
readily available to the complainant. "An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy
for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is
available, such as a motion for reconsideration or an appeal."23 Errors committed by him/her in
the exercise of adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings
but should be assailed instead through judicial remedies.24

On the Charges of Grave Bias and Partiality

We likewise find the allegations of bias and partiality on the part of the respondent baseless.
The truth about the respondent’s alleged partiality cannot be determined by simply relying on
the complainant’s verified complaint. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, in light especially
of a judge’s sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without respect to the
person, and to give equal right to the poor and rich.25 There should be clear and convincing
evidence to prove the charge; mere suspicion of partiality is not enough.26

In the present case, aside from being speculative and judicial in character, the circumstances
cited by the complainant were grounded on mere opinion and surmises. The complainant, too,
failed to adduce proof indicating the respondent’s predisposition to decide the case in favor of
one party. This kind of evidence would have helped its cause. The bare allegations of the

13 | P a g e
complainant cannot overturn the presumption that the respondent acted regularly and
impartially. We thus conclude that due to the complainant’s failure to establish with clear, solid,
and convincing proof, the allegations of bias and partiality must fail.

On the Charges of Grave Incompetence

and Gross Ignorance of the Law

We agree with the findings of the OCA that not every error or mistake of a judge in the
performance of his official duties renders him liable.27 "[A]s a matter of policy, in the absence of
fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous."28

In the present case, what was involved was the respondent’s application of Section 23, Rule 4
of the Rules, which provides:

Sec. 23. Approval of the Rehabilitation Plan. - The court may approve a rehabilitation plan even
over the opposition of creditors holding a majority of the total liabilities of the debtor if, in its
judgment, the rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible and the opposition of the creditors is
manifestly unreasonable.29

The respondent approved the rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza, subject to the
modifications she found necessary to make the plan viable. The complainant alleged that in
modifying the plan, she exceeded her authority and effectively usurped the functions of a
rehabilitation receiver. We find, however, that in failing to show that the respondent was
motivated by bad faith or ill motives in rendering the assailed decision, the charge of gross
ignorance of the law against her should be dismissed. "To [rule] otherwise would be to render
judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process
of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment."30

To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the decision, order or actuation of
the judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence. It
must also be proven that he was moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption31 or had
committed an error so egregious that it amounted to bad faith.

In the present case, nothing in the records suggests that the respondent was motivated by bad
faith, fraud, corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in rendering her decision approving the
modified rehabilitation plan. Besides his bare accusations, the complainant failed to substantiate
his allegations with competent proof. Bad faith cannot be presumed32 and this Court cannot
conclude that bad faith intervened when none was actually proven.

With respect to the action of the respondent in ordering the creation of a management
committee without first conducting an evidentiary hearing for the purpose, however, we find the
error to be so egregious as to amount to bad faith, leading to the conclusion of gross ignorance
of the law, as charged.

Due process and fair play are basic requirements that no less than the Constitution demands. In
rehabilitation proceedings, the parties must first be given an opportunity to prove (or disprove)
the existence of an imminent danger of dissipation, loss, wastage or destruction of the debtor-
company’s assets and properties that are or may be prejudicial to the interest of minority
stockholders, parties-litigants or the general public.33 The rehabilitation court should hear both
sides, allow them to present proof and conscientiously deliberate, based on their submissions,
on whether the appointment of a management receiver is justified. This is a very basic
requirement in every adversarial proceeding that no judge or magistrate can disregard.

In SCP’s rehabilitation proceedings, SCP was not given at all the opportunity to present its
evidence, nor to confront the EPCIB witnesses. Significantly, the CA, in its May 16, 2006
decision, found that the respondent’s act of denying SCP the opportunity to disprove the
grounds for the appointment of a management committee was tantamount to grave abuse of

14 | P a g e
discretion. As aptly observed by Justice Gonzales-Sison:

[T]he acts of the respondent judge (Judge Austria) in creating a MANCOM without observing the
procedures prescribed under the IRPGICC clearly constitute grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction.34

Indeed, while a judge may not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for every erroneous
order that he renders, this does not mean that a judge need not observe due care in the
performance of his/her official functions.35 When a basic principle of law is involved and when
an error is so gross and patent, error can produce an inference of bad faith, making the judge
liable for gross ignorance of the law.36 On this basis, we conclude that the respondent’s act of
promptly ordering the creation of a management committee, without the benefit of a hearing and
despite the demand for one, was tantamount to punishable professional incompetence and
gross ignorance of the law.

On the Ground of Failure to Observe

the Reglementary Period

On the respondent’s failure to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Rules, we find
the respondent’s explanation to be satisfactory.

Section 11, Rule 4 of the previous Rules provides:

Sec. 11. Period of the Stay Order. – xxx

The petition shall be dismissed if no rehabilitation plan is approved by the court upon the lapse
of one hundred eighty (180) days from the date of the initial hearing. The court may grant an
extension beyond this period only if it appears by convincing and compelling evidence that the
debtor may successfully be rehabilitated. In no instance, however, shall the period for approving
or disapproving a rehabilitation plan exceed eighteen (18) months from the date of filing of the
petition.37

Under this provision, the matter of who would grant the extension beyond the 180-day period
carried a good measure of ambiguity as it did not indicate with particularity whether the
rehabilitation court could act by itself or whether Supreme Court approval was still required.
Only recently was this uncertainty clarified when A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC, the 2008 Rules of
Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation, took effect.

Section 12, Rule 4 of the Rules provides:

Section 12. Period to Decide Petition. - The court shall decide the petition within one (1) year
from the date of filing of the petition, unless the court, for good cause shown, is able to secure
an extension of the period from the Supreme Court.38

Since the new Rules only took effect on January 16, 2009 (long after the respondent’s approval
of the rehabilitation plan on December 3, 2007), we find no basis to hold the respondent liable
for the extension she granted and for the consequent delay.

On the Ground of Conduct

Unbecoming of a Judge

On the allegation of conduct unbecoming of a judge, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct states that:

SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and
be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with
whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal
representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control.39

15 | P a g e
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity,
independence and respect for himself/herself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must
exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint.40 He should
choose his words and exercise more caution and control in expressing himself. In other words,
a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas.41

As held in De la Cruz (Concerned Citizen of Legazpi City) v. Judge Carretas,42 a judge should
be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court; he should always keep
his passion guarded. He can never allow it to run loose and overcome his reason. Furthermore,
a magistrate should not descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by
uttering harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments.

Similarly in Attys. Guanzon and Montesino v. Judge Rufon,43 the Court declared that "although
respondent judge may attribute his intemperate language to human frailty, his noble position in
the bench nevertheless demands from him courteous speech in and out of court.

Judges are required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in
language."

Accordingly, the respondent’s unnecessary bickering with SCP’s legal counsel, her expressions
of exasperation over trivial procedural and negligible lapses, her snide remarks, as well as her
condescending attitude, are conduct that the Court cannot allow. They are displays of arrogance
and air of superiority that the Code abhors.

Records and transcripts of the proceedings bear out that the respondent failed to observe
judicial temperament and to conduct herself irreproachably. She also failed to maintain the
decorum required by the Code and to use temperate language befitting a magistrate. "As a
judge, [she] should ensure that [her] conduct is always above reproach and perceived to be so
by a reasonable observer. [She] must never show conceit or even an appearance thereof, or
any kind of impropriety."44

Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.

In these lights, the respondent exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge and thus violated
Section 6, Canon 6 and Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

On the Ground of Impropriety

We are not unaware of the increasing prevalence of social networking sites in the Internet – a
new medium through which more and more Filipinos communicate with each other.45 While
judges are not prohibited from becoming members of and from taking part in social networking
activities, we remind them that they do not thereby shed off their status as judges. They carry
with them in cyberspace the same ethical responsibilities and duties that every judge is
expected to follow in his/her everyday activities. It is in this light that we judge the respondent in
the charge of impropriety when she posted her pictures in a manner viewable by the public.

Lest this rule be misunderstood, the New Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit a judge
from joining or maintaining an account in a social networking site such as Friendster. Section 6,
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are
entitled to freedom of expression. This right "includes the freedom to hold opinions without
interference and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers."46
Joining a social networking site is an exercise of one’s freedom of expression. The respondent
judge’s act of joining Friendster is, therefore, per se not violative of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct.

16 | P a g e
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, however, also imposes a correlative
restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they should always conduct
themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the Judiciary.

This rule reflects the general principle of propriety expected of judges in all of their activities,
whether it be in the course of their judicial office or in their personal lives. In particular, Sections
1 and 2 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct prohibit impropriety and even the
appearance of impropriety in all of their activities:

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.

SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions
that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and
willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the
dignity of the judicial office.

Based on this provision, we hold that the respondent disregarded the propriety and appearance
of propriety required of her when she posted Friendster photos of herself wearing an "off-
shouldered" suggestive dress and made this available for public viewing.

To restate the rule: in communicating and socializing through social networks, judges must bear
in mind that what they communicate – regardless of whether it is a personal matter or part of his
or her judicial duties – creates and contributes to the people’s opinion not just of the judge but of
the entire Judiciary of which he or she is a part. This is especially true when the posts the judge
makes are viewable not only by his or her family and close friends, but by acquaintances and
the general public.

Thus, it may be acceptable for the respondent to show a picture of herself in the attire she wore
to her family and close friends, but when she made this picture available for public consumption,
she placed herself in a situation where she, and the status she holds as a judge, may be the
object of the public’s criticism and ridicule. The nature of cyber communications, particularly its
speedy and wide-scale character, renders this rule necessary.

We are not also unaware that the respondent’s act of posting her photos would seem harmless
and inoffensive had this act been done by an ordinary member of the public. As the visible
personification of law and justice, however, judges are held to higher standards of conduct and
thus must accordingly comport themselves.47

This exacting standard applies both to acts involving the judicial office and personal
matters.1âwphi1 The very nature of their functions requires behavior under exacting standards
of morality, decency and propriety; both in the performance of their duties and their daily
personal lives, they should be beyond reproach.48 Judges necessarily accept this standard of
conduct when they take their oath of office as magistrates.

Imposable Penalty

Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross
ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge. Under Section 11(A) of the
same Rule, a serious charge merits any of the following sanctions:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine,
and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations; provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits
shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

17 | P a g e
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3), but not
exceeding six (6), months; or

3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00, but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.

On the other hand, conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section
10, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. It is penalized under Section 11(C) thereof by any of the
following: (1) A fine of not less than ₱1,000.00 but not exceeding ₱10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3)
Reprimand; and ( 4) Admonition with warning.

Judge Austria's record shows that she had never been administratively charged or found liable
for any wrongdoing in the past. Since this is her first offense, the Court finds it fair and proper to
temper the penalty for her offenses.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria guilty of GROSS IGNORANCE OF
THE LAW for which she is FINED Twenty-One Thousand Pesos (₱21,000,00). Judge Austria is
likewise hereby ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of IMPROPRIETY and to refrain from
CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

3. Sison-Barias vs Rubia
DECISION

PER CURIAM :

Public trust requires that we exact strict integrity from judges and court employees. This case
emphasizes the need for members of the judiciary and those within its employ to exhibit the
impartiality, prudence, and propriety that the New Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel require when dealing with parties in pending cases.

Complainant Emilie Sison-Barias is involved in three cases pending before the sala of
respondent Judge Marino Rubia.

The first case is an intestate proceeding.1 Complainant filed a petition for letters of
administration over the intestate estate of her late husband, Ramon A. Barias. This was
opposed by her mother-in-law, Romelias Almeda-Barias.2

The second case is a guardianship proceeding over Romelias Almeda-Barias.3 Evelyn Tanael,
the guardian appointed by the court, submitted a property inventory report that included not only
the properties of Romelias Almeda-Barias but also properties forming part of the estate of
complainant’s late husband.4

The third case is a civil action5 for annulment of contracts and reconveyance of real properties
filed by Romelias Almeda-Barias, represented by Evelyn Tanael, against complainant, among
others.6

In all these cases, a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-510712 and
part of the estate of complainant’s husband was involved.7

Complainant alleged that there was delay in the publication of the notice in the petition for
issuance of letters of administration filed. She was then informed by her brother, Enrique "Ike"
Sison, that respondent Eileen Pecaña, the daughter of his good friend, was a data encoder in
the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna.8

Complainant, together with her two brothers, Enrique and Perlito "Jun" Sison, Jr.,9 met with

18 | P a g e
respondent Pecaña on February 20, 2010.10 During this meeting, complainant informed
respondent Pecaña of the delay in the publication of the notice in the petition for issuance of
letters of administration. She then asked respondent Pecaña to check the status of the
publication of the notice.11 Respondent Pecaña asked for complainant’s number so that she
could inform her as soon as any development takes place in the case.12 Enrique13 and
Perlito14 executed affidavits to corroborate these allegations.

Respondent Pecaña asked complainant to meet her again at her house in Biñan, Laguna.15
Complainant went there with Enrique.16 Respondent Pecaña then informed complainant that
she could no longer assist her since respondent Judge Rubia had already given administration
of the properties to Evelyn Tanael.17

Complainant stated that she was not interested in the grant of administration to Tanael because
these concerned the properties of her mother-in-law, Romelias Almeda-Barias.18 She was only
concerned with the administration of the properties of her late husband, to which respondent
Pecaña replied, "Ah ganun ba? Iba pala ung kaso mo."19

Complainant alleged that respondent Pecaña sent her a text message on March 2, 201020
asking complainant to call her. Complainant called respondent Pecaña who informed her that
respondent Judge Rubia wanted to talk to her.21 Complainant agreed to meet with respondent
Judge Rubia over dinner, on the condition that respondent Pecaña would be present as well.22

On March 3, 201023 at around 7:00 p.m, complainant picked up respondent Pecaña at 6750
Ayala Avenuein Makati City. They proceeded to Café Juanita in The Fort, Bonifacio Global City.
Respondent Pecaña said that respondent Judge Rubia would arrive late as he would be coming
from a Rotary Club meeting held at the Mandarin Hotel.24

Respondent Judge Rubia arrived at Café Juanita around 8:30 p.m. During the dinner meeting,
respondents allegedly asked complainant inappropriate questions. Respondent Judge Rubia
allegedly asked whether she was still connected with Philippine Airlines, which she still was at
that time.25 Complainant was then informed that respondent Judge Rubia knew of this fact
through Atty. Noe Zarate, counsel of Romelias Almeda-Barias.26 This disclosure surprised
complainant,as she was under the impression that opposing counsel and respondent
JudgeRubia had no business discussing matters that were not relevant to their pending
cases.27

Respondent Judge Rubia also allegedly asked her questions about her supposed involvement
with another man and other accusations made by Romelias Almeda-Barias.28 She was asked
about the hospital where she brought her husband at the time of his cardiac arrest.29

These details, according to complainant, were never discussed in the pleadings or in the course
of the trial.30 Thus, she inferred that respondent Judge Rubia had been talking to the opposing
counsel regarding these matters outside of the court proceedings.31 The impression of
complainant was that respondent Judge Rubia was actively taking a position in favor of Atty.
Zarate.32

To confirm her suspicion, respondents then allegedly "told complainant to just talk to Atty.
Zarate, counsel for the oppositor, claiming that he is a nice person. Complainant was appalled
by such suggestion and replied[,] ‘Why will I talk to him? Judge di ko yata kaya gawin un.’"33

After dinner, complainant stayed behind to settle the bill. Even before he left, she alleged that
respondent Judge Rubia had made insinuations that she was awaiting the company of another
man.34

From then on, complainant and respondents did not communicate and/or meet outside the
courtroom until August 8, 2010.

In the meantime, complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia acted in a manner that

19 | P a g e
showed manifest partiality in favor of the opposing parties, namely, Romelias Almeda-Barias
and Evelyn Tanael, as represented by their counsel, Atty. Noe Zarate.35

On June 15, 2010, counsel for complainant was personally handed a copy of a motion for
consolidation filed by the oppositor, Romelias Almeda-Barias, despite the date of the hearing on
such motion being set on June 18, 2010.36 Complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia
did not even consider the comment/opposition to the motion for consolidation filed by her
counsel, which stated that since two of these cases were special proceedings, they could not be
consolidated with an ordinary civil action. Respondent Judge Rubia insisted on discussing the
totality of the different issues involved in the three distinct cases under one court proceeding.37
As such, complainant alleged that the main issues of the special proceedings were consolidated
with matters that were properly the subject of a separate civil action.38 Complainant alleged that
respondent Judge Rubia refused to issue Orders39 that would have allowed her to comply with
her duties as the special administrator of her late husband’s estate.40 This included the order to
conduct an inventory of the properties, rights, and credits of the deceased, subject to the
authority of the administrator.

In addition, complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia refused to grant her request for
subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum that she had prayed for to compel Evelyn Tanael
to produce the documents showing the accrued rentals of the parcel of land belonging toher late
husband.41 As such, complainant raised that respondent Judge Rubia’s refusal emboldened
Evelyn Tanael and oppositor Romelias Almeda-Barias to interfere in the management of the
estate of complainant’s late husband.42 Because of this refusal, she asserted that respondent
Judge Rubia failed to adhere to the duty of the court to ensure a proper inventory of the
estate.43

Complainant enumerated occasions that alleged manifest partiality on the part of respondent
Judge Rubia. She alleged that respondent Judge Rubia failed to require a timely filing of the
pre-trial brief on the part of Evelyn Tanael and Romelias Almeda-Barias, and despite their
noncompliance on four (4) separate pre-trials that were postponed, Tanael and Almeda-Barias
were not declared in default.44 She also alleged that respondent Judge Rubia stated that the
burden to prove ownership of the property was on complainant, when in fact it was the
oppositor, or Tanael and Almeda-Barias, who had the burden of proof to show that the land was
fraudulently transferred to her late husband.45

Complainant admitted that she did not inform her counsel of the dinner meeting she had with
respondents.46 It was Enrique who allegedly told complainant’s lawyers about it when he went
to the lawyer’s office to pay some bills.47 Complainant said that her lawyer immediately
admonished her for agreeing to meet with respondent Judge Rubia. Complainant then texted
respondent Pecaña on August 8, 2010 on her lawyer’s reaction concerning the March 3, 2010
meeting. The following exchanges took place via text message:

COMPLAINANT:

Hi Aileen! Sorry jz feeling bad. . my lawyer jz called me at galit n galit. My brother went to hm
today to pay som bills. Sa kakadaldal na mention s lawyr my meeting wid u n judge rubia. My
lawyr ws mad dat m nt suppose to do dat w/out hs knowledge. I cnt understand anymore wat he
ws sayng kanina kse nga galit. He wil file yata somtng abt dat n I dnt knwwat? Pls. Help me.
(August 8, 2010, 2:31 p.m.)

AILEEN PECAÑA [sic]:

Ha? Anong ififile? Bkt xa galit? Bka lalo tayo mapahamak? (August 8, 2010, 3:48 p.m.)

COMPLAINANT

M nt very sure bt he mentioned abt administrative or administratn something. I hav to talk to hm

n person para mas claro. Hirap kse by fon tlaga. He ws mad bcoz f our meetng nga, dats wat

20 | P a g e
struck hm. Sorry, daldal kse ni kuya. M going to col kuya tomorrow na. Its 1am na hr, I have to
buy foncard pa. (August 8, 2010, 4:18 p.m.)

AILEEN PECAÑA [sic]

Admin? Nku d mapapahamak nga kaming 2 ni juj. Pati ikaw mapapahamak pa dn. (August 8,
2010, 4:28 p.m.)

AILEEN PECAÑA [sic]

Bkt xa galit kng mkpg kta ka sminwidout his knowledge. I cnt fathom y wil it end up filing an
admin case. (August 8, 2010, 4:29 p.m.)

AILEEN PECAÑA [sic]

Pls Emily do something 2 pacify ur lawyer, juj rubia will definitely get mad wid us. (August 8,
2010, 4:30 p.m.)48 (Emphasis supplied)

On September 15, 2010, complainant moved for respondent Judge Rubia’s inhibition. This was
denied on October 6, 2010. Complainant then filed a motion for reconsideration denied in an
order49 dated November 15, 2010.50

On November 11, 2010, complainant filed a complaint affidavit51 before the Office of the Court
Administrator charging respondent Pecaña for gross misconduct and respondent Judge Rubia
for conduct unbecoming of a judge, partiality, gross ignorance of the law or procedure,
incompetence, and gross misconduct.52

The Office of the Court Administrator referred the complaint to respondents for comment.53

In her comment,54 respondent Pecaña did not deny meeting complainant on February 20, 2010
through the introduction of Enrique Sison.55 However, she claimed that the alleged meeting
between complainant and respondent Judge Rubia was merely a chance encounter.

Respondent Pecaña alleged that "sometime [in the] second week of March 2010,"56 when she
was on her way to Makati City to meet her sisters for coffee, complainant invited her for dinner.
Respondent Pecaña hesitantly agreed after complainant had insisted.57 Complainant picked
her up at Starbucks 6750 in Makati City, and they proceeded to Café Juanita in Burgos Circle
for dinner. Upon passing by Burgos Circle, respondent Pecaña saw respondent Judge Rubia’s
car parked near Café Juanita.58

At about past 10:00 p.m., respondent Pecaña said that she saw respondent Judge Rubia
together with some companions walking toward his car.59 She stepped out of the restaurant
and greeted him. Complainant allegedly followed respondent Pecaña and so the latter was
constrained to introduce complainant as an employee of Philippine Airlines to respondent Judge
Rubia.60 After the introduction, respondent Judge Rubia went to his car and left. Complainant
and respondent Pecaña returned to the restaurant to finish their food and pay the bill.61

Complainant drove respondent Pecaña back to Makati City. During the drive, complainant
allegedly asked her help regarding the cases filed in court and inquired as to what she could
give to respondent Judge Rubia because her lawyers instructed her to bribe him. Respondent
Pecaña only said that respondent Judge Rubia does not accept money and that he is financially
stable.62

After the dinner, complainant allegedly kept on sending text messages to respondent Pecaña
concerning her case filed in court.63 Respondent Pecaña admitted to the exchanges through
text messages she had with complainant on August 8, 2010 regarding the filing of administrative
case against her and respondent Judge Rubia.64

21 | P a g e
Respondent Pecaña denied being an advocate of Atty. Zarate.65 She maintained the position
that she should not be held administratively liable for what she construed to be primarily judicial
matters, such as the bases for respondent Judge Rubia’s decisions and orders in court.66

Respondent Judge Rubia filed his comment67 on January 17, 2011.

Respondent Judge Rubia claimed that the alleged meeting between him and his co-respondent
Pecaña together with complainant was a mere chance encounter.68 He denied any pre-
arranged dinner meeting, stating that after the brief encounter with complainant, he had to rush
home to attend to his ailing wife.69 He stated that he was only introduced to complainant
because she was an employee of Philippine Airlines where he was a former executive.70
Respondent Judge Rubia argued that if the alleged meeting with complainant did take place, it
should have been mentioned in the first motion for inhibition.71 Further, he emphasized that it
took complainant eight (8) months since the alleged dinner meeting to file a motion for inhibition
and an administrative case.72

Respondent Judge Rubia surmised that complainant and her counsel, hoping for a favorable
outcome of the cases filed, initiated contact with respondent Pecaña. The filing of the
administrative case against him was only to compel him to inhibit from the cases to seek a
friendlier forum.73

Moreover, respondent Judge Rubia denied knowledge of any text messages exchanged
between complainant and respondent Pecaña as well as any active advocacy in favor of
opposing counsel, Atty. Zarate.74

As to the allegations of partiality concerning the orders he issued for the cases filed, respondent
Judge Rubia argued that the best forum to ventilate complainant’s allegations was not through
an administrative proceeding but through judicial recourse.75

Due to the gravity of the charges and the conflicting facts presented by the parties, the Office of
the Court Administrator recommended the referral of the administrative complaint to a Court of
Appeals Justice for investigation, report, and recommendation.76

On September 12, 2011, this court issued a resolution referring the administrative complaint to a
Justice of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report, and recommendation.77 The complaint
was assigned to Court of Appeals Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan.

On December 5, 2011, Atty. Noe Zarate filed a motion for Intervention78 allegedly due to the
implication of his name in the administrative complaint.79

Atty. Zarate argued that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping
because the orders issued by respondent Judge Rubia and mentioned in the complaint were
assailed in a petition for certiorari.80

Further, Atty. Zarate alleged that he did not know respondents personally, and he was not
closely associated with them.81 He asserted that the records were replete with incidents where
he and respondent Judge Rubia engaged in heated discussions on legal matters.82 He
maintained that he did not foster any closeness or personal affinity with respondent Judge
Rubia that would substantiate complainant’s allegations.83

In addition, Atty. Zarate expressed his agreement with respondents’ narration of the events on
the alleged dinner meeting.84 He argued that if the dinner meeting did take place, this incident
should have been the ground for the motion for inhibition filed.85

Atty. Zarate stated that, granting arguendo that the dinner meeting happened, there was nothing
"wrong, improper or illegal"86 about it. It could have been reasonably interpreted as an
extrajudicial means initiated by respondent Judge Rubia to assuage the parties in the
contentious litigation.87

22 | P a g e
The motion for intervention was noted without action by Justice Gaerlan.88

On December 15, 2011, the parties, together with their counsels, appeared before Justice
Gaerlan. It was agreed that respondents would file their respective supplemental comments and
complainant her reply to the comment. Complainant manifested that she would present three (3)
witnesses: herself and her two brothers. Respondent Pecaña would testify for herself and
present Semenidad Pecaña, her aunt, as witness. Respondent Judge Rubia manifested that he
would testify on his behalf and present respondent Pecaña as witness.89

Respondents Judge Rubia and Pecaña filed their respective supplemental comments dated
December 15, 201190 and December 16, 2011,91 respectively. Complainant filed her
consolidated reply on January 17, 2012.92

A second hearing on the administrative complaint ensued on January 10, 2012 where
complainant testified on the dinner meeting on March 3, 2010.

During the hearing, complainant identified a document containing a list of phone calls showing
that she called respondent Pecaña on March 2 and 3, 2010.93 Counsel for respondent Pecaña
stipulated that these calls were made to her.94

The hearing of the administrative complaint continued on January 12, 17, and 24, 2012.

In the January 17, 2012 hearing, respondent Pecaña testified to the allegations in her comment
and judicial affidavit. She alleged for the first time that the dinner meeting with complainant
happened on March 10, not March 3, 2010.

On January 24, 2012, Mr. Rodel Cortez, secretariat of the Rotary Club of Makati Southwest
Chapter, was presented as witness for respondent Judge Rubia. Rodel testified that the Rotary
Club of Makati Southwest Chapter had a meeting on March 10, 2010 at Numa Restaurant in
Bonifacio Global City. Respondent Judge Rubia attended the meeting as shown in the
attendance sheet identified by Rodel.

Rodel testified that after the meeting, he, Billy Francisco, and respondent Judge Rubia walked
together toward the parking area. When they were nearing Burgos Circle where their cars were
parked, Rodel allegedly saw complainant and respondent Pecaña approaching them.95 He then
saw respondent Pecaña introduce complainant to respondent Judge Rubia.96 After the
introduction, he saw respondent Judge Rubia go to his car and drive away.97

Respondent Judge Rubia testified for himself. He identified the comment and judicial affidavit
filed.98 He alleged that the encounter with complainant at Burgos Circle was on March 10, not
March 3, 2010.99

Complying with the order dated January 31, 2012,100 the parties filed their respective
memoranda.

Justice Gaerlan submitted his investigation report dated March 13, 2012.101 In his report,
Justice Gaerlan recommended that no penalty be imposed against respondents.102 He was
"convinced that the meeting at Burgos Circle was just a chance encounter"103 and found that
complainant failed to prove her claim with substantial evidence that would justify the imposition
of a penalty on respondents.104

Justice Gaerlan relied on the testimony of Rodel Cortez as against the uncorroborated
testimony of complainant.105

Justice Gaerlan emphasized the fact that it had taken complainant eight (8) months before she
filed the administrative complaint.106 He stated that the deliberate concealment of the meeting
was inconsistent with her resolve to prove respondent Judge Rubia’s alleged partiality toward

23 | P a g e
the counsel of the opposing party.107

As to the other charges against respondent Judge Rubia, Justice Gaerlan stated that the
administrative case was not the proper recourse for complainant.108 The proper action for her
was to pursue remedial action through the courts "to rectify the purported error"109 in the court
proceedings.

The Office of the Court Administrator referred the report to this court.

The issue in this case is whether respondents Judge Rubia and Pecaña should be held
administratively liable.

This court must set aside the findings of fact and reject the report of Justice Samuel Gaerlan.
Respondents Judge Rubia and Pecaña should be held administratively liable for their actions.
The findings of fact of an investigating justice must be accorded great weight and finality similar
with the weight given to a trial court judge’s since an investigating justice personally assessed
the witnesses’ credibility.110 However, this rule admits of exceptions.

In J. King & Sons Company, Inc. v. Judge Hontanosas, Jr.,111 this court held:

Such findings may be reviewed if there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of
weight which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and
which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case. Among the circumstances which
had been held to be justifiable reasons for the Court to re-examine the trial court or appellate
court’s findings of facts are, when the interference made is manifestly mistaken; when the
judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and when the finding of fact of the trial court or
appellate court is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by
evidence on record.112 (Citations omitted)

These exceptions are applicable in this case. In disregarding the complainant’s testimony and
relying on the testimony of Cortez, respondent Judge Rubia’s witness, Justice Gaerlan said:

While respondents were able to present a witness to corroborate their version of the incident on
all material points, complainant miserably failed on this regard. The Investigating Justice who
had the untrammeled opportunity to observe the deportment and demeanor of the respondent’s
witness, Rodel Cortez (Cortez) during the hearing finds his forthright narration of facts credible
and rang with truth. The clear, candid and unmistakable declaration of Cortez that the incident
that transpired along the sidewalk of Burgos Circle was just a chance encounter, absent any
ulterior motive for him to perjure, swayed this Investigating Justice to believe that the dinner
meeting between Judge Rubia and Barias did not [take] place. A testimony is credible if it bears
the earmarks of truth and sincerity and has been delivered in a spontaneous, natural, and
straightforward manner.

Not only that. Cortez’[s] testimony was likewise corroborated by other pieces of evidence, such
as the Program of Meeting and the Attendance Sheet of the Rotary Club of Makati Southwest
which tend to prove that at that particular date and time Judge Rubia was in a rotary meeting
and was not dining with Rubia and Pecaña. These evidence, when taken together, debase the
uncorroborated version of incident as narrated by Barias. Barias[’] self-serving declarations
have no evidentiary value when ranged against the testimony of a credible witness on
affirmative matters.113 (Emphasis supplied)

We cannot agree with Justice Gaerlan’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight given to their testimonies.

Justice Gaerlan placed too much importance on the testimony of Rodel Cortez, the Secretariat
of the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter, and qualified him as a "disinterested" witness.

A disinterested witness’ testimony is afforded evidentiary weight by his or her lack of interest in

24 | P a g e
the outcome of the case.1âwphi1 This lack of stake makes the disinterested witness’ testimony
more believable. To actively take part in litigation as a party or a witness entails willingness to
commit to the arduous and exacting nature of most judicial proceedings. The disinterested
witness’ candor and submission to the proceedings before the court add credibility and
believability to the content of his or her testimony.

To qualify a witness as truly disinterested, courts should analyze the circumstances that
surround his or her testimony.

The record shows that the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter, employed Rodel in
1989.114 He was appointed Secretariat in 1994 where respondent Judge Rubia was a former
President and remains an active member.115

The finding that respondent Judge Rubia is administratively liable could taint the reputation of
the organization that the witness has been serving for more than 20 years. It would be a definite
blow to the reputation of the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter, if its former President
were to be found guilty of the offenses that complainant imputed upon respondent Judge Rubia.
The possibility of Rodel testifying in favor of respondent Judge Rubia as a result of his loyalty to
the latter and the Rotary Club puts into question the characterization that he is disinterested.
The substance of Rodel’s narration of events should also be scrutinized.

Complainant alleged that the dinner meeting set among her, respondent Pecaña, and
respondent Judge Rubia took place on March 3, 2010, as indicated in the investigation report of
Justice Gaerlan. The record shows that the Investigating Justice accepted the formal offer of
Exhibit A, which was complainant’s judicial affidavit establishing the date of the dinner as March
3, 2010 in Café Juanita.116 Complainant also alleged in her complaint that respondent Judge
Rubia came from Mandarin Hotel in Makati from the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter
meeting.117

The testimony of Rodel and the evidence submitted by respondents alleged that the chance
meeting of respondent Judge Rubia with complainant and respondent Pecaña took place on
March 10, 2010 on the side street of Burgos Circle in Bonifacio Global City, after the Rotary
Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter meeting and dinner at Numa Restaurant, on their way to the
parking lot. This means that the testimony of and the evidence presented by Rodel do not
disprove the occurrence of the dinner meeting as alleged by complainant, since the meeting of
the Rotary Club and the dinner meeting alleged by complainant took place on different dates.
Assuming that the alleged chance meeting between complainant and respondent Judge Rubia
took place on March 10, 2010 as alleged by respondents, this does not discount the veracity of
complainant’s allegations. Both the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter dinner and the
dinner meeting alleged by complainant took place in the vicinity of Bonifacio Global City. This
could have allowed respondent Judge Rubia ample time to travel to the dinner meeting after the
meeting of the Rotary Club of Makati.

The investigation report stated that the attendance sheet118 and the program of meeting that
Rodel submitted corroborated his testimony. The date indicated on the attendance sheet and on
the program of meeting was March 10, 2010, not March 3, 2010. However, there was nothing to
indicate the time of arrival or departure of the attendees. Neither was there an indication of the
time when the meeting began or ended. The attendance sheet and the program of meeting, by
themselves or taken as corroborative evidence of Rodel’s testimony, do not discount the distinct
and tangible possibility that the dinner meeting as narrated by complainant took place. On the
other hand, we find the allegation that the dinner meeting took place on March 3, 2010 more
credible.

Complainant presented a document containing a list of calls she made from January to March
2010.119 She identified her cellular phone number120 as well as respondent Pecaña’s.121
Respondent Pecaña admitted that the number identified by complainant was her number.122
On March 2 and 3, 2010, calls were made to respondent Pecaña’s number.123 Respondent
Pecaña admitted that she had received a call from complainant before the latter picked her up

25 | P a g e
at 6750 Makati City.124 However, no calls to respondent Pecaña were recorded on March 10,
2010 in the document presented.125 On the other hand, the calls made to respondent Pecaña
as shown in the document coincided with complainant’s allegations.

Finally, during the December 15, 2011 hearing, respondent Judge only manifested that he
would testify for himself and present respondent Pecaña as witness.126 He did not manifest
that he would be presenting Rodel or any participant in the Rotary Club meeting as his witness.

The totality of these circumstances places doubt on the alibi of respondent Judge Rubia and
Rodel’s narration of events.

The differing accounts on the dates and the venues were not addressed in the investigation
report of Justice Gaerlan. The report failed to mention that complainant alleged that respondent
Judge Rubia arrived late precisely because he came from a meeting of the Rotary Club of
Makati. These glaring inconsistencies did not add evidentiary weight to respondents’ claims.
They only put into question the veracity of the exculpatory evidence.

This court has held:

In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required to establish a respondent’s

malfeasance is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is
required. Faced with conflicting versions of complainant and respondent, the Court gives more
weight to the allegations and testimony of the complainant and her witnesses who testified
clearly and consistently before the Investigating Judge.127 (Emphasis supplied; citations
omitted)

After scrutinizing the testimony of complainant and the evidence she presented to support her
allegations, we find her account of the event to be genuine and believable.

Complainant’s narration of the dinner meeting held on March 3, 2010 and her account of events
leading up to the dinner meeting were detailed and comprehensive. The conversation alleged
by complainant that took place with respondents during the meeting was replete with details.

The strongest corroborative evidence to support complainant’s allegations was the exchange of
text messages between complainant and respondent Pecaña regarding the dinner meeting.
These text messages were admitted by respondent Pecaña.128 However, Justice Gaerlan
failed to give any weight to the exchange of text messages. This fact was not included in his
investigation report.129

The content of the text messages of respondent Pecaña belied respondents’ claim that the
alleged dinner meeting in Burgos Circle was only a chance encounter.

AILEEN PECAÑA [sic]

Bkt xa galit kngmkpg kta ka smin widout his knowledge. I cnt fathom y wil it end up filing an
admin case. (August 8, 2010, 4:29 p.m.)

AILEEN PECAÑA [sic]

Pls Emily do something 2 pacify ur lawyer, juj rubia will definitely get mad wid us. (August 8,
2010, 4:30 p.m.)130 (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent Pecaña used the phrase, "mkpg kta," which may be translated to "have a meeting."
"Mkpg kta" can in no way mean a chance encounter.

Further, respondent Pecaña’s text messages sent to complainant belied her claim of an
innocent chance encounter. She said that respondent Judge Rubia would get angry after

26 | P a g e
complainant had informed her that her lawyer might file an administrative case against them.
Respondent Judge Rubia would not have had a reason to get upset because of the possibility of
administrative liability if an innocent and coincidental encounter happened and not a dinner
meeting. However, if the meeting took place as alleged by complainant, this would have
logically led to a hostile reaction from respondents, particularly respondent Judge Rubia.

In her testimony before Justice Gaerlan, respondent Pecaña gave the following testimony:

ATTY FERNANDEZ:

In August 2010, you admitted in your comment and your supplemental comment that you
received a text coming from Emilie Barias saying her lawyer is mad with her because of that
meeting, isn’t it?

EILEEN PECAÑA:

Yes, sir.

ATTY FERNANDEZ:

In fact you admitted that there were text messages coming from you and Judge Rubia in March
2010, isn’t it?

EILEEN PECAÑA:

Yes, sir.

ATTY FERNANDEZ:

And in fact, you admitted that there were [sic] indeed a text message coming from you and this
is: ["]ha anong ipafile baka lalo tayong mapapahamk?["] And another message says "bakit
siya...another...did you do something to pacify her lawyer...so you affirm these message [sic]?
EILEEN PECAÑA:

Yes, sir.

ATTY FERNANDEZ:

Based on those messages of yours, is it correct that you fear....?

EILEEN PECAÑA:

I am not afraid in a way na pinalalabas nila.

ATTY. FERNANDEZ:

And in fact in your comment and in your supplemental comment you were explaining the context
of these messages?

EILEEN PECAÑA:

Alin po doon?

ATTY. FERNANDEZ

The first one? "bakit sya galit baka lalo tayong mapahamak"

EILEEN PECAÑA:

27 | P a g e
Ang ipinapaliwanag ko chance meeting outside the street.

ATTY. FERNANDEZ

How about the part where "administrative[. . . .]"

EILEEN PECAÑA:

The reason why I said that is because as employees of the court, whenever an administrative
case is filed against us[,] we will be investigated like this, and our benefits and promotion
chances we will be disqualified.

ATTY. FERNANDEZ

In your text messages you never mentioned to Emilie that it would end up in an administrative
case because you simply thought that it was a chance meeting?

EILEEN PECAÑA:

Ano po sir?

ATTY. FERNANDEZ:

You cannot fathom why it will end up as an administrative case because it was only a chance
meeting?

EILEEN PECAÑA:

Immediately on the text messages she knows already what happened why should I have to
explain?

....

ATTY. FERNANDEZ:

Did you tell her while exchanging text messages that it was just a chance meeting?

EILEEN PECAÑA:

No more, sir.

ATTY. FERNANDEZ:

So you no longer took it upon you to tell Emilie to advise her lawyer not to get mad becauseit
was only a chance meeting? (No answer from the witness.)131

Respondents also alleged that the chance encounter happened because respondent Pecaña,
while having dinner with complainant, stepped out of the restaurant to greet respondent Judge
Rubia on the side street of Burgos Circle. Since complainant allegedly followed respondent
Pecaña out of the restaurant, the latter introduced complainant to respondent Judge Rubia.

This allegation is quite implausible after taking into account the following admissions:

1. Respondent Pecaña described her relationship with Judge Rubia as "[w]ala naman po
masyado. My dealing with the Judge is only in relation with my work because during flag
ceremonies he always reminds us not to act as go between or not to be involved in the cases
filed in the court."132

28 | P a g e
2. Respondent Judge Rubia is not the immediate superior of respondent Pecaña as the latter is
in the Office of the Clerk of Court.

3. Respondent Pecaña was having dinner with complainant whom she knew had a pending
case before respondent Judge Rubia.

4. Respondent Judge Rubia always reminded court employees not to have dealings with
litigants.

There was clearly no reason for respondent Pecaña to go out of her way to greet respondent
Judge Rubia. In fact, after allegedly being repeatedly reminded that court employees should not
have any dealings with litigants, respondent Pecaña should not have gone out to greet
respondent Judge Rubia since she was dining with a litigant.

The odds that complainant and respondent Pecaña would meet respondent Judge Rubia by
pure coincidence are highly improbable. Granted, chance meetings between persons may take
place, but a chance meeting between a litigant in the company of a court employee who
acceded to assisting the litigant in a case and the judge deciding that case is outside the realm
of common experience. The odds of such an occurrence are, indeed, one in a million. The sheer
improbability of such an occurrence already puts into question the truth of respondents’
allegations.

Based on these considerations, the narrative of complainant is more believable and must be
afforded greater evidentiary weight.

Delay in filing of administrative complaint is not a defense

The investigation report placed particular emphasis on the eight-month period between the
alleged dinner meeting and the filing of the administrative complaint. The eight-month delay in
the filing of the administrative complaint is of no consequence.

Delay in filing an administrative complaint should not be construed as basis to question its
veracity or credibility. There are considerations that a litigant must think about before filing an
administrative case against judges and court personnel. This is more so for lawyers where the
possibility of appearing before the judge where an administrative complaint has been filed is
high.

Here, respondent Judge Rubia presided over three cases that involved complainant and her late
husband’s estate. He wielded an unmistakable amount of control over the proceedings.

Filing an administrative case against respondents is a time-consuming ordeal, and it would

require additional time and resources that litigants would rather not expend in the interest of
preserving their rights in the suit. Complainant might have decided to tread with caution so as
not to incur the ire of respondent Judge Rubia for fear of the reprisal that could take place after
the filing of an administrative complaint.

Judges and court personnel wield extraordinary control over court proceedings of cases filed.
Thus, litigants are always cautious in filing administrative cases against judges and court
personnel.

In any case, administrative offenses, including those committed by members of the bench and
bar, are not subject to a fixed period within which they must be reported. In Heck v. Judge
Santos,133 this court held that:

Pursuant to the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that an administrative
complaint against an erring lawyer who was thereafter appointed as a judge, albeit filed only
after twenty-four years after the offending act was committed, is not barred by prescription. If the

29 | P a g e
rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to disregard the very oath they
took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would
immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever
administrative liability they ought to answer for. It is the duty of this Court to protect the integrity
of the practice of law as well as the administration of justice. No matter how much time has
elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the institution
of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the
Court. This categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the bench and
bar, to deter them from committing acts which violate the Code of Professional Responsibility,
the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyer’s Oath.134 (Emphasis supplied)

If this court saw fit to penalize a member of the bench for an offense committed more than
twenty years prior to the filing of the complaint, then the eight-month period cannot prejudice the
complainant.

The interval between the time when the offense was committed and the time when the offense
was officially reported cannot serve as a basis to doubt the veracity of complainant’s allegations.
This court’s mandate to discipline members of the judiciary and its personnel is implemented by
pertinent rules and statutes. Judges are disciplined based on whether their actions violated the
New Code of Judicial Conduct.135 Court personnel are also governed by the Code of Conduct
for Court Personnel136 and are appointed in accordance with the Civil Service Law, as provided
for in Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. None of these rules for administrative
discipline mandates a period within which a complaint must be filed after the commission or
discovery of the offense. This court determines with finality the liability of erring members of the
judiciary and its employees. The gravity of an administrative offense cannot be diminished by a
delay in the filing of a complaint.

To dismiss the commission of the offense based on this eight-month period is to ignore the
distinct and tangible possibility that the offense was actually committed. The commission of the
offense is not contingent on the period of revelation or disclosure. To dismiss the complaint on
this ground is tantamount to attaching a period of prescription to the offense, which does not
apply in administrative charges.

Respondent Pecaña’s actions amount to violations of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel

"Court personnel, regardless of position or rank, are expected to conduct themselves in

accordance with the strict standards of integrity and morality."137

The complaint states that respondents were allegedly acting in favor of Atty. Noe Zarate,
counsel for the opposing parties in the three cases pending in the sala of respondent Judge
Rubia. Because of respondents’ actions, complainant and all who will be made aware of the
events of this case will harbor distrust toward the judiciary and its processes. For this alone,
respondents should be held administratively liable.

For respondent Pecaña, the fact that she allowed herself to be placed in a position that could
cause suspicion toward her work as a court personnel is disconcerting.

As a court employee, respondent Pecaña should have known better than to interact with
litigants in a way that could compromise the confidence that the general public places in the
judiciary. Respondent Pecaña should have refused to meet with complainant in her home. She
should have refused any other form of extended communication with complainant, save for
those in her official capacity as a Data Encoder of the court. This continued communication
between complainant and respondent Pecaña makes her culpable for failure to adhere to the
strict standard of propriety mandated of court personnel.

Respondent Pecaña admitted to meeting with complainant several times, despite the former’s
knowledge of the pendency of cases in the court where she is employed and in addition to the
text messages exchanged between them. She had a duty to sever all forms of communication

30 | P a g e
with complainant or to inform her superiors or the proper authority of complainant’s attempts to
communicate with her. Respondent Pecaña failed to do so. Instead, she continued to
communicate with complainant, even to the extent of advising complainant against filing an
administrative case against her and respondent Judge Rubia.

Respondent Pecaña violated Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel:

CANON I
FIDELITY TO DUTY

....

SECTION 3. Court personnel shall not discriminate by dispensing special favors to anyone.
They shall not allow kinship, rank, position or favors from any party to influence their official acts
or duties.

....

SECTION 5. Court personnel shall use the resources, property and funds under their official
custody in a judicious manner and solely in accordance with the prescribed statutory and
regulatory guidelines or procedures.

Respondent Pecaña’s actions constitute a clear violation of the requirement that all court
personnel uphold integrity and prudence in all their actions. As stated in Villaros v. Orpiano:138

Time and time again, we have stressed that the behavior of all employees and officials involved
in the administration of justice, from judges to the most junior clerks, is circumscribed with a
heavy responsibility. Their conduct must be guided by strict propriety and decorum at all times
in order to merit and maintain the public’s respect for and trust in the judiciary. Needless to say,
all court personnel must conduct themselves in a manner exemplifying integrity, honesty and
uprightness.139

Respondent Pecaña should, thus, be held administratively liable for her actions.

Respondent Judge Rubia committed gross violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct

By meeting a litigant and advising her to talk to opposing counsel, respondent Judge Rubia
violated several canons of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

Respondent Judge Rubia failed to act in a manner that upholds the dignity mandated by his
office. He was already made aware of the impropriety of respondent Pecaña’s actions by virtue
of her admissions in her comment. At the time of the referral of the complaint to the Office of the
Court Administrator, respondent Judge Rubia was already the Executive Judge of Branch 24 of
the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna.140 As a judge, he had the authority to ensure that all
court employees, whether or not they were under his direct supervision, act in accordance with
the esteem of their office.

Respondent Pecaña even alleged that respondent Judge Rubia made several warnings to all
court employees not to intercede in any case pending before any court under his jurisdiction as
Executive Judge.141 However, nothing in the record shows that respondent Judge Rubia took
action after being informed of respondent Pecaña’s interactions with a litigant, such as
ascertaining her actions, conducting an inquiry to admonish or discipline her, or at least
reporting her actions to the Office of the Court Administrator.

For this failure alone, respondent Judge Rubia should be held administratively liable.
Furthermore, the evidence on record supports the allegations that a meeting with complainant, a
litigant with several cases pending before his sala, took place. Respondent Judge Rubia’s mere
presence in the dinner meeting provides a ground for administrative liability.

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In Gandeza Jr. v. Tabin,142 this court reminded judges:

Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to avoid not only impropriety but also
the mere appearance of impropriety in all activities.

To stress how the law frowns upon even any appearance of impropriety in a magistrate’s
activities, it has often been held that a judge must be like Caesar’s wife - above suspicion and
beyond reproach. Respondent’s act discloses a deficiency in prudence and discretion that a
member of the Judiciary must exercise in the performance of his official functions and of his
activities as a private individual. It is never trite to caution respondent to be prudent and
circumspect in both speech and action, keeping in mind that her conduct in and outside the
courtroom is always under constant observation.143 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Respondent Judge Rubia clearly failed to live up to the standards of his office. By participating
in the dinner meeting and by failing to admonish respondent Pecaña for her admitted
impropriety, respondent Judge Rubia violated Canons 1 and 2 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct.

Canon 1 INDEPENDECE

Judicial Independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair
trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its individual
and institutional aspects.

Section 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their
assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free
of any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from
any quarter or for any reason.

Section 6. Judges shall be independent in relation to society in general and in relation to the
particular parties to a dispute which he or she has to adjudicate.

Section 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to
reinforce public confidence in the judiciary, which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial
independence.

Canon 2 INTEGRITY

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the
personal demeanor of judges.

Section 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in view of a reasonable observer.

Section 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of
the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.

Section 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or
court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have become aware.

In De la Cruz v. Judge Bersamira,144 this court explained the necessity of a judge’s integrity:

By the very nature of the bench, judges, more than the average man, are required to observe an
exacting standard of morality and decency. The character of a judge is perceived by the people
not only through his official acts but also through his private morals as reflected in his external
behavior. It is therefore paramount that a judge’s personal behavior both in the performance of
his duties and his daily life, be free from the appearance of impropriety as to be beyond
reproach. Only recently, in Magarang v. Judge Galdino B. Jardin, Sr., the Court pointedly stated

32 | P a g e
that:

While every public office in the government is a public trust, no position exacts a greater
demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary.
Hence, judges are strictly mandated to abide by the law, the Code of Judicial Conduct and with
existing administrative policies in order to maintain the faith of the people in the administration of
justice.145

In Castillo v. Judge Calanog, Jr.,146 this court held:

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his
behavior outside his sala as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public
official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at
all times. As we have recently explained, a judge’s official life can not simply be detached or
separated from his personal existence. Thus:

Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept
restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.

A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal
behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above
suspicion.147 (Citations omitted)

In De la Cruz, this court emphasized the need for impartiality of judges:

. . . [A] judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities. A
judge is not only required to be impartial; he must also appear to be impartial. x x x Public
confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges.

. . . In this connection, the Court pointed out in Joselito Rallos, et al. v. Judge Ireneo Lee Gako
Jr., RTC Branch 5, Cebu City, that:

Well-known is the judicial norm that "judges should not only be impartial but should also appear
impartial." Jurisprudence repeatedly teaches that litigants are entitled to nothing less than the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The other elements of due process, like notice and hearing,
would become meaningless if the ultimate decision is rendered by a partial or biased judge.
Judges must not only render just, correct and impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner
free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity.

This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal, metropolitan and regional trial court
judges like herein respondent, because they are judicial front-liners who have direct contact with
the litigating parties.

They are the intermediaries between conflicting interests and the embodiments of the people’s
sense of justice. Thus, their official conduct should be beyond reproach.148 (Citations omitted,
emphasis supplied)

In the motion for intervention filed by Atty. Zarate before Justice Gaerlan, Atty. Zarate stated
that even if respondent Judge Rubia was present at the dinner meeting, it was merely an
attempt to reconcile the parties and reach an extrajudicial solution.149

This is telling of a culture of tolerance that has led to the decay of the exacting nature of judicial
propriety. Instead of being outraged by respondent Judge Rubia’s meeting an opposing party,
Atty. Zarate defended respondent Judge Rubia’s actions.

Had it been true that a settlement was being brokered by respondent Judge Rubia, it should

33 | P a g e
have been done in open court with the record reflecting such an initiative.

As to complainant’s questioning of respondent Judge Rubia’s actions in the issuance of the

orders in her pending cases and the exercise of his judgment, this court agrees that
complainant should resort to the appropriate judicial remedies. This, however, does not negate
the administrative liability of respondent Judge Rubia. His actions failed to assure complainant
and other litigants before his court of the required "cold neutrality of an impartial judge."150
Because of this, respondent Judge Rubia also violated Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct on Impartiality:

CANON 3. IMPARTIALITY

Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the
decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.

Section 1. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias, or prejudice.

Section 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and
enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the
judge and of the judiciary.

Section 3. Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the

occasions on which it will be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding
cases.

Section 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before, or could come before them,
make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such
proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make any comment
in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.

Complainant correctly cited Pascual v. Judge Bonifacio151 where this court held:

Upon assumption of office, a judge becomes the visible representation of the law and of justice.
Membership in the judiciary circumscribes one's personal conduct and imposes upon him a
number of inhibitions, whose faithful observance is the price one has to pay for holding such an
exalted position. Thus, a magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such a
manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can withstand the most searching public scrutiny,
for the ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of
the people's faith in the judicial system. This Court does not require of judges that they measure
up to the standards of conduct of the saints and martyrs, but we do expect them to be like
Caesar's wife in all their activities. Hence, we require them to abide strictly by the Code of
Judicial Conduct.

It appears now that respondent has failed to live up to those rigorous standards. Whether or not
he purposely went to the Manila Hotel on November 25, 1998 to meet complainant or only had a
chance meeting with him, his act of trying to convince complainant to agree to his proposal is an
act of impropriety. It is improper and highly unethical for a judge to suggest to a litigant what to
do to resolve his case for such would generate the suspicion that the judge is in collusion with
one party. A litigant in a case is entitled to no less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
Judges are not only required to be impartial, but also to appear to be so, for appearance is an
essential manifestation of reality. Hence, not only must a judge render a just decision, he is also
duty bound to render it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and its
integrity. Respondent's conduct in the instant case inevitably invites doubts about respondent's
probity and integrity. It gives ground for a valid reproach. In the judiciary, moral integrity is more
than a cardinal virtue, it is a necessity. Moreover, a judge's lack of impartiality or the mere
appearance of bias would cause resentment if the party who refused the judge's proposal
subsequently lost his case. It would give rise to suspicion that the judgment was "fixed"
beforehand. Such circumstance tarnishes the image of the judiciary and brings to it public

34 | P a g e
contempt, disrepute, and ridicule. Thus, we are constrained to rule that respondent violated
Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. His misconduct is not excused but rather made more
glaring by the fact that the controversy involving complainant was pending in his own sala.152
(Citations omitted)

The totality of the actions of respondent Judge Rubia is a clear manifestation of a lack of
integrity and impartiality essential to a judge.

By meeting with complainant, respondent Judge Rubia also violated Canon 4 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct:

CANON 4. PROPRIETY

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of
a judge.

Section 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.

Section 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In
particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the
judicial office.

Section 3. Judges shall, in their personal relations with individual members of the legal
profession who practice regularly in their court, avoid situations which might reasonably give
rise to the suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality.

On propriety, this court held in Atty. Raul L. Correa v. Judge Medel Arnaldo Belen153 that:
Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary exhorts members of the
judiciary, in the discharge of their duties, to be models of propriety at all times.

....

A judge is the visible representation of the law. Thus, he must behave, at all times, in such a
manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can withstand the most searching public scrutiny.
The ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the
people's faith in the judicial system.154

Because of the meeting, and the subsequent orders issued after the meeting, respondent Judge
Rubia violated the notions of propriety required of his office. Respondents have relentlessly
stood by their position that the meeting was a chance encounter, and, thus, no impropriety could
be attributed to the meeting itself.

Respondent Judge Rubia’s actions belittled the integrity required of judges in all their dealings
inside and outside the courts. For these actions, respondent Judge Rubia now lost the requisite
integrity, impartiality, and propriety fundamental to his office. He cannot be allowed to remain a
member of the judiciary.

Respondents in this case failed to subscribe to the highest moral fiber mandated of the judiciary
and its personnel. Their actions tainted their office and besmirched its integrity. In effect, both
respondents are guilty of gross misconduct. This court defined misconduct as "a transgression
of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by a public officer."155 In Camus v. The Civil Service Board of Appeals,156 this
court held that "[m]isconduct has been defined as ‘wrong or improper conduct’ and ‘gross’ has
been held to mean ‘flagrant; shameful’. . . . This Court once held that the word misconduct
implies a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment."157

35 | P a g e
Both respondents are indeed guilty of gross misconduct. However, respondent Judge Rubia is
also guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge for violating Canons 2, 3, and 4 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct.

This is not to say that complainant comes to these proceedings with clean hands either. As a
litigant, she is enjoined to act in such a way that will not place the integrity of the proceedings in
jeopardy. Her liability, however, is not the subject of these proceedings. To ensure that these
actions will no longer be committed by any party, respondents must be sanctioned accordingly,
in keeping with the court’s mandate to uphold a character of trust and integrity in society.
WHEREFORE, the court resolved tore docket the case as a regular administrative matter.
Respondent Judge Marino Rubia is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with corresponding
forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and disqualified from
reinstatement or appointment in any public office, including government owned or -controlled
corporations. Respondent Eileen Pecaña is SUSPENDED for one (1) year for gross
misconduct. This decision is immediately executory. Respondent Judge Rubia is further ordered
to cease and desist from discharging the functions of his office upon receipt of this decision. Let
a copy hereof be entered in the personal records of respondents.

SO ORDERED.

4. OCA VS JUDGE AMOR

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a Memorandum1 dated November 23, 1999 filed by Acting Presiding Judge
Manuel E. Contreras (Judge Contreras) of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Paracale,
Camarines Norte for the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) against respondent Executive
Judge Owen B. Amor (respondent) of the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte (RTC),
accusing him of Grave Abuse of Authority, Grave Misconduct, and Acts Inimical to Judicial
Service.

The Facts

In the Memorandum which he submitted pursuant to the verbal instruction of then Court
Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo, 2 Judge Contreras reported on the alleged acts of
respondent, as follows:

First, on October 1, 1999, respondent impounded the tricycle of a certain Gervin Ojeda at the
Hall of Justice of Daet, Camarines Norte, when the latter bumped the former’s vehicle and was
unable to pay the amount demanded for the incurred damages. As such impounding was
entered in the Guard’s Logbook, Judge Contreras was able to secure a certification regarding
the same from Security Guard Virginia Morico (SG Morico). However, SG Morico inadvertently
dated the certification October 11, 1999, instead of November 11, 1999. When Judge Contreras
called the attention of SG Morico of the wrong date, the latter took the certification and went
straight to respondent’s chambers. After leaving the chambers, SG Morico became "belligerent
and discourteous" and refused to return the certification to Judge Contreras. Thus, Judge
Contreras sought the assistance of Judge Sancho Dames and 2nd Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Leo Intia in order to retrieve the aforesaid certification from SG Morico, but to no
avail. Thereafter, Judge Contreras learned that respondent had berated the guards of the Hall of
Justice, including SG Morico, for issuing the certification, and that SG Morico and Head Guard
Quintin Fernandez tried to conceal the alleged acts of grave abuse of authority by respondent.3

Second, during the latter part of October 1999, Acting Presiding Judge Rosita Lalwani (Judge
Lalwani) of the MTC of Mercedes, Camarines Norte called respondent to seek reconsideration
of her detail to another station. Respondent then berated Judge Lalwani and accused her of
being lazy and abusive like the other judges of Camarines Sur who were also detailed at
Camarines Norte. Further, respondent instructed Judge Lalwani to go slow with the trial of a BP
224 case as the accused therein was his friend.5

36 | P a g e
Third, on October 27, 1999 and under the pretext of a judicial visit, respondent visited Judge
Contreras at the latter’s chambers and personally intervened for one Atty. Freddie Venida (Atty.
Venida), who was previously arrested and charged with indirect contempt for his failure to
appear in three (3) criminal cases for which he stood as an accused. Respondent then told
Judge Contreras that he does not mind Atty. Verida’s abusive practice as he gives him gold
which was abundant in Paracale, Camarines Norte. Respondent further sneered at Judge
Contreras for "not exploiting the situation" and intimated to the latter that Atty. Venida would
give him gold. Judge Contreras rejected respondent’s indecent overtures, resulting in the latter
publicly announcing in open court that he is an abusive judge for persecuting Atty. Venida.6

Fourth, lawyers, prosecutors, and litigants complained about the habitual absenteeism of
respondent, especially during Mondays and Fridays, resulting in delays in the disposition of
cases in violation of existing laws and circulars on speedy trial.7

Lastly, upon assumption as Executive Judge, respondent ordered Clerk of Court Atty. Perfecto
Loria (Atty. Loria) to submit all petitions for extra-judicial foreclosures to him for scrutiny,
especially those requiring publication upon filing, resulting in the delay in the proceedings.
Respondent also ordered Atty. Loria to ask for "grease money" from the newspaper publishers
under the pain of being blacklisted. Atty. Loria, however, never obeyed respondent regarding
this matter.8

Pursuant to the OCA’s Report9 dated February 3, 2000, the Court issued a Resolution10 dated
February 28, 2000 treating Judge Contreras’s Memorandum as an administrative complaint to
which respondent was required to comment, but to no avail. Thus, the Court issued a
Resolution11 dated July 2, 2001, ordering respondent to show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure, and to submit his comment on Judge
Contreras’s Memorandum. As respondent continued to ignore the said directives, the Court
issued a Resolution12 dated January 30, 2008 referring the matter to the OCA for evaluation,
report, and recommendation.

Meanwhile, respondent filed his certificate of candidacy (COC) for the 2002 Barangay Elections,
resulting in his automatic resignation from the service effective June 7, 2002.13

The OCA’s Report and Recommendation

In a Memorandum14 dated July 25, 2008, the OCA found respondent administratively liable as
charged, and accordingly recommended that: (a) the case be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter; (b) respondent’s retirement benefits be ordered forfeited; and (c)
respondent be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned and controlled corporations.15

The OCA found that respondent’s failure to comment on the administrative complaint despite
being given an opportunity to do so is tantamount to an admission of the truth of the allegations
against him. Thus, the OCA found respondent to have gravely abused his authority, committed
grave misconduct, and performed acts inimical to judicial service.16

The OCA also found respondent guilty of gross misconduct and insubordination for unduly
refusing to obey the Court’s repeated orders for him to file his comment on the instant
administrative case against him.17

Further, the OCA considered respondent’s filing of a COC for the 2002 Barangay Elections that
resulted in his automatic resignation "as a mere convenient ploy for a ‘graceful exit’ from the
judiciary and to evade liability on his part."18 In this relation, the OCA opined that respondent’s
automatic resignation during the pendency of the case did not divest the Court of its jurisdiction
to pronounce whether or not respondent was guilty or innocent of the charges against him.19

Finally, the OCA held that respondent’s acts would have warranted the imposition of the penalty
of dismissal but due to his automatic resignation, it recommended, instead, that he be meted the

37 | P a g e
aforesaid penalties.20

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively
liable for Grave Abuse of Authority, Grave Misconduct, Gross Insubordination, and Acts Inimical
to Judicial Service.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court concurs with the OCA’s findings and recommendation.

Grave abuse of authority is defined as a misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who, under
color of his office, wrongfully inflicts upon a person any bodily harm, imprisonment, or other
injury; it is an act characterized with cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority.21

Misconduct, on the other hand, is a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant
dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous,
and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment
and must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the public
officer’s official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or
failure to discharge the duties of the office. In order to differentiate grave misconduct from
simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
disregard of established rule, must be manifest in the former.22

Needless to say, these acts are inimical to judicial service, and thus, constitute conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service as they violate the norm of public accountability and
diminish – or tend to diminish – the people’s faith in the Judiciary.23

In the instant case, the OCA correctly found respondent guilty of the charges against him. As
aptly pointed out, respondent’s failure to file a comment despite all the opportunities afforded
him constituted a waiver of his right to defend himself. In the natural order of things, a man
would resist an unfounded claim or imputation against him. It is generally contrary to human
nature to remain silent and say nothing in the face of false accusations. As such, respondent’s
silence may thus be construed as an implied admission and acknowledgement of the veracity of
the allegations against him.24 Hence, the Court upholds the OCA’s findings that respondent: (a)
abused his authority in impounding the tricycle and exerted undue influence on the security
guards of the Hall of Justice in his attempt to obstruct the investigation of Judge Contreras; (b)
was discourteous in dealing with a fellow judge when the latter was merely asking for
reconsideration of her detail to another station; (c) used his office and position to intervene in
behalf of Atty. Venida and tolerated the latter’s abusive practice as a lawyer in exchange for
gold; (d) was habitually absent; and (e) gave orders to Atty. Loria to submit all petitions for
extra-judicial foreclosures to him which resulted in delays in the proceedings and asked the
latter to demand "grease money" from newspaper publishers in order not to be blacklisted.25

Further, the OCA properly found respondent guilty of Gross Misconduct and Insubordination for
refusing to comply with the numerous directives of the Court to file a comment on the
administrative complaint against him. Verily, a judge who deliberately and continuously fails and
refuses to comply with the resolution of the Court is guilty of the same. 26 Such willful
disobedience and disregard of the directives of the Court constitute grave and serious
misconduct affecting his fitness and worthiness of the honor and integrity attached to his office.
27 In this case, it is noteworthy that respondent was afforded several opportunities, not to
mention a generous amount of time to comply with the Court’s lawful orders, but he has failed
and continuously refused to heed the same. This continued refusal to abide by the lawful
directives issued by the Court is glaring proof that he has become disinterested to remain with
the judicial system to which he purports to belong.28

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Finally, the OCA correctly noted that respondent’s automatic resignation due to his filing of a
COC for the 2002 Barangay Elections did not divest the Court of its jurisdiction in determining
his administrative liability. It is well-settled that resignation should not be used either as an
escape or an easy way out to evade an administrative liability or administrative sanction.29 In
this light, respondent’s administrative liability for his acts stands.

The totality of respondent’s acts warrant the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from
service.1âwphi1 Corollary thereto, such penalty carries with it the following administrative
disabilities: (a) cancellation of civil service eligibility; (b) forfeiture of retirement and other
benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any; (c) perpetual disqualification from re-employment
in any government agency or instrumentality, including any governmentowned and controlled
corporation or government financial institution; and (d) bar from taking the civil service
examinations.30

In this instance, since respondent had been deemed to have automatically resigned from his
position due to his filing of a COC in the 2002 Barangay Elections, only the aforesaid
administrative disabilities can be imposed upon him.

It must be emphasized that those in the Judiciary serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of
impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the
people’s confidence in it. The Institution demands the best possible individuals in the service
and it had never and will never tolerate nor condone any conduct which would violate the norms
of public accountability, and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the
justice system. As such, the Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables who
undermine its efforts towards an effective and efficient administration of justice, thus tainting its
image in the eyes of the public.31

WHEREFORE, respondent Executive Judge Owen B. Amor of the Regional Trial Court of Daet,
Camarines Norte, is found GUILTY of Grave Abuse of Authority, Grave Misconduct, Acts
Inimical to Judicial Service, and Insubordination and would have been DISMISSED from
service, had he not been deemed automatically resigned effective June 7, 2002. Accordingly,
his civil service eligibility is CANCELLED, his retirement and other benefits, except accrued
leave credits which he had already claimed, are hereby FORFEITED. Further, he is
PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from re-employment in any government agency or
instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled corporation or government
financial institution.

SO ORDERED

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