Facts:
In 1960, the petitioner, Caltex (Philippines) Inc., launched a promotional
scheme called "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" which calls for participants to
estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump of each Caltex
Station will dispense within a specific period. Such contest is open to all
motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers. There is no required fee or
consideration, and there is no need for the contestants to purchase the
products of Caltex. The forms are available upon request at each Caltex
Station and there is a sealed can where accomplished entry stubs may be
deposited. Then, seeing the extensive use of mails for publicizing and
transmission of communication purposes, Caltex sent representatives to the
postal authorities for advance clearing for the use of mails for the
contest. But then, the Postmaster General, Enrico Palomar, denied the
request of Caltex in view of Sections 1954 (a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised
Administrative Code. The aforesaid sections prohibits the use of mail
conveying any information concerning non-mailable schemes, such as
lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme. Consequently, Caltex invoked a
judicial intervention by filing a petition of declaratory relief against the
Postmaster General, ordering the Postmaster General to allow the petitioner
to use the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public and that the
aforesaid contest is not violative of the Postal Law.
Issue:
Whether or not the scheme proposed by Caltex is within the coverage of the
prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into
the intended meaning of the words used therein.
Held:
No. Caltex may be granted declaratory relief, even if Enrico Palomar simply
applied the clear provisions of the law to a given set of facts as embodied in
the rules of the contest. For, construction is the art or process of discovering
and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with
respect to its application to a given case is not explicitly provided for in the
law.
In this case, the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably
required an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used
therein. Also, the Court is tasked to look beyond the fair exterior, to the
substance, in order to unmask the real element that the law is seeking to
prevent or prohibit.
Facts:
On 5 March 1982, the National Federation of Labor filed with the Ministry of Labor
andEmployment (Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga City), a petition for direct
certification asthe sole exclusive collective bargaining representative of the monthly
paid employees at theLumbayao manufacturing plant of the Zamboanga Wood
Products, Inc. (Zambowood). On 17April 1982, such employees charged the firm
before the same office for underpayment of monthly living allowances. On 3 May
1982, the union issued a notice of strike against the firm,alleging illegal termination of
Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local union; unfair labor practice; nonpayment
of living allowances; and “employment of oppressive alien management personnel
without proper permit. The strike began on 23 May 1982.On 9 July 1982,
Zambowood filed a complaint with the trial court against the officers andmembers of
the union, for “damages for obstruction of private property with prayer for preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order.” The union filed a motion for the dismissal andfor
the dissolution of the restraining order, and opposition to the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction, contending that the incidents of picketing are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa 227 (Labor
Code, Article 217) andnot to the Court of First Instance. The motion was denied.
Hence, the petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether construction of the law is required to determine jurisdiction.
Held:
The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. Construction and
interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible
or inadequate without them. Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial
proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; and it is
given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred by law in words
that do not admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is
derived exclusively from the statutes of the forum, the issue should be resolved on the
basis of the law or statute in force. Therefore, since (1) the original wording of Article
217 vested the labor arbiters with jurisdiction; since (2) Presidential Decree
1691reverted the jurisdiction with respect to money claims of workers or claims for
damages arising from employer-employee relations to the labor arbiters after
Presidential Decree 1367 transferred such jurisdiction to the ordinary courts, and since
(3) Batas Pambansa 130 made no change with respect to the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with respect to money claims of workers or
claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations; Article 217 is to be
applied the way it is worded. The exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is
therein provided for explicitly. It means, it can only mean, that a court of first instance
judge then, a regional trial court judge now, certainly acts beyond the scope of the
authority conferred on him
FACTS: Facts:
The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR personnel while on its way to Bulacan
The accused was convicted in violation of Sec. 878 in connection to Sec. 2692 of the
because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest product found concealed in the truck.
Revised Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and further
Petitioner Jovito Layugan, CENRO ordered the confiscation of the truck and required the owner to explain. Private
amended by R.A. 4. On August 13, 1962, the accused was discovered to have in its
respondents failed to submit required explanation. The DENR Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained
possession and control a home-made revolver cal. 22 with no license permit. In the court
Layugan’s action for confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck. Private respondents brought the case to the

DENR Secretary. Pending appeal, private respondents filed a replevin case before the RTC against petitioner Layugan proceeding, the accused admitted that he owns the gun and affirmed that it has no license.
and Baggayan. RTC granted the same. Petitioners moved to dismiss the case contending, inter alia, that private The accused further stated that he is a secret agent appointed by Gov. Leviste of Batangas
respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied their motion. and showed evidences of appointment. In his defense, the accused presented the case of
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for
People vs. Macarandang, stating that he must acquitted because he is a secret agent and
replevin because the truck was under administrative seizure proceedings.
which may qualify into peace officers equivalent to municipal police which is covered by Art.
ISSUE:
879.
Whether or not the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine.
Issue:
HELD:

The Court held in the negative. The Court has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of Whether or not holding a position of secret agent of the Governor is a proper defense to
the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of adminis trative processed afforded him. illegal possession of firearms.
Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer Ruling:
concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be

exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court’ intervention is fatal to one’s The Supreme Court in its decision affirmed the lower court’s decision. It stated that the law
cause of action.
is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to
The doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and
. . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any
circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is violation of due process, (2) when the issue
instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of
involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppels on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable
firearms, or ammunition." The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly

injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied
and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8)
when it would amount to nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,
(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
A suit for replevin cannot be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for
administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Sections 68-A of OD 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit
and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of
Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers,
municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are
not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for
use in the performance of their official duties.

for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have

been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently

issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck.

The Court construed that there is no provision for the secret agent;
including it in the list therefore the accused is not exempted.
Facts:
On 23 March 1971, spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition
with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte seeking the
adoption of minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. However, minors
Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad
litem, the petitioners herein filed an opposition to the said adoption. They
contended that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a
legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors mother, who died
on 1 March 1971, and therefore said spouses were disqualified to adopt
under Article 335 of the Civil Code, which provides that those who have
legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or children by
legal fiction cannot adopt.
Issue:
Whether the spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos are
disqualified to adopt under paragraph 1 of Article 335 of the Civil Code.
Held:
The words used in paragraph (1) of Article 335 of the Civil Code, in
enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous.
When the New Civil Code was adopted, it changed the word
“descendant,” found in the Spanish Civil Code to which the New Civil
Code was patterned, to “children.” The children thus mentioned have a
clearly defined meaning in law and do not include grandchildren. Well
known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute
clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted. The rule is
that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the
subjects of statutory construction. In the present case, Roderick and
Rommel Daoang, the grandchildren of Antero Agonoy and Amanda
Ramos-Agonoy, cannot assail the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson
Marcos by the Agonoys.
The Supreme Court denied the petition, and affirmed the judgment of the
Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte (Special Proceedings 37),
without pronouncement as to costs.
Facts:
A petition for recall was filed against the incubent Punong Barangay pf
Pula, Cabanatuan City, Mr. Danilo Paras. The petition was signed by the
tegistered voters therein. However, when the COMELEC scheduled the
recall election, Paras filed with the RTC a petition for injunction. The
matter reached the Supreme Court with Mr. Paras' simple argument
citing Section 74(b) of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, which states that no recall shall take place within 1
year immediately preceding a regular local election. Paras insisted that
the January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred by Section 4(b) of RA
7160 as the SK Election was set by RA 7808 on the first Monday of May
1996, and every 3 years thereafter. He argued that SK Election is a
regular local election, hence no recall can be had for it is barely 4 months
separate SK Election from the recall election.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner's contention was correct?
Ruling:
The SC ruled in the negative. The above cited provision by the petitioner
was construed by the SC as merely designating the period when such
elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is during the
2nd year of his term of office. The SK election has nothing to do with the
recall because the regular local election where the office had by the local
official sought to be recalled will be contested ad be filled by the
electorate. However, the recall in this case is already barred by Section
74(b) of the code because the election involving the barqangay office
concerned is barely 7 months away, having been
scheduled on May1997.
FACTS:
Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Philex), who, while working at its
copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28,
1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the
mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of
government rules and regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to
take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men
working underground. Floresca et al moved to claim their benefits
pursuant to the Workmen’s Compensation Act before the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission. They also petitioned before the regular
courts and sue Philex for additional damages. Philex invoked that they
can no longer be sued because the petitioners have already claimed
benefits under the WCA.
ISSUE: Whether or not Floresca et al can claim benefits and at the same
time sue.
HELD: Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed
for benefits under the WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding
with a civil case before the regular courts. Conversely, if they sued
before the civil courts then they would also be estopped from claiming
benefits under the WCA. The SC however ruled that Floresca et al are
excused from this deficiency due to ignorance of the fact. Had they been
aware of such then they may have not availed of such a remedy.
However, if in case they’ll win in the lower court whatever award may be
granted, the amount given to them under the WCA should be deducted.
The SC emphasized that if they would go strictly by the book in this case
then the purpose of the law may be defeated. Idolatrous reverence for
the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law
insures man’s survival and ennobles him. As Shakespeare said, the
letter of the law killeth but its spirit giveth life.
FACTS:
The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina
void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The couple got married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs
of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he
squandered his money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in regard to
their finances. In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was estranged. Roridel quit
her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their
child. Since then he abandoned them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes psychological incapacity is not
mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit
inclinations which would not meet the essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some psychological
illness. Reynaldo’s action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds
for psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband cannot get along
with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In addition,
the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered
as psychological incapacity.
The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in this case:
 burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff
 root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined
 such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
 such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of marital
obligations of marriage
 such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code
 decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be respected
 court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the state.
Facts: Held:

Since 7 March and on 21 June 1969, a Personal Accident Policy was issued by Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular

Perla Compania de Seguros, through its authorized agent Rodolfo Aisporna, for a words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole

period of 12 months with the beneficiary designated as Ana M. Isidro. The insured and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to

died by violence during lifetime of policy. Mapalad Aisporna participated actively with produce harmonious whole. In the present case, the first paragraph of Section 189 prohibits a person

the aforementioned policy. from acting as agent, subagent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance

without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the InsuranceCommissioner; while the

For reason unexplained, an information was filed against Mapalad Aisporna, Rodolfo’s second paragraph defines who is an insurance agent within the intent of the section; while the third

wife, with the City Court of Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the paragraph prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its violation. The appellate court’s ruling that the

Insurance Act on 21 November 1970, or acting as an agent in the soliciting insurance petitioner is prosecuted not under the second paragraph of Section 189 but under its first paragraph is a

without securing the certificate of authority from the office of the reversible error, as the definition of insurance agent in paragraph 2 applies to the paragraph 1 and 2 of

Insurance Commissioner. Mapalad contends that being the wife of true agent, Section 189, which is “any person who for compensation shall be an insurance agent within the intent of

Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and that policy was merely this section.” Without proof of compensation, directly or indirectly, received from the insurance policy or

a renewal and was issued because Isidro had called by telephone to renew, and at contract, Mapalad Aisporna may not be held to have violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act. “Under

that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent and so she left a note on top of her the Texas Penal Code 1911, Article 689, making it a misdemeanor for any person for direct or indirect

husband’s desk to renew. On 2 August 1971, the trial court found Mapalad guilty compensation to solicit insurance without a certificate of authority to act as an insurance agent, an

and sentenced here to pay a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of information, failing to allege that the solicitor was to receive compensation either directly or indirectly,

insolvency and to pay the costs. On appeal and on 14 August 1974, the trial court’s charges no offense. In the case of Bolen vs. Stake,19 the provision of Section 3750, Snyder's Compiled

decision was affirmed by the appellate court (CA-GR 13243-CR). Hence, the present Laws of Oklahoma 1909 is intended to penalize persons only who acted as insurance solicitors without

recourse was filed on 22 October 1974. On 20 December 1974, the Office of the license, and while acting in such capacity negotiated and concluded insurance contracts for

Solicitor General, representing the Court of Appeals, submitted that Aisporna may not compensation. It must be noted that the information, in the case at bar, does not allege that the

be considered as having violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act. negotiation of an insurance contracts by the accused with Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation.

This allegation is essential, and having been omitted, a conviction of the accused could not be

Issue: sustained. It is well-settled in our jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of the crime

Whether Mapalad Aisporna is an insurance agent within the scope or intent of the must be alleged and proved. After going over the records of this case, we are fully convinced, as the

Insurance Act Solicitor General maintains, that accused did not violate Section 189 of the Insurance Act.”
FACTS:

Tan Kim Liong was ordered to inform the Court whether or not there
is a deposit in the China Banking Corporation of defendant B & B
Forest Development Corporation, and if there is any deposit, to hold
the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order from
the Court. Petitioners in this case refuse to comply with a court
process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor by
invoking the provisions of Republic A ct No. 1405 ( Secrecy of Bank
Deposits Act) which allegedly prohibits the disclosure of any
information concerning to bank deposits.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with

a court processes garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor,
by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405.

HELD:

No. The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into
deposit of B & BForest Development Corporation, as contemplated in
the law. It merely required Tan KimLiong to inform the court whether
or not the defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation had a
deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for the purposes of
thegarnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the same
intact and not allow anywithdrawal until further order. It is sufficiently
clear that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into bank
deposit under RA 1405 does not preclude its beinggarnished to
insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed there is no real inquiry in
such acase, and the existence of the deposit is disclosed the
disclosure is purely incidental to theexecution process.
WHEREFORE, the orders of the lower court dated March 4 and 27,
1972,respectively, are hereby affirmed, with costs against the
petitioners-appellants