LEGAL FORMS

MEMORANDUM

BY:

CORPUZ, EDWIN JR., A.

DAMIAN, SHERLEEN ANNE A.
GALERA, RUTH ANNE B
ISIDERIO, JOAN THERESE Z.
LEANDER, KATELEYN S.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila City

NUTT O. RIOUSE,
Petitioner,

-versus- ____ CASE NO. L-8888

For: Certiorari assailing the
constitutionality and legality of
the creation of the Board.

GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES

BOARD (GCPB),
Respondent.
x----------------------------------------------x

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER

COMES NOW PETITIONER, through the undersigned counsel, unto

this Honorable Court most respectfully submits this Memorandum and state:

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PARTIES TO THE CASE

1. Petitioner Nutt O. Riouse (“Petitioner”), is of legal age,

married, and residing on 1010 Ginoo Boulevard, Pasay City, where he may

be served with legal processes and notices issued by this Honorable Court;

2. Respondent Graft and Corrupt Practices Board (“Board”), is a government

agency, duly organized under Philippine law, represented by its Chairman,

whose office is located at 2021 Binibini Street, Quezon City, and may be

served with legal processes and judicial notices thereto.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent on the 12th day of

March 2019, questioning the constitutionality of the creation of the GCPB,

specifically regarding the provision mandating the Judicial Bar Council (JBC)

to interview, screen and vet the nominees for each position of the said board.

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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

1. Petitioner claims that Congress has no power and authority to give

additional assignments to the JBC as this prerogative belongs exclusively to

the Supreme Court. Further, petitioner claims that, although a prior

authorization from the Supreme Court is secured, the same would still run

contrary to the language and spirit of the Fundamental Law – “The Judicial

and Bar Council shall have the principal function of recommending

appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties

as the Supreme Court may assign to it.” (1987 PH Constitution, Art VIII, Sec.

8 [5])

2. Respondent Board, has been created as an agency by Congress,

allegedly with whom it can more easily direct the investigation, summary

disciplining, and prosecute government officials and employees for graft and

corruption.

3. The respondent Board is composed of a Chairman, and two members to

be appointed by the President for a fixed term of five (5) years. The two

members will be selected by the President from a list of at least five (5)

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nominees for each position. The nominees are to be interviewed, screened

and vetted by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).

4. Petitioner, being the bureau head and who was appointed by the previous

administration, was the first one being targeted by the Board for

investigation, for allegedly may be into hanky-pankies operation.

Subsequently, the Board proceeded to have him preventively suspended as

preparation to the filling of various administrative and criminal charges

against him.

5. Petitioner, questioning the constitutionality of the creation of the Board,

filed the instant case.

ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE CREATION OF THE BOARD IS

CONSTITUTIONAL.

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2. WHETHER OR NOT CONGRESS HAS THE POWER TO MANDATE JBC

TO SCREEN AND VET NOMINEES NOT APPOINTEE TO THE

JUDICIARY, DESPITE CLEAR CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION.

ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSSIONS

1. The creation of the Board is unconstitutional.

2. The Congress has no power to mandate JBC to screen and vet nominees

not appointee to the judiciary.

Under the Constitution1 a Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created

under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice

as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the

Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a

professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a

representative of the private sector… XXX.. The Council shall have the

principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may

1 Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 8(5)

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exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign

to it.

It is clear therefore from the mandate of the Constitution that such authority

to assign additional functions and duties to the Judicial bar and Council are

exclusively within the hands of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court

alone.

The Congress when it sought to create a body that would investigate

government officials and employees for graft and corruption, issuing the

directives that such body’s composition is to be actually nominated by the

Judicial Bar and Council resulted to the encroachment of the exclusive

authority of the Supreme Court (Judiciary) and hence therefore violated the

doctrine of separation of powers.

In Angara v. Electoral Commission, explained the principle of

separation of powers, as follows:

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of

government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division

in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive

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cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own

sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be

kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be

absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has

provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure

coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.

x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,

effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to

determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void

if violative of the Constitution.

The concept of the independence of the three branches of government,

on the other hand, extends from the notion that the powers of government

must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch;

the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power

over the other branches or the citizenry.2 To achieve this purpose, the

divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of government that are

equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective

mandates; lack of independence would result in the inability of one branch

2CARL BAAR, SEPARATE BUT SUBSERVIENT: COURT BUDGETING IN THE AMERICAN STATES 149-52 (1975),
cited in Jeffrey Jackson, Judicial Independence, Adequate Court Funding, and Inherent Judicial Powers, 52 Md. L. Rev. 217

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of government to check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or

others.3

Under the Judiciary’s unique circumstances, independence

encompasses the idea that individual judges can freely exercise their

mandate to resolve justiciable disputes, while the judicial branch, as a whole,

should work in the discharge of its constitutional functions free of restraints

and influence from the other branches, save only for those imposed by the

Constitution itself.4

Recognizing the vital role that the Judiciary plays in our system of

government as the sole repository of judicial power, with the power to

determine whether any act of any branch or instrumentality of the

government is attended with grave abuse of discretion,5 no less than the

Constitution provides a number of safeguards to ensure that judicial

independence is protected and maintained.

The Constitution expressly prohibits Congress from depriving the

Supreme Court of its jurisdiction, as enumerated in Section 5, Article VII of

3
Jeffrey Jackson, Judicial Independence, Adequate Court Funding, and Inherent Judicial Powers, 52 Md. L. Rev. 217 (1993)
4
Joseph M. Hood, Judicial Independence, 23 J. National Association Admin. L. Judges 137, 138 (2003) citing American
Judicature Society, What is Judicial Independence?
5
CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 1

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the Constitution, or from passing a law that undermines the security of tenure

of the members of the judiciary.6 The Constitution also mandates that the

judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy,7 and grants the Supreme Court

administrative supervision over all courts and judicial personnel.

Jurisprudence8 has characterized administrative supervision as exclusive,

noting that only the Supreme Court can oversee the judges and court

personnel's compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. No other branch

of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the

doctrine of separation of powers.22

All of these constitutional provisions were put in place to strengthen

judicial independence, not only by clearly stating the Court’s powers, but also

by providing express limits on the power of the two other branches of

government to interfere with the Court’s affairs.

6
CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 2
7
CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 3

8
Garcia v. Miro, G.R. No. 167409, March 20, 2009, 582 SCRA 127; Ampong v. Civil Service Commission, CSC-Regional
Office No. 11, G.R. No. 167916, August 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 293

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 Justice Presbitero Velasco in his dissenting opinion in Province of

North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace

Panel on Ancestral Domain9 states:

The system of separation of powers contemplates the division of the

functions of government into its three (3) branches: the legislative which is

empowered to make laws; the executive which is required to carry out the

law; and the judiciary which is charged with interpreting the law. Consequent

to actual delineation of power, each branch of government is entitled to be

left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit. Being one such branch, the

judiciary, as Justice Laurel asserted in Planas v. Gil10, will neither direct nor

restrain executive [or legislative action]. Expressed in another perspective,

the system of separated powers is designed to restrain one branch from

inappropriate interference in the business, or intruding upon the central

prerogatives, of another branch; it is a blend of courtesy and caution, a self-

executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one

branch at the expense of the other. x x x

9
G.R. No. 183591
10
G.R. No. L-46440

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 Under our constitutional set up, there cannot be any serious dispute

that the maintenance of the peace, insuring domestic tranquility and the

suppression of violence are the domain and responsibility of the

executive. Now then, if it be important to restrict the great departments of

government to the exercise of their appointed powers, it follows, as a logical

corollary, equally important, that one branch should be left completely

independent of the others, independent not in the sense that the three shall

not cooperate in the common end of carrying into effect the purposes of the

constitution, but in the sense that the acts of each shall never be controlled

by or subjected to the influence of either of the branches.

Indeed, adherence to the principle of separation of powers which is

enshrined in our Constitution is essential to prevent tyranny by prohibiting

the concentration of the sovereign powers of state in one body11. Considering

that executive power is exclusively vested in the President of the Philippines,

the Judiciary should neither undermine such exercise of executive power by

the President nor arrogate executive power unto itself. The Judiciary

11
Carlota, The Three Most Important Features of the Philippine Legal System that Others Should
Understand, in IALS Conference Learning from Each Other: Enriching the Law School Curriculum in an
Interrelated World

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must confine itself to the exercise of judicial functions and not encroach upon

the functions of the other branches of the government.

Corollary to the principle of separation of powers is the doctrine of non-

delegation of powers. The Supreme Court, in the case of Bureau of Customs

and Employees Association vs HON. Margarito Teves12, explained:

The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three

great branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme

in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. Necessarily

imbedded in this doctrine is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as

expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest, which

means what has been delegated, cannot be delegated. This doctrine is

based on the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only

a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality

of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another.

The powers of the government which have been delegated to them by

the people, who possess original sovereignty, cannot be further delegated

12
G.R. No. L-46440

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by the different government departments to another branch or instrumentality

of the government. 13

The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all three

major powers of the government. As in the instant case, there was an

ostensible undue delegation of power specifically appointed by the

Constitution to the Judicial Department, particularly with the Supreme Court,

to which the Congress has encroached upon.

As provided under Sec 8 paragraph (1) Art VIII of the Constitution, the

Judicial and Bar Council was created under the supervision of the Supreme

Court, and paragraph (5) further states The Council shall have the principal

function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise other

functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.14

13
Hector de Leon, “Textbook on the Philippine Constitution”

14
1987 Philippine Constitution

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 The Congress, in creating the Graft and Corrupt Practices Board, and

directing the Judicial Board and Council to exercise an additional

responsibility of screening and vetting nominees that will compose such

Board, is unduly delegating in itself the power vested by the Constitution to

the Supreme Court. Albeit the provision in the last paragraph “XXX…after

securing prior authorization from the Supreme Court.”, the same nonetheless

encroaches upon the power of the Supreme Court to assign other functions

and duties of the Judicial Board and Council.

Following the rule on statutory construction, when the law is clear and

unambiguous, there is no room for interpretation. The provision in the

Constitution is unambiguous when it vested the power to the Supreme Court

the supervision over the Judicial Board and Council, and to assign other

functions and duties. The creation of the Board, and appointing the Judicial

Board and Council by the Congress is a clear violation of non-delegation of

powers. Such function is incumbent and within the power of the Supreme

Court, and the Congress is not vested with the authority to impose additional

responsibilities to the said Council. In doing to, it exercised undue delegation

of the power of the Supreme Court to itself, and as a result, encroached upon

the power of the latter.

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 PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed for

before this

Honorable Court that the creation of GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES

BOARD(GCPB) be declared as unconstitutional pursuant to Article VIIII,

Sec. 8, Par. 5 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

Other just and equitable relief under the foregoing are likewise being
prayed for.

Respectfully submitted.

Pasay City for Manila City, Philippines. March 12, 2019.

CORPUZ DAMIAN GALERA ISIDERIO AND LEANDER

LAW OFFICES
Counsel for Plaintiff
Ground Floor, Niu Building, Pasay City

By:

ATTY. _________________
IBP Lifetime No. 67891; 5/10/2016
PTR No. 44568; 1/10/2016
Roll of Attorney No. 2016-001023

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 MCLE Compliance No. III – 000899

Copy Furnished:
ATTY. JEFFREY A. ARCHER
Counsel for Respondent
Unit 1200, Tall Building Condominium,Espana, Manila

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