History and context of ESDP/CSDP development

The origins of the security and defence architecture of Europe can be found in the post–
World War II situation. Starting in the late 1940s, a number of initiatives set the stage for
increased cooperation across Europe. Examples include the launch of the U.S. sponsored
Marshall plan in 1947, the signing of the Franco–British Treaty of Dunkirk (1947) containing
a clause of automatic armed assistance, the signing of the Brussels Treaty (1948) sowing the
seeds for a Western European Union, and the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in
Washington (1949). With the gradual emergence of the Cold War, the first European
institutions in this field had a pronounced Euro–Atlantic dimension.
The desire to avoid future wars in Europe also played a key role for institutional
development. The European Coal and Steel Community created in 1951 placed strategic
resources under a supranational authority. It would later serve as a model for the European
Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community established in 1957
through the Treaty of Rome. The three communities were merged in 1967, highlighting the
trend towards legal arrangements to move European co–operation forward. Follow–on treaties
would develop closer collaboration in the area of security and defence, culminating with the
Treaty of Nice in 2001.
Setting an ambitious agenda – from the European Defence Author: Geneva Centre
Community to the Western European Union. for Security Policy

The European Defence Community

On 9 May 1950, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman pronounced a plan calling for
the “Franco–German production of coal and steel as a whole [to] be placed under a common
High Authority”. Inspired by the French economist Jean Monnet, the Schuman Plan sought to
lower the potential for conflict in Europe by placing the control of these strategic resources at
the supranational level. The Schuman Plan also underscored the importance of a “United
Europe” to enable peaceful relations.

The Schuman Plan led to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel
Community in 1951 through the Treaty of Paris. It included Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The breakout of the Korean War in June 1950 made it
urgent to find a solution for a contribution by the newly created West Germany to the West’s
defence efforts. Inspired by the Schuman Plan, Jean Monnet (then serving as head of France’s
General Planning Commission) proposed the creation of a unified European army. French
Prime Minister René Pleven officially tabled a plan for “the creation for the common defence
of a European army under political institutions of the united Europe” in October 1950. This
common army would respond to a European defence minister, be financed by a common
budget and placed at the disposal of the unified Atlantic command. Known as the European
Defence Community, it would include Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands
and, West Germany.
Although the Treaty was signed in May 1952, the European Defence Community was
never created as it failed to be ratified by the French National Assembly in 1954. West
Germany’s integration into the Western defence architecture eventually took place through
the Western European Union (WEU) and, in 1955, NATO. For its part, European integration
was re–launched, on the economic side, through the Messina conference in June 1955 and the
signing, in Rome in March 1957, of the European Atomic Energy Community and the
European Economic Community Treaties.

The Western European Union

The conception of the Western European Union (WEU) dates to the Brussels Treaty
signed on 17 March 1948. Known as the Treaty of Economic, Social, and Cultural
Collaboration and Collective Self–Defence, it calls for the member countries to assist each
other in case one is “the object of an armed attack in Europe”. The signatories of the Treaty
were Paul–Henri Spaak (Belgium), Georges Bidault (France), Joseph Bech (Luxembourg),
Baron von Boetzelaer (Netherlands) and Ernest Bevin (United Kingdom).
However, the WEU was not formally created until the signing of the modified Brussels
Treaty on 23 October 1954. The treaty came in the wake of the failed European Defence
Community. Signed in Paris, it also included Germany and Italy. The treaty modified the
original Brussels Treaty by incorporating controls and ceilings on armed forces and
armaments production. It also added a new Article IV, based on Article V of the original
Brussels Treaty, which recognised NATO´s prime responsibility for protecting Europe.
It became rapidly clear that a substantial portion of the WEU´s portfolio overlapped with
that of other international institutions such as NATO and the Council of Europe. Over time,
the WEU saw many of its functions transferred away to these organisations. As a result, the
WEU gradually entered a dormant phase, focussing on lower profile activities such as
monitoring arms production and armaments stocks. An external presence was nonetheless
facilitated through the WEU Assembly with its status as the sole European parliamentary
assembly with a mandate to monitor defence issues.
2. Sowing the seeds of European cooperation – from the
Davignon Report (1970) to the Petersberg tasks.

European Political Cooperation

At the time the WEU entered a dormant phase, the European Community (EC) began to
explore ways in which to harmonise members´ foreign policies. While the Treaty of Rome
does not contain any reference to cooperation in foreign policy nor, a fortiori, in the field of
security and defence, the idea of some form of political cooperation began to appear in the
informal framework of the meetings of the European heads of state and government. At the
Hague Summit held in December 1969, European leaders instructed their respective foreign
ministers to examine the feasibility of closer integration in the political domain.
In response, foreign ministers introduced the idea of European Political Cooperation
(EPC) in the Davignon Report from October 1970. Also known as the Luxembourg Report, it
defined its objectives (harmonization of positions, consultation and, when appropriate,
common actions) and its procedures (six–monthly meetings of the Foreign Affairs Ministers,
quarterly meetings of the Political Directors forming the Political Committee). Overall, the
EPC aimed to facilitate the consultation process among EC Member States.
On 13 October 1981, the EC foreign ministers adopted the London Report on EPC. It
noted that although the EPC excludes defence issues, it could extend to “certain important
foreign policy issues concerning political aspects of security”. To give some substance to
EPC, the report introduced crisis procedures to enable the organisation of emergency
meetings within 48 hours if needed and provided the rotating Presidency with a team of ofAt
the Stuttgart European Council held in June 1983, the heads of state and government of the
Member States of the EC issued a Solemn Declaration on European Union. Known as the
Stuttgart Declaration, it set the stage for the future Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP).
Finally, the Single European Act, signed in Luxemburg and The Hague in February 1986
(at twelve, given the accession of Greece, then Spain and Portugal), incorporated the EPC into
the Treaties. The parties agreed to “endeavour jointly to formulate and implement a European
foreign policy” and to develop “a European identity in external policy matters”. The Act
provided a legal framework to the EPC structures and procedures as well as to the European
Commission’s role. With the signing of the Single European Act, a secretariat was set–up in
Brussels under the Presidency’s authority to prepare and follow up on European Council
meetings. The consistency between EPC, operating on consensus, and Community processes
was likewise strengthened.
Linking the WEU and the EU
In the 1980s, the Western European Union received new impetus. During the 1987
Hague Platform, WEU members reaffirmed the obligations of the modified Brussels Treaty
and posited the idea of defining common positions on security policy matters. In 1988, the
WEU carried out its first military operation. Known as Operation Cleansweep, it coordinated
mine clearance along a 300 mile corridor around the Strait of Hormuz. Additional missions
were carried out in the 1990s, including a naval operation in the Adriatic (Sharp Guard), a
police and customs operation (Danube Operation), and a police operation in Mostar in 1993
on behalf of the European Union. Among the WEU’s last missions was a Multinational
Advisory Police Element sent to Albania in 1997 to train local police forces.
The signing of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in Maastricht in 1991 opened the
door to closer collaboration between the EU and the WEU. In the TEU, the WEU is
recognised as “an integral part of the development of the Union”. According to Article J.4 of
the TEU, the WEU is “to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which
have defence implications”. Reflecting a closer relationship with the EU, the WEU
Headquarters was relocated from London to Brussels in 1993.
WEU Membership (by membership category)
Members Associate Members Observers Associate Partners
(1954) (1992) (1992) (1994)
Belgium Czech Republic (1999) Austria (1995) Bulgaria
France Hungary (1999) Denmark Estonia
Germany Iceland Finland (1995) Latvia
Greece (1995) Norway Ireland Lithuania
Italy Poland (1999) Sweden (1995) Romania
Luxembourg Turkey Slovakia
Netherlands Slovenia (1996)
Portugal (1990)
Spain (1990)
United Kingdom

In 1992, the WEU Council of Ministers met in Petersberg (outside Bonn) and outlined a new
operational role for the organisation. Ministers declared the WEU’;s readiness to make
available military units for a range of tasks: “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping
tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking”. Collectively,
these became known as the Petersberg tasks.
In 1996, the WEU was involved in the establishment of a European Security and
Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO. According to the Final Communiqu’ of the
Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Berlin, the ESDI would “permit the
creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political
control and strategic direction of the WEU”. The arrangement was significant, as it
accommodated a “European pillar” within the Alliance, facilitating the identification of
capabilities that were separable – but not separate – and that could be used in WEU–led
operations. Moreover, as ESDI could rely on the newly established concept of Combined
Joint Task Forces, it also served to limit potential duplication. The groundwork laid via ESDI
would eventually serve as a template for the Berlin Plus Arrangements adopted in 2003
between NATO and the EU.
With the gradual incorporation of WEU assets and functions into the European Union –
such as the WEU Satellite Centre (now the EU Satellite Centre), the WEU Institute for
Security Studies, and the Petersberg tasks – the WEU slowly entered a closure phase. As of
30 June 2011, the WEU gradually lost it role. After a slow process of liquidation and closure,
the WEU formally ceased to exist as a treaty-based international organisation on 30 June
2011.
3. Developing the EU’s Common Foreign and Security
Policy – from Maastricht to Nice.

The Treaty on European Union (TEU)

The Treaty on European Union – often called the Maastricht Treaty – was signed in
Maastricht (the Netherlands) on 7 February 1992 and entered into force on 1 November 1993.
Using the Single European Act as its departure point, the Maastricht Treaty created a single
institutional framework (the European Union) based on three pillars. These pillars
encompassed community affairs (1st pillar), common foreign and security policy (2nd pillar)
and justice and home affairs (3rd pillar).
 In spite of a single institutional framework, the roles of institutions in the decision–
making process differed considerably according to the pillars and policy areas. In the 2nd and
3rd pillars, an intergovernmental approach to policy making prevailed. However, it should be
noted that within the TEU the European Commission is “fully associated with the work
carried out in the common foreign and security policy field” (art. J9) and “may refer to the
Council any question relating to the common foreign and security policy and may submit
proposals to the Council” (art. J8). Overall, CFSP aims to enhance the EU’s ability to address
the growing number of challenges at the international level, identifying five principal
objectives.

CFSP is more far–reaching than European Political Cooperation in at least four ways. First, it
breaks new ground – Article J4 of the TEU states that CFSP includes “all questions related to
the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which
might in time lead to a common defence”. Second, the Maastricht Treaty introduces a new
legal instrument – the Joint Action – in support of the CFSP decision–making processes. A
Joint Action enables the mobilisation of EU assets (human, financial, etc.) to reach Council–
defined objectives. Third, CFSP encourages a closer consultation and co–ordination process,
explicitly calling for national policies to be consistent with Common Positions. Lastly, and as
noted earlier, European leaders agreed at Maastricht that the WEU forms an integral part of
the development of the EU, tasking it to elaborate and implement EU decisions and actions
with defence implications.

The Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997

The Treaty of Amsterdam was signed on 2 October 1997 and entered into force on 1
May 1999. Building on the Treaty of Maastricht, its main contributions in the area of CFSP
relate to institutional arrangements and the decision–making process.
With respect to institution–building, the Treaty of Amsterdam created the post of a High
Representative for the CFSP to be held by the Secretary–General of the Council of the EU
(henceforth Council). The Secretary–General/High Representative (SG/HR) serves to improve
the efficiency and consistency of the CFSP by assisting with the formulation, processing, and
implementation of decisions. In support of the SG/HR’s work, the Treaty of Amsterdam
established a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit to provide the Council with an early
warning capability. The unit served to facilitate joint analysis, strengthening the EU’s
capacity to support a Common Foreign and Security Policy.
Lastly, the Amsterdam Treaty supported closer institutional relations between the EU
and the WEU – including the incorporation of the Petersberg tasks into the TEU – with a view
to the integration of the WEU into the EU, “should the European Council so decide”.
In the area of decision–making, the Amsterdam Treaty introduced the concept of
constructive abstention. This mechanism makes it possible for an EU Member State to abstain
in a CFSP–related vote in the Council without blocking a unanimous decision. The
Amsterdam Treaty also introduced a new legal instrument to enhance coherence in the
Union’s external action: the Common Strategy. These may be used to specify a political
objective and the resources needed to achieve the objective(s).
The Treaty of Nice, 2001
The Treaty of Nice was signed on 26 February 2001 and entered into force on 1
February 2003. Coming in the heels of the St. Malo Declaration (1998) and numerous
European Council meetings focussing on crisis management capabilities (treated in greater
detail in the next section), the Treaty of Nice formalised European Security and Defence
Policy (now the Common Security and Defence Policy) by bringing it into the EU’s
institutional structure.
For example, in line with the December 2000 European Council held in Nice
establishing the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee and the
EU Military Staff, the Treaty of Nice formally tasked the PSC to “monitor the international
situation in the areas covered by the common foreign and security policy and contribute to the
definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council”. In addition, the PSC is to
“exercise, under the responsibility of the Council, political control and strategic direction of
crisis management operations”.
In some areas of decision–making, the Nice Treaty extends the use of qualified majority
voting. For example, the Council could now rely on qualified majority voting when
concluding international agreements under the second pillar, specifically those needed to
implement a joint action or common position. Likewise, the concept of enhanced cooperation,
introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, was extended to the second pillar for the implementation
of relevant joint actions or common positions. Enhanced cooperation allows a number of
Member States (at least eight are required – nine under the Lisbon Treaty) that wish to work
more closely on a specific area to do so.
PART 2 – The development of the Common Security and Defence Policy

Presents the establishment of CSDP, its relation to CFSP and how both policies might
evolve.

Introduction

While the European Union identified ambitious objectives in the area of external
security and defence in 1992 through the Maastricht Treaty, it would not be until the late
1990s, in the aftermath of the wars of secession in the Balkans, that concrete provisions were
introduced to endow the EU with tangible crisis management capabilities. Following the St.
Malo Declaration in 1998, numerous European Council summit meetings defined the military
and civilian capabilities needed to fulfil the Petersberg tasks. Examples include the Helsinki
European Council Meeting (1999), which laid the foundations for the Headline Goal 2003 and
the Santa Maria da Feira European Council Meeting (2000) which identified four civilian
priority areas. In 2003, ESDP (now CSDP) became operational through the initiation of the
first ESDP missions, giving policy–makers additional guidance on how to further develop
CFSP and ESDP.

1. Laying the foundations for Common Security and

Defence Policy (CSDP)

The Franco–British Joint Declaration on European Defence, St. Malo, 1998

A Franco–British summit was held in French port city of St. Malo on 3–4 December
1998. It was a turning point in European public diplomacy, with the UK and France jointly
underlining the growing need for greater European engagement in the areas of security and
defence. The St. Malo Declaration calls on the EU to have the capacity for autonomous
action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use these forces and a
readiness to do so in order to respond to international crises. In line with previous
formulations, these capabilities should not challenge the role of NATO as EU Member States
should act “in conformity with the respective obligations in NATO”.
To better understand the context surrounding the St. Malo Declaration, it is useful to
briefly summarise some of the key British and French motives behind it. From the British
perspective, an important foreign policy concern during the post–World War II period was to
maintain and strengthen the transatlantic link between Europe and the US: The United
Kingdom saw itself as a bridge–builder between the two continents. However, the security
system changed fundamentally after the Cold War. After the bloodshed in the Balkans, the
British government came to the conclusion that the EU had to take on more responsibility for
security and defence. Furthermore, Tony Blair’s election as prime minister marked a
fundamental shift in the United Kingdom’s approach to Europe. Mr. Blair favoured a policy
of constructive engagement within European institutions. And in the field of security and
defence, the United Kingdom could offer both credibility and leadership.
France, like the United Kingdom, was convinced that after the Cold War domestic
stability and integration into the EU no longer sufficed to ensure security in Europe.
Moreover, a core objective of French foreign and security policy had long been to create a
(relatively) autonomous European security and defence policy to balance the US and
complement NATO. France also hoped that such a policy would lead to a more equitable
transatlantic partnership. After St. Malo, a number of European Council meetings from the
late 1990s onward focused on providing CSDP with the necessary tools to strengthen crisis
management capabilities.
 Cologne European Council Meeting, 3–4 June 1999
At the June 1999 European Council meeting held in Cologne (Germany), EU heads of
state and government reiterated the message contained in the St. Malo Declaration, calling on
the EU to acquire the necessary means and capacities to engage in EU–led crisis management
operations. Serving as the stepping stone for CSDP, they also made it clear that the EU’s
efforts in this area should not challenge the role of NATO as the basis of collective defence of
all NATO members.

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) aims to give the European Union the
means to assume its responsibilities in the fields of crisis prevention and management, in
accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. The Presidency Report states that
“necessary arrangements must be made in order to ensure political control and strategic
direction of EU–led Petersberg operations”. To do so, the report identifies the need “for
analysis of situations, sources of intelligence and a capability for relevant strategic planning”.
It foreshadowed the need for, among others:
 A permanent body in Brussels (Political and Security Committee).
 An EU Military Committee consisting of Military Representatives making
recommendations to the Political and Security Committee.
 An EU military Staff and a Situation Centre.
 Other resources such as a Satellite Centre and an Institute for Security Studies.

Helsinki European Council Meeting, 10–11 December 1999

The December 1999 Helsinki Summit focused mainly on the development of the EU’s
military crisis management capability. It called on EU Member States to “be able, by 2003, to
deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000–60,000
persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks”. The annex provides further details on
the development of military capabilities, including the need for forces that are “militarily self–
sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other
combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements”.
The specific operational requirements for the Petersberg tasks are provided in the Helsinki
Headline Goal Catalogue. Voluntary national contributions were pledged at the 2000
Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels, and a pool of more than 100,000 personnel
and approximately 400 combat aircraft and 100 naval vessels was constituted.
Despite some qualitative shortfalls, the EU declared CSDP operational at the December 2001
Laeken European Council meeting, stating that the EU was “capable of conducting some
crisis–management operations”. This position was confirmed in May 2003 by the General
Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) which declared that “the EU now has
 operational capability across the full range of Petersberg tasks, limited and constrained by
recognized shortfalls” in the military sphere.

Santa Maria da Feira European Council Meeting, 19–20 June 2000

The Feira European Council meeting concentrated on the development of the EU's
civilian crisis management capabilities. Appendix 3 of the Annex identified four priority areas
for civilian crisis management:
 Police
 Strengthening the rule of law
 Strengthening civilian administration
 Civil protection

It should be noted that additional civilian priorities were added in later years. These
include monitoring, support for the EU Special Representatives and the set–up of civilian
response teams (specifically through the Civilian Headline Goal 2010 which calls for a 100
person strong pool of experts prepared for rapid deployment).
Within the police category, concrete targets were specified. By 2003, EU Member States
were to be able to provide up to 5,000 police officers to international missions. Of these, up to
1,000 police should be available for deployment within 30 days. At the Göteborg European
Council meeting held in Sweden on 15–16 June 2001, additional targets were identified for
the remaining categories. In the area of rule of law, Member States were to be able to
contribute up to 200 personnel “adequately prepared for crisis management operations in the
field of rule of law” on a voluntary basis. Consisting of legal, judicial, and prosecution
experts, such an element would be deployable within 30 days.
In the area of civil protection, “Civil Protection intervention teams” consisting of up to
2,000 individuals were to be available by 2003 in response to major natural, technological, or
environmental emergencies. In addition, 2 to 3 assessment and/or co–ordination teams made
up of 10 experts should be available for deployment within 3–7 hours. Lastly, in the domain
of civilian administration, no numerical targets were provided. Instead, the Göteborg
European Council identified the need for a “pool of experts able on a voluntary basis to take
on assignments within civilian administration”. All targets were later declared to be met. At
the Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference held in Brussels on 22 November 2004, it
was confirmed that “Member States have well exceeded the concrete targets set by the
European Council”.
Linking CFSP and ESDP/CSDP Author: Geneva Centre for Security Policy

Complementary objectives
There were clear links between the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the
European Security and Defence Policy. Both serve to fulfil the EU’s foreign policy objectives,
and as shown in the following diagram, ESDP was subsumed under the wider umbrella of
CFSP. In addition, CFSP and ESDP were to complement each other, with CFSP concentrating
 on foreign policy objectives at the strategic level
while ESDP enabling the EU to execute crisis
management operations on the ground.

With respect to ESDP, it is essential to

underline that it included both military and
civilian dimensions. Many (erroneously) believe
that ESDP only covers military missions. In fact,
as of 2017, the majority of ESDP/CSDP missions
were civilian in nature. Moreover, given the EU’s strong emphasis on civil–military co–
ordination and its recognition that the new security threats cannot be addressed through
military means alone, many recent CSDP crisis management operations include both military
and civilian components.
While CFSP and ESDP/CSDP are interlinked, they are not fully synchronised. For
example from a historical perspective, when CFSP was established under the Maastricht
Treaty in the early 1990s, there was no formal ESDP. Ironically, when the first ESDP
missions were launched in 2003 – providing a strong push forward for the ESDP – CFSP was
static due to differing European positions on the war in Iraq. Thus, while ESDP was
progressing rapidly, the same was not the case for CFSP.
The Lisbon Treaty and CFSP/CSDP
The Lisbon Treaty was signed on 13 December 2007 and entered into force on 1
December 2009 after all EU Member States – including Ireland following a second
referendum on 2 October 2009 – ratified it. The Treaty provisions pertaining to CFSP and
ESDP are by and large identical to the ones present in the failed Constitutional Treaty. Those
provisions are about institutions, the scope of activities that the EU will be able to perform
under the new Treaty, and decision–making processes.
a. Institutions
The Treaty renames ESDP as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), to
which it dedicates a full section. CSDP is presented as an ‘integral part of the common foreign
and security policy’, and shall ‘provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on
civilian and military assets’, that can be used ‘on missions outside the Union for
peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security’. Several
institutions or positions falling within the CFSP/CSDP framework are established, with the
aim of enhancing the institutional coherence and the overall effectiveness of EU action.
Among the key new positions is the post of President of the European Council and that
of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Elected by
the European Council by a qualified majority for a term of two and a half years, renewable
once, the President of the European Council will ‘ensure the external representation of the
Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy’. The former Belgian
Prime Minister Herman Van Rompuy was elected the first President of the European Council
on 19 November 2009. As such, he is responsible for chairing the European Council, drive its
work and act as a consensus–builder within it.
The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is
appointed by the European Council, acting on a qualified majority vote, and with the
agreement of the President of the Commission. The first holder of this position was Ms.
Catherine Ashton, a British national and former Trade Commissioner. The post merges the
two positions of High Representative for CFSP (held by Dr. Javier Solana between 1999–
2009) and of Commissioner for External Relations (held by Ms. Benita Ferrero–Waldner
between 2004 and early 2010) and symbolizes the disappearance of the pillar structure. The
High Representative also acts as Vice–President of the European Commission, giving the
European Parliament a say on his/her appointment as the Commission is accountable to the
Parliament. In this new position, the HR/VP represents ‘the Union for matters relating to
CFSP’, conducts ‘political dialogue with third parties on the Union’s behalf’, and expresses
‘the Union’s position in international organizations and at international conferences’. The
holder of the position likewise chairs the Foreign Affairs Council (a new format of Council
meetings Ms. Catherine ASHTON, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy, Vice – President of the Commission Credit “The Council of the European
Union” separate from the General Affairs Council), while one of her representatives chairs
meetings of the Political and Security Committee (PSC). Overall, the new High
Representative contributes to the preparation of CFSP and ensures its implementation (art.
13A).
The High Representative is assisted by a European External Action Service
(EEAS) that ‘shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States
and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the
Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of
the Member States’ (art. 13A). The EEAS is a sui generis structure, distinct from the
Commission and the Council Secretariat, but bodies such as the Crisis Management and
Planning Directorate (CMPD), the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capacity (CPCC), and the
EU Military Staff (EUMS) are part of the EEAS. European Commission Delegations become
EU Delegations and are part of the EEAS.
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the division of tasks between the
President of the Council and the High Representative, as well as the responsibilities that each
will assume, are not clearly specified and were expected to be shaped in practice by the initial
two incumbents. Likewise, the role of the President of the Council vis–à–vis the still existing
rotating presidencies was to evolve over time. Formally, the creation of these positions put an
end to the rotating presidency in foreign affairs.
At the institutional level, the Lisbon Treaty also formally endorses the creation of
the European Defense Agency, operational since 2004 with the mandate of harmonizing
defence spending, supporting defence research, and assisting member states to meet the
capability commitments (art. 28D). Finally, the Treaty gives the EU a single legal
personality (art. 46A), something previously enjoyed only by the European Communities.
b. Scope of activities
The Lisbon Treaty contains provisions on the activities of the EU in the fields of foreign
and security policy. In terms of missions, the Treaty formally endorses the extension of the
so–called ‘Petersberg Tasks’, that now include ‘joint disarmament operations, humanitarian
and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace–keeping
tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace–making and post–conflict
stabilisation’ (art. 28B). These tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including
by ‘supporting third states in combating terrorism on their territories’.
The Treaty also extends the concept of ‘enhanced co–operation’ to all EU policy areas,
including CSDP (art. 10). ‘Enhanced co–operation’ – which allows EU Member States that
wish to work more closely together to do so – can be established by the Council and requires
at least nine member states participating in it. ‘Enhanced cooperation’ differs from
‘permanent structured cooperation’ (see below) in that the latter is permanent and deals with
defence matters, while the former can be activated in all EU policy areas and on a non–
permanent basis.
The Treaty also unveils new mechanisms or commitments. For example, the Lisbon
Treaty makes it possible for a group of Member states ‘which are willing and have the
necessary capability’ to implement a task, within the Union framework, ‘in order to protect
the Union’s values and serve its interests’ (art. 28A §5 and 28C).
In the same vein, flexibility in the CSDP field is encouraged by the establishment
of permanent structured co–operation (art. 28). EU Member States ‘whose military
capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one
another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent
structured cooperation within the Union framework’ (art. 28A6). This aims at allowing
Member States (with no minimum number of countries involved) that are willing to move
forward in the field of military cooperation to do so without being hindered by others. The
Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation refers to a ‘new stage in the development of
the European Security and Defence Policy’. The Battlegroup Concept provides an example of
what a permanent structured cooperation could look like, but other types of military
cooperation are foreseen, leading to the debate about a “hard core” Europe or a two–speed
Europe. At the financial level, the Treaty establishes a ‘start–up fund’ aimed at allowing for
urgent financing of initiatives in the framework of CFSP and EU–led missions that cannot be
charged to the Union budget (art.28 §3).
Finally, political and military solidarity among EU Member States is boosted by the
inclusion of a mutual assistance clause (art. 28A7), and a ‘solidarity clause’ (Title VII, art.
188R1). The mutual assistance clause is inspired by the Western European Union Treaty’s
clause. It states that ‘If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the
other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means
in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter’. The importance
of the clause is watered down by the provision stating that it ‘shall not prejudice the specific
character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States’, in reference to the role
of NATO and its collective defence provisions.
The ‘solidarity clause’, which was introduced in the context of the terrorist attack in
Madrid in March 2004, states that ‘The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a
spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural
or man–made disaster.’ (art. 188R1).
c. Decision–Making Process
The unanimity rule prevails in the CFSP/CSDP decision–making processes, and the
Treaty confirms that ‘Decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including
those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting
unanimously’ (art.28 A4). However, exceptions are introduced in the Treaty. In particular,
decisions pertaining to ‘permanent structured co–operation’, the procedures for setting up and
administering the ‘start–up fund’ or the appointment of the High Representative, are adopted
by qualified majority. On the other hand, the unanimity rule remains when deciding on the
launch of a mission. In practice, this means that states involved in permanent structured co–
operation may not launch an operation on behalf of the EU without having the formal
approval of all EU Member States.
Over time, policy–makers have stressed the importance of enhancing the coherence not
just between CFSP and CSDP, but across all foreign policy–related tools. In fact, several
provisions in the Lisbon Treaty aim to improve the coherence across the EU’s three pillars.
How CSDP and CFSP might evolve? The evolution of CSDP is partially visible in two
recent roadmaps: the Civilian Headline Goal 2010 and the Headline Goal 2010 (which
focuses mostly on military capability development). Both headline goals identify the need for
rapid response capabilities, consistent with the establishment of Civilian Response Teams and
EU Battlegroups. They also emphasise the importance of qualitative aspects of capability
development – such as interoperability among military forces or advanced levels of training
for civilian staff. Both headline goals incorporate a systematic review process to ensure that
the EU achieves the capabilities needed to address current and future risks. Another important
factor is the continued push towards the comprehensive approach. The combination of both
civilian and military tools, guided through an overarching joint strategy and/or Special
Representative (e.g. for the Sahel, Great Lakes, Horn of Africa, etc.), are indicative of a
movement towards greater coherence vis–à–vis external action.
The evolution of CSDP is also subject to external factors. Examples include the future
demand for CSDP operations, the level of financial/manpower resources made available for
CSDP operations, the speed at which new capabilities are acquired, the EU’s relations with
third states and international organisations, and EU–specific developments such as
enlargement or exit of an EU member state (e.g. Brexit). With over thirty CSDP missions
either executed or currently underway, a number of lessons have been identified which
likewise impact the evolution of CSDP.
The evolution of CFSP is not as clear cut as that of CSDP. While the linkage to CSDP is
likely to be strengthened as policymakers strive to increase the coherence among tools in the
foreign policy arena, the actual level of “common” foreign policy across the range of EU
Member States is still work in progress. Given the volatile nature of politics, CFSP is more
likely to evolve in a non–linear fashion, with periodic improvements marked by occasional
dips as external challenges complicate the formulation of a common policy.
Year Event
1945 End of World War II
Churchill’s speech at the University of Zürich calling
1946
for a United States of Europe
Launching of the European Recovery Program
1947
(Marshall Plan)
1948 Signing of the Brussels Treaty
1949 Signing of the North Atlantic Treaty
Unveiling of the Schumann Plan
1950
Outbreak of the Korean War
Signing of the Treaty of Paris establishing the
1951
European Coal and Steel Community
Failure of the European Defence Community
1954 Signing of the Modified Brussels Treaty formally
creating the WEU
1955 Establishment of the Warsaw Pact
1956 Suez Canal Crisis
1957 Signing of the Treaties of Rome
1961 Construction of the Berlin Wall
The Davignon Report introduces the idea of
1969
European Political Cooperation
1975 Adoption of the Helsinki Final Act
1983 Stuttgart Declaration (‘Solemn Declaration’)
1986 Signing of the Single European Act
1989 Fall of the Berlin Wall
Signing of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces
1990
in Europe
Signing of the Treaty on European Union (in force
1992
1993)
1993 Official creation of the EUROCORPS
Reinforcement of ESDI within NATO at the Berlin
1996
Summit
1997 Signing of the Amsterdam Treaty (in force 1999)
Franco–British Joint Declaration on European
1998
Defence (St. Malo)
Cologne and Helsinki European Council Meetings
1999
lay the foundations for ESDP
2000 Santa Maria da Feira European Council
Adoption of the European Security Strategy
2003
Adoption of the Berlin Plus Arrangements
Headline Goal 2010 / Civilian Headline Goal 2008
(updated in 2007 to CHG
2004
2010)
Establishment of the EDA
 Entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on the
European Union. New
2009
institutions, scope of activities, and decision–making
in CFSP/CSDP.
2016 Presentation of the EU Global Strategy

The European Global Strategy

General Description
AKU2 explains why we need strategies and highlights the cornerstones of the newly
welcomed European Global Strategy. There is no time limit for the study of this AKU.
However, the time needed is estimated to be between 2 and 3 hours, depending on the pre–
knowledge.

Content
The AKU2 consists of six chapters:

1. The Function of Strategy

o Why we need strategy?
o How we write strategy?
o Codification and flexibility
2. Towards the EU’s first strategy
o Absence of strategy
o Strategic roots
o Towards the ESS
o Drafting the ESS
3. The European Security Strategy (ESS 2003)
o An egalitarian Europe
o An egalitarian foreign policy
o Codifying the EU way
o The neighbourhood and the world
4. Strategic debates
o The impact of the ESS
o Calls for revision
o The report on implementation
o Towards a global strategy?
5. The EU Global Strategy
o Realpolitik with European characteristics
o EU interests
o The security of the EU
 o The neighbourhood
o War and crisis
o Regional orders
o Effective multilateralism
6. Strategic Implementation
o Creating a process
o Brexit

The Function of Strategy

Nobody could have predicted the Arab Spring, or the crisis in Ukraine, or the civil war
in Syria, so what do we need strategy for? Let’s not waste time on drafting strategic
documents, especially since it will be extremely difficult with so many Member States at the
table. This is still the view taken by many practitioners of foreign and security policy. Their
frustration with often cumbersome negotiations is understandable, but this view betrays a
fundamental misunderstanding about the function of strategy.
Why we need strategy?

It is true that practitioners and academics are rarely able to predict anything with any
degree of success or precision. But strategy does not aim to predict anything in the first place.
The primary function of strategy is rather to help the decision–maker define a course of action
when events occur which are, by definition, unpredictable. How important is this for me? That
is the question that strategy will help to answer, and that answer will determine whether and
what action must be taken, and what resources must be allocated to it.

Of course, when a crisis occurs and unpredictable events do turn out to be important
because vital interests are directly at stake, urgency in combination with uncertainty and a
lack of information will create friction. The fog of diplomacy or, in a worst–case scenario, of
war, is unavoidable. Yet that still differs from mere improvisation, which is what decision–
making without any prior strategy would amount to.

Fully–fledged strategic actors do not limit themselves to reacting to events. They also
try to proactively shape events and developments. The second function of strategy is therefore
to set out a limited number of overall objectives, to guide day–to–day decision–making and
the allocation of budgets and other resources.

Lastly, though some elements of strategy may remain secret, strategy also serves to
further accountability and public diplomacy. It is a way of communicating a vision of one’s
role in the world, to give legitimacy to one’s actions in the eyes of parliaments and citizens,
and to create clarity vis–à–vis allies, partners and competitors alike.
How we write strategy?

The first rule of strategy–making could be stated quite simply as: know thyself. Know
your interests, and know your values. Values and interests do not stand in contradiction: your
values will determine what kind of society you want to build and preserve, and that will in
turn determine the conditions which need to be fulfilled for that to be possible: your vital
interests. Your values will further determine which types of instrument are deemed morally
acceptable to be put to use to that end.

Strategy–making, then, starts with an analysis of the world, so as to identify the most
significant threats and challenges to one’s values and interests, and to define ends, ways and
means by setting priority objectives, choosing the instruments to achieve them, and allocating
the necessary resources.

Codification and flexibility

Does all this need to be put in writing? The more straightforward the decision–making
system, the less necessary it is to codify strategy. A state in which strategy is ultimately
whatever the president says it is can operate on the basis of an implicit strategy. Conversely, a
complex multi–layered foreign policy actor such as the EU has a much greater need for an
explicit strategy. The chances of the High Representative and twenty–eight foreign ministers,
not to mention the President of the European Council and twenty–eight heads of state and
government, all having the same implicit understanding of EU strategy are rather slim.

Documents like the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) operate at the level of grand strategy:
they frame all dimensions of foreign policy or external action, for which they put forward
broad long–term goals. These then have to be translated into more specific functional and
regional strategies. But neither the grand strategy nor the specific strategies remain valid for
ever. Good strategy is flexible, and therefore a systematic review mechanism is crucial.

Towards the EU’s first strategy

The European Union as we know it came into being in 1993, when the Treaty of
Maastricht entered into force and the preceding European Economic Community (EEC) was
absorbed into a more overtly political Union which aspired to pursue a Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP). In 1999 a politicomilitary arm was added to the CFSP; originally the
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), it is now known as the Common Security and
Defence Policy (CSDP).

Absence of strategy

However, the EU’s first strategy, the European Security Strategy (ESS), was only
adopted a full ten years later, in 2003. Member States purposely avoided any strategic debate,
because of their widely differing views on the degree of autonomy of EU policy vis–à–vis the
capitals themselves and vis–à–vis the US. That did not halt progress on other dimensions of
foreign and security policy, however: Member States often pragmatically agree to disagree on
one aspect, which allows them to move forward on the issues on which they do agree. Thus
they were able to create the institutions of the CFSP and the CSDP.
Strategic roots
The absence of a formal strategy does not necessarily mean that all action is un–
strategic. During the first decade of the CFSP, an implicit ‘European way’ of doing things
emerged from the practice of EU foreign policy–making, characterised by cooperation with
partner countries, an emphasis on conflict prevention, and a broad approach through aid, trade
and diplomacy. This approach has its roots in the external relations of the EEC. Although it
had no formal competence in foreign policy, the EEC developed dense worldwide trade
relations and built up a network of delegations more encompassing than the embassy network
of any Member State.
This implicit concept of strategy steered the development of EU partnerships and
long–term policies such as development. But it proved entirely insufficient when the EU was
confronted with crisis. It was the EU’s failure to address the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina
in the early 1990s and again in Kosovo in 1999 that drove the institutional development of the
CFSP and the CSDP. Even perfect institutions will not deliver, though, if there is no strategy
for them to operate on.

Towards the ESS

That insight finally came to the Member States in 2003. That year the US invasion of
Iraq created a deep divide within Europe, between those who wanted to stand by their most
important ally no matter what, and those who felt that even an ally cannot be followed when it
so clearly violates one’s own principles and, as would be revealed all too soon, acts against
one’s interests. But whatever Europeans thought, it did not matter. This was the great lesson
of the Iraq crisis: when Europe is divided, it has no influence.

This was the catalyst for the unexpected drive to finally organise a formal strategic
debate in the EU and produce a strategic document. EU Member States needed to heal the
wounds inflicted by the highly emotional debate over Iraq and project an image of unity to the
outside world once again. It also sent a message to the US. Those who had supported the
invasion of Iraq wanted to signal that Europe was still an ally and that it cared about the same
threats and challenges as the US. Those who had opposed it wanted to make it clear that
caring about the same threats and challenges does not imply addressing them in the same
way.

Drafting the ESS

This window of opportunity was not wasted. Javier Solana, then the High
Representative, was tasked with producing a first draft, which was drawn up by a small team
around him and put to the European Council in June 2003. Then, instead of discussing points
and commas and working his way up through the hierarchy of CFSP bodies, which is the
normal procedure when drafting official EU foreign policy texts, Solana had three seminars
organised, where the same officials could give their input on the draft, but alongside
representatives from national parliaments, from key allies and partners, and from academia
and civil society. This approach created a much greater sense of ownership and produced a
very readable text, short and free of jargon. The final document was formally adopted by the
European Council as the European Security Strategy in December 2003. A strategy was born.

The European Security Strategy (2003)

If ‘know thyself’ is the first rule of strategy–making, then for which Europe was the ESS
adopted?
An egalitarian Europe
Through a combination of democracy, the free market, and government intervention at
European and national level, Europeans have constructed a model of society which is set apart
by its egalitarian aspirations. In 2009, the Member States formally codified these aspirations
in the Lisbon Treaty, which amended Article 2, the list of values on which European
integration is based:

 ‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy,
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons
belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in
which pluralism, non–discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between
men and women prevail.’

Europe is indeed the most equal region, providing the greatest security, freedom and
prosperity to the greatest number of citizens. Security: every citizen must be kept free from
harm. Freedom: every citizen must be included in democratic decision–making, must have his
or her human rights respected, and must be treated equally before the law. And prosperity:
every citizen has a right to a fair share of the wealth produced by his or her society; not an
equal share, but a just one.

This social model was an inherent part of the European project from the start. After the
end of the Second World War, to prevent another world war from ever again breaking out in
Europe, the founding fathers set out along a path of integration between states that would
make war between them a practical impossibility. At the same time, the countries of (western)
Europe made a quantum leap in establishing the comprehensive welfare state. They had
learned that without the social buffer of the welfare state, democracy was unable to cope with
severe economic crisis and the resulting political upheaval. In the 1930s, as a result, in the
majority of European countries democracy had collapsed and given way to various forms of
authoritarianism and fascism, which inevitably led to war. For the founding fathers, the social
model was an inherent part of their peace project. It is not a luxury, something that is nice to
have when things are going well and can easily be discarded as ballast when things are going
badly; on the contrary, the worse things get, the more important the social buffer is. It is
precisely in times of crisis that one must invest in it.

An egalitarian foreign policy

The strength of the ESS was that it took this very same egalitarian aspiration and turned it into
a positive narrative for European foreign and security policy. Its subtitle was ‘A secure
Europe in a better world’: the aim was to secure Europe, and the best way of making that
happen was to make the world a better place. The core of this philosophy is neatly captured in
just two sentences, which express the essence of EU strategy:

 ‘The best protection for our security is a world of well–governed democratic

states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform,
dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and
protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international
order.’

In other words, the key to security is the existence of effective states that provide for the
security, freedom and prosperity of their own citizens. Only where governments treat their
citizens equally are lasting peace and stability possible. Where governments do not provide
for their citizens, tensions will arise, and instability, repression and conflict will follow;
citizens will eventually revolt, and regimes will either implode, relatively peacefully (think of
the Soviet Union in 1991 or Tunisia in 2011), or explode in violence. Therefore, put less
diplomatically: the more the rest of the world becomes like Europe, the better for everybody.
The better for Europe, since there will be fewer grounds for mass migration to Europe, less
interruption of trade, and less risk of conflict spilling over to its territory. But the better too for
citizens in the rest of the world, since they will enjoy more security, freedom and prosperity.

That does not mean, however, that the EU should simply try to export its own social model in
all its intricate detail to the rest of the world. Not only would that be far too paternalistic and
neo–imperialist; more importantly, it simply would not work. What Europe should try to
promote is its core values: the egalitarian aspirations, the sense that government is responsible
for the common welfare – the res publica – and not just for the wellbeing of the ruling elite.
Europeans should abandon the idea that they know better how to govern other countries than
the citizens of those countries themselves, but they can legitimately advertise the results that
they have achieved in Europe. There are probably many ways of achieving the same result,
and it is the result itself, as well as the sincere commitment to at least attempting to achieve it,
that counts.

Codifying the EU way

By adopting the ESS, the Heads of State or Government provided the formal underpinnings of
the European way of doing foreign policy which was already emerging through the practice of
EU external action, and gave it a conceptual basis. Rather than a radical new departure, the
ESS thus marks the codification and consolidation of a specific European approach.

This approach, first of all, clearly puts the emphasis on prevention. By attempting to improve
the provision of public goods, EU foreign policy seeks to address the root causes of tensions,
disputes and conflicts. If successful, conflict should be avoided altogether. Unfortunately,
there will always be cases when prevention will fail and the choice will be between acting
militarily or not acting at all, but the aspiration is clear.
Secondly, the approach is comprehensive and holistic: because security, freedom and
prosperity are interrelated, any external action addresses all three dimensions simultaneously,
integrating all available EU instruments, from aid and trade to diplomacy and the military.
Unidimensional interventions may tackle the symptoms of a problem, but they will not have
any lasting impact and may produce negative side effects. The classic example is the US
invasion of Iraq: a military victory was quickly gained, but due to the lack of an
accompanying political and economic strategy, it simply led to another (civil) war. But
Europeans do not seem to have absorbed that lesson, since they made exactly the same
mistake when, with US support, they intervened in Libya in 2011. As a result, no stable new
regime has yet emerged, and furthermore many combatants were pushed into Mali,
necessitating another military intervention soon afterwards.

Finally, the EU approach is multilateral: the aim is to influence other governments, not to
subjugate them, hence the emphasis on dialogue and partnership, notably with the UN and the
global multilateral agencies, with regional organisations, and with the great powers (because
they are the great powers and therefore cannot be ignored).

The neighbourhood and the world

All of this may seem perfectly unobjectionable: who could possibly be against it? But
formally adopting this approach in the wake of a National Security Strategy (The White
House, 2002) in which the US reserved the right to unilateral pre–emptive military
intervention (‘before a threat is fully formed’, as President Bush’s cover letter stated)
represented a very conscious choice to do things differently. The strategy plays out at two
levels. In the EU’s own neighbourhood, the bloc seeks to take the lead itself and establish a
ring of well–governed countries around it. At the global level, Europe opts for the indirect
approach: promoting cooperation in regional and other multilateral frameworks, thus pulling
states into what the EU calls ‘effective multilateralism’. Multilateralism can be deemed
effective if it increases security, freedom and prosperity. This is grand strategy, a single
framework for all EU external action, across the complex EU institutional machinery, from
the European Commission (development, trade, enlargement, humanitarian aid) to the
European External Action Service (diplomacy and defence).

Strategic debates

The adoption of the ESS was a turning point, but after several years calls for a strategic
review began to sound louder and louder.
The impact of the ESS
The ESS certainly worked as a narrative. In 2003, many expected that the ESS would
be quickly forgotten – locked in some drawer, with the key given to NATO. In fact, the
opposite happened: EU foreign policy decisions continued to refer to the ESS as the overall
framework, and EU and national officials continued to refer to it when explaining Europe’s
role in the world, because it expressed it so neatly and concisely. That is important, because in
a disparate organisation such as the EU, comprising twenty–eight Member States each with
their own strategic culture, commonality must be stressed time and again.

But did the ESS drive a proactive EU foreign policy, and did it help the EU make the
right decisions in moments of crisis? Here the picture is more mixed, for the simple reason
that the ESS was not a complete strategy at all. In the ESS, the EU was very clear about its
values, which it translates into very specific methods: Europe wants to tackle things in a
preventive, comprehensive and multilateral way. The ESS had little to say, however, about
either the means, apart from a general acknowledgement that in the military field especially
more resources were required, or, even more importantly, the objectives. The decision to
prioritise assuming leadership in stabilising Europe’s own neighbourhood was an important
one; opting for a more indirect approach at the global level was the logical corollary, for one
cannot prioritise everything at once. In the ESS itself, however, neither broad objective was
detailed into more specific priorities that could drive day–to–day decision–making. The ESS
codified how to do things – but it did not really tell Europe what to do first.

Calls for revision

In the autumn of 2007 French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Swedish Foreign
Minister Carl Bildt put the revision of the ESS on the agenda as an objective for their
upcoming Presidencies. This idea did not meet with universal enthusiasm. Not everybody was
convinced that the ESS was already in need of updating, and some also feared that it would
provoke excessively divisive debates, particularly on Russia, and that the EU would end up
with a worse rather than a better document. Hence the somewhat cautiously expressed
mandate given to High Representative Javier Solana by the December 2007 European
Council: ‘to examine the implementation of the Strategy with a view to proposing elements
on how to improve the implementation and, as appropriate, elements to complement it’.
The debate was concluded by the adoption of a Report on the implementation of the
European Security Strategy – providing security in a changing world by the December 2008
European Council, which decided to leave the text of the ESS itself untouched. The Report
‘does not replace the ESS, but reinforces it’, and the ESS remained in force.

The Report on implementation

Solana did not allow the debate to be hijacked by the events of August 2008 – the war
between Georgia and Russia. Strategy should not be about the last thing that happened to
occur, but about fundamental interests and principles and long–term objectives. The Report
provided a concise overview of implementation and confirmed the holistic and multilateral
approach. Interestingly, it mentioned human security: ‘We have worked to build human
security, by reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights,
assisting development, and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity.’ Absent
from, though implicitly present in, the ESS, human security can be a useful organising
concept, binding everything together and explaining the core aim of the EU’s holistic
approach as a global actor: making sure that every individual, everywhere, has access to
physical security, economic prosperity, political freedom and social wellbeing. Realising this
for its own citizens is the fundamental interest of the EU; realising it for citizens worldwide is
both the means of defending that interest and a positive objective in its own right.
The Report ended with a firm call to action: ‘To build a secure Europe in a better
world, we must do more to shape events. And we must do it now.’ But it offered little in terms
of concrete recommendations. Nor did the European Council provide a follow–up mechanism
to ensure that implementation of the ESS would be stepped up and the links between the ESS
and decision–making enhanced.
Towards a global strategy?
After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, a number of Member States, with
Sweden once more in the lead, again attempted to put a revision of the ESS on the agenda.
However, no agreement was reached. To continue the debate, Sweden, Poland, Italy and
Spain launched a think–tank process, which in May 2013 produced a report on a ‘European
Global Strategy’ (EGS). Member States remained strongly divided on the need for a new
strategy, however.
Eventually, the December 2013 European Council, in the context of a debate about
defence, could only agree on a veiled mandate for the High Representative to assess the
impact of the changes in the geopolitical environment. In layman’s terms: write a strategy?
When the new High Representative, Federica Mogherini, assumed office, she gave
renewed impetus to the strategic debate. When she submitted her assessment of the EU’s
environment to the European Council in June 2015, she finally received a mandate to produce
an entirely new strategy. Albeit grudgingly in many cases, Member States could no longer
deny that the various crises in and around Europe, the US ‘pivot’ and the rise of China called
for a new strategy. This EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) was
presented to the European Council in June 2016.

The EU Global Strategy

On 28 June 2016 High Representative Federica Mogherini presented the Global Strategy for
the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) to the European Council. Many
pundits portrayed it as an example of Brussels’ disconnectedness from reality – tabling an
external strategy just a few days after the UK had created a huge internal challenge by voting
to leave the EU. But would it have demonstrated a better sense of reality to pretend that
because of the British decision to put a stop to its EU membership the world around Europe
would come to a stop as well? The EU needs the EUGS and that ‘is even more true after the
British referendum’, as Mogherini rightly says in her foreword.

Realpolitik with European characteristics

The EUGS introduces a new overall approach to foreign and security policy, which
can be read as a corrigendum to the ESS. ‘The best protection for our security is a world of
well–governed democratic states’, the EU said in 2003. Unfortunately, spreading good
governance and democracy proved more difficult than expected, and when their absence
provoked crises, we did not always muster the will and the resources to respond. Where the
ESS proved to be overoptimistic (and optimism is a moral duty, as Karl Popper said), the
EUGS is more conscious of the limits imposed by our own capabilities and by others’
intractability, and therefore more modest. It charts a course between isolationism and
interventionism, under the new heading of what the EUGS now calls ‘principled
pragmatism’.
This represents a return to realpolitik. Not realpolitik as it has come to be understood,
as ends justifying means, but realpolitik in the original sense of the term. Coined by the
German liberal Ludwig von Rochau in 1853, it meant a rejection of liberal utopianism, but not
of liberal ideals themselves. Rather, it was about how to achieve those ideals in a realistic
way. As the EUGS has it, ‘responsible engagement can bring about positive change’.
EU interests
The fact that for the first time ever we have an EU document listing our vital interests
(which is a breakthrough in its own right) is a reflection of this new approach. Policy is about
interests; if it isn’t, no one will invest in it. That applies to the EU as much as to a state, and
‘there is no clash between national and European interests’. The vital interests defined by the
EUGS are vital to all Member States: the security of EU citizens and territory; prosperity
(which, the EUGS states, implies equality – otherwise we would not be talking about the
prosperity of all citizens); democracy; and a rules–based global order to contain power
politics.
Setting these interests off against the analysis of the global environment that Mogherini
presented to the European Council in June 2015, the EUGS identifies five priorities:
1. The security of the EU itself
2. The neighbourhood
3. How to deal with war and crisis
4. Stable regional orders across the globe
5. Effective global governance
The pursuit of the first three priorities especially clearly reflects the modesty or realism
imposed by ‘principled pragmatism’, by emphasising our own security, the neighbourhood,
and hard power, and by no longer emphasising democratisation.
The security of the EU
The EUGS focuses on Europe’s own security (which was much less present in the ESS) and
on the neighbourhood: ‘We will take responsibility foremost in Europe and its surrounding
regions, while pursuing targeted engagement further afield’. Following the terrorist attacks in
Paris and Brussels, and the refugee crisis that is visible across Europe, addressing our internal
and border security was indispensable for the EUGS to be credible with citizens and Member
States alike.
The focus on the neighbourhood is justified by the range of our capabilities. It is defined very
broadly, though, going beyond what Brussels now often calls our ‘neighbours’: ‘to the east
stretching into Central Asia, and south down to Central Africa’. Stabilising this part of the
world is no mean task, yet the EUGS achieves the right balance, since it does not ignore the
challenges in Asia (‘there is a direct connection between European prosperity and Asian
security’) and at the global level (such as the freedom of the global commons).
The neighbourhood
The EUGS puts much less emphasis on democracy. The EU will support democracies where
they emerge, for ‘their success [...] would reverberate across their respective regions’ – but
in our broad neighbourhood the EUGS mentions only Tunisia and Georgia as positive
examples. As many others do not wish to pursue closer relations with the EU, the EUGS puts
the emphasis on reducing the fragility of these states rather than on changing their regimes,
for which we have but limited leverage. However, since many of our neighbours are
‘repressive states [that] are inherently fragile in the long term’, that requires targeting civil
society instead. The aim is to increase the resilience of people and societies, notably by
fighting poverty and inequality, so that over time home–grown positive change can emerge.
This will require considerable funds, however.
Lowering the level of ambition in terms of democratisation is simply acceptance of
reality. This is all about being honest with ourselves. The EU cannot democratise Egypt, so it
should not pretend to. At the same time, it should then also not feel obliged to pretend that the
Al–Sisi regime is a great friend – it is not. But we maintain diplomatic relations with (nearly)
everybody, not just with our friends, and we work with (nearly) everybody where interests
coincide. As long as they are there, we may indeed be obliged to work with authoritarian
regimes in order to address urgent problems; the anti–IS coalition is a case in point. The
EUGS doesn’t say much about this dimension: how to work with such regimes, in line with
‘principled pragmatism’, without further strengthening their hold on power?
This question demonstrates that resilience is a tricky concept. Increasing the resilience
of a state against external threats can easily lead to increasing the resilience of a repressive
regime. While we must be modest about our ability to change regimes, we should not be
propping them up either. It makes sense, therefore, for the EUGS to simultaneously advocate
capacity–building and the reform of the justice, security and defence sectors, as well as
human rights protection. The strong emphasis on human rights (which is indeed to be
distinguished from democratisation) is indispensable, for it is often against their own
governments that people have to be resilient. But can we deliver on that promise? Perhaps
‘fighting inequality’ would have been a better heading for the new strategy towards our
eastern and southern neighbours than ‘resilience’.
On a side note, if the EU wants to be even more honest with itself, then (the Balkans
excepted) ‘a credible enlargement policy’ does not really have a place in the section on the
neighbourhood, for enlargement is no longer a credible project, least of all for Turkey.
War and crisis
The EUGS shows a much stronger awareness of the indispensability of a credible
military instrument. ‘Soft and hard power go hand in hand’, Mogherini rightly says in the
foreword. The EUGS has not rediscovered geopolitics per se – the ESS already stated that
‘even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important’ – but it recognises to a greater
extent than the ESS that some powers will not hesitate to use blackmail and force in what they
consider to be a geopolitical competition. Hence the ambition ‘to protect Europe, respond to
external crises, and assist in developing our partners security and defence capacities’.
Furthermore, our efforts ‘should enable the EU to act autonomously while also contributing
to and undertaking actions in cooperation with NATO’. This can be read as the EU
constituting the European pillar that allows its Member States to act with the US where
possible and without US assets when necessary.
The ends to which the EU should apply this ‘strategic autonomy’ (as Mogherini calls
it in the foreword) are spread throughout the text. Firstly, ‘this means living up to our
commitments to mutual assistance and solidarity’, i.e. Article 42(7) TEU and Article 222
TFEU. Secondly, where conflict is ongoing, the EU should ‘protect human lives, notably
civilians’ and ‘be ready to support and help consolidate local ceasefires’, presumably in the
broad neighbourhood as a matter of priority. This is an ambitious undertaking, for it entails
deploying troops on the ground, with serious firepower, who are backed up by significant air
support and ready reserves, and who are not necessarily there to seek out and destroy an
opponent but who will fight when the civilians for whom they are responsible are threatened.
Thirdly, the EU ‘is seeking to make greater practical contributions to Asian security’,
including in the maritime area. Finally, the EU ‘could assist further and complement UN
peacekeeping’ as a demonstration of its belief in the UN as ‘the bedrock of the multilateral
rules–based order’.
These are more than sufficient elements to translate the EUGS into a revised military
level of ambition in ‘a sectoral strategy, to be agreed by the Council’ – into a white paper, in
other words, that should kick–start more cooperation and even integration in defence. The
EUGS also offers guidelines on how to do so: ‘an annual coordinated review process at EU
level to discuss Member States military spending plans’. Or, as an earlier draft had it, a
European semester on defence.
Regional orders
The focus on ‘cooperative regional orders’ also reflects the awareness of ongoing
geopolitical competition between different global and regional powers. The intention of
ensuring a coherent response to China’s ‘Belt and Road’ initiative, not just through the EU–
China Connectivity Platform (to create a link with the EU’s own investment plans) but also
through ASEM and the EU–ASEAN partnership, could signal the start of a sophisticated
diplomatic initiative. In the same vein, the aim of deepening dialogue with Iran and the GCC
countries ought to be the beginning of a new vision on the future regional order in the Middle
East. After all, there are not one but several wars ongoing in an area that clearly falls within
the neighbourhood in which the EU ought to assume responsibility. This will also be one of
the issues (though it is not among the examples explicitly listed in the EUGS) on which the
EU will have to cooperate with Russia, while making ‘substantial changes in relations’
dependent on Russia’s respect for international law. On Russia, the EUGS essentially
advocates strategic patience.

Effective multilateralism
The fifth priority puts global governance firmly back on the EU agenda, after ‘effective
multilateralism’ (as the ESS phrased it) had more or less disappeared from radar screens. Now
the EUGS ambitiously sets out ‘to transform rather than simply preserve the existing system’,
which will indeed be necessary to prevent ‘the emerging of alternative groupings to the
detriment of all’. Under this heading as well, an ambitious programme on free trade
(envisaging FTAs with the US, Japan, Mercosur, India, ASEAN and others) and on the
freedom of the global commons could herald a creative diplomatic initiative – and a more
strategic use of EU trade policy, which ought to be as embedded in overall strategy as it is in
the US.

Strategic implementation

The EUGS is a strategy, and strategies have to be translated into sub–strategies, policies and
action to achieve their objectives. Unlike in 2003, the EUGS itself already provides the links
to what should become a systematic process of implementation and review.

Creating a process
 The EUGS calls for a prompt decision on ‘clear procedures and timeframes’ for
revising existing sectoral strategies and designing new ones. It then announces an annual
reflection on the state of play, ‘pointing out where further implementation must be sought’,
though not a systematic overall review. ‘A new process of strategic reflection will be launched
whenever the EU and its Member States deem it necessary’ (so not automatically every five
years, for every legislature).
For this scheme to succeed, it is crucial that it be firmly anchored institutionally, not
just within the EEAS but in the Commission as well. Of course, the High Representative has
the main ownership of the EUGS and will take charge of overall coordination and initiative.
But which body, including Commission and EEAS officials, will monitor implementation and
prepare the annual state of play? (In the same way as the National Security Council in the US,
which not only coordinates the drafting of the National Security Strategy but also monitors
whether all relevant subsequent documents comply with its approach). And, most crucially,
will the Member States feel ownership of the EUGS? Mogherini will obviously drive
implementation, but if she is the only one, it cannot work. And implementing this ambitious
strategy will demand serious drive.
Brexit
It is on the implementation of the EUGS that Brexit will have the most impact. Not on
substance: the analysis of the environment, the definition of our vital interests, and the
identification of our priorities will not change because we have one fewer Member State. But,
unfortunately, it will have a negative impact on the capacity for delivery. For one, the EU has
quite simply lost face – and face is important in diplomacy. The credibility and persuasiveness
of any EU initiative will be undermined by the fact that one of the three biggest Member
States has just decided to leave. Furthermore, the UK can no longer directly contribute its
impressive diplomatic and military clout to EU foreign and security policy. What options
there are to bring it to bear indirectly will have to be explored.
Nevertheless, Federica Mogherini is absolutely right when she says that ‘a fragile
world calls for a more confident and responsible European Union’ – even though the EU
itself is somewhat more fragile now than in 2003. Hiding inside for fear of the world around
us will not solve anything, whereas ‘responsible engagement can bring about positive
change’.