Mark Ferdinand Hernando F.

Vinluan MWF 5:00-6:00

Compre Metaphysical research

Thomas Aquinas

First, we observe that some things in the world are in motion.

Whatever is in motion is put into motion by another object that is in

motion. These other objects, in turn, was put into motion by still

another object preceding it, and so forth. This series cannot go on

backward to infinity, though, since there would otherwise be no first

mover and thus no subsequent movement. Therefore, we must conclude

that there is a first unmoved mover, which we understand to be God.

Second, we observe that everything has an efficient cause and that

nothing is or can be the cause of it. It is impossible, though; that

the series of causes should extend back to infinity because every

cause is dependent on a prior cause and the ultimate cause is thus

dependent on a previous cause. So if there is no first cause, there

will be no intermediate causes and no final cause. But the absence of

such causes clearly does not square with our observation, and so there

must therefore be a first efficient cause, which everyone calls God.

Third, we observe in nature things that are possible to be and not to

be, as they come into existence and pass out of existence. Such things

could not always exist, though, because something that could possibly

not exist at some time actually does not exist at some time. Thus, if

it is possible for everything not to exist, then, at some time,

nothing did exist. But if nothing ever did exist, then nothing would

exist even now, since everything that exists requires for its

existence something that already existed. Yet it is absurd to claim

that nothing exists even now. Therefore, not all beings are merely

possible, but there must be something the existence of which is

necessary. Now, every necessary thing has its necessity caused by

something else or it does not. Since it is impossible for there to

exist an infinite series of causes of necessary things, we must

conclude that there is something that is necessary in itself. People

speak of this thing as God.

Fourth, beings in the world have characteristics to varying degrees.

Some are more or less good, true, noble, and so forth. Such gradations

are all measured in relation to a maximum, however. Thus, there must

be something best, truest, noblest, and so on. Now, as Aristotle

teaches, things that are greatest in truth are also greatest in being.

Therefore, there must be something that is the cause of being,

goodness, and every other perfection that we find in beings in the

world. We call this maximum cause God.

Finally, we observe in nature that inanimate and no intelligent

objects act toward the best possible purpose, even though these

objects are not aware of doing so. It is clear that these objects do

not achieve their purpose by sheer chance but rather according to a

plan. Any inanimate or no intelligent object that acts toward a

purpose, though, must be guided by a being that possesses knowledge

and intelligence, just as an arrow is directed by an archer.

Therefore, there must be some intelligent being that directs all

natural things toward their purpose. We call this being God.

Having presented these proofs for the existence of God, Aquinas goes

on to discuss God in terms of his simplicity, perfection, goodness,

infinity, knowledge, and other attributes. This discussion leads into

a protracted consideration of questions pertaining to the Creation,

the nature of angels, demons, and the work done on the individual six

days of the Creation, which culminated with the creation of man.

The existence of God is the necessary foundation of any theology.

Before discussing any other topics, Aquinas needs to establish the

crucial fact that God exists, since, without certainty of God’s

existence, the conclusions of the rest of the Summa would be in doubt

or even in vain. To this end, he advances five arguments intended to

prove the existence of God.

Argument 1 considers and attempts to account for the presence of

change in the world. Aquinas draws his argument from Aristotelian

physics, which was known as “natural philosophy” in Aquinas’s day and

which studied motion and change in the physical world. Just as

everything that exists in the world is generated by something before

it, so too must motion be passed from one object to another. Rigidly

applying this principle, though, we find ourselves confronted with an

infinitely regressive series and thus with the need for a first

unmoved mover to set the entire series into motion. Aquinas is saying

that an infinitely regressive series is impossible, and from the

impossibility of such a series, he concludes that the first unmoved

mover can be only God.

Argument 2 marks a transition from argumentation based on physics to

argumentation based on metaphysics and considers the existence of the

world as a whole. In this argument, Aquinas relies on the “principle

of efficient causation,” a cardinal assumption of physics which states

that every effect must have a cause. Aquinas reasons by analogy that,

just as no object in the world comes into being from nothing or by

itself but every object is caused, so too must the world as a whole

come into being through a cause, namely, through God.

Argument 3 carries the premise of Argument 2 into the realm of

metaphysics and rational speculation about being itself. Aquinas first

defines possible beings as those that can either exist or not exist,

thereby implying that necessary beings are those that necessarily

must, and thus do, exist. All objects in the world are possible beings

and thus can either exist or not exist. Aquinas reasons that, since

these objects can, in principle, either exist or not exist at any

time, then they did in fact not exist at some time. Yet, Aquinas

continues, if they did not exist at some time, then we are at a loss

to explain the obvious existence of the world now, since all that

exists requires a cause for its existence. Aquinas concludes that

there must be an absolutely necessary being, that is, one that (a)

must necessarily exist and (b) thus owes its existence to no other

being.
Argument 4 is unique among the five Arguments in that it considers not

the physical or metaphysical but the qualitative. By a leap of

abstraction, Aquinas, adopting Aristotle, concludes that there must be

something in relation to which all individual qualities, such as good,

true, beautiful, and noble, are measured and from which those

qualities derive their existence. For example, the existence of

something good implies the existence of something best that not only

serves as the ultimate benchmark against which the good thing is

measured but also even causes the good thing to exist. The idea that

ultimate qualities are responsible for the existence of lesser

instances of qualities is strongly reminiscent of Plato’s idea that

Forms essences are the real and true originals of which lesser beings

existences are pale and inferior copies. Nevertheless, Aquinas,

following Aristotle, invests these ultimate qualities with being—in

other words, with existence.

Argument 5 appeals to our wonder in the face of the apparent purposive

activity of the animate and inanimate worlds alike. The world,

functioning with such smoothness, efficiency, detail, and aim, simply

cannot be the product of chance but must be the product of a sort of

grand architect, that is, of God. Aquinas is drawing two rather bold

conclusions here: there is a designer and that the designer is God.

There are strong conceptual ties between and among the first three

Arguments. Arguments 1 and 2 are similar in that both maintain that

there cannot be a series of causes stretching back infinitely. The two

Arguments are different, though, in that Argument 1 considers the

cause of motion in individual objects in the world, whereas Argument 2

considers the cause of the entire world itself. Argument 1 takes the

existence of the world for granted and seeks to account for observable

change in the physical world. Argument 2, on the other hand, does draw

on observation of the world but attempts to account for the existence

of the world. Argument 3 considers the concept of being itself and

casts its gaze toward theoretical, no observable states of the world

far beyond our possible experience. Thus, the first three Arguments

attempt to force one to accept the proposition that only the existence

of God can account for (1) change in the physical world, (2) the

existence of the physical world, and (3) existence itself.

Having established that God exists, Aquinas is free to consider God’s

The nature and limits of human knowledge: summa theologica

The soul knows bodies through the intellect by a knowledge that is

immaterial, universal and necessary, although only God can understand

all things. The cognitive soul has the potential to form principles of

understanding and principles of sensation. Individual objects of our

knowledge are not derived from Platonic forms but rather from the mind

of God. Intellectual knowledge is formed by a conjunction of the

passive senses and the active intellect. It is impossible for the

intellect to understand anything without the mind forming phantasms,

that is, mental images.

The intellect understands by abstracting from phantasms and thereby

attains some knowledge of immaterial things. Our knowledge of things,

though, is not the same as knowledge of our phantasms, for, if the two

types of knowledge were the same, then the taste of honey, for

example, could be either sweet or bitter, depending on the state of

the perceiver. Rather, the phantasms are the means by which we come to

understand things. Knowledge of individuals is prior to knowledge of

universals.

The intellect is incapable of directly knowing individual things

because it perceives them by means of phantasms. On the other hand,

the intellect does perceive universals directly by means of

abstraction. The intellect is potentially capable of understanding the

concept of infinity insofar as it can form the idea of infinite

succession, but it is actually incapable of comprehending infinity.

Contingent things are known through sense experience and indirectly by

the intellect, but necessary principles governing those contingent

things are known only by the intellect. Although only God can know how

the future will be in itself, we nevertheless can have some knowledge

of the future insofar as we have knowledge of causes and effects.

Aquinas accepts the proposition that any knowledge that is to count as

real knowledge must be universal, but he rejects Plato’s view that

knowledge derives from a contemplation of ideas that exist latently

and innately in the mind. Aquinas insists that the soul, which

includes the intellect, would have no use for the body if, as Plato
held, all knowledge were derived from the mind alone. Not only does

Aquinas thereby affirm the necessity of the body and reject the notion

that the body is an impediment to our acquisition of truth, he also

rejects the doctrine of innate ideas. In other words, he contradicts

Plato in asserting that there is nothing in the mind that was not

first in the senses. At the same time, though, he says that the mind

contributes to the acquisition of knowledge by forming “phantasms,”

that is, mental images, that are ultimately derived from sense

experience and by forming universal ideas and principles. Thus, sense

experience provides the passive component of knowledge and the mind

provides the active component of knowledge.

The mental images that we form are not universal knowledge itself. If

we were to equate our mental images with universal knowledge, then we

would be confronted with the problem of how to deal with the ideas

that confused or even irrational people have. It would be absurd, for

example, to say that honey is both sweet and bitter, but if all

phantasms were to count as knowledge, we would fall into exactly such

a radical subjectivism in which there was no objective standard of

truth. Aquinas concludes that phantasms are indeed ultimately derived

from individual things but require the abstraction that the intellect

provides to rise to the level of being knowledge. This process of

abstraction results in the formation of ideas of universals, that is,

of ideas that define objects according to their essential qualities.

Aquinas arrives at the surprising notion that, although sense

experience of a particular object is necessary to formulate both a

mental image of that object and a universal concept that applies to

that and all similar objects, knowledge of the

particular material object, as that object is in itself, is impossible

precisely because we have a mental image of it. It is true that we get

to know the essence of the object through abstraction. Yet we do not

and indeed cannot, have knowledge of the object as a material object.

Aquinas is thus saying that all knowledge worth the name “knowledge”

is necessarily abstract.

This process of abstraction makes scientific knowledge, that is,

knowledge of causes and effects, possible at all, and so we can have

some knowledge of the future through scientific prediction.

Nevertheless, the intellect has limits even with respect to abstract

knowledge. We gain an abstract concept of infinity through the idea of

infinitely adding numbers, for example, yet we are unable to

comprehend an infinite series of numbers itself.

Happiness is the goal of human life, and every human being is on the

path toward the complete actualization of his or her potential.

Indeed, humans’ actualization and realization of their potential is

exactly what constitutes happiness. Humans’ potential, or what humans

can be, consists in the contemplation of the Divine Essence. Happiness

and the contemplation of the Divine Essence are thus identical and

inseparable.

The contemplation of the Divine Essence is not only necessary for

happiness, it is uniquely sufficient. Nothing except the contemplation

of the Divine Essence can bring happiness. No worldly or material

good, such as fame, honor, glory, power, health, or even pleasure

itself can bring happiness, as even pleasure is just a component of

happiness. A state of happiness can exist only when the will no longer

seeks anything. Since the will naturally seeks the Divine Essence, it

will continue to seek, and thus to be unhappy, until it finds it.

Aquinas applies Aristotle’s notions of efficient and final cause here,

whereby human nature, in the form of the will, is the efficient cause

and happiness, or contemplation of the Divine Essence, is the final

cause. The will thus inescapably propels every individual to seek

happiness. The process of becoming leads naturally to God, who is pure

being and actuality. The culmination of this process, though, is

possible only in the next life and only works of virtue, that is,

performance of the will of God, can lead to this culmination. Thus,

the will achieves its goal, which is happiness, only when it is at one

with the Divine Will.

The remainder of the Summa examines these various works of virtue, as

well as sin, and explains the role of Christ, who mediates between God

and man. The supplement to the Summa, which was added to the Summa

after Aquinas’s death, discusses sundry related issues that Aquinas

presumably might have incorporated into his great work had he lived to

complete it.