SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 125134. January 22, 1999.]

XERXES ADZUARA Y DOTIMAS , petitioner, vs . COURT OF APPEALS

and PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES , respondents.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYNOPSIS

At half past 1:00 o'clock in the morning, Adzuara and friends were cruising in a
Galant Sedan along the stretch of Quezon Avenue coming from the direction of EDSA
towards Delta Circle. However, upon reaching the intersection of 4th West Street, their car
collided with a Toyota Corona Sedan driven by Martinez, who was coming from the eastern
portion of Quezon Avenue near Delta Circle. He was then executing a U-turn at the speed of
5 kph at the northwest portion of Quezon Avenue going to Manila when the accident
occurred. The collision ung the Corona 20 meters southward from the point of impact
causing it to land atop the center island of Quezon Avenue. The Galant skittered southward
of Quezon Avenue's western half leaving its left rear about 4 meters past the Corona's right
front side. The principal points of contact between the 2 cars were the Galant's left front
side and the Corona's right front door including its right front fender. Sahlee Martinez, who
was seated on the Corona's right front seat, sustained physical injuries which required
con nement and medical attendance at the hospital for 5 days. Thereafter, petitioner was
charged with and convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with
less serious physical injuries. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is a rmed. Petitioner alleged that his
conviction was based merely on his post-collision conduct. However, the appreciation of
the same served only as a means to emphasize the nding of negligence which was
established by the admission of petitioner and his friend that they saw the car of Martinez
making a U-turn but could not avoid the collision by the mere application of the brakes. The
claim of petitioner that Martinez made a swift U-turn which cause the collision is devoid of
evidence. In fact, the speed at which petitioner drove his car appears to be the prime cause
for his inability to stop his car and avoid the collision. TDCAHE

On the allegation of petitioner that the medical certi cate was uncorroborated by
actual testimony of the physician, the Court ruled that the fact of the injury resulting from
the collision may be proved in other ways such as the testimony of the injured person, as in
the case at bar.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURT;

RESPECTED. — Xerxes Adzuara Y Dotimas was found guilty by the trial court of reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property with less serious physical injuries. A perusal
of the decision of the trial court shows that there are factual circumstances warranting a
nding of negligence on the part of petitioner. And nothing on record shows that the facts
were not properly evaluated by the court a quo. As such, we nd no reason to disturb their
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 findings.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO
PROPERTY WITH LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES; NEGLIGENCE, APPRECIATED. —
Petitioner maintains that his conviction in the courts below was based merely on his post-
collision conduct. However, it bears to stress that the appreciation of petitioner's post-
collision behavior serves only as a means to emphasize the nding of negligence which is
readily established by the admission of petitioner and his friend Renato that they saw the
car of Martinez making a U-turn but could not avoid the collision by the mere application of
the brakes. Negligence is the want of care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or
comparative, not an absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the
parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require.
At half past 1:00 o'clock in the morning along an almost deserted avenue, ordinary care
and vigilance would su ce. This may consist of keeping a watchful eye on the road ahead
and observing the tra c rules on speed, right of way and tra c light. The claim of
petitioner that Martinez made a swift U-turn which caused the collision is devoid of
evidence. On the other hand, the speed at which petitioner drove his car appears to be the
prime cause for his inability to stop his car and avoid the collision.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; TESTIMONIES; CREDIBILITY; NOT AFFECTED BY
MINOR INCONSISTENCIES THEREOF. — To weaken the evidence of the prosecution,
petitioner assails the testimony of Martinez as being replete with inconsistencies. The
records however reveal that these inconsistencies refer only to minor points which
indicate veracity rather than prevarication by the witness. They tend to bolster the
probative value of the testimony in question as they erase any suspicion of being
rehearsed. TEDAHI

4. ID.; ID.; WITNESSES; INJURY RESULTING FROM THE COLLISION MAY BE

PROVED BY TESTIMONY OF INJURED PERSON. — Petitioner claims that the medical
certi cate presented by the prosecution was uncorroborated by actual testimony of the
physician who accomplished the same and as such has no probative value insofar as the
physical injuries suffered by Sahlee are concerned. Regretfully, we cannot agree. The fact
of the injury resulting from the collision may be proved in other ways such as the testimony
of the injured person. In the case at bar, Sahlee Martinez testi ed that her injuries as
described in the medical certi cate were caused by the vehicular accident of 17 December
1990. This declaration was corroborated by Gregorio. This, no less, is convincing proof.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO , J : p

XERXES ADZUARA Y DOTIMAS was found guilty by the trial court of reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property with less serious physical injuries. His
conviction was a rmed by the Court of Appeals. Through this petition for review on
certiorari he seeks the reversal of his conviction.
cdasia

On 17 December 1990, at half past 1:00 o'clock in the morning, petitioner Xerxes
Adzuara y Dotimas, then a law student, and his friends Rene Gonzalo and Richard Jose
were cruising in a 4-door Colt Galant sedan with plate number NMT 718 along the stretch
of Quezon Avenue coming from the direction of EDSA towards Delta Circle at
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 approximately 40 kilometers per hour. 1 Upon reaching the intersection of 4th West Street
their car collided with a 1975 4-door Toyota Corona sedan with plate number PMD 711
owned and driven by Gregorio Martinez. Martinez had just attended a Loved Flock meeting
with his daughter Sahlee 2 and was coming from the eastern portion of Quezon Avenue
near Delta Circle. He was then executing a U-turn at the speed of 5 kph at the north-west
portion of Quezon Avenue going to Manila when the accident occurred.
The collision ung the Corona twenty (20) meters southward from the point of
impact causing it to land atop the center island of Quezon Avenue. The Galant skittered
southward on Quezon Avenue's western half leaving its left rear about four (4) meters past
the Corona's right front side. The principal points of contact between the two (2) cars were
the Galant's left front side and the Corona's right front door including its right front fender.
Both petitioner and Martinez claimed that their lanes had green tra c lights 3
although the investigating policeman Marcelo Sabido declared that the tra c light was
blinking red and orange when he arrived at the scene of the accident an hour later. 4
Sahlee Martinez, who was seated on the Corona's right front seat, sustained physical
injuries which required con nement and medical attendance at the National Orthopaedic
Hospital for ve (5) days. As a result she missed classes at St. Paul's College for two (2)
weeks. 5 Petitioner and his friends were treated at the Capitol Medical Center for their
injuries.
On 12 July 1991 petitioner was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
city 6 with reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with less serious physical
injuries under Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code. He pleaded not guilty to the charge. 7
On 11 December 1991, before the presentation of evidence, private complainant
Martinez manifested his intention to institute a separate civil action for damages against
petitioner. 8
The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95, convicted petitioner Xerxes
Adzuara after trial and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of two (2) months and
fteen (15) days of arresto mayor and to pay a ne of P50,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. 9
The Court of Appeals a rmed the decision of the trial court but deleted the ne of
P50,000.00. 1 0 On 23 May 1996 1 1 the appellate court denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court charging that (a) petitioner's post-collision conduct does not constitute su cient
basis to convict where there are no factual circumstances warranting a nding of
negligence, and (b) the medical certi cate by itself and unsubstantiated by the doctor's
testimony creates doubt as to the existence of the injuries complained of.
We nd no merit in the petition. A perusal of the decision of the trial court shows
that there are factual circumstances warranting a nding of negligence on the part of
petitioner. Thus —
Having carefully examined the evidence adduced, the Court nds that the
defense version cannot prevail against the prosecution version satisfactorily
demonstrating that the subject accident occurred because of Xerxes' reckless
imprudence consisting in his paying no heed to the red light and making V-1
(Galant car) proceed at a fast clip as it approached and entered the intersection.
Gregorio's basic claim, substantially corroborated by Sahlee's testimony — in sum
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 to the effect that when he made V-2 (Corona car) proceed to turn left, the left-turn
arrow was lighted green or go for V-2 and it was red light or stop for V-1 — is the
same basic version he gave in his written question-and-answer statement to the
police investigator on 13 December 1990; certainly, the clear consistency of
Gregorio's posture respecting such crucial, nay decisive, material circumstance
attending the subject accident underscores the veracity of the prosecution
version, even as it tends to indicate the scant measure of faith and credence that
can be safely reposed on the defense version . . . (emphasis ours). 1 2

This is further elaborated upon by the Court of Appeals in its decision —

Gregorio testi ed that when the arrow of the tra c light turned green, he
turned left at the speed of ve kilometers per hour (TSN, August 11, 1992, pp. 11-
12). While he was already at the middle of the western half of Quezon Avenue, his
car was smashed by appellant's vehicle (id., p. 13). This was corroborated by the
testimony of Sahlee Martinez (TSN, August 12, 1992, pp. 3-4). Their declarations
were con rmed by physical evidence: the resulting damage on Gregorio's car as
shown by exhibits A, A-1 and A-2. The dent on the main frame of Gregorio's car
(Exh. A) attests to the strong impact caused by appellant's car. Such impact
proves that appellant must have been running at high speed.
At the time of the collision, the trial court found that the arrow for left turn
was green and the tra c light facing appellant was red. Given these facts,
appellant should have stopped his car as Gregorio had the right of way. There
could be no debate on this legal proposition.

Appellant testi ed that he was driving slow(ly), about 40 kilometers per

hour (TSN, August 31, 1992, p. 13). This is refuted by the fact that the colliding
vehicles were thrown 20 meters away from the point of impact (TSN, August 11,
1992, p. 14); in fact, Gregorio's car rested on top of the center island of Quezon
Avenue, while appellant's car stopped at the middle of the lane of Quezon Avenue
facing towards the general direction of Quiapo (id., pp. 13-14; emphasis supplied).
13

Despite these ndings, petitioner, maintaining that his conviction in the courts below
was based merely on his post-collision conduct, asks us to discard the ndings of fact of
the trial court and evaluate anew the probative value of the evidence. In this regard, we
reiterate our ruling in People v. Bernal 1 4 —
. . . It has thus become a persistent monotony for the Court to hold, since
more often than not the challenge relates to the credibility of witnesses, that it is
bound by the prevailing doctrine, founded on a host of jurisprudential rulings, to
the effect that the matter is best determined at the trial court level where
testimonies are " rst hand given received, assessed and evaluated" ( People v.
Miranda, 235 SCRA 202). The ndings of the trial court on the credulity of
testimony are generally not disturbed on appeal since "signi cant focus is held to
lie on the deportment of, as well as the peculiar manner in which the declaration
is made by, the witness in open court" ( People v. Dado, 244 SCRA 655) which an
appellate court would be unable to fully appreciate, in the same way that a trial
court can, from the mere reading of the transcript of stenographic notes. It is only
when strong justi cations exist that an appellate court could deny respect to the
trial court's ndings when, quite repeatedly said, it is shown that the trial court
has clearly overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight or substance which could affect the results of the case
(People v. Flores, 243 SCRA 374; People v. Timple, 237 SCRA 52).
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 In the instant case, nothing on record shows that the facts were not properly
evaluated by the court a quo. As such, we nd no reason to disturb their ndings. It bears
to stress that the appreciation of petitioner's post-collision behavior serves only as a
means to emphasize the nding of negligence which is readily established by the
admission of petitioner and his friend Renato that they saw the car of Martinez making a U-
turn but could not avoid the collision by the mere application of the brakes. 1 5 Negligence
is the want of care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an
absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree
of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. 1 6
What degree of care and vigilance then did the circumstances require? At half past
1:00 o'clock in the morning along an almost deserted avenue, ordinary care and vigilance
would su ce. This may consist of keeping a watchful eye on the road ahead and
observing the tra c rules on speed, right of way and tra c light. The claim of petitioner
that Martinez made a swift U-turn which caused the collision is not credible since a U-turn
is done at a much slower speed to avoid skidding and overturning, compared to running
straight ahead. Nonetheless, no evidence was presented showing skid marks caused by
the car driven by Martinez if only to demonstrate that he was driving at a fast clip in
negotiating the U-turn. On the other hand, the speed at which petitioner drove his car
appears to be the prime cause for his inability to stop his car and avoid the collision. His
assertion that he drove at the speed of 40 kph. is belied by Martinez who testi ed that
when he looked at the opposite lane for any oncoming cars, he saw none; then a few
seconds later, he was hit by Adzuara's car. 1 7 The extent of the damage on the car of
Martinez and the position of the cars after the impact further con rm the nding that
petitioner went beyond the speed limit required by law and by the circumstances. 1 8
It is a rule that a motorist crossing a thru-stop street has the right of way over the
one making a U-turn. But if the person making a U-turn has already negotiated half of the
turn and is almost on the other side so that he is already visible to the person on the thru-
street, the latter must give way to the former. Petitioner was on the thru-street and had
already seen the Martinez car. 1 9 He should have stopped to allow Martinez to complete
the U-turn having, as it were, the last clear chance to avoid the accident which he ignored.
In fact, he never stopped. Rather, he claimed that on the assumption that he was negligent,
the other party was also guilty of contributory negligence since his car had no lights on. 2 0
The negligence of Martinez however has not been satisfactorily shown. aisadc

Petitioner insists that the tra c light facing him at the intersection was green which
only indicated that he had the right of way. But the ndings of the court a quo on the
matter countervail this stance, hence, we see no reason to disturb them.
To weaken the evidence of the prosecution, petitioner assails the testimony of
Martinez as being replete with inconsistencies. The records however reveal that these
inconsistencies refer only to minor points which indicate veracity rather than prevarication
by the witness. They tend to bolster the probative value of the testimony in question as
they erase any suspicion of being rehearsed. 2 1
Finally, petitioner claims that the medical certi cate presented by the prosecution
was uncorroborated by actual testimony of the physician who accomplished the same and
as such has no probative value insofar as the physical injuries suffered by Sahlee are
concerned. Regretfully, we cannot agree. The fact of the injury resulting from the collision
may be proved in other ways such as the testimony of the injured person. In the case at
bar, Sahlee Martinez testi ed that her injuries as described in the medical certi cate were
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 caused by the vehicular accident of 17 December 1990. 2 2 This declaration was
corroborated by Gregorio. 2 3 This, no less, is convincing proof.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals of 22
November 1995 nding petitioner XERXES ADZUARA Y DOTIMAS guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentencing him to suffer an imprisonment of
two (2) months and fteen (15) days of arresto mayor medium is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner. cdasia

SO ORDERED.
Puno, Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. TSN, 31 August 1992, p. 16.

2. TSN, 11 August 1992, p. 3.
3. Rollo, pp. 21-22.
4. See note 2, pp. 4-7.
5. Rollo, p. 72.
6. Regional Trial Court Records, p. 1.
7. Id., p. 29.
8. Id., p. 23.
9. Decision penned by Judge Aloysius C. Alday, RTC-Br. 95, Rollo, pp. 20-22.

10. Decision penned by Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero, concurred in by Justices Minerva

P. Gonzaga-Reyes and Romeo A. Brawner, id., pp. 12-18.
11. Rollo, p. 10.
12. See Note 9, p. 22.
13. See Note 10, p. 14.
14. G.R. No. 101332, 13 March 1996, 254 SCRA 659, 668-669.
15. See Note 2, pp. 14 and 16.

16. United States v. Barias, No. 7567, 23 Phil. 434, 438 (1912). See also Valenzuela v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 115024, 7 February 1996, 253 SCRA 303, 320.
17. See Note 2, pp. 12-13.

18. See Note 13.

19. See Note 2.
20. Ibid.
21. People v. Fabrigas Jr., G.R. No. 115005, 5 September 1996, 261 SCRA 436, 445.
22. TSN, 12 August 1992, pp. 5-6.
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 23. See Note 3, pp. 7-8.

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