MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs.LA CAMPANA FOOD PRODUCTS, INC, G.R.
Judge Dayaw denied the said motion and opined that Meralco cannot presume that
No. 97535 August 4, 1995
Doctrine: Fraud as a ground for new trial, fraud must be extrinsic or collateral, that is,
one which prevents the aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his case to
the court, or that which is used to procure the judgment without fair submission of the
controversy. Here, the ex parte motion to declare the defendant in default was filed
before the answer of defendant was filed.
Facts:
A complaint was filed by La Campana against Meralco for recovery of a sum of
money with preliminary injunction after it was served a notice of disconnection by the
latter for alleged non-payment of the following billings: (a) the differential billing in the
sum of P65,619.26, representing the value of electric energy used but not registered
in the meter due to alleged tampering of the metering installation discovered on
September 22, 1986; and (b) the underbilling in the sum of P169,941.29 (with a
balance of P28,323.55) rendered from January 16, 1987, to December 16, 1987, due
to meter multiplier failure.
Summons and a copy of the complaint were duly served upon Meralco on August 23,
1990. The case, was initially assigned on to Branch 78 of the RTC QC but was re-
raffled to Branch 80, presided over by public respondent Judge Dayaw.
On September 7, 1990, Meralco filed a motion for extension of time of fifteen days
from said date within which to file an answer to the complaint at the Office of the Clerk
of Court after the clerk of Branch 78 allegedly refused to receive the same because
the case had already been re-raffled. The motion however, was not acted upon
because it did not contain a notice of hearing.
Meralco's "Answer With Counterclaim" was actually received at Branch 78 only on
September 21, 1990 which is beyond the period to answer but within the requested
extension.
On account of Meralco's failure to file an answer to the complaint within the
reglementary period which expired on September 7, 1990, La Campana filed an "Ex-
Parte Motion, to Declare Defendant in Default," which Judge Dayaw granted in an
order of default dated October 8, 1990.
After hearing and receiving La Campana's evidence ex parte, the court rendered a in
favor of La Campana.
Instead of appealing to the Court of Appeals, Meralco filed on December 3, 1990, a
"Motion to Set Aside Judgment by Default and/or for New Trial" on the ground that it
filed an answer to the complaint and that the judgment by default was obtained by
fraud.
its motion for extension will be granted by the court, especially in this case where its
motion for extension was defective in that it did not contain any notice of date and
place of hearing. He also stated that the motion to set aside judgment by default
and/or for new trial was a pro forma motion because it did not set forth the facts and
circumstances which allegedly constituted the fraud upon which the motion was
grounded.
On January 28, 1991, Meralco filed a notice of appeal. This was opposed by La
Campana on the ground that it was filed out of time since the motion to set aside
judgment by default and/or for new trial did not stop the running of the period to
appeal, which expired on December 14, 1990, or fifteen days from the time Meralco
received the decision on November 29, 1990.
The trial court, denied Meralco's notice of appeal and granted the motion for
execution earlier filed by La Campana.
Meralco filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition claiming that Judge Dayaw
committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering his decision dated November 20,
1990.
Issue: Whether the Judge Dayaw committed GADALEJ?
Ruling: NO.
Meralco in fact failed to indicate in its motion for extension of time to file an answer a
notice of place and date of hearing, an omission for which it could offer no explanation
making such motion worthless. Meralco was also not entitled to received notice of
hearing of the motion to declare it in default because in the early case of Pielago
v.Generosa the SC, in applying Section 9, Rule 27 of the old Rules of Court (now
covered by Section 9 of Rule 13), laid down the doctrine that a defendant who fails to
file an answer within the time provided by the Rules of Court is already in default and
is no longer entitled to notice of the motion to declare him in default.
Thus, when it filed in Branch 78 its answer with counterclaim on September 21, 1990,
fourteen days after the expiration of the period within which to file an answer, Meralco
was already in default and, naturally, it had to bear all the legal consequences of
being in default.
The judgment was based solely on the evidence presented by La Campana. No
abuse of discretion attended such decision because, as stated above, Meralco was
already in default.
The records indicate that Meralco was not certain at this juncture what remedy to
adopt: a motion to set aside the judgment by default or a motion for new trial?
Meralco chose to play it safe by using the "and/or" option.
It must be clarified that under the Rules, what an aggrieved party seeks to set aside is
the order of default, an interlocutory order which is not appealable, and not
the judgment by default, which is a final disposition of the case and appealable to the
Court of Appeals. Notice that in the following pertinent provisions, the Rules expressly
state that what may be set aside is the order of default, while the judgment itself may
be appealed to a higher court:
Sec. 3. Relief from order of default. — A party declared in default may at any
time after discovery thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to
set aside the order of default upon proper showing that his failure to answer
was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect and that he has a
meritorious defense. In such case the order of default may be set aside on
such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice.
[Rule 18]
Sec. 9. Service upon party in default. — No service of papers other than
substantially amended or supplemental pleadings and final orders or
judgments shall be necessary on a party in default unless he files a motion
to set aside the order of default, in which event he shall be entitled to notice
of all further proceedings regardless of whether the order of default is set
aside or not. [Rule 13]
Sec. 2. Judgments or orders subject to appeal. —xxx xxx xxx
A party who has been declared in default may likewise appeal from the
judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law,
even if no petition for relief to set aside the order of default has been
presented by him in accordance with Rule 38. [Rule 41]
Granting arguendo that the motion to set aside judgment by default was proper, it was
still correctly denied by respondent Judge for failure to show that Meralco's omission
to answer was due to any of the causes mentioned in Section 3 of Rule 18.
On the other hand, as a motion for new trial grounded on fraud, Meralco's motion fails
to convince. The fraud it claims is in the ex-parte motion of La Campana to declare it
in default. Meralco claims that the reason for the ex-parte motion was "to deprive the
defendant of the opportunity to oppose it, knowing that defendant actually filed its
answer." But how could La Campana have known about the answer with counterclaim
when it was actually received only on October 8, 1990, as evidenced by the registry
return receipt while the ex-parte motion to declare Meralco in default was filed much
earlier on September 27, 1990? "Fraud, as a ground for new trial, must be extrinsic or
collateral, that is, it is the kind of fraud which prevented the aggrieved party from
having a trial or presenting his case to the court, or was used to procure the judgment
without fair submission of the controversy." 4 Meralco's failure to go to trial in this case
is solely attributable to its failure to comply with the Rules of Court..
Having lost its right to appeal, Meralco cannot take refuge in the petition
for certiorari and prohibition. The Court has always maintained that the special civil
action of certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal, and there appears to be no
cogent reason why such policy should be waived in this case.
SOLORIA vs. DE LA CRUZ
DOCTRINE: The failure to attend trial for lack of advance notice, has been held to
constitute an "accident" within the meaning of Section 1, Rule 37, of the Rules of
Court which, in turn, is a proper and valid ground to grant a new trial in the interest of
justice to give the respondent his day in court.
FACTS:
Dela Cruz commenced a proceeding against Soloria alleging that since 1959 he has
been a share-tenant of Soloria over her one-hectare Riceland, that on 1961 Soloria
summarily ejected him from the land and he had shared on a fifty-fifty (50-50) basis
on the net harvest of palay after having furnished all farm labor, implements except
the land which was the sole contribution of Soloria.
On the scheduled hearing respondents did not appear; hence, De la Cruz presented
his evidence ex parte and thereafter considered the case submitted for decision. The
court a quo rendered a decision granting the reliefs prayed for in the petition of de la
Cruz. Three days after, counsel for respondents presented a motion to reconsider and
set aside said decision and to allow them to cross-examine petitioners' witnesses and
to present their own evidence, because their failure to attend the scheduled hearing
was due to an accident since notice thereof was received only six days after trial. The
court a quo denied respondents' motion for reconsideration and/or new trial.
In the order of denial, the court a quo ruled that they were still negligent in not filing,
before judgment was rendered any pleading to indicate their intention to cross-
examine petitioners' witnesses and to present their own evidence despite the receipt,
of the order; hence, respondents were not deprived of their day in court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are entitled for a reconsideration/new trial?
RULING:
Yes. The circumstance, i.e. failure to attend trial for lack of advance notice, has been
held in previous cases to constitute an "accident" within the meaning of Section 1,
Rule 37, of the Rules of Court which, in turn, is a proper and valid ground to grant a
new trial. Rule 37 is applicable to cases filed in the Court of Agrarian Relations (Rule
20 of the Rules of Court of Agrarian Relations).
This Court has also held that: where the movant has been deprived of his day in court
through no fault or negligence on his part and because no notice of hearing was
furnished him in advance so as to enable him to prepare for trial, the judgment or
order is absolutely null and void for denying him his day in court. In such case, the
judgment or order suffers from an inherent procedural defect and is absolutely void.
Thus, the court should have granted a new trial.
After all, the Rules allow a party to move for a new trial on the ground of unavoidable
accident within the period for perfecting an appeal (Rule 37, Sec. 1), as the appellants
have done; or even to ask relief within 60 days after learning of a judgment or order
against them (Rule 28, sec. 3).
VIKING INDUSTRIAL CORP. V. CA
FACTS: In 1993, petitioner extended Jose Luison, Jr. a loan amounting to Php
2Million secured by a promissory note and a real estate mortgage. Thereafter,
petitioner demanded payment of Php19Million with interest and penalties. Luison
disputed the accuracy of the amount. Petitioner, on the other hand, threatened him to
foreclose the mortgage property. Hence, Luison filed a petitioner for prohibition and
declaratory relief with the RTC of QC. Petitioner then refused to answer the petition
because it was erroneously impleaded as “VIKING TRADING CORP” not “VIKING
INDUSTRIAL CORP”. Consequently, petitioner was declared in default. Later, RTC
rendered judgment in favor of respondent holding the reduction of the principal
amount of lloan to 1.4Million and the interest from 60% per annum to 30%. Pursuant
to such order, Luison tendered a check payment.
Petitoner refused to acknowledge the full satisfaction of the judgment by
dafault. Thus, Luison filed 2 motions: Ex parte motion to require Viking to cause the
cancellation of the annotation of mortgage and to return the TCT and Ex parte motion
to enjoin the sheriff or his deputies from selling at public auction the subject property.
The RTC set aside the judgment by default order on the ground that the RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over Viking because of improper service of summons (incorrect
name). MR was then filed, and RTC overturned its order and reinstated the judgment
by default and granted the twin motions.
Petitioner filed a petitioner for certiorari with the CA but the said court
reinstated the judgment by default. Summons and other court processes, before the
amendment in the designation of the corporation’s name from Viking Trading
Corporation to that of Viking Industrial Corporation, were received by agents of Viking
Trading Corporation which turned out to be the same employees working for Viking
Industrial Corporation. Also, by seeking affirmative reliefs before the RTC as well as
various participation in the proceedings in the said court by its President, it had in
effect voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court. Later, petitioner filed
with the SC a petition for review on certiorari but the same was dismissed in 1998.
Unwilling to yield, petitioner filed with the RTC a motion for new trial with RTC in
1999 on the ground that it acted in the honest mistake that, before it should file its
responsive pleading thereto, the petition which had been served on it for “Viking
Trading Corporation” must first be corrected to reflect its true corporate name, an
issue it had pursued to its end at the appellate courts, and that by reason of which its
rights had been impaired.
RTC granted petitioner’s motion, holding that petitioner’s failure to file an
answer to respondent’s petition was due to its “honest mistake” that it had no legal
obligation to answer the petition erroneously impleading it as Viking Trading
Corporation instead of Viking Industrial Corporation. He set aside the judgment by
default and ordered a new trial. Luison, Jr. filed MR. RTC denied the MR. Hence, this
petition for certiorari amd prohibition.
ISSUE W/N petitioner’s HONEST MISTAKE qualifies as a ground for a new trial.
RULING NO.
Under Sec. 1 (a) of Rule 37 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, one of the
grounds for new trial is: fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which
ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which such
aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his rights The mistake referred to
above is one which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. Here, the
mistake petitioner committed is a mistake of law. Its lawyer believed that he should
not file an answer because his client is erroneously impleaded. Had petitioner’s
counsel reviewed more closely the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
particularly Section 4, Rule 10 and Section 1, Rule 16, he would not have committed
a mistake which, unfortunately, binds his client. Clearly, petitioner’s counsel, instead
of ignoring respondent’s petition, should have filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the court has not acquired jurisdiction over its person as the summons (with a
copy of the petition) served upon it is defective.
Note: Petitioners main argument is that it received a copy of the judgment by default
only on January 9, 1999, thus, its motion for new trial filed with the RTC on January
21, 1999 was within the 15-day reglementary period. That contention that they
received only the decision on January 9, 1999 is a lie, flimsy and frivolous. Way back
on October 15, 1997, private respondent went to the Court of Appeals by way of
Petition for Certiorari assailing the decision of the lower court. Common sense
dictates, that one could not have gone to the Court of Appeals without private
respondents receiving a copy of the decision of the lower court.
VICTORIANO SALAZAR v. CAYETANA SALAZAR, G.R. No. L-2995. March 27,
1907
DOCTRINE: In view of the evidence showing a compromise between the parties, it
was natural and logical that the plaintiff herein believed that the action brought against
him by the defendant herein had been ended by the aforesaid compromise and that
he was relieved, therefore, from the duty of filing his answer. Such belief excusable
and having prevented the plaintiff herein from making a defense that would have been
good and efficacious, this case comes within the provisions of section 513 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, and the judgment by default must be set aside a new trial
ordered.
FACTS: On March 11, 1905, the court below ordered cited by subpoena, among
other persons, Victoriano Salazar as the defendant and that said citation could not be
served for the reason that Salazar could not be found. On March 14, 1905, the court
below entered an order finding Victoriano Salazar in default for his failure to appear
and answer to the complaint. As a result, on October 2, 1905, judgment in default
was rendered against Victoriano Salazar ordering him to pay the sum of 6,000 pesos
to Cayetana Salazar, together with the costs of the action.
The plaintiff herein, Victoriano Salazar, explains in his pleading the reasons he had
for not having answered the complaint of Cayetana Salazar. The complaint was not
answered, he says, for the following reasons:
a) That a transaction or compromise had been executed, before a notary public,
and between the attorney for the defendant herein (Cayetana Salazar) with the
knowledge and consent of the same, and the now plaintiff herein, then a
defendant, and Paulino Villarosa, then also a defendant, wherein the litigation
pending between them was terminated and compromised.
b) That he was called upon to appear again in March, 1904, and employed and
engaged Attorney Dominguez, of the firm of Montagne & Dominguez, to attend to
the case for the purpose of having Dominguez show in court said transaction and
compromise and to do whatever else was required by law to have the case
brought to a happy conclusions.
c) That said Dominguez obligated himself to do this and, on the other hand the
attorney then presenting the present defendant, filed in said court in September,
1904, a written motion asking for the dismissal of the cause based on the
compromise and transaction above mentioned: that the present plaintiff not only
believed that Dominguez had complied with his duties but that the case had been
definitely terminated. For this reason he did not answer complaint or pay any
further attention to the matter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment declaring the Victoriano Salazar should be
annulled.
HELD: YES. In view of these proofs we consider it natural and logical that Victoriano
Salazar believed, and that such belief was well founded, that the action brought
against him by Cayetana Salazar had been ended in fact by virtue of the aforesaid
compromise and that he was, therefore, relieved from the duty of filing his answer.
Perhaps technically such belief would be erroneous, but it was, without doubt,
excusable and the causes were reasonable why he did not answer; and this having
been the cause that prevented Salazar from making or utilizing a defense which
would have been good and efficacious — that is, the aforesaid transaction or
compromise — it is seen that this case provided for in Section 513 of the Code of Civil
Procedure as invoked by said Salazar in his complaint herein.
Thus, the SC declared that the judgment entered on October 2, 1905, which declared
Victoriano in default, annulled and granted Victoriano a new trial of the case.
Philippine Phospate Fertilizer Corp. vs CIR, GR No. 141973 June 28, 2005; 461
SCRA 369
Doctrine:
The “mistake” that is allowable in Rule 37 is one which ordinary prudence could not
have guarded against. Negligence to be “excusable” must also be one which ordinary
diligence and prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which the
rights of an aggrieved party have probably been impaired. The test of excusable
negligence is whether a party has acted with ordinary prudence while transacting
important business. In this case, it cannot be said that petitioner did not act with
ordinary prudence in claiming its refund with the CTA, in light of its previous cases
with the CTA which did not require invoices and the non-mandatory nature of CTA
Circular No. 1-95.
Facts:
Petitioner is a domestic corporation registered with the Export Processing Zone
Authority (EPZA). It manufactures fertilizers for domestic and international distribution
and as such, utilizes fuel, oil and other petroleum products which it procures locally
from Petron. Petron initially pays the BIR and the Bureau of Customs the taxes and
duties imposed upon the petroleum products. Petron is then reimbursed by petitioner
when Petron sells such petroleum products to the petitioner. In a letter, petitioner
sought a refund of specific taxes paid on the purchases of petroleum products from
Petron for the period of September 1993 to December 1994 in the total amount of
P602,349.00 which claim is pursuant to the incentives it enjoyed by virtue of its EPZA
registration. Since the two-year period within which petitioner could file a case for tax
refund before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) was about to expire and no action had
been taken by the BIR, petitioner instituted a petition for review before the CTA
against the CIR.
To prove that the duties imposed upon the petroleum products delivered to petitioner
by Petron had been duly paid for by petitioner, petitioner presented a Certification
from Petron; a schedule of petroleum products sold and delivered to petitioner
detailing the volume of sales and the excise taxes paid thereon; photocopies of
Authority to Accept Payment for Excise Taxes issued by the CIR pertaining to
petroleum products purchased; as well as the testimony of Sylvia Osorio, officer of
Petron, to attest to the summary and certification presented. The CIR did not present
any evidence to controvert the ones presented by petitioner nor did it file an
opposition to petitioner’s formal offer of evidence.
CTA promulgated its Decision finding that while petitioner is exempt from the payment
of excise taxes, it failed to sufficiently prove that it is entitled to refund in this particular
case since it did not submit invoices to support the summary of petroleum products
sold and delivered to it by Petron. The CTA ruled that: Although these Authority to
Accept Payment for Excise Taxes reflect therein the amount of excise taxes paid by
Petron to respondent, this Court cannot verify the exact amount of excise taxes which
correspond to the petroleum products delivered to petitioner. Petitioner merely
presented a summary of petroleum products sold and delivered by Petron during the
period covered by the claim. We cannot, by the summary alone, ascertain the veracity
of the amount being claimed neither can it prove the existence of the invoices being
referred to therein. Petitioner should have submitted the invoices supporting the
schedules of petroleum products sold and delivered to it by Petron. These invoices
would reveal whether or not the amount claimed for refund by petitioner is correct.
On August 31, 1998, petitioner filed a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION alleging
that it failed to submit invoices because it thought that the presentation of said
invoices was not necessary to prove the claim for refund, since petitioner’s previous
claims involving similar facts, were granted by the CTA even without the presentation
of invoices. It then prayed that the CTA decision be reconsidered and its claim for
refund be allowed, or in the alternative, allow petitioner to present and offer the
invoices in evidence to present its claim.
The CTA denied the motion for reconsideration. It ruled that: Petitioner’s reliance on
previous CTA cases is misplaced because during the hearings of these cases up to
the time of formal offer of evidence, CTA Circular No. 1-95 was not yet in effect. The
nature and presentation of evidence involving voluminous documents prior to the
effectivity of CTA Circular No. 1-95 differ from that which is required by this Court
from the effectivity of said Circular beginning January 25, 1995. In the instant case,
the Petition for Review was filed on September 1, 1995. It is obviously clear that the
provisions of CTA Circular 1-95 already applied to Petitioner’s presentation of
evidence. It can be revealed from the evidence presented by the Petitioner that it
failed to present a certification of an independent Certified Public Accountant, as well
as the invoices supporting the schedules of petroleum products sold and delivered to
it by Petron. From this perspective alone, the claim for refund was correctly denied.
Now that an unfavorable decision has been rendered by this Court, Petitioner
belatedly seeks to present the invoices as additional evidence. The prayer to present
additional evidence partakes of the nature of a MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL under
Section 1 Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It has already been
emphasized in several cases that failure to present evidence already existing at the
time of trial does not warrant the grant of a new trial because said evidence can no
longer be considered newly discovered but is more in the nature of forgotten
evidence. Neither can such inadvertence on the part of the counsel to present said
evidence qualify as excusable negligence.
CTA Presiding Judge Ernesto D. Acosta dissented with the view that in the interest of
justice, petitioner should be given a chance to prove its case by allowing it to present
the invoices of its purchases. The reason advanced by the Petitioner was that they
thought the presentation by the Manager of Petron Corporation of a duly notarized
certification (supporting the schedules of invoices), coupled with testimonies of
witness, Mrs. Sylvia Osorio of Petron Corporation, are enough to prove their case.
Respondent did not even controvert said exhibits and testimonies. It is this Court that
raised doubts on the veracity of the claim in view of the absence of the invoices. This
ground could easily fall under the phrase “MISTAKE OR EXCUSABLE
NEGLIGENCE” as a ground for new trial under Sec. 1(a) of Rule 37 and not under
the phrase “newly discovered evidence” as stated in our said resolution. The denial of
this motion is too harsh considering that this case is only civil in nature, govern (sic)
merely by the rule on preponderance of evidence.
On January 25, 1999, petitioner filed another motion for reconsideration with motion
for new trial praying that it be allowed to present an additional witness and to have
invoices and receipts pre-marked in accordance with CTA Circular No. 1-95. The CTA
denied the same for the reason that it found no convincing reason to reverse its
earlier decision and the motion for new trial was filed beyond the period prescribed by
Sec. 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court as well as for appeals as provided under Sec. 4,
Rule 43.
Petitioner then went to the CA which, in a Resolution, dismissed the petition for
review. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Issue:
Whether the CTA should have granted petitioner’s claim for refund.
Held: YES
In this case, there is no dispute that petitioner is entitled to exemption from the
payment of excise taxes by virtue of its being an EPZA registered enterprise. The only
thing left to be determined is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the amount
claimed for refund.
Petitioner’s entire claim for refund, however, was denied for petitioner’s failure to
present invoices allegedly in violation of CTA Circular No. 1-95. But nowhere in said
Circular is it stated that invoices are required to be presented in claiming refunds. The
CTA in denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, also mentioned for the first
time that petitioner’s failure to present “a certification of an independent CPA” is
another ground that justified the denial of its claim for refund.
Again, we find such reasoning to be erroneous. The certification of an independent
CPA is not another mandatory requirement under the Circular which petitioner failed
to comply with. It is rather a requirement that must accompany the invoices should
one decide to present invoices under the Circular. Since petitioner did not present
invoices, on the assumption that such were not necessary in this case, it logically did
not present a certification because there was nothing to certify.
The CTA also could not deny that in its previous decisions involving petitioner’s
claims for refund, invoices were not deemed necessary to grant such claims. It merely
said that in said decisions, CTA Circular No. 1-95 was not yet in effect. Since CTA
Circular No. 1-95 did not make it mandatory to present invoices, coupled with the
previous cases of petitioner where the certifications issued by Petron sufficed, it is
understandable that petitioner did not think it necessary to present invoices and the
accompanying certifications when it filed the present case for refund before the CTA.
Even then, petitioner, in its motion for reconsideration, asked the CTA for an
opportunity to present invoices to substantiate its claims. But this was denied by the
CTA explaining that its prayer to present additional evidence partakes of the nature of
a motion for new trial under Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. The CTA held
that under such rule, failure to present evidence already existing at the time of trial
does not warrant the grant of a new trial because such evidence is not newly
discovered but is more in the nature of forgotten evidence which is not excusable.
On this point, we agree with the dissenting opinion of CTA Presiding Judge Ernesto
D. Acosta. (Please see Rule 37, Sec. 1, ROC, Grounds and period for filing motion for
new trial or reconsideration). It is true that petitioner could not move for new trial on
the basis of newly discovered evidence because in order to have a new trial on the
basis of newly discovered evidence, it must be proved that: (a) the evidence was
discovered after the trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and
produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; (c) it is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) it is of such weight that, if admitted,
will probably change the judgment. This does not mean however, that petitioner is
altogether barred from having a new trial. As pointed out by Judge Acosta, the
reasons put forth by petitioner could fall under mistake or excusable negligence.
(See DOCTRINE)
Respondent also argues that petitioner’s motion for new trial was filed out of time and
should therefore be dismissed in view of Sec. 1, Rule 37 and Sec. 4, Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court. (Rule 37, Sec 1: Within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved
party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new
trial… Rulee 43, Sec 4: The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice
of the award, judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its last
publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of
petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the
governing law of the court or agency a quo.)
It is borne by the records however that in its first motion for reconsideration duly filed
on time, petitioner had already prayed that it be allowed to present and offer the
pieces of evidence deemed lacking by the CTA in its Decision dated August 11, 1998.
Thus, while it named its pleading as a Motion for New Trial only in its motion dated
January 25, 1999, petitioner should not be deemed to have moved for new trial only
at such time.
We reiterate the fundamental principle that technical rules of procedure are not ends
in themselves but are primarily designed to aid in the administration of justice. And in
cases before tax courts, Rules of Court applies only by analogy or in a suppletory
character and whenever practicable and convenient shall be liberally construed in
order to promote its objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition
of every action and proceeding. Section 8 of RA No. 1125 creating the CTA also
expressly provides that it shall not be governed strictly by technical rules of evidence.
Since it is not disputed that petitioner is entitled to tax exemption, it should not be
precluded from presenting evidence to substantiate the amount of refund it is claiming
on mere technicality especially in this case, where the failure to present invoices at
the first instance was adequately explained by petitioner.
Bernaldez vs Francia
Doctrine: The Court said that it has previously ruled that a motion for new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence shall be granted when the concurrence of the
following requisites is established:(a) the evidence is discovered after trial; (b) the
evidence could not have been discovered and produced during trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is material and not merely
corroborative, cumulative or impeaching and is of such weight that if admitted, would
probably change the judgment.
In order that a particular piece of evidence may be regarded as newly discovered for
purposes of granting a new trial, it is essential to show that the offering party
exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate such evidence before or during
trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it. The Court notes that although petitioners
found out about the existence of the TCT of Sps. Tupaz only after trial, they could
have easily discovered the same before or during the trial of the case had they
bothered to check the TCT of respondents lot to ascertain whether or not it
overlapped with their own lot.
Facts: Francia is the registered owner of a residential lot in Sampaloc, Manila
covered by TCT. Beside said lot is a parcel of land owned by petitioners Guillermo
and Lourdes Bernaldez. Building and other improvements erected on respondents lot
were destroyed by fire. Subsequently, petitioners built their kitchen and in the process
encroached upon a portion of respondents lot. Respondent had her property
resurveyed by a geodetic engineer and as a result, she was able to confirm that
petitioners had encroached upon some nineteen square meters of her lot.
Respondent then filed before RTC a complaint against petitioner praying that the
court determine the rightful owner of the area in dispute. A resurvey of the was
conducted and the RTC rendered that petitioners had encroached on respondents lot
by an area of seventeen square meters.
Petitioners filed with the trial court a motion for new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence. They claimed that the TCT covering respondents lot
referred to another lot owned by Nolasco and Editha Tupaz. However, the RTC
denied the motion for lack of merit. CA affirmed in toto the decision of RTC, and on
the issue of motion for new trial, CA affirmed the denial of the RTC because
petitioners had not satisfactorily shown that they exercised reasonable diligence in
producing or locating a copy of TCT No. 180189 in the name of Nolasco and Editha
Tupaz before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in denying the motion for new trial on the ground
of newly discovered evidence?
Ruling: NO. The Court said that it has previously ruled that a motion for new trial on
the ground of newly discovered evidence shall be granted when the concurrence of
the following requisites is established:
(a) the evidence is discovered after trial;
(b) the evidence could not have been discovered and produced during trial even with
the exercise of reasonable diligence; and
(c) the evidence is material and not merely corroborative, cumulative or impeaching
and is of such weight that if admitted, would probably change the judgment.
In order that a particular piece of evidence may be regarded as newly discovered for
purposes of granting a new trial, it is essential to show that the offering party
exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate such evidence before or during
trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it.
The evidence offered by petitioners, TCT No. 180189 issued by the Registry of Deeds
of Manila not to respondent, but to Spouses Nolasco E. Tupaz and Editha L. Tupaz,
does not satisfy the aforementioned requisites. The Court notes that although
petitioners found out about the existence of said TCT only after trial, they could have
easily discovered the same before or during the trial of the case had they bothered to
check the TCT of respondents lot to ascertain whether or not it overlapped with their
own lot. In any case, TCT No. 180189 is hardly material to their case, considering that
respondents TCT is of a different number: TCT No. 180199. Hence, it is not difficult to
see why the two certificates of title refer to different parcels of land and owners. Such
piece of evidence would certainly not have affected, much less, altered the outcome
of the case.
Capuz vs. Court of Appeals
DOCTRINE: The verified motion to lift the order of default and set aside the decision
where the allegations contain the same grounds to sustain a motion for new trial can
be treated as such. No separate affidavit of merit needed to be filed with the motion
for new trial.
Capuz was correct when it argued that his verified motion to lift the order of default
and to set aside the motion can be treated as a motion for new trial without submitting
a separate affidavit of merit considering that the motion was verified.
FACTS: On a same day, Capuz received a copy of the Order where he was declared
in default and the decision where he was made to pay the amount of the loan to
Banez,
Capuz filed a verified motion to lift the order of default and to set aside the decision.
Averring that:
Defendant’s failure to file his responsive pleading is due to fraud, mistake, accident
and/or excusable neglect, and that when defendant received a copy of the summons
and the complaint on September 5, 1992, defendant wasted no time in seeing the
plaintiff and confronted him about his receipt (payment of the subject obligation),
plaintiff assured the defendant that he (plaintiff) will instruct his lawyer to withdraw the
complaint, and not to worry anymore. Defendant took the word of his “compadre” the
plaintiff. Hence, defendant did not file his answer to the complaint
The RTC denied the verified motion, thus, Capuz filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA. The CA dismissed the petition holding that, (1) that petitioner’s motion to lift the
order of default and set aside the judgment was improper because there was already
a judgment by default rendered when it was filed; (2) that having discovered the order
of default after the rendition of the judgment, the remedy of petitioner was either to
appeal the decision or file a motion for new trial under Rule 37; and (3) that the said
motion could not be considered as a motion for new trial under Rule 37 because it
was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit.
Capuz argues that the motion to lift the order of defaut and to set aside the decision
can be treated as a motion for new trial under Rule 37 and that a separate affidavit of
merit need not be submitted considering that the said motion was verified.
ISSUE: Whether the motion to lift the order of default and set aside the decision can
be treated as a motion for new trial under Rule 37.
RULING: Yes, it can be treated the same because it had allegations which are of the
same grounds for a motion for new trial under Rule 37.
For the grounds stated under Rule 37 Sec. 1(a) – fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence – what is required in filing for a motion for new trial is to be
supported by affidavit of merits, which may be rebutted by affidavits.
However, the allegations contained in an affidavit of merit required to be attached to a
motion to lift an order of default or for a new trial need not be embodied in a separate
document but may be incorporated in the petition itself. As held in Tanhu v. Ramolete,
66 SCRA 425 (1975):
“Stated otherwise, when a motion to lift an order of default contains the reasons for
the failure to answer as well as the facts constituting the prospective defense of the
defendant and it is sworn to by said defendant, neither a formal verification nor a
separate affidavit of merit is necessary.”
Here, the motion to lift the order of default and set aside the decision contained the
allegations needed to sustain a motion for new trial, and it was a verified motion. The
only reason that the CA did not consider the motion for new trial was because the
said motion did not include an affidavit of merit.
Dulos Realty and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
DOCTRINE: The appellate court err in treating petitioner’s motion for reopening/
clarification and reconsideration as a motion for new trial. Under Section 1 (c) of Rule
37 of the Rules of Court, before it was amended on July 1, 1997, motion for new trial
was aimed to convince the court that its ruling was erroneous and improper for being
contrary to the law or the evidence. However, apparent from petitioner’s motion and
the subsequent hearing thereon was petitioner’s intention to make the trial court
reconsider its decision to conform with the law and the evidence by reiterating the
decision of the HLURB, the government agency which has the primary jurisdiction on
the enforcement of PD 957 as amended, and by informing said trial court that private
respondent already abandoned the premises.
That private respondent had already abandoned the premises is not a newly found
evidence for admittedly, petitioner knew of it before the trial court rendered its
decision. Hence, it could not be introduced through a motion for new trial under
Section 1 Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. Neither could said abandonment be
introduced through a motion to reopen, because such motion could only be made
after the case was submitted for decision but before judgment is actually rendered. In
this case, it was only introduced as evidence in the motion filed after judgment, which
in our view is appropriately one for reconsideration.
FACTS: Petitioner Dulos Realty and Development Corporation (Dulos, for brevity) is
the owner and developer of Airmen’s Village Subdivision located at Las Piñas, Metro
Manila. Dulos entered in a contract to sell a house and lot with private respondent
Vicenta Peleas for P168,180 payable as follows: (a) P20,000 upon the signing of the
contract, and (b) P148,180 in monthly amortization of P2,010.36. The parties agreed
that in case private respondent defaulted in the payment of any monthly installment,
she would have a grace period of not less than 120 days within which to pay. If
despite the grace period she still failed to pay, petitioner could declare the contract
cancelled. The right to cancel, however, would not obtain if private respondent’s non-
payment were due to petitioner’s failure to complete development within the period
allowed by the National Housing Authority.
Upon payment of P20,000, Vicenta Peleas and her family occupied the premises.
Thereafter, she failed to pay the monthly amortizations when they became due. This
resulted in demands made by Dulos for her to vacate the premises, otherwise a civil
case would be filed against her.
Before a civil case was initiated, Peleas filed a the then Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission (now Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board or HLURB) a
complaint against the company and its president, for failure to develop the subdivision
in accordance with its approved plan, thus violating Presidential Decree No. 957 and
related laws.
A month later, Dulos filed a complaint against Peleas for rescission of contract and
recovery of possession with damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
alleging among others, that she failed to pay her obligation under the contract.
Pending resolution of the case by the trial court, the HLURB dismissed the complaint
filed by Peleas stating that the later did not adduced any evidence to support her
allegations.
April 12, 1989 Decision: Trial court, likewise, dismissed the complaint of Dulos on the
ground that both parties are in pari delicto.
Dulos filed a Dulos filed a Motion for Reopening/Clarification and Reconsideration,
alleging that Vicenta Peleas had voluntarily relinquished possession of the subject
property. During the hearing, Dulos reiterated the aforecited decision of HLURB.
November 28, 1989 Decision: Thus, trial court rendered judgement in favor of Dulos.
Peleas appealed to CA. CA nullified decision of RTC. It ruled that the lower court
committed reversible error in having the case re-opened in response to either a
motion to reopen or a motion for a new trial on the ground of supposedly newly
discovered evidence. CA affirmed and reinstated the decision dismissing the
complaint on the ground of in pari delicto. (April 12, 1989 Decision)
ISSUE: Whether the appellate court err in treating petitioner’s motion for reopening/
clarification and reconsideration as a motion for new trial.
RULING: Yes. See Doctrine.
ALFARERO vs. SEVILLA
DOCTRINE: A motion for new trial should be made within the period for perfecting an
appeal. Rule 37, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides that a
motion for new trial should be made “within the period for taking an appeal.” Instead,
what the record shows is that petitioners (Alfareros), in effect, only asked for a new
trial after the appellate court had rendered its decision on appeal. Such a situation is
definitely not permissible under the Rules. It is well accepted that a motion for new
trial based on newly discovered evidence may indeed be filed after judgment, but
within the period for perfecting an appeal.
FACTS: The Spouses Petra and Sancho Sevilla (Sevillas) are the registered owners
of a piece of land situated at San Vicente, Panabo, Davao del Norte with an area of
14.038 hectares, more or less and covered by an Original Certificate of Title. In a
Deed of Sale executed and ratified before Notary Public, it appears that on May 25,
1986, a portion of the above-mentioned parcel of land with an area of 1.000 hectare,
more or less, was sold to the Spouses Shem G. Alfarero and Aurelia Tagalog,
Spouses Gines G. Alfarero and Noni Cruspero, Joel G. Alfarero and Naomi G.
Alfarero (Alfareros) in the amount of P12,000.00.
The Deed of Sale was registered by the Alfareros with the Office of the Register of
Deeds of the Province of Davao and as a result, a new TCT was issued in their name.
Inscribed on the face of the said new TCT is the following limitation: Subject to the
rights of repurchase by the Original Patentee or his heirs within a period of five (5)
years from the date of the conveyance pursuant to Section 119 of Commonwealth Act
141, as amended.
Sometime on October 1986, Petra Sevilla allegedly sent a letter to the Alfareros,
indicating the desire of the Sevillas to repurchase the above-mentioned parcel of land,
but the Alfareros allegedly objected to the offer of repurchase.
On January 3, 1991, the Sevillas filed the present action to repurchase in the RTC.
The Alfareros rejected of the offer to repurchase because they argue that such action
has already prescribed, that their offer to repurchase is already beyond the five (5)
year limitation period. According to the Alfareros, the Deed of Sale was executed
sometime in December 1985 although notarized only on May 26, 1986. Hence,
according to them, counting from December 1985 to January 3, 1991, when the
Sevillas filed the present action, the five (5) year period has then elapsed. During the
pre-trial proceedings, the parties again moved for judgment on the pleadings. The
court granted the parties motion and allowed them to submit their respective
memoranda. After the parties submitted their memoranda, the court resolved the
matter in favor of the Sevillas on the basis of such submitted pleadings.
The Alfareros appealed to the CA but the appellate court affirmed in toto the decision
of the trial court.
In sustaining the trial court, the CA found that the notarized Deed of Sale executed on
May 25, 1986, relied upon by the Sevillas herein, is entitled to more evidentiary
weight than the Deed of Sale offered by the Alfareros herein to sustain their theory
that the action of the Sevillas had already prescribed. The CA noted that the date of
execution in the Deed of Sale presented by the Alfareros merely read __th day of
December 1985 and the document was not notarized nor its authenticity proven by
substantial evidence. Hence, as between the two Deeds of Sale offered by the parties
in evidence, that of the Sevillas, which was notarized and with the date of its
execution plainly indicated therein, should prevail over that of the Alfareros, which
was not notarized and whose date of execution in December 1985 was not stated
with definiteness. Otherwise put, it is the public document, rather than the private one,
which commands the greater evidentiary weight, according to the assailed decision.
(Walang nakalagay sa full text na facts na nagmotion for new trial sila Alfarero
habang pending sa CA pero parang yun yung nangyari based sa ruling. Sa ruling part
lang kasi nabanggit yung Motion for New Trial.)
ISSUE: WON a party litigant can file a motion for new trial even if the case is on
appeal and is pending before the Court of Appeals on the ground of newly discovered
evidence which petitioners could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and
produced at the trial and which if presented would probably alter the result.
RULING: NO. The time is past for the arguments of the Alfareros. Rule 37, Section 1
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides that a motion for new trial should
be made within the period for taking an appeal. Instead, what the record shows is that
the Alfareros, in effect, only asked for a new trial after the appellate court had
rendered its decision on appeal. Such a situation is definitely not permissible under
the Rules. It is well accepted that a motion for new trial based on newly discovered
evidence may indeed be filed after judgment, but within the period for perfecting an
appeal.
Moreover, the record clearly and categorically shows that Alfareros’ query was not
raised in the proceedings at the first instance. As a rule, basic considerations of due
process dictate that no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been
raised in the court below. Points of law, theories of the case, questions of fact and
law, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not
and ordinarily will not be considered by the reviewing court, as these cannot be raised
for the first time at that late stage. To conclude, the CA did not err when it acted
unfavorably on the motion for a new trial filed by the Alfareros.
Note just in case matanong, ito yung new evidence daw nina Alfarero: They
insist that they have new evidence which would show that on December 28, 1990, or
one week before Civil Case No. 91-01 was filed, the Sevillas herein delivered
P45,000.00 to their counsel for the repurchase of the disputed lot and after their
lawyer failed to consign said amount with the trial court, the Sevillas then filed an
estafa case against said lawyer. From the foregoing, it can be deduced that the actual
purchase price of the property was actually P45,000.00 and not P12,000.00 as
indicated in the notarized Deed of Sale relied upon both by the trial court and the CA,
say the Alfareros. They submit that from the foregoing, a new trial should have been
ordered by the court a quo.
HABALUYAS ENTERPRISES vs. JUDGE MAXIMO M. JAPSON, G.R. No. 70895
May 30, 1986 (FULL CASE ITO KASI WALA NA AKO MAIIKSI SA KANYA)
Doctrine: Starting June 1, 1986 no motion for extension of time to file a motion
for new trial or reconsideration may be filed in the Metropolitan and Municipal
Courts, RTC’s and the I.A.C., except in cases pending in the Supreme Court
Facts:
Respondents have filed a MR of the Decision of the Court promulgated on August 5,
1985 which granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition and set aside the order of
respondent Judge granting private respondents' motion for new trial.
Issue: Whether the fifteen-day period within which a party may file a motion for
reconsideration of a final order or ruling of the Regional Trial Court may be extended.
Ruling: it depends
Section 39 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, reduced
the period for appeal from final orders or judgments of the Regional Trial Courts
(formerly Courts of First Instance) from thirty (30) to fifteen (15) days and provides a
uniform period of fifteen days for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court counted from notice thereof, except in habeas
corpus cases where the period for appeal remains at forty- eight (48) hours.
To expedite appeals, only a notice of appeal is required and a record on appeal is no
longer required except in appeals in special proceedings under Rule 109 of the Rules
of Court and in other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed. Section 19 of the
Interim Rules provides that in these exceptional cases, the period for appeal is thirty
(30) days since a record on appeal is required. Moreover Section 18 of the Interim
Rules provides that no appeal bond shall be required for an appeal, and Section 4
thereof disallows a second motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment.
All these amendments are designed, as the decision sought to be reconsidered rightly
states, to avoid the procedural delays which plagued the administration of justice
under the Rules of Court which are intended to assist the parties in obtaining a just,
speedy and inexpensive administration of justice.
However, the law and the Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit the filing of a
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration of a final order or
judgment.
In the case of Gibbs vs. Court, of First Instance, ruled that the failure of defendant's
attorney to file the petition to set aside the judgment within the reglementary period
was due to excusable neglect, and, consequently, the record on appeal was allowed.
The Court did not rule that the motion for extension of time to file a motion for new
trial or reconsideration could not be granted.
In the case of Roque vs. Gunigundo (Administrative Case No. 1684, March 30, 1979,
89 SCRA 178), a division of the Court cited the Gibbs decision to support a statement
that a motion to extend the reglementary period for filing the motion for
reconsideration is not authorized or is not in order.
The Intermediate Appellate Court is sharply divided on this issue. Appeals have been
dismissed on the basis of the original decision in this case.
After considering the able arguments of counsels for petitioners and respondents, the
Court resolved that the interest of justice would be better served if the ruling in the
original decision were applied prospectively from the time herein stated. The reason is
that it would be unfair to deprive parties of their right to appeal simply because they
availed themselves of a procedure which was not expressly prohibited or allowed by
the law or the Rules.
On the other hand, a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not a pre-requisite to an
appeal, a petition for review or a petition for review on certiorari, and since the
purpose of the amendments above referred to is to expedite the final disposition of
cases, a strict but prospective application of the said ruling is in order. Hence, for the
guidance of Bench and Bar, the Court restates and clarifies the rules on this point, as
follows:
1.) Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be
strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the
Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be
filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which
may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested.
2.) In appeals in special proceedings under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and in
other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, a motion for extension of time to
file the record on appeal may be filed within the reglementary period of thirty (30)
days. (Moya vs. Barton, 76 Phil. 831; Heirs of Nantes vs. Court of Appeals, July 25,
1983, 123 SCRA 753.) If the court denies the motion for extension, the appeal must
be taken within the original period (Bello vs. Fernando, January 30, 1962, 4 SCRA
135), inasmuch as such a motion does not suspend the period for appeal (Reyes vs.
Sta. Maria, November 20, 1972, 48 SCRA 1). The trial court may grant said motion
after the expiration of the period for appeal provided it was filed within the original
period. (Valero vs. Court of Appeals, June 28, 1973, 51 SCRA 467; Berkenkotter vs.
Court of Appeals, September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 228).
All appeals heretofore timely taken, after extensions of time were granted for the filing
of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, shall be allowed and determined on the
merits.
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANK OF SAUDI ARABIA vs. CA
DOCTRINE: The requirement of notice under Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of
Court is mandatory. The absence of a notice of hearing is fatal and, in cases of
motions to reconsider a decision, the running of the period to appeal is not tolled by
their filing or pendency. Thus, the denial of the MR without a notice of hearing was
proper.
FACTS:
Petitioner National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia (NCBSA) filed a case against
Philippine Banking Corporation (PBC) to recover "the duplication in the payment of
the proceeds of a letter of credit NCBSA has issued brought about by the fact that
both the head office and the Makati branch of PBC collected the proceeds of the
letter of credit."
RTC of Makati rendered a decision in favor of NCBSA. PBC received a copy of the
decision on September 3, 1993 and on the 12th day of the period of appeal or on
September 15, it filed a Motion for Reconsideration.The motion, however, did not
contain a notice of hearing. NCBSA filed a Manifestation pointing out that PBC's Mr
did not contain any notice of hearing. NCBSA filed a Motion for Writ of Execution of
the decision of the trial court. On even date, PBC filed a Motion to Set "Motion for
Reconsideration" for Hearing.. NCBSA opposed this motion which was granted by the
trial court, it struck from the records of the case PBC's MR of its decision and granted
NCBSA's Motion for Writ of Execution. PBC filed a Motion for Reconsideration of that
Order alleging that PBC's failure to comply with the 3-day notice rule "was essentially
an honest mistake or oversight of counsel." This motion was also opposed by NCBSA
where the trial court also denied PBC's MR for that Order.
PBC assailed before the CA via Certiorari the trial court's Order. The CA dismissed
PBC's Petition for Certiorari. On PBC's MR, however, the CA, set aside its Decision
and granted PBC's Petition for Certiorari and directed the trial court to resolve PBC's
MR.
ISSUE: Was the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the ground of
failure to contain a notice of hearing proper?
RULING:
Yes. The requirement of notice under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 in connection with
Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court is mandatory. The absence of a notice of
hearing is fatal and, in cases of motions to reconsider a decision, the running of the
period to appeal is not tolled by their filing or pendency. In an attempt to cure the
defect, PBC filed on Motion to Set the "Motion for Reconsideration" for Hearing 9
days after the period for filing the Notice of Appeal had expired.
The motion for reconsideration, however, being fatally defective for lack of notice of
hearing, cannot be cured by a belated filing of a notice of hearing.More so in the case
at bar where the Motion to Set the "Motion for Reconsideration" was filed after the
expiration of the period for filing an appeal.
PBC had the opportunity to participate in the trial and present its defense and had
actually made full use of the remedies under our rules of procedure. The finality of the
decision of the trial court cannot be set aside purely on the basis of liberality. PBC,
however, has not advanced any persuasive or exceptional reason in failing to set its
Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court's decision for hearing. As earlier stated,
the requirement of notice in this kind of motion is mandatory. The Motion for
Reconsideration thus remained a mere scrap of paper which deserved no
consideration.
But assuming that PBC had presented exceptional reason or excuse for its failure to
comply with the notice requirement, the Motion for Reconsideration would be denied
on the ground that it is pro forma. PBC's MR of the trial court's decision was thus "in
substance . . . a reiteration of reasons and arguments" raised before the trial court for
the dismissal of NCBSA's complaint, which reasons and arguments had already been
considered and resolved against it on the merits by the trial court. The Motion for
Reconsideration was thus merely pro forma.
SECURITY BANK AND TRUST CO. v. CUENCA
FACTS: Sta. Ines is a corporation engaged in logging operations. In 1980, it
wasgranted by Security Bank a credit line in the amount of Php 8M. To
securepayment, it executed a chattel mortgage over some of its machineries
andequipments. And as an additional security, its President and Chairman of
theBoard of Directors Rodolfo Cuenca, executed an Indemnity agreement infavor of
Security Bank whereby he bound himself jointly and severally withSta. Ines. After
Cuenca resigned, Sta. Ines obtained a Php 6M loan. Becauseof its difficulty in making
the amortization payments, in 1989 it requestedSecurity Bank a complete restructure
of its indebtedness, which wasapproved without prior notice to, or prior consent of
Cuenca. Still it wasunable to pay.
Thus, SBTC filed a complaint for collection of sum of money on 14 June 1993,
resulting after trial on the merits in a decision by the court a quo, x x x from which
[Respondent] Cuenca appealed. Cuenca was then ordered release from obligation
(1998 CA Decision). MR was filed by Security Bank rehashing the same arguments
passed upon by the CA but the same was denied(.1999 CA Decision). In releasing
Respondent Cuenca from liability, the CA ruled that the 1989 Loan Agreement had
novated the 1980 credit accommodation earlier granted by the bank to Sta. Ines.
Accordingly, such novation extinguished the Indemnity Agreement Hence, this
petition.
Cuenca now contends that petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision,
in merely rehashing the arguments already passed upon by the appellate court, was
pro forma; that as such, it did not toll the period for filing the present Petition for
Review. Consequently, the Petition was filed out of time.
ISSUE: W/N the MR reiterating the arguments earilier passed upon and rejected by
the appellate court is a pro forma and does not toll the running of the period to file the
present petition.
RULING: NO.
A motion for reconsideration is not pro forma just because it reiterated the arguments
earlier passed upon and rejected by the appellate court. The Court has explained that
a movant may raise the same arguments, precisely to convince the court that its
ruling was erroneous.11
Moreover, there is no clear showing of intent on the part of petitioner to delay the
proceedings. In Marikina Valley Development Corporation vs. Flojo, the Court
explained that a pro forma motion had no other purpose than to gain time and to
delay or impede the proceedings.
Hence, as in this case, “where the circumstances of a case do not show an intent on
the part of the movant merely to delay the proceedings, Court has refused to
characterize the motion as simply pro forma.
ELIZABETH M. GAGUI v. SIMEON DEJERO AND TEODORO R. PERMEJO, G.R.
No. 196036, October 23, 2013
DOCTRINE: To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford
litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a
fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial
Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion
for reconsideration. This “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40 governing
appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on
petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing
appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make
the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion
for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution.
FACTS: On 14 December 1993, respondents Simeon Dejero and Teodoro Permejo
filed separate Complaints for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of salaries and overtime
pay, refund of transportation expenses, damages, and attorney’s fees against PRO
Agency Manila, Inc., and Abdul Rahman Al Mahwes. After due proceedings, on 7 May
1997, Labor Arbiter Pedro Ramos rendered a Decision ordering respondents Pro
Agency Manila, Inc., and Abdul Rahman Al Mahwes to jointly and severally pay
complainants.
On 30 October 2002, respondents filed a Motion to Implead Respondent Pro Agency
Manila, Inc.’s Corporate Officers and Directors as Judgment Debtors. It included
petitioner (Elizabeth Gagui) as the Vice-President/Stockholder/Director of PRO
Agency, Manila, Inc. After due hearing, Executive Labor Arbiter Voltaire A. Balitaan
issued an Order on 25 April 2003 granting respondents’ motion and accordingly was
held liable to complainant jointly and solidarily with the original party-respondent.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the NLRC, which rendered a Decision which
affirmed the decision of the LA. The case was also appealed to the CA but the latter
also affirmed NLRC’s decision.
On 8 and 15 December 2010, petitioner filed two Motions for Reconsideration, but
both were denied in a Resolution issued by the CA on 25 February 2011. Hence, this
Petition for Review filed on 30 March 2011.
On 1 August 2011, respondents filed their Comment, alleging that the petition had
been filed 15 days after the prescriptive period of appeal under Section 2, Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
On 14 February 2012, petitioner filed a Reply, countering that she has a fresh period
of 15 days from 16 March 2011 (the date she received the Resolution of the CA) or up
to 31 March 2011 to file the Petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition was filed on time.
HELD: YES the petition was filed on time. Petitioner has a fresh period of 15 days
within which to file this petition, in accordance withthe Neypes rule.
In a misleading attempt to discredit this petition, respondents insist that by opting to
file a Motion for Reconsideration instead of directly appealing the CA Decision,
petitioner effectively lost her right to appeal. Hence, she should have sought an
extension of time to file her appeal from the denial of her motion. This contention,
however, deserves scant consideration. We agree with petitioner that starting from
the date she received the Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration, she
had a “fresh period” of 15 days within which to appeal to this Court. The matter has
already been settled in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, as follows:
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford
litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to
allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion
for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals
from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions
for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45
governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to
regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the
order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or
partial) or any final order or resolution.
Since petitioner received the CA Resolution denying her two Motions for
Reconsideration only on 16 March 2011, she had another 15 days within which to file
her Petition, or until 31 March 2011. This Petition, filed on 30 March 2011, fell within
the prescribed 15-day period.
ESQUIVEL V ALEGRE, GR NO. 79425, APRIL 17, 1989; 172 SCRA 215
Doctrine:
There is a difference between an amended judgment and a supplemental judgment.
In an amended and clarified judgment, the lower court makes a thorough study of the
original judgment and renders the amended and clarified judgment only after
considering all the factual and legal issues. The amended and clarified decision is an
entirely new decision which supersedes the original decision.
Facts:
The original complaint for reconveyance with nullity of judgment, damages and
preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 4883 decided by respondent court on October
29, 1975 arose from Civil Case No. 990 for unlawful detainer filed by the spouses
Teotimo Alaurin and Visitacion Magno, private respondents herein, against the
spouses Cresenciana Atun and Lamberto Esquivel, petitioners herein, in the City
Court of Legaspi which rendered a decision in favor of private respondents herein, the
spouses Teotimo Alaurin and Visitacion Magno. Said decision was affirmed by
respondent court herein, the Court of Appeals and finally by the Supreme Court. The
question of prior possession of the land in question was raised and passed upon in
that case which had already become final and executory when Civil Case No. 4883
was filed in the Court of First Instance of Albay.
In Civil Case No. 4883, petitioners herein anchored their action for reconveyance on
their claim of prior possession but this matter had already been resolved in favor of
private respondents herein and therefore, conclusive on respondent court in Civil
Case No. 4883 being res judicata as to the issue of possession de facto. Trial on the
merits was held on all the other aspects of the case after which judgment was
rendered by respondent court which proved to be unfavorable to petitioners herein.
After their motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioners herein filed their notice
of appeal but due to the opposition of private respondents herein, to the non-inclusion
in the record on appeal of certain pleadings, orders and decisions which they claimed
are relevant to the disposition of the appeal, petitioners herein were ordered by
respondent court to amend their record on appeal to satisfy the objections of the
private respondents who were the original defendants in Civil Case No. 4883. In the
meantime private respondents transferred the property in question to the spouses
Wilfredo Encinas and Patrocinia Dasmarinas, the two other private respondents
herein.
Petitioners must have learned of the sale before they could file their amended record
on appeal which must have prompted them to file a motion for supplemental
complaint against the vendees of the property in question, the spouses Wilfredo
Encinas and Patrocinia Dasmarinas which was admitted by respondent court. As
borne by the records of the case, respondent court ruled in favor of herein petitioners
in the supplemental complaint which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners claim that the decision of respondent court in the supplemental complaint
revised the decision in the original complaint tantamount to an amendment or reversal
of said original decision of respondent court penned by a previous presiding judge
therein.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision rendered by a trial court in a supplemental complaint
modified the decision of the same branch of the court in the original complaint and
amounts to an amendment of the original decision.
Held. NO
There is a difference between an amended judgment and a supplemental judgment.
In an amended and clarified judgment, the lower court makes a thorough study of the
original judgment and renders the amended and clarified judgment only after
considering all the factual and legal issues. The amended and clarified decision is an
entirely new decision which supersedes the original decision.

Following the Court’s differentiation of a supplemental pleading from an amending

pleading, it can be said that a supplemental decision does not take the place or
extinguish the existence of the original. As its very name denotes, it only serves to
bolster or adds something to the primary decision. A supplement exists side by side
with the original. It does not replace that which it supplements.

In the instant case no restudy was made by respondent court of the original decision
but only on the issues raised in the supplemental complaint. The supplemental
decision cannot stand alone as a judgment on the merits as there was no declaration
of the respective rights and duties of the parties. It only declared the supplemental
defendants as successors-in-interest of the defendants in the original complaint,
“such that whatever is the result of the appealed case shall be legally binding upon
them.

The part of the supplemental decision which petitioners claim to have revised the
original, is quoted as follows: “In the light of the foregoing testimony of the witnesses
presented by supplemental plaintiffs together with the documentary exhibits
supporting the allegations of the supplemental complaint, the Court finds that the
evidence presented by the supplemental plaintiffs are preponderantly sufficient to
justify and warrant a judgment in their favor.”

There can be no other interpretation of the above statement of respondent court than
that all documentary and testimonial evidence prescribed by supplemental plaintiffs,
petitioners herein, sufficiently prove that when supplemental defendants entered into
the contract of absolute sale with the original defendants, they already had full
knowledge of the controversy between supplemental plaintiffs and the original
defendants in Civil Case No. 4883 such that they must be adjudged as successors-in-
interest of original defendants Teotimo Alaurin and Visitacion Magno.

It must be pointed out that the dispositive portion itself of the supplemental decision is
clear and unambiguous. It does not make any declaration or pronouncement that may
be taken to have revised or amended the original decision. All that it declares is that
the supplemental defendants Wilfredo Encinas and Patrocinia Dasmarinas are
successors-in-interest of defendants Teotimo Alaurin and Visitacion Magno such that
whatever is the result of the appealed case shall be legally binding upon them.

Petitioners herein pursued their appeal of the original decision with the Court of
Appeals which can be interpreted to mean that they themselves did not believe that
the supplemental decision had amended the original decision of respondent court.
Unfortunately for them, the appellate court found the appeal without merit. Petitioners
herein then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court questioning the
decision of the appellate court which petition likewise did not prosper.