DAMODARAM SANJIVAYYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

VISAKHAPATNAM, A.P., INDIA

PROJECT TITLE

INDO RUSSIAN RELATIONS: THE YELTSIN PERIOD (1991-2000)

SUBJECT

POLITICAL SCIENCE

NAME OF THE FACULTY

MRS. NIRMALA DEVI

Name of the Candidate

Roll No.
Semester

Movva Uma Utkarsha

Roll No: - 2018053
2nd Semester

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT……………………………………………………..3
2. ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………..4
3. INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………6
4. ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION IN INDIA DURING 1990’s…………….8
5. GEOGRAPHICAL CONDITIONS OF RUSSIA DURING 1990’s………....9
6. COLLAPSE OF SOVIET UNION……………………………………………12
7. PHASE OF RUSSIA AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF SOVIET UNION
(1991-93)……………………………………........................................................13
8. IRRITANTS IN INDO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS DURING
YELTSIN ERA…………………………………………………………………16
9. THE YELTSIN VISIT: JANUARY 1993…………………………………….19
10. THE RAO VISIT: 29 JUNE-2 JULY 1994…………………………………...20
11. CHERNOMYRDIN VISIT: 22-24 DECEMBER 1994……………………...20
12. YEVGENY PRIMAKOV’S VISITS 1996, 1998……………………………..20
13. INDIA’S NUCLEAR TEST (1998) AND INDO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS..22
14. IRIGC……………………………………………………………………………24
15. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT……………………………………………….24
16. CONCLUSION………………………………………………………................25
17. BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………....................28

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I want to express my special thanks to my MRS. NIRMALA DEVI, who gave me this golden
opportunity to do this wonderful project on the topic ‘INDO RUSSIAN RELATIONS: THE YELTSIN
PERIOD(1991-2000)’, which also helped me in doing a lot of research and I came to know about a
lot of things.

Secondly, I also thank DSNLU for providing me with all the necessary materials required for the
completion of the project.

Movva Uma Utkarsha

2ndSemester

Regd. No.-2018053

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ABSTRACT

Yeltsin’s Period, (1991-1999)

When Yeltsin joined Soviet Union, Gorbachev’s efforts to democratize the system had resulted
in the foreign exchange crisis, the fall in the production of raw materials, the fall in the supply of
labour, decline in fixed capital assets and the budget crisis.

Two generations of Soviet citizens were brought up cherishing close affinity and affection for
India, represented by Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi. Following the collapse of the Soviet
Union, a noticeable change in Russian attitude towards Indians became evident. Indians were
targeted even in daylight robberies in Moscow and St. Petersburg. There were two clear trends in
the changing attitudes towards Indians. Firstly, there was a clear generational divide between the
continued goodwill of the older Russians and the indifference of increasingly westernized
younger Russians. This was evident within the Russian governments as well. Yeltsin told me,
during my first meeting with him at Kremlin, that he looked forward to his visit to India, not only
as President but as an average Russian with popular goodwill towards our country. He added that
his two day single country visit to India was too short, like just one set of a (tennis) match. His
much younger Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, could not be accused of harboring any such
sentiments. With the passage of time this generational gap has presumably grown. Secondly, in
the '90s there was a marked difference in the perception of India between Moscow and St.
Petersburg and elsewhere in the Russian Federation. In the republics and regions, my wife and I
were invariably warmly welcomed with special ceremonials not extended to ambassadors of
other countries. The change in attitude applies equally to Indians as well, at least among the vast
majority of urban Indians. This worrying trend needs to be addressed. Both governments took
initiatives in reviving high profile cultural exchanges since the '90s.

The Jawaharlal Nehru Cultural Centre was set up in Moscow. There were high profile cultural
festivals. As part of our public outreach initiatives, we organized quiz competitions about India
in popular television and leading newspapers. By far the most successful quiz programme was in
St.Petersburg, thanks to the First Deputy Mayor who took great personal interest and spent
several hours in discussions at our Consulate with the Press Counselor of our Embassy, Ajai
Malhotra, who is currently our ambassador in Kuwait. The First Deputy Mayor was Vladimir

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Putin. There were efforts to create better awareness of the rich legacy of the Roericks in
promoting better understanding between our peoples. The intensification of such exchanges,
combined with new initiatives for cooperation in the film and entertainment industries,
improvements in the visa regime and other recent steps are welcome. Yet these are baby steps.
We have long way to go in promoting people-topeople ties between India and Russia. Russia has
an incredibly rich civilizational heritage which is far better appreciated globally than in India. On
the other hand, Indian culture, cuisine, music, literature etc. are becoming part of the western
mainstream and no longer limited to the Indian diaspora.

The number of Indians resident in Russia is miniscule, in fact insignificant, in comparison to the
millions resident in the US, the UK and elsewhere. Multitudes of Indians have multiple-entry
long term visas to these destinations. In this broader context, Russia does not need to be over
sensitive to western concerns about illegal migration from India through Russia. Concerns
relating to the much better monitored but still porous internal borders in the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) are understandable. So are concerns on terrorism, illegal trafficking in
narcotics, arms and people. These are high in the national security priorities of both the
countries. Restrictions on travel are, however, no substitute for effective intelligence monitoring
and sharing

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INTRODUCTION

The solidity of Indo-Soviet relations is so well established now that it seems hardly necessary to
recapitulate the background. It is difficult to mention the factors that brought about the
convergence of policies and interests of India and the Soviet Union. Indo-Soviet relations had
deep roots. Trade exchanges between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and India
was promoted after the conclusion of a Soviet - British trade agreement in 1921. In the mid-
1920s, the first batch of spices, rice, tea, raw jute and other goods were supplied from India to
the Soviet Union. In 1925, Soviet oil products for the first time reached the Indian market, and at
the end of the next five years, the first big consignment of Soviet sugar was sent to India. Crude
oil and oil products- Kerosene and petrol were the main Soviet exports to India. Cheap and high
quality Soviet Kerosene successfully competed with the oil products of British companies,
causing soon a 30 % reduction in the price of these goods in the Indian market. In 1935, Soviet
Union became the best buyer of Indian goods and itself could also supply India with a number of
manufactured articles. But this was the prospect that most worried the ruling circles of Britain,
by whose unilateral efforts, Soviet- Indian trade in 1939-40 was in fact reduced to zero. The
main obstacle in the way of rapid development of Soviet Indian relations was the dependence of
India on British imperialism. After the proclamation of India as a republic, the relations between
the two countries became closer. This found reflection in agreements on exchange of goods,
which ensured supply of grain from the U.S.S.R. in exchange of jute, tea, castor oil, tobacco,
shellac and some other products. The first Soviet trade agency in India was established in
Calcutta in 1943. India gained diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. and received a good
impetus for all round expansion after Independence in 1947.

India-Russia relationship helped in different ways, on one hand, in the struggle against Western
imperialism and colonialism and on the other hand, in the national interests and requirements of
India in the last 20-30 years of the Soviet Union. In 1950, India had persistent balance of
payment difficulties due to accelerated economic development. Bilateral trade and payment
agreements with Russia helped India to a large extent. Gorbachev wanted to end the supremacy
of the communist party of the Soviet Union and democratize the administrative command
system. The fall of the communist Governments in Eastern Europe also affected Soviet Union.
Gorbachev failed for getting large scale economic aid and resulted in disintegration of Soviet

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Union. Yeltsin took charge of Russia in the year 1990 and Russia got revived in the year 1991
but there was resurgence of Russia only during Putin’s time period. Russian economy saw the
doubling of nominal GDP; industry grew by 70%, investments increased by 125% and
agriculture production increased as well in his period. Medvedev joined as president in 2008 and
had priority for Russia’s economic development strategy up to 2020 and aimed at modernizing
the economy.

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ECONOMIC LIBERALISATION IN INDIA DURING THE 1990’s

The economic liberalisation in India refers to the changes and reforms, initiated in 1991, of the
country's economic policies, with the goal of making the economy more market- and service-
oriented, and expanding the role of private and foreign investment. Most of these changes were
made as part of the conditions laid out by the World Bank and the IMF as a condition for a $500
million bail out to the Indian government in December 1991.Specific changes include a
reduction in import tariffs, deregulation of markets, reduction of taxes, and greater foreign
investment. Liberalisation has been credited by its proponents for the high economic growth
recorded by the country in the 1990s and 2000s. Its opponents have blamed it for increased
inequality and economic degradation. The overall direction of liberalisation has since remained
the same, irrespective of the ruling party, although no party has yet solved a variety of politically
difficult issues, such as liberalising labour laws and reducing agricultural subsidies. There exists
a lively debate in India as to whether the economic reforms were sustainable and beneficial to the
people of India as a whole. Indian government coalitions have been advised by the IMF and
World Bank to continue liberalisation. 1

The economic liberalization of India had a multitude of impacts, some of which were positive
and others negative for its people. The foreign investment in the country (including foreign direct
investment, portfolio investment, and investment raised on international capital markets])
increased from a minuscule US$132 million in 1991–92 to $5.3 billion in 1995–96. On the other
hand, it also enabled a number of companies like Enron to invest more easily in India, in over
expensive projects. As per the US Senate, the largest share of foreign direct investment in India
since 1992 came from Enron (more than 10%).

Election of AB Vajpayee as Prime Minister of India in 1998 and his agenda was seen as a
welcome change by some. His prescription to speed up economic progress included solution of
all outstanding problems with the West (Cold War related) and then opening gates for FDI
investment.

1
https://www.epw.in/journal/2017/2/25-years-economic-liberalisation/economic-liberalisation-india.html (Last
visited on 5:00 PM, 1st March, 2019)

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GEOGRAPHICAL CONDITIONS OF RUSSIA IN 1990’S

Russia is a country that stretches over a vast expanse of Eastern Europe and northern Asia. Once
the preeminent republic of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.; commonly known
as the Soviet Union), Russia became an independent country after the dissolution of the Soviet
Union in December 1991.2

In 1991, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia joined with several other former
Soviet republics to form a loose coalition, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
Although the demise of Soviet-style communism and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet
Union brought profound political and economic changes, including the beginnings of the
formation of a large middle class, for much of the post-communist era Russians had to endure a
generally weak economy, high inflation, and a complex of social ills that served to lower life
expectancy significantly. Despite such profound problems, Russia showed promise of achieving
its potential as a world power once again.

India and Russia have acquired a new self-confidence arising out of their rapid economic
growth.

As rising economic powers, both India and Russia are playing an increasingly larger role on the
world stage. India-Russia relationship has evolved into an equal partnership. The deep roots of
this relationship go back to the early 20th century when India was under British rule and the
Czars ruled Russia. The Russian Revolution of 1905 inspired Indian freedom fighters. Mahatma
Gandhi was also struck by the similarity in the prevailing conditions in Russia and India. He
developed a close connection with Russia and carried on lengthy correspondence with Leo
Tolstoy. Russia's communist leader V.I. Lenin followed with interest and sympathy the nascent
Indian freedom struggle. Following 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, the Soviet leaders understood
that their revolution stood better chance of success and encouraged India to become free and
independent. Many Indian freedom fighters who were greatly inspired by the Bolshevik
Revolution established personal contacts with the Soviet leaders. It was Pandit Nehru’s thinking,
which laid foundation of the policy of the Indian National Congress towards the Soviet Union.
After visiting Soviet Union in 1927, on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Bolshevik

2
https://www.britannica.com/place/Russia (Last visited on 7:00 PM , 2ND March, 2019 )

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Revolution, Jawaharlal Nehru came back deeply impressed with the Soviet experiment. He was
convinced that poor developing country like India needed to follow not the capitalist path but a
development model that emphasized social justice, equality and human dignity. Nehru was
emphatic that India must develop close and friendly relationship with the Soviet Union. It is
noteworthy that even before India became independent, an official announcement was made on
13 April 1947 on the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and the Soviet Union.

Nehru’s faith in the Soviet Union was immense. The Soviet Union consistently gave India
valuable political, diplomatic and strategic support bilaterally as well as in international forums
on Kashmir and other vital issues affecting India’s national interests. It was Soviet diplomatic
backing and material support and the confidence provided by the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace,
Friendship and Cooperation, which enabled India to successfully undertake the operations in
1971 that led to the creation of Bangladesh. This political understanding was underpinned by a
strong economic and strategic relationship. Beginning in the 1950s, India received from the
Soviet Union generous assistance for its industrialization as well as for development in the areas
of defense, space and atomic energy. Short of capital, foreign exchange and technology, India
appreciated the support that it received low-priced economic credits for infrastructure projects
repayable in rupees; reliable affordable and good quality military supplies, also on credit and
supply of crucial products like oil and oil product, fertilizer, metals etc. mostly via swap deal.
Some of India’s globally competitive public sector companies like BHEL, Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation (ONGC) and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), as well as the steel industry in
India, were set up with Soviet cooperation. The first Indian Institute of Technology set up with
foreign collaboration was the one in Mumbai with the Soviet support. Soviet Union helped India
in many ways to become more self-reliant and was a true partner of India.

Today, both India and Russia have acquired a new self-confidence arising out of their
rapid economic growth, at the time when many developed countries are suffering from
economic recession. As rising economic powers, both India and Russia are playing an
increasingly larger role on the world stage. The two countries share the goal of creating a
multipolar world. India values the political and diplomatic support it continues to get from
Russia on vital issues. India is also happy to note that Russia is recovering economically
and militarily and is reasserting itself on the international sphere. In today’s complicated

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and fast changing geopolitical situation, both countries have wisely diversified their foreign
policy options, yet have been careful not to abandon a mutually beneficial partnership of
trust built up over decades.-reliant and was a true partner of India.

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COLLAPSE OF SOVIET UNION

The impact of the Soviet disintegration on Indo-Russian relations was enormous including every
aspect of bilateral relations. There are many explanations which describe the collapse of the
Soviet Union. The first one is Totalitarian school of thought which is related to western scholars
led by L. Schapiro, M. Fainsod and Z. Brzezinski. This school of thought focuses that the failure
was destined from the beginning of the Bolshevik revolution because the capture of power by the
Bolsheviks in 1917 “was an anti-democratic coup d’etat leading necessarily to a one party rule.
The transition from Lenin to Stalin was a logical one and the Stalin’s Industrialization through
forced collectivization was the corollary to the dogma on state planning, even when growing
weaknesses came to light, every attempt at radical reform, political or economic, from within
came to naught because of the incompatibility with the monopoly power of the party-state”.

Second school of thought which explained the collapse of the Soviet Union views dismal
economic performance of the system was responsible for the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The third explanation given by Bhupinder Brar is based on Gramscian notion of hegemony. This
notion holds that the hegemonic group is always successful in establishing its “moral, cultural
and political values as the values of the whole Universe” and that such values are not imposed on
the universe rather they are “internalized by it”. The Bolshevik values acquired hegemonic
character when the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) acquired absolute position in
USSR and other Communist Parties being under the hegemony of CPSU.3

Fourth explanation which explains the collapse was nationality factor. H.S. Deol is the main
supporter of this explanation, which focus on that economic crisis created problems for
constituent republics and they simply refused to stay together. The failure was economic as well
as federal. USSR has increasingly developed towards centralism and authoritarianism which has
a great impact on nationalities. Right to self-determination was completely ignored and slowly
progressive regionalism distorted the process of russification.

Fifth major explanation highlights that the denial of democracy in the political system as well as
in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, negative aspects of Stalin’s personality at the
expense of positive aspects, were responsible for the collapse of the Soviet Union.

3
Kuldip Singh, Major Explanations of Soviet Collapse and Beyond”, Punjab Journal of Politics, Vol. I, No. 2, 2005

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PHASE OF RUSSIA AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF SOVIET UNION (1991-
93)

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the initial two years (1991-93) were the most difficult
years in bilateral relations. Russian economy was passing through a difficult phase of transition
from a socialist society to a market-oriented economy. In this difficult scenario, it was natural
that Indo-Russian relations were facing difficult situation. After the collapse of the Soviet Union,
Russia became legal successor state, facing several political, economic and domestic problems
(Chechnya) etc. One of the problems of foreign policy development in the new Russia has been
that different institution and groups have, to some extent, been following their own contradictory
policies. This is a clear reflection of lack of central authority. Russia was also facing economic
problems and wanted aid from International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank as well
as from other western countries. Security problems in Central Asia, increasing Chinese
influence, and Western attitudes towards Russia were also matter of concern for Russia. Yeltsin
and his team was specially pro-America.

After the demise of the Soviet Union, there was also debate from a geopolitical point of view
between Atlanticists and Eurasians. Atlanticists like President Yeltsin and his team advocated
marketization, democratization, liberal economic policies and the adoption of Western Cultural
values. On the other hand, Eurasians were against the Atlanticists. Their focus was that Russia
cannot ignore its unique relations with its Islamic and Southern neighbours. They also argued
that Russia has a unique integral civilization different from Europe.6 Russia emerged as the legal
successor state of the former USSR. But there is also controversy over the beginning of its
foreign policy.

Yeltsin, President of Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (RSFSR the official name of the
Russian Federation in the Soviet period) did act and behave as he was head of an independent
sovereign state. His action related to foreign policy like the recognition of three Baltic states, as
separate entities from the USSR. He also made visits to European countries like Germany and
Italy. From aforementioned, it is clear that the real beginning of Russian foreign policy is from
the formal demise of the USSR i.e. 25 December, 1991.4

4
Zafar Imam, Foreign Policy of Russia: 1991-2000, (New Delhi: New Horizon Publishers, 2001)

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During the year of 1993, there was openly growing struggle between executive and legislative
wings. Chechnya problem had paralyzed its functioning. In these circumstances, India was rather
a low priority in overall Russian policy at that time. Like the former Soviet Union, Russia did not
consider the special relationship with India in its politics-strategic point of view because Russia
maintained friendly cooperative relations with both the West and China. Unlike the former
Soviet Union, new Russia was no longer interested in championing the cause of the third world
countries because it has no economic resources to spare for the third world countries. During that
period, India was also facing many problems such as lack of political stability and economic
crisis. The grave economic crisis pushed Narasimha Rao government to liberalize economy,
dismantle strict regulations, remove all barriers. The IMF and World bank, imposed some
conditionalities for opening up economy to foreign investment. Moscow was not willing to act as
the guardian of India’s interests at international level and was also not able to provide soft
currency for military equipment. Economic and military hard realities of economy and security
forced India toward the West, the US, Germany, Italy, Japan, Israel and even Taiwan. Indian
diplomats were talking more about the need to integrate Indian economy with the world
economy. India has no option but to nurture close links with the West.5

Under Yeltsin’s period, Russia had its own problems, above all economic weakness, criminality,
corruption and political divisions etc. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, new Russia lacked
wherewithal for operating beyond its borderlands in Asia. President Yeltsin and his
administration also quickly made a conscious turn-away from the third world. With the collapse
of the Soviet Union, the Communist Party lost power and Democratic opposition seized the
power and launched radical market reforms. Government overtly adopted pro-Western foreign
policy and accepted the role of a junior partner to the “civilized world” (Civilized World means
West, NATO, the Euro-Atlantic Axis etc.) .The initial years after the Soviet disintegration was
for us a period of disappointment and frustration. The Foreign Minister A. Kozyrov believed that
there was no need to preserve the special relations with India as were in the Soviet era. From
economic point of view, Yeltsin period was described as decade of lost. For economy, most
valuable resources has been transferred to private hand during this period. On the eve of 1992,

5
https://mainstreamweekly.net/article3704.html/ (last visited on 5th February 2019 , 8:00 pm )

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Russia’s economy was in a bad situation. Decline in production, fall in investment, growing
deficits, massive borrowings, budget and trade deficit, or had led to an economic crisis.

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IRRITANTS IN INDO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS DURING YELTSIN ERA

There were many irritants during Yeltsin era which proved obstacles in close cooperation
between the both time-tested friends. These irritants included like cryogenic engine issue,
Kashmir issue, Rupee-Rouble issue etc. The cryogenic deal was signed by the Soviet Space
Agency Glavkosmos and the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) in 1991 worth 2.35
billion rupees. According to this deal, Soviet Union was to provide Soviet Cryogenic space
technology to India and also training of Indian specialists. Russia became legal successor of the
Soviet Union and declared that it would abide by all the treaties and agreements signed by its
predecessor. But the US objected to the agreement on the ground that it was violation of Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The US objection was based on the argument that the
cryogenic engines were of dual use which could also be used for developing ballistic missiles.
On the other hand, one reason behind this was US commercial interests. The US did not want
India and Russia to become a competitor in the world market and space field technologies.
Cryogenic Deal showed that Russia could not follow an independent foreign policy in the initial
years.6

Irregular supply of spare parts for Soviet weapons was another irritant factor which further
deteriorated Indo-Russian relations. For the smooth supply of Russian weapons and spare parts,
Sharad Pawar, India’s Defence Minister, visited Moscow on 6 September 1992, sensing the
possibility of obtaining an improved version of the Mig26 fighter. He also discussed the further
deliveries of spare parts to India. In the context of deliveries of spare parts, Gorbachev admitted
that the transitional period after the collapse of the Soviet Union had slowed down the
development of Russia’s relations with India.

For Procurement of spare parts, India also diversified its strategic-military relations. Sharad
Pawar also visited other countries such as Ukraine in 1992 for defence-cooperation. Ukraine
agreed to supply armaments and spare parts to India in return of medicines and cloth and a
partial payment in hard currency. The issues of Kashmir and NPT also contributed in worsening
the bilateral relations during the initial years of 1991-92. Russia did not have any clear-cut policy
towards Kashmir. Initial foreign policy of Russia was pro-west, therefore, it was not surprising to
see changes in the Kashmir policy on unexpected lines. During the visit of Russian Vice
6
S.P. Singh, “Indo-Russian Cryogenic Deal in US Strategic Radar”, in P.L. Dash and Andrci M. Nazarkin (ed.)

16 | P a g e
President Alexander Rutskai to Pakistan in December 1991 he took very different stand on
Kashmir by saying that the right of self-determination of the people of Kashmir should be
decided under the United Nations auspices and in accordance with its resolutions. This was a
clear negation of the Indian stand on the Kashmir issue. It was also against the provisions of the
Shimla Agreement signed and the Kashmir issue bilaterally without any third party medication.
Over the Russian stand on Kashmir, Kesava Menon wrote “it is now possible that Russia which
takes the Soviet Union’s seal on the United Nations Security Council will not exercise veto in
favour of India”. On the nuclear non-proliferation issue, Moscow was now not showing any
special relations from Indian point of view. Russia now was compelling India for signing the
NPT under the international pressure particularly USA.7

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were two stages in Indo-Russian relations (i) 1991-
93, (ii) 1993-2000.23 First phase of the Russian foreign policy toward India was not identical
with that of the erstwhile Soviet Union. During the first stage there was turbulence in every
aspect of Russian society, polity, economy and culture. The leadership gave up the special
approach towards its old allies including India. In the post-confrontation and post-communist
world, the focus was on democracy, market reforms and pluralism. Russian leadership
considered that western aid was essential. But overall this phase proved costly for the Russia.
Unilateral activities by USA, Gulf crisis, Yugoslavia bomb-bardment and Cryogenic rocket etc.
were proof of Russia’s weakness. The year 1993 was a lean period in Russian foreign policy for
a number of reasons: first there was struggle between President Yeltsin and legislature and result
of this struggle was the implementation of new Constitution which provided supremacy of the
Russian President over other institutions of Russian political system. Second, Russia was worried
about NATO expansion towards East Europe. And finally there was decline in Russian arms
export under the US pressure. US withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system under
the pretext of an Iranian threat. It’s plan to establish National Missile Defence System in Poland
and the Czech Republic snubbing Russia’s well-founded concerns. Unilateral actions in the
context of Iraq, Sudan etc. and most recent example of unilateral action performed by the

7
Kesava Menon, “Pak’s ties with Russia on the Upswing”, The Hindu, December 23, 1991

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Kosovo separation from Serbia and intervention in Georgia. But during that period there was
also indication that reassessment process of Russian foreign policy had started.8

8
India and Russia Towards Strategic Partnership, (New Delhi: Lancer’s Books, 2001)

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THE YELTSIN VISIT: JANUARY 1993

The time from 1993 to 2000 can be called the second phase in Indo-Russian relations in the post-
cold war scenario which was to revive the old friendship. President Yeltsin postponed his visit to
India twice. It was a sign of Russian reluctance to further develop relations with India. During
his visit to India, President Yeltsin replaced the 1971 treaty with the new treaty of friendship and
cooperation, which excluded the security clauses, which in the cold war era were against the
United States and China.9

During his visit, two countries signed agreements and announced a renewed focus on bilateral
economic cooperation. Yeltsin made it clear that Russia would deliver cryogenic engines and
space technology for India’s space programme under US $ 350 million deal between the ISRO
and Glavkosmos inspite of the imposition of sanctions on both organizations by the US. Before
this decision, Moscow earlier scrapped the deal under US pressure. He also expressed strong
support for India’s stand on Jammu and Kashmir issue. He also assured continued supply of
Russian arms and spare parts to fulfill India’s military requirements. Big issue during Yeltsin’s
visit to India was Rupee-Rouble debt agreement. India has nearly ten billion rouble debt to
former Soviet Union which Russia wanted to be settled in profitable manner because his country
was facing serious economic crisis. During Yeltsin visit, the agreement was concluded that 63
per cent of debt would be paid in the next twelve years at the rate of rupees 1990 to a rouble with
2.4 per cent interest and the remaining 37% was to be paid over 45 years with no interest at the
rate of 31.57 rupees to a rouble. Rupee-rouble agreement was only applied to the servicing of
Indi’s debt to former Soviet Union. Future trade between the two countries was to be governed
by hard currency.

9
https://www.nytimes.com/1993/01/30/world/despite-us-yeltsin-backs-rocket-deal-with-india.html/ ( last visited
on 6 February 2019 , 9:00 AM)

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 THE RAO VISIT: 29 JUNE-2 JULY 1994

Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao’s visit to Moscow from 29 June to 2 July 1994 further
strengthened the bilateral relations. Rao and Yeltsin signed two declarations on 30 June 1994.
The first was the Moscow Declaration which was related to protecting the interests of pluralistic
states and second was related to further development and deepening of cooperation. Moscow
Declaration highlighted the facts that both the countries were facing challenges of terrorism,
India in Kashmir and Russia in Chechanya. Increasing Islamic Fundamentalism in Central Asian
region was a matter of great concern for both countries.

CHERNOMYRDIN VISIT: 22-24 DECEMBER 1994

During Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin’s visit to India from 22 to 24 December 1994, eight
agreements were signed. Russian Prime Minister allayed the Indian fears regarding Moscow’s
arms supply to Pakistan. He made it clear that their relations with Pakistan are fully transparent
and open. He said that they are not supplying any weapons to Pakistan today and they had no
intention of doing that in the future. In the context of Chechnya war, he said that it had domino
effect. Facing the problems in Chechanya, Russia was able to realize the problems that India was
facing in Kashmir. In return of the chernomyrdin visit in 1994, Indian Minister of External
affairs, Pranab Mukherjee visited Moscow from 3 to 5 August 1995 which further strengthened
the bilateral relaties. 10

YEVGENY PRIMAKOV’S VISITS 1996, 1998

During Andrei Kozyrev as Russian Minister of External Affairs, Russia tilted toward west. But
After Kozyrev, Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov became the Minister of External Affairs on 9
January 1996. While Kozyrev was known for his pro-western orientation, Primakov was
interested in maintaining good relations with the old allies. He followed a new course in Russian
foreign policy under the “New Course” designed to correct the Western tilt. In India, despite the
friendly relations with USA and Europe, Russian relations remained important in South Bloc and
among the strategic field. In April 1996 Foreign Minister Primakov described the four priorities
of Russia’s foreign policy:

10
https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/visits/russia/ (last visited on 10 February 2019, 3:00 PM)

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a) Creation of suitable external conditions for Russia’s territorial integrity.

b) Pursuing stability at international level as well as regional level.

c) Cultivate inter-state relations and check on nuclear proliferation.

Primakov had also mentioned the US, the European countries, the EU, China, India, Japan, the
Middle East, Canada, Asia Pacific countries as important areas where Moscow should expand its
relations.

In fact, Primakov was first Russian Foreign Minister to visit India since Gromyko’s visit some
sixteen years ago in 1980. During the Primakov’s visit, issues of convergence between India and
Russia were discussed. Both countries were worried about increasing influence of Islamic
Fundamentalism in the region of Central and SouthWest Asia. Primakov expressed the view that
the territorial integrity of both countries are of primary interest. During the visit Primakov said
that India is a global power and priority partner of Russia. Issues regarding NPT and CTBT were
not discussed because they could ruin the growing relationship. Primakov’s visit to New Delhi in
December 1998 proved highly successful in the bilateral relations. He also floated the idea about
strategic triangle including India, Russia and China for peace and stability in the world and also
as a counter to unipolarism. But Primakov’s proposal was not received with great enthusiasm in
Beijing or in New Delhi due to long-standing differences between India and China.

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INDIA’S NUCLEAR TEST (1998) AND INDO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

At the Pokhran event on 11 May 1998, Russia consistently refused to impose sanctions against
India for her breach of nuclear ethics. Although Boris Yeltsin expressed his displeasure
concerning the Indian action, but his criticism was mute. When India conducted three nuclear
tests on 11 May 1998, same day the Foreign Ministry issued a statement, “the three nuclear tests
carried out in India has pushed the world towards the proliferation of nuclear weapons and
created additional difficulties for further reduction of nuclear weapons. Mixed reaction came
from Russia towards India’s nuclear test. The Chairman of the State Duma Gannadey Seleznev
offered his support to India. He said that India acted correctly. Communist Party leader Gennedy
Zyuganov also expressed his happiness over the nuclear test. The nuclear test by India did not
put an end to close and warmth relations between India and Russia. Indian nuclear tests were the
first major proof of the imperfection model of the world order which was dominated by the USA.

The US adopted a different attitude toward the nuclear missiles of its allies, Israel and Pakistan.
After the Indian nuclear tests, Pakistan and China came close to each other and strains between
India and China appeared. In response to Indian nuclear tests, Pakistan conducted nuclear tests
on 28 May 1998 and at the same time, Primakov opposed sanctions and embargo against
Pakistan as in the case of India. He said that the new nuclear powers should not be excluded
from international dialogues. The use of carrot and stick policy by US to dissuade Pakistan from
doing so was a sign of a decreasing American influence in the geo-politically important country
of South Asia. The increasing influence of China on the other hand was also a matter of concern
for the US.

In the context of nuclear tests, the Russia diplomats made it clear that Russia’s policy toward
India would remain same as was before the tests. So the Indo-Russia relations during Yeltsin era
can be divided into two phases. The initial two years were difficult in shaping the bilateral
relations while the later years showed gradual evolution of relations in a steady manner. The
Russian foreign policy in the first phase was totally guided by enlightened pragmatism”. But
Yevgeny Primakov former Russian Foreign Minister and later Prime Minister, described it as
neither enlightened nor pragmatic. The Russian Honeymoon with West particularly USA proved
very costly. As a result, the short-lived first phase had to enter into the second phase. In this
phase, Russia started considering itself a 'Eurasian Country‟ because more of its part lies in Asia

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than in Europe. Indo-Russian relations revived in the second phase. The two countries revived
their relations in the context of changing world order.

The Yeltsin visit to India in 1993 was considered first step in that direction. The initial two years
period was nadir in Indo-Russian relation. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was
transition phase in Russia from the socialist pattern of society to market economy. 11

Turbulence in every aspect of Russian society, polity, economy and culture witnessed .The
leadership gave up the traditional approach towards its old allies including India. In this post-
confrontation post-communist world, the focus was on democracy, market reforms and pluralism
for which the leaders thought that the Western aid was necessary. The Russian response towards
Gulf crisis, Yugolsavian crisis and Cryogenic rocket are proof of Russia’s weakness. The Yeltsin
visit in 1993 provided a new direction to Indo-Russian relations. The overall Russian perception
and attitude during Yeltsin period remained friendly. Barring the initial two years 1991-92,
Russia distanced itself from its old stand regarding Kashmir issue. During Yeltsin visit many
agreements were concluded and Indo-Russian relations came to an old track. During the
Primakov rule, Indo-Russian relations reached a new height. Now Russia supported the Indian
stand on Kashmir and India supported the Russian stand on Chechanya. Also issues like
multipolarism, economic reforms and democracy brought both the countries together.

11
India and Russia Strategic Partnership, (New Delhi: Lancer’s Book, 2001)

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IRIGC

The Indo-Russian Inter-Governmental Commission (IRIGC) is the main body that conducts
affairs at the governmental level between both countries. Some have described it as the steering
committee of Indo-Russia relations. It is divided into two parts, the first covering Trade,
Economic, Scientific, Technological and Cultural Co-operation. This is normally co-chaired by
the Russian Deputy Prime Minister and the Indian External Affairs Minister. The second part of
the commission covers Military Technical Co-operation this is co-chaired by the two countries
respective Defence Ministers. Both parts of IRIGC meet annually.

In addition, to the IRIGC there are other bodies that conduct economic relations between the two
countries. These include, the Indo-Russian Forum on Trade and Investment, the India-Russia
Business Council, the India-Russia Trade, Investment and Technology Promotion Council and
the India-Russia Chamber of Commerce.

An article penned by Vladimir Putin was published in The Times of India on 30 May 2017, a day
before Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to Russia, to mark the 70th anniversary of the
establishment of relations between India and the Russia on 13 April 1947.

FREE TRADE AGREEMENT

Both governments have long viewed their bilateral trade well below its optimal potential, with
the only long term way of rectifying this through having a Free trade agreement (FTA). Both
governments have set up a joint study group (JSG) to negotiate the specifications of an
agreement, a final agreement would be signed between India and Eurasian Economic Union of
which Russia is a part of (also including Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan & Belarus). Thereby,
the Indo-Russian FTA would result in a much bigger free trade agreement including India,
Russia, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan & Belarus. It is predicted once an FTA is in place
bilateral trade will increase manifold, thereby significantly increasing the importance of
economics in bilateral ties.

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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

.After its emergence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation changed its
national emblem. The hammer and sickle was replaced by the imperial twin-headed eagle by a
leadership which had destroyed the edifice of the empire with that of the socialist state. In
strategic terms, the eagle looks to both the West and the East. In economic, political, even
civilizational terms, however, both the heads of the eagle are directed predominantly to the West .
While proud of its own unique identity, the yearning for moorings in a common European home
was evident not just during Czarist rule but also during the Soviet period. This continues. It was
reflected in Medvedev's reference to “Russia, the European Union and North America” being the
“three branches of European civilization”. Russia has strengthened its strategic ties with India
and China. It is asserting its Eurasian identity and role in central, east and south-east Asia. At the
same time it has responded in a proactive and calibrated manner to overtures from the West. It
has made proposals at the Russia-NATO Joint Council summit in Lisbon in November, 2010,
especially on cooperation in ballistic missiles defense. If successful, such a project could
fundamentally change European and global power equations. It is premature to predict the
outcome. Russia has, under the Putin-Medvedev leadership, raised the global profile of Russia
and increased Moscow's options and leverage in a number of areas. Russia's principal challenges
are to arrest its demographic decline, significantly lower its overwhelming dependence on oil,
gas and mineral resources, modernize its manufacturing sector and upgrade its infrastructure.
Russia's greatest resource is its incredibly talented and creative people. As a top Indian corporate
leader put it Russia's “gene pool of innovation” is its major asset. This will be the key to Russia's
resurrection as a great power of the 21 century. Indo-Russian relations will remain firmly
anchored in the convergence of the strategic interests of the two countries. This was the essence
of our ties with the former Soviet Union. It remains so with Russia. There were problems of
perception and differences on major issues. These were overcome. The Soviet support to India
during Bangladesh crisis was not spontaneous or unconditional. There were large-scale Soviet
supplies of offensive weapon systems to Pakistan, during negotiations leading to and even
shortly after the conclusion of the Indo-Soviet treaty of 1991. There were persistent moves by
Moscow to revive arms supplies to Pakistan and to revive leverage with Pakistan in the 1980s
and, in a much more concerted manner, throughout my stay in Russia in 1990s. There were high-
level discussions between the Russian and Pakistani defence establishments. We were aware of
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all these contacts. I was not interested in analyzing or even reporting most of these
developments. My brief was to ensure that no Russian arms supplies were made to Pakistan. This
was ensured. At that time, they had invoked French arms supplies to both Pakistan and India. It
is possible that now some isolated and equally naïve Russian groups may invoke US arms sales
to both Pakistan and India. Ultimately good sense prevailed in the '90s. The futility of such
thinking should be even more evident given our stronger strategic ties with Russia today. In the
past India had not supported Soviet proposals for Asian collective security perceived to be aimed
at China. Later the Russian leadership, primarily urged by Yevgeny Primakov, took the initiative
to establish a strategic partnership with China, and later with India. In 1996, when I was about to
leave Moscow for taking up my officially announced assignment as ambassador to China (which
did not materialize), most top Russian dignitaries I met urged me to support a trilateral Russia,
India, China (RIC) dialogue mechanism. This dialogue mechanism was launched some years
later. Russia also took the lead in proposing close coordination in the quadrilateral Brazil,
Russia, India, China (BRIC) framework since the first G-20 summit convened by George W.
Bush in 2008. Russia has also supported our full membership of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO). It has reiterated its support to India becoming a UN Security Council
permanent member. Russia has overcome its hesitation in naming Pakistan as the major source
and safe haven of terrorism, and reaffirmed the position which was taken by Putin earlier in this
regard. There are a number of other manifestations of the shared concerns and inter-locking
national interests of India and Russia. These will contribute to the stability of our strategic
partnership on the basis of which we can build our relationship. All this augurs well for the
future of Indo-Russian relations. We will, however, have to do much more in broad-basing and
strengthening our cooperation in different areas. Russia will, for instance, remain a highly valued
and preferred partner in defence cooperation. Yet it cannot expect to be an exclusive partner or
an automatic partner of first choice. Both sides will have to work increasingly on the basis of
international best practices and of competitive bidding for defense systems and of lifetime
product support for ensuring high serviceability. Both sides will have to honour all contractual
commitments and accept penalty clauses for cost and time over runs. It will be difficult to sustain
any relationship on the sole basis of core geo-political or security issues. We will have to give
greater economic ballast to the relationship. Inter-governmental arrangements are no substitute
for business to business ties. These in turn will require two way flows of trade and investments.

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We need greater commercial linkages to joint research and development projects, or commercial
applications of already developed innovative technologies.

India has a vital interest in a strong, secure and prosperous Russia. It is clear that this interest is
reciprocated in Russia with respect to India. The steady strengthening of Indo-Russian relations
will benefit not just our two countries but have a wider positive and stabilizing impact in the
world.

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BIBILOGRAPHY

BOOKS

 Zafar Imam, Foreign Policy of Russia: 1991-2000, (New Delhi: New Horizon Publishers,
2001)
 S.P. Singh, “Indo-Russian Cryogenic Deal in US Strategic Radar”, in P.L. Dash and
Andrci M. Nazarkin (ed.)
 India and Russia Towards Strategic Partnership, (New Delhi: Lancer’s Books, 2001)

ARTICLES

 Kuldip Singh, Major Explanations of Soviet Collapse and Beyond”, Punjab Journal of
Politics, Vol. I, No. 2, 2005

 Kesava Menon, “Pak’s ties with Russia on the Upswing”, The Hindu, December 23, 1991

WEB SOURCES

 https://mainstreamweekly.net/article3704.html/
 https://www.nytimes.com/1993/01/30/world/despite-us-yeltsin-backs-rocket-deal-
with-india.html/
 https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/visits/russia/
 https://www.epw.in/journal/2017/2/25-years-economic-liberalisation/economic-
liberalisation-india.html
 https://www.britannica.com/place/Russia

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