The Ergon Inference ALFONSO GOMEZ-LOBO Aristotle's inference of the definition of eudaimonia in the N.E. has been ‘commonly understood in a way which commits him to some form of fallacious naturalism or inference from fact to value. This view of the ergon inference is prompted to some extend by the fact that commentators rarely make an effort to identify the premises of the argument and also by the fact that. as I shall try to show, some key terms ‘employed therein have been misunderstood. The purpose of the present paper is to show by means of a detailed analysis of Aristoti’s text that the most commonly held view of the argument cannot be right and that he does not infer the notion of the human good from facts about human nature.” 1 ld like to start by presenting the general framework of the view I shall icize and then add some examples of the more precise form it has adopted recently. Among Aristotelians it has been rather common to understand the Nicomachean Ethics 2s bolding that the humsn good or human flourishing is simply “the realization of man’s nature"? This general contention is taken to receive support from the well-known passage in which, according to W.F.R. Hardie, | Earlier versions ofthis paper were presented st XI ieramerican Congres of Philos opty, Condaajare, Merc, in Nov. 1985, atthe Dayton Arnie Clloguiam in Nov. 198? and at a recting of the Society for Ancient Greck Philosophy in Apa 1583 am iruefulto Deborah Achtenber, Tom Tao andtothe editor of Plroneis for helpful etic. Pt. eg. A. Grant, The Ethics of Aristode strated with esays and ete, 185, (reprint New York, 1973), Vo. 1p. 419. 170 Phronesis 1989. Vol. XXXIVi2 (Accepted September 1988)«starting from the conceptions of powers which are specie or peculiar to men _smembersf the lass of living beings, Aristotle arives aa tematve definition of the hurnas good (1097333-1098420).”" Although the expressions “starting from” and “arriving at” are somewhat vague, there is a suggestion here that a step is taken from an examination of specifically human powers to the ethical notion of the human good, But, how exactly does that step proceed? What role does the notion of ‘ergon or characteristcally human activity play in the determination of the ‘human good? Let us observe two implicit replies to these questions. In the collection of Exsays on Aristotle's Ethics edited by A.O. Roy K. ‘Wilkes holds that “A study of man's gon, then, can ellos what itis to bea good man, once we have iscovered just what activities are indeed characteristic of mankind."* Since “what itis 10 be a good man” stands for an evaluative question, indeed the question which is answered by giving a definition of the human ‘ood of happiness, the quotation suggests the idea of a direct inference from the ergon of man to a basic ethical notion. In the same collection of articles ‘T. Nagel goes even further when he holds that “Toe proper ergon of man, by whch human excellence is measured, is that which (ay emphasis, ot Noget's) ‘Lam not sure ¥ am being uncharitable inthe interpretation ofthis quotation, but it does suggest to me that the engon of man is expected fo provide something like a measuring fod to determine the value of actions and/or persons. Ifthese accord with the ergon, then they are good; if they accord perfectly, then they are excellent. It would not be difficult to rephrase this kind of relation between a measuring rod or standard and what is thereby measured in terms of premises and conclusion. The only doubt in my mind is whether the premise involving the ergon or characteristic activity of man is conceived by Nagel as descriptive or as evaluative Regardless of this last doubt, what scems to emerge from these examples (and more quotations along these lines could be easily produced) is a attern of interpretation of the ergon argument which could be set out scnematically as follows: W.E.R. Hardie, Ariuoe's Eshcal Theory, Second Eaton, Oxford, 1980, p. 362, KV. Wilkes, “The good man and the good for wan in Aristotle's ethics" i A.O. Rory (ed), Essays on Arisou's Eihes, Berkeley, 1980, p. 38. *°T. Nagel, “Aristotle on eudaimonia in Rony, Essays, p. 8. im(Premise 1) “Human beings have a characteristic activity E”, therefore, (Conctusion) “The good for human beings isto exercise the characteristic activity E." ‘A more refined version of the pattem may well include a further premise ‘hich is both universal and evaluative and thus allows for a valid inference: (Premise 2) “The good of any being (or perhaps any natural or living. ‘substance) consists in its exercising its characteristic activity or ergon.” T would now like to argue that the aforementioned way of presenting the ‘argument is most probably wrong. I shall try to show that Aristotle does not arrive at a definition of happiness starting exchusively from the powers specific to man, that a study of man’s ergan by itself cannot tell us what it is to be a good man, that the proper ergon of man is not that by which human ‘excellence is measured and that the good for humans does not consist in the ‘unqualified exercite of the ergon. In order to make these somewhat sweeping denials plausible, I shall analyse the long conditional sentence in the text which contains the inferen- ce. But before doing so, a few words must be said about the context in which it appears. ‘Aristotle has argued that a correct definition of eudaimonia must specify something which is both final, i.e. always chosen for its own sake but never for the sake of something else, and self-sufficient, i.e. such that it includes all basic goods.” He then proceeds to argue that a correct definition can be found if we first ascertain the function or ergon of man. The justification for this strategy is given by means of a general principle which runs as follows: (Principle 1) “For all things that have a function [Eeyov 1} of activity [xea8is], the good [xdya8év} and the ‘well’ [xd <8] is thought fo reside in the function."* * Cl. tor example, the able of contents fr the N-E. in H.G, Apostle and L.P. Gerson, Aristo Selected works, Grinll, 986, p. 435, where we read: "Man's good is men's function.” 'N.E. 17.1087 425-108721. Reterences ae to Bywater's edition of the Greek text of the N.E. (Oxford, 1844, repiat 1957). "NE. 1097626:27. Unies otherwie note, I shall be quoting from the Revised Oxford m