PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS vs Torres Case Digest

FACTS: DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16 Series of 1991 temporarily
suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of “Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong
Kong”. As a result of the department order DOLE, through the POEA took over the business of deploying
Hong Kong bound workers.

The petitioner, PASEI, the largest organization of private employment and recruitment agencies duly
licensed and authorized by the POEA to engage in the business of obtaining overseas employment for
Filipino land-based workers filed a petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned order and to
prohibit implementation.

ISSUES:

1. whether or not respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-
making authority in issuing said circulars;
2. whether or not the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are
unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and
3. whether or not the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National
Administrative Register were not complied with.

HELD: FIRST, the respondents acted well within in their authority and did not commit grave abuse of
discretion. This is because Article 36 (LC) clearly grants the Labor Secretary to restrict and regulate
recruitment and placement activities, to wit:

Art. 36. Regulatory Power. — The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and regulate the
recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of
Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules
and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this title.

SECOND, the vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is

constitutional. It is necessitated by the growing complexities of the modern society.

THIRD, the orders and circulars issued are however, invalid and unenforceable. The reason is the lack of
proper publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Registrar as required in Article 2
of the Civil Code to wit:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided;

Article 5 of the Labor Code to wit:

Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. — The Department of Labor and other government agencies charged with
the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary
implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days
after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general circulation;

and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide:
Sec. 3. Filing. — (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center, three (3)
certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which
are not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party
or persons. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.)

Sec. 4. Effectivity. — In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent
with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above
provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to
public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement
accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to
persons who may be affected by them. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987).

Prohibition granted.

Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs Court of Appeals and Davao Pilots Association

FACTS:
Private respondent Davao Pilots Association filed a complaint against petitioner Eastern Shipping
Lines,Inc. for sum of money, alleging that petitioner has unpaid fees for pilotage services rendered by
respondent. Petitioner disputed the claims of respondent by assailing the constitutionality of Executive
Order 1088,from which respondent based its claims. It maintains that rates of pilotage fees should be
based on circulars issued by the Philippine Ports Authority since it has been given the power to set the rates by virtue of
PD 857.The lower court ruled in favor of respondent and this decision was affirmed in toto by the Court
of Appeals. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether EO 1088 is unconstitutional.

RULING:

EO 1088 is valid.The Court adopts its pronouncement in Philippine Interisland Shipping Association of the Philippines vs.
Court of Appeals:
“…E.O. NO. 1088 provides for adjusted pilotage service rates without withdrawing the power of the PPA
to impose, prescribe, increase or decrease rates, charges or fees. The reason is because EO 1088 is
not meant simply to fix new pilotage rates. Its legislative purpose is the "rationalization of pilotage
service charges, through the imposition of uniform and adjusted rates for foreign and coastwise vessels
in all Philippine ports. xxx xxx xxx We conclude that E.O. No. 1088 is a valid statute and that the PPA is duty bound to
comply with its provisions. The PPA may increase the rates but it may not decrease them below those
mandated by EO
1088…”

Because the PPA circulars are inconsistent with EO 1088, they are void and ineffective. "Administrative
or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution." An administrative agency, like PPA, has no discretion whether to implement the law or not. Its duty is to
enforce it. Thus, if there is any conflict between the PPA circular and a law, such as EO 1088, the latter
prevails. Petition is denied and the decision of the CA is affirmed.

BLAS F. OPLE vs. RUBEN D. TORRES, et.al.

FACTS:

A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on December 12, 1996 for the Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System. It was published in four newspapers of general
circulation on January. Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, on the grounds that:

1. it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate,

2. it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s protected zone of privacy.

ISSUE:

Whether there is a violation of the Right to Privacy as enshrined in the Bill of Rights.

HELD:

The essence of privacy is the “right to be left alone.” The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.

The Court prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two
considerations:

1. the need to provides our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business
with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and ;
2. the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by
persons seeking basic services.

It is debatable whether the interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of the said order.
The broadness, vagueness, and overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people’s
right to privacy in clear and present danger. In the case at bar, the threat comes from which by issuing
A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on
the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services.

Petition is granted. A.O. No. 308 is unconstitutional.

Manila Jockey Club vs. CA – Full Case

Cruz vs. Younberg – Full Case

Romulo Mabanta vs. HDMF

Facts:

Petitioner Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc and De Los Angeles (hereafter PETITIONER),
a law firm, was exempted for the period 1 January to 31 December 1995, from the Pag-IBIG Fund
coverage by respondent HDMF because of a superior retirement plan.
The HDMF Board of Trustees, pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7742, issued Board Resolution
No. 1011, Series of 1995, amending and modifying the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No.
7742. As amended, Section 1 of Rule VII provides that for a company to be entitled to a waiver or
suspension of Fund coverage, 3 it must have a plan providing for both provident/retirement and housing
benefits superior to those provided under the Pag-IBIG Fund.

PETITIONER submitted to the HDMF a letter explaining that the Amendments to the Rules are
invalid. In that the amendments are void insofar as they abolished the exemption granted by Section 19
of P.D. 1752, as amended. The repeal of such exemption involves the exercise of legislative power,
which cannot be delegated to HMDF.
HDMF disapproved PETITIONER’s application on the ground that the requirement that there should be
both a provident retirement fund and a housing plan is clear in the use of the phrase “and/or,” and that
the Rules Implementing R.A. No. 7742 did not amend nor repeal Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752 but merely
implement the law. The respondent Board was merely exercising its rule-making power under Section
13 of P.D. No. 1752. It had the option to use “and” only instead of “or” in the rules on waiver in order to
effectively implement the Pag-IBIG Fund Law. By choosing “and,” the Board has clarified the confusion
brought about by the use of “and/or” in Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752, as amended.
PETITIONER filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals but was dismissed.

Issue:

Whether or not the board of HDMF exceeded its delegated power.

Held:

YES. The controversy lies in the legal signification of the words “and/or.”

It seems to us clear from the language of the enabling law that Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752 intended that
an employer with a provident plan or an employee housing plan superior to that of the fund may obtain
exemption from coverage. If the law had intended that the employee [sic] should have both a superior
provident plan and a housing plan in order to qualify for exemption, it would have used the words “and”
instead of “and/or.”
Notably, paragraph (a) of Section 19 requires for annual certification of waiver or suspension, that the
features of the plan or plans are superior to the fund or continue to be so. The law obviously
contemplates that the existence of either plan is considered as sufficient basis for the grant of an
exemption; needless to state, the concurrence of both plans is more than sufficient. To require the
existence of both plans would radically impose a more stringent condition for waiver which was not
clearly envisioned by the basic law. By removing the disjunctive word “or” in the implementing rules the
respondent Board has exceeded its authority.
It is without doubt that the HDMF Board has rule-making power as provided in Section 51 17 of R.A. No.
7742 and Section 13 18 of P.D. No. 1752. However, it is well-settled that rules and regulations, which are
the product of a delegated power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of
law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the
administrative agency. 19 It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of
the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.

In the present case, when the Board of Trustees of the HDMF required in Section 1, Rule VII of the 1995
Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742 that employers should have
both provident/retirement and housing benefits for all its employees in order to qualify for exemption
from the Fund, it effectively amended Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. And when the Board subsequently
abolished that exemption through the 1996 Amendments, it repealed Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. Such
amendment and subsequent repeal of Section 19 are both invalid, as they are not within the delegated
power of the Board. The HDMF cannot, in the exercise of its rule-making power, issue a regulation not
consistent with the law it seeks to apply. Indeed, administrative issuances must not override, supplant
or modify the law, but must remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out. Only Congress can
repeal or amend the law.

Association of the Philippines Coconut Desiccators vs. PCA

Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators vs. PHILCOA, G.R. No. 110526, February 10, 1998
DOCTRINE: (FREE ENTERPRISE) Art 12, Sec 6 and 9, it is very clear that the government reserves the
power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare and when the public interest so
requires.

FACTS:
PCA was created by PD 232 as an independent public corporation to promote the rapid integrated
development and growth of the coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects and to ensure that
coconut farmers become direct participants in, and beneficiaries of, such development and growth
through a regulatory scheme set up by law. PCA is also in charge of the issuing of licenses to would-be
coconut plant operators. On 24 March 1993, however, PCA issued Board Resolution No. 018-93 which
no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply for licenses as a condition for
engaging in such business. The purpose of which is to promote free enterprise unhampered by
protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes. But this caused cut-throat competition
among operators specifically in congested areas, underselling, smuggling, and the decline of coconut-
based commodities. The APCD then filed a petition for mandamus to compel PCA to revoke BR No. 018-
93.

ISSUE: Whether or not PCA ran in conflict against the very nature of its creation.

HELD: Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document, have repudiated laissez-faire as an
economic principle. Although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it
nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the
general welfare. As such, free enterprise does not call for the removal of "protective regulations" for the
benefit of the general public. This is so because under Art 12, Sec 6 and 9, it is very clear that the
government reserves the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare and
when the public interest so requires.
Lupangco vs. CA

Facts:
On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued
Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees," to all those applying for
admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy:

No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive
any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or
the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar
institutions during the three days immediately proceeding every examination day including examination
day.

Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of
the Rules and Regulations of the Commission.

On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in
accountancy schedule on October 25 and November 2 of the same year, filed on their own behalf of all
others similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for injunction
with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain
the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional.

Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower court had
no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. In an Order of October 21,
1987, the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent
commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be
unconstitutional. Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, an appeal with the
Court of Appeals. The petition was granted.

Issue:
Whether or not Resolution No. 105 is constitutional.

Held:
CA stated as basis its conclusion that PCS and RTC are co-equal branches. They relied heavily on the case
of National Electrification Administration vs. Mendoza where the Court held that a Court of First
Instance cannot interfere with the orders of SEC, the two being a co-equal branch.

SC said the cases cited by CA are not in point. It is glaringly apparent that the reason why the Court ruled
that the Court of First Instance could not interfere with the orders of SEC was that this was provided for
by the law. Nowhere in the said cases was it held that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over
all other government agencies. On the contrary, the ruling was specifically limited to the SEC. The
respondent court erred when it place he SEC and PRC in the same category. There is no law providing for
the next course of action for a party who wants to question a ruling or order of the PRC. What is clear
from PD No. 223 is that PRC is attached to the Office of the President for general direction and
coordination. Well settled in our jurisprudence the view that even acts of the Office of the President
may be reviewed by the RTC. In view of the foregoing, SC rules that RTC has jurisdiction to entertain the
case and enjoin PRC from enforcing its resolution.
As to the validity of Resolution No. 105, although the resolution has a commendable purpose which is to
preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations, the resolution is unreasonable in that an
examinee cannot even attend and review class, briefing, conference or the like or receive hand-out,
review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center. The
unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even
without ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations.

Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees’ right to
liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they
should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations specially if the steps they take are lawful.

Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of the schools
concerned. PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and centers believe
would best enable their enrollees to pass the examination. Unless the means and methods of instruction
are clearly found to be inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools and centers
may not be stopped from helping out their students.

The enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure
examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. What is needed to be done by the respondent is
to find out the source of such leakages and stop it right there.

The decision of the CA was REVERSE and SET ASIDE.

Tanada vs. Tuvera

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued
that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the
decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.

Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a number of
Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by Law. The government
argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as
when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon approval.
The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming the necessity for publication of some of the decrees.
The court ordered the respondents to publish in the official gazette all unpublished Presidential
Issuances which are of general force and effect. The petitioners suggest that there should be no
distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not. The publication means
complete publication, and that publication must be made in the official gazette. In a comment required
by the solicitor general, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and
therefore be dismissed. And on the clause “unless otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the new civil code
meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative, that the publication when
necessary, did not have to be made in the official gazette.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as
to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement
of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its
previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without
any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra
vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might
be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a
whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by
the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the
wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with
their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as
binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full
disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot
faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
People vs. Maceren

FACTS:

This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water
fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission.

Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were
charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1.

The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric current is not an obnoxious
or poisonous substance as contemplated in section I I of the Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance
at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by substances. The lower court further held that,
since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot
consider it unlawful.

As legal background, it should be stated that section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use of any
obnoxious or poisonous substance" in fishing.

Section 76 of the same law punishes any person who uses an obnoxious or poisonous substance in
fishing with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos nor more than five thousand, and by
imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than five years.

It is noteworthy that the Fisheries Law does not expressly punish .electro fishing."

The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Fisheries
Commission, issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending section 2 of Administrative Order
No. 84, by restricting the ban against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries (63 O.G. 9963).

Thus, the phrase "in any portion of the Philippine waters" found in section 2, was changed by the
amendatory order to read as follows: "in fresh water fisheries in the Philippines, such as rivers, lakes,
swamps, dams, irrigation canals and other bodies of fresh water."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the secretary of agriculture exceeded its authority in issuing administartive orders.

HELD:
The Court is of the opinion that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84
and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No.
3512.

The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not
banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in
penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.
Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have
been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law.

That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful
fishing in deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5)
failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other violations.

Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order No. 84, in punishing
electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense fails within the category of "other violations"
because, as already shown, the penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next lower to the penalty for
fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed in section 76, and is not the same as
the penalty for "other violations" of the law and regulations fixed in section 83 of the Fisheries Law.

The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should
constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty
provided for in the law itself. (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 11 25, citing 11 Am. Jur. 965 on p. 11 32).

However, at present, there is no more doubt that electro fishing is punishable under the Fisheries Law
and that it cannot be penalized merely by executive revolution because Presidential Decree No. 704,
which is a revision and consolidation of all laws and decrees affecting fishing and fisheries and which
was promulgated on May 16, 1975 (71 O.G. 4269), expressly punishes electro fishing in fresh water and
salt water areas.

n examination of the rule-making power of executive officials and administrative agencies and, in
particular, of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now Secretary of Natural Resources)
under the Fisheries Law sustains the view that he ex his authority in penalizing electro fishing by means
of an administrative order.

Administrative agent are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body finds it
impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations
that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is that the regulation should be
germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it should conform to the standards that the
law prescribes (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 1125; Director of Forestry vs. Muñ;oz, L-24796, June 28,
1968, 23 SCRA 1183, 1198; Geukeko vs. Araneta, 102 Phil. 706, 712).

The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide for all the details in the enforcement of a particular statute
(U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 125, citing U.S. vs. Grimaud 220 U.S. 506; Interprovincial Autobus
Co., Inc. vs. Coll. of Internal Revenue, 98 Phil. 290, 295-6).

The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of
separation of powers and is an exception to the nondeleption of legislative, powers. Administrative
regulations or "subordinate legislation calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because
of "the growing complexity of modem life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law" Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726;
People vs. Rosenthal and Osmeñ;a, 68 Phil. 328).
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its
general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. (U.S. vs. Tupasi
Molina, supra). An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress (Santos vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil.
419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the d of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel
vs. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao vs. Casteel, L-21906,
August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).

The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into
effect the law as it his been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute
cannot be sanctioned. (University of Santo Tomas vs. Board of Tax A 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-
46. As to invalid regulations, see of Internal Revenue vs. Villaflor 69 Phil. 319, Wise & Co. vs. Meer, 78
Phil. 655, 676; Del March vs. Phil. Veterans Administrative, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349).