Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Doctrine of Necessary Inplication
Doctrine of Necessary Inplication
Doctrine of Necessary Inplication
PADILLA, J.:
Sec. 2. Coverage. — This Act shall cover all appointive officials and
employees of the National Government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters, as well as
the personnel of all local government units. The benefits
authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary,
casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have
rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government
service as of the date of separation. Uniformed personnel of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the PC-INP are
excluded from the coverage of this Act.
Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of
the program, filed an application on 30 January 1989 with respondent National
Irrigation Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same; instead, she
was offered separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for
every year of service commencing from 1980. A recourse by petitioner to the
Civil Service Commission yielded negative results. 1 Her letter for
reconsideration dated 25 April 1989 pleaded thus:
Denying the plea for reconsideration, the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
emphasized:
In view of such denial, petitioner is before this Court by way of a special civil
action for certiorari, insisting that she is entitled to the benefits granted under
Republic Act No. 6683. Her arguments:
The NIA and the Civil Service Commission reiterate in their comment
petitioner's exclusion from the benefits of Republic Act No. 6683, because:
2. Petitioner is not a regular and career employee of NIA — her position is not
included in its regular plantilla. She belongs to the non-career service (Sec. 6,
P.D. No. 807) which is inherently short-lived, temporary and transient; on the
other hand, retirement presupposes employment for a long period. The most
that a non-career personnel can expect upon the expiration of his employment
is financial assistance. Petitioner is not even qualified to retire under the GSIS
law.
4. The objective of Republic Act No. 6683 is not really to grant separation or
retirement benefits but reorganization 5to streamline government functions.
The application of the law must be made consistent with the purpose for which
it was enacted. Thus, as the expressed purpose of the law is to reorganize the
government, it will not have any application to special projects such as the
WMECP which exists only for a short and definite period. This being the nature
of special projects, there is no necessity for offering its personnel early
retirement benefits just to induce voluntary separation as a step to
reorganization. In fact, there is even no need of reorganizing the WMECP
considering its short and limited life-span. 6
Who are regular employees? The Labor Code in Art. 280 (P.D. No. 492, as
amended) deems an employment regular where the employee has been engaged
to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer. No equivalent definition can be found in
P.D.No. 807 (promulgated on 6 October 1975, which superseded the Civil
Service Act of 1965 — R.A. No. 2260) or in the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292 promulgated on 25 July 1987). The Early Retirement
Law itself (Rep. Act No. 6683) merely includes such class of employees (regular
employees) in its coverage, unmindful that no such specie is employed in the
public sector.
Republic Act No. 6683 seeks to cover and benefits regular, temporary,
casual and emergency employees who have rendered at least a total of two (2)
consecutive years government service.
The case of Fegurin, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 16 comes to mind where, workers
belonging to a work pool, hired and re-hired continuously from one project to
another were considered non-project-regular and permanent employees.
Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired in four (4) successive projects
during a span of fifteen (15) years. Although no proof of the existence of a work
pool can be assumed, her service record cannot be disregarded.
Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees: "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
. . . In Felwa vs. Salas, L-26511, Oct. 29, 1966, We ruled that the
equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically
situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject
of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is
based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2)
these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification
applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions
which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the
classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. 17
Applying the criteria set forth above, the Early Retirement Law would violate
the equal protection clause were we to sustain respondents' submission that
the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government employees who
are similarly situated as those covered by said law. The maxim of Expressio
unius est exclusio alterius should not be the applicable maxim in this case but
the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that:
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved
in its application. There is always an omission that may not meet a
particular situation. What is thought, at the time of enactment, to
be an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for
the unfolding events of the future. So-called gaps in the law
develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory
construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary
implication. The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is
as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is
understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may
be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make
effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants,
including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may
be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis.
And every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to
include all incidental power, right or privilege. This is so because
the greater includes the lesser, expressed in the Maxim, in eo plus
sit, simper inest et minus. 18
This Bill covers only those who would like to go on early retirement
and voluntary separation. It is irrespective of the actual status or
nature of the appointment one received, but if he opts to retire
under this, then he is covered.
It will be noted that, presently Pending in Congress, is House Bill No. 33399 (a
proposal to extend the scope of the Early Retirement Law). Its wording supports
the submission that Rep. Act No. 6683 indeed overlooked a qualified group of
civil servants. Sec. 3 of said House bill, on coverage of early retirement, would
provide:
In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents
NIA and CSC of petitioner's application for early retirement benefits under Rep.
Act No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had
filed an application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she
is entitled to the benefits of said law. While the application was filed after
expiration of her term, we can give allowance for the fact that she originally
filed the application on her own without the assistance of counsel. In the
interest of substantial justice, her application must be granted; after all she
served the government not only for two (2) years — the minimum requirement
under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive
governmental projects.
SO ORDERED.
CASTRO, J.:
The parties are agreed that the Cavite Department of Public Safety possesses
the nature, attributes, powers and functions of a police force. The issue here is
whether a provincial government has the power, by necessary implication from
certain express powers granted to it, to create a provincial police force, the
parties admitting that there is no express or explicit statutory grant of power.
Neither the need for such a body nor the wisdom of its creation is in question.
The issue is simply one of implied power.
e. Civil Defense. The CDPS shall also constitute the main civil
defense arm in the province, responsible to the Governor, and shall
undertake such measures as it would be required in emergencies
in coordination with the National Civil Defense Administration.
It shall maintain its central office in Trece Martires City and establish at
least three (3) sector station in strategically located places in the
province.
The CDPS shall also establish liaison with the NBI and the PC in order to
achieve their common goal of combating crime effectively.
Done in the City of Trece Martires, this 1st day of March, in the year of
our Lord, Nineteen hundred and sixty-five.
In their answer, the respondents maintain that the power of the province to
create agency is necessary implied from section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of
19591 especially the portion thereof which provides that "Provincial Boards of
the respective provinces shall have authority (a) To appropriate money for
purposes not specified by law, having in view the general welfare of the
province and the inhabitants." In support of the existence of such implied
power, they invoke section 12 of the same Act which reads as follows:
They further contend that the power to create the police agency is recognized in
the following provisions of the Police Act of 1966:2
(8) He must be at least five feet, five inches in height in the case
of provinces and chartered cities and five feet four inches in the case of
municipalities; and
Persons who at the time of the approval of this Act have rendered at least
five years of satisfactory service inprovincial, city or municipal police
agency although they have not qualified in an appropriate civil service
examination are considered as civil service eligibles for the purpose of
this Act.
Not once, since 1906, has the power to create public offices been asserted. But
this power is now urged as a necessary corollary of the power to appropriate,
this because section 12(1) (2) of the Local Autonomy Act commands that the
implied powers of municipal corporations shall be liberally construed and that
all doubts as to the existence of the power must be resolved in their favor.
The case of Fred v. Mayor and Council of Borough of Old Tappan8 indicates the
proper construction that should be placed on a provision like section 12(1) (2).
There a similar provision of the New Jersey Constitution of 1947 was invoked
to justify the validity of a municipal ordinance regulating the removal of soil.
The Constitutional provision states:
It was argued that this clause of the Constitution, which had no counterpart in
its predecessor constitution, introduced a new concept of home rule, being in
effect a direct grant of the police power to all municipalities. This contention
was rejected (although the ordinance was upheld on other grounds), the
Supreme Court of New Jersey stating:
It bears strong emphasis to state here that provincial governments, like other
municipal corporations, are governments of enumerated powers.10 The
assumption, although historically inaccurate,11 is that municipal corporations
are mere creatures of the state with no inherent powers of their own.12This
same assumption underlies the grant of autonomy to local governments,13 for
implicit in the grant is precisely the recognition that they exercise only
delegated powers which should be enlarged and, in case of "fair and reasonable
doubt," should be resolved in their favor.
Section 12(1) (2) of the Local Autonomy Act, which is reproduced in section 23
of the Decentralization Act of 1967, did not alter the basic nature of municipal
governments as governments of limited power. What it changed was the
prevailing rule at the time of its enactment that the grant of powers to
municipal corporations must be strictly construed against them.14 As a rule of
interpretation it does not purport to supply power where none exists, not even
by necessary implication.
This lack of statutory basis for the creation of provincial police forces stands in
sharp contrast to the proliferation of statutory materials on municipal and city
police forces. Not that peace and order are less a responsibility of the
provinces. The reason is simply that the Governors are already clothed with
ample powers and resources. They can temporarily transfer policemen from
one municipality to another when public interest so requires.23 They can call
on the Philippine Constabulary or even on the Armed Forces of the Philippines
to quell any "disorder, riot, lawless violence or rebelious or petitions conspiracy
or to apprehend violators of law."24
It seems quite clear indeed that the legislature intended to reserve for itself the
field of legislation on this matter and thereby exclude from it like actions by
local governments. Precedents in support of this view are not wanting. In
Fluker v. City of Union Point25 it was held that where the charter authorizes
the appointment of a marshal and, in case of "special emergencies," of a special
police, the city could not create an office of a night watchman with powers to
arrest persons violating the laws and ordinances. Not even the plea that the
office was necessary for the preservation of peace and order justified the
creation of the office. Similarly, in Stout v. Stinnett26 it was held that a statute
creating the office of "the Chief of the Police" did not authorize a city to appoint
a day chief of police and a night chief of police and that an ordinance so
providing was invalid.
MR. PEREZ (L.). This bill carries phrases like "police agencies of a
province or chartered city or municipality." Under the present set-up,
what would you consider as constituting the police agencies of a
province?
MR. AMANTE. That is a misnomer here. The original bill includes the
organization of the provincial guards; hence it is suggested here that they
be included in this bill. Even at the conference called by the President in
connection with the peace and order condition, he suggested that the
provincial guards be included under the supervision of the Commission.
MR. PEREZ (L.). I support such proposal. This bill should state the
number of provincial guards which each province, in accordance with its
class, can employ; and also provide additional powers, because today
such provincial guards only keep the security of the provincial jail.
MR. PEREZ (L.). Will these guards enjoy the police powers of other police
agencies contemplated under this bill?
MR. AMANTE. No, they are only guards. However, their qualifications
and their discipline shall be governed by this bill. In connection with the
inclusion of provincial guards in the proposed measure, the Committee
will welcome amendments.
In fact, the term is used in other legislation before the enactment of the Police
Act of 1966 and it has always been understood to refer to provincial guards
assigned to provincial jails. It is used in Commonwealth Act 343 which
constituted the Philippine Constabulary as a national police force28 and
returned to the control of the Governors the "provincial . . . police bodies or
provincial guards"29 who earlier, had been organized into a State Police, along
with the police forces of the cities and municipalities.30 President Quezon's
Executive Order 15331 as well as Executive Order 175,32 issued to implement
Commonwealth Act 343, likewise spoke of "local police bodies in each province"
and "provincial police service" but that the term meant no more than provincial
guards is evident from the text thereof.
Like the power to appropriate money for the general welfare, the reference in
statutes to provincial police agencies is nothing new.
Apart from this, since a municipal office can be created only by legislative
authority exercised either directly or through a grant of the power to municipal
corporation, the existence of such an office as a fact cannot be inferred. This is
the thrust of the rulings in City of Metropolis v. Industrial Commission33 and
in Murphy v. Industrial Commission.34 In the first case, the Cities and Villages
Act provided that offices must be created by ordinance. It was argued that
certain provisions of the Municipal Code of the City of Metropolis prescribed
the powers and duties of policemen and hence that the office of night
policeman "necessarily exists in that city." In disposing of this contention, the
Illinois Supreme Court held that "neither provision of that character nor an
appropriation of public money to pay the salary or compensation of a person
acting as a policeman can operate, standing alone, to create the particular
office."
In the second case, an ordinance, enacted under the same Cities and Villages
Act, provided that "The mayor shall, with the advice and consent of the city
council, appoint for the term of one year, and until their respective successors
in office are appointed and qualified, additional police officers in such number
as said mayor and city council may deem expedient, to assist the chief of police
in his official duty." In denying that an office was thereby created, the same
court said: "That section does not purport to create the office of policeman or
assistant chief of police. The provision that the mayor shall appoint additional
police officer cannot be construed as an ordinance to create the office of
policeman."
Upon all the foregoing, it follows ineluctably that the creation of the Cavite
Department of Public Safety is an unlawful exercise of power, and is without
basis in law.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 is the March 26, 2010
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV. No. 89732 which
affirmed with modification the April 10, 2007 Decision3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Agoo, La Union, Branch 31, declaring inter alia the nullity of the
loan agreements entered into by petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (Land
Bank) and the Municipality of Agoo, La Union (Municipality).
The Facts
From 2005 to 2006, the Municipality’s Sangguniang Bayan (SB) passed certain
resolutions to implement a multi-phased plan (Redevelopment Plan) to
redevelop the Agoo Public Plaza (Agoo Plaza) where the Imelda Garden and Jose
Rizal Monument were situated.
To finance phase 1 of the said plan, the SB initially passed Resolution No. 68-
20054 on April 19, 2005, authorizing then Mayor Eufranio Eriguel (Mayor
Eriguel) to obtain a loan from Land Bank and incidental thereto, mortgage a
2,323.75 square meter lot situated at the southeastern portion of the Agoo
Plaza (Plaza Lot) as collateral. To serve as additional security, it further
authorized the assignment of a portion of its internal revenue allotment (IRA)
and the monthly income from the proposed project in favor of Land Bank.5 The
foregoing terms were confirmed, approved and ratified on October 4, 2005
through Resolution No. 139-2005.6 Consequently, on November 21, 2005, Land
Bank extended a ₱4,000,000.00 loan in favor of the Municipality (First
Loan),7 the proceeds of which were used to construct ten (10) kiosks at the
northern and southern portions of the Imelda Garden. After completion, these
kiosks were rented out.8
Unable to get any response, Cacayuran, invoking his right as a taxpayer, filed a
Complaint16 against the Implicated Officers and Land Bank, assailing, among
others, the validity of the Subject Loans on the ground that the Plaza Lot used
as collateral thereof is property of public dominion and therefore, beyond the
commerce of man.17
Upon denial of the Motion to Dismiss dated December 27, 2006,18 the
Implicated Officers and Land Bank filed their respective Answers.
For its part, Land Bank claimed that it is not privy to the Implicated Officers’
acts of destroying the Agoo Plaza. It further asserted that Cacayuran did not
have a cause of action against it since he was not privy to any of the Subject
Loans.19
In its Decision dated April 10, 2007,21 the RTC ruled in favor of Cacayuran,
declaring the nullity of the Subject Loans.22 It found that the resolutions
approving the said loans were passed in a highly irregular manner and thus,
ultra vires; as such, the Municipality is not bound by the same.23 Moreover, it
found that the Plaza Lot is proscribed from collateralization given its nature as
property for public use.24
Aggrieved, Land Bank filed its Notice of Appeal on April 23, 2007.25 On the
other hand, the Implicated Officers’ appeal was deemed abandoned and
dismissed for their failure to file an appellants’ brief despite due notice.26 In
this regard, only Land Bank’s appeal was given due course by the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its Decision dated March 26, 2010,27 the CA affirmed with modification the
RTC’s ruling, excluding Vice Mayor Eslao from any personal liability arising
from the Subject Loans.28
It held, among others, that: (1) Cacayuran had locus standi to file his
complaint, considering that (a) he was born, raised and a bona fide resident of
the Municipality; and (b) the issue at hand involved public interest of
transcendental importance;29 (2) Resolution Nos. 68-2005, 139-2005, 58-2006,
128-2006 and all other related resolutions (Subject Resolutions) were invalidly
passed due to the SB’s non-compliance with certain sections of Republic Act
No. 7160, otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC); (3)
the Plaza Lot, which served as collateral for the Subject Loans, is property of
public dominion and thus, cannot be appropriated either by the State or by
private persons;30 and (4) the Subject Loans are ultra vires because they were
transacted without proper authority and their collateralization constituted
improper disbursement of public funds.
The following issues have been raised for the Court’s resolution: (1) whether
Cacayuran has standing to sue; (2) whether the Subject Resolutions were
validly passed; and (3) whether the Subject Loans are ultra vires.
Land Bank claims that Cacayuran did not have any standing to contest the
construction of the APC as it was funded through the proceeds coming from
the Subject Loans and not from public funds. Besides, Cacayuran was not even
a party to any of the Subject Loans and is thus, precluded from questioning the
same.
First, although the construction of the APC would be primarily sourced from
the proceeds of the Subject Loans, which Land Bank insists are not taxpayer’s
money, there is no denying that public funds derived from taxation are bound
to be expended as the Municipality assigned a portion of its IRA as a security
for the foregoing loans. Needless to state, the Municipality’s IRA, which serves
as the local government unit’s just share in the national taxes,32 is in the
nature of public funds derived from taxation. The Court believes, however, that
although these funds may be posted as a security, its collateralization should
only be deemed effective during the incumbency of the public officers who
approved the same, else those who succeed them be effectively deprived of its
use.
In any event, it is observed that the proceeds from the Subject Loans had
already been converted into public funds by the Municipality’s receipt thereof.
Funds coming from private sources become impressed with the characteristics
of public funds when they are under official custody.33
Land Bank avers that the Subject Resolutions provided ample authority for
Mayor Eriguel to contract the Subject Loans. It posits that Section 444(b)(1)(vi)
of the LGC merely requires that the municipal mayor be authorized by the SB
concerned and that such authorization need not be embodied in an
ordinance.38
A careful perusal of Section 444(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC shows that while the
authorization of the municipal mayor need not be in the form of an ordinance,
the obligation which the said local executive is authorized to enter into must be
made pursuant to a law or ordinance, viz:
Sec. 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. -
xxxx
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is
the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section
16 of this Code, the municipal mayor shall:
xxxx
In the present case, while Mayor Eriguel’s authorization to contract the Subject
Loans was not contained – as it need not be contained – in the form of an
ordinance, the said loans and even the Redevelopment Plan itself were not
approved pursuant to any law or ordinance but through mere resolutions. The
distinction between ordinances and resolutions is well-perceived. While
ordinances are laws and possess a general and permanent character,
resolutions are merely declarations of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking
body on a specific matter and are temporary in nature.39 As opposed to
ordinances, "no rights can be conferred by and be inferred from a
resolution."40 In this accord, it cannot be denied that the SB violated Section
444(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC altogether.
Noticeably, the passage of the Subject Resolutions was also tainted with other
irregularities, such as (1) the SB’s failure to submit the Subject Resolutions to
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of La Union for its review contrary to Section 56
of the LGC;41 and (2) the lack of publication and posting in contravention of
Section 59 of the LGC.42
In fine, Land Bank cannot rely on the Subject Resolutions as basis to validate
the Subject Loans.
Loans
Neither can Land Bank claim that the Subject Loans do not constitute ultra
vires acts of the officers who approved the same.
Generally, an ultra vires act is one committed outside the object for which a
corporation is created as defined by the law of its organization and therefore
beyond the powers conferred upon it by law.43 There are two (2) types of ultra
vires acts. As held in Middletown Policemen's Benevolent Association v.
Township of Middletown:44
Applying these principles to the case at bar, it is clear that the Subject Loans
belong to the first class of ultra vires acts deemed as void.
Records disclose that the said loans were executed by the Municipality for the
purpose of funding the conversion of the Agoo Plaza into a commercial center
pursuant to the Redevelopment Plan. However, the conversion of the said plaza
is beyond the Municipality’s jurisdiction considering the property’s nature as
one for public use and thereby, forming part of the public dominion.
Accordingly, it cannot be the object of appropriation either by the State or by
private persons.46 Nor can it be the subject of lease or any other contractual
undertaking.47 In Villanueva v. Castañeda, Jr.,48 citing Espiritu v. Municipal
Council of Pozorrubio,49 the Court pronounced that:
At this juncture, it is equally observed that the land on which the Agoo Plaza is
situated cannot be converted into patrimonial property – as the SB tried to
when it passed Municipal Ordinance No. 02-200752 – absent any express grant
by the national government.53 As public land used for public use, the foregoing
lot rightfully belongs to and is subject to the administration and control of the
Republic of the Philippines.54 Hence, without the said grant, the Municipality
has no right to claim it as patrimonial property.
Nevertheless, while the Subject Loans cannot bind the Municipality for being
ultra vires, the officers who authorized the passage of the Subject Resolutions
are personally liable. Case law states that public officials can be held
personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection
with official duties where they have acted ultra vires,55 as in this case.
SO ORDERED.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The provincial governor of the province of Cebu, as chairman of the local school
board, under Section 98 of the Local Government Code, appointed classroom
teachers who have no items in the DECS plantilla to handle extension classes
that would accommodate students in the public schools.
Faced with the Notices of Suspension issued by the COA, the province of Cebu,
represented by its governor, filed a petition for declaratory relief with the trial
court.
On December 13, 1999, the court a quo rendered a decision declaring the
questioned expenses as authorized expenditures of the SEF. The dispositive
portion thereof reads:
The Special Education Fund was created by virtue of R.A. No. 5447, which is
An act creating a special education fund to be constituted from the proceeds of
an additional real property tax and a certain portion of the taxes on Virginia-
type cigarettes and duties on imported leaf tobacco, defining the activities to be
financed, creating school boards for the purpose, and appropriating funds
therefrom, which took effect on January 1, 1969. Pursuant thereto, P.D. No.
464, also known as the Real Property Tax Code of the Philippines, imposed an
annual tax of 1% on real property which shall accrue to the SEF.4
Under R.A. No. 5447, the SEF may be expended exclusively for the following
activities of the DECS —
(c) the payment and adjustment of salaries of public school teachers under
and by virtue of Republic Act Numbered Five Thousand One Hundred
Sixty-Eight and all the benefits in favor of public school teachers provided
under Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Six Hundred Seventy;
(g) the purchase of teaching materials such as work books, atlases, flip
charts, science and mathematics teaching aids, and simple laboratory
devices for elementary and secondary classes;
With the effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991, petitioner contends
that R.A. No. 5447 was repealed, leaving Sections 235, 272 and 100 (c) of the
Code to govern the disposition of the SEF, to wit:
SEC. 235. Additional Levy on Real Property for the Special Education
Fund (SEF). — A province or city or a municipality within the
Metropolitan Manila Area, may levy and collect an annual tax of one
percent (1%) on the assessed value of real property which shall be in
addition to the basic real property tax. The proceeds thereof shall
exclusively accrue to the Special Education Fund (SEF).
SEC. 272. Application of Proceeds of the Additional One Percent SEF Tax.
— The proceeds from the additional one percent (1%) tax on real properly
accruing to the SEF shall be automatically released to the local school
boards: Provided, That, in case of provinces, the proceeds shall be
divided equally between the provincial and municipal school
boards: Provided, however, That the proceeds shall be allocated for the
operation and maintenance of public schools, construction and repair of
school buildings, facilities and equipment, educational research, purchase
of books and periodicals, and sports development as determined and
approved by the local school board. (Emphasis supplied)
(c) The annual school board budget shall give priority to the following:
Moreover, petitioner claims that since what is allowed for local school boards to
determine under Section 995 of the Local Government Code is only the
"annual supplementary budgetary needs; for the operation and maintenance of
public schools," as well as the "supplementary local cost to meet such needs,"
the budget of the local school boards for the establishment and maintenance of
extension classes should be construed to refer only to the upkeep and
maintenance of public school building, facilities and similar expenses other
than personnel-related benefits. This is because, petitioner argued, the
maintenance and operation of public schools pertain principally to the DECS.
(Continuation)
In response, Mr. De Pedro clarified that the provision is not limited to the
three activities, to which may be added other sets of priorities at the
proper time. As to extension classes, he pointed out that the school boards
may provide out of its own funds, for additional teachers or other
requirements if the national government cannot provide funding therefor.
Upon Ms. Raymundo's query, Mr. de Pedro further explained that
support for teacher tools could fall under the priorities cited and is
covered by certain circulars.
(c) The provisions of . . . Sections 3, a (3) and b (2) of Republic Act No.
5447, regarding the Special Education Fund . . . are hereby repealed and
rendered of no force and effect.
Evidently, what was expressly repealed by the Local Government Code was only
Section 3, of R.A. No. 5447, which deals with the "Allocation of taxes on
Virginia type cigarettes and duties on imported leaf tobacco." The legislature is
presumed to know the existing laws, such that whenever it intends to repeal a
particular or specific provision of law, it does so expressly. The failure to add a
specific repealing clause particularly mentioning the statute to be repealed
indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law on the matter,
unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of
the new and the old laws.7 Hence, the provisions allocating funds for the
salaries of teachers under Section 1, of R.A. No. 5447, which are not
inconsistent with Sections 272 and 100 (c) of the Local Government Code,
remain in force and effect.
Even under the doctrine of necessary implication, the allocation of the SEF for
the establishment and maintenance of extension classes logically implies the
hiring of teachers who should, as a matter of course be compensated for their
services. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such
provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make
effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all
such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically
inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis.8 Verily, the services and the
corresponding compensation of these teachers are necessary and indispensable
to the establishment and maintenance of extension classes.
In the same vein, however noble the intention of the province in extending said
scholarship to deserving students, we cannot apply the doctrine of necessary
implication inasmuch as the grant of scholarship is neither necessary nor
indispensable to the operation and maintenance of public schools. Instead,
such scholarship grants may be charged to the General Funds of the province.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 6311 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a
petition for declaratory relief may be filed before there is a breach or violation.
The Solicitor General claims that the Notices of Suspension issued by the COA
to the respondent province amounted to a breach or violation, and therefore,
the petition for declaratory relief should have been denied by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 20, in Civil Case No. CEB-24422, is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. The salaries and personnel-related benefits of the
teachers appointed by the provincial school board of Cebu in connection with
the establishment and maintenance of extension classes, are declared
chargeable against the Special Education Fund of the province. However, the
expenses incurred by the provincial government for the college scholarship
grants should not be charged against the Special Education Fund, but against
the General Funds of the province of Cebu.
SO ORDERED.