The Question of Historical Context and the Study of Plato

Author(s): Peter J. Ahrensdorf

Source: Polity, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Autumn, 1994), pp. 113-135
Published by: Palgrave Macmillan Journals
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The Question of Historical Context
and the Study of Plato*
Peter J. Ahrensdorf
Davidson College

This article challenges Quentin Skinner's claim that a belief in the

importance of studying the historical context of classical texts is
incompatible with the belief that we can learn timeless truths from
them. The author uses a study of Plato to show that political
philosophers adapt their writings to their immediate audience as well
as address posterity. He contends that a study of the historical context
of a work is necessary for distinguishing its timely and timeless aspects
and developing a deeper appreciation of the latter.

Peter J. Ahrensdorf is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and

Humanities at Davidson College in Davidson, North Carolina. He is
the author of The Death of Socrates and the Life of Philosophy: An
Interpretation of Plato's Phaedo (forthcoming).

I. Quentin Skinner on Text and Context

In our day, the student of political philosophy who is inclined to believe

in the importance of studying the historical context of classic texts will
naturally turn to the writings of Quentin Skinner. He is today the most
prominent scholar to argue against a purely textual approach to the study
of classic texts and for the necessity of studying their historical context in
order to achieve a clear and accurate understanding of those texts them-
selves.' Yet in his most extensive methodological writing, Skinner goes
well beyond this argument. He claims that the textualist belief in the text
as a "self-sufficient object of inquiry and understanding" is "logically

*TheauthorthanksStevenJ. Kautz,AlfredR. Mele, ThomasL. Pangle,AnneRuder-

man, RichardS. Ruderman,NathanTarcov,and StephenH. Wirlsfor theirhelpfulcriti-
cismsand suggestions,and the John M. Olin Foundationfor its support.
1. See, for example,QuentinSkinner,"Meaningand Understandingin the Historyof
Ideas," Historyand Theory,8 (1969):3-4, 31-35;and TheFoundationsof ModernPolit-
ical Thought(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1978), l:xiii-xiv.

1994
Fall1994
Polity
Polity XX
Volume
Volume VII,Number
XXVII, I1
Number Fall
114 The Questionof HistoricalContext

tied" to the justificationof studyingit for its "timeless"and "univer-

sal" wisdom. Hence "to suggestinsteadthat a knowledgeof the social
contextis a necessaryconditionfor an understandingof the classictexts
is equivalentto denyingthatthey do containany elementsof timelessand
perennialinterest."2SinceSkinnerbelievesthat a knowledgeof the con-
text is indeednecessaryfor understandingthose texts, he concludesthat
"thereis in consequencesimplyno hope of seekingthe point of studying
the history of ideas in the attempt to learn directly from the classic
authorsby focusing on their attemptedanswersto supposedlytimeless
questions." Thereforewe must conclude "not merely that the classic
texts cannotbe concernedwith our questionsand answers,but only with
their own," but also that "there simply are no perennialproblemsin
philosophy:there are only individualanswersto individualquestions,
and as many different questions as there are questioners."3Having
warnedus againstthe dangersof textualism,then, Skinnerends up by
agreeing with the most intransigenttextualists that we must choose
betweenthe belief thatthe classictextsarewhollyunconcernedwiththeir
historicalcontext and the belief that they addressnothingbut their his-
torical context.
Skinner presents the student of political philosophy with the un-
necessarychoice of either denyingthe importanceof studyingthe his-
torical context of classic texts or denyingthe possibilitythat they can
speakto our questions,our problems,and our interests.For thereis no
reasonwhy one cannotcombinethe belief in the importanceof suchhis-
torical studieswith a belief in the possibilityof learningimportantand
relevanttruths from such texts.4Thereis no reasonwhy a text may not
addressits immediatecontextas well as posterity,discusspressingas well
as perennialproblems,and hencebe a timelyworkas well as a possession
for all time. I contendthat the classic authorsdo in fact write for their
own timesas well as for posterity,that they deliberatelyadapttheirwrit-
ings to their own times above all in orderto ensurethat posteritywill
have access to those writings,and that their writingsthereforecontain
both a timelyand a timelessaspect.And it is preciselyfor this reasonthat
it is necessaryfor us to study the historicalcontext in which the classic
authorswrote. For it is only by identifyingthat contextthat we can prop-
erlydeterminein whatsensetheirworksareaddressedto theirimmediate

2. Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding," pp. 4-5; see also pp. 39-40.
3. Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding," p. 50.
4. See Nathan Tarcov, "Quentin Skinner's Method and Machiavelli's Prince," Ethics,
92 (1982): 697-98. I am greatly indebted to this article for my understanding of Quentin
Skinner as a whole.
 Peter J. Ahrensdorf 115

audience in particular and in what sense they are addressed to human

beings in general and therefore to us.
To support this contention I propose to examine the case of one classic
author, Plato, and show why a study of his historical context is especially
necessary. More specifically, I intend to show that, contrary to what a
number of scholars in our times claim, the context within which Plato
wrote was marked by a profound religious hostility to philosophy or
rationalism. He sought to defuse that hostility by making not only a
theoretically compelling defense of rationalism for all times but also a
rhetorically effective defense for his own time. And while I cannot
explain within the confines of this essay what I understand Plato's time-
less defense of rationalism to be, I do hope to show how a study of his
historical context helps us recognize his distinctively timely defense of
rationalism and thereby enables us to identify and begin to study his dis-
tinctively timeless defense of the life of reason.

II. The Importance of Studying the Context of Plato's Texts

Skinner's claim that a statement in the classic texts "is inescapably the
embodiment of a particular intention, on a particular occasion,
addressed to the solution of a particular problem, and thus specific to its
situation in a way that it can only be naive to try to transcend" is, in cer-
tain ways, especially applicable to Plato's dialogues.5 For, unlike such
classic authors as Thucydides and Rousseau, Plato never explicitly states
in his dialogues that he is writing for posterity.6 Indeed, apart from their
titles, Plato never speaks in his own name but rather presents particular
characters addressing one another in particular situations. Furthermore,
almost all of the characters in the dialogues are historical characters, that
is, individuals who are known from sources other than Plato to have
actually lived. The chief character of the dialogues is the historical char-
acter Socrates, and the only dialogue whose title mentions Socrates, the
Apology of Socrates, refers directly to a historical event, his trial. Plato,
then, presents all statements or speeches within the dialogues as being
specific to a particular historical context and a failure to appreciate this
fact is bound to lead to serious misunderstandings of those texts.7

5. Skinner,"Meaningand Understanding,"p. 50.

6. See ThucydidesI 22.4 and Rousseau'sPrefaceto The Discourseon the Arts and
Sciences.
7. As Leo Strausssays, "a muchmore carefulconsiderationof the narrowerand the
widercontextof eachstatementis requiredfor the understanding
of Plato'sbooksthanfor
the understandingof most books." Leo Strauss,"On a New Interpretationof Plato's
116 The Questionof HistoricalContext

Of all the Platonicdialogues,the Apology is most clearlyspecificto its

historicalcontextand hence seemsto conformmost clearlyto Skinner's
general claim about the specific characterof the classic texts. There
Socrates,beforethe particularaudienceof the citizensof Athens,and on
the particularoccasion of his trial, clearlyaddressesthe particularques-
tion of whetheror not he is guiltyof not believingin the gods the Atheni-
ans believe in and of corruptingthe Athenianyouth. Yet the Apology
also showsmost clearlywhy, notwithstandingSkinner'sclaimto the con-
trary, it is necessaryfor us to determinein what ways the classic texts
transcendtheir context. For the Apology may be said to culminatewith
Socrates' claim that "this is preciselythe greatestgood for a human
being, to make speeches[or arguments]every day about virtueand the
other things about which you hear me conversingand examiningboth
myselfand others,and that the unexaminedlife is not livablefor a human
being."8 Socrateshere explicitlyarguesthat to defend himself he must
defend the universalclaim that the philosophiclife, the life devotedto
the pursuitof wisdomthroughreasonalone, is the best way of life for a
human being.9Moreover,inasmuchas the Platonic dialogues contain
numerous"apologies" or defensesof and by Socrates,we may say that
Plato's dialoguesas a whole constitutean "apology" or defenseof both
Socrates in particularand the philosophiclife as such.'? Plato's dia-
logues, then, explicitlyaddressnot only the particularand timely ques-
tions of whetheror not Socratesis guilty as chargedand deservesto be
punishedbut also the universaland perennialquestionof whatis the best
way of life for a humanbeing. Consequentlythey addressnot only the
Athenianjurorsbut also humanbeingsas such or at least those human
beingswho are willingto wonderabout that question.Insofaras we too
areconcernedwith this question,Plato's dialoguesshow that,pace Skin-

Political Philosophy," Social Research,13 (1946): 352. For Strauss'sargumentfor the

importanceof externalhistoricalstudiesin the studyof classictexts, see Persecutionand
the Art of Writing(rpt., Westport,CT: GreenwoodPress, [1952]1973),pp. 158-62;and
The City and Man (Chicago:RandMcNally& Co., 1964),pp. 240-41.As these passages
show, Skinnerdoes a seriousinjusticeto Straussby attributingto him the view that "the
text itself should form the self-sufficientobject of inquiry and understanding."See
"Meaning and Understanding,"pp. 4-5. For the significantdifferencesbetween the
textualistsand Strauss,see NathanTarcov, "Philosophyand History:John Gunnelland
Leo Strauss on Tradition and Interpretation," in Tradition, Interpretation, and Science,
ed. John S. Nelson (Albany:State Universityof New York Press, 1986), especiallypp.
82-83.
8. Apology of Socrates 38al-6.
9. See Apology of Socrates 29b9-d5 and 37e3-38bl.
10. See, for example, Phaedo 63bl-69e5, 91b8-c5; Republic 487bl-497a8; Gorgias
484c4-488bl, 500cl-d4, 508c4-509a4, 521b4ff.; Meno 79e7ff.; and Euthyphro 5a3ff.
 Peter J. Ahrensdorf 117

ner, the classic texts can indeed be concerned with our own question and
not merely with their own."1The dialogues, then, both address and tran-
scend their specific historical situation, and any attempt to understand
them must consider both aspects of those texts.
What is the relation between the timely and the transcendent aspects of
Plato's dialogues? Plato indicates that relation by portraying Socrates as
a man who always deliberately adapts his defense of the philosophic life
to his particular audience and hence to his particular context. In the dia-
logues, Socrates is convincingly identified as a master of irony, that is, as
a man who is not simply frank or truthful but who rather speaks dif-
ferently to different people and who thereby adapts his speeches to his
particular audience.12 Socrates himself suggests in the Apology that he is
being ironic in his defense of his philosophic life and hence that he is
tailoring that defense to the particular beliefs of his jurors.'3 According-
ly, it is vital that we study both that context and how Plato's Socrates'
defense is adapted to it in order to distinguish his ironic and timely
defense from his genuine defense of the philosophic life.
The broad context of Socrates' defense of philosophy is set by the pop-
ular view of philosophy in the Athens and the Greece of his time. This
view is directly relevant to the Apology since there Socrates converses, so
to speak, with the city of Athens and seeks to persuade it of the goodness
of the philosophic life.14 Insofar as the Athenians' and the Greeks' stance
toward philosophy forms the backdrop against which all of Socrates'
speeches on behalf of philosophy take place, a study of this context
should help us to distinguish his rhetorical defense of philosophy from
his theoretical defense of it in the dialogues as a whole.'5
In the Apology, Socrates describes the context of his defense speech as
one of overwhelming hostility not only to himself in particular but to
philosophers as a whole. He asserts that the Athenians believe that
philosophers as such are impious and unjust and that, consequently, it is
virtually impossible for him to defend either himself or philosophy effec-
tively before this audience.'6 Furthermore, other Platonic dialogues

11. Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding," pp. 50-52.

12. See Republic 336e2-337a7; Symposium 216c4-217a2, 221d7-222a6; and Gorgias
489dl-e4. See also Lovers 133d8-el; and Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1108a19-22,
1124b29-31, 1127a20-26, b22-31.
13. Apology of Socrates 37e3-38a8.
14. See Apology of Socrates 37a4-7 and 37e3-38a8.
15. See, for example, Phaedo 63bl-5, 64a10-65a7, 68b9-69a4, 69e6-70b4 (cf. 77a9-b5),
84d8-e3; Republic 487bl-497a8; Gorgias 481c5-487b6, 513c4-8; and Meno 79e7-80b7,
94e3-95al.
16. See Apology of Socrates 18bl-e4, especially 18c2-3, 23c7-d7, 26dl-6, 29b9-dl,
37a4-7, 37e3-38a8.
118 The Questionof HistoricalContext

alludeto the popularhostilityto philosophersnot only in Athens but in

other Greekcities as well, and therebyreinforceSocrates'suggestionin
the Apology that the Greeksviewedphilosophywith suspicionand even
with hatred.17 In these ways Plato gives a tolerablyclearaccountof the
broad context within which his defense of philosophytakes place. Yet
this account gives rise to a numberof questions.How seriouswas this
hostility to the philosophers?We know from Plato that it led to the
executionof Socrates.But to what extentwas his case an isolatedone in
the Athens or Greeceof his time?What, moreover,was the causeof the
popular hostility to philosophy?And, finally, how did Plato and his
Socratesadapt their defense of philosophyto this hostile context?
We cannot find complete answers to these questions by studying
Plato's texts alone. For Plato's accountof the contextof Socrates'trial
and execution is far from complete. While Plato presents Socrates'
defense speech at his trial, he does not present the speeches of his
accusers. And while he providesus with at least a partial account of
Socrates'trial, he does not provideus with any accountof the trials of
otherphilosophers.Plato seemsto presupposethat his readershavesome
experienceof hostilityto or persecutionof philosophers.18He seems to
assumethat they live in a worldin whichthe verynotion of pursuingthe
truththroughreasonalone is viewedwith suspicion,if not hatred.Plato
seems not to have foreseen the emergenceof liberal societies such as
ours, which were founded on such principlesas tolerationand the sep-
arationof religionand politicsand whichhave traditionallyheld ration-
alismand sciencein greatesteem.g1Thereis, then, reasonto believethat
it may be necessaryfor us to look beyondhis texts and makeuse of exter-
nal sourcesin orderto clarifyfor ourselvesthe appropriatecontextof his
defenseof philosophy.For if we considerour own historicalcontextwe
must recognizethat, as citizensof longstandingliberalsocieties,we have
little directexperienceof hostilityto, muchless persecutionof, philoso-
phers. It is prudentto assumethat we may be consequentlyill-equipped
to discernand to graspthe natureof such hostility.As Skinnerhimself
says, "it is a commonplace-we are all Marxists[andPlatonists,I would
add] to this extent-that our own society placesunrecognizedrestraints
upon our imaginations."20 Accordingly, in order to transcend those con-

17. See Republic 487b1-489c10, 494a4-7, 520a6-b4; Gorgias 484c5-486dl; Laws 966d9-
967dl; Phaedo 59cl and 64a10-b6; Lovers 132b8-10; Theatetus 173c5-175b7; Meno 79e7-
80b7; and Hippias Major 285b5-c2.
18. See, for example, Apology of Socrates 18bl-d2, 19b2-c5, 26dl-6.
19. But consider Theatetus 180c7-d5.
20. Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding," p. 53; see also Republic 514al-519b6.
 Peter J. Ahrensdorf 119

straints, it is reasonable for us to make special efforts to reconstruct as

fully as we can the broad context of Plato's defense of the philosophic
life.

III. The Context of Plato's Defense of Philosophy

The conviction and execution of Socrates by Athens was not the only
instance of a Greek city persecuting a philosopher. Soon after the emer-
gence of philosophy in Greece, philosophers began to suffer from the
hostility of the politically powerful. Pythagoras and his followers had
formidable enemies in Sicily. A large number of Pythagoreans were slain
there and, according to one account, Pythagoras himself was killed while
fleeing from an angry mob.21 Xenophanes was expelled from his native
city of Colophon,22 and Zeno was put to death for plotting to overthrow
the tyrant of Elea.23
But of greater importance than these instances was the plight of
philosophers in Athens, the self-proclaimed school of Greece and the
Greek city most open to philosophy.24 Anaxagoras was the first philoso-
pher to take up residence in Athens, where he became the adviser and
friend of Pericles. But his association with Pericles did not prevent him
from being imprisoned; he barely won release from prison and then fled
from the city.25 Damon, a sophist and an associate of both Pericles and
Socrates, was ostracized.26Protagoras was expelled from Athens and his
books were burned in the agora.27 The philosopher Diagoras was con-
demned to death and fled from Athens; the Athenians then announced

21. Polybius, II 38.10ff.; Diogenes Laertius, VIII 39-40; Porphyry, Life of Pythagoras
54-58; and Iambilichus, Life of Pythagoras 248ff. See also Cicero, Tusculan Disputations
V 7-9 and Diogenes Laertius, I 12-13, VIII 8.
22. Diogenes Laertius, IX 18.
23. Plutarch, De Stoicorum 105 c; Diodorus Siculus, X 18.2; Diogenes Laertius, IX 26;
and Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy I iii.3043.
24. See Thucydides, II 39-41; Isocrates, Panegyricus 47-50; Antidosis 295.
25. John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy (rpt., New York: Meridian Books, [1930]
1957),p. 254; Leon Robin, GreekThoughtand the Originsof the ScientificSpirit,trans.
M. R. Dobie (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), p. 122; Plutarch, Pericles 4.4, 5.3, 6, 8.1,
16.5-7, 32.1-3, 35.1-2; Nicias 23.2-3; Plato, Phaedrus 269el-270a8; Alcibiades I 118b8-c6;
Isocrates, Antidosis 235-36; and Diogenes Laertius, II 12.
26. Plutarch, Pericles 4.1-2; Nicias 6.1; Isocrates, Antidosis 235-6; Plato, Republic
400bl-c6, 424c5-6; Laches 180c5-d3; and Diogenes Laertius, II 19.
27. Cicero, De Natura Deorum 12, 63, 117-19; Sextus Empiricus, Against the Physicists
I 55-57; and Diogenes Laertius, IX 51-52.
120 The Questionof HistoricalContext

that a talent of silver would be awardedto the man who killed him.28
And Socrateshimself was condemnedto death and executed.
Philosophersand their associates, then, were frequentlyvictims of
severepersecutionin Athens, but other cities were at least as hostile to
philosophersas was Athens.29It is truethat philosophersappearto have
been drawn to Athens by her reputation for openness. Parmenides,
Zeno, and Democritus, for example, appear to have passed through
Athens without being harassed.30Nevertheless,the number and the
prominenceof the philosopherswho were persecutedindicatesthat, by
the end of the fifth century, a clear patternof persecutionof philoso-
phersby Athens had emerged.
Nor did this hostilityto philosophersabatesoon afterthe executionof
Socrates.Plato and his companionsfled from Athens shortlyafter that
execution.Aristotlelater had to steal away from Athens for fear of im-
prisonment.Fifty years after Socrates'death his executionwas publicly
cited with approval.At about the same time, Isocratesthoughtit neces-
sary to make a defense of philosophy in responseto the Athenians'
strong opposition to it.31The hostility of the Atheniansto philosophy,
then, was neither evanescentnor superficial,but persistentand deep-
seated.

IV. The Philosophersand the ImpietyCharge

What was the cause of this hostility?Althoughthe reasonsvariedfrom
case to case, the principalcause of the hostilityto philosopherswas the
widely held opinion that they were impious. Anaxagoras,Protagoras,
Diagoras,Socrates,and Aristotlewereall accusedand convictedof impi-

28. Lysias, Against Andocides 17-18; Aristophanes, Birds 1071-75; Cicero, De Natura
Deorum I 2, 63, 89; Diodorus Siculus, XIII 6.7; Plutarch, Moralia 1075a; and Sextus
Empiricus, Against the Physicists I 50-59. See also Eudore Derenne, Les Proces D'Impiete
Intentes aux Philosophes a Athenes au Vme et au IVme Siecles avant J-C (rpt., New York:
Arno Press, [1930] 1976), pp. 64-66.
29. See Phaedo 59cl, 64a10-b6; Meno 79e7-80b7; Protagoras 316c5-317b3; and Hippias
Major 285b5-c2. See also George Grote, A History of Greece (London: John Murray,
1862), 6:155-56, 180-83; and Derenne, Les Proces, pp. 264-66.
30. See Plato, Parmenides as a whole; and Diogenes Laertes, IX 51-52.
31. Diogenes Laertius, II 106, V 5-6; Aeschines, Against Timarchus 173; and Isocrates,
Antidosis 170, 173, 175-76, 215, 246-47, 270-71, 285-86, 304-05. See also Grote, History, p.
183; and Derenne, Les Proces, pp. 178-81.
 PeterJ. Ahrensdorf 121

ety.32In the Apology Socrates states that the standardcharge against

philosophersis atheismand Plato has the AthenianStrangerrepeatand
elaborateon this statementin the Laws.33In the eyes of the people, their
leaders, and their poets, the philosopherswere atheists and they cor-
ruptedthe youth by turningthem into atheistsas well.34
The chargeof impietywas an extremelygrave chargein the cities of
ancientGreece.35Religionwas at the heartof family and politicallife in
the ancientcity. The Greeksclaimedto derivetheirmoralcodes and laws
from the gods. To call into questionthe existenceof the gods was tanta-
mountto underminingthe most fundamentalmoralbeliefsandthe legiti-
macy of the city's laws.36Accordingly,the Greekstook their piety most
seriously.The Athenians, for example, showedthemselveswillingon a
number of occasions to sacrifice political and military advantagefor
religiousreasons.Athens'soutstandinggeneral,Alcibiades,was arrested
and then condemnedto death in absentia at a crucial moment in the
PeloponnesianWarbecausehe had allegedlymockedhis city's religion.37
The generalNicias chose to riskthe destructionof the Athenianarmyin
Sicilyratherthan refuseto heed whathe and most of the Athenianstook
to be a sign from the gods.38Finally, the Atheniansput to death the
admiralswho had just led them to one of their city's greatestnaval vic-
tories because they had chosen not to gather the bodies of the dead
Atheniansailors-as requiredby religiouscustom-during a dangerous
storm after their victory.39The Athenianswerewillingto court military

32. Plutarch, Pericles 32; Nicias 23; Diogenes Laertius, II 12-14; Diodorus Siculus, XIII
6.7; Sextus Empiricus, Against the Physicists I 50-59; Cicero, De Natura Deorum I 63,
117-18; Diogenes Laertius, IX 51-52; Xenophon, Apology of Socrates to the Jury 10-11;
Memorabilia I i.1; and Diogenes Laertius, II 40; V 5-6.
33. Apology of Socrates 23c7-d7 and Laws 966d9-967d2.
34. See Apology of Socrates 26a8-27a7; and Aristophanes, Clouds 365-411, 817-31,
1227-41, 1468-1511.
35. See Lysias, Against Andocides and Andocides, On the Mysteries 30.
36. See Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges, La Cite Antique (Paris: Hachette, 1900),
especially the introduction; George Grote, A History of Greece (London: John Murray,
1862), 5:147-48; Derenne, Les Proces, pp. 9-12, 254-62; and J. V. Muir, "Religion and the
New Education: The Challenge of the Sophists," in Greek Religion and Society, ed. P. E.
Easterling and J. V. Muir (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 193-95. See
also Aristophanes, Clouds 395-407, 901-05, 1214-59, 1321-1477, 1506-09; and Plato, Laws
624al-625a3.
37. Thucydides, VI 15, 27-32, 47-53, 60-61, 74, 88.7-93; and Plutarch, Alcibiades 18-22,
23.1-2.
38. Thucydides, VII 50 ff.; and Plutarch, Nicias 23-30.
39. Xenophon, Hellenica I.vi.24-vii.35; Diodorus Siculus, XIII 31; and Fustel de
Coulanges, pp. 11-12.
122 The Questionof HistoricalContext

disasterand to executevictoriousgeneralsin orderto fulfil theirreligious

duties.40They believedthat to leave impietyunpunishedwas to commit
impietyand therebyto provokethe righteousangerof the gods.41Those
who did not believein the gods and who taughtothersnot to believein
them were, then, peculiarlydangerouscriminalsand wereto be treated
accordingly.
Whatwas the basis of the chargethat the philosopherswereimpious?
Plutarch,in a key passageof his life of Nicias (23), sheds light on this
importantquestion:
But just as all these things were ready [for the Athenianforces'
retreatfrom Syracuse]and none of the enemy wereon the watch,
since they did not expect it, there was an eclipse of the moon by
night and a great fear enteredNicias and those of the rest who,
becauseof theirinexperienceor superstition,werestruckwith ter-
ror at such things. For that the darkeningof the sun at the end of
the month was somehowcaused by the moon was alreadyunder-
stood even by the many. But what it was that the moon encoun-
tered and how, being full, she should suddenlylose her light and
emit all sortsof colors, this was not easyto grasp,but they believed
it strangeand a sign from a god in advanceof certaingreat mis-
fortunes.
For the first man to set down in writingthe clearestand boldest
argumentof all about the shiningand shadowingof the moon was
Anaxagoras.And neither was he ancient nor was the argument
reputablebut it was still secret and proceededamong a few and
with a certaincaution or trust. For they [the many]did not abide
the naturalphilosophersand the pratersaboutthe heavens,as they
were called at that time, because they reducedthe divine to un-
reasoningcauses, improvidentpowers, and necessaryproperties.
But even Protagoraswent into exile, the imprisonedAnaxagoras
was barely saved by Pericles, and Socrates,who did not concern
himself with any of such things,42neverthelessdied on accountof
philosophy. But later the reputation of Plato shone forth, on
account of the life of the man and becausehe placed the natural
necessitiesunderthe divineand more authoritativeprinciples,and
took away the slanderagainstthese argumentsand gave a path to

40. See also Plutarch, Themistocles 13; and Pelopidas 21-22.

41. See Lysias, Against Andocides 1-2, 13-14, 19-34, 53; Antiphon, Tetralogy 1.1.10;
Murder ofHerodes 81-83; and Derenne, Les Proces, pp. 254-58.
42. But see Plato, Phaedo 96a6ff.
 PeterJ. Ahrensdorf 123

these studiesto all men. At any rate, his companionDion, although

there was an eclipseof the moon at the time whenhe was about to
set sail out of ZacyntheagainstDionysius,was not at all disturbed
but put to sea, and landingat Syracusehe expelledthe tyrant.
Plutarch explains that the many were hostile to philosophersbecause
they reducedwhat the many thought divine-the gods who cared for
human beings and who were free to reward and punish them-to
unreasoningcauses, improvidentpowers, and necessaryproperties.In
the eyes of the many, the philosophersreducedthe divineto the natural,
the religiousto the scientific. The philosopherstaughtthat eclipsesare
not signs of the gods' righteousangerbut predictablenaturalphenom-
ena. They showedthat thunderand lightningare not divinepunishments
of the wickedbut forcesof uncaringnature.The philosophersrevealeda
universethat is deaf to man's demand for cosmic justice.43These dis-
coveries shatteredthe Greeks'vision of a universethat supportedand
enforcedtheirlaws and theirmoralcodes. The philosophersdemystified
the world and this demystificationthreatenedto delegitimizeand de-
moralizethe ancientcity. By challengingin particularthe belief in gods
who rewardthe just and punishthe unjust,the philosophersappearedto
underminethe belief in the superiorityof the just life to the unjust life
and therewiththe belief in the goodnessof justice itself.44This "atheis-
tical trend of early Greek philosophy," as one scholar has called it,
seemedto lead to the conclusionthat the gods do not exist, that thereare
no divinesanctionsfor morality,and thereforethat everythingis permit-
ted to humanbeings.45Unwillingor unableto acceptthis conclusion,the
cities of ancient Greecestrove to quiet and even to silencethe philoso-
phers.And in doing so they understoodthemselvesto be actingnot only
on behalf of themselvesand their gods but on behalf of justice itself.
The religious persecution of philosophers threatenedto eradicate
philosophyaltogetherin ancientGreece.The philosophersweredefense-

43. See Diogenes Laertius, I 23; Aristophanes, Clouds 395-407, 901-05; Lysias, Against
Andocides 19-32; Cicero, De Natura Deorum I 1-4, 117-20; and Plutarch, Pericles 6,
35.1-2.
44. See Aristophanes, Clouds 366-402, 889-1104, 1140-62; and Plato, Republic 358el-
367e5, especially 365b4-el.
45. See W. K. C. Guthrie, The Greeks and Their Gods (Boston: Beacon Press, 1950), pp.
340, 351 and also pp. 132-33, 136-37, 144. For the relevant fragments of the Pre-Socratic
philosophers, see Xenophanes, 11-12, 14-16, 23-26, 32, 34; Heraclitus, 5, 14-15, 27, 30, 32,
40-42, 80, 96, 102, 132; Epicharmus, 1, 64; Empedocles, 17, 21, 28, 131-34; Anaxagoras,
19; Diogenes of Apollonia, 5; Democratus, 297; Protagoras, 1, 4; and Thrasymachus, 10.
See also Aristophanes, Clouds 365-402, 1321-1511; and Plato, Laws 889e3-890b2.
124 TheQuestionof HistoricalContext

less in the face of the hostilityof the Greekcities. The threatof imprison-
ment, exile, or even executionhung over theirheads at all times.46Over
time such persecutionthreatenedto reduce philosophersto solitude,
silence, and even to extinction.
It is true that, in our century,some have deniedthat philosophersin
generaland Socratesin particularwere persecutedfor religiousreasons
in ancientGreece.Most prominently,the eminentBritishscholar John
Burnet claimed that Socrates was put to death not because he was
believedto be impiousbut ratherbecauseof his criticismof the Athenian
democracyand its leaders.47Sincethis claim has been repeatedby such
scholarsas Taylor,Grube,and Stone and since I believeit is mistaken,I
wish to examineit in some detail.48
Burnetsays: "We have now to ask why Sokrateswas chargedwith
irreligionand why he was put to death. We must at once put aside the
ideathat it was for not believingthe storiesaboutthe gods. It is not likely
that any educatedman believedthese, and uneducatedpeople probably
knew little about them. There was no churchand no priesthood, and
thereforethe conceptionof religiousorthodoxydid not exist. So far as
mythologywas concerned,you mighttake any liberty."49Burnet'sclaim
that the impietychargeagainstSocrateswas not the real chargeagainst
him is based, then, on the broaderclaim that Greekpiety did not entail
"belief in narrativesof any kind." "No one," he goes on to say, "could
be prosecutedfor what we call religiousopinions."50And earlierin this
book he claims, "Speculative opinions . . . were no part of Greek
religion, which consisted entirely in worship and not in theological
affirmationsor negations."51In Burnet'sview, the Greeksdid not care

46. See Robin, p. 122; and George Grote, Plato and the Other Companions of Socrates
(London: John Murray, 1888), 1:252, 388-90.
47. John Burnet, Greek Philosophy: Thales to Plato (rpt., London: Macmillan and Co.,
[1914] 1962), pp. 182-89.
48. See A. E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work (London: Methuen and Co., 1960),
pp. 157-60; A. E. Taylor, Platonism and Its Influence (Boston: Marshall Jones Co., 1924),
pp. 109-10, 143; and I. F. Stone, The Trial of Socrates (London: Pan Books, 1989), pp.
237-47. See also Toynbee's claim that "It was Politics, not Religion, that cost Socrates his
life" and Grube's astonishing claim that "it is important to remember that Plato had no
experience of a persecuting religion." Arnold Toynbee, A Study of History (New York and
London, 1939), 7:472; and G. M. A. Grube, Plato's Thought (rpt., Indianapolis, IN:
Hackett Publishing Co., [1935] 1980), p. 175. For what may be the first expression of the
opinion that Socrates was executed primarily for political reasons, see Voltaire, "Des sectes
des Grecs," in Essai sur les moeurs et l'esprit des nations (1767), chap. 26, Oeuvres, 11:77.
49. Burnet, Greek Philosophy, pp. 182-83.
50. Burnet, Greek Philosophy, p. 183.
51. Burnet, Greek Philosophy, p. 117.
 PeterJ. Ahrensdorf 125

whetheror not men's opinions were religious-that is, whetheror not

they actually believed in the gods-so long as their actions were not
impious. And since Socrates' actions were not impious, he could not
have been condemned to death for impiety. Therefore, Burnet con-
cludes, he must have been condemnedfor his associationwith the anti-
democraticCritiasand Alcibiades.52
Burnet's explanationof why Socrates was condemnedis, however,
contradictedby Plato's own wordsand by the historicalevidenceavaila-
ble to us from other ancientsources.AlthoughBurnetsays that "Plato
indicatesin the clearestpossible mannerthat Sokratesreally owed his
deathto his politicalattitude," Plato himself says in the SeventhLetter,
which Buret regardsas genuine,that Socrateswas condemnedto death
for impietytout court.53And in the Apology and the Euthyphro,Plato
presentsSocrates as saying that, by charginghim with corruptingthe
youth, the Athenianswereactuallycharginghim with teachingthe youth
not to believein the gods of the city.54 Furthermore,accordingto Plato's
Socratesand his AthenianStranger,the standardchargeagainstphiloso-
phers was atheism.55Plato, then, indicates quite clearly that Socrates
owed his condemnationprimarilyto the Athenians'opinion that he was
impious.
Moreover,Burnetfails to considerthe fact that, in additionto being
regarded as anti-democratic, Socrates' companions Alcibiades and
Critias were also regardedas impious. Alcibiades was condemnedto
death for impietyand Critiaswas a well-knownatheist.56Eventhe polit-
ical hostilityagainstSocrates,then, was connectedwith the beliefthat he
and his companionswere impious.57
Finally, to maintainhis view that the Greeksdid not ever prosecute
anyone for religiousopinions, Buret is compelledto give accountsof
the impietytrialsof the philosophersthat arewhollyat odds with ancient
accountsof those trials. He says that "even Diagoras,the typicalatheist

52. Burnet, Greek Philosophy, pp. 187-88.

53. Burnet, Greek Philosophy, pp. 186 and 209-11, 218-19, 221, 294-301; Plato, Seventh
Letter 325bl-c5. See also Euthyphro 5c4-8, 12el-4, 15e5-16a4.
54. Apology of Socrates 26a8-b7 and Euthyphro 2b12-3b4.
55. Apology of Socrates 23c7-d7 and Laws 966d9-967d2.
56. See Thucydides, VI 27-29, 53, 60-61; Plutarch, Alcibiades 18-22; Critias, fragment
25; and Sextus Empiricus, Against the Physicists I 54 and context.
57. See W. K. C. Guthrie, Socrates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp.
62-63; Grote, A History of Greece, 6:155, 160, 181-83. See also Grote, A History of
Greece, 5:147-48; Fustel de Coulanges, La Cite Antique, p. 420; Derenne, Les Proces, pp.
254-62; E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1951), pp. 189-91; and Muir, "Religion and the New Education," pp. 193-95.
126 The Question of Historical Context

of those days, was not tried for his opinions, but for offences in language
against the temples and festivals."58 But ancient writers report that
Diagoras was condemned for being an atheist, that is, for his opinion
that the gods do not exist, and not merely for his language against tem-
ples and festivals or for any actions.59 Burnet implies that Anaxagoras
was accused of impiety for political reasons.60 But Plato and Plutarch
indicate that he was brought to trial primarily for religious reasons.61
Finally, Burnet claims that it is "highly improbable" that Protagoras
was accused of impiety.62 He then remarks that, even if Protagoras did
say, "With regard to the gods, I cannot feel sure that they are or that
they are not" (Burnet's own translation), "There is surely nothing
impious in these words from any point of view, and certainly none from
the Greek." Yet ancient writers report that Protagoras was indeed
accused of impiety, that he was forced to flee Athens, and that his books
were burned in the Athenian agora precisely because of the very state-
ment that Burnet cites.63
Burnet's remark about Protagoras is noteworthy because it indicates
how he may have arrived at the conclusion that the Greeks never prose-
cuted Socrates or anyone else for his opinions about the gods. Burnet
himself evidently believes that one can be pious without being convinced
that gods exist. And he evidently assumes that the Greeks must have
shared this opinion and consequently that they must have tolerated any
and all opinions about their gods. Therefore, he concludes, the Greeks
never prosecuted anyone for religious opinions. But Burnet's opinion
about piety is not an opinion that the ancient Greeks held.64 As I have
tried to show, the conviction that gods exist-and, specifically, that gods
who reward the righteous and punish the wicked exist-was, in the
Greeks' view, the foundation not only of their religious life but of their

58. Burnet, Greek Philosophy, p. 76.

59. Lysias, Against Andocides 17-18; Diodorus Siculus, XII 6.7; Cicero, De Natura
Deorum I 2, 63, 117-18; and Sextus Empiricus, Against the Physicists I 50-54. See also
Derenne, Les Proces, pp. 64-66; and Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, pp. 189, 201.
60. Burnet, Greek Philosophy, p. 76.
61. Apology of Socrates 26b8-e5; Laws 967b4-d2 and Phaedo 97b8-c2; and Plutarch,
Nicias 23; Pericles 32. See also Diogenes Laertius, II 12-14; and Derenne, Les Proces, pp.
23-26, 41.
62. Burnet, Greek Philosophy, p. 117.
63. Cicero, De Natura Deorum I 63; Sextus Empiricus, Against the Physicists I 56-57;
and Diogenes Laertius, IX 51-52. See also Cicero, De Natura Deorum I 2, 117-18; Plutarch,
Nicias 23; and Derenne, Les Proc,s, pp. 45-55.
64. See Derenne, Les Proces, pp. 9-12, 14-16, 21-25, 254-64, and above all his excellent
discussion on pp. 217-23.
 PeterJ. Ahrensdorf 127

political, moral, and family life as well. Accordingly,they regardedany

challengeto that fundamentalconvictionas an intolerablechallengeto
their whole way of life.65
By claiming, then, that the Greeksnever prosecutedphilosophersor
anyone else for their religiousopinions, Burnetoverlooksthe historical
evidenceavailableto us in the worksof Plato and otherancientauthors.
He also fails to appreciatethe gravityof the impietychargeagainstthe
philosophersbecause he fails to appreciatethe gravityof the religious
question as both the Greek cities and the philosophersunderstoodit.
Burnet cannot recognize the timely, historical conflict that existed
betweenthe pious Greeksand the philosophersbecausehe fails to recog-
nize the all-importanttheoretical conflict that existed between the
Greeks'convictionthat the pious life is the just, noble, and blessedlife
and the philosophers'contentionthat the life of reasonis the best way of
life.

V. Plato's Timely Defense of Philosophy

This examinationof the historicalcontext of Plato's dialoguessuggests

that, just as it is unreasonablefor Skinnerto assumethat a classictext
may not containboth timelyand timelesselements,so is it unreasonable
for him to assumethat a particularhistoricalcontext may not also con-
tain both timely and timeless elements. For, as we have seen, the his-
torical context of Plato's dialogueswas markedby profound religious
hostility to philosophy.And this hostilityhad what we may call both a
timelyand a timelessaspect. Insofaras it led to the persecutionof philos-
ophers, it posed a practicalthreatto the very survivalof philosophyin
the Greece of Plato's time. But, insofar as that hostility reflectedthe
pious convictionthat the life based on religiousfaith is the best way of
life for a human being, it representeda theoreticalchallenge to the
philosophers'claim that it is reasonand not faith that shouldguide our
lives.
This theoreticalconflict betweenrationalismand faith has appeared
time and time again throughouthistory. We see it in medieval Islam
when Alfarabi arguedthat philosophyas it has been handeddown by
Plato and Aristotle is "the superiorscienceand the one with the most
perfect[claimto rule or to] authority,"that "truewisdomis this science
and state of mind alone," that "the true philosopheris himself the

65. See Aristophanes, Clouds 1464-1509; and Plato, Laws 887c7-888a2.

128 The Questionof HistoricalContext

supremeruler," and that "philosophyis priorto religionin time."66We

see it when Averroessoughtto defendphilosophybeforethe tribunalof
the Divine Law and sought to defend the philosophersAlfarabi and
Avicennaagainstthe impietychargemadeby the theologianAlghazali.67
We see it in medievalChristendom,whenEtienneTempier,the Bishopof
Paris, condemnedthe teachingin the Universityof Parisof 219 proposi-
tions, includingsuchclaimsas: "Thatthe only wise menin the worldare
the philosophers";"That the teachingsof the theologianare based on
fables"; and "That a philosophermustnot concedethe ressurrectionto
come, because it cannot be investigatedby reason."68We see it in
modernEuropewhen Pascal criticizedDescartesfor attemptingto dis-
pense with God in his philosophyand criticizedphilosophersas a whole
for ignoringthe vital questionof the immortalityof the soul and again
when Lockedeclaredthat reasonis "our only Starand compass."69And
we see it in our own day when religiousforces throughoutthe worldare
challenging "secular" rationality and the "corrupt" culture it has
createdin the nameof divinelaw and religioustruth.70Insofar, then, as
the debate between rationalismand religious faith has emergedin so
many differenttimes and placesin the past and continuesto ragein our
own times, we may reasonablyconsiderthe theoreticalchallengeposed
by the pious Greeks to the life of reason as an enduringor timeless
challenge.Indeed,the rationalistCondorcetwentso far as to saythat, by

66. Alfarabi, "The Attainment of Happiness," trans. Muhsin Mahdi, Medieval Polit-
ical Philosophy, ed. Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1972), secs. 52-55, 63.
67. Averroes, "The Decisive Treatise, Determining What the Connection is Between
Religion and Philosophy," trans. George F. Hourani, in Lerner and Mahdi, Medieval
Political Philosophy, pp. 163-86; see also Alghazali, Erreur et Delivrance, trans. Farid
Jabre (Beyrouth: Commission Libanaise pour la Traduction des Chefs-D'Oeuvre, 1969),
pp. 72-74, 78-79.
68. Etienne Tempier, "Condemnation of 219 Propositions," trans. Ernest L. Fortin and
Peter D. O'Neill, props. 2, 183, 216, in Lerner and Mahdi, Medieval Political Philosophy.
69. Blaise Pascal, Pensees, ed. Leon Brunschvicg (Paris: Flammarion, 1976), frags. 77
[1001], 219-220 [612, 409]; and John Locke, First Treatise, in Two Treatises of Govern-
ment, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), sec. 58.
70. See Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, Fundamentalisms Observed (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1991); Ruhullah Khomeini, Islam and Revolution: Writings
and Declarations of Imam Khomeini, trans. Hamid Algar (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981),
pp. 52-53, 291-92; Maryam Jameelah, Islam and Modernism (Lahore: Mohammad Yusuf
Khan, 1966), pp. 1-39, 124-42; and Jerry Falwell, Ed Dobson, and Ed Hinson, The Funda-
mentalist Phenomenon (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981), p. 199. See also Stephen
Carter, "Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby," Duke Law Jour-
nal (1987): 977-96, especially pp. 979-83 and 992-93.
 PeterJ. Ahrensdorf 129

executing Socrates, the pious Athenians committed "the first crime

which gave birthto the war betweenphilosophyand superstition."7'
An awarenessof his historicalcontext can help us both to appreciate
why it was necessaryfor Plato to presenta timely as well as a timeless
defense of the philosophiclife and to distinguishthe timely from the
timelessaspect of his defense. As is evident from such dialoguesas the
Euthyphroand the Phaedo, Plato took the theoreticalchallengeto the
philosophiclife posed by the pious Greekswith the utmost seriousness
and sought to defend that way of life in responseto that challenge.72
Insofaras that defenseaddressesthe questionof whetherreasonor faith
shouldguideour lives, it is addressedto humanbeingsas suchand hence
to posterity. But to ensure that posterity would have access to that
defense,that all futurephilosopherswouldnot sufferthe fate of Anaxa-
goras and Socrates,and that his own workswould not suffer the fate of
Protagoras'works, Plato had to do more than compose a theoretically
compellingdefense of the philosophiclife. He also had to addressand
somehow defuse the immediateand practicalthreatto that way of life
posed by the Greeks'religioushostility. In order,then, to gain a hearing
for his theoreticaldefense of the life of reason, Plato had to adaptit to
the religiousbeliefs of his immediateaudience.
How did Plato adapt his defense of the philosophiclife to his audi-
ence?Plato addressesthis questionmost clearlyin his Apology. After he
has been convictedfor impietyand corruptionof the youth but beforehe
has been sentenced,Socratesspeculatesthat one of the Atheniansmight
ask him why he cannotdesistfrom philosophizing.In response,he says:
It is hardestof all to persuadesome of you about this. For if I say
that this is to disobeythe god and on accountof this it is impossible
for me to keep quiet, you will not be persuadedby me on the
groundsthat I am beingironic. But if I say that this is preciselythe
greatestgood for a humanbeing, to makespeeches[or arguments]
everyday about virtueand the other thingsabout whichyou hear
me conversingand examiningboth myself and others,and that the
unexaminedlife is not livablefor a humanbeing, you will be per-
suadedby me still less whenI say thesethings. But this is the way it
is, as I say, men, though to persuadeyou is not easy. (37e3-38a8)
Socratesheredrawsa sharpdistinctionbetweenhis evidentlyreligious

71. Jean-Antoine-Nicolas Caritat de Condorcet, Esquisse d'un Tableau Historique des

Progres de l'esprit Humain (Paris: Flammarion, 1988), p. 127; but see pp. 119-21 above.
72. See Euthyphro 4e4ff.; and Phaedo 62c9ff.
130 The Questionof HistoricalContext

contentionthat he has devotedhis life to the rationalpursuitof wisdom

out of obedienceto the god at Delphi and his seeminglynon-religious
contentionthat he has devotedhis life to that pursuitbecausethe philo-
sophic life, and not the pious life, is the best way of life for a human
being.73And he suggeststhat his religiousdefenseof his philosophiclife
is ironicand thereforeinsincere.But he also suggeststhat such a defense
is more likelyto persuadethe Atheniansthan would the non-ironiccon-
tention that the philosophiclife is simply the best way of life. Socrates
evidentlybelievesthat, given the Athenians'piety and their belief that
the philosopheris an essentiallyimpiousman, his only hope of persuad-
ing them of the goodnessof the philosophiclife is to persuadethemthat
the philosophiclife and the pious life are fundamentallyone and the
same.74Accordingly,throughouthis defensespeech,Socratesrepeatedly
(andironically)presentshis devotionto philosophyas a manifestationof
his devotion to the god at Delphi, a devotion that is so sincereand so
heartfeltthat he would ratherdie "many times" than abandonit.75In
this way, Socratesattemptsto defendthe philosophiclife in the Apology
not by openlychallengingthe pious beliefsof the Atheniansbut ratherby
reassuringthem that the philosopheris genuinelypious.
The suggestionthat Socrates'repeatedclaims that he is a pious man
must be taken with a grainof salt is, to be sure, a controversialone. For
example,the prominentscholarGregoryVlastosinsists that "Socrates'
acceptanceof the supernatural"must be taken as "a brute fact." He
declaresthat "far aheadof his time as Socrateswas in so manyways, in
this part of his thoughthe is a man of his time." And he concludesby
sayingthat "Born into this systemof religiousbelief, Socrates,a deeply
religiousman, could not have shruggedit off."76 Yet, the fact that the
Atheniansultimatelydid convict Socratesof impietysuggeststhat they,
at least, did not believe him to be "a deeply religiousman." Further-
more, since Vlastos admits that to "flout" the Athenians' religious
beliefs "publicly" was "an offense against the state punishable by
death," he mustalso admitthat, if Socrateshad questionedthose beliefs
in the courseof his life, he wouldhavehad to have done so with "the ut-
most discretion."77Indeed,as we haveseen, Socrateshimselfindicatesin

73. See also Apology of Socrates 22a8-c8.

74. Apology of Socrates 18b4-c3, 23d2-7.
75. See Apology of Socrates 20c4-21b9, 23a5-cl, 28d10-30cl, 30d5-31al, 35d2-8; but see
also 31c4-32a3, 33b9-c4, 41a7-b7.
76. Gregory Vlastos, Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 1991), p. 158.
77. Vlastos, Socrates, pp. 158-59; compare pp. 159-61 with Plato, Phaedo 95e7ff.,
especially 96a6-10.
 PeterJ. Ahrensdorf 131

the Apology that his claimthat the philosophiclife is a pious life is ironic
and hence disingenuousbut that it is necessaryfor him to make that
claimif he is to persuadehis pious audienceof the goodnessof his way of
life.78And as the altogetherfrank Alcibiadessays in the Symposium,
Socrates spends his whole life being ironic with his fellow human be-
ings.79It seemsreasonableto conclude,then, that, even thoughSocrates
did indeed live in religioustimes and even though he did not flout his
fellow citizens' pious beliefs publicly, he did not simply share those
beliefs and hencewas not, even in this partof his thought, simplya man
of his time.80
The rhetoricalstrategy that Plato attributesto his Socrates in the
Apology is one that he himselfemploysin his dialoguesas a whole, and
for the samereasons.Forthroughoutthe dialogues,Plato goes out of his
way to portraythe philosopheras an emphaticallypious man and as one
who specificallybelievesin gods who rewardthe righteousand punish
the wicked.For example,in such dialoguesas the Republic,the Gorgias,
the Meno, the Phaedrus,and the Phaedo, Socratesgives accountsof an
afterlifein whichthe souls of the just, including,above all, the philoso-
phers,enjoy divinerewardsand those of the unjustsuffer divinepunish-
ments. These accounts are all more or less explicitly "mythical" and
hence do not ultimatelypretendto constituterational demonstrations
eitherof the actualexistenceof such an afterlifeor of the superiorityof
the philosophiclife to other ways of life.8' Moreover,in the dialogues,
Socratespresentsargumentsfor the philosophiclife that do not depend
at all on the existenceof an afterlifein whichthe philosopheris rewarded
by the gods.82Nevertheless,the fact that Socratesrepeatedlygives such

78. Apology of Socrates 37e4-38a8. Vlastos denies that Plato's Socrates ever deliberately
deceived anyone on the grounds that such disingenuousness would have been incompatible
with Plato's praise of Socrates in the Phaedo as "the most just" man he had ever come to
know (Vlastos, pp. 147-48; see pp. 132-56 and also pp. 25-29 and 37). Yet in the Republic
Socrates explicitly argues that it is sometimes just to deceive not only one's enemies but also
one's friends (see 331cl-d3 and 382c6-10; see also 414b8-415d5 and 450d10-el) and in the
Phaedo he explicitly warns his friends that he may deceive them (91al-c5). It would seem,
then, that, at least according to Plato's Socrates, it is quite possible both to deceive human
beings and to be a most just man. See also the Hippias Minor.
79. See Symposium 221c1-3, 216e2-5, 218d5-6, and also 214e4-215al.
80. For an account of Socrates' "supernatural" divine sign see Plato, Theages.
81. See Republic 613e6-621d3, especially 621b8; Gorgias 523al-527a8, especially
527a5-8; Meno 81a5-e3; Phaedrus 245b7-257a2, especially 253c7-dl; and Phaedo 107cl-
114d7, especially 114d7. See also Apology of Socrates 39el-41c7, especially 39e4-5; and
Crito 54b2-c8.
82. See, for example, Republic 484b3-540e3, 580a9-591b6; and Phaedo 89dl-90d7,
95b9-100a7.
132 The Questionof HistoricalContext

pious accounts of an afterlife creates the overall impressionthat he

honestlybelievesin them, that he embracesthe pious belief in just gods,
and consequentlythat this philosopher,at least, is a truly pious man.
Furthermore,in the Phaedo in particular,Socratesattemptsover and
over againto vindicatethe pious beliefin an afterlifeby provingthat our
individualsouls are immortal.Now, as ancient,modern,and contempo-
rary commentatorshave noted and as Socrateshimself acknowledges
repeatedlyin the dialogue, all of the argumentsin the Phaedo fail to
provethe immortalityof the individualsoul.83Nevertheless,the fact that
Socratesstrivesso mightilyto defendthe pious beliefin immortality,that
he does so on the very day of his execution for impiety, and that he
appearsto confirmthe sincerityof his beliefin immortalityby appearing
to die fearlesslycreatesthe almostoverwhelmingimpressionthat he is a
sincerelypious man.84In this way, Socrates'argumentsfor immortality
in that dialoguedo succeed,not in provingthe immortalityof the indi-
vidualsoul, but ratherin fulfillinghis explicitintentionto defendhimself
and all philosophersagainstthe chargethat they are impiousand to per-
suade humanbeingsat largethat he believesin an afterlife.85Finally,in
Plato's Laws, the seeminglyphilosophicAthenianStrangerundertakes
to providea rationaldefenseof piety againstthe challengeof atheism.86
That defense is open to seriousdoubts above all becauseat one crucial
point it is explicitly"mythical."87Yet it persuasivelypresentsthe philos-
opher as a loyal defenderof piety.
Thesepassagesreflect,at least in part, Plato's attemptto persuadehis
audience that the philosopheris a man of unassailablepiety.88They

83. See Cicero, TusculanDisputationsI 49; Georg Hegel, Lectureson the Historyof
Philosophy,trans. E. S. Haldaneand F. Simson(New Jersey:HumanitiesPress, 1955),
2:43; R. Hackforth,Plato's Phaedo(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1955),pp.
64-65, 76, 84-86, 157, 163-66, 195-98;Paul Friedlander,Plato, trans. H. Meyerhoff
(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1969), 3:45-49, 54, 57-60, 474; David Gallop,
Plato's Phaedo (Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1975), pp. 104-13, 134-36, 140-42, 216-22;
Hans-GeorgGadamer,Dialogue and Dialectic:Eight HermeneuticalStudies on Plato,
trans.P. C. Smith(New Haven:YaleUniversityPress, 1980),pp. 21-22,25-28,36-38;and
Phaedo 63b5-c4,84c5-7,86d5-e4,91al-b7, 106c9-d7,107b4-9,114dl-7.
84. See, for example,Phaedo 58e3-59al.
85. See Phaedo62c9-64a3,84d4-e3.
86. Laws 886e6ff.
87. Laws 903a10-905d3.
88. Comparealso Apology of Socrates18b4-c3and 23d2-7with Timaeus27a3-6,27cl-
d4, 29a2-6,29e1-30c1,39e3-42d2,46e6-47c4,52d3-e6,90bl-d7. Plato also defendedphilos-
the traditionalreligionof the Greeksso as to renderit compatible
ophy by reinterpreting
with the rationalismof the philosopher.See Republic377bll-383c7 and also Cratylus
395d7-410el.
 Peter J. Ahrensdorf 133

reflect his intention to remove the threat to philosophy posed by the

religious persecution of philosophers in Greece by making a religious
defense of philosophy to the Greeks. They reflect his attempt to present a
practically effective defense of philosophy for his times as well as a theo-
retically compelling defense of philosophy for all times.
It is worth noting that some time after Plato wrote, the position of
philosophers in the Greek world improved dramatically. The persecution
of philosophers did persist for a time. Aristotle, Theodorus, and Stilpo
were all accused of impiety by the Athenians and were forced to flee the
city.89 But these instances of hostility to philosophers are outweighed by
the overall improvement of the reputation of philosophy. Plato won
enormous fame among the Greeks in his lifetime.90 The school he
founded in Athens attracted students from all over the ancient world and
was not closed once in the eight hundred years of its existence. During
that time it produced not only such philosophers as Speusippus, Aris-
totle, and Xenocrates, but also such statesmen as the Athenian Phocion,
the Syracusan Dion, and the Romans Cicero and Brutus.91
Other philosophers, following the example of Plato, founded schools
of their own which also enjoyed the goodwill of the Greeks.92The Cynic
Diogenes and the Stoic Zeno were honored and cherished by the Atheni-
ans.93And Pyrrho, whose students founded the Sceptics, was appointed
the chief priest of Elis.94Eventually, the philosophers won renown in the
most powerful city in the ancient world, Rome. The reputation of philos-
ophy grew so great in Rome that such students of philosophy as Scipio
Aemilianus Africanus, Cato the Younger, and Marcus Aurelius became
its political leaders.95 Philosophy, then, which had been an activity
engaged in by a small band of persecuted men at the time of Socrates'
death, gradually became a subject of study for preeminent statesmen of
the ancient world.
It is also worth noting that, in the judgment of Plutarch, it was Plato

89. Diogenes Laertius, V 5-6; II 101-02; II 116; and Derenne, Les Proces, pp. 188-94,
202-12. See also Diogenes Laertius, III 23-24; and Grote, Plato, p. 260.
90. See Diogenes Laertius, III 23-25; Grote, Plato, pp. 246, 255, 261; and Plutarch,
Dion 10-11.
91. See Friedlander, Plato, 1:91-92; Grote, Plato, 1:254-56, 261, 265-67; Burnet, Greek
Philosophy, pp. 213-14; Taylor, Platonism, pp. 6-7; Plutarch, Phocion 4, 5.2, 14.4, 38.2;
Dion 1-2, 4, 10-11, 17-18.1, 22; Cicero 3-4, 32.6; Brutus 2, 24.1-2.
92. See Grote, Plato, p. 266.
93. Diogenes Laertius, VI 43; VII 6, 9-12, 29-30.
94. Diogenes Laertius, IX 64, 69-70.
95. See Cicero, De Republica III 5-6, IV 4-5 (see also I 34 and Tusculan Disputations I
79); and Plutarch, Cato the Younger 4, 6.1-3, 10, 65.5, 66-70.
134 The Questionof HistoricalContext

in particularwho brought about this remarkableimprovementin the

statusof philosophyand that he did so by givingphilosophersa reputa-
tion for piety which they had lacked before. For in the passage cited
above from his life of Nicias (see above pp. 122-23),he contendsthat
Plato removedthe slanderthat philosophywas an essentiallyimpious
activity and therebymade it acceptableto "all men." Although indi-
vidual philosopherscontinuedto be chargedwith impiety after Plato
died, philosophyas such ceased to be viewed as an essentiallyimpious
way of life. Withthe threatof impietytrialsno longerhangingover their
heads at all times, philosophersand their students could survive un-
molested and even respectedin the ancient world. And Plato himself,
whose teacherand friendhad been put to death for impiety,eventually
acquiredthe epithet "the divine."96
Plato's religiousdefenseof philosophyprovedto be a brilliantsuccess.
But the successof that defenseshouldnot blindus to the ironicand time-
ly characterof that defense. As I have tried to show, a study of the
appropriatehistoricalcontextof Plato's defenseof the philosophiclife in
conjunctionwith a study of his texts themselvessuggeststhat, insofaras
that defenseidentifiesthe philosophiclife withthe pious life, it is specifi-
cally adaptedto the religiousbeliefs of his immediateaudienceand it is
specificallyintended to remove the practicalthreat that those beliefs
posed to the survivalof philosophyin Greece.And, accordingly,such a
studysuggestsas well that Plato's genuinedefenseof the philosophiclife
is not itself of a religious characterbut is in fact directedagainst the
theoreticalchallengeposed by piety to that way of life.
I cannotexplainthe timelesselementsof Plato's genuinedefenseof the
philosophiclife in this essay. I can only suggestthat a criticalinvestiga-
tion of piety is centralto that defense. Plato presentsthat investigation
most clearly in the Phaedo, that is, in the dialogue in which Socrates
offers his final defenseof the philosophiclife beforehe is executedby the
city of Athens for impiety.97
I do hope to have shownthat a studyof the contextof Plato's defense
of the philosophiclife permitsus to recognizethe distinctivelytimely
characterof his religiousdefenseand permitsus to discernthe intransi-
gent characterof his distinctivelytimelessdefenseof the life of reason.I
also hope to have shownhow sucha studycan enableus to recognizenot
only the immediateconflict betweenthe philosopherPlato and the pious
Greeksof his time, but also the timelessdebatebetweenrationalismand

96. See Cicero, De Legibus III 1; De Natura Deorum II 32.

97. See Phaedo 63blff.
 PeterJ. Ahrensdorf 135

religiousfaith that lay at the heartof that conflict. In this way, I hope to
have persuadedthe readerthat, notwithstandingSkinner'sclaimsto the
contrary,the study of the historicalcontext of the classic authorsneed
not lead us to conclude that those authors are merelytimely but may
ratherlead us to a deeperappreciationof the timelesscharacterboth of
their thought and of the ouestionsthev address.