PICOP RESOURCES, INC. vs.

BASE METALS MINERAL RESOURCES CORPORATION

G.R. No. 163509 December 6, 2006
TINGA, J.:
FACTS: In 1987, the Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation entered into a
Mines Operating Agreement with Banahaw Mining and Development Corporationwhereby the
latter agreed to act as Mine Operator for the exploration, development, and eventualcommercial
operation of CMMCI's 18 mining claims located in Agusan del Sur. Pursuant to theterms of the
Agreement, Banahaw Mining filed applications for Mining Lease Contracts over themining
claims with the Bureau of Mines. On April 29, 1988, Banahaw Mining was issued a
MinesTemporary Permit authorizing it to extract and dispose of precious minerals found within
its miningclaims. Since a portion of Banahaw Mining's mining claims was located in
petitioner PICOP'slogging concession in Agusan del Sur, Banahaw Mining and petitioner
PICOP entered into a MOAwhereby petitioner PICOP allowed Banahaw Mining an
access to its mining claims. In 1991,Banahaw Mining converted its mining claims
to applications for Mineral Production SharingAgreements (MPSA for brevity). While the
MPSA were pending, Banahaw Mining, on December 18, 1996, decided
tosell/assign its rights and interests over 37 mining claims in favor of private respondent Base
MetalsMineral Resources Corporation. The transfer included those covered by its
mining operatingagreement with CMMCI. Upon being informed of the development,
CMMCI, as claim owner,immediately approved the assignment made by Banahaw Mining in
favor of private respondentBase Metals, thereby recognizing private respondent Base
Metals as the new operator of itsclaims. On March 10, 1997, private respondent Base
Metals amended Banahaw Mining's pendingMPSA applications with the Bureau of
Mines to substitute itself as applicant and to submitadditional documents in support
of the application. Area clearances from the DENR RegionalDirector and
Superintendent of the Agusan Marsh and Wildlife Sanctuary were submitted,
asrequired. On November 18, 1997, petitioner PICOP filed with the Mines Geo-
Sciences Bureau(MGB), an Opposition to private respondent Base Metals' application
because it violate the non-impairment clause and will be prejudicial to herein petitioner. The
Panel Arbitrator initially ruled forpetitioner, but upon appeal to the Mines Adjudication Board,
judgment was in favor of respondent,CA affirmed stating that the Presidential Warranty
of
September 25, 1968 issued by then PresidentFerdinand E. Marcos merely confirmed the timber
license granted to PICOP and warranted thelatter's peaceful and adequate possession and
enjoyment of its concession areas. It was only givenupon the request of the Board of
Investments to establish the boundaries of PICOP's timber licenseagreement. The
Presidential Warranty did not convert PICOP's timber license into a
contractbecause it did not create any obligation on the part of the government in favor of
PICOP. Thus, thenon-impairment clause finds no application.
ISSUE: W/N the concession area of petitioner is closed to mining activities .
PICOP RESOURCES, INC. vs. BASE METALS MINERAL RESOURCES CORPORATION
G.R. No. 163509 December 6, 2006
TINGA, J.:
FACTS: In 1987, the Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation entered into a
Mines Operating Agreement with Banahaw Mining and Development Corporationwhereby the
latter agreed to act as Mine Operator for the exploration, development, and eventualcommercial
operation of CMMCI's 18 mining claims located in Agusan del Sur. Pursuant to theterms of the
Agreement, Banahaw Mining filed applications for Mining Lease Contracts over themining
claims with the Bureau of Mines. On April 29, 1988, Banahaw Mining was issued a
MinesTemporary Permit authorizing it to extract and dispose of precious minerals found within
its miningclaims. Since a portion of Banahaw Mining's mining claims was located in
petitioner PICOP'slogging concession in Agusan del Sur, Banahaw Mining and petitioner
PICOP entered into a MOAwhereby petitioner PICOP allowed Banahaw Mining an
access to its mining claims. In 1991,Banahaw Mining converted its mining claims
to applications for Mineral Production SharingAgreements (MPSA for brevity). While the
MPSA were pending, Banahaw Mining, on December 18, 1996, decided
tosell/assign its rights and interests over 37 mining claims in favor of private respondent Base
MetalsMineral Resources Corporation. The transfer included those covered by its
mining operatingagreement with CMMCI. Upon being informed of the development,
CMMCI, as claim owner,immediately approved the assignment made by Banahaw Mining in
favor of private respondentBase Metals, thereby recognizing private respondent Base
Metals as the new operator of itsclaims. On March 10, 1997, private respondent Base
Metals amended Banahaw Mining's pendingMPSA applications with the Bureau of
Mines to substitute itself as applicant and to submitadditional documents in support
of the application. Area clearances from the DENR RegionalDirector and
Superintendent of the Agusan Marsh and Wildlife Sanctuary were submitted,
asrequired. On November 18, 1997, petitioner PICOP filed with the Mines Geo-
Sciences Bureau(MGB), an Opposition to private respondent Base Metals' application
because it violate the non-impairment clause and will be prejudicial to herein petitioner. The
Panel Arbitrator initially ruled forpetitioner, but upon appeal to the Mines Adjudication Board,
judgment was in favor of respondent,CA affirmed stating that the Presidential Warranty
of
September 25, 1968 issued by then PresidentFerdinand E. Marcos merely confirmed the timber
license granted to PICOP and warranted thelatter's peaceful and adequate possession and
enjoyment of its concession areas. It was only givenupon the request of the Board of
Investments to establish the boundaries of PICOP's timber licenseagreement. The
Presidential Warranty did not convert PICOP's timber license into a
contractbecause it did not create any obligation on the part of the government in favor of
PICOP. Thus, thenon-impairment clause finds no application.
ISSUE: W/N the concession area of petitioner is closed to mining activities
G.R. No. 163509 PICOP RESOURCES, INC.,petitioner, - versus BASE METALS MINERAL RESOURCES ADJUDICATION BOARD,
respondents. CORPORATION and THE MINES

FACTS:

Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation (CMMCI for brevity) entered into a Mines Operating Agreement
(Agreement for brevity) with Banahaw Mining and Development Corporation (Banahaw Mining for brevity) whereby the latter
agreed to act as Mine Operator for the exploration, development, and eventual commercial operation of CMMCI‟s eighteen (18)
mining claims located in Agusan del Sur. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Banahaw Mining filed applications for Mining
Lease Contracts over the mining claims with the Bureau of Mines. So that Banahaw Mining was issued a Mines Temporary
Permit authorizing it to extract and dispose of precious minerals found within its mining claims. Upon its expiration, the
temporary permit was subsequently renewed thrice by the Bureau of Mines, the last being on June 28, 1991. Since a portion of
Banahaw Mining‟s mining claims was located in petitioner PICOP‟s logging concession in Agusan del Sur, Banahaw Mining and
petitioner PICOP entered into a Memorandum of Agreement, whereby, in mutual recognition of each other‟s right to the area
concerned, petitioner PICOP allowed Banahaw Mining an access/right of way to its mining claims. Banahaw Mining converted its
mining claims to applications for Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA for brevity). While the MPSA were pending,
Banahaw Mining, on December 18, 1996, decided to sell/assign its rights and interests over thirty-seven (37) mining claims in
favor of private respondent Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation (Base Metals for brevity). The transfer included mining
claims held by Banahaw Mining in its own right as claim owner, as well as those covered by its mining operating agreement with
CMMCI. Upon being informed of the development, CMMCI, as claim owner, immediately approved the assignment made by
Banahaw Mining in favor of private respondent Base Metals, thereby recognizing private respondent Base Metals as the new
operator of its claims. On March 10, 1997, private respondent Base Metals amended Banahaw Mining‟s pending MPSA
applications with the Bureau of Mines to substitute itself as applicant and to submit additional documents in support of the
application. Area clearances from the DENR Regional Director and Superintendent of the Agusan Marsh and Wildlife Sanctuary
were submitted, as required. On October 7, 1997, private respondent Base Metals‟ amended MPSA applications were published
in accordance with the requirements of the Mining Act of 1995. On November 18, 1997, petitioner PICOP filed with the Mines
Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB), Caraga Regional Office No. XIII an Adverse Claim and/or Opposition to private respondent Base
Metals‟ application. After the submission of their respective position paper, the Panel Arbitrator issued an Order disapproving
private respondent Base Metals‟ MPSA on the reasons that adverse claim was filed on time, that the granting of the MPSA
application on area subject of an IFMA or PTLA which is covered by a Presidential Warranty, the panel believes it cannot, unless
the grantee consents thereto, without the grantee‟s consent, the area is considered closed to mining location (sec. 19) (b) (No.
2), DAO No. 96-40) and that the mining location in forest or timberland is allowed only if such forest or timberland is not leased
by the government to a qualified person or entity and if it is leased the consent of the lessor is necessary, in addition to the area
clearance to be issued by the agency concerned before it is subjected to mining operation. Plantation is considered closed to
mining locations because it is off tangent to mining. Both are extremes. They can not exist at the same time. The other must
necessarily stop before the other operate. Private respondent Base Metals filed a Notice of Appeal with public respondent MAB,
the latter rendered the assailed decision setting aside the Panel Arbitrator‟s order. The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of
the MAB. Hence this petition. PICOP presents the following issues: (1) the 2,756 hectares subject of Base Metals‟ MPSA are
closed to mining operations except upon PICOP‟s written consent pursuant to existing laws, rules and regulations and by virtue
of the Presidential Warranty; (2) its Presidential Warranty is protected by the non-impairment clause of the Constitution; and (3)
it does not raise new issues in its petition. PICOP asserts that its concession areas are closed to mining operations as these are
within the Agusan-Surigao-Davao forest reserve established under Proclamation No. 369 of then Gov. Gen. Dwight Davis. The
area is allegedly also part of permanent forest established under Republic Act No. 3092 (RA 3092), and overlaps the wilderness
area where mining applications are expressly prohibited under RA 7586. Hence, the area is closed to mining operations under
Sec. 19(f) of RA 7942.

ISSUE: Whether or not the area covered by Base Metals‟ MPSA is, by law, closed to mining activities Whether or not the
Presidential Warranty is a contract protected by the non-impairment clause of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD: Anent the first issue, the Court ruled that the area covered by Base Metals‟ MPSA is, by law, not closed to mining
activities. There is no evidence in this case that the area covered by Base Metals‟ MPSA has been proclaimed as watershed
forest reserves. Even granting that the area covered by the MPSA is part of the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve, such does
not necessarily signify that the area is absolutely closed to mining activities. Contrary to PICOP‟s obvious misreading of our
decision in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, supra, to the effect that mineral agreements are not allowed in the forest reserve
established under Proclamation 369, the Court in that case actually ruled that pursuant to PD 463 as amended by PD 1385, one
can acquire mining rights within forest reserves, such as the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve, by initially applying for a
permit to prospect with the Bureau of Forest and Development and subsequently for a permit to explore with the Bureau of
Mines and Geosciences. Moreover, Sec. 18 RA 7942 allows mining even in timberland or forestty subject to existing rights and
reservations. Similarly, Sec. 47 of PD 705 permits mining operations in forest lands which include the public forest, the
permanent forest or forest reserves, and forest reservations With regard to the second issue, the Court do not subscribe to
PICOP‟s argument that the Presidential Warranty dated September 25, 1968 is a contract protected by the nonimpairment
clause of the 1987 Constitution. An examination of the Presidential Warranty at once reveals that it simply reassures PICOP of
the government‟s commitment to uphold the terms and conditions of its timber license and guarantees PICOP‟s peaceful and
adequate possession and enjoyment of the areas which are the basic sources of raw materials for its wood processing complex.
The warranty covers only the right to cut, collect, and remove timber in its concession area, and does not extend to the
utilization of other resources, such as mineral resources, occurring within the concession. The Presidential Warranty cannot be
considered a contract distinct from PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35. It is merely a collateral undertaking which cannot amplify
PICOP‟s rights under its timber license. Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked.

Hilarion M. Henares, et al v. LTFRB FACTS:Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus
commanding respondents LTFRBand DOTC to require PUVs to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as
alternative fuel. Assertingtheir right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their petition
for a writ of mandamusto order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in
Section 16, ArticleII of the 1987 Constitution, our ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., and Section 4
of Republic ActNo. 8749otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999."ISSUE:WON LTFRB
can be compelled to require PUVs to use CNG through a writ of Mandamus?HELD:NO. Petitioners
invoke the provisions of the Constitution and the Clean Air Act in their prayer for issuance of a writ of
mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG asan alternative fuel. Although
both are general mandates that do not specifically enjoin the use ofany kind of f uel, parti cularly
the us e of C NG, there i s an execu tive ord er im plem enting a program on the use of CNG by
public vehicles. Executive Order No. 290, entitled Implementingthe Natural Gas Vehicle Program
for Public Transport (NGVPPT), took effect on February 24,2004. A thorough reading of the
executive order assures us that implementation for a cleanerenvironment is being addressed. To
a certain extent, the instant petition had been mooted bythe issuance of E.O. No. 290.Regrettably,
however, a writ of mandamus is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an
act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents
LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. Further,mandamus will not
generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch, for theo b v i o u s re a s o n t h a t
n e i t h e r i s i n f e r i o r t o t h e o t h e r. T h e n e e d f o r f u t u re c h a n g e s i n b o t h legislation and its
implementation cannot be preempted by orders from this Court, especially when what is prayed
for is procedurally infirm. Besides, comity with and courtesy to a coequal branch dictate that we
give suffi cient time and leeway for the coequal branches to address bythemselves the
environmental problems raised in this petition. In the same manner that we haveassociated the
fundamental right to a balanced and healthful ecology with the twin concepts of "inter-generational
responsibility" and "inter-generational justice" in Oposa, where we upheld theright of future Filipinos
to prevent the destruction of the rainforests, so do we recognize, in this petition, the right of
petitioners and the future generation to clean air.

Henares v LTFRB (Environmental Law)

Henares v LTFRB
GR No. 158290
October 23, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents Land
Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use
compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.

ISSUES:

(1) Do petitioners have legal personality to bring this petition before us?
(2) Should mandamus issue against respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG as alternative
fuel?

APPLICABLE LAWS:

• Section 16,12 Article II of the 1987 Constitution

The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

• Section 414 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of
1999." SEC. 4. Recognition of Rights. – Pursuant to the above-declared principles, the following
rights of citizens are hereby sought to be recognized and the State shall seek to guarantee
their enjoyment:
a) The right to breathe clean air;
b) The right to utilize and enjoy all natural resources according to the principle of sustainable
development;
c) The right to participate in the formulation, planning, implementation and monitoring of
environmental policies and programs and in the decision-making process;
d) The right to participate in the decision-making process concerning development policies,
plans and programs, projects or activities that may have adverse impact on the environment
and public health;
e) The right to be informed of the nature and extent of the potential hazard of any activity,
undertaking or project and to be served timely notice of any significant rise in the level of
pollution and the accidental or deliberate release into the atmosphere of harmful or hazardous
substances;
f) The right of access to public records which a citizen may need to exercise his or her rights
effectively under this Act;
g) The right to bring action in court or quasi-judicial bodies to enjoin all activities in violation
of environmental laws and regulations, to compel the rehabilitation and cleanup of affected
area, and to seek the imposition of penal sanctions against violators of environmental laws;
and
h) The right to bring action in court for compensation of personal damages resulting from the
adverse environmental and public health impact of a project or activity.

RULING:

(1) YES. There is no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring their case before this
Court. Moreover, as held previously, a party's standing before this Court is a procedural
technicality which may, in the exercise of the Court's discretion, be set aside in view of the
importance of the issue raised. We brush aside this issue of technicality under the principle of
the transcendental importance to the public, especially so if these cases demand that they be
settled promptly.

(2) NO. plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of
mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus
is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here,
there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor
vehicles to use CNG. Mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a
coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other.

It appears that more properly, the legislature should provide first the specific statutory
remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial
recourse by mandamus is taken.

MUSTANG LUMBER v. CA
G.R Nos. 104988, 106424, 123784
Ponente: J. Davide Jr.

FACTS:

On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and
slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, DENR
organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said
lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the
petitioner's truck, loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions.
Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and transport documents, the team
seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound at
Visayas Avenue, Quezon City. The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because
of the refusal of the owner.

On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive Judge Adriano
R. Osorio of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the
team seized on that date from the petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts,
trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board
feet of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa.

On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela
and placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan
lumber with a total volume of 311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon
demand the corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and
delivery receipts from the source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy
of their source and origin.

The petitioner's question the seizure contending that the possession of lumber, as opposed to
timber, is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even granting arguendo
that lumber falls within the purview of the said section, the same may not be used in evidence
against him for they were taken by virtue of an illegal seizure.

ISSUE:
Whether the contention of the petitioner is correct that lumber is different from timber

HELD:

No,

The Supreme Court held that the Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber
or lumber.
While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the
latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant."

Lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material.

The Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition
of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs
after being prepared for the market."

Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in the absence of legislative
intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain,
ordinary, and common usage meaning.

And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned,
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed
timber. Neither should we.
G.R. No. 131270, March 17, 2000
PERFECTO PALLADA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT
FACTS:
In the latter part of 1992, the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) office in Bukidnon received reports that illegally
cut lumber was being delivered to the warehouse of the Valencia Golden
Harvest Corporation in Valencia, Bukidnon. The company is engaged in
rice milling and trading. DENR officers, assisted by elements of the
Philippine National Police, raided the company's warehouse in Poblacion,
Valencia on the strength of a warrant issued by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 8, Malaybalay, Bukidnon .They found a large stockpile of lumber of
varying sizes cut by a chain saw. As proof that the company had acquired
the lumber by purchase, petitioner produced two receipts issued by R.L.
Rivero Lumberyard of Maramag, Bukidnon, dated March 6 and 17, 1992.
5

The DENR officers did not, give credit to the receipts considering that R. L.
Rivero Lumberyard's permit to operate had long been suspended. Moreover
the pieces of lumber found by the authorities were cut by chain saw and
thus could not have come from a licensed sawmill operator.
On October 1, 1992, the raiding team returned for the remaining
lumber. Company president Francisco Tankiko and a certain Isaias
Valdehueza, who represented himself to be a lawyer, asked for a suspension
of the operations to enable them to seek a lifting of the warrant. The motion
was filed with the court which issued the warrant but, on October 5, 1992,
the motion was denied. Accordingly, the remaining lumber was confiscated.
By October 9, 1992, all the lumber in the warehouse had been seized.
On February 23, 1993, petitioner, as general manager, together with
Noel Sy, as assistant operations manager, and Francisco Tankiko, as
president of the Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation, and Isaias
Valdehueza, were charged with violation of §68 of P.D .No. 705, as
amended. As all the accused pleaded not guilty, trial ensued. Then on July
27, 1994, judgment was rendered finding accused Perfecto Pallada and
Francisco Tankiko guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having in their
possession timber products worth of P488, 334.45 without the legal
documents as charged in the information in violation of Section 68 of
Presidential Decree 705, as amended. Petitioner and Francisco Tankiko
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, on October 31, 1997, affirmed
petitioner's conviction but acquitted Tankiko for lack of proof of his
participation in the purchase or acquisition of the seized lumber.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals was correct in upholding
the decision of the trial court that the certificate of timber origin was the
proper document to justify petitioner’s possession of the squared timber or
flitches
Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals was correct in upholding
the ruling of the trial court that the presence of erasures in the certificate of
timber origin render them valueless as evidence
RULING:
The Court held that trial court acted correctly in not giving credence
to the Certificates of Timber Origin presented by petitioner since the
lumber held by the company should be covered by Certificates of Lumber
Origin.
Even assuming that a Certificate of Timber Origin could serve as a
substitute for Certificate of Lumber Origin, the trial court and the Court of
6

Appeals were justified in convicting petitioner, considering the numerous

irregularities and defects found in the documents presented by the latter.
These irregularities and discrepancies make the documents in which they
are found not only questionable but invalid and, thus, justified the trial
court in giving no credence to the same.