11. People v.

Balacanao, GR 118133, 28 February 2003 (GR 118133)

FACTS:

Fifteen (15) armed men stormed the house of Manuel Calata and his wife ―AAA‖ in
Cagayan. Conspiring together and helping one another with intent to gain, the armed men stole
and carried away several personal properties (total amount 11150) to the damage and prejudice
of the owner and on occasion thereof, four of them had sexual intercourse with the offended party
AAA against her will. The trial court found Balacanao, Salvador, Soriano, Batuelo, Gangan,
Camayang, Caronan, Tacio Acorda and Ruben Acorda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
special complex crime of Robbery with Rape aggravated by abuse of superior strength and
ignominy.

Accused-appellants contend that the prosecution failed to establish their identity as

participants in the crime.

(cant find any issue or resolution which relates to Art 302 RPC- Robbery in an uninhabited
place or building)

ISSUE: Whether accused-appellants are guilty of the crime charged- complex crime of robbery
with rape.

HELD:

In robbery with rape, the rule is the same as the rule in robbery with homicide. Instead of
convicting only the sexual offenders of Robbery with Rape, their co-conspirators will also be made
liable to the same offense, even if they did not actually rape any of the victim.

12. People v. Salvilla, 184 SCRA 671

The accused Bienvenido Salvilla together with his co-accused armed with homemade guns and
hand grenade robbed Rodita Habiero in the latter’s office. In the office there was Severino
Choco; her two daughters Mary and Mimmie were also inside. One of the accused asks Mary to
get the paper bag which contained money (20 000 according to the victim 5000 according to
the accused). Rodita, Mary and Mimmie were held victims as hostage when the police and
military authorities had surrounded the lumber yard. After the negotiation fails to proceed, the
police makes their move in assaulting the robbers thus Mary and Mimmie are injured as well
the accused also got an injury.
COS: "Robbery with Serious Physical Injuries and Serious Illegal Detention"
COA: ( wala po ako mahanapan COA regarding sa complexity , maybe kasi dapat absorb din ang
illegal detention sa crime of robbery )
Held: Under Article 48, a complex crime arises "when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other." The term "necessary means" does not connote indispensable means for
if it did then the offense as a "necessary means" to commit another would be an indispensable
element of the latter and would be an ingredient thereof. The phrase "necessary means"
merely signifies that one crime is committed to facilitate and insure the commission of the
other .

In this case, the crime of Serious Illegal Detention was such a "necessary means" as it was
selected by Appellant and his co-accused to facilitate and carry out more effectively their evil
design to stage a robbery.

The elements of the offense of Serious Illegal Detention are present in this case. The victims
were illegally deprived of their liberty. Two females (Mary and Minnie) and a minor (Minnie), a
specified circumstance in Article 267 (3), were among those detained. The continuing detention
was also for the purpose of extorting ransom, another listed circumstance in Article 267 (last
parag.) not only from the detained persons themselves but even from the authorities who
arrived to rescue them.

It follows then that as the detention in this case was not merely incidental to the robbery but a
necessary means employed to facilitate it, the penalty imposed by the Trial Court is proper.

13. People v. Apduhan, 24 SCRA 798, GR No. L-19491

Contention of the State: Apolonio Apduhan, Jr. was convicted of robbery with homicide and
sentencing him to death. Apduhan, along with five others entered the house of the spouses Miano,
shooting Geronimo Miano and Norberto Aton and killing both of them, then took money amounting
to P322.00 belonging to Geronimo. The act committed was contrary to the provisions of Art. 294,
par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code with the special aggravating circumstance that the crime was
committed by a band with the use of unlicensed firearms (Art. 296).
Contention of the Accused: The use of unlicensed firearm, if ever appreciated in the case at bar,
must be considered a generic aggravating factor which "may be off-set by the existence of
mitigating circumstances so that the penalty to be imposed should be the penalty of reclusion
perpetua."

Resolution: Consequently, although the use of unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating

circumstance under art. 296, as amended by Rep. Act 12, 3 it cannot be appreciated as such in
relation to robbery with homicide, described and penalized under paragraph 1 of art. 294.

As previously stated, art. 295 provides that if any of the classes of robbery described in
subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of art. 294 is committed by a band, the offender shall be punished by
the maximum period of the proper penalty. Correspondingly, the immediately following
provisions of art. 296 define the term "band", prescribe the collective liability of the members of
the band, and state that "when any of the arms used in the commission of the offense be in
unlicensed firearm, the penalty to be imposed upon all the malefactors shall be the maximum of
the corresponding penalty provided by law."

The special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm, however, was initially
applicable to all the subdivisions of art. 294 since the said Rep. Act No. 12 also amended art.
295 to include within its scope all the classes of robbery described in art. 294. With the then
enlarged coverage of art. 295, art. 296, being corollary to the former, was perforce made
applicable to robbery with homicide (art. 294[1]). Thus, in People vs. Bersamin, this Court, in
passing, opined: "The use of unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating circumstance
applicable only in cases of robbery in band (Art. 296, Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 3, Republic Act No. 12)."

14. People v. Jaranilla, 55 SCRA 563

FACTS: Heman Gorriceta driving a Ford pickup truck saw defendants Ricardo Suyo, Elias Jaranilla and Franco Brillantes.
They asked Gorriceta to bring them to Mandurriao which he initially demurred but the appellants eventually prevailed.
Upon reaching Mandurriao, they parked the pickup truck at a distance 50 – 70 meters away from the provincial
hospital and Gorriceta was instructed to wait for the defendants as they alighted. After twenty minutes, the three-
accused arrived carrying two roosters each. They ran to the truck and instructed Gorriceta to drive immediately as
they were being chased. Gorriceta then drove the truck to Jaro, another city district. In the middle of the road, they
were intercepted by Policemen Ramonito Jabatan and Benjamin Castro. Gorriceta stopped the truck near the
policemn after Jabatan fired a warning shot. Jabatan ordered all of them to step out which they did not heed. Brillantes
pulled his revolver but did not fire it while Suyo did nothing. Jaranilla, all of a sudden, shot Patrolman Jabatan. The
shooting frightened Gorriceta who immediately started the truck and drove straight home while Jaranilla kept on
firing towards Jabatan.

STATE: Robbery with Homicide

ACCUSED: The taking of the roosters was theft and, alternatively, if it was robbery, the crime could not be robbery
with homicide because the robbery was already consummated when Jabatan was killed.

HELD: The killing of the police officer was not by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, hence only the person
who shot such officer should be liable for the killing.

15. People v. Puno, 219 SCRA 85

FACTS:
Mrs. Maria Soccoro sarmiento was an owner of a bakeshop in araneta avenue, in 5:00 in the
afternoon she called her husband’s driver, because her personal driver fred was in Pampanga pior
to an emergency, she was not familiar with her husband’s driver, yet she boarded the car; then,
instructed the driver ( isabello guevarra) to take her home in pasig. The driver went in a
different route, whereby another person boarded the car named Enrique amurao. So in the course
of taking her home she was held hostage in demand for money amounting to 100k pesos. She
gave the money by way of checks, while withdrawing in a nearby ATM machine. She was asked
to board the car again, then as the car speedily ran. She jumped out of the car, then sought for
help from the fish vendors who near the place of the incident.
Accused’s contention:
There was no evidence to show that the appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the
time they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of money
from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation. This much is admitted by both
appellants,
States contention:
The court agrees that the crime is robbery. But it is also clear from the allegation in the
information that the victim was carried away and extorted for more money. The accused
admitted that the robbery was carried on from Araneta Avenue up to the North Superhighway.
They likewise admitted that along the way they intimidated Ma. Socorro to produce more money
that she had with her at the time for which reason Ma. Socorro, not having more cash, drew out
three checks.

Held:
The accused-appellants Isabelo Puno y Guevarra and Enrique Amurao y Puno were found guilty
of robbery as Punished in Paragraph 5 of Article 294, in relation to Article 295, of the Revised
Penal Code
On the issue that the crime committed was kidnapping
Lastly, in a prosecution for kidnapping, the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of the latter's liberty, in
any manner, needs to be established by indubitable proof

16. People v. Pulusan, 290 SCRA 353 (G.R. No. 110037, May 21, 1998)
Facts: Accused held up a passenger jeep along the McArthur highway. Of the 6 passengers, the only
woman, Marilyn was successively raped by the accused at a talahiban and 4 male passengers were
clubbed and stabbed on after the other. They were convicted of robbery with homicide although they
were charged with highway robbery. What was the crime committed?
Held: Robbery with homicide, not highway robbery. Conviction under PD 532 requires proof that the
accused were organised for the purpose of committing robbery indiscriminately. In this case, there was
no proof that the 4 accused previously attempted to commit armed robberies.
E. ART. 304- POSSESSION OF PICKLOCKS OR SIMILAR TOOLS

F. ART. 305 FALSE KEYS

G. SPECIAL LAWS:

1. Highway Robbery PD 532

2. Republic Act No. 10883 entitled: "An Act Providing for a New. Anti-Carnapping Law of the
Philippines".

(i) Definition of terms

(ii) Registration

(iii) Who are liable

(a) Duty of collector of customs

(b) Duty of importers, distributors and sellers

(c) Clearance and permit

(iv) Punishable acts

3. Human Security Act of 2007 (R.A. 9372)

(i) Punishable acts of terrorism

4. Anti-Arson Law (P.D.1613)

(i) Punishable acts

CHAPTER TWO: BRIGANDAGE

A. PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 532 - modified Art 306 & 307

B. Distinctions Between Brigandage and Robbery in Band

CHAPTER THREE: THEFT

A. ART. 308-WHO ARE LIABLE FOR THEFT

1. People v. Gulinao, 179 SCRA 774 G.R. No. 82264-66

December 4, 1989

FACTS:

Accused ISAGANI GULINAO Y ALZONA was charged with separate cases of Illegal Possession of Firearm
with Murder, Robbery, and Carnapping.

On March 3, 1987, at about 9:00 P.M., Dr. Chua, appellant Gulinao (driver-bodyguard of Dr. Chua),
Virgilio Caguioa, Vice Mayor Teofilo Reyes, Dante Reyes, Boy Salazar and other politicians were having a
caucus in the house of a certain Torre. After the caucus at about 11:00 P.M., the group of Dr. Chua
boarded Dr. Chua's car and proceeded to the Bar-Bar Disco House.

Upon arriving at the disco house, Gulinao, who had in his possession an Ingram machine pistol, swapped
the same with a .45 caliber pistol in possession of Dante Reyes. Gulinao then tucked the .45 caliber
pistol in his right waist.
While Dr. Chua was watching the floor show, Gulinao stood up and shot him on the head at close range
with the .45 caliber pistol. When Gulinao was about to leave the disco house, he turned back to Dr. Chua
and took the latter's gold ring embedded with 12 diamonds. Thereupon, Gulinao rushed outside the
disco house to the car of Dr. Chua.

The accused poked the gun at Caguioa who was inside the car, Gulinao ordered the former to leave the
car. While Caguioa was getting out of the car, Gulinao fired at him but missed.

Gulinao drove the car towards Monumento. However, he was constrained to leave the car and take a
taxi when the car he was driving figured in an accident in Malabon.

Dr. Chua, who sustained gunshot wounds oil the head, was brought to the nearby Our Lady of Fatima
Hospital where he died on arrival.

COA:

The accused contends that the TC gravely erred in finding him guilty of robbery under article 294,
paragraph 5, of the RPC.

HELD:

Gulinao should have been convicted of the crime of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code
and not robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of a person under par. 5, Article 294
since the taking of the ring of Dr. Chua was merely an afterthought. The force employed in the killing of
Dr. Chua has no bearing on the taking of his ring.

2. Santos v. People, 181 SCRA 487

Lauro Santos was guilty the crime of theft. Encarnacion Peñalosa, entrusted her
1976 Ford Escort, Santos for repair of the carburetor. Santos persuaded her to
have her car repainted by him within a period of two months. After two months,
Peñalosa went to retrieve her car. Santos refused to deliver the vehicle unless
she paid him P634.60 for the repairs. As she did not have the money then, she
left the shop to get the needed payment. Upon her return, she could not find
Santos although she waited five hours for him. She went back to the shop
several times thereafter but to no avail.

COA: There was no intent to gain at the time of the taking of the vehicle and so
no crime was committed.

COS: The information charged the petitioner with estafa, the crime committed
was theft. (Estafa kc ang case na nafile ni Penalosa against sa kanya instead of
theft)It is settled that what controls is not the designation of the offense but the
description thereof as alleged in the information. And as described therein, the
offense imputed to Santos contains all the essential elements of theft, to wit: (1)
that there be a taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to
another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be
done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be
accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons or
force upon things.

Held: In U.S. v. De Vera, we held that the subsequent appropriation by the

accused of the thing earlier delivered to him supplied the third element that
made the crime theft instead of estafa.

Theft should not be confused with estafa. According to Chief Justice Ramon C.
Aquino in his book on the Revised Penal Code, "The principal distinction
between the two crimes is that in theft the thing is taken while in estafa the
accused receives the property and converts it to his own use or benefit.
However, there may be theft even if the accused has possession of the
property. If he was entrusted only with the material or physical (natural) or de
factopossession of the thing, his misappropriation of the same constitutes theft,
but if he has the juridical possession of the thing, his conversion of the same
constitutes embezzlement or estafa."

3. Laurel v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 155076 February 27, 2006

Facts: Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) filed a complaint for theft under Article 308
of the Revised Penal Code against Baynet Co., Ltd. (Baynet) for stealing its business. PLDT alleged that
Baynet offered phone cards to people in Japan to call their friends and relatives in the Philippines using
PLDT’s facilities and equipment.

Petitioner Laurel: Filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, assailing the Order of the RTC. He alleged
that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in denying his Motion to Quash the Amended
Information.

Respondent PLDT: Asserts that personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code
comprehends intangible property such as electricity and gas which are valuable articles for merchandise,
bought and sold like other personal property, and are capable of appropriation. It insists that the
business of international calls and revenues constitute personal property because the same are valuable
articles of merchandise. The respondent reiterates that international calls involve (a) the intangible
telephone services that are being offered by it, that is, the connection and interconnection to the
telephone network, lines or facilities; (b) the use of its telephone network, lines or facilities over a
period of time; and (c) the income derived in connection therewith.

Issue: Whether or not the PLDT's business of providing telecommunication services is a personal
property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.
Held: No, PLDT's business of providing telecommunication services is not a personal property under
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.

Resolution: Personal property under the Revised Penal Code covers both tangible and intangible
properties but must be considered with the word "take" in the law. There is "taking" of personal
property, and theft is consummated when the offender unlawfully acquires possession of personal
property even if for a short time; or if such property is under the dominion and control of the thief. The
statutory definition of "taking" clearly indicates that not all personal properties may be the proper
subjects of theft. The general rule is that only movable properties, which have physical or material
existence and susceptible of occupation by another are proper subjects of theft. Movable properties
under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code should be distinguished from the rights or interest to which
they relate to. While the rights or interests are properties, they are not considered personal properties
under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.

PLDT's business is intangible and cannot be taken by another and not the proper subjects of theft
because they are without form or substance.

4. Hizon v. CA, 265 SCRA 517 G.R. No. 119619 December 13, 1996
FACTS:
Petitioners Hizon, et al. were charged with violating PD 704 for supposedly fishing without the use of a poisonous
substance (sodium cyanide). A report that some fishing boats were fishing by "muro ami" led to the apprehension
of such boat (F/B Robinson), where Hizon et al were present. The police (PNP Maritime Command and the Task
Force Bantay Dagat) directed the boat captain to get random samples of the fish from the fish cage for testing. The
initial results tested the fish positive for sodium cyanide and that was the basis of the information against Hizon et
al. However, a second set of fish samples yielded a negative result on the sodium cyanide. The RTC found Hizon et
al. guilty and sentenced them to imprisonment and forfeiture of the fishes. The CA affirmed this decision. Hizon et
al., together with the Solicitor general now question the admissibility of the evidence against petitioners in view of
the warrantless search of the fishing boat and the subsequent arrest of petitioners.

COTA:
Petitioners were arraigned and they pled not guilty to the charge. As defense, they claimed that they are legitimate
fishermen of the First Fishermen Industries, Inc., a domestic corporation licensed to engage in fishing. They alleged
that they catch fish by the hook and line method and that they had used this method for one month and a half in
the waters of Cuyo Island. According to them, they caught the fishes by the ordinary and legal way, i.e., by hook
and line on board their sampans. This method of fishing needs approximately two hundred (200) fishermen to
execute.[53] What the apprehending officers instead discovered were twenty eight (28) fishermen in their discovered
were twenty eight (28) fishermen in their sampans fishing by hook and line. The authorities found nothing on the
boat that would have indicated any form of illegal fishing. All the documents of the boat and the fishermen were
in order. It was only after the fish specimens were tested, albeit under suspicious circumstances, that petitioners
were charged with illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances.
ISSUE: Whether they are guilty of illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances.

HELD: NO. As a general rule, any evidence obtained without a judicial warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding. The rule is, however, subject to certain exceptions. Search and seizure without search warrant of
vessels and aircrafts for violations of customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional
requirement of a search warrant. The same exception ought to apply to seizures of fishing vessels and boats
breaching our fishery laws. Hizon et al. were charged with illegal fishing penalized under sections 33 and 38 of P.D.
704. These provisions create a presumption of guilt for possession of explosives or poisonous substances.
However, this presumption is merely prima facie and the accused has the right to present evidence to rebut this
presumption. In this case, the only basis for the charge of fishing with poisonous substance is the result of the first
NBI laboratory test on the four fish specimens. The apprehending officers who boarded and searched the boat did
not find any sodium cyanide nor any poisonous or obnoxious substance. Neither did they find any trace of the
poison in the possession of the fishermen or in the fish cage itself. Under the circumstances of the case, however,
this finding does not warrant the infallible conclusion that the fishes in the F/B Robinson, or even the same four
specimens, were caught with the use of sodium cyanide.

The offense of illegal fishing is committed when a person catches, takes or gathers or causes to be caught,
taken or gathered fish, fishery or aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives, electricity,
obnoxious or poisonous substances. The law creates a presumption that illegal fishing has been committed
when: (a) explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substances or equipment or device for electric fishing are found in a
fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman; or (b) when fish caught or killed with the use of explosives, obnoxious
or poisonous substances or by electricity are found in a fishing boat. Under these instances, the boat owner, operator
or fishermen are presumed to have engaged in illegal fishing.

B. ART. 310-QUALIFIED THEFT

• Empelis v. IAC, 132 SCRA 398 G.R. No. L-66136

FACTS: Guillermo Catarining owner of a coconut plantation in Sitio Tambangan, Dapdap, Uson,
Masbate, was frequently losing coconuts in his plantation due to thievery. Thus, on the early
morning of June 10, 1979, while he stayed in his plantation to keep watch, he saw four (4)
persons within the premises of his plantation gathering and tying some coconuts. He then went
home, fetched his neighbors Anastacio Andales and Teodomero Garay and took along a
flashlight. Upon reaching the coconut plantation with his companions, Catarining beamed his
flashlight on the four persons who, turned out to be the herein appellants. Elpidio Empelis and
Emilio Carbungco were seen carrying coconuts on a piece of wood on their shoulders while
Salvador and Mamerto Carbungco were espied carrying coconuts with their bare hands. As the
four persons noticed the presence of Catarining and the latter's companions, they dropped the
coconuts they were carrying and fled leaving behind about 50 pieces of coconuts valued at
P50.00 and two poles, one made of bamboo and the other of wood.
STATE: The accused are convicted of qualified theft.
ACCUSED: The only issue raised with earnestness by petitioners is that the crime committed, if
at all is simple and not qualified theft as found by respondent court.
RESOL: Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code states that the crime of theft shall "be punished
by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively expressed in the next
preceding article ... if the property stolen ... consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a
plantation, ... ." Thus, the stealing of coconuts when they are still in the tree or deposited on the
ground within the premises is qualified theft. When the coconuts are stolen in any other place, it
is simple theft. Stated differently, if the coconuts were taken in front of a house along the
highway outside the coconut plantation, it would be simple theft only.
In the case of People vs. Isnain, 85 Phil. 648, this Court held that "[i]n the matter of theft of
coconuts, the purpose of the heavier penalty is to encourage and protect the development of the
coconut industry as one of the sources of our national economy. Unlike rice and sugar cane
farms where the range of vision is unobstructed, coconut groves can not be efficiently watched
because of the nature of the growth of coconut trees; and without a special measure to protect
this kind of property, of will be as it has been in the past the favorite resort of thieves."
However, the crime committed is only frustrated qualified theft because petitioners were not
able to perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the felon as a
consequence. They were not able to carry the coconuts away from the plantation due to the
timely arrival of the owner.

C. SPECIAL LAWS:

1. Illegal Logging PD 330 and PD 705

• Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. CA, 25 SCRA 430 (June 18, 1996) G.R. No. 104988
Facts:

Petitioner was a duly registered lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest Development. Now, the Special
Action and investigation of the DENR were informed that a huge stockpile of narra flitches,
shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner. The SAID organized a team of forest
ers and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance. In the course thereof, the team members
saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of as
sorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and transportdocu
ments, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound.

Contention of the Petitioner:

The Petitioner contends that what was to be confiscated was only the timber and not the lumber,
therefore the confiscation was unlawful.

Resolution:

The court held that the term ‘lumber’ as used in the information against petitioners, although not
mentioned in express terms as among the prohibited articles under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705(Revised
Forestry Code) must be understood in its ordinary and common usage. Lumber is to be understood as a
processed log or timber. The court said that since the law makes no distinction between raw or processed
timber, neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguere debemus. The court held that the petitioners were
then correctly charged with the offense of violating Sec68 of PD No 705 as alleged by the facts in the
information.

The court also held that the seizure of items and the truck carrying the same was done lawfully as it falls
under lawful warrantless searches. Search of moving vehicles is one of the exceptions to the general rule
that searches must be done with a warrant. Furthermore, such search and seizure was a valid exercise of
the power vested upon the forest officer or employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D.
No. 1775.

Finally, the court stressed petitioner’s violation of Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705. The court held that
Secretary Factoran or his authorized representative indeed had the authority to seize the Lumber since
petitioner’s license, at the time of seizure, was still suspended. Thus, petitioner was in illegal possession
of the seized articles.

2. RA 7832 Anti-Electricity Pilferage Act 3. RA 8041 Water Crisis Act

4. Illegal Fishing RA 8550, sec. 86

5. PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 533 - ANTI-CATTLE RUSTLING LAW OF 1974

a. Taer vs. CA 186 SCRA 598 G.R. No. 85204

FACTS:
Accused Cirilo Saludes slept in the house of his compadre accused Jorge Taer. At about 2:00
o'clock dawn, December 6, 1981, accused Emilio Namocatcat and Mario Cago arrived at Taer's house with
two (2) male carabaos which Namocatcat wanted Taer to tend. The said carabaos were left at Taer's place.
Tirso Dalde and Eladio Palaca discovered that their respective male carabaos, 3 to 4 years old, were
missing at the different grazing grounds where they tied them the afternoon preceding. Upon searching,
they found their missing carabaos tied to a bamboo thicket near the house of Taer. They asked Taer why
their carabaos were found at his place, and he answered that the carabaos reached his place, tied together
without any person in company.
Saludes, Cago, Taer and Namocatcat were charged of theft of large cattle aggravated with
nocturnity (cattle rustling). However, Saludes and Cago were acquitted. Taer and Namocatcat were found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt and were convicted. Taer appealed to the CA. The CA, finding the evidence
of the prosecution that conspiracy indeed existed between Emilio Namocatcat and Jorge Taer, affirmed in
toto the decision appealed from.

COA:
1. That the extent of his participation did not go beyond the participation of the original defendants Cirilo
Saludes and Mario Cago. Therefore, he submits that the acquittal of these two by the trial court should also
lead to his acquittal;
2. That the only evidence proving the alleged conspiracy between him and Emilio Namocatcat was the
confession of his co-accused Emilio Namocatcat. However this should not be considered as admissible
because the same is hearsay under the rule of res inter alios acta.

RESOLUTION:
Conspiracy must be established not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. The
same degree of proof necessary to establish the crime is required to support a finding of the presence of
criminal conspiracy, which is, proof beyond reasonable doubt. Namocatcat’s testimony, being res inter
alios acta, can not affect another except as provided in the Rules of Court. This rule on res inter alios acta
specifically applies when the evidence consists of an admission in an extrajudicial confession or declaration
of another because the defendant has no opportunity to cross-examine the co-conspirator testifying against
him. Since this is the only evidence of the prosecution to prove the conspiracy with Namocatcat, this
uncorroborated testimony can not be sufficient to convict Taer. Thus mere knowledge, acquiescence to, or
approval of the act, without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party
to a conspiracy absent the intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the
common design and purpose. At most the facts establish Taer's knowledge of the crime. And yet without
having participated either as principal or as an accomplice, for he did not participate in the taking of the
carabaos, he took part subsequent to the commission of the act of taking by profiting himself by its effects.
Taer is thus only an accessory after the fact.

The offense for which Taer is accused is covered by Articles 308, 309, and 310, as amended by
"The Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974”. The penalty imposed on the principal for the crime of cattle
rustling is:
Sec. 8. Penal provisions. — Any person convicted of cattle rustling as herein defined shall,
irrespective of the value of the large cattle involved, be punished by prision mayor in its maximum
period to reclusion temporal in its medium period if the offense is committed without violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. If the offense is committed with violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If a person is seriously injured or killed
as a result or on the occasion of the commission of cattle rustling, the penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death shall be imposed. 17

Inasmuch as Taer's culpability is only that of an accessory after the fact, under Art. 53 of the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated
felony shall be imposed.

WHEREFORE, the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran and affirmed by
the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED in that the herein JORGE TAER is convicted as an
accessory of the crime of cattle-rustling as defined and penalized by PD No. 533 amending Arts. 308, 309,
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code and he will serve the minimum penalty within the range of arresto
mayor medium, which we shall fix at 4 months imprisonment and the maximum penalty of prision
correccional minimum which we shall fix at 2 years.

b. Cattle rustling is mala in se since PD 533 is an amendment to Arts. 308, 309 and 310 of the RPC

c. Ordonio v. CA 199 SCRA 873

Contention of the State:
Constancio Ordonio is guilty of violating PD 533 also known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of
1974. Anastacio Pajunar discovered that he lost his 11 month old cow and as he searched for it he asked
Ordonio if he had seen it and Pajunar heard a mooing and he Ordonio said it was his cow. Pajunar followed
the sound and discovered his cow which Ordonio insisted as his brother’s. Pajunar reported it to the
authorities. Pajunar with two Police Constabulary went to Barrio Councilman Pajaron and together they
went to Ordonio with the cow of Pajunar. As they arrived the calf approached its mother. The PC soldier
said that the cow had to be entrusted to the barrio official and the wife gave the consent.

Contention of the Accused:

The cow is his brother’s cow which was entrusted to him. The lower court erred in presuming the
elements of the crime
Resolution:
The records however show that the respondent court, as well as the trial court, committed no such
misapprehension of facts. Significantly, the lower courts did not anchor the conviction of the appellant on
what he alleges to have resulted in a misapprehension of facts. The lower courts did not convict the appellant
on the basis of the missing calf s having been found tied in the accused's premises nor on his failure and/or
refusal to tell the owner the whereabouts of the calf, nor on the accused's stepping on the rope to which the
"lost" calf was tied when the complainant was towing it. Rather, the lower courts convicted him on the basis
of his actuations when the lost calf was found in his possession
The accused-petitioner had the temerity to act thus even if the calf did not belong to him, but to the
complainant as he admitted before the trial court. But independent of the admission by the accused,
complainant ownership of the calf is further forfeited with this one important circumstance. When
complainant went to accused's house, accompanied by barangay councilman, Pajunar, and two PC soldiers,
the milking cow was brought along. Upon arrival, the PC soldiers let loose the calf and the latter
immediately ran to the milking cow to suck on its milk. Such conduct of the calf manifests all the signs of
the young whether human or not, on finding a lost mother.

6. Anti-Fencing Law (P.D. 1612) and its implementing rules and regulations

a. Fencing

(a) Definition

(b) Presumption of fencing

b. Exception

(a) With clearance or permit to sell

a. Dizon-Pamintuan v. People, G.R. No. 111426, July 11, 1994

FACTS

Teodoro Encarnacion, Undersecretary DPWH testified that he has just arrived at his residence located at
Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque at around 9:45 p.m. of February 12, 1988 coming from the Airport
and immediately proceeded inside the house, leaving behind his driver and two housemaids outside to
pick-up his personal belongings from his case. It was at this point that five unidentified masked armed
persons appeared from the grassy portion of the lot beside the house and poked their guns to his driver
and two helpers and dragged them inside his house. That the men pointed a gun at him and she was made
to lie face down on the floor. The other occupants, namely his wife, the maids and his driver were
likewise made to lie on the floor. Thereafter, the robbers ransacked the house and took away jewelries and
other personal properties including cash. After the intruders left the house he reported the matter
immediately to the police. He was then interviewed by the Parañaque police and was informed that an
operation group would be assigned to the case. He was later told that some of the lost items were in
Chinatown area as tipped by the informer the police had dispatched. That an entrapment would be made
with their participation, that he is with his wife posed as a buyer and were able to recognize items of the
jewelry stolen displayed at the stall being tended by Norma Dizon Pamintuan.
ISSUE:

Whether Pamintuan is guilty of a crime under P.D. No. 1612 (Anti- Fencing Law)

HELD:

The petitioner was unable to rebut the presumption under P.D. No. 1612. She relied solely on the
testimony of her brother which was insufficient to overcome the presumption, and, on the contrary, even
disclosed that the petitioner was engaged in the purchase and sale of jewelry and that she used to buy
from a certain Fredo. Fredo was not presented as a witness and it was not established that he was a
licensed dealer or supplier of jewelry.

Section 6. Clearance/Permit to Sell/Used Second Hand Articles. - For purposes of this Act, all stores,
establishments or entities dealing in the buy and sell of any good, article item, object of anything of value
obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof, shall before offering the same for sale to the
public, secure the necessary clearance or permit from the station commander of the Integrated National
Police in the town or city where such store, establishment or entity is located. The Chief of
Constabulary/Director General, Integrated National Police shall promulgate such rules and regulations to
carry out the provisions of this section. Any person who fails to secure the clearance or permit required by
this section or who violates any of the provisions of the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder
shall upon conviction be punished as a fence.

NOTE: The more crucial issue to be resolved is whether the prosecution proved the existence of the third
element: that the accused knew or should have known that the items recovered from her were the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.

One is deemed to know a particular fact if he has the cognizance, consciousness or awareness thereof, or
is aware of the existence of something, or has the acquaintance with facts, or if he has something within
the mind's grasp with certitude and clarity. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an
element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its
existence unless he actually believes that it does not exist. On the other hand, the words "should know"
denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in
performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact
exists. Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness about a fact. Since the court cannot penetrate the
mind of an accused and state with certainty what is contained therein, it must determine such knowledge
with care from the overt acts of that person. And given two equally plausible states of cognition or mental
awareness, the court should choose the one which sustains the constitutional presumption of innocence.

b. Tan v. People, G.R. No. 134298, Aug. 26, 1999

FACTS: Complainant Rosita Lim is the proprietor of Bueno Metal Industries, engaged in the
business of manufacturing propellers or spare parts for boats. Manuelito Mendez was one of the
employees working for her. Sometime in February 1991, Manuelito Mendez left the employ of
the company. Complainant Lim noticed that some of the welding rods, propellers and boat spare
parts, such as bronze and stainless propellers and brass screws were missing. She conducted
an inventory and discovered that propellers and stocks valued at P48,000.00, more or less,
were missing. Complainant Rosita Lim informed Victor Sy, uncle of Manuelito Mendez, of the
loss. Subsequently, Manuelito Mendez was arrested in the Visayas and he admitted that he and
his companion Gaudencio Dayop stole from the complainants warehouse some boat spare
parts. Manuelito Mendez asked for complainants forgiveness. He pointed to petitioner Ramon
C. Tan as the one who bought the stolen items and who paid the amount of P13,000.00, in cash
to Mendez and Dayop, and they split the amount with one another. Complainant did not file a
case against Manuelito Mendez and Gaudencio Dayop.
STATE: On relation of complainant Lim, an Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 19, an information against petitioner charging him with
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law)
ACCUSED: RAMON TAN, the accused, in exculpation, stated that he is a businessman
engaged in selling hardware (marine spare parts. He denied having bought the stolen spare
parts worth P48,000.00 for he never talked nor met Manuelito Mendez, the confessed thief nor
to Mrs. Lim and her husband.
ISSUE: The issue raised is whether or not the prosecution has successfully established the
elements of fencing as against petitioner.
HELD: Before the enactment of PD 1612, the fence could only be prosecuted as an accessory
after the fact of robbery or theft. Presently, the accessory could be prosecuted under the RPC or
as the principal under PD 1612.

The essential elements of fencing are: 1) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the
accused, who is not a principal or an accomplicein the crime, with intent to gain, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes of, or shall buy and sell, or in any
manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value derived from the proceeds of the
crime; and 3) the accused knows, or should have known that the article or object was derived
from the proceeds of the crime.

Lim reported no loss to the police, therefore it cannot be held for certain that the crime of theft
was committed. Thus, the first element of the crime of fencing is absent; that is, the commission
of the crime of robbery or theft. There was no evidence of corpus delicti as theft or robbery was
not proved. What is more, there was no showing that the accused knew or should have known
that the stolen articles were the ones sold to him. Without the petitioner knowing that he
acquired stolen articles, he cannot be guilty of fencing.

CHAPTER FOUR: USURPTION (ARTS. 312 AND 313)

A. ART. 312- OCCUPATION OF REAL PROPERTY OR USURPATION OF REAL RIGHTS IN PROPERTY

• Distinctions Between Theft/Robbery and Article 312

A. ART.313 - ALTERING BOUNDARIES OR LANDMARKS

CHAPTER FIVE: CULPABLE INSOLVENCY

A. ART. 314- FRAUDULENT INSOLVENCY

CHAPTER SIX: SWINDLING AND OTHER DECEITS

A. ART. 315-SWINDLING/ESTAFA

1. ELEMENTS in general

2. ESTAFA WITH UNFAITHFULNESS OR ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE

a. ELEMENTS OF 315, NO.1 (A)

b. ELEMENTS OF 315, NO.1 (B)

c. ELEMENTS OF 315, NO.1 (C)

d. Manahan v. CA, 255 SCRA 202 [G.R. No. 111656. March 20, 1996]

Facts: That in or about and during the period from April 30, 1976 and September 7, 1976, the
accused, in accordance to a Lease Agreement received from IFC-LEASING AND ACCEPTANCE
CORPORATION One (1) Unit Isuzu Dump Truck and One (1) Unit Kimco Hough JH65CN Payloader
all valued at P110,000.00, with the obligation to pay rentals as agreed upon and to return the
said equipments upon termination of the lease period, but accused far from complying with his
obligation, with intent of gain, grave abuse of confidence and to defraud the herein complainant,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to
his own personal use and benefit the said equipments, and despite demands failed and refused
and still fails and refuses to return the said equipments, to the damage and prejudice of said IFC-
LEASING AND ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, represented by one ARMANDO M. MARCELO, in the
aforementioned amount of P110,000.00.
COS: Since the demand had not been heeded, IFC, this time, charged petitioner
with estafa, the court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
COA: Petitioner contending, among other things, that the fourth element of the crime of
estafa, namely, the misappropriation or conversion by the accused of the thing received
to the prejudice of another, was not present in this case. He averred that his failure to
return the dump truck was due to circumstances beyond his control, and that it was not
he but other persons, particularly Gorospe and Espino and their men, who unlawfully
detained the vehicle
Held: All the foregoing elements are present in this case. The dump truck, a personal property
was received by the accused who was under obligation to pay rentals as agreed upon and to
return the said equipment upon the termination of the lease period. Accused did not return the
equipment to the offended party as accused subleased it to a certain Mr. Gorospe, although
accused has no authority to sub-lease the equipment to a third person. Granting therefore that
Manuel Manahan, Jr. has no intention of defrauding the owner of the truck, accused certainly
committed abuse of confidence when he sub-leased the equipment without the knowledge and
consent of the owner.
All the foregoing elements are present in this case. The dump truck, a personal property was
received by the accused who was under obligation to pay rentals as agreed upon and to return
the said equipment upon the termination of the lease period. Accused did not return the
equipment to the offended party as accused subleased it to a certain Mr. Gorospe, although
accused has no authority to sub-lease the equipment to a third person. Granting therefore that
Manuel Manahan, Jr. has no intention of defrauding the owner of the truck, accused certainly
committed abuse of confidence when he sub-leased the equipment without the knowledge and
consent of the owner.
Appellants contention that one element of estafa, that is, misappropriation or conversion, is not
present in the case at bar, is untenable. It must be recalled that under the lease agreement
entered into by and between complainant and appellant, any breach of the lease by the latter as
lessee would entitle the lessor, upon demand, to the return and possession of the vehicle in
question. Admittedly, appellant failed to pay the stipulated monthly rentals. Despite IFCs
demand for the return of the vehicle and the decision rendered in its (IFCs)favor, appellant, had
failed to give the equipment back its rightful owner. From that time on, appellant Manahan could
already be considered to have committed the crime of estafa.

>Elements of Estafa with abuse of confidence:

1) That money, goods, or other personal property be received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any obligation involving the duty to make delivery of,
or to return, the same;

2) That there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or

denial on his part of such receipt;

3) That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;

4) That there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.

e. Saddul v. CA, 192 SCRA 277

3. Distinctions Between Theft and Estafa

4. Distinctions Between Estafa and Malversation

5. ESTAFA BY MEANS OF DECEIT (Art. 315, nos. 2 and 3)

a. ELEMENTS OF 315, NO.2

b. 315 N0.2 (A)

c. 315 No.2 (B)

d. 315 No.2 (C)

e. ELEMENTS OF 315 No. 2 (D)

6. Cases:

i. Allied Banking Corp. v. Ordonez, 192 SCRA 246

Contention of the State: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) thru its duly authorized officer, private
respondent Alfredo Ching, applied for the issuance of commercial letters of credit with petitioner’s Makati
branch to finance the purchase of 500 M/T Magtar Branch Dolomites and one (1) Lot High Fired Refractory
Sliding Nozzle Bricks. Allied Bank issued an irrevocable letter of credit in favor of Nikko Industry Co.,
Ltd. (Nikko) by virtue of which the latter drew four (4) drafts which were accepted by PBM and duly
honored and paid by the petitioner bank. To secure payment of the amount covered by the drafts, and in
consideration of the transfer by petitioner of the possession of the goods to PBM, the latter as entrustee,
thru private respondent, executed four (4) Trust Receipt Agreements with maturity dates on acknowledging
petitioner’s ownership of the goods and its (PBM’S) obligation to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the
goods, if sold, or to return the same, if unsold within the stated period.

PBM defaulted on the payment of the trust receipts.. Despite repeated demands, PBM failed and refused to
either turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods or to return the same. Allied Bank filed a criminal
complaint against private respondent for violation of PD 115 (Providing for the Trust Receipts
Transactions) before the office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. The Fiscal found a prima facie case for
violation of PD 115 on four (4) counts and filed the corresponding information in court.

Contention of the Ching/PBM: PBM contended that since it was under rehabilitation receivership, no
criminal liability can be imputed to Ching. Ching also contended that he should not be convicted of
violation of PD 115 as it was not criminally punishable.

Resolution:

"Sec. 4. What constitutes a trust receipt transaction. — A trust receipt transaction, within the meaning of
this Decree, is any transaction by and between a person referred to in this Decree as the entrustee, and
another person referred to in this Decree as the entrustee, whereby the entruster, who owns or holds absolute
title or security interests over certain specified goods, documents or instruments, releases the same to the
possession of the entrustee upon the latter's execution and delivery to the entruster of a signed document
called a 'trust receipt' wherein the entrustee binds himself to hold the designated goods, documents or
instruments in trust for the entruster and to sell or otherwise dispose of the goods, documents or instruments
with the obligation to turn over to the entruster the proceeds thereof to the extent of the amount owing to
the entruster or as appears in the trust receipt or the goods, documents or instruments themselves, if they
are unsold or not otherwise disposed of, in accordance with the terms and conditions specified in the trust
receipt, . . ."

It cannot be denied that the offense was consummated long before the appointment of rehabilitation
receivers. The filing of a criminal case against respondent Ching is not only for the purpose of effectuating
a collection of a debt but primarily for the purpose of punishing an offender for a crime committed not only
against the complaining witness but also against the state. The crime of estafa for violation of the Trust
Receipts Law is a special offense or mala prohibita. It is a fundamental rule in criminal law that when the
crime is punished by a special law, the act alone, irrespective of its motives, constitutes the offense. In the
instant case the failure of the entrustee to pay complainant the remaining balance of the value of the goods
covered by the trust receipt when the same became due constitutes the offense penalized under Section 13
of P.D. No. 115; and on the basis of this failure alone, the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish
a prima facie case (Res. No. 671, s. 1981; Allied Banking Corporation vs. Reinhard Sagemuller, et al.,
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, September 18, 1981).

In examination of P.D. 115 shows the growing importance of trust receipts in Philippine business, the need
to provide for the rights and obligations of parties to a trust receipt transaction, the study of the problems
involved and the action by monetary authorities, and the necessity of regulating the enforcement of rights
arising from default or violations of trust receipt agreements. The legislative intent to meet a pressing need
is clearly expressed.

ii. Lee v. Rodil, 175 SCRA 100 G.R. No. 80544 July 5, 1989
FACTS: Lee executed TRA for the purchase of materials but misappropriated the value of the goods for
personal use. Lee defraud the Philippine Bank of Communications, a banking institution duly organized
and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, in the following manner, to wit: the said
accused, being then the duly authorized representative of C.S. Lee Enterprises, Inc., after opening letter
of credit with the said bank under L/C No. 63251 dated July 26, 1982, for the amount of P 154,711.97,
coveting the purchase price of a certain merchandise consisting of 23 ctns. Lab. Culture Media in favor
of said bank, received from the latter the necessary document and thereafter the said merchandise and
forthwith, executed trust receipt for, the aforesaid merchandise dated July 26, 1982, by virtue of which,
the said accused obligated herself to hold said merchandise in trust with liberty to sell the same in cash
for the account of the said bank and to account for the proceeds of the sale thereof, if sold or of
returning the said merchandise to said bank in case of failure to sell the same, on or before October 24,
1982, but the said accused, once in possession of the said merchandise, far from complying with her
aforesaid obligation and despite the lapse of a long period of time and repeated demands made upon
her to that effect, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to defraud,
misappropriate, misapply and convert the said merchandise or the value thereof, to her own personal
use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said Philippine Bank of Communications in the
amount of P154,711.97, Philippine currency.

STATE: Charged with estafa under PD 115.

ACCUSED: Challenged the validity of the law saying that a violation of PD 115 is NOT estafa and that the
law violates non-imprisonment for debts clause of the Constitution.

HELD: Sec 13 of PD 115 explicitly states that the failure to give back the proceeds or return the goods of
estafa is punishable. No violation of the Constitution as the loan is separate from the trust receipt. What
is punished is the violation of the trust receipt and not the non-payment of the loan.

 The 4th element is not necessary where there is evidence of misappropriation of goods by the
defendant

 Check is included in the word "money"

 Money/goods must be received by the offender. Otherwise, crime is THEFT (taking without consent
of owner)

Celino v. CA, 163 SCRA 97

FACTS:
Two separate information were filed before the RTC charging petitioner with violation of the gun
ban and illegal possession of firearms. That on or about the 12th day of May, 2004, in the City of Roxas,
Philippines, the said accused, carry outside of his residence an armalite rifle colt M16 with serial number
3210606 with two (2) long magazines each loaded with thirty (30) live ammunitions of the same caliber
during the election period December 15, 2005 to June 9, 2004 without first having obtained the proper
authority in writing from the Commission on Elections, Manila, Philippines.

COA:
Contending that he cannot be prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms if he was also charged
of having committed another crime of violating the Comelec gun ban under the same set of facts.

HELD:
The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided
that "no other crime was committed by the person arrested." If the intention of the law in the second
paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so. As accusation is not
synonymous with guilt, there is yet no showing that petitioner did in fact commit the other crime charged.
Consequently, the proviso does not yet apply.

In sum, when the other offense involved is one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294, any information for
illegal possession of firearm should be quashed because the illegal possession of firearm would have to be
tried together with such other offense, either considered as an aggravating circumstance in murder or
homicide, or absorbed as an element of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'etat.
Conversely, when the other offense involved is not one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294, then the
separate case for illegal possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted.

iv. Abujuela v. People, 200 SCRA 806

Facts: Balo offered financial assistance to Abujuela by virtue of some insurance proceeds that Balo would
receive from his father. Balo borrowed Abujuela's passbook and made it appear that certain deposits were
made. When the account was closed, discrepancies were found between the ledger and the account.
Abujuela charged as accomplice to estafa through falsification of commercial documents
Contention of the Accused: Abujuela has no knowledge of the criminal intent of his co-accused, Glicerio
Balo, Jr., hence, there being no conspiracy, be cannot be convicted as principal, neither as accomplice, nor
did he benefit from the effects of the crime, hence, he cannot be convicted even as an accessory.

Resolution: Not guilty. Abujuela not aware of the fraudulent plans of Balo. Knowledge of the criminal
intent of the principal in this case, (Glicerio Balo, Jr.) is essential in order that petitioner Abejuela can be
convicted as an accomplice in the crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial document. To be
convicted as an accomplice, there must be cooperation in the execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous acts. However, the cooperation which the law punishes is the assistance rendered
knowingly or intentionally, which assistance cannot be said to exist without the prior cognizance of the
offense intended to be committed.

v. Koh Tieck Heng v. People, 192 SCRA 533

FACTS
Koh Tieck Heng, alias Teddy Koh, alias Tomas P. Flores was charged of estafa thru falsification of
a commercial documenting the following manner:
After opening a savings account with SBTC under the name Tomas P. Flores and somehow illegally
obtained a Paycheck issued by one F. Dycaico,
Accused making or causing alterations and changes in a genuine document w&c changed its
meaning and thereby affixing his signature at the back of the check, which check was cleared by
the PBC.
In the second instance, accused did not perform all the acts of execution which should have
produced the crime of estafa thru falsification of a commercial document by reason of some
cause other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is, timely discovery made by officials &
employees of said bank of the forgery and falsification made on the aforesaid check before
payment could $e made which led then and there to the apprehension of said accused.
Under the two information, the mode of falsification attributed to the accused is that of having
erased and altered the dates and amounts of the checks in question, and superimposing over
the original dates and amounts, thereby making alterations and changes in genuine documents
which changed their meaning. Accused misappropriated, misapplied and concerted to his own
personal use and benefit checks in various amounts.
ISSUE
Whether there was attempted estafa in the absence of deceit and damage
HELD
YES.
The fact that appellant was the possessor and utterer of the checks in question and having
benefited from the subsequent withdrawals, as well as having attempted to gain $y trying to
withdraw an amount thereon. The use of the spurious checks
is by itself fraud or deceit. The appellant made use of and benefited from the falsified document
is strong evidence that he either himself falsified it or caused the same to $e falsified, he being
criminally responsible in either case. Since Heng is the only person who stood to be benefited by
the falsification of the document that was found in his possession, it is presumed that he is
the material author of such falsification

vi. People v. Ong, 204 SCRA 942

Facts:

Accused Dick Ong, one of the depositors of the Home Savings Bank and Trust Company (HSBTC) opened a savings
account with HSBTC with an initial deposit of P22.14 in cash and P10,000.00 in check.

Ong was allowed to withdraw from his savings account with the Bank the sum of P5,000.00, without his check
undergoing the usual and reglementary clearance. The withdrawal slip was signed and approved by Lino Morfe, then
the Branch Manager, and accused Lucila Talabis, the Branch Cashier.

Subsequently, Ong deposited eleven checks in his savings account with the Bank and against which he made
withdrawals against its amount. Again, the withdrawal of the amount by Ong was made before said checks were
cleared and the Bank had collected their amounts and with the approval of Talabis.

However, when the Bank presented the eleven checks issued, deposited and against which Ong made withdrawals
against its amounts, to their respective drawee banks for payment, they were all dishonored for lack or insufficiency
of funds. Because of this, the Bank filed a criminal action for Estafa against Ong, and the Bank’s officer in charge
Villaran and Talabis.

Talabis testified that the approval of the withdrawals of Ong against his uncleared checks was in accordance with the
instruction of their then bank manager and that it is a kind of accommodation given to Ong and also a common practice
of the Bank.

RTC ruled Ong as guilty for the crime of estafa but acquitted Villarin and Talabis as their guilt were not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. CA affirmed RTCs decisions.

Issue:
1. What is the nature of bank deposits?
2. WON Ong is guilty of Estafa. No.

Ruling:

1. The Supreme Court held that bank deposits are in the nature of irregular deposits.
Bank deposits are really loans because they earn interest. Whether fixed, savings, or current, all bank
Adeposits are to be treated as loans and are to be covered by the law on loans.
 2. The elements of this kind of estafa are the following: (1) postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an
obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check;
and (3) damage to the payee thereof.

In this case, the fact was established that Ong either issued or indorsed the subject checks. However, it must
be remembered that the reason for the conviction of an accused of the crime of estafa is his guilty knowledge
of the fact that he had no funds in the bank when he negotiated the spurious check.
In the present case, however, the prosecution failed to prove that Ong had knowledge with respect to the
checks he indorsed.
Moreover, it has also been proven that it was the Bank which granted him a drawn against uncollected deposit
(DAUD) privilege without need of any pretensions on his part. The privilege this privilege was not only for
the subject checks, but for other past transactions. If ever, he, indeed acted fr
audulently, he could not have done so without the active cooperation of the Banks employees. Since Talabis
and Villaran were declared innocent of the crimes charged against them, the same should be said for the
Ong.

Thus, Ong cannot be held criminally liable against the Bank. He can only be held civilly liable as the Bank
incurred damages.

vii. Llamado vs. CA G.R. No. 99032 March 26, 1997

FACTS:
Accused-appellant, Ricardo Llamado, together with Jacinto Pascual, was charged with
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Ricardo Llamado and his co-accused Jacinto Pascual were
the Treasurer and President, respectively, of the Pan Asia Finance Corporation.
Private complainant, Leon Gaw, delivered to accused the amount of P180,000.00, with
the assurance of Aida Tan, the secretary of the accused in the corporation, that it will be repaid
on 4 November 1983, plus interests thereon at 12% plus a share in the profits of the corporation,
if any.
On 4 November 1983, private complainant deposited the check in his current account with
the Equitable Banking Corporation which later informed the complainant that said check was
dishonored by the drawee bank. Thereupon, private complainant went to accused Ricardo
Llamado on 11 November 1983 to inform him of the dishonor of the check. Accused offered in
writing to pay private complainant a portion of the amount equivalent to 10% thereof on 14 or 15
November 1983, and the balance to be rolled over for a period of ninety (90) days. This offer was
accepted by private complainant. Accused, however, failed to remit to private complainant the
aforesaid 10% on or before 15 November 1983 and to roll over the balance of the money. Private
complainant then demanded from the accused the payment of P186,500.00 but accused failed to
pay and instead, accused offered to return to private complainant only 30% of his money which
was refused by the latter.

ACCUSED:
Respondent Court of Appeals erred because it held petitioner personally liable for the
amount of the check in question, although it was a check of the Pan Asia Finance Corporation
and he signed the same in his capacity as Treasurer of the corporation.

RESOLUTION:
Petitioner's argument that he should not be held personally liable for the amount of the
check because it was a check of the Pan Asia Finance Corporation and he signed the same in
his capacity as Treasurer of the corporation, is also untenable. The third paragraph of Section 1
of BP Blg. 22 states: Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person
or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.

viii. Lu Hayco vs. CA

Haycu was a former employee of Units optical with 124 complaints of estafa files against him by the
company with the office of city fiscal of manila. after the procedural PI, fiscal filed 75 cases of estafa
against Haycu, except as to the dates and amounts of conversions, the 75 informations commonly
charge that Haycu having collected and received customers of the company the purchase of goods has
converted the sum of money he collected to his own personal account with a bank.

A civil action for accounting was filed also by the owner of the company against Haycu complaining that
Haycu initiated discharging the business functions and prerogatives of the company thru deceit and
machinations that the owner affixing his signatures to the power of attorney to open account in the
bank.

Contention of the accused:

-the 75 criminal cases is not only oppressing but also out of the jurisdiction of the city fiscal of manila.
asserting also that the 75 were mere components of only one crime.

- that there is no estafa since the element of misappropriation or conversion was not proven

Resolution:

The disturbance in property rights caused by misappropriation, though only temporary, is itself sufficient
to constitute injury within the meaning of Art. 315(l -b) of the RPC. In U.S. v. Goyenechea (8 Phil. 117),
the defendant pledged a typewriter belonging to McCullough & Co. to the American Loan Company.
Because of said act, the typewriter was seized by the police, and taken into court. Throughout the trial,
McCullough & Co. was placed in a doubtful position as to its right over the typewriter. [The SC] held
that: “McCullough & Co. at least suffered disturbance in its property rights in the said typewriter and in
the possession thereof. This fact, by itself, and without it being necessary to deal with any other
considerations of material fact herein, always constitutes real and actual damage, and is positive enough
under rule of law to produce one of the elements constituting the offense, the crime of estafa.”
In the case at bar, there was a disturbance in the property rights of Lu Chiong Sun. While the funds
received by Lu Hayco were deposited in his personal bank accounts, Lu Chiong Sun and Units Optical
could not dispose of the said amounts. At least, this could be considered as a temporary prejudice
suffered by Lu Chiong Sun, which is sufficient to constitute conversion in the context of Art. 315 (1-b) of
the RPC.

ix. Salcedo vs. CA

Facts:

Salcedo was the local branch manager of Manhattan Guaranty Company, Inc. at Iligan City, which was
engaged in the business of property insurance. Said company had been suspended from operating and
eventually closed by the Insurance Commissioner since February 21, 1968. Salcedo was aware of the
suspension and closure order but he deliberately concealed the same from complainant Ponce when he
issued on March 18, 1968 a P50, 000 fire insurance policies unto the complainant, and collected Pl,
095.80 as premium. Eventually, the City Court of Iligan City convicted Salcedo of estafa.

Contention of the accused:

He cannot be held criminally liable because he was not aware then that his company was suspended
and therefore was forbidden to engage in business transaction by the Insurance Commissioner. 'That
although he had read about the said suspension in the newspapers, he was only officially informed of
the reported suspension and stoppage of business transaction when he received the Memorandum
(Exh. "I") dated February 26, 1968 from the Branch Manager of the Company of Cebu City Branch Office;
and that such receipt was only after two (2) days from the issuance of the fire insurance policy to the
complaining witness, Basilio Ponce.

Contention of the state:

Salcedo was aware of the suspension and closure order but he deliberately concealed the same from
complainant Ponce when he issued on March 18, 1968 a P50, 000 fire insurance policies unto the
complainant, and collected Pl, 095.80 as premium

HELD: Salcedo was the local branch manager of Manhattan Guarantee. When he signed and issued the
policy and collected the premium thereof, he had knowledge that his company was no longer authorized
to conduct insurance business. This knowledge makes him liable under paragraph 2(a) of Art. 315 of the
RPC which provides that:

“2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.”

To secure a conviction for estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the RPC, the following requisites must
concur:

 that the accused made false pretenses or fraudulent representations as to his power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary

 that such false premises or fraudulent representations constitute the very cause which
induced the offended party to part with his money or property, and that as result thereof,
the offended party suffered damage.

All these requisites are present in this case. The deliberate concealment by Salcedo of the fact that his
company was no longer authorized to engage in the business of insurance when he signed and issued
the fire insurance policy and collected the premium payment constitutes false representations or false
pretenses, upon which the complainant relied when he paid the premium.

7. 3 WAYS TO COMMIT 315, NO. 2(E)

a. ELEMENTS OF 315 NO. 3 (A)

b. 315 No. 3 (B)

c. ELEMENTS OF 315 NO. 3 (C)

8. Distinctions Between Article 226 (Infidelity in Custody of Document) and Estafa

B. ART. 316- OTHER FORMS OF SWINDLING

C. ART. 317-SWINDLING A MINOR

D. ART. 318- OTHER DECEITS

1. Villaflor v. CA, 192 SCRA 680 G.R. No. 95694, October 9, 1997

The case is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the CA’s order affirming the
dismissal by the lower court of petitioner’s complaint against Private Respondent Nasipit Lumber
Co., Incorporated.

The synopsis of the case is as follows:

In 1940, Cirilo Piencenaves, in a Deed of Absolute Sale, sold to Vicente Villafor, a parcel of
agricultural land (planted with Abaca) containing an area of 50 hectares. The deed states that
the land was sold to Villaflor in 1937, but no formal document was then executed, and since
then until the present time, Villaflor has been in possession and occupation of the same.
On 7 December 1948, Villaflor and Nasipit Lumber executed an “Agreement,” confirming an
Agreement to Sell, but with reference to the Sales Application filed with the Bureau of Land.
Sales Application of Villaflor were rejected for having leased the property to another even before
he had acquired transmissible rights thereto. In August 1950, Villaflor executed a document,
denominated as a “Deed of Relinquishment of Rights,” in favor on Nasipit Lumber, in
consideration of the amount of P5,000 that was to be reimbursed to the former representing part
of the purchase price of the land. Pursuant thereto Nasipit Lumber filed a Sales Application over
the 2 parcels of land. “Order of Award” was then issued in favor of Nasipit Lumber.
In 1973, Villafor wrote a letter to Nasipit Lumber, reminding the latter of their verbal agreement
in 1955; but the new set of corporate officers refused to recognize Villaflor’s claim. In a formal
protest dated 31 January 1974 which Villaflor filed with the Bureau of Lands, he protested the
Sales Application of Nasipit Lumber, claiming that the company has not paid him P5,000.00 as
provided in the Deed of Relinquishment of Rights dated 16 August 1950. The Director of Lands
found that the payment P5,000.00 in the Deed and the consideration in the Agreement to Sell
were duly proven, and ordered the dismissal of Villaflor’s protest.
The trial court ordered his widow, Lourdes D. Villaflor, to be substituted as petitioner. CFI
dismissed the complaint. The heirs of petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which,
however, rendered judgment against them. Hence this petition.

Issues:

Whether or not the petitioner still has cause of action to pursue claim of ownership over
the property since his rights thereon was already transferred and relinquished to the
respondent by virtue of the Deed executed thereon; and

Whether or not the private respondent corporation is qualified to acquire ownership over
the land of public domain.

Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit. The court ruled that the petitioner no longer has a cause of
action to demand declaration of nullity over the rights conferred to respondents since his claimed
thereof was merely based on speculations, surmises and conjectures. The petitioner’s claim of
ownership and rights over the property was negated by proof that he ceded the same to the
respondent by virtue of an “Agreement on the Relinquishment of Rights” which they have
executed. The petitioner insistence that the court erred in affirming his cause is misplaced. The
finding of the court and the agency which acquire primary jurisdiction over the petition, was
accorded great weight by the court.

All told, the only disqualification that can be imputed to private respondent is the prohibition in the
1973 Constitution against the holding of alienable lands of the public domain by corporations.
However, this Court settled the matter, declaring that said constitutional prohibition had no
retroactive effect and could not prevail over a vested right to the land. Application for patent for
and in behalf of Nasipit has clearly no impediment, for they have proven satisfactory compliance
of the requirements of the law. Petition is DISMISSED.

2. Veloso v. Sandiganbayan, 187 SCRA 504 G.R. No. 89043-65 July 16, 1990

FACTS:
Accused Jose R. Veloso, a District Auditor, and other district officials resorted to "splitting" of RSEs,
POs (Purchase Orders) and GVs(General Vouchers) in order to avoid review or approval by higher
authorities. Under COA Circular No. 76-41, it is provided that all GVs in amounts exceeding P50,000.00
must have to be processed, pre-audited and approved by the Regional Auditor of the COA, not the
resident auditor Jose R. Veloso.

The district officials herein resorted to the splitting of the RSEs, POs and the GVs involved in the fake
LAA (Letters of Advice of Allotments ) in the amount of P200,000.00. Said LAA evolved into three (3)
separate transactions involving the amounts of P48,480.00, P48,480.00 and P48,189.60. If such
transactions were to be reviewed and pre-audited by the Regional (COA) Auditor, then the GVs and
supporting papers may be found to be the result of (1) inexistent programs of work, (2) illegal funding, (3)
irregular or non-existent bidding, (4) fictitious deliveries and inspection, and other anomalies. The Court
considers such "splitting" as an integral and/or essential element or link in the conspiracy to defraud the
Government inasmuch as such practices was consciously and deliberately resorted to in order to hide the
massive and stupefying misappropriations being undertaken by the accused herein.

Contention of Veloso

Petitioner vigorously argues his innocence, alleging his non- participation in the conspiracy and his good
faith in attaching his signature to the documents involved. He contends that it has not been shown that he
falsified any of the documents which the Sandiganbayan found to be falsifications.

Contention of the Sandiganbayan

The Sandiganbayan found that petitioner's liability, as District Auditor, emanated from his irregular and
improper processing, pre-audit and approval of all the general vouchers and checks in question, based on
irregular or fake supporting papers.

Ruling:

Petitioner, as resident auditor of the SHED (Siquijor Highway Engineering District) was tasked with
ensuring the regularity of all transactions that are subject to his review. In these cases, he had before him,
for his signature, vouchers that were patently irregular, supported by similarly irregularly issued
documents, which he should not have passed in audit. Instead of refusing to affix his signature and
reporting the irregularities to his superiors, as he was duty bound to do, he turned a blind eye and signed
the documents, completing the process that led to the consummation of the crime.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED, and the decision of the Sandiganbayan, to charge forty-
six (46) counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents, insofar as it relates to petitioner, is
AFFIRMED.

H. SPECIAL LAWS

1. PD 2018 Illegal Recruitment

2. Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22) plus Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 Re: Penalty for Violation
of B.P. 22 and Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 Re:

Clarification of Admin Circular No. 12-2000

(i) Punishable acts

(ii) Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds

(iii) Preference of imposition of fine

a. People vs. Vaca GR 43596, 31 October 1936

Facts:

duardo Vaca is the president and owner of Ervine International while Fernando Nieto, Vaca’s son-
in-law, is the firm’s purchasing manager. They issued a check for P10,000 to the General Agency for
Reconnaissance, Detection and Security (GARDS) and drawn against China Bank. When deposited with
PCIBank, the check was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. GARDS sent a demand letter but the drawers
failed to pay within the time given (7 days from notice). A few days later, however, Vaca issued a check to
GARDS for P19,866.16, drawn against Associated Bank, replacing the dishonored check. GARDS did not
return the dishonored check. Later on, GARDS Acting Operations Manager filed a criminal suit against
Vaca and Nieto for violation of BP 22. The trial court sentenced each to 1 year imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P10,000 and costs.

Issue [1]:
Whether the drawers had knowledge of insufficient funds in issuing the check.

Held [1]:
Section 2 of BP 22 provides a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds if the drawer
fails to maintain sufficient funds within 90 days after the date of the check, or to make arrangement for
payment in full by the drawee of such check within 5 days after receiving notice that such check has not
been paid by the drawee. Herein, the second check supposedly replacing the dishonored check is actually
the payment of two separate bills, and was issued 15 days after notice. Such “replacement” cannot negate
the presumption that the drawers knew of the insufficiency of funds.

Issue [2]:
Whether the absence of damages incurred by the payee absolves the drawers from liability.

Held [2]:
The claim — that the case was simply a result of a misunderstanding between GARDS and the
drawers and that the security agency did not suffer any damage from the dishonor of the check — is
flimsy. Even if the payee suffered no damage as a result of the issuance of the bouncing check, the damage
to the integrity of the banking system cannot be denied. Damage to the payee is not an element of the
crime punished in BP 22.

Note:
 In this case, the Court recognized the contribution of Filipino entrepreneurs to the national
economy; and that to serve the ends of criminal justice, instead of the 1 year imprisonment, a fine of
double the amount of the check involved was imposed as penalty. This was made to redeem valuable
human material and prevent unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with
due regard to the protection of the social order.

b. Distinctions Between BP22 and Estafa under the RPC

c. Nierras v. Dacuycuy, 181 SCRA 1

Nature: this is a petition for certiorari assailing the dismissal of the motion to quash the information.

Facts: It appears that petitioner, a customer of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, purchased oil products from it.
Simultaneous with the delivery of the products, he issued nine (9) checks in payment thereof. Upon presentation to the
Philippine National Bank at Naval, Leyte, said checks were dishonored for the reason that his account was already
closed. Thereafter, Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation repeatedly demanded of petitioner either to deposit funds for
his checks or pay for the oil products he had purchased but he failed and refused to do either. Because of this Shell
Corporation filed two charges against him namely Estafa and violation of BP Blg 22.

Petitioner argues that he would be placed in double jeopardy as all the elements of estafa under Article 315 (2-d) of the
Revised Penal Code are also present in that crime punishable under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 namely (1) "the
postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack or
insufficiency of funds to cover the check and (3) damage to the payee thereof."

Issue: can petitioner be held liable for the nine criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and separately
also be held liable for the crime of estafa under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code for the issuance of the same
bouncing checks?

Held: YES.

Rationale: Petitioner is charged with two distinct and separate offenses. What petitioner failed to mention in his
argument is the fact that deceit and damage are essential elements in Article 315 (2-d) Revised Penal Code, but
are not required in Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Under the latter law, mere issuance of a check that is dishonored gives
rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the same without sufficient funds and
hence punishable which is not so under the Penal Code.

While the filing of the two sets of Information under the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, on estafa, may refer to identical acts committed by petitioner, the
prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense, because a single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of
offenses and where there is variance or differences between the elements of an offense in one law and another law as in
the case at bar there will be no double jeopardy because what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of
elements in the two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is
prosecution for the same offense. Hence, the mere filing of the two (2) sets of information does not itself give rise to
double jeopardy.

Decision: Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

d. People v. Grospe, 157 SCRA 154

Facts: Manuel Parulan, is an authorized wholesale dealer of petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC, for
short) in Bulacan. Two checks involved herein were issued and signed by the accused in connection with
the beer purchases made by him on various occasions at the Guiguinto sales office of SMC at Guiguinto,
Bulacan and which checks he handed and delivered to the sales Supervisor of SMC, Mr. Ruben Cornelio,
who holds office in that municipality. The two checks were subsequently dishonored due to lack of funds
resulting in damage to SMC, the offended party herein. In Criminal Case No. 2800 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pampanga, he was charged with Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law and in Criminal Case No.
2813 of the same Court, Respondent-accused was charged with Estafa. Respondent Judge then decreed
dismissed these cases for lack of jurisdiction.

COS: there are two dishonored checks involved, each the subject of different penal laws and with
different basic elements: (1) Respondent-accused issued Planters Development Bank (Santa Maria,
Bulacan Branch) a check in favor of SMC, which was received by the SMC Supervisor at Guiguinto,
Bulacan. The check was forwarded to the SMC Regional Office at San Fernando, Pampanga, where it was
delivered to and received by the SMC Finance Officer, who then deposited the check with the Bank of
the Philippine Islands (BPI), San Fernando Branch, which is the SMC depository bank. On July 8,1983, the
SMC depository bank received a notice of dishonor of the said check for "insufficiency of funds" from
the PDB, the drawee bank in Santa Maria, Bulacan. This dishonored check is the subject of the charge of
Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (BP Blg. 22) in Criminal Case No. 2800 of the lower Court
(hereafter, the Bouncing Checks Case). (2) Respondent-accused likewise issued a check in favor of SMC,
which was received also by the SMC Supervisor at Guiguinto, Bulacan, as direct payment for the spot
sale of beer. That check was similarly forwarded by the SMC Supervisor to the SMC Regional Office in
San Fernando, Pampanga, where it was delivered to the Finance Officer thereat and who, in turn
deposited the check with the SMC depository bank in San Fernando, Pampanga. On July 8,1983, the SMC
depository bank received a notice of dishonor for "insufficiency of funds" from the drawee bank, the
PDB, in Santa Maria, Bulacan. This dishonored check is the subject of the prosecution for Estafa by
postdating or issuing a bad check under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code in
Criminal Case No, 2813 of the lower Court (briefly, the Estafa Case).

COA: Respondent-accused adopts the contrary proposition and argues that the order of dismissal was,
in effect, an acquittal not reviewable by certiorari, and that to set the order aside after plea and trial on
the merits, would subject Respondent-accused to double jeopardy.

ISSUE: WON venue was sufficiently conferred in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga in the two cases.

RULING:

Respondent Judge had jurisdiction to try and decide the subject criminal case, venue having
been properly laid. The present petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the void Decision of
Respondent Judge does not place Respondent-accused in double jeopardy for the same offense. It will
be recalled that the questioned judgment was not an adjudication on the merits. It was a dismissal upon
Respondent Judge's erroneous conclusion that his Court had no "territorial jurisdiction" over the cases.
Where an order dismissing a criminal case is not a decision on the merits, it cannot bar as res judicata a
subsequent case based on the same offense.

A person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or province
where the offense was in part committed. However, if the acts material and essential to the crime and
requisite of its consummation occurred in one municipality or territory, the Court of that municipality or
territory has the sole jurisdiction to try the case.

The estafa charged in the two information’s involved in the case before Us appears to be
transitory or continuing in nature. In respect of the Bouncing Checks Case, the offense also appears to
be continuing in nature.