WEEK 11- QUO WARRANTO
P Failure to obtain a response from MMDA, he sent a formal
XII • DE CASTRO V. CARLOS, G.R. NO. 194994, 16 APRIL 2013
CUEVAS
Principle:
1. In a quo warranto proceeding, the person suing must
show that he has a clear right to the office allegedly held
unlawfully by another. Absent a showing of that right,
the lack of qualification or eligibility of the supposed
usurper is immaterial.
2. A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to
determine the right of a person to use or exercise a
franchise or an office and to oust the holder from the
enjoyment, thereof, if the claim is not well-founded, or if
his right to enjoy the privilege has been forfeited. Where
the action is filed by a private person, in his own name,
he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted
position, otherwise, respondent has a right to the
undisturbed possession of the office.
Facts:
Sometime on July 29, 2009, then President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo appointed Emmanuel A. de Castro (Petitioner) as
Assistant General Manager for Operations (AGMO) of the
Metropolitan Development Authority (MMDA). His appointment
was concurred by the members of MMDA and was able to
thereafter take his oath.
Meanwhile, on July 29, 2010, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa
issued Office of the President (OP) Memorandum Circular No. 2
series of 2010, amending OP Memorandum Circular No. 1, series
of 2010 stating among others that:
2. All non-Career Executive Service Officials (non-CESO) occupying
Career Executive Service (CES) positions in all agencies of the
executive branch shall remain in office and continue to perform
their duties and discharge their responsibility until October 31,
2010 or until their resignations have been accepted and/or until
their respective replacements have been appointed or designated,
whichever comes first, unless they are reappointed in the
meantime.
On the basis of the order, Atty. Francis Tolentino, chairman of
MMDA, issued an office order designating a certain Corazon Cruz
as OIC of the Office of the AGMO thereby reassigning Petitioner to
Legal and Legislative Affairs Office, Office of the General Manager.
As a result, petitioner was stricken off the MMDA payroll, and he
was no longer paid his salary beginning November 2010.
Aggrieved, petitioner sought a clarification from the Career
Executive Board (CESB) as to the proper classification of the
position of AGMO. The then Executive Director, opined that the
said position had not yet been classified and could not be
considered as belonging to the Career Executive Service (CES)
and that Petitioner was not covered by OP Memorandum
Circulars 1 and 2.
Petitioner was later offered the position of Direct IV of MMDA
Public Health and Safety Services and/or MMDA Consultant but
petitioner declined. He then sent a letter to the AGM demanding
payment of his salary and reinstatement in the monthly payroll.
demand for his reinstatement to the Office of the President.
However, President Benigno Aquino III appointed respondent as
the new AGMO of the MMDA. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner’s contentiom:
Petitioner contends that Section 2(3), Article IX(B) of the 1987
Constitution guarantees the security of tenure of employees in
the civil service. He further argues that his appointment as AGMO
is not covered by OP Memorandum Circular No. 2, since it is not a
CES position as determined by the CESB.
Respondent’s contention:
Respondent posits that the AGMO position belongs to the CES;
thus, in order to have security of tenure, petitioner, must be a
Career Executive Service official (CESO). Respondent maintains
that the function of an AGM is executive and managerial in
nature. Thus, considering that petitioner is a non-CESO occupying
a CES position, he is covered by OP Memorandum Circular Nos. 1
and 2. Respondent likewise raises the issue of procedural
infirmity in the direct recourse to the Supreme Court by
petitioner, who thereby failed to adhere to the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts.
Issue:
Can a person without a clear right to the office allegedly held
unlawfully by another file a quo warranto proceeding?
Held:
No.
In a quo warranto proceeding, the person suing must show that
he has a clear right to the office allegedly held unlawfully by
another. Absent a showing of that right, the lack of qualification
or eligibility of the supposed usurper is immaterial.
The Petition must still be dismissed for lack of merit. "A petition
for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a
person to use or exercise a franchise or an office and to oust the
holder from the enjoyment, thereof, if the claim is not well-
founded, or if his right to enjoy the privilege has been forfeited."
Where the action is filed by a private person, in his own name, he
must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position,
otherwise, respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession
of the office.
The controversy arose from the issuance of OP Memorandum
Circular Nos. 1 and 2, which applies to all non-CESO’s occupying
CES positions in all agencies of the executive branch. Petitioner,
being a non-CESO, avers that he is not covered by these OP
memoranda considering that the AGMO of the MMDA is a non-
CES position.
In order to settle the controversy, there is a need to determine
the nature of the contentious position of AGMO of the MMDA.
Evidently, an AGMO should possess all the qualifications required
by third-level career service within the CES. In this case,
petitioner does not have the required eligibility. Therefore, we
find that his appointment to the position of AGMO was merely
temporary.
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  1

Petitioner undisputedly lacked CES eligibility. Thus, he did not
hold the position of AGMO in a permanent capacity or acquire
security of tenure in that position. Otherwise stated, his
appointment was temporary and "co-terminus with the
appointing authority." In Carillo v. CA, this Court ruled that "one
who holds a temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of office;
his employment can be terminated at the pleasure of the
appointing power, there being no need to show that the
termination is for cause." Therefore, we find no violation of
security of tenure when petitioner was replaced by respondent
upon the latter’s appointment to the position of AGMO by
President Aquino.
All appointments to positions which have not been previously
classified as part of the CES would be deemed co-terminus with
the appointing authority. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, considering that petitioner is an appointee of then
President Arroyo whose term ended on 30 June 2010,
petitioner’s term of office was also deemed terminated upon the
assumption of President Aquino.
Likewise, it is inconsequential that petitioner was allegedly
replaced by another non-CESO eligible. In a quo warranto
proceeding, the person suing must show that he has a clear right
to the office allegedly held unlawfully by another. Absent a
showing of that right, the lack of qualification or eligibility of the
supposed usurper is immaterial.
All the foregoing considered, the petition merits an outright
dismissal for disregarding the hierarchy of courts and
petitioner’s lack of cause of action against respondent for failure
to sufficiently show that he has undisturbed rights to the position
of AGMO of the MMDA.
VILANDO V. HRET, G.R. NO. 192147, 23 AUGUST 2011
SURRALTA
Principle:
"The power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive,
does not carry with it the authority to delve into the legality of
the judgment of naturalization which is raised as issue in the
petition for quo warranto. To rule otherwise would operate as a
collateral attack on the judgment of citizenship which, is not
permissible."
VILANDO vs. HRET, G.R. Nos. 192147-49, Aug. 23, 2011
FACTS:
Petitoner Vilando and private respondent Limkaichiong were
candidates for Congressman. Petioner filed a disqualification case
before the Comelec against respondent questioning her
citizenship. In the meanwhile, respondent was proclaimed as the
duly elected Congressman and thereby assumed office. The
disqualification case filed against her by petitioner Vilando was
dismissed by the Comelec and directed the latter to seek relief
before the HRET by way of a petition for Quo Warranto.
WEEK 11- QUO WARRANTO
And so petitioner filed a petition for Quo Warranto against
Limkaichong before the HRET. Petitioner asserted that
Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen and ineligible for the office
she was elected and proclaimed. Petitioner asserted that
Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen and ineligible for the office
she was elected and proclaimed. They alleged that she was born
to a father (Julio Sy), whose naturalization had not attained
finality, and to a mother who acquired the Chinese citizenship of
Julio Sy from the time of her marriage to the latter. Also, he
invoked the jurisdiction of the HRET for a determination of
Limkaichongs citizenship, which necessarily included an inquiry
into the validity of the naturalization certificate of Julio Sy.
For her defense, Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural-
born Filipino citizen. She averred that the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by her father was regular and in order and
had already attained the status of res judicata. Further, she
claimed that the validity of such citizenship could not be assailed
through a collateral attack.
However, petitioner Vilando argued that the quo warranto
petition does not operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship
of Limkaichongs father as the certificate of naturalization is null
and void from the beginning. He further asserted that as an
incident in determining the eligibility of Limkaichong, the HRET,
having the plenary, absolute and exclusive jurisdiction to
determine her qualifications, can pass upon the efficacy of the
certificate of naturalization.
The Office of the Solicitor General in siding with the HRET wrote
that a collateral attack against a judgment is generally not
allowed, unless the judgment is void upon its face or its nullity is
apparent by virtue of its own recitals.Thus, relying on the
presumptionn of validity of the naturalization of private
respondent Limkaichong's father - Julio Sy - the HRET dismissed
the petition and declared Limkaichong not disqualified as
Member of the House of Representatives grounded on
petitioner's failur to satisfy the quantum of proof to sustain their
theory that respondent is not a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the aforesaid decision, but it
was denied by the HRET.
ISSUE:
Can the Congress pass upon the validity of the naturalization
proceeding raised as issue in the petition for quo warranto?
HELD:
NO.
The Court ruled, the HRET has jurisdiction over quo warranto
petitions, specifically over cases challenging ineligibility on the
ground of lack of citizenship. No less than the 1987 Constitution
vests the HRET the authority to be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its Members.
Time and again, this Court has acknowledged this sole and
exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET.The power granted to HRET by
the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as
if it had remained originally in the legislature. Such power is
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  2

regarded as full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise of
any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise
restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same.
Such power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive,
does not carry with it the authority to delve into the legality of
the judgment of naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying
Limkaichong. To rule otherwise would operate as a collateral
attack on the citizenship of the father which, as already stated, is
not permissible.
Evidently, there is no basis to oblige the Tribunal to reopen the
naturalization proceedings for a determination of the citizenship
of the ascendant of respondent. A petition for quo warranto is not
a means to achieve that purpose. To rule on this issue in this quo
warranto proceeding will not only be a clear grave abuse of
discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction, but also a
blatant violation of due process on the part of the persons who
will be affected or who are not parties in this case.
Well-settled is the principle that the judgments of the HRET are
beyond judicial interference. The only instance where this Court
may intervene in the exercise of its so-called extraordinary
jurisdiction is upon a determination that the decision or
resolution of the HRET was rendered without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or upon a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of its power to
constitute a denial of due process of law, or upon a
demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly
constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a
remedy for such abuse. In this case, there is no showing of any
such arbitrariness or improvidence. The HRET acted well within
the sphere of its power when it dismissed the quo warranto
petition.
BAR EXAM QUESTION
Vilando vs. HRET
Petitioner Karingking filed a petition for quo warranto before the
HRET questioning the citizenship of respondent Winjalingling.
Petitioner argued that respondent father 's naturalization from
Chinese to Filipino was null and void as it was attended by
irregularities and thus, this being the case, respondent
Winjalingling is not a Filipino. Petitioner urged the HRET to look
upon the validity of the naturalization proceeding of resondent's
father. Respondent countered that the HRET has no power to
delve into that issue as it would tantamount to collateral attack
on the citizenship of his father; and further argued that a direct
action for attacking the validity of her father's citizenship should
be filed instead of a petition for quo warranto. But petitioner
Karingking contended that the HRET, having the plenary,
absolute and exclusive jurisdiction to determine her
qualifications, can pass upon the efficacy of the naturalization.
Is petitioner Karingking correct?
Answer:
No.
WEEK 11- QUO WARRANTO
The power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive,
does not carry with it the authority to delve into the legality of
the judgment of naturalization which is raised as issue in the
petition for quo warranto. To rule otherwise would operate as a
collateral attack on the judgment of citizenship which, is not
permissible.
TOPACIO V. ONG, GR NO. 179895, DECEMBER 18, 2008
BITANGJOL
Principle:
For a quo warranto petition to be successful, the private
person suing must show a clear right to the contested office. In
fact, not even a mere preferential right to be appointed thereto
can lend a modicum of legal ground to proceed with the action.
In the instance in which the Petition for Quo Warranto
is filed by an individual in his own name, he must be able to
prove that he is entitled to the controverted public office,
position, or franchise; otherwise, the holder of the same has a
right to the undisturbed possession thereof.
Long digest:
Facts:
Ferdinand Topacio (petitioner) via the present petition
for certiorari and prohibition seeks, in the main, to prevent
Justice Gregory Ong (Ong) from further exercising the powers,
duties and responsibilities of a Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
On July 9, 2007, Ong immediately filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City a Petition for the
“amendment/ correction/ supplementation or annotation of an
entry in [his] Certificate of Birth,” docketed as S.P. Proc No.
11767-SJ, “Gregory Santos Ong v. The Civil Registrar of San Juan,
Metro Manila, et al.”
Meanwhile, petitioner, by verified Letter-
Request/Complaint of September 5, 2007, implored respondent
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to initiate post-haste a quo
warranto proceeding against Ong in the latter’s capacity as an
incumbent Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. Invoking
paragraph 1, Section 7, Article VIII of the Constitution in
conjunction with the Court’s Decision in Kilosbayan Foundation
v. Ermita, petitioner points out that natural-born citizenship is
also a qualification for appointment as member of the
Sandiganbayan and that Ong has failed to meet the citizenship
requirement from the time of his appointment as such in October
1998.
The OSG, by letter of September 25, 2007, informed
petitioner that it “cannot favorably act on [his] request for the
filing of a quo warranto petition until the [RTC] case shall have
been terminated with finality.” Petitioner assails this position of
the OSG as being tainted with grave abuse of discretion, aside
from Ong’s continuous discharge of judicial functions.
Hence, this petition, positing that:
IN OCTOBER OF 1998, RESPONDENT WAS NOT DULY-
QUALIFIED UNDER THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 1,
SECTION 7, OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, TO BE APPOINTED AN
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, MERELY ON THE
STRENGTH OF AN IDENTIFICATION CERTIFICATE ISSUED BY
THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND A 1ST INDORSEMENT
DATED 22 MAY 1997 ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,
BECAUSE, AS OF OCTOBER 1998, RESPONDET’S BIRTH
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CERTIFICATE INDICATED THAT RESPONDENT IS A CHINESE
CITIZEN AND BECAUSE, AS OF OCTOBER 1998, THE RECORDS
OF THIS HONORABLE COURT DECLARED THAT RESPONDENT IS
A NATURALIZED FILIPINO CITIZEN.
Petitioner thus contends that Ong should immediately
desist from holding the position of Associate Justice of the
Sandiganbayan since he is disqualified on the basis of citizenship,
whether gauged from his birth certificate which indicates him to
be a Chinese citizen or against his bar records bearing out his
status as a naturalized Filipino citizen, as declared in Kilosbayan
Foundation v. Ermita.
Ong, on the other hand, states that Kilosbayan
Foundation v. Ermita did not annul or declare null his
appointment as Justice of the Supreme Court, but merely
enjoined him from accepting his appointment, and that there is
no definitive pronouncement therein that he is not a natural-born
Filipino. He informs that he, nonetheless, voluntarily
relinquished the appointment to the Supreme Court out of
judicial statesmanship.[9]
By Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss of January 3,
2008, Ong informs that the RTC, by Decision of October 24, 2007,
already granted his petition and recognized him as a natural-
born citizen. The Decision having, to him, become final,[10]he
caused the corresponding annotation thereof on his Certificate of
Birth.[11]
Invoking the curative provisions of the 1987
Constitution, Ong explains that his status as a natural-born
citizen inheres from birth and the legal effect of such recognition
retroacts to the time of his birth.
Ong thus concludes that in view of the RTC decision,
there is no more legal or factual basis for the present petition, or
at the very least this petition must await the final disposition of
the RTC case which to him involves a prejudicial issue.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the OSG committed grave abuse of
discretion in deferring the filing of a petition for quo
warranto.
2. Whether or not the petitioner (who did not show any
clear right to the contested office of the respondent) can
file a petition for quo warranto.
Ruling:
The OSG did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, or, in other words, where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
The Court appreciates no abuse of discretion, much less,
a grave one, on the part of the OSG in deferring action on the
filing of a quo warranto case until after the RTC case has been
terminated with finality. A decision is not deemed tainted with
grave abuse of discretion simply because the affected party
disagrees with it.
The Solicitor General is the counsel of the government,
its agencies and instrumentalities, and its officials or agents. In
WEEK 11- QUO WARRANTO
the discharge of its task, the Solicitor General must see to it that
the best interest of the government is upheld within the limits set
by law.
In the exercise of sound discretion, the Solicitor General
may suspend or turn down the institution of an action for quo
warranto where there are just and valid reasons.
Upon receipt of a case certified to him, the Solicitor
General exercises his discretion in the management of the case.
He may start the prosecution of the case by filing the appropriate
action in court or he may opt not to file the case at all. He may do
everything within his legal authority but always conformably
with the national interest and the policy of the government on
the matter at hand.
It appears that after studying the case, the Solicitor
General saw the folly of re-litigating the same issue of Ong’s
citizenship in the quo warranto case simultaneously with the RTC
case, not to mention the consequent risk of forum-shopping. In
any event, the OSG did not totally write finis to the issue as it
merely advised petitioner to await the outcome of the RTC case.
Petitioner cannot file a Quo Warranto.
By petitioner’s admission, what is at issue is Ong’s title
to the office of Associate Justice of Sandiganbayan. He claims to
have been constrained to file the present petition after the OSG
refused to heed his request to institute a suit for quo warranto.
Averring that Ong is disqualified to be a member of any lower
collegiate court, petitioner specifically prays that, after
appropriate proceedings, the Court:
. . . issue the writs of certiorari and prohibition against
Respondent Ong, ordering Respondent Ong to cease and desist
from further exercising the powers, duties, and responsibilities of
a Justice of the Sandiganbayan due to violation of the first
sentence of paragraph 1, Section 7, of the 1987 Constitution; . . .
issue the writs of certiorari and prohibition against Respondent
Ong and declare that he was disqualified from being appointed to
the post of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan in October of
1998, considering that, as of October of 1998, the birth certificate
of Respondent Ong declared that he is a Chinese citizen, while
even the records of this Honorable Court, as of October of 1998,
declared that Respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino.
While denominated as a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, the petition partakes of the nature of a quo warranto
proceeding with respect to Ong, for it effectively seeks to declare
null and void his appointment as an Associate Justice of the
Sandiganbayan for being unconstitutional.
Being a collateral attack on a public officer’s title, the
present petition for certiorari and prohibition must be dismissed.
The title to a public office may not be contested except
directly, by quo warranto proceedings; and it cannot be assailed
collaterally, even through mandamus or a motion to annul or set
aside order.
A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy
to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to
oust the holder from its enjoyment.[33] It is brought against the
person who is alleged to have usurped, intruded into, or
unlawfully held or exercised the public office,[34] and may be
commenced by the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, as the
case may be, or by any person claiming to be entitled to the
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  4

public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised
by another.
Nothing is more settled than the principle, which goes
back to the 1905 case of Acosta v. Flor, reiterated in the recent
2008 case of Feliciano v. Villasin, that for a quo warranto petition
to be successful, the private person suing must show a clear right
to the contested office. In fact, not even a mere preferential right
to be appointed thereto can lend a modicum of legal ground to
proceed with the action.
In the present case, petitioner presented no sufficient
proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of an
Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. He in fact concedes that
he was never entitled to assume the office of an Associate Justice
of the Sandiganbayan.[39]
In the instance in which the Petition for Quo Warranto
is filed by an individual in his own name, he must be able to
prove that he is entitled to the controverted public office,
position, or franchise; otherwise, the holder of the same has a
right to the undisturbed possession thereof. In actions for Quo
Warranto to determine title to a public office, the complaint, to be
sufficient in form, must show that the plaintiff is entitled to the
office. In Garcia v. Perez, this Court ruled that the person
instituting Quo Warranto proceedings on his own behalf, under
Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, must aver and be able to
show that he is entitled to the office in dispute. Without such
averment or evidence of such right, the action may be dismissed
at any stage.
The rightful authority of a judge, in the full exercise of
his public judicial functions, cannot be questioned by any merely
private suitor, or by any other, except in the form especially
provided by law.To uphold such action would encourage every
disgruntled citizen to resort to the courts, thereby causing
incalculable mischief and hindrance to the efficient operation of
the governmental machine.
Short Digest:
Petitioner (Topacio) filed petition certiorari and
prohibition, in the main, to prevent Justice Gregory Ong (Ong)
from further exercising the powers, duties and responsibilities of
a Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, alleging that Ong is not a
natural born Filipino citizen.
On July 9, 2007, Ong immediately filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City a Petition for the
“amendment/ correction/ supplementation or annotation of an
entry in [his] Certificate of Birth,” which the same court ruled and
recognized on October 24, 2007 that Ong is a natural born
Filipino citizen.
Petitioner implored (OSG) to initiate post-haste a quo
warranto proceeding against Ong in the latter’s capacity as an
incumbent Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. The OSG
deferred from filing the petition because of the pending case of
Ong in the RTC regarding his citizenship.
Hence, petitioner filed a certiorari and prohibition
against the OSG and Ong.
MENDOZA V. ALLAS, G.R. NO. 131977, FEBRUARY 4, 1999
GIME
PRINCIPLE: A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the
respondent's successor in office, even though such successor may
WEEK 11- QUO WARRANTO
trace his title to the same source. This follows from the nature of
the writ of quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as
such, but always against the person.
Facts:
On March 1, 1988, Mendoza was appointed Customs Service Chief
of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service (CIIS). In
1989, the position of Customs Service Chief was reclassified by
the Civil Service as "Director III" in accordance with Republic Act
No. 6758 and National Compensation Circular No. 50. Petitioner's
position was thus categorized as "Director III, CIIS" and he
discharged the function and duties of said office.
On April 22, 1993, petitioner was temporarily designated as
Acting District Collector, Collection District X, Cagayan de Oro
City. In his place, respondent Ray Allas was appointed as "Acting
Director III" of the CIIS. Despite petitioner's new assignment as
Acting District Collector, however, he continued to receive the
salary and benefits of the position of Director III.
In September 1994, petitioner received a letter from Deputy
Customs Commissioner Cesar Z. Dario, informing him of his
termination from the Bureau of Customs, in view of respondent
Allas' appointment as Director III by President Fidel V. Ramos.
On December 2, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto
against respondent Allas before the Regional Trial Court,
Paranaque, Branch 258.The case was tried and on September 11,
1995, a decision was rendered granting the petition.
Respondent Allas appealed to the Court of Appeals. On February
8, 1996, while the case was pending before said court,
respondent Allas was promoted by President Ramos to the
position of Deputy Commissioner of Customs for Assessment and
Operations. As a consequence of this promotion, petitioner
moved to dismiss respondent's appeal as having been rendered
moot and academic. The Court of Appeals granted the motion and
dismissed the case accordingly. The order of dismissal became
final and entry of judgment was made on March 19, 1996.
On May 9, 1996, petitioner filed with the court a quo a Motion for
Execution of its decision. On July 24, 1996, the court denied the
motion on the ground that the contested position vacated by
respondent Allas was now being occupied by respondent
Godofredo Olores who was not a party to the quo warranto
petition.
ISSUE:
WON the court can executed the judgement eventhough Olores
was not a party to the quo warranto petition?
RULING:
No.
A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's
successor in office, even though such successor may trace his title
to the same source. This follows from the nature of the writ of
quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as such, but
always against the person-- to determine whether he is
constitutionally and legally authorized to perform any act in, or
exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim.In the
case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was filed by petitioner
solely against respondent Allas. What was threshed out before
the trial court was the qualification and right of petitioner to the
contested position as against respondent Ray Allas, not against
Godofredo Olores. The Court of Appeals did not err in denying
execution of the trial court's decision.
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  5

BAR EXAM:
X files a quo warranto proceeding against Y. The trial court
granted the petition of X and ordered Y to vacate the position. Y
filed for appeal. Pending such appeal Y was appointed into
another posistion. Z was appointed in the vacated posistion of Y.
Can X execute the judgement against Z eventhough he is not a
party to the quo warranto?
ANSWER:
NO.
The nature of the writ of quo warranto itself. It is never directed
to an officer as such, but always against the person.
DAMASEN V. TUMAMAO, G.R. NO. 173165, FEBRUARY 17,
2010 ESPARAGOZA
CALLEJA V. PANDAY, G.R. NO. 168696, FEBRUARY 28, 2006
GUANTERO
FACTS: Respondents filed a petition with the RTC of San Jose,
Camarines Sur for quo warranto with Damages and Prayer for
Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction, Damages and Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order against herein
petitioners. Respondents alleged that from 1985 up to the filing
of the petition with the trial court, they had been members of the
board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated,
but sometime in May 2005, petitioners, who are also among the
incorporators and stockholders of said corporation, forcibly and
with the aid of armed men usurped the powers which supposedly
belonged to respondents.
RTC-Br. 58 issued an Order transferring the case to the RTC in
Naga City. According to RTC-Br. 58, since the verified petition
showed petitioners therein (herein respondents) to be residents
of Naga City, then pursuant to Section 7, Rule 66 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, the action for quo warranto should be
brought in the RTC exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area
where the respondents or any of the respondents
resides. However, the Executive Judge of RTC, Naga City refused
to receive the case folder of the subject case for quo warranto,
stating that improper venue is not a ground for transferring a quo
warranto case to another administrative jurisdiction.
The RTC-Br. 58 then proceeded to issue and serve summons
on herein petitioners (respondents below). Petitioner Tabora
filed his Answer, raising therein the affirmative defenses of (1)
improper venue, (2) lack of jurisdiction, and (3) wrong remedy of
quo warranto. Thereafter, the other petitioners also filed their
Answer, also raising the same affirmative defenses. All the parties
were then required to submit their respective memoranda.
RTC-Br. 58 issued the assailed Order: "xxx xxx
Under Section 8, of the Interim Rules, [a] Motion to Dismiss is
among the prohibited pleadings. On the otherhand, the Supreme
Court under Administrative Order 8-01 has directed the transfer
from the regular courts to the branches of the Regional Trial
Courts specially designated to try and decide intra-corporate
dispute. xxx The Motion to Dismiss is DENIED pursuant to the
Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies
(A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC) which mandates that motion to dismiss is a
prohibited pleading (Section 8) and in consonance with
Administrative Order 8-01 of the Supreme Court dated March 1,
2001, this case is hereby ordered remanded to the Regional Trial
WEEK 11- QUO WARRANTO
Court Branch 23, Naga City which under A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC
has been designated as special court to try and decide intra-
corporate controversies under R.A. 8799. xxx The scheduled
hearing on the prayer for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction set on July 18, 2005 is hereby
cancelled.For reasons of comity the issue of whether Quo
Warranto is the proper remedy is better left to the court of
competent jurisdiction to rule upon."
Petitioners no longer moved for reconsideration of the foregoing
Order and, instead, immediately elevated the case to this Court
via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
HELD: It should be noted that allegations in a complaint for quo
warranto that certain persons usurped the offices, powers and
functions of duly elected members of the board, trustees and/or
officers make out a case for an intra-corporate controversy. Prior
to the enactment of R.A. No. 8799, the Court, adopting Justice Jose
Y. Feria’s view, declared in Unilongo v. Court of Appeals that
Section 1, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is “limited
to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public
office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their
office; and associations which act as corporations without being
legally incorporated,” while “[a]ctions of quo warranto against
corporations, or against persons who usurp an office in a
corporation, fall under the jurisdiction of the Securities and
Exchange Commission and are governed by its rules. (P.D. No.
902-A as amended).”
However, R.A. No. 8799 was passed and Section 5.2 thereof
provides as follows:
5.2. The Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated
under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby
transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the
appropriate Regional Trial Court: Provided, That the Supreme
Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional
Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these
cases. Xxx
Therefore, actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp an
office in a corporation, which were formerly cognizable by the
Securities and Exchange Commission under PD 902-A, have been
transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction. But, this does
not change the fact that Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure does not apply to quo warranto cases against persons
who usurp an office in a private corporation. Presently, Section
1(a) of Rule 66 reads thus:
Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. – An action
for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be
commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines against
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises a public office, position or franchise;
xxxx
As explained in the Unilongocase, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 of the
present Rules no longer contains the phrase “or an office in a
corporation created by authority of law” which was found in the
old Rules. Clearly, the present Rule 66 only applies to actions
of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office,
position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office;
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  6

and associations which act as corporations without being
legally incorporated despite the passage of R.A. No. 8799. It
is, therefore, The Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-
Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 which applies to
the petition for quo warranto filed by respondents before the trial
court since what is being questioned is the authority of herein
petitioners to assume the office and act as the board of directors
and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated.
The next question then is, which branch of the Regional Trial
Court has jurisdiction over the present action for quo
warrato? Section 5 of the Interim Rules provides that the petition
should be commenced and tried in the Regional Trial Court that
has jurisdiction over the principal office of the corporation. It is
undisputed that the principal office of the corporation is situated
at Goa, Camarines Sur. Thus, pursuant to A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC
and A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, it is the Regional Trial Court
designated as Special Commercial Courts in Camarines Sur
which shall have jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto
filed by herein respondents.
Evidently, the RTC-Br. 58 in San Jose, Camarines Sur is bereft of
jurisdiction over respondents’ petition for quo warranto. Based
on the allegations in the petition, the case was clearly one
involving an intra-corporate dispute. The trial court should have
been aware that under R.A. No. 8799 and the aforementioned
administrative issuances of this Court, RTC-Br. 58 was never
designated as a Special Commercial Court; hence, it was never
vested with jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by the
SEC.
The petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED. The Order of
the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur dated July 13,
2005 is SET ASIDE for being NULL and VOID. The petition for
quo warranto in Civil Case No. T-1007 (now re-docketed as SEC
Case No. RTC 2005-0001), entitled “Jose Pierre A. Panday, et al. v.
Sps. Joaquin M. Calleja, Jr., et al.” is ordered DISMISSED.
MADRIGAL V. LECAROZ, G.R. NO. L-46218, OCTOBER 23, 1990
BRAGAT
PARDO DE TAVERA V. PHIL. TUBERCULOSIS SOCIETY, GR. NO.
L-48928, FEBRUARY 25, 1982 ROLLAN
Principle: The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern
it, including the period of prescription, is to be determined not by
the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or
brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer
for relief.
Facts: Plaintiff is a doctor of Medicine by profession and a
recognized specialist in the treatment of tuberculosis. She is a
member of the Board of Directors of the defendant Society, in
representation of the PCSO. She was duly appointed as Executive
Secretary of the Society. On May 29, 1974, the past Board of
Directors removed her summarily from her position, the lawful
cause of which she was not informed, through the simple
expedient of declaring her position vacant. Defendant Romulo
was appointed to the position and defendants Pardo, Nubla,
Garcia and Adil, not being members of defendant Society were
elevated as members of the Board of Directors. Not being
qualified, petitioner alleged said acts to be null and void. The
court a quo rendered a decision holding that the present suit
WEEK 11- QUO WARRANTO
being one for quo warranto it should be filed within one year
from plaintiff's ouster from office; that nevertheless, plaintiff was
not illegally removed from her position as Executive Secretary in
The Society since plaintiff was holding an appointment at the
pleasure of the appointing power and hence temporary.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the present case is one for quo warranto and
the one-year period to file the action has prescribed.
2. Whether or not petitioner was illegally removed and thus
entitled to damages.
Ruling:
1. No.
The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it,
including the period of prescription, is to be determined not by
the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or
brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer
for relief.
In this case, while it is true that the complaint questions
petitioner's removal from the position of Executive Secretary and
seeks her reinstatement thereto, the nature of the suit is not
necessarily one of quo warranto. The nature of the instant suit is
one involving a violation of the rights of the plaintiff under the
By-Laws of the Society, the Civil Code and the Constitution, which
allegedly renders the individuals responsible therefore,
accountable for damages, as may be gleaned from the allegations
in the complaint as constituting the plaintiff's causes of action.
Corollarily, the one-year period fixed in Section 16, Rule 66 of the
Revised Rules of Court within which a petition for quo
warranto should be filed, counted from the date of ouster, does
not apply to the case at bar.
2. No.
The action is primarily against the Society and the past members
of the Board who are responsible for her removal. Where the
respondents, except for Romulo, are not actually holding the
office in question, the suit could not be one for quo warranto.
The absence of a fixed term in the letter addressed to petitioner
informing her of her appointment as Executive Secretary is very
significant. This could have no other implication than that
petitioner held an appointment at the pleasure of the appointing
power.
Petitioner cannot likewise seek relief from the general provisions
of the New Civil Code on Human Relations nor from the
fundamental principles of the New Constitution on preservation
of human dignity. While these provisions present some basic
principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship
between human beings and the stability of social order, these are
merely guides for human conduct in the absence of specific legal
provisions and definite contractual stipulations. In the case at
bar, the Code of By-Laws of the Society contains a specific
provision governing the term of office of petitioner. The same
necessarily limits her rights under the New Civil Code and the
New Constitution upon acceptance of the appointment.
PPSTA V. APOSTOL, G.R. NO. L-36966, FEBRUARY 28, 1974
11/13 GOMBA
LIBAN V. GORDON, G.R. NO. 175352 SITOY
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  7

SANTIAGO V. GUINGONA, G.R. NO. 134577, NOVEMBER 18,
1998 PAGAPONG
Doctrines:
• In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the
person suing must show that he or she has a clear right to the
contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office
allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent.
• In the regular course, the regional trial courts and this Court
have concurrent jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for quo
warranto (as well as certiorari, prohibition and mandamus), and
a basic deference to the hierarchy of courts impels a filing of such
petitions in the lower tribunals. 2 However, for special and
important reasons or for exceptional and compelling
circumstances, as in the present case, this Court has allowed
exceptions to this doctrine. 3 In fact, original petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto assailing
acts of legislative officers like the Senate President 4 and the
Speaker of the House 5 have been recognized as exceptions to
this rule.
Facts:
On the first session of the eleventh Congress, Sen. Fernan was
declared the duly elected President of the Senate against Sen.
Tatad, by a vote of 20 to 2.
Senator Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Senator
Santiago (allegedly the only other member of the minority), he
was assuming the position of minority leader.
He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan
comprised the majority, while only those who had voted for him,
belonged to the minority.
Subsequently however, Senator Flavier manifested that the
senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party (7 senators)
are the minority and had chosen Senator Guingona as the
minority leader.
By virtue of the letter indorsed by the 7 senators (Lakas-NUCD)
the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as
the minority leader of the Senate.
Senators Santiago and Tatad filed a petition for quo warranto,
alleging that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully
holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a
position that, in their view, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
Issue:
WON the person suing ( Tatay Tatad) has a clear right to the
contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office
allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent (Manong
Gingona).
Ruling: NO!
In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the
person suing must show that he or she has a clear right to the
contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office
WEEK 11- QUO WARRANTO
allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. 58 In
this case, petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear and
indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader.
As discussed earlier, the specific norms or standards that may be
used in determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed
position has not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes,
or the Senate itself in which the power has been vested. Absent
any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality or
irregularity tainted Respondent Guingona's assumption and
exercise of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader.
Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to
characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.
Bar Exam type:
Senator Pogi loss the bid for the majority leadership against
senator Tanda, thus he manifested that being a losing party he
must be automatically the minority leader. However, senator
Sexy manifested that his party, the Lakas-Napolis party
composing of just 7 senators should be the minority and thereby
elected Senator Acosta. Senator Pogi protested and filed a qou
warranto alleging that senator Pogi has usurped the office.
Decide the plunder case against the senators.
CAMID V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. NO. 161414,
JANUARY 17, 2005 DACUA
LONG DIGEST:
FACTS:
The municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur, is a town that is not
supposed to exist yet is actually insisted by some as alive and
thriving. The creation of the putative municipality was declared
void ab initio by the Supreme Court four decades ago, but the
present petition insists that Andong thrives on and, hence, it’s
legal personality should be given judicial affirmation.
The factual antecedents derive from the ruling in Pelaez
vs.Auditor General in 1965. Then President Diosdado Macapagal
issued several Executive Orders creating 33 municipalities in
Mindanao.
President Macapagal justified the creation of these municipalities
citing his powers underSec.68 of the Revised Admin. Code. Then
VP Emmanuel Pelaez filed a special civil action for a writ of
prohibition alleging that the EOs were null and void, Sec. 68
having been repealed by RA 2370, and said orders constituting an
undue delegation of legislative power.
After due deliberation, the SC ruled that the challenged EOs were
null and void since Sec. 68 of the Revised Admin. Code did not
meet the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of
legislative power to the executive branch.
Among the EOs annulled was EO 107 which created the
Municipality of Andong.
Petitioner represents himself as a current resident of Andong and
alleged that Andong “has metamorphosed into a full-blown
municipality with a complete set of officials appointed to handle
essential services for the municipality and its constituents,”
despite the fact that no person has been appointed, elected or
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  8

qualified to serve any of the local government offices of Andong
since 1968.
Camid imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of DILG “in
not classifying [Andong] as a regular existing municipality and in
not including said municipality in its records and official database
as [an] existing regular municipality”. He argues that Pelaez has
already been modified by supervening events consisting of
subsequent laws and jurisprudence, particularly citing
Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez wherein the court
affirmed the unique status of the Municipality of San Andres as a
“de facto municipal corporation”. Camid also cites Sec. 442(d) of
the Local Government Code of 1991 as basis for the recognition
of the impugned municipality.
ISSUE:
1. Whether a municipality whose creation by executive fiat
was previously voided by this Court may attain
recognition in the absence of any curative or
reimplementing statute.
2. Jurisprudential basis regarding quo warranto invoked
in this case.
RULING:
1. Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where
it is shown that the community has claimed and
exercised corporate functions with the knowledge and
acquiescence of the legislature, and without
interruption or objection for period long enough to
afford title by prescription. What is clearly essential is a
factual demonstration of the continuous exercise by the
municipal corporation of its corporate powers, as well
as the acquiescence thereto by instrumentalities of the
state. Camid’s plaint should have undergone the usual
administrative gauntlet and, once that was done, should
have been filed first with the Court of Appeals, which at
least would have had the power to make the necessary
factual determinations. Petitioner’s seeming ignorance
of the principles of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and hierarchy of courts, as well as the
concomitant prematurity of the present petition, cannot
be countenanced.
The question as to whether a municipality previously
annulled by the Supreme Court may attain recognition
in the absence of any curative/reimplementing statute
has never been decided before. The effect of Sec. 442(d)
of the Local Government Code on municipalities such as
Andong warrants explanation.
EO 107 which established Andong was declared “null
and void ab initio in 1965 by the Supreme Court
in Pelaez vs. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 (1965),
along with 33 other EOs. The phrase ”ab initio“ means
“from the beginning”. Pelaez was never reversed by the
SC but was rather expressly affirmed in the cases
of Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva, Municipality of
Malabang v. Benito, and Municipality of Kapalong v.
Moya. No subsequent ruling declared Pelaez as
overturned/inoperative. No subsequent legislation has
been passed since 1965 creating the Municipality of
Andong. Given these facts, there is hardly any reason to
WEEK 11- QUO WARRANTO
elaborate why Andong does not exist as a duly
constituted municipality.
Pelaez and its offspring cases ruled that the President
has no power to create municipalities yet limited it’s
nullificatory effects to the particular municipalities
challenged in actual cases before this Court. With the
promulgation of the LGC in 1991, the legal cloud was
lifted over the municipalities similarly created by
executive order but not judicially annulled – Sec. 442(b)
of the LGC deemed curative whatever legal defects to
title these municipalities had labored under.
There are eminent differences between Andong and
municipalities such as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban.
Most prominent is the fact that the EO creating Andong
was expressly annulled by the SC in 1965. Court
decisions cannot lose their efficacy due to sheer
defiance by the parties aggrieved.
Sec. 442(d) of the LGC does not serve to
affirm/reconstitute the judicially dissolved
municipalities which had been previously created by
presidential issuances/EOs. The provision only affirms
the legal personalities of those municipalities which
may have been created using the same infirm legal
basis, yet were fortunate enough not to have been
judicially annulled. On the other hand, the
municipalities judicially dissolved remain inexistent
unless recreated through specific legislative
enactments.
The legal effect of the nullification of a municipality in
Pelaez was to revert the constituent barrios of the
voided town back to their original municipalities.
If there is only a strong impulse for the reconstitution of
the municipality nullified in Pelaez, the solution is
through the legislature and not judicial confirmation of
void title. The time has come for the light to seep in and
for the petitioner and like-minded persons to awaken to
legal reality.
2. In the 1969 case of Municipality of Malabang v. Benito
what was challenged is the validity of the constitution of
the Municipality of Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, also
created by an executive order, and which, similar to
Lawigan, was not one of the municipalities annulled
in Pelaez. This time, the officials of Balabagan
invoked de facto status as a municipal corporation in
order to dissuade the Court from nullifying action. They
alleged that its status as a de facto corporation cannot
be collaterally attacked but should be inquired into
directly in an action for quo warranto at the instance of
the State, and not by a private individual as it was in
that case. In response, the Court conceded that an
inquiry into the legal existence of a municipality is
reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto,
but only if the municipal corporation is
a de facto corporation.
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  9

Under Rule 66, of the Rules of Court, a quo
warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its
charter must be commenced within five (5) years from
the time the act complained of was done or committed.
SHORT DIGEST:
Then President Diosdado Macapagal issued several Executive
Orders creating 33 municipalities in Mindanao.
After due deliberation, the SC ruled that the challenged EOs were
null and void since Sec. 68 of the Revised Admin. Code did not
meet the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of
legislative power to the executive branch.
Among the EOs annulled was EO 107 which created the
Municipality of Andong.
Petitioner contended that the Municipality of Andong is a de facto
Municipal Corporation and should be afforded with great respect
as to its existence being created by an executed fiat.
Is the petitioner correct?
YAP V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. NO. 104226,
AUGUST 12, 1993 EDOMBINGO
Principle:
A person claiming to be entitled to a public office or
position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another may
bring an action for quo warranto (Rule 66, Sec. 6, Rules of Court).
FACTS:
Conchita Romualdez-Yap started working with the PNB
as special assistant with the rank of Second Assistant Manager
assigned to the office of the PNB President. After several
promotions, she was appointed as Senior Vice President assigned
to the Fund Transfer Department. She was separated from work
pursuant to the reorganization plan of PNB. Petitioner contends
that there is an existence of bad faith in its reorganization and
that there is an erroneous application of the one year
prescriptive period for quo warranto proceedings in her case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 1 year prescriptive period for quo
warranto proceedings should apply in this case
HELD:
YES.
The prayer in the petition at bar seeks petitioner's
immediate reinstatement to her former position as senior vice
president and head of the Fund Transfer Department, or
reappointment to a position of comparable or equivalent rank
without loss of seniority rights and pay, etc., under the bank's
new staffing pattern.
An action for quo warranto should be brought within
one (1) year after ouster from office. The failure to institute the
same within the reglementary period constitutes more than a
sufficient basis for its dismissal, since it is not proper that the title
to a public office be subjected to continue with uncertainty. An
exception to this prescriptive period lies only if the failure to file
the action can be attributed to the acts of a responsible
WEEK 11- QUO WARRANTO
government officer and not of the dismissed employee. Based on
her allegations, the action is one for quo warranto which
prescribes after 1 year from the ouster. She claims that the action
is one for separation from service without just cause with a
prescriptive period of 4 years under Article 1146 of the Civil
Code and that there is no claim of usurpation. This cannot be
upheld because her separation from service was due to the
abolition of her office in implementation of a valid
reorganization. This is not the unjustifiable cause whichresults in
injury to the rights of a person contemplated by Article 1146.
Vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura subveniunt (Laws
come to the assistance of the vigilant, not of the sleeping).
Restoring petitioner to her previous position with
backwages would be unjust enrichment to her, considering that
she had abandoned or showed lack of interest in reclaiming the
same position when the bank was not yet fully rehabilitated and
she only insisted on reinstatement in August 1989 or two (2)
years after her alleged unjustified separation.
DIVINAGRACIA V. CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING, G.R. NO.
162272, APRIL 7, 2009 SAURA
PRINCIPLE:
The special civil action of quo warranto is a prerogative writ by
which the Government can call upon any person to show by what
warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public franchise.
Quo warranto is specifically available as a remedy if it is thought
that a government corporation has offended against its corporate
charter or misused its franchise. The determination of the right to
the exercise of a franchise, or whether the right to enjoy such
privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more properly the
subject of the prerogative writ of quo warranto, the right to
assert which, as a rule, belongs to the State ‘upon complaint or
otherwise,’ the reason being that the abuse of a franchise is a
public wrong and not a private injury.”
FACTS:
CBS and PBS (C/PBS), two of the three networks that operate
“BomboRadyo Philippines”, operate radio broadcasting services
by virtue of their legislative franchises (RA 7477 and 7582).
Under the RAs, there is common provision, aimed towards the
“constitutional mandate to democratize ownership of public
utilities”, that C/PBS should offer 30% of its common stocks to
the public. Following these laws, National Telecommunication
Commission thus granted Provisional Authorities to C/PBS.
Divinagracia then filed 2 complaints against C/PBS, alleging that
he was the owner of 12% of the shares of stock” of C/PBS
separately, and that both stations failed to make the 30% public
offering of their stocks as mandated by the RAs. For this failure,
he prayed to cancel the Provisional Authorities granted to C/PBS
as well as in its legislative franchises. NTC dismissed, saying it
was not competent to render a ruling on that issue, that the
complaint was a collateral attack on the legislative franchises of
C/PBS, and that the same is more properly the subject of an
action for quo warranto to be commenced by the Solicitor
General in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, pursuant
to Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  10

Divinagracia counters that NTC has the power to cancel
Provisional Authorities and CPCs, or in effect, the power to cancel
the licenses that allow broadcast stations to operate.
ISSUE:
1. Wether or not NTC has the authority to cancel
Provisional Authorities and Certificates of Public
Convenience it issued to legislative franchise-holders.
2. Whether or not a quo warranto is a more appropriate
remedy? – YES!
HELD:
1. E.O. No. 546 establishing the National
Telecommunications Commission provides no explicit
basis to assert that the NTC has the power to cancel the
licenses or CPCs it has duly issued. The Court will be
unable to rely on an unequivocally current and extant
provision of law that justifies the NTC’s power to cancel
CPCs.
Licenses issued by the NTC such as CPCs and
provisional authorities are junior to the legislative
franchise enacted by Congress. The licensing authority
of the NTC is not on equal footing with the franchising
authority of the State through Congress. The issuance of
licenses by the NTC implements the legislative
franchises established by Congress. NTC cannot,
without clear and proper delegation by Congress,
prevent the exercise of a legislative franchise by
withholding or canceling the licenses of the franchisee.
And the role of the courts, through quo warranto
proceedings, neatly complements the traditional
separation of powers that come to bear in our analysis.
DIVINAGRACIA’s theory that NTC has the presumed
authority to cancel licenses and CPCs issued to due
holders of legislative franchise to engage in
broadcast operations would violate the separation
of powers.
The complexities of our dual franchise/license regime
for broadcast media should be understood within the
context of separation of powers. The right of a
particular entity to broadcast over the airwaves is
established by law —i.e., the legislative franchise — and
determined by Congress, the branch of government
tasked with the creation of rights and obligations. As
with all other laws passed by Congress, the function of
the executive branch of government, to which the NTC
belongs, is the implementation of the law. In broad
theory, the legal obligation of the NTC once Congress
has established a legislative franchise for a broadcast
media station is to facilitate the operation by the
franchisee of its broadcast stations. However, since the
public administration of the airwaves is a requisite for
the operation of a franchise and is moreover a highly
technical function, Congress has delegated to the NTC
the task of administration over the broadcast spectrum,
including the determination of available bandwidths
and the allocation of such available bandwidths among
the various legislative franchisees. The licensing
power of the NTC thus arises from the necessary
delegation by Congress of legislative power geared
WEEK 11- QUO WARRANTO
towards the orderly exercise by franchisees of the
rights granted them by Congress.
2. There is in fact a more appropriate, more narrowly-
tailored and least restrictive remedy that is afforded by
the law for DIVINAGRACIA, which is quo warranto
under Rule 64 . The special civil action of quo warranto
is a prerogative writ by which the Government can call
upon any person to show by what warrant he holds a
public office or exercises a public franchise. A forfeiture
of a franchise will have to be declared in a direct
proceeding for the purpose brought by the State
because a franchise is granted by law and its unlawful
exercise is primarily a concern of Government.
Quo warranto is specifically available as a remedy if it is
thought that a government corporation has offended
against its corporate charter or misused its franchise.
The determination of the right to the exercise of a
franchise, or whether the right to enjoy such privilege
has been forfeited by non-user, is more properly the
subject of the prerogative writ of quo warranto, the
right to assert which, as a rule, belongs to the State
‘upon complaint or otherwise,’ the reason being that the
abuse of a franchise is a public wrong and not a private
injury.”
DIVINAGRACIA argues that since their prayer involves
the cancellation of the provisional authority and CPCs,
and not the legislative franchise, then quo warranto fails
as a remedy. This is without merit, as the authority of
the franchisee to engage in broadcast operations is
derived in the legislative mandate. To cancel the
provisional authority or the CPC is, in effect, to cancel
the franchise or otherwise prevent its exercise. What
could happen is that if the courts conclude that private
respondents have violated the terms of their franchise
and thus issue the writs of quo warranto against them,
then the NTC is obliged to cancel any existing licenses
and CPCs since these permits draw strength from the
possession of a valid franchise.
Short Digest:
FACTS:
Petitioner filed 2 complaints against CBS and PBS, alleging that
both stations failed to make the 30% public offering of their
stocks as mandated by the RAs. For this failure, he prayed NTC to
cancel the Provisional Authorities granted to C/PBS as well as in
its legislative franchises.
RULING:
Petitioner’s theory that NTC has the presumed authority to
cancel licenses and CPCs issued to due holders of legislative
franchiseto engage in broadcast operations would violate the
separation of powers. (NTC is under executive department but
its licensing power is delegated by Congress of legislative power)
Quo warranto is specifically available as a remedy if it is thought
that a government corporation has offended against its corporate
charter or misused its franchise. The determination of the right to
the exercise of a franchise, or whether the right to enjoy such
privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more properly the
subject of the prerogative writ of quo warranto, the right to
assert which, as a rule, belongs to the State ‘upon complaint or
otherwise,’ the reason being that the abuse of a franchise is a
public wrong and not a private injury.”
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  11

FELICIANO V. VILLASIN, G.R. NO. 174929, JUNE 27, 2008 TIU
XIII • NPC V. CO, G.R. NO. 166973, FEBRUARY 10, 2009
VILLAMANTE
Basic Principle:
1. The Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that when
petitioner takes private property to construct
transmission lines, it is liable to pay the full market
value upon proper determination by the courts.
2. It is settled that just compensation is to be ascertained
as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with
the commencement of the expropriation proceedings.
Where the institution of the action precedes entry into
the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained
as of the time of the filing of the complaint.
3. The general rule is what is provided for by Rule 67
where it states that . There are exceptions—grave
injustice to the property owner,32 the taking did not
have color of legal authority,33 the taking of the
property was not initially for expropriation34 and the
owner will be given undue increment advantages
because of the expropriation.35 However, none of these
exceptions are present in the instant case.
Facts:
Before us is a Rule 45 petition1 which seeks the reversal of the
Decision2 and Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
79211. The Court of Appeals’ Decision affirmed the Partial
Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando,
Pampanga, Branch 41 in Civil Case No. 12281, fixing the
compensation due respondent following the expropriation of his
property for the construction of petitioner’s power transmission
lines.
Petitioner was established by R.A. No. 6395 to undertake the
development of hydroelectric generation of power and the
production of electricity from nuclear, geothermal and other
sources, as well as the transmission of electric power on a
nationwide basis.5 Its charter grants to petitioner, among others,
the power to exercise the right to eminent domain.6
On 27 June 2001, petitioner filed a complaint7 with the RTC of
San Fernando, Pampanga, for the acquisition of an easement of
right-of-way over three (3) lots at Barangay Cabalantian, Bacolor,
Pampanga with a total area of 575 square meters belonging to
respondent, in connection with the construction of its
transmission lines for its Lahar Affected Transmission Line
Project (Lahar Project).
Commissioners Dayrit and Garcia submitted their joint report9
wherein they appraised the value of the property at P1,900.00
per square meter or a total of P1,179,000.00, while
Commissioner Abcejo submitted his Commissioner's Report10
pegging the value of the property at P875.00 per square meter.
The RTC declared the validity of the expropriation and ordered
petitioner to pay the sum of P1,179,000.00, with interest at 6%
WEEK 11- QUO WARRANTO
per annum beginning 15 April 2002, the date of actual taking,
until full payment.
Not satisfied, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals held that petitioner is liable to pay the full
fair market value at the time of actual taking, with interest at 6%
per annum from 15 April 2002 and ordered the RTC to appoint a
new set of disinterested commissioners.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the petitioner should pay the subject
property it its full market value.
2. Whether or not the just compensation should be
reckoned from the date of the filing of the complaint
since such date preceded the date of the taking of the
property in this case.
Held:
1. Yes.
Petitioner relies on Sec. 3A18 of R.A. No. 6395, as amended,
which provides that only an easement fee equivalent to 10%
of the market value shall be paid to affected property
owners.
As earlier mentioned, Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395, as
amended, substantially provides that properties which will
be traversed by transmission lines will only be considered as
easements and just compensation for such right of way
easement shall not exceed 10 percent of the market value.26
However, this Court has repeatedly ruled that when
petitioner takes private property to construct transmission
lines, it is liable to pay the full market value upon proper
determination by the courts.27
The presence of transmission lines undoubtedly restricts
respondent’s use of his property.Petitioner is thus liable to
pay respondent the full market value of the property.
2. Just compensation should be reckoned from the date of
the filing of the complaint.
Rule 67 clearly provides that the value of just compensation
shall "be determined as of the date of the taking of the
property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came
first."
It is settled that just compensation is to be ascertained as of
the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the
institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the
just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the
filing of the complaint.
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  12
 WEEK 11- QUO WARRANTO

The general rule is what is provided for by Rule 67. There
are exceptions—grave injustice to the property owner,32 the
taking did not have color of legal authority,33 the taking of
the property was not initially for expropriation34 and the
owner will be given undue increment advantages because of
the expropriation.35 However, none of these exceptions are
present in the instant case.
Based on the foregoing, the reckoning date for the
determination of the amount of just compensation is 27 June
2001, the date when petitioner filed its expropriation
complaint.
Quick Digest:
Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint7 with the RTC of San Fernando,
Pampanga, for the acquisition of an easement of right-of-way
over three (3) lots at Barangay Cabalantian, Bacolor, Pampanga
with a total area of 575 square meters belonging to respondent,
in connection with the construction of its transmission lines for
its Lahar Affected Transmission Line Project (Lahar Project).
Commissioners Dayrit and Garcia appraised the value of the
property at P1,900.00 per square meter or a total of
P1,179,000.00, while Commissioner Abcejo pegged the value of
the property at P875.00 per square meter.
property to construct transmission lines, it is liable to
pay the full market value upon proper determination by
the courts.27
2. Just compensation should be reckoned from the date of
the filing of the complaint.
Rule 67 clearly provides that the value of just
compensation shall "be determined as of the date of the
taking of the property or the filing of the complaint,
whichever came first."
It is settled that just compensation is to be ascertained
as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with
the commencement of the expropriation proceedings.
Where the institution of the action precedes entry into
the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained
as of the time of the filing of the complaint.
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK V. BASES CONVERSION
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, G.R. NO. 173085, JANUARY 19,
2011 DELVO
COMPILE- REALINO
43 CASES= 43 ASSIGNMENTS
LET’S EXEMPT CORTES, CLAROS AND MARCELO. THEY ARE
BUSY PREPARING FOR THE MOOT.

The RTC declared the validity of the expropriation and ordered

petitioner to pay the sum of P1,179,000.00, with interest at 6% p.
a. reckoned from actual taking, until full payment.

The Court of Appeals held that petitioner is liable to pay the full
fair market value at the time of actual taking, with interest at 6%
p. a. and ordered the RTC to appoint a new set of disinterested
commissioners.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not the petitioner should pay the subject

property it its full market value.
2. Whether or not the just compensation should be
reckoned from the date of the filing of the complaint
since such date preceded the date of the taking of the
property in this case.

Held:

1. Yes.

As earlier mentioned, Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395, as

amended, substantially provides that properties which
will be traversed by transmission lines will only be
considered as easements and just compensation for
such right of way easement shall not exceed 10 percent
of the market value.26 However, this Court has
repeatedly ruled that when petitioner takes private

It’s not a PROVREM 2015  13