WRITTEN PLEADINGS

[1]. THE DECEIT CLAIM OF LAMPROS IS BARRED BY LIMITATION

1. The ‘law of limitation’ prescribes a time limit for different suits within, which an aggrieved
person can approach the court to seek remedy. The suit, if filed after the prescribed time period,
is barred by the law of limitation. It is submitted that the Lampros’s suit for deceit claim is
barred by limitation. It is further submitted that the High Court did not err in dismissing
Lampros’s claim even though Sanderson had not pleaded limitation defence. The time spent in
Frugalian proceedings does not fall to be excluded in calculating the limitation period as the
conditions under Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter “Limitation Act”) are not
satisfied [1.1]. The Limitation Act under Sec.3 casts duty on the court, even though limitation
has not been set up as defence [1.2].

[1.1] FRUGALIAN PROCEEDINGS DO NOT FALL WITHIN THE EXCEPTIONS PROVIDED UNDER
THE LIMITATION ACT

2. Sec. 12-15 of the Limitation Act provide for exclusion of time in computing the period of
limitation prescribed by law. In the given fact scenario, Sec. 14 is of utmost relevance as it
provides for exclusion of time spent in proceedings, in good faith, in a court having no
jurisdiction.1 Sec. 14 entails five conditions which need to be fulfilled in order to claim the
exclusion of time envisaged under Sec. 14.2 A close perusal of the abovementioned conditions
leads to the conclusion that Lampros claim is barred by limitation because the proceedings in
Frugalia were not prosecuted in good faith [1.1.1], and furthermore, Frugalian courts are not
courts as envisaged within the ambit of Sec. 14 [1.1.2]. Thus, the suit for deceit claim is barred
by Article 113 of the Limitation Act [1.1.3]
[1.1.1] PROCEEDINGS IN FRUGALIA WERE NOT PROSECUTED IN GOOD FAITH BY LAMPROS
3. For a subsequent claim under Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act, it is a pre requisite that the earlier
proceedings relate to the same matter and are prosecuted in good faith.3 Sec. 2(h) of the

1
Sec. 14, Limitation Act, 1963.
2
Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Irrigation Deptt., (2008) 7 SCC 169, 181 (Supreme Court of India).
3
Sec. 14, Limitation Act, 1963.
Limitation Act defines “good faith”4 which has been interpreted by Hon’ble Supreme Court to
mean ‘exercise of due care and attention’.5 The enquiry as to good faith or the absence of it is a
finding of fact and need to be ascertained necessarily from facts of the case.6 In this instant case
given the fact scenario it is clear that in the BSA agreement Lampros submitted to the
jurisdiction of Indian courts for any dispute arising out of the said agreement.7 The proceedings
instituted in Frugalia, thus, cannot be said in good faith as it had was based on a blind simple
belief in Frugalian counsel’s advice and did not have a rational basis as it was in breach of clause
18(2) of the BSA agreement.
[1.1.2] FRUGALIAN COURTS ARE NOT “COURTS” FOR THE PURPOSE OF SEC. 14
4. For Sec. 14 to be applicable it is a pre requisite that both the proceedings are in a court.8 The
Limitation Act does not define a ‘Court’ or a ‘Foreign Court’, however, Supreme Court for the
purpose of Sec. 14 has interpreted the expression narrowly. The applicability of Limitation Act
does not extend beyond the court system which is to be construed in the strict sense as being part
of the judicial branch of the state.9 Thus, Frugalian court being a foreign court, time spent in
proceedings in Frugalian courts cannot be excluded while calculating the limitation period.
[1.1.3] LAMPROS’S DECEIT CLAIM IS BARRED BY ARTICLE 113 OF THE LIMITATION ACT
5. In light of the above made submissions it is further argued that Lampros’s deceit claim is
barred by the Limitation Act. Under the Limitation Act there is no specific Article which
prescribes the limitation period to file suit the tort of deceit. Thus, limitation period for the suit of
tort of deceit is governed by Article 113 which prescribes limitation period of three years from
the date the right to sue accrues.10 In the claim of deceit or fraud the right to sue accrues when
the deceit or fraud becomes known to the plaintiff.11 Lampros discovered the fraud on October
16, 2013 through extensive tests conducted on the BSA Gold.12 Thus, the limitation period ended
three years commencing from October 16, 2013, that is, under normal circumstances on October

4
Sec. 2(h), Limitation Act, 1963
5
Asstt. Commr., Anti-Evasion Commercial Taxes v. Amtek India Ltd., (2007) 11 SCC 407, 409 (Supreme Court of
India).
6
Deena v. Bharat Singh, (2002) 6 SCC 336, 341 (Supreme Court of India).
7
¶ 9, Page 4, STATEMENT OF FACTS, NLS University Selections, 2018.
8
Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Irrigation Deptt., (2008) 7 SCC 169, 181 (Supreme Court of India).
9
CST v. Parson Tools and Plants, (1975) 4 SCC 22 (Supreme Court of India).
10
Article 113, Part X, The Schedule, Limitation Act, 1963.
11
Sec. 17(1)(a), Limitation Act, 1963.
12
¶ 13, Page 5, STATEMENT OF FACTS, NLS University Selections, 2018.
16, 2016. However, the suit was filed in Bombay High Court on June 30, 201713 after the
limitation period ended. Hence, the Lampros’s suit is barred by limitation.

[1.2] DUTY OF THE COURT, EVEN THOUGH LIMITATION IS NOT PLEADED

6. Sec. 3 of the Limitation Act mandates that a suit shall be dismissed, although limitation has
not been set up as defence.14 Thus, Sec. 3 is peremptory or mandatory in nature and casts duty on
the court to dismiss the suit, if it is beyond the period of limitation.15 It is submitted that the High
Court did not err in dismissing Lampros’s deceit claim [1.2.1] even though Sanderson had not
pleaded a limitation defence [1.2.2].
[1.2.1] HIGH COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING LAMPROS’S CLAIM
7. Sec. 3 of the Limitation Act casts duty upon the court to dismiss a suit, appeal or application,
if it is beyond the period of limitation.16 It is thus, incumbent upon the court to satisfy itself that
the suit is not barred by limitation. The appellate court or even the court of last resort should
dismiss a claim in the suit if the suit is barred by limitation.17 Thus, the Commercial Appellate
Division was correct in ruling that the Lampros’s claim was barred by limitation as the court
even as an appellate court had a duty to dismiss the claim if the suit was barred by limitation.18
[1.2.2] SUIT MUST BE DISMISSED IF BARRED BY LIMITATION EVEN IF NOT PLEADED
8. Sec. 3 also mandates the court to dismiss the suit, if barred by limitation irrespective of
whether such a plea has been setup in defence by the opposite party.19 In the instant case even
though Sanderson did not plead the defence of limitation in the Bombay High Court and the
Commercial Appellate Division both Courts had a duty to dismiss Lampros’s claim which was
barred by limitation. The undertaking given to Frugalian courts has no value as there can be no
grounds for waiver as the Sec. 3 casts duty on the courts to consider the issue of limitation.20
Hence, the defence of limitation cannot be waived.

13
¶ 20, Page 7, STATEMENT OF FACTS, NLS University Selections, 2018.
14
Sec. 3, Limitation Act, 1963.
15
C.K. Takwani, Civil Procedure With Limitation Act, 1963, 771 (8 th edn., 2017).
16
Sec 3(1), Limitation Act, 1963.
17
Gujarat v. Kothari & Associates, (2016) 14 SCC 761, 766 (Supreme Court of India); Lachhmi Sewak Sahu v.
Ram Rup Sahu, AIR 1944 PC 24.
18
¶ 22, Page 9, STATEMENT OF FACTS, NLS University Selections, 2018.
19
Union of India v. British India Corpn. Ltd., (2003) 9 SCC 505, 508 (Supreme Court Of India).
20
Ajab Enterprises vs Jayant Vegoiles And Chemicals, AIR 1991 Bom 35 (Bombay High Court).