1

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners,
vs.
ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The individual's desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society is an equally
powerful desire. Thus each individual is continually engaged in a personal adjustment process in
which he balances the desire for privacy with the desire for disclosure and communication of himself
to others, in light of the environmental conditions and social norms set by the society in which he
lives.

- Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)

The Case

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation to
Section 19 of A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC,1 otherwise known as the "Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data."
Petitioners herein assail the July 27, 2012 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu
City (RTC) in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB, which dismissed their habeas data petition.

The Facts

Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were, during the
period material, graduating high school students at St. Theresa's College (STC), Cebu City.
Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to
attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in
their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her
Facebook3 profile.

Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher at STC’s high school
department, learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting
themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they
knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes
Taboada (Chloe), among others.

Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal Facebook
accounts and showed her photos of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne
drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets
of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of their black brassieres. What is
more, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access to or the availability of the
identified students’ photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook friends, 4but were, in fact, viewable
by any Facebook user.5

Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her student’s Facebook page,
showed the photosto Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action.
Thereafter, following an investigation, STC found the identified students to have deported themselves
in a manner proscribed by the school’s Student Handbook, to wit:
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1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;

2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;

3. Smoking and drinking alcoholicbeverages in public places;

4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;

5. Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity; contains sexually

suggestive messages, language or symbols; and 6. Posing and uploading pictures on the
Internet that entail ample body exposure.

On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures in question,
reported, as required, to the office of Sr. Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe (Sr. Purisima), STC’s high school
principal and ICM6 Directress. They claimed that during the meeting, they were castigated and
verbally abused by the STC officials present in the conference, including Assistant Principal Mussolini
S. Yap (Yap), Roswinda Jumiller, and Tigol. What is more, Sr. Purisima informed their parents the
following day that, as part of their penalty, they are barred from joining the commencement exercises
scheduled on March 30, 2012.

A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed a
Petition for Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Cebu City against STC, et al., docketed as
Civil Case No. CEB-38594.7In it, Tan prayed that defendants therein be enjoined from implementing
the sanction that precluded Angela from joining the commencement exercises.

On March 25, 2012,petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother of Julia, joined the fray as an
intervenor. On March 28, 2012, defendants inCivil Case No. CEB-38594 filed their memorandum,
containing printed copies of the photographs in issue as annexes. That same day, the RTC issued a
temporary restraining order (TRO) allowing the students to attend the graduation ceremony, to which
STC filed a motion for reconsideration.

Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned students from
participating in the graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of the commencement exercises, its
adverted motion for reconsideration on the issuance ofthe TRO remained unresolved.

Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB8 on the basis of the following considerations:

1. The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were taken for posterity before
they changed into their swimsuits on the occasion of a birthday beach party;

2. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at "Friends Only." They,
thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.

3. Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or ought to have known of laws
that safeguard the right to privacy. Corollarily, respondents knew or ought to have known that
the girls, whose privacy has been invaded, are the victims in this case, and not the offenders.
Worse, after viewing the photos, the minors were called "immoral" and were punished outright;

4. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without
their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos
and by subsequently showing them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of
petitioners’ children were intruded upon;
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5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and
digital images happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory; and

6. All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly broadcasted by respondents
through their memorandum submitted to the RTC in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-
38594. To petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing constitutes an invasion of their children’s
privacy and, thus, prayed that: (a) a writ of habeas databe issued; (b) respondents be ordered
to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the subjectdata before or
at the preliminary hearing; and (c) after trial, judgment be rendered declaring all information,
data, and digital images accessed, saved or stored, reproduced, spread and used, to have
been illegally obtained inviolation of the children’s right to privacy.

Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC, through an Order dated July 5, 2012,
issued the writ of habeas data. Through the same Order, herein respondents were directed to file
their verified written return, together with the supporting affidavits, within five (5) working days from
service of the writ.

In time, respondents complied with the RTC’s directive and filed their verified written return, laying
down the following grounds for the denial of the petition, viz: (a) petitioners are not the proper parties
to file the petition; (b) petitioners are engaging in forum shopping; (c) the instant case is not one
where a writ of habeas data may issue;and (d) there can be no violation of their right to privacy as
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy on Facebook.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for habeas data. The
dispositive portion of the Decision pertinently states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.9

To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the
minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data.
Moreover, the court a quoheld that the photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without
restrictions as to who may view them, lost their privacy in some way. Besides, the RTC noted, STC
gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the implementation of
the school’s policies and rules on discipline.

Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court pursuant to Section 19 of the
Rule on Habeas Data.10

The Issues

The main issue to be threshed out inthis case is whether or not a writ of habeas datashould be issued
given the factual milieu. Crucial in resolving the controversy, however, is the pivotal point of whether
or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or
security of the minors involved in this case.

Our Ruling
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We find no merit in the petition.

Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of Habeas Data

The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of
a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. 11 It is an independent
and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to
informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself,
particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order
to achieve unlawful ends.12

In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to informational
privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas dataas "a procedure
designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age." 13 The writ, however, will
not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a
person.Availment of the writ requires the existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on the one
hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. 14 Thus, the existence of a person’s right to
informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable before the
privilege of the writ may be extended.15

Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational privacy, a habeas
datapetition will not prosper. Viewed from the perspective of the case at bar,this requisite begs this
question: given the nature of an online social network (OSN)––(1) that it facilitates and promotes real-
time interaction among millions, if not billions, of users, sans the spatial barriers, 16 bridging the gap
created by physical space; and (2) that any information uploaded in OSNs leavesan indelible trace in
the provider’s databases, which are outside the control of the end-users––is there a right to
informational privacy in OSN activities of its users? Before addressing this point, We must first
resolve the procedural issues in this case.

a. The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances

Contrary to respondents’ submission, the Writ of Habeas Datawas not enacted solely for the purpose
of complementing the Writ of Amparoin cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data. However,
in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by:

(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children
and parents; or

(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth
civil degreeof consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding
paragraph. (emphasis supplied)

Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to cases of extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances, the above underscored portion of Section 2, reflecting a variance
of habeas data situations, would not have been made.
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Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information
age."17 As such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances only. In fact, the annotations to the Rule preparedby the Committee on the Revision
of the Rules of Court, after explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data complements the Writ of Amparo,
pointed out that:

The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s right
to privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies against the violation of
such right can include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or
information or files in possession or in control of respondents. 18 (emphasis Ours) Clearly then, the
privilege of the Writ of Habeas Datamay also be availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances.

b. Meaning of "engaged" in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information

Respondents’ contention that the habeas data writ may not issue against STC, it not being an entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is, nonetheless, erroneous.

To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only
against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the businessof gathering, storing, and collecting of
data. As provided under Section 1 of the Rule:

Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing
of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
(emphasis Ours)

The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea that habeas
data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private individuals or
entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her
correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or entity need not be in the business of
collecting or storing data.

To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To "engage" means "to
do or take part in something."19 It does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit
of a business. What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said
data or information about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries
the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal
endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent
the writ from getting to said person or entity.

To agree with respondents’ above argument, would mean unduly limiting the reach of the writ to a
very small group, i.e., private persons and entities whose business is data gathering and storage, and
in the process decreasing the effectiveness of the writ asan instrument designed to protect a right
which is easily violated in view of rapid advancements in the information and communications
technology––a right which a great majority of the users of technology themselves are not capable of
protecting.

Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now proceed to the core of the controversy.

The right to informational privacy on Facebook

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a. The Right to Informational Privacy

The concept of privacyhas, through time, greatly evolved, with technological advancements having an
influential part therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno’s
speech, The Common Right to Privacy,20 where he explained the three strands of the right to privacy,
viz: (1) locational or situational privacy;21(2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy.22 Of the
three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the right to informational privacy––usually defined as the
right of individuals to control information about themselves.23

With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data sharing nowadays, not
to mention each system’s inherent vulnerability to attacks and intrusions, there is more reason that
every individual’s right to control said flow of information should be protected and that each individual
should have at least a reasonable expectation of privacy in cyberspace. Several commentators
regarding privacy and social networking sites, however, all agree that given the millions of OSN
users, "[i]n this [Social Networking] environment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable
expectations, but rather in some theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking." 24

It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to provide for judicial remedies that would
allow a summary hearing of the unlawful use of data or information and to remedy possible violations
of the right to privacy.25 In the same vein, the South African High Court, in its Decision in the
landmark case, H v. W,26promulgated on January30, 2013, recognized that "[t]he law has to take into
account the changing realities not only technologically but also socially or else it will lose credibility in
the eyes of the people. x x x It is imperative that the courts respond appropriately to changing times,
acting cautiously and with wisdom." Consistent with this, the Court, by developing what may be
viewed as the Philippine model of the writ of habeas data, in effect, recognized that, generally
speaking, having an expectation of informational privacy is not necessarily incompatible with
engaging in cyberspace activities, including those that occur in OSNs.

The question now though is up to whatextent is the right to privacy protected in OSNs? Bear in mind
that informational privacy involves personal information. At the same time, the very purpose of OSNs
is socializing––sharing a myriad of information,27 some of which would have otherwise remained
personal.

b. Facebook’s Privacy Tools: a response to the clamor for privacy in OSN activities

Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact and to stay connected
to other members of the same or different social media platform through the sharing of statuses,
photos, videos, among others, depending on the services provided by the site. It is akin to having a
room filled with millions of personal bulletin boards or "walls," the contents of which are under the
control of each and every user. In his or her bulletin board, a user/owner can post anything––from
text, to pictures, to music and videos––access to which would depend on whether he or she allows
one, some or all of the other users to see his or her posts. Since gaining popularity, the OSN
phenomenon has paved the way to the creation of various social networking sites, includingthe one
involved in the case at bar, www.facebook.com (Facebook), which, according to its developers,
people use "to stay connected with friends and family, to discover what’s going on in the world, and to
share and express what matters to them."28

Facebook connections are established through the process of "friending" another user. By sending a
"friend request," the user invites another to connect their accounts so that they can view any and all
"Public" and "Friends Only" posts of the other.Once the request is accepted, the link is established
and both users are permitted to view the other user’s "Public" or "Friends Only" posts, among others.
"Friending," therefore, allows the user to form or maintain one-to-one relationships with other users,
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whereby the user gives his or her "Facebook friend" access to his or her profile and shares certain
information to the latter.29

To address concerns about privacy,30 but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with
different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile 31 as well as information
uploaded by the user. In H v. W,32 the South Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users
to "customize their privacy settings," but did so with this caveat: "Facebook states in its policies that,
although it makes every effort to protect a user’s information, these privacy settings are not
foolproof."33

For instance, a Facebook user canregulate the visibility and accessibility of digital images(photos),
posted on his or her personal bulletin or "wall," except for the user’sprofile picture and ID, by selecting
his or her desired privacy setting:

(a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;

(b) Friends of Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;

(b) Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;

(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the
Facebook user; and

(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user.

The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up barriers to broaden
or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content, statuses, and photos, among others, from
another user’s point of view. In other words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the
availability of their Facebook activities reflect their choice as to "when and to what extent to disclose
facts about [themselves] – and to put others in the position of receiving such confidences." 34 Ideally,
the selected setting will be based on one’s desire to interact with others, coupled with the opposing
need to withhold certain information as well as to regulate the spreading of his or her personal
information. Needless to say, as the privacy setting becomes more limiting, fewer Facebook users
can view that user’s particular post.

STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy

Without these privacy settings, respondents’ contention that there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in Facebook would, in context, be correct. However, such is not the case. It is through the
availability of said privacy tools that many OSN users are said to have a subjective expectation that
only those to whomthey grant access to their profile will view the information they post or upload
thereto.35

This, however, does not mean thatany Facebook user automatically has a protected expectation of
privacy inall of his or her Facebook activities.

Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary that said
user, in this case the children of petitioners,manifest the intention to keepcertain posts private,
through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. 36 And this
intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools. In other
words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation,in cyber world, of the user’s invocation of
his or her right to informational privacy.37
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Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny access to his or
her post orprofile detail should not be denied the informational privacy right which necessarily
accompanies said choice.38Otherwise, using these privacy tools would be a feckless exercise, such
that if, for instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal information to his or her Facebook page
and sets its privacy level at "Only Me" or a custom list so that only the user or a chosen few can view
it, said photo would still be deemed public by the courts as if the user never chose to limit the photo’s
visibility and accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of their
function but it would also disregard the very intention of the user to keep said photo or information
within the confines of his or her private space.

We must now determine the extent that the images in question were visible to other Facebook users
and whether the disclosure was confidential in nature. In other words, did the minors limit the
disclosure of the photos such that the images were kept within their zones of privacy? This
determination is necessary in resolving the issue of whether the minors carved out a zone of privacy
when the photos were uploaded to Facebook so that the images will be protected against
unauthorized access and disclosure.

Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their children’s privacy right being violated, insist that
Escudero intruded upon their children’s Facebook accounts, downloaded copies ofthe pictures and
showed said photos to Tigol. To them, this was a breach of the minors’ privacy since their Facebook
accounts, allegedly, were under "very private" or "Only Friends" setting safeguarded with a
password.39 Ultimately, they posit that their children’s disclosure was only limited since their profiles
were not open to public viewing. Therefore, according to them, people who are not their Facebook
friends, including respondents, are barred from accessing said post without their knowledge and
consent. Aspetitioner’s children testified, it was Angelawho uploaded the subjectphotos which were
only viewable by the five of them,40 although who these five are do not appear on the records.

Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit41 that "my students showed me some pictures of
girls cladin brassieres. This student [sic] of mine informed me that these are senior high school
[students] of STC, who are their friends in [F]acebook. x x x They then said [that] there are still many
other photos posted on the Facebook accounts of these girls. At the computer lab, these students
then logged into their Facebook account [sic], and accessed from there the various photographs x x
x. They even told me that there had been times when these photos were ‘public’ i.e., not confined to
their friends in Facebook."

In this regard, We cannot give muchweight to the minors’ testimonies for one key reason: failure to
question the students’ act of showing the photos to Tigol disproves their allegation that the photos
were viewable only by the five of them. Without any evidence to corroborate their statement that the
images were visible only to the five of them, and without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the
other students were able to view the photos, their statements are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving
scant consideration.42

It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her students, who
are the minors’ Facebook "friends," showed her the photos using their own Facebook accounts. This
only goes to show that no special means to be able to viewthe allegedly private posts were ever
resorted to by Escudero’s students,43 and that it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos
were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.

Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is"Public," it can be surmised that the
photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’
children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If suchwere the case, they cannot invoke
the protection attached to the right to informational privacy. The ensuing pronouncement in US v.
Gines-Perez44 is most instructive:
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[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all
privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances suchas here, where the Defendant
did not employ protective measures or devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or
the photograph itself.45

Also, United States v. Maxwell46 held that "[t]he more open the method of transmission is, the less
privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large inthe chat room or e-mail
that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy."

That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not necessarily bolster the petitioners’ contention.
In this regard, the cyber community is agreed that the digital images under this setting still remain to
be outside the confines of the zones of privacy in view of the following:

(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the tools to
interact and share in any conceivable way;"47

(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total strangers;48

(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and

(4) A user’s Facebook friend can "share"49 the former’s post, or "tag"50 others who are not
Facebook friends with the former, despite its being visible only tohis or her own Facebook
friends.

It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to "Friends" is no
assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the
source of the content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own
Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or
not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective
Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the
privacy setting of which was set at "Friends."

To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B are not Facebook friends.
If C, A’s Facebook friend, tags B in A’s post, which is set at "Friends," the initial audience of 100 (A’s
own Facebook friends) is dramatically increased to 300 (A’s 100 friends plus B’s 200 friends or the
public, depending upon B’s privacy setting). As a result, the audience who can view the post is
effectively expanded––and to a very large extent.

This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of Facebook’s proclivity towards user
interaction and socialization rather than seclusion or privacy, as it encourages broadcasting of
individual user posts. In fact, it has been said that OSNs have facilitated their users’ self-tribute,
thereby resulting into the "democratization of fame." 51Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or even a
post, with visibility set at "Friends Only" cannot easily, more so automatically, be said to be "very
private," contrary to petitioners’ argument.

As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’
Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion
since it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere
recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the
information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access to the said
posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither
the minors nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy against the students who showed the
images to Escudero.
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Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents reproduced and
broadcasted the photographs. In fact, what petitioners attributed to respondents as an act of offensive
disclosure was no more than the actuality that respondents appended said photographs in their
memorandum submitted to the trial court in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594.52 These are
not tantamount to a violation of the minor’s informational privacy rights, contrary to petitioners’
assertion.

In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more precise, the photos of
minor students scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the
reputation of the minors enrolled in a conservative institution. However, the records are bereft of any
evidence, other than bare assertions that they utilized Facebook’s privacy settings to make the
photos visible only to them or to a select few. Without proof that they placed the photographs subject
of this case within the ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have
an expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question.

Had it been proved that the access tothe pictures posted were limited to the original uploader,
through the "Me Only" privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been screened to limit access
to a select few, through the "Custom" setting, the result may have been different, for in such
instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted to the
public at large or all the user’s friends en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.

On Cyber Responsibility

It has been said that "the best filter is the one between your children’s ears." 53 This means that self-
regulation on the part of OSN users and internet consumers ingeneral is the best means of avoiding
privacy rights violations.54 As a cyberspace communitymember, one has to be proactive in protecting
his or her own privacy.55 It is in this regard that many OSN users, especially minors, fail.Responsible
social networking or observance of the "netiquettes" 56 on the part of teenagers has been the concern
of many due to the widespreadnotion that teenagers can sometimes go too far since they generally
lack the people skills or general wisdom to conduct themselves sensibly in a public forum. 57

Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons on good cyber citizenship in its
curriculum to educate its students on proper online conduct may be mosttimely. Too, it is not only
STC but a number of schools and organizations have already deemed it important to include digital
literacy and good cyber citizenshipin their respective programs and curricula in view of the risks that
the children are exposed to every time they participate in online activities.58 Furthermore, considering
the complexity of the cyber world and its pervasiveness,as well as the dangers that these children are
wittingly or unwittingly exposed to in view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the
participation of the parents in disciplining and educating their children about being a good digital
citizen is encouraged by these institutions and organizations. In fact, it is believed that "to limit such
risks, there’s no substitute for parental involvement and supervision."59

As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its students to
beresponsible in their dealings and activities in cyberspace, particularly in OSNs, whenit enforced the
disciplinary actions specified in the Student Handbook, absenta showing that, in the process, it
violated the students’ rights.

OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to whenever they engage
incyberspace activities.1âwphi1 Accordingly, they should be cautious enough to control their privacy
and to exercise sound discretion regarding how much information about themselves they are willing
to give up. Internet consumers ought to be aware that, by entering or uploading any kind of data or
information online, they are automatically and inevitably making it permanently available online, the
perpetuation of which is outside the ambit of their control. Furthermore, and more importantly,
 11

information, otherwise private, voluntarily surrendered by them can be opened, read, or copied by
third parties who may or may not be allowed access to such.

It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings and
activities and must not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding
relief from the courts, as here, requires that claimants themselves take utmost care in safeguarding a
right which they allege to have been violated. These are indispensable. We cannot afford protection
to persons if they themselves did nothing to place the matter within the confines of their private zone.
OSN users must be mindful enough to learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if they desire to
keep the information private, and to keep track of changes in the available privacy settings, such as
those of Facebook, especially because Facebook is notorious for changing these settings and the
site's layout often.

In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors' privacy rights, We find no
cogent reason to disturb the findings and case disposition of the court a quo.

In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other assigned errors.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated July 27,
2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB is hereby
AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 12

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200 April 2, 2014

(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2834-RTJ)

ANTONIO M. LORENZANA, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE MA. CECILIA I. AUSTRIA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Batangas City, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve in this Decision the administrative complaints1 filed by Antonio M. Lorenzana

(complainant) against Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria (respondent), Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
2, Batangas City.

The records show that the administrative complaints arose from the case "In the Matter of the Petition
to have Steel Corporation of the Philippines Placed under Corporate Rehabilitation with Prayer for the
Approval of the Proposed Rehabilitation Plan," docketed as SP. Proc. No. 06-7993, where the
respondent was the presiding judge. The complainant was the Executive Vice President and Chief
Operating Officer of Steel Corporation of the Philippines (SCP), a company then under rehabilitation
proceedings.

i. Complaint

In his verified complaint dated January 21, 2008, the complainant alleged that in the course of SP.
Proc. No. 06-7993, the respondent committed Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority,
Gross Misconduct, Grave Incompetence, Irregularity in the Performance of Duty, Grave Bias and
Partiality, Lack of Circumspection, Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, Failure to Observe the
Reglementary Period and Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as shown by the
following instances:

1. The respondent appointed Atty. Santiago T. Gabionza, Jr. as rehabilitation receiver over
SCP’s objections and despite serious conflict of interest in being the duly appointed
rehabilitation receiver for SCP and, at the same time, the external legal counsel of most of
SCP’s creditors; he is also a partner of the law firm that he engaged as legal adviser.

2. The respondent conducted informal meetings (which she termed as "consultative meetings"
in her Order2dated May 11, 2007) in places outside her official jurisdiction (i.e., a first class golf
club, a hotel and sports club facilities in Metro Manila) and where she arbitrarily dictated the
 13

terms, parameters and features of the rehabilitation plan she wanted to approve for SCP. She
also announced in the meetings that she would prepare the rehabilitation plan for SCP.

3. The modified rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza is a replica of what the
respondent dictated to him. Thus, the respondent exceeded the limits of her authority and
effectively usurped and pre-empted the rehabilitation receiver’s exercise of functions.

4. The respondent ordered that the proceedings of the informal meetings be off-record so that
there would be no record that she had favored Equitable-PCI Bank (EPCIB).

5. The respondent had secret meetings and communications with EPCIB to discuss the case
without the knowledge and presence of SCP and its creditors.

6. The respondent appointed Gerardo Anonas (Anonas) as Atty. Gabionza’s financial adviser
and, at the same time, as her financial adviser to guide her in the formulation and development
of the rehabilitation plan, for a fee of ₱3.5M at SCP’s expense. Anonas is also the cousin-in-
law of the managing partner of Atty. Gabionza’s law firm.

7. The respondent encouraged EPCIB to raise complaints or accusations against SCP, leading
to EPCIB’s filing of a motion to create a management committee.

8. When requested to conduct an evidentiary meeting and to issue a subpoena (so that SCP
could confront EPCIB’s witnesses to prove the allegation that there was a need for the creation
of a management committee), the respondent denied SCP’s requests and delayed the
issuance of the order until the last minute.

9. At the hearing of September 14, 2007, the respondent intimidated SCP’s counsel, Atty.
Ferdinand Topacio; blocked his every attempt to speak; refused to recognize his appearances
in court; and made condescending and snide remarks.

10. The respondent failed to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Interim Rules
of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (Rules). She approved the rehabilitation plan beyond
the 180 days given to her in the Rules, without asking for permission to extend the period from
the Supreme Court (SC).

11. The respondent erroneously interpreted and applied Section 23, Rule 4 of the Rules (the
court’s power to approve the rehabilitation plan) to include the power to amend, modify and
alter it.

12. The respondent took a personal interest and commitment to decide the matter in EPCIB’s
favor and made comments and rulings in the proceedings that raised concerns regarding her
impartiality.

13. The respondent adamantly refused to inhibit herself and showed special interest and
personal involvement in the case.

ii. Supplemental Complaint

The complainant likewise filed a supplemental complaint3 dated April 14, 2008 where he alleged that
the respondent committed an act of impropriety when she displayed her photographs in a social
networking website called "Friendster" and posted her personal details as an RTC Judge, allegedly
for the purpose of finding a compatible partner. She also posed with her upper body barely covered
by a shawl, allegedly suggesting that nothing was worn underneath except probably a brassiere.
 14

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in its 1st Indorsement4 dated March 18, 2008, referred
the complaints to the respondent for comment.

a. Comment to January 21, 2008 Complaint

The respondent vehemently denied the allegations against her. While she admitted that she crafted a
workable, feasible rehabilitation plan best suited for SCP, she maintained that she did so only to
render fairness and equity to all the parties to the rehabilitation proceedings. She also submitted that
if indeed she erred in modifying the rehabilitation plan, hers was a mere error of judgment that does
not call for an administrative disciplinary action. Accordingly, she claimed that the administrative
complaints were premature because judicial remedies were still available. 5

The respondent also argued that the rules do not prohibit informal meetings and conferences. On the
contrary, she argued that informal meetings are even encouraged in view of the summary and non-
adversarial nature of rehabilitation proceedings. Since Section 21, Rule 4 of the Rules6 gives the
rehabilitation receiver the power to meet with the creditors, then there is all the more reason for the
rehabilitation judge, who has the authority to approve the plan, to call and hold meetings with the
parties. She also pointed out that it was SCP which suggested that informal meetings be called and
that she only agreed to hold these meetings on the condition that all the parties would attend.

As to her alleged failure to observe the reglementary period, she contended that she approved the
rehabilitation plan within the period prescribed by law. She argued that the matter of granting
extension of time under Section 11, Rule 4 of the Rules7 pertains not to the SC, but to the
rehabilitation court.

The respondent likewise refuted the allegations of bias and partiality. First, she claimed that her
denial of the complainant’s motion for inhibition was not due to any bias or prejudice on her part but
due to lack of basis. Second, she argued that her decision was not orchestrated to favor EPCIB, as
evidenced by the fact that EPCIP itself (as some other creditors did) promptly appealed her decision
to the Court of Appeals (CA). Third, she did not remove Atty. Gabionza as SCP’s rehabilitation
receiver because she disagreed that the grounds the complainant raised warranted his removal.

She also found no merit to the allegation of conflict of interest. Lastly, she maintained that the rest of
the complainant’s allegations were not substantiated and corroborated by evidence.

The respondent further alleged that she did not gravely abuse her authority in not issuing a subpoena
as Section 1, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation of the Rules specifically states
that the court may decide matters on the basis of affidavits and other documentary evidence.

On the allegation of conflict of interest, she maintained that the allegations were not proven and
substantiated by evidence. Finally, the respondent also believed that there was nothing improper in
expressing her ideas during the informal meetings.

b. Comment to April 14, 2008 Supplemental Complaint

In her comment8 on the supplemental complaint, the respondent submitted that the photos she
posted in the social networking website "Friendster" could hardly be considered vulgar or lewd. She
added that an "off-shouldered" attire is an acceptable social outfit under contemporary standards and
is not forbidden. She further stated that there is no prohibition against attractive ladies being judges;
she is proud of her photo for having been aesthetically made. Lastly, she submitted that the ruling of
the Court in the case of Impao v. Judge Makilala9 should not be applied to her case since the facts
are different.
 15

On July 4, 2008, the complainant filed a reply,10 insisting that the respondent’s acts of posting
"seductive" pictures and maintaining a "Friendster" account constituted acts of impropriety, in violation
of Rules 2.01,11 2.0212 and 2.03,13 Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

In a Resolution14 dated September 9, 2009, the Court re-docketed the complaints as regular
administrative matters, and referred them to the CA for investigation, report and recommendation.

The CA’s Report and Recommendation

On November 13, 2009, Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, the Investigating Justice, conducted a
hearing, followed by the submission of memoranda by both parties. In her January 4, 2010 Report
and Recommendation,15 Justice Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complaints were partly meritorious.
She found that the issues raised were judicial in nature since these involved the respondent’s
appreciation of evidence.

She also added that while the CA resolved to set aside the respondent’s decision in the rehabilitation
proceedings, it was not by reason of her ignorance of the law or abuse of authority, but because the
rehabilitation plan could no longer be implemented in view of SCP’s financial predicament.

On the allegation of grave bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation proceedings, Justice
Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complainant failed to present any clear and convincing proof that the
respondent intentionally and deliberately acted against SCP’s interests; the complaint merely relied
on his opinions and surmises.

On the matter of the respondent’s inhibition, she noted that in cases not covered by the rule on
mandatory inhibition, the decision to inhibit lies within the discretion of the sitting judge and is
primarily a matter of conscience.

With respect to the respondent’s informal meetings, Justice Gonzales-Sison found nothing irregular
despite the out-of-court meetings as these were agreed upon by all the parties, including SCP’s
creditors. She also found satisfactory the respondent’s explanation in approving the rehabilitation plan
beyond the 180-day period prescribed by the Rules.

The foregoing notwithstanding, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the respondent’s unnecessary

bickering with SCP’s legal counsel and ruled that her exchanges and utterances were reflective of
arrogance and superiority. In the words of the Justice Gonzales-Sison:

Rather than rule on the manifestations of counsels, she instead brushed off the matter with what
would appear to be a conceited show of a prerogative of her office, a conduct that falls below the
standard of decorum expected of a judge. Her statements appear to be done recklessly and were
uncalled for. xxx. Section 6[,] Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary states that: judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and
be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others whom the
judge deals in an official capacity. Judicial decorum requires judges to be temperate in their language
at all times. Failure on this regard amounts to a conduct unbecoming of a judge, for which Judge
Austria should be held liable.16

On the respondent’s Friendster account, she believes that her act of maintaining a personal social
networking account (displaying photos of herself and disclosing personal details as a magistrate in
the account) – even during these changing times when social networking websites seem to be the
trend – constitutes an act of impropriety which cannot be legally justified by the public’s acceptance of
this type of conduct. She explained that propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the
performance of all the activities of a judge and that judges shall conduct themselves in a manner
consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
 16

Finally, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the CA’s May 16, 2006 Decision 17 in CA-G.R. SP No. 100941
finding that the respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the creation of a
management committee without first conducting an evidentiary hearing in accordance with the
procedures prescribed under the Rules. She ruled that such professional incompetence was
tantamount to gross ignorance of the law and procedure, and recommended a fine of ₱20,000.00.
She also recommended that the respondent be admonished for failing to observe strict propriety and
judicial decorum required by her office.

The Action and Recommendation of the OCA

In its Memorandum18 dated September 4, 2013, the OCA recommended the following:

RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended for the consideration of the Honorable Court

that:

1) the Report dated January 4, 2010 of Investigating Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison be

NOTED;

2) respondent Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, Branch 2, Regional Trial Court, Batangas City,
Batangas, be found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming a judge and for violation of Section 6,
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct;

3) respondent Judge Austria be FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos

(Php20,000.00); and

4) respondent Judge Austria be ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of impropriety with
a stern warning that a repetition of the same or any similar act will be dealt with more
severely.19

In arriving at its recommendation the OCA found that the respondent was not guilty of gross
ignorance of the law as the complainant failed to prove that her orders were motivated by bad faith,
fraud, dishonesty or corruption.

The OCA also found that the charges of bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation proceedings
were not supported by evidence. It accepted the respondent’s explanation in the charge of failure to
observe the reglementary period.

Lastly, the OCA maintained that the allegations of grave abuse of authority and gross incompetence
are judicial in nature, hence, they should not be the subject of disciplinary action. On the other hand,
on allegations of conduct unbecoming of a judge, violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code), lack of circumspection and impropriety, the OCA shared Justice Gonzales-Sison’s
observations that the respondent’s act of posting seductive photos in her Friendster account
contravened the standard of propriety set forth by the Code.

The Court’s Ruling

We agree with the recommendation of both Justice Gonzales-Sison and the OCA for the imposition of
a fine on the respondent but modify the amount as indicated below. We sustain Justice Gonzales-
Sison’s finding of gross ignorance of the law in so far as the respondent ordered the creation of a
management committee without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The absence of a hearing was a
matter of basic due process that no magistrate should be forgetful or careless about.
 17

On the Charges of Grave Abuse of Authority;

Irregularity in the Performance of Duty; Grave
Bias and Partiality; and Lack of Circumspection

It is well settled that in administrative cases, the complainant bears the onus of proving the averments
of his complaint by substantial evidence.20 In the present case, the allegations of grave abuse of
authority, irregularity in the performance of duty, grave bias and partiality, and lack of circumspection
are devoid of merit because the complainant failed to establish the respondent’s bad faith, malice or
ill will. The complainant merely pointed to circumstances based on mere conjectures and
suppositions. These, by themselves, however, are not sufficient to prove the accusations. "[M]ere
allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof." 21

"[U]nless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or
deliberate intent to do an injustice, [the] respondent judge may not be held administratively liable for
gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial
functions and duties, particularly in the adjudication of cases." 22

Even granting that the respondent indeed erred in the exercise of her judicial functions, these are, at
best, legal errors correctible not by a disciplinary action, but by judicial remedies that are readily
available to the complainant. "An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every
irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such
as a motion for reconsideration or an appeal." 23 Errors committed by him/her in the exercise of
adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings but should be assailed
instead through judicial remedies.24

On the Charges of Grave Bias and Partiality

We likewise find the allegations of bias and partiality on the part of the respondent baseless. The truth
about the respondent’s alleged partiality cannot be determined by simply relying on the complainant’s
verified complaint. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, in light especially of a judge’s sacred
obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without respect to the person, and to give
equal right to the poor and rich.25 There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge;
mere suspicion of partiality is not enough.26

In the present case, aside from being speculative and judicial in character, the circumstances cited by
the complainant were grounded on mere opinion and surmises. The complainant, too, failed to
adduce proof indicating the respondent’s predisposition to decide the case in favor of one party. This
kind of evidence would have helped its cause. The bare allegations of the complainant cannot
overturn the presumption that the respondent acted regularly and impartially. We thus conclude that
due to the complainant’s failure to establish with clear, solid, and convincing proof, the allegations of
bias and partiality must fail.

On the Charges of Grave Incompetence

and Gross Ignorance of the Law

We agree with the findings of the OCA that not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance
of his official duties renders him liable.27 "[A]s a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty
or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even
though such acts are erroneous."28

In the present case, what was involved was the respondent’s application of Section 23, Rule 4 of the
Rules, which provides:
 18

Sec. 23. Approval of the Rehabilitation Plan. - The court may approve a rehabilitation plan even over
the opposition of creditors holding a majority of the total liabilities of the debtor if, in its judgment, the
rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible and the opposition of the creditors is manifestly unreasonable. 29

The respondent approved the rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza, subject to the
modifications she found necessary to make the plan viable. The complainant alleged that in modifying
the plan, she exceeded her authority and effectively usurped the functions of a rehabilitation receiver.
We find, however, that in failing to show that the respondent was motivated by bad faith or ill motives
in rendering the assailed decision, the charge of gross ignorance of the law against her should be
dismissed. "To [rule] otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to
try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment."30

To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the decision, order or actuation of the
judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence. It must
also be proven that he was moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption 31 or had committed an
error so egregious that it amounted to bad faith.

In the present case, nothing in the records suggests that the respondent was motivated by bad faith,
fraud, corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in rendering her decision approving the modified
rehabilitation plan. Besides his bare accusations, the complainant failed to substantiate his
allegations with competent proof. Bad faith cannot be presumed 32 and this Court cannot conclude that
bad faith intervened when none was actually proven.

With respect to the action of the respondent in ordering the creation of a management committee
without first conducting an evidentiary hearing for the purpose, however, we find the error to be so
egregious as to amount to bad faith, leading to the conclusion of gross ignorance of the law, as
charged.

Due process and fair play are basic requirements that no less than the Constitution demands. In
rehabilitation proceedings, the parties must first be given an opportunity to prove (or disprove) the
existence of an imminent danger of dissipation, loss, wastage or destruction of the debtor-company’s
assets and properties that are or may be prejudicial to the interest of minority stockholders, parties-
litigants or the general public.33 The rehabilitation court should hear both sides, allow them to present
proof and conscientiously deliberate, based on their submissions, on whether the appointment of a
management receiver is justified. This is a very basic requirement in every adversarial proceeding
that no judge or magistrate can disregard.

In SCP’s rehabilitation proceedings, SCP was not given at all the opportunity to present its evidence,
nor to confront the EPCIB witnesses. Significantly, the CA, in its May 16, 2006 decision, found that
the respondent’s act of denying SCP the opportunity to disprove the grounds for the appointment of a
management committee was tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. As aptly observed by Justice
Gonzales-Sison:

[T]he acts of the respondent judge (Judge Austria) in creating a MANCOM without observing the
procedures prescribed under the IRPGICC clearly constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction.34

Indeed, while a judge may not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for every erroneous order
that he renders, this does not mean that a judge need not observe due care in the performance of
his/her official functions.35 When a basic principle of law is involved and when an error is so gross and
patent, error can produce an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the
law.36 On this basis, we conclude that the respondent’s act of promptly ordering the creation of a
 19

management committee, without the benefit of a hearing and despite the demand for one, was
tantamount to punishable professional incompetence and gross ignorance of the law.

On the Ground of Failure to Observe

the Reglementary Period

On the respondent’s failure to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Rules, we find the
respondent’s explanation to be satisfactory.

Section 11, Rule 4 of the previous Rules provides:

Sec. 11. Period of the Stay Order. – xxx

The petition shall be dismissed if no rehabilitation plan is approved by the court upon the lapse of one
hundred eighty (180) days from the date of the initial hearing. The court may grant an extension
beyond this period only if it appears by convincing and compelling evidence that the debtor may
successfully be rehabilitated. In no instance, however, shall the period for approving or disapproving
a rehabilitation plan exceed eighteen (18) months from the date of filing of the petition. 37

Under this provision, the matter of who would grant the extension beyond the 180-day period carried
a good measure of ambiguity as it did not indicate with particularity whether the rehabilitation court
could act by itself or whether Supreme Court approval was still required. Only recently was this
uncertainty clarified when A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC, the 2008 Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation, took effect.

Section 12, Rule 4 of the Rules provides:

Section 12. Period to Decide Petition. - The court shall decide the petition within one (1) year from the
date of filing of the petition, unless the court, for good cause shown, is able to secure an extension of
the period from the Supreme Court.38

Since the new Rules only took effect on January 16, 2009 (long after the respondent’s approval of the
rehabilitation plan on December 3, 2007), we find no basis to hold the respondent liable for the
extension she granted and for the consequent delay.

On the Ground of Conduct

Unbecoming of a Judge

On the allegation of conduct unbecoming of a judge, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct states that:

SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be
patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the
judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court
staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control.39

A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity, independence
and respect for himself/herself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the hallmark
judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint.40 He should choose his words and exercise
more caution and control in expressing himself. In other words, a judge should possess the virtue of
gravitas.41

As held in De la Cruz (Concerned Citizen of Legazpi City) v. Judge Carretas, 42 a judge should be
considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court; he should always keep his
 20

passion guarded. He can never allow it to run loose and overcome his reason. Furthermore, a
magistrate should not descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering
harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments.

Similarly in Attys. Guanzon and Montesino v. Judge Rufon, 43 the Court declared that "although
respondent judge may attribute his intemperate language to human frailty, his noble position in the
bench nevertheless demands from him courteous speech in and out of court.

Judges are required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in
language."

Accordingly, the respondent’s unnecessary bickering with SCP’s legal counsel, her expressions of
exasperation over trivial procedural and negligible lapses, her snide remarks, as well as her
condescending attitude, are conduct that the Court cannot allow. They are displays of arrogance and
air of superiority that the Code abhors.

Records and transcripts of the proceedings bear out that the respondent failed to observe judicial
temperament and to conduct herself irreproachably. She also failed to maintain the decorum required
by the Code and to use temperate language befitting a magistrate. "As a judge, [she] should ensure
that [her] conduct is always above reproach and perceived to be so by a reasonable observer. [She]
must never show conceit or even an appearance thereof, or any kind of impropriety."44

Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived
to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.

In these lights, the respondent exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge and thus violated Section 6,
Canon 6 and Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

On the Ground of Impropriety

We are not unaware of the increasing prevalence of social networking sites in the Internet – a new
medium through which more and more Filipinos communicate with each other. 45 While judges are not
prohibited from becoming members of and from taking part in social networking activities, we remind
them that they do not thereby shed off their status as judges. They carry with them in cyberspace the
same ethical responsibilities and duties that every judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday
activities. It is in this light that we judge the respondent in the charge of impropriety when she posted
her pictures in a manner viewable by the public.

Lest this rule be misunderstood, the New Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit a judge from
joining or maintaining an account in a social networking site such as Friendster. Section 6, Canon 4 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to
freedom of expression. This right "includes the freedom to hold opinions without interference and
impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers." 46 Joining a social networking
site is an exercise of one’s freedom of expression. The respondent judge’s act of joining Friendster is,
therefore, per se not violative of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, however, also imposes a correlative
restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they should always conduct
themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the Judiciary.
 21

This rule reflects the general principle of propriety expected of judges in all of their activities, whether
it be in the course of their judicial office or in their personal lives. In particular, Sections 1 and 2 of
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct prohibit impropriety and even the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities:

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In
particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial
office.

Based on this provision, we hold that the respondent disregarded the propriety and appearance of
propriety required of her when she posted Friendster photos of herself wearing an "off-shouldered"
suggestive dress and made this available for public viewing.

To restate the rule: in communicating and socializing through social networks, judges must bear in
mind that what they communicate – regardless of whether it is a personal matter or part of his or her
judicial duties – creates and contributes to the people’s opinion not just of the judge but of the entire
Judiciary of which he or she is a part. This is especially true when the posts the judge makes are
viewable not only by his or her family and close friends, but by acquaintances and the general public.

Thus, it may be acceptable for the respondent to show a picture of herself in the attire she wore to her
family and close friends, but when she made this picture available for public consumption, she placed
herself in a situation where she, and the status she holds as a judge, may be the object of the public’s
criticism and ridicule. The nature of cyber communications, particularly its speedy and wide-scale
character, renders this rule necessary.

We are not also unaware that the respondent’s act of posting her photos would seem harmless and
inoffensive had this act been done by an ordinary member of the public. As the visible personification
of law and justice, however, judges are held to higher standards of conduct and thus must
accordingly comport themselves.47

This exacting standard applies both to acts involving the judicial office and personal
matters.1âwphi1 The very nature of their functions requires behavior under exacting standards of
morality, decency and propriety; both in the performance of their duties and their daily personal lives,
they should be beyond reproach.48 Judges necessarily accept this standard of conduct when they
take their oath of office as magistrates.

Imposable Penalty

Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross
ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge. Under Section 11(A) of the same
Rule, a serious charge merits any of the following sanctions:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations; provided, however, that the forfeiture
of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3), but not
exceeding six (6), months; or

3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00, but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.

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On the other hand, conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10,
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. It is penalized under Section 11(C) thereof by any of the following: (1)
A fine of not less than ₱1,000.00 but not exceeding ₱10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and ( 4)
Admonition with warning.

Judge Austria's record shows that she had never been administratively charged or found liable for
any wrongdoing in the past. Since this is her first offense, the Court finds it fair and proper to temper
the penalty for her offenses.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria guilty of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE
LAW for which she is FINED Twenty-One Thousand Pesos (₱21,000,00). Judge Austria is likewise
hereby ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of IMPROPRIETY and to refrain from CONDUCT
UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.