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    Peterson The Greatest Dificulty For Plato S Theory of Forms. Unknowability Argument of Parmenides 133c-134c PDF

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    eu Hermann Mérchen: Adomo und Heidegger 6 Seiten, Register, Leinen lag, 148,~ DM. WAX. Jen Denke ihe Leben lang unter- lieb, Soll hier posthum doch noch nt werden. Dabei zeigt © Nahe der Geunderfah rungen beider Philosophen. Diese wird erst sichtbar, nachdem durch Philologische und biographische Vorarbeiten das Textmaterial 2u- verlissig bereitgestellt und fir eine genaue Diskussion der stittigen Hauptthemen der Boden bereitet ist. Ein Basiswerk zar philosophi- sohen Zeltgeschichte Maximitian Forschner: Die stoische Ethik Uber den Zusammenhang von, Sprach-, Natur- und Moralphilo- ‘sophie im alistoischen System 244 Seiten, Rey 68 DM ISBN 3-1 er, Leinen, 2-915450-7 Ein Grundwerk zu derjenigen Ethik der Antike, die witkungs schichtlich auf das Selbstverstand: nis der Neureit den grOBten Ein- f1uB ausibte Paul Hofmai Problem und Probleme einer Sinn-erforschenden Philosophie | Herausgegeben und miteine fdhrung yon Kate Hamburger 8 Seiten, Leinen mit Schutz ‘umschiag, 28, DM ISBN 3-12-933280-4 Paul Hofmann betrachtete di Sinnerforschung als zentrale Auf: gabe der Philosophie, Die Sinnhaf- ligkeit der menschlichen Existenz, ‘war fir ihn die Grundlage der Ethik. Der 1947 verstorbene Berli- ner Philosoph wire im Jahre 1980 | 100 Jahre alt geworden. Kite S Hamburger hat nun aus dem, | Nachla und aus Teilen von y Hofmanns Hauptwerk Sinn tnd Geschichte ein Buch zusammen 1estelt, das Einblick in, Paul Hofmanns eneut aktuell gewor- | denes Philosophieren gibt. Panajotis Kondylis: x Die Aufklirung imm Rahmen des neuzeitichen Rationalismus PS Seiten, Register, Leinen mit | Schutzumschlag, 148,- DM i phisehe Aufktirung in Europa, Detuillierte Darstellungen, um- fangreiche Bibliographie, ausfUbr- liche Register RCHIV ‘UR GESCHICHTE ER PHILOSOPHIE jevriindet von Ludwig Stein, privetiihrt von Paul Wilpert und Hans Wagner Verbindung mit Edwin M. Curley, Evanston andiger Mitwirkung von Jaakko Hintikha, Helsinki/Stanford Univ. 11. Kahn, Philadelphia, Ludwig Landgrebe, Kotn, G. E. L, Owen, Cambridge icket, Regensburg, Wolfgang Stegmiller, Minehen, Joes Vuillemin, Pir, Wieland, Freiburg, Margaret D-Wison, Princeton, Richard! Wolheim. Lond svinermann, Kan Fousgegeben von RL-HEINZ ILTING 63. BAND 1981 HEFT 1 a 1 Aulsates ww Primes, Susi: The Greatest Dilfizully for Plato's Theory of Farms the Oa iuiiyAtguaient of Parinenades I 8e- Me Esai Pepesen, Taal: Kat Choose Sake: More on Aivvinaccut Hie tans 0 M. Zur Diskussion ‘Munisai, 1x: Kart von Frit om Interpreting Ancient Phiksophy a Kuve Law v7: Probability n Levonte. On the internal coherence of «ul Gon = 7 Rucutt Uxs: Michael Theunissens Desiruktion der Binkeit son Darstelang und Kerik an Heyes, Wisenvehatt der Logik a ML, Rezensionen ‘Stian, C2 Divine Substance (K. Biithein) 80 Mantis M.: Das Problem des Lachens und der Komidie bei Plaion J: Sprutg) "81 Du N siusvuosoriue pes Anistoret rs. Hlerausgepeben von Gustav Adolph Seeck A. Brews) Sq Monavn, Pi: Le commentated Alexandre d'Aphrodise due « Seconds Analtigues WAtiione (E Bert) 84 Parade: LeConsequentie nel Logica Medievaie (W. Risse) 86 recone ase fe ne) usar ul aden a Zin erghhe Mtg wd USA ad Kamae cn 9 mize Rect Kram, ns an Brg Linas tax Reson Sane cin ‘ce Stvcpon eprint ee ‘The Greatest Difficulty for Plato’s Theory of Forms: the Unknowability Argument of Parmenides 133¢—134c by Sandra Peterson (Minneapolis) 91. Brief sketch of the argument Plato's Parmenides constructs difficulties for the theory of forms. One, called “the greatest” (133b 4), is an argument (133¢—1340) which concludes that the forms are unknowable by us, Plato gives, 1 think, to routes to the conclusion. The first route, Up to 134b 6, achieves the claim that if our knowledge is of something, that something cannot be a form. The second route, after 134b, establishes an equivalent to the achievement of the fist: if something is knowledge of a form, that something cannot be knowledge of ours. Here are selected parts of the argument: “Whoever poss that here i certain being itn cach cae, by sel, would agree tat none of these sinus... And then, sch a the deat as are what they ae with reference to one anrher ave thee beng wth reference to themselves, bu not with reference to those things alongside ws... the things alongside us, onthe other hand these having the same names a those, are again with reference to themselves For example, ifsome one of us is master of someone not of slave itself, that which is stave, isa master the master, but... of a man. But mastery set i what i is of slavery self... Then knowledge, ... that which is knowledge, itself, would it be knowledge ofthat which is ruth sel? While again, each of the knowledges which js ~ would it be knowledge ofeach ofthe Beings which are? ... But the knowledge alongside ws, would it not be of the truth alongside ws, snd again each knowledge ‘hich i alongside us, would not tbe knowledge ofeach of the beings alongside us? But yet ne neither have the forms themslies nor can they be alongside ws ut the forms themselves, each [thing] which i, re they knows by the form isl that of knowedge? which we donot have --_ Then ode ofthe forms x known ty since wo Jo not partake of Knowledge ioc” § 2. A striking principle: definitional isolation A striking principle of one route of the argument is: one thing (x) is what i is with reference to (pros) a second (y) then if xis form, yisa form, 0003-9101/81/0631-000182.00 Copyright by Walter de Gruyter & Co, 2 Sandra Peterson 1 call this “the general principle of definitional isolation.” “Definitio- nal" is to indicate a connection with the answer to a “What is —?” question. The texts I use as evidence for the general principle could alternatively be understood as giving a restricted principle: Ifa form xis what itis with reference to aformy, then theres non-form zsuch that sis what its with reference coz ‘Although by itself the restricted principle does not have the same consequences as the general, use of the restricted principle in the argument here would yield Plato’s conclusion in a way only slightly different from the way of § 4’s reconstruction, which uses the general principle, ‘The general principle is my interpretation of 133¢ 8—d4: “Those ideas which are what they are with reference to each other have theit being wrth reference to themselves but not with reference tothe things alongside ws and of 133¢ 6: those things are themselves of themselves and to themselves “What 133¢ 6 says depends on what “those things” refers to. Cornford’s translation, “things in that world”, seems a reference to forms gene~ rally, in which case 133 6 and surroundings (e. g. 133¢ 4) are evi dence for the general principle. But if “those things” restricts its reference to the relational forms mentioned previously, 133¢ 6 is evidence for the restricted principle. . ‘Subsequent remarks are evidence for a further principle, concern- ing non-forms: If xis itself pros y, and x fs in us or alongside us, then y is in ws or alongside us The evidence is 1334 2ff.: ‘The things alongside us ~ these having the same names as those ~ are again them- aves with reference ta themselves but not with reference to the forms. Agi, in this way they are called such of thomeelves tut mot of those “That the evidence for the principle for non-forms points to the prin ciple Ihave chosen is one reason I have adopted its parallel, the general principle, as the principle Plato intends for forms. Another reason is that I have not been able to see why Plato would have asserted the restricted as opposed to the general principle, * and “have their Note some assumptions I make, First [ake “are what they a boeing” to have the same meaning, Second, I write as if Pato intends oo distnetion between things alongside us and things in us, One might take the things alongside us to be i least people and the things in us to be things naturally stid to be in (or of, or “The Greatest Difficulty for Plato's Theory of Forms 3 belonging to) us, ¢, g. our slavery, our mastery. But 133¢ 845, “things alongside us ‘having which”, tells us that some of the things alongside ws are the same as whet is had by vs, ein us. At 134a 10 Plato speaks of “knowledge alongside us", yet know. Jedge f naturally said to be possessed by us or in us. [take 134a 10 as reason to assume that Plato isnot distinguishing between the in-us and the alongsie-us here, Third take fare themselves" to mean the same as “are what they are™ and “have their significance” Fourth, on “of themselves.” the distinction Plato intends between “with reference to themselves” and “of themselves i, I think, between, relatedness in general and such relatedness os i expressed, as in the case of being a slave of or being knowledge of, by the genitive, “of Take the genitive to give an instance of the pros relation It has mistakenly been supposed that the remarks I have cited as evidence for the principle of definitional isolation were evidence for what I call “divorce theses”, such as: Relational forms cannot bear relations of any kind to non-forms.* ‘A more sweeping divorce thesis for which the unknowability argument has been taken as evidence is: Forms have no relations of any kind to what is in or alongside us. But what Plato says about forms is evidently confined to a principle about what relata are somehow involved in the account of what certain things are. The phrases “is what it is with reference to”, “is itself”, “has its being" narrow the principle about failure of relations in some way. As I understand the principle, its content is: the answer to the question “What is it?” asked about a form will not mention any non-forms, The principle for non-forms, more difficult to grasp than the principle of definitional isolation for forms, is also a narrow one: non- forms are not shemselves pros forms. It is not the wider claim that non- forms bear no relations to forms. TW. G. Runciman, “Plato's Parmenides”,in R.E. Allen, Sudies in Plato’s Metaphysics (Sew York. 1982)

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