To The Same Court, and No. 29, Peter v. United States, On Certiorari To The United States Court of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit

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31 United States v. Seeger 380 U.S.

163 (March 8, 1965)


Note: Together with No. 51, United States v. Jakobson, on certiorari
to the same court, and No. 29, Peter v. United States, on certiorari to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Facts:
 The Universal Military Training and Service Act established a
draft for all men in the US. However there was an exemption
(§6(j)), for 'conscientious objectors'.
o 'Conscientious objectors' were defined in §6(j) as persons
who by reason of their religious training and belief are
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any
form.
 'Religious training and belief' is defined as "an
individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being
involved in duties superior to those arising from any
human relation, but not including essentially political
sociological, or philosophical views or merely a
personal moral code."
SEEGER
 Seeger was drafted and refused to go, claiming that he was a
conscientious objector. He was arrested.
o Instead of professing a belief in a Supreme Being, Seeger
claimed that he had a "belief in goodness and virtue for
their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical
creed."
o He cited such personages as Plato, Aristotle and Spinoza for
support of his ethical belief in intellectual and moral
integrity "without belief in God, except in the remotest
sense."
o Though his belief was determined to be sincere and based
upon individual training and belief, Seeger was denied
exemption because his claim was not based on "belief in
relation to a Supreme Being" as specified in the draft
statute.
 The Trial Court convicted Seeger of draft-dodging. He appealed.
o Seeger claimed that §6(j) was unconstitutional, since it only
allowed exemptions for people who believed in a Supreme
Being, and so was a violation of the 1stAmendment's right
of free exercise of religious belief.
 The Appellate Court reversed.
o holding that the Supreme Being requirement of the section
distinguished "between internally derived and externally
compelled beliefs" and was, therefore, an "impermissible
classification" under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
 The government appealed.
JAKOBSON
 Jakobson was also drafted and refused to go, claiming that he
was a conscientious objector.
o He stated on the Selective Service System form that he
believed in a "Supreme Being" who was "Creator of Man" in
the sense of being "ultimately responsible for the existence
of" man and who was "the Supreme Reality" of which "the
existence of man is the result."
o He explained that his religious and social thinking had
developed after much meditation and thought. He had
concluded that man must be "partly spiritual" and,
therefore, "partly akin to the Supreme Reality"; and that his
"most important religious law" was that "no man ought ever
to wilfully sacrifice another man's life as a means to any
other end . . . ."
 The Board classified him 1-A-O (A selective service class
denoting that the registrant is only available for noncombat
military service due to their conscientious objector status) and
Jakobson appealed.
o The hearing officer found that the claim was based upon a
personal moral code and that he was not sincere in his
claim. The Appeal Board classified him 1-A. It did not
indicate upon what ground it based its decision, i. e.,
insincerity or a conclusion that his belief was only a
personal moral code.
 The Appellate Court reversed.
o finding that his claim came within the requirements of 6
(j). Because it could not determine whether the Appeal
Board had found that Jakobson's beliefs failed to come
within the statutory definition, or whether it had
concluded that he lacked sincerity, it directed dismissal of
the indictment.
 The government appealed.
PETER
 Forest Britt Peter was convicted in the Northern District of
California on a charge of refusing to submit to induction.
o He hedged the question as to his belief in a Supreme Being
by saying that it depended on the definition and he
appended a statement that he felt it a violation of his moral
code to take human life and that he considered this belief
superior to his obligation to the state.
o As to his belief in a Supreme Being, Peter stated that he
supposed "you could call that a belief in the Supreme
Being or God. These just do not happen to be the words
I use."
 Peter was classified as 1-A (eligible for military service).
o Although there was no evidence in the record that he
was not sincere in his beliefs. After his conviction for
failure to report for induction the Court of Appeals,
assuming arguendo that he was sincere, affirmed.
Ruling:
 The US Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court.
o The US Supreme Court found that a person can meet the
requirements of being a conscientious objector even if they
have unorthodox spiritual beliefs, as long as those beliefs
are fundamentally equivalent to a traditional belief in God.
 The Court found that the proper test of religious belief
should be "whether a given belief that is sincere and
meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor
parallel to that filled by the orthodox beliefs in God of
one who clearly qualifies for the conscientious
objector exemption."
o The Court noted that §6(j) can still require that that a
person seeking exemption proves both that his beliefs
prohibit him from participating in war, and that these
beliefs are strong and sincere.
 This case is notable for being one of the few times that the US
Supreme Court has attempted to define the term 'religion' in
relation to the 1st Amendment.

Additional Info:
The issue in question was the definition of religious belief.
Whether the phrase "Supreme Being" as used in the statute meant
only the orthodox concept of God, or a "broader concept of a power
or being, or a faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon which all
else is ultimately dependent.'"
Examining the development of draft laws since 1917, the Court
found no evidence that Congress wanted the act to apply only to
those holding traditional theocratic beliefs, and noted the "well-
established congressional policy of equal treatment for those whose
opposition to service is grounded in their religious tenets."
33 Lemon v. Kurtzman 403 U.S. 602 (1971)
 Laws that allowed the State to pay for aspects of non-secular,
non-public education in Pennsylvania (Nonpublic Elementary
and Secondary Education Act) and Rhode Island (Rhode Island
Salary Supplement Act).
o The laws were facially-neutral in that they allowed any
parochial private school to apply for reimbursement for
certain expenses (Pennsylvania: teacher salaries, textbooks,
and other instructional materials for secular subjects;
Rhode Island: pay private school teachers a 15% salary
supplement)
 However, the majority of the private schools were
Catholic schools.
 Lemon and others sued, claiming that the use of tax money to
fund religious schools was a violation of the Establishment
Clause of the 1st Amendment.

Issue:
Whether or not the statutes are constitutional.
Whether or not the statutes were a violation of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

Ruling:
 The US Supreme Court found both laws to be unconstitutional.
o The US Supreme Court found that the laws did not
discriminate among religions.
 If they did, then they would have to meet strict
scrutiny review.
 See Larson v. Valente (456 U.S. 228 (1982)).
 The Court's decision in this case established the "Lemon test"
(named after the lead plaintiff Alton Lemon), which details
legislation concerning religion. It is threefold:

1. The statute must have a secular legislative purpose. (Also


known as the Purpose Prong)
2. The principal or primary effect of the statute must not
advance nor inhibit religion. (Also known as the Effect
Prong)
3. The statute must not result in an "excessive government
entanglement" with religion. (Also known as the
Entanglement Prong)
 Factors.

1. Character and purpose of institution benefited.


2. Nature of aid the state provides.
3. Resulting relationship between government and
religious authority.
If any of these prongs are violated, the government's action is
deemed unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution.

 This three-prong test is now known as the Lemon Test.


o It's a pretty malleable test, and the provisions are a bit
vague. It tends to be invoked when the Justices want to
strike down a practice they don't like, and ignored when
judging the merits of a practice they want to uphold.
o While the Lemon Test is still good law, its future is in
doubt. A number of Justices have called for it to be
overruled.
 See Justice Scalia's concurrence in Lamb's Chapel v.
Center Moriches Union Free School District (508 U.S.
384 (1993)).
o In this case, the Court found that both laws were
unconstitutional because they created "excessive
government entanglement between the government and
religion". Excessive entanglement is determined by the
character and purpose of the institution benefited the
nature of the aid given, and the resulting relationship
between the government and church.
o The Court held that both the state statutes in question had
secular legislative purposes because they reflected the
desire of the states to ensure minimum secular education
requirements were being met in the non-public schools.

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