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It
cannot be said, therefore, that in attacking the victim, the accused
was impelled by pure compassion or beneficence or the lawful desire
to avenge the immediate wrong inflicted on his cousin. Rather, he
was motivated by revenge, resentment or evil motive because of a
running feud between them. (People vs. Toring, G.R. No. 56358, Oct.
26, 1990, 191 SCRA 38, 47)
The deceased hit the first cousin of the accused with the
butt of a shotgun. The deceased also pointed the shotgun at the
first cousin, took a bullet from his jacket pocket, showed it to
him and asked him, "Do you like this, Dong?" to which the latter
replied, "No, Noy, I do not like that." The deceased then placed
the bullet in the shotgun and was thus pointing it at the first
cousin when the accused came from behind the deceased and
stabbed him. There was unlawful aggression on the part of the
deceased and there was no provocation on the part of the accused.
However, because of a running feud between the deceased and
his brother on one side and the accused and his brother on the
other side, the accused could not have been impelled by pure
compassion or beneficence or the lawful desire to avenge the
immediate wrong inflicted on his cousin. He was motivated by
revenge, resentment or evil motive. He is only entitled to the
privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of
relative. (People vs. Toring, G.R. No. 56358, Oct. 26, 1990, 191
SCRA 38, 45-48)
Andal vs Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
- Andal appealed to the Court upon being charged for the crime of Homicide. He alleges that
Sandiganbayan erred in rejecting his self-defense plea, since the unlawful agression was initiated
by the deceased (victim) He also contends that the cause of death of the deceased was through
accidental gunshots as he was trying to disarm the deceased.
- The antecedent of the crime was that Andal called out the deceased, Pfc Maximo Macaraig, for
failure to report to police headquarters for briefing but the latter just disrespected and told Andal
that he did not need to report as he already had Andal’s orders.
- At 11:00 PM, the deceased furiously approached Andal, asking why Andal embarrassed him in
front of so many people. Andal denied the deceased accusation and told him to put it all behind.
But the deceased refused to stop and challenged Andal to a gunfight that lead to both of them
grappling for the possession of the gun.
- The court finds Andal’s petition having no merit because the witnesses testified that the
deceased was more or less 2 meters from Andal when the gunshots were heard and that Andal
was seen holding the gun stretched downward and that he and the deceased were not grappling
for the possession of the gun when the gunshots were fired.
ISSUE
Whether or not Andal can use self-defense as a defense against his criminal liability of homicide.
HELD
- No, as it is essential that the attack upon defendant be simultaneous with the killing, or
preceded the latter without an appreciable interval of time. Also, before the decased and Andal
grappled for the possession of the gun and before the gunshots were fired, the deceased first
attacked Andal. The said initial unlawful aggression staged by deceased had ceased after he was
disarmed by accused. Lastly, the primordial requisite of self-defense is unlawful aggression. And
for unlawful aggression to be present, there must be a real danger to life or personal safety. In the
instant case, there was no imminent and real danger to the life or limb of the petitioner when he
shot the deceased, since the latter had already been disarmed.
People vs Andal
He testified that at 3:00 p.m. of March 2, 1990, he and Antalo were on their way to Mayor Asis house in
Pasaupnon, Matungao. He saw the victim, the appellant and four (4) other persons talking to one
another. Then he heard a gunshot from behind. When he turned to look, he noticed that smoke was
coming out of appellants gun and that empty shells were dropping from it as appellant continued to fire
at the victim. Appellants rifle was pointed at the victim who had fallen on the ground. He heard seven
(7) gunshots. Appellants companions also carried Garand rifles, but Mosa concluded that these were not
fired because he did not notice any smoke from their barrels. He was not frightened. Neither did he take
cover, as he knew both the victim and the appellant. After firing at the victim, appellant together with
his four companions fled towards Mayor Asis coffee plantation. He and Antalo approached the victim,
whom they found already dead. Thereafter, they reported the shooting to the victims wife
A person who invokes the exempting circumstance of compulsion due to irresistible force must
prove his defense by clear and convincing evidence.i[25] He must show that the irresistible force
reduced him to a mere instrument that acted not only without will but also against his will.ii[26]
The compulsion must be of such character as to leave the accused no opportunity to defend
himself or to escape.
The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending; and it must be
of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the
act is not done. A threat of future injury is not enough.iii[27] A speculative, fanciful or remote
fear,iv[28] even fear of future injury,v[29] is insufficient.
In this case, appellant failed to show such compulsion. In his testimony, he did not mention that
the Dorados physically or morally threatened to kill or hurt him. He did not even make any
attempt to resist. He simply took for granted that they would kill or hurt him if he did not follow
them. No evidence was presented to establish how, if at all, he was compelled to join the
Dorados in killing the victim. In other words, appellant failed to prove that the Dorados made a
real and imminent threat on his life or limb sufficient to overcome his free will.
Facts:
Ernesto Romualdez was confronted by Sazon for circulating a rumor that Sazon and his
companions were engaged in stealing, upon confrontation however, Romualdez boxed Sazon and
threatened to kill him. 2 days later, Sazon and his cousin followed Romualdez after seeing the
latter pass by. Sazon again confronted Romualdez, and Romualdez allegedly provoked Sazon to
just shoot. To which Sazon shot Romualdez dead.
Issue: WON Sazon was justified in killing Romualdez because there was provocation
Held: No. The alleged provocation of Romualdez was insufficient to justify Sazon's actions.
Furthermore, there was evident premeditation when Sazon and his cousin followed the
victim in an attempt to overpower himfatal blows, cannot adequately sustain a conclusion of premeditated killing.
To justify its attendance, the prosecution must prove (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly
indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination, and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution to
allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 22
In the case at bar, the first and second elements are lacking. The angry outburst of appellant in that incident of September 15, 1983, warning
the victim that the former would kill him, does not convince us that, under the circumstances therein, appellant as of that time had already
decided to kill the victim. A homicidal premeditation is studiedly conceived and not impulsively adopted just like that and, worse, publicly
announced. It was more of a spontaneous expression of resentment or bravado on the part of appellant.
Counsel for the appellant maintains that the accused was a minor below eighteen when the
offense was committed and asked that this be considered as an additional mitigating
circumstance under the provisions of article 13, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code. Article
13, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code is as follows:
That the offender is under eighteen years of age or over seventy years. In the case of the
minor, he shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of article 80.
Exhibit A, offered by the prosecution, states that the age of the accused at the time of the
commission of the offense was seventeen years and eight months. We accept this as the best
evidence in the record as to the true age of the accused. It is necessary, therefore, to reform the
judgment of the court below and to enter one in conformity with article 80 of the Revised Penal
Code. We accept and affirm the findings of fact of the court below as to the guilt of the
defendant. We further find the presence of the following extenuating circumstances and direct
that they be applied when final sentenced may be pronounced, namely: First, the age of the
accused being under eighteen (article 13, paragraph 2); second, provocation on the part of the
deceased (article 13, paragraph 4); third, obfuscation (article 13, paragraph 6); fourth, voluntary
surrender (article 13, paragraph 7). That part of the judgment which sentences the defendant to
twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
sum of P1,000 is hereby revoked and it is ordered that the defendant-appellant be placed in the
Philippine Training School for Boys at Welfareville in the custody of the care of the
Commissioner of Public Welfare until the said defendant shall have attained his majority, subject
however, to the provisions and conditions of said article 80 of the Revised Penal Code.
When the deceased who had attacked Alconga ran away, there
was no necessity for Alconga to pursue and kill the deceased. (People
vs. Alconga, 78 Phil. 366)
Held: There were two stages in the fight between the accused and
the deceased. During the first stage of the fight, the accused in inflicting
several wounds upon the deceased acted in self-defense, because then
the deceased, who had attacked the accused with repeated blows, was
the unlawful aggressor. But when the deceased after receiving several
wounds, ran away, from that moment there was no longer any danger
to the life of the accused who, being virtually unscathed, could have
chosen to remain where he was and when he pursued the deceased,
fatally wounding him upon overtaking him, Alconga was no longer
acting in self-defense, because the aggression begun by the deceased
ceased from the moment he took to his heels.
enjamin, when they fell from the "papag", according to Macario Pascua.
Again, Benjamin's version is that, after this accidental injury on the back of Piol, the latter
succeeded in rolling over and being on top of him (Benjamin); that Piol then struck him on the
face with a stone; that, after fending off another attempt of Piol to similarly hit him again, he
(Benjamin) picked up another stone and, in turn, struck him with it on the head; that, as
Benjamin squeezed him by the neck, he let the stone loose and, pulling Piol down with his
(Benjamin's) right hand, he (Benjamin) stabbed Piol on the back — on which, according to
Benjamin, Piol was lying — by thrusting the dagger with his left hand; and that, at this juncture,
the Chief of Police came and took the weapon from him.
This story is manifestly artificious and unworthy of credence. It should be noted that, according
to Benjamin, he held the dagger, even before they fell from the "papag"; that the dagger was still
in his hand when Piol allegedly struck his face with a stone; and that he (Benjamin), in turn, took
another piece of stone, and hit Piol with it. This would have been impossible, however, unless
Benjamin first released the dagger, which he then held; but, We cannot believe that he, or
anybody for that matter, would have done so under the circumstances.
Again, when Piol allegedly squeezed the neck of Benjamin, the latter threw the stone away and
picked up the dagger once more. He would thus have Us believe that, in order to get the stone
with which he claimed to have hit Piol on the head, he put the dagger in a convenient place from
which, at the opportune moment, he got it back to inflict the second stab wound. The context of
Benjamin's story does not convey the idea that he had such a control of the situation as to be able
to choose the place where he would put the dagger and the time he would retrieve it.
But, this is not all. Instead of stabbing Piol on the stomach, for, by this time, he was again lying
down on his back — according to the defense — with Benjamin on top of him, he (Benjamin)
thrust the dagger, with his left hand, into the back of Piol, causing therein another stab wound
almost at right angle with his body, like the first. Just why, being in the precarious condition he
depicted himself, Benjamin chose to stab Piol in such an awkward, inconvenient and
unbelievable manner, the defense has not even tried to explain. Regardless of the foregoing, an
injury inflicted in this fashion on Piol's back, which was allegedly pressed against the ground,
would have necessarily been much more slanting than the first, instead of being almost
perpendicular to the body. The fact of the matter — and this has been established by the
testimony of the Chief of Police, whose impartiality and veracity are not contested — is that Piol
was then lying down, not on his back, but on his stomach with Benjamin on top of him. This
explains why and how he (Benjamin) managed to stab Piol on the back. It, likewise, shows that
Piol could not have struck Benjamin on the face with a stone, much less squeezed his neck. .
It is clear, from the foregoing, that Benjamin stabbed Piol twice from behind, after disarming
him.1 Considering, moreover, that Benjamin had provoked the incident, by hurling
uncomplimentary remarks at his political opponents, one of whom was Piol;2 that such remarks
led to an altercation with Piol, in consequence of which, stones were thrown at him, hitting him
on the head; that when, owing to the impact of said stone, which could have rendered him
groggy, and the lacerated injuries thus sustained by him, Piol prepared himself to fight by
drawing out his dagger, Benjamin accepted the challenge resulting from this act, by "rushing" to
his encounter and grappling with him; and that, accordingly, Benjamin cannot be given the
benefit of either complete or incomplete self-defense.3 Although Piol was stabbed from
behind, Benjamin did not act with treachery, for this was merely an incident of their
struggle, which had begun with both contenders facing each other, each prepared for the
fight that ensued.4
In this case, four members of the police force went after him
as soon as the detention prisoner had escaped. When the escaping
detainee saw one of the policemen, he lunged at the latter, hitting
him with a stone on the right cheek, as a consequence of which he
fell down, and while in that position on the ground, he was again
struck with a stone by the escaping detainee; thereafter, the latter
ran away pursued by the policeman and his companions; in the course
of the pursuit, the policeman fired a warning shot into the air, and as
the escaping detainee paid no heed to this, the policeman fired into
the air four times more and kept on pursuing him; as the latter was
apparently widening the distance between them, and fearing that
he might finally be able to elude arrest, the policeman fired directly
at him while he was in the act of jumping again into another part of
the creek, the shot having hit him on the back. (Valcorza vs. People,
30 SCRA 148-150)
Facts: The accused, armed with a shotgun, was looking over his
land. He noticed a man carrying a bundle on his shoulder. Believing
that the man had stolen his palay, the accused shouted for him to stop,
and as he did not, the accused fired in the air and then at him, causing
his death.
Held: Defense of property is not of such importance as right to
life, and defense of property can be invoked as a justifying circumstance
only when it is coupled with an attack on the person of one entrusted
with said property.
Had the accused, who wanted to stop the thief then approaching
him, been attacked, say with a bolo, by that thief, he would have
been justified in shooting him, if the shotgun was the only available
weapon for his defense.
In such case, there would be unlawful aggression on the part of
the deceased, which is required even in defense of one's property. It
will be noted that in paragraph 1 of Article 11, the opening clause,
which is followed by the enumeration of the three requisites, states:
"anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights." The word
"rights" includes right to property. Hence, all the three requisites of
self-defense, particularly unlawful aggression, must also concur in
defense of property.
Negligence, on the
other hand, is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest
of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which
the circumstances justly demand without which such other person
suffers injury. Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory;
one cannot exist with the other.
The aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle in the commission of the crimes,"
can be considered present because the Biscayne car of Ong was used to trail the
victim's car and to facilitate the commission of the crimes," and the escape of the
accused.
Evident premeditation attended the commission of the crimes, because the accused
meditated, planned, and tenaciously persisted in the accomplishment of the crime.
Accused Ong was given the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and one
analogous to passion and obfuscation" 33 because Chua previously threatened Ong for
non-payment of debt arising from gambling, causing Ong humiliation and shame. 34
Title: People v. Jaime Jose, G.R. No. L-28232
Facts:
On June 26, 1967, four principal-accused Jaime Jose, Basilio Pineda Jr., Eduardo Aquino and
Rogelio Cañal conspired together, confederated with and mutually helped one another, then and
there, to willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design to forcibly abduct Magdalena
“Maggie” dela Riva, 25 years old and single, a movie actress by profession at the time of the
incident, where the four principal accused, by means of force and intimidation using a deadly
weapon, have carnal knowledge of the complainant against her will, and brought her to the
Swanky Hotel in Pasay City, and hence committed the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape.
Having established the element of conspiracy, the trial court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of forcible abduction with rape and sentences each of them to the
death penalty.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court made a proper ruling of the case considering the element of
conspiracy.
Held:
No, the trial court’s ruling was not proper. The SC ruled that since the element of conspiracy was
present, where the act of one is the act of all, each of the accused is also liable for the crime
committed by each of the other persons who conspired to commit the crime. The SC modified
the judgment as follows: appellants Jaime Jose, Basilio Pineda Jr., and Eduardo Aquino are
guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape and each and every one of them is
likewise convicted of three (3) other crimes of rape.
Lomerio
Lucas
The alternative circumstance of relationship is taken into consideration when, as in this case, the victim
is the descendant of the offender [Art. 15, Revised Penal Code]. In crimes against chastity, relationship is
aggravating.
Evident premeditation was attendant where the accused
apprehended the victims about 10 o'clock in the evening
and the crime was consummated at about 1 o'clock early
the following morning. The accused had sufficient time
to meditate and reflect on the consequences of their act.
(People vs. Berdida, No. L-20183, June 30,1966,17 SCRA
520, 530)