CollectiveMemory:The Two Cultures*

JEFFREY K. OLICK
Columbia University

Whatis collectiveaboutcollectivememory? Twodifferentconceptsofcollectivemem-

orycompete-one refersto theaggregationof sociallyframedindividualmemories
and one refersto collectivephenomenasui generis-thoughthedifference is rarely
articulatedin the literature.This articletheorizesthedifferencesand relationsbe-
tweenindividualist and collectivistunderstandingsof collectivememory. Theformer
are open to psychologicalconsiderations, includingneurologicaland cognitivefac-
tors,butneglecttechnologiesof memory otherthanthebrainand thewaysin which
cognitiveand evenneurologicalpatternsare constituted in part by genuinelysocial
processes.The latteremphasizethesocial and culturalpatternings ofpublicand per-
sonal memory, butneglectthewaysin whichthoseprocessesare constituted inpart
bypsychologicaldynamics.Thisarticleadvocates,through theexampleof traumatic
events,a strategyof multidimensional rapprochement betweenindividualistand col-
lectivistapproaches.

Collectivememory, one mightplausiblyargue,oftenplaysan important role in politics

and society.Such claimsare by now commonplacein scholarlyas well as politicaldis-
courses:imagesof theVietnamwarlimitsupportforAmericanmilitary activities;mem-
oriesof theNazi periodconstrain Germanforeignand domesticpolicy;recollections of
dictatorship shape the activitiesof transitional
and posttransitionregimesfromEastern
Europeto LatinAmerica;andWatergate has becometheperennialreference pointforall
subsequentscandalsin Washington, to namejust a fewpossiblesuchhypotheses. Indeed,
the termcollectivememoryhas become a powerfulsymbolof the manypoliticaland
socialtransitionscurrentlyunderway, thoughthereis also somethingbroadlyepochalabout
ourseemingly pervasiveinterest in memory. New regimesseekwaysto "settle"theresi-
dues of theirpredecessors, whileestablishedsystemsface a risein historicalconscious-
ness and increasinglypursuea "politicsof regret." 1
Whateverits sources,theflurry of recentinterestin and use of the termcollective
memoryraisesan important challengeto scholarsinterested in thediversephenomenait
apparently indicates.Before,or at veryleastas partof,offering thekindsof hypotheses
mentioned above,we needto be clearaboutwhatexactlythetermmeans.I do notmean
thatwe need to "operationalize" collectivememorypostivistically in orderto generate
empirically coveringlaws.Rather,I meanthatwe needto inquireintothevalue
verifiable

* Directall correspondence to theauthor,Department of Sociology,324M Fayerweather Hall, ColumbiaUni-

versity,New York,New York,10027 orjko5@Columbia.edu.This articlewas presented at themeetingof the
International of Sociology,Tel Aviv,Israel,July1999,and at themeetingoftheAmericanSociological
Institute
Association,Chicago,Illinois,August1999.I thankJan-Werner Mueller,Ina Mueller-Mack, HowardSchuman,
BarrySchwartz,CharlesTilly,RobinWagner-Pacifici, and HarrisonWhiteforhelpof variouskinds.I particu-
larlyappreciateHowardSchuman'sgenerosity in responseto myanalysisofhis work.
II use thistermtoreferto an historically
specificconstellationofideas aboutcollectivejustice.It seemsthata
generalwillingness to acknowledgehistorical misdeedshas disseminated throughouttheworldrecently, leading
tomoreandmoreofficialandunofficial apologiestobothinternal and,perhapsevenmoresurprisingly, external
victims.An expectation ofacknowledgment hasbecomea decisivefactorinprocessesof"transitional justice"as
well as in domesticand internationalpoliticsmoregenerally.

SociologicalTheory17:3 November1999
C)AmericanSociologicalAssociation.1307 New YorkAvenueNW,Washington,
DC 20005-4701

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334 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

addedby theterm,to specifywhatphenomenathetermsensitizesus to as well as what

kindof a sensitivity
thisis.2
Some criticshave chargedthatcollectivememoryis a poorsubstitute forolderterms
or myth.Gedi andElam (1996:30),forinstance,call itsuse "an act
likepoliticaltradition
of intrusion. . . forcingitselflike a moltenrock into an earlierformation... unavoidably
obliterating Othersworryabouttheleap impliedin adaptinga termthat
finedistinctions."
refersto an individual-levelphenomenon (memory)to thecollectivelevel. Fentressand
Wickham(1992:1), forinstance,are waryof "a conceptof collectiveconsciousnesscuri-
ouslydisconnected fromactualthought processesofanyparticular person,"a concernnot
entirelyunfounded giventheterm'soriginsin theDurkheimian On theother
tradition.
hand,Burke(1989:98) arguesthat"ifwe refuseto use suchterms,we are in dangerof
failingto noticethedifferentwaysin whichtheideas of individualsareinfluenced bythe
groupsto whichtheybelong."
Ourrealconcern,ofcourse,is notwiththetermitself,butwiththewaysin whichsuch
a labelstructures(thatis,bothenablesandconstrains) ourconceptualandempiricalwork.
Whataretheadvantagesanddisadvantages of"collectivememory" incomparison toother
terms,likecommemoration, myth,and so forth?Whatdoes it meanto say that
tradition,
thememoriesof individualsare "influenced" by thegroupsto whichtheybelong?Are
ideas ultimatelyindividual-levelor collective-level
phenomena, or somecombination of
thetwo?Or does thestudyof social memorydemonstrate theuselessnessof thatsortof
distinction?

ORIGINS
Contemporary usagesofthetermcollectivememory arelargely
traceable toEmileDurkheim
([1915] 1961), who wroteextensively in TheElementary FormsofReligiousLifeabout
commemorative rituals,andtohisstudent, MauriceHalbwachs,whopublisheda landmark
studyon The Social Frameworksof Memoryin 1925.3Durkheimand his students, of
course,have oftenbeencriticizedforan organicism thatneglectsdifferenceandconflict.
Indeed,Durkheimdid write"Society"witha capitalS, and collectiverepresentations in
his workdo take on something of a lifeof theirown. Halbwachswas somewhatmore
careful,employing"groups"in place of Durkheim's"Society,"and characterized collec-
tivememoryas plural,showinghow sharedmemoriescan be effective markers of social
differentiation(Coser 1992; Wood 1994).
Nevertheless, thereis, in myreading,an unresolvedtensionbetweenindividualist and
collectiviststrainsrunningthroughHalbwachs'sworkon collectivememory, one that
dependslargelyon thedifferent arguments to whichhe responds.For Halbwachs,who
acceptedDurkheim'scritiqueofphilosophy, studying memory is nota matter ofreflecting
on properties ofthesubjectivemind,as Bergson([1896] 1991) emphasized;rather, mem-
oryis a matter ofhowmindsworktogether in society,howtheiroperations arestructured
by social arrangements: "It is in societythatpeoplenormally acquiretheirmemories.It is
also insocietythattheyrecall,recognize,andlocalizetheirmemories" (Halbwachs[1925]
1992:38).Halbwachsarguedthatitis impossibleforindividuals toremember inanycoher-
entand persistent fashionoutsideof theirgroupcontexts.His favoriteexamplesinclude
theimpossibility ofcertainty regarding particularchildhoodmemories:itis verydifficult,
2Thisdistinction betweenoperationaland sensitizing conceptscomes fromHerbertBlumer(1969:153-82).
Blumersaw "operational" conceptsas delimiting
fixedand measurablephenomena, and "sensitizing"
concepts
as evolvingfieldsofpurviewand modesofperceivinggeneralareasof social process.
3Halbwachs'sStrasbourg colleague,MarcBloch (1925, [1939] 1974),also usedthetermcollectivememory in
1925,as well as in his laterbookon feudalsociety.

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COLLECTIVE MEMORY: THE TWO CULTURES 335

at thelimit,to saywhether whatwe remember is somehowindividualandindependent or

theresultofcues and suggestions givento us by ourfamilies.
However,Halbwachsoffered thesearguments as an analysisof thesocialframeworks
of memory, ratherthanof social memoryper se, and elsewhere(1966) talksaboutthe
distinctionsbetweenindividualandcollectivememory. Halbwachsremindsthatitis only
individualswho remember, even if theydo muchof thisremembering together.Group
memberships providethe materialsformemoryand prodthe individualintorecalling
particular eventsand intoforgetting others.Groupscan evenproducememoriesin indi-
vidualsof eventsthattheynever"experienced" in anydirectsense.Halbwachstherefore
resistedthemoreextremeinternalist subjectivism of Bergson,as well as thecommon-
senseviewofremembering as a purely-perhapsevenparadigmatically-individual affair.
At thesame time,however,he does seemto have preservedthenotionof an individual
memory, howevershapedthatmemoryis by social frameworks and identities.
On theotherhand,thereis a moreradicallycollectivist momentin Halbwachsas well,
largelyin his reactionto Freudand in theattempt to distinguish collectivememory from
history.Freud,providingone of themostimportant theoriesof memoryin Halbwachs's
intellectualuniverse,had arguedthattheindividual'sunconsciousactsas a repository for
all pastexperiences.Forgetting, ratherthanremembering, is whattakesworkin theform
ofrepression andthesubstitution of "screen"memoriesthatblockaccess to moredisturb-
ingones.In contrast, Halbwachsarguedthatmemory is in no waya repository of all past
experiences. Overtime,memories becomegeneralized"imagos,"andsuchimagosrequire
a socialcontextfortheirpreservation. Memories,inthissense,areas muchtheproducts of
thesymbolsand narratives availablepublicly-and of thesocial meansforstoringand
transmitting them-as theyare thepossessionsof individuals. As such,"thereis thusno
pointin seekingwhere... [memories]are preservedin mybrainor in somenookof my
mindto whichI alonehave access: fortheyarerecalledbyme externally, andthegroups
ofwhichI am a partatanygiventimegivemethemeanstoreconstruct them"(Halbwachs
[1925] 1992:38).4
This is themoreauthentically Durkheimian momentin Halbwachs'stheoryof social
memory, in whichimagosare collectiverepresentations sui generis.In contrastto his
discussionofTheSocial Frameworks ofMemory-inwhichwhatindividuals remember is
determined bytheirgroupmemberships butstilltakesplace intheirownminds-in works
like TheLegendaryTopography of theHolyLand and elsewhereHalbwachsfocusedon
publiclyavailablecommemorative symbols,rituals,and technologies.5 This moreDurk-
heimiandiscussionundergirds Halbwachs'scontrastbetween"history"and "collective
memory" notas one betweenpublicandprivatebutas one based on therelevanceof the
pastto thepresent:bothhistory andcollectivememory arepubliclyavailablesocialfacts.
Halbwachsthusalternately referred to autobiographical memory, historicalmemory, his-
tory,andcollectivememory. Autobiographical memory is memory ofthoseeventsthatwe
ourselvesexperience(thoughthoseexperiencesareshapedbygroupmemberships), while
historicalmemoryis memorythatreachesus onlythrough historicalrecords.6Historyis
theremembered pasttowhichwe no longerhavean "organic"relation-thepastthatis no
longeran important partof our lives-while collectivememoryis the activepast that
formsouridentities.

4This statementcan be takenas a powerfulsuggestionthatwe need to inquireintothosetechnologiesof

memory-suchas thearchive,museum,orlibrary-thatarepurelysocial.I willtakeup thispointindetailbelow.
5Fromour presentperspective, of course,notionsof public availabilityare usuallymuchmorecomplex,
allowingfordifferential access and subversivereadings.See Johnson,McLennan,Schwarz,and Sutton(1982).
6Laterresearch(e.g., Schumanand Corning1999) pointsoutthedifferent waysto experiencecontemporary
events-suchas byparticipating inthemdirectly orobserving themthrough massmedia-and thedifferent
ways
suchexperiencesenterintomemory, individualor collective.

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336 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

"Collectivememory"in Halbwachsthusindicatesat leasttwo distinct, and notobvi-

ouslycomplementary, sortsof phenomena:sociallyframedindividualmemoriesand col-
lectivecommemorative andmnemonic
representations traces.Theproblem is thatHalbwachs
doesnotpresent us withanintegrated
paradigm thatidentifies
theuniquestructuresinvolved
in each of theseand showshow theyare related-thoughhe does providesome useful
suggestions Halbwachsis in thissensestilla "nineteenth
on all ofthesematters. century"
theorist,one who sees individual-and collective-level
problemsas problemsof different
orders.In sucha dichotomous worldview,theoptionsaretoemphasizeone ortheother, to
presenta grandtheoryof aggregation and translationbetweenthe"levels,"or to produce
a sometimes productive hodgepodgeofinsights abouta particular
rangeofproblems. This
last,itseemstome,is theroadHalbwachstookinhisseminalworkon collectivememory,
and itis a solutionthat,in myreading,has predominated thefieldsincethen,thoughnot
alwaysin quitesucha felicitousmanner.

TWO CULTURES
The problemis thatthesetwo sortsof phenomenato whichthetermcollectivememory
can refer(in Halbwachsandin general)seemtobe ofradicallydistinct ontologicalorders
andto requiredifferent epistemologicaland methodological strategies. Andyetprecisely
thiskindofclarityhas beenmissingfromtherather indiscriminate (in thetruesenseofthe
word)usage of collectivememory.7 Collectivememoryhas beenused to referto aggre-
gatedindividualrecollections, to officialcommemorations, to collectiverepresentations,
and to disembodiedconstitutive featuresof sharedidentities; it is said to be locatedin
dreamyreminiscence, personaltestimony, oral history,tradition, myth,style,language,
art,popularculture,and thebuiltworld.Whatis to be gained,and whatis to be lost,by
callingall ofthese"collectivememory"? PierreNora(1992)-one ofthemostprominent
practitioners inthefieldofsocialmemory studies(OlickandRobbins1998)-for instance,
attempts to identifyall of whathe calls lieuxde me'moire (realmsof memory)in French
society;theresultrunsto sevenvolumes-includingentrieson "Vichy,""RightandLeft,"
"Divisionsof Time and Space," "The Land," "StreetNames,""Gastronomy," "Bastille
Day,""JoanofArc,"and"The FrenchLanguage,"raisingthequestionofwhatis nota lieu
de me'moire. The same maybe said of collectivememory:sincesocial actionand social
production takeplace withcapacitiesandmaterials handeddownfromthepast,collective
memory becomessynonymous withpattern-maintenance perse.
Nevertheless, even if we restrict
thetermcollectivememoryto explicitlycommemo-
rativeactivitiesand productions-apopularanalyticalstrategy-theproblemremains-
andremains unarticulated-of choosingbetweenindividualistic orcollectivisticprocedures.
Thisis becausetworadicallydifferent conceptsofcultureareinvolvedhere,one thatsees
cultureas a subjectivecategoryof meaningscontainedin people'smindsversusone that
sees cultureas patterns ofpubliclyavailablesymbolsobjectified in society.Each ofthese
cultureconceptsentailsdifferent methodological strategiesandproducesdifferent kindsof
knowledge.In orderto be as clearas possibleaboutthesensitivities ofthetermcollective
memory, we needtounderstand exactlyhowthesetwocultureconceptsplayout.Whatthe
hypotheses abouttheroleofmemory in politicsI beganwithmean,forinstance,depends
fundamentally on how we conceptualizethephenomenon, on whatkindof a processor
thingwe thinkthiscollectivememoryis.
In thiseffort,we have an advantagebecausejust sucha discussionhas alreadytaken
place in debateoverthemeaningoftheterm"politicalculture."Indeed,scholarly workon

7Therearenowseveralreviewsofthecollectivememory See especiallyOlickandRobbins(1998),

literature.
Thelen(1989), Kammen(1995), and Zelizer(1995).

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COLLECTIVE MEMORY: THE TWO CULTURES 337

collectivememory can be seenas partofthefieldofpoliticalcultureresearchinsofaras it

is concernedwiththeculturalconstitution of politicalidentitiesand activities.The term
politicalcultureis perhapsmostwidelyknownfroma lineof workon politicaldevelop-
mentbegunin the 1950s and 1960s by politicalscientists GabrielAlmond,Lucien Pye,
andSidneyVerba,amongothers.Therethetermwas usedtoreferto aggregate patterns of
psychologicalorientations towardpoliticaloutcomes(AlmondandVerba1963, 1980). In
perhapsthemostfamousworkin thistradition, Almondand Verba(1963) hypothesized
thata distinctset of subjectiveorientations-what theycalled "the civic culture"-is
essentialforgenerating and maintaining democratic politicalinstitutions.
Politicalculturetheorists inthistradition thusrefertocultureinthesenseofa nurturant
environment ratherthanin thesenseofpubliclyavailableideas and symbols.Theythere-
foredevelopandemploymethods-primarily surveyresearch-todiscoverandaggregate
thehiddensourcesof social patterns in people'sheads. Politicalcultureanalysisin this
view is a kindof collectivepoliticalpsychology: individualisticin bothitspoliticsandin
its ontology,it identifiesthe black box of humanmindsas the sourceof institutional
outcomes.Politicalcultureandotherphenomena likepublicopinionarenothing morethan
theattitudes andopinionsofindividuals addedup intogeneralpictures. To be sure,macro-
social and "objective"variablesinfluence thosedispositions, buttheyarebyno meansto
be seenas sui generis.Thoughitposes itsbehavioral(thatis, purelyobservational) meth-
ods as a "scientific"responsetopoliticalphilosophy, thereis thusa greatdeal ofontology
impliedininterpreting surveydataeitheras an indicator ofculturalstructures,orindeedas
theculturalstructure itself.
In recentyears,interpretive social scientists,manyof themcomingout of theDurk-
heimiantradition, have reinvented theconceptof politicalculture(Baker 1990; Berezin
1994; Brint1994;Hunt1984; Somers1995; OlickandLevy 1997). In contrast bothto the
politicalcultureworkjust discussedas well as to variousinstrumentalist strategies that
dismissedculturaldimensions ofpolitics,newpoliticalcultureanalysisdefinesculturenot
narrowlyas subjectivevalues or attitudes butbroadlyas thesymbolicdimensionof all
social situations.
Culturehereis regardedas intersubjective (or evenas objective)and as
embodiedin symbolismand patternsof meaning.Rejectingtheassociationof political
culturewithcollectivepoliticalpsychology, new politicalculturetheoryhighlights the
discursivedimensions ofpolitics,seeingpoliticallanguage,symbolism, andclaim-making
as constitutiveofinterests andidentities. Politicalculture,as newlyconceived,is thusthe
symbolicstructuring of politicaldiscourse,and the analysisof politicalcultureis the
attempt to understand thepatterns andlogicsofthatdiscourse.Politicalculturecan there-
forebe measuredonlycrudelybysurveyanalysis;instead,itmustbe excavated,observed,
andinterpreted on itsowntermsas culture(OlickandLevy 1997).Attheveryleast,there
is an ontologicalhiatusbetweensurveydata and politicalculture,betweenaggregated
opinionsand "publicopinion."8

COLLECTED VERSUS COLLECTIVE MEMORY

This debateovertheconceptof politicalculture-andovertheappropriate for
strategies
studyingit-is directlygermaneto thepresentquestionof collectivememory:thesame
two conflicting
cultureconceptsunderliethevarietiesof workon collectivememoryas
8Theseissuesgo back at leastas faras Rousseau,who attempted to distinguish
betweenthe"willof all" (the
unanimity of individualpreferences)
and the"generalwill" (thebestinterests
of thecollectivity).
Durkheim, of
course,was powerfully influenced by Rousseau'scommunitarianism. In morecontemporary discussions,work
on publicopinionalso conceptualizesan ontologicaldistinction
betweentheaggregation of individualopinions
and publicopinionperse. See Blumer(1969:195ff.),Herbst(1993), and Noelle-Neumann (1984).

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338 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

well,thoughthepractitioners kindsof workon collectivememoryhave not

of different
joined thefrayin thismanner.Social memorystudiesforma nonparadigmatic, transdis-
centerlessenterprise,
ciplinary, and workin differenthistorical, and disci-
geographical,
plinarycontextsproceedslargelyindependently ofworkin othersuchcontexts(Olickand
Robbins1998). Therehas to datebeen verylittlein theway of conceptualand method-
ologicaldiscourseon collectivememory;althoughsome veryusefulinsightshave been
developedwithinthedifferent contexts,thisworkhas-from a systematic, "scientific"
pointof view-been a ratherunproductive hodgepodge.In theremainderof thisarticle,
therefore, betweentwo basic conceptsof "collectivememory"at this
I will distinguish
fundamental level,neitherto argueforoneovertheothernortodenytheirrealdifferences,
butas a productive prolegomenon theirrelations.
to understanding

CollectedMemory
The firstkindof collectivememoryis thatbased on individualistic principles:theaggre-
gatedindividualmemoriesofmembers ofa group.9Surely,workofthissortdoes notpre-
cludethatsometransformations mayoccurwhenindividual memories areaggregated,through
theactivitieseitherofthepeopleinvolvedorofthesocial scientists "collecting"or "mea-
suring"theirmemories.Butthefundamental presumptionhereis thatindividualsarecen-
tral:onlyindividualsremember, thoughtheymaydo so aloneortogether, andanypublicly
availablecommemorative symbolsareinterpretable onlytothedegreetowhichtheyelicita
reactionin somegroupofindividuals. Thisontologyofmemory does notexcludethepos-
sibilitythatdifferent
rememberers arevalueddifferentlyinthegroup,thatthememories of
somecommandmoreattention thanthoseofothers, butsomeoftheresearchstrategies here
function eithertechnicallydemocratically (surveysthatassignthesamevalueto everyre-
spondent)orevenredistributively (suchas oralhistoryprojects,whichoftenaimatrecov-
eringthelostorneglectedmemoriesofthosewhohavebeendisenfranchised).10
FromthepointofviewofwhatI wouldcall this"collected"memory approach,notions
ofcollectivememory as objectivesymbolsordeepstructures thattranscend theindividual
riskslippingintoa metaphysics of groupmind.Thereis no doubt,fromthisperspective,
thatsocialframeworks shapewhatindividuals remember, butultimatelyitis onlyindivid-
uals who do the remembering. And sharedsymbolsand deep structures are onlyreal
insofaras individuals(albeitsometimesorganizedas membersof groups)treatthemas
suchorinstantiate theminpractice.It does notmakesensefroman individualist's pointof
view to treatcommemorative objects,symbols,or structures as havinga "life of their
own": onlypeoplehave lives.
One advantageof the collectedmemoryapproachis thatit can avoid manyof the
potentialreificationsand politicalbiases of approachesthatbeginwithcollectivities and
theircharacteristics.
First,as alreadymentioned, accountsofthecollectivememory ofany
groupor societyare usuallyaccountsof thememoriesof some subsetof thegroup,par-
ticularlyof thosewithaccess to themeansof culturalproduction or whoseopinionsare

9The mostsignificantsociologicalexamplesof thiskindof workcome fromHowardSchumanand various

colleagues,who employsurveyresearchto measuregenerational effectsand knowledgeof historicalevents
nationalpopulations.
acrossdifferent See SchumanandScott(1989), SchumanandRieger(1992), Schumanand
Corning(1999), andSchuman,Belli,andBischoping(1997), as wellas theotheressaysinPennebaker, Paez, and
Rime(1997). See also Vinitzky-Seroussi(1998), whoapproachescollectivememory through "autobiographical
occasions,"highschoolreunionsin particular. HistoriansRoy Rosenzweigand David Thelen(1998) also use
surveyresearchas well as depthinterviewing to producean aggregatepictureof whatI am callingAmerican
"collected"memory. The individualistorientationof thisworkis clearwhentheyquoteCarl Becker'sfamous
essay,"Everyman his Own Historian"(citedin Rosenzweigand Thelen1998:178).
'0Bothsurveyresearchers and oral historians, theirsamples,and oftenfocuson the
of course,can partition
differences
betweeneliteand popularattitudes (Converse1964).

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