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Beyond "State vs.
Society": Theories of the State and New Deal Agricultural Policies

Author(s): Jess Gilbert and Carolyn Howe
Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 56, No. 2 (Apr., 1991), pp. 204-220
Published by: American Sociological Association
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BEYOND "STATE VS. SOCIETY": THEORIES OF THE STATE AND
NEW DEAL AGRICULTURAL POLICIES*
JEssGILBERT CAROLYN
HowE
Universityof Wisconsin College of the Holy Cross
Political sociologists studying social classes, state structures, and public policies are en-
gaged in a debate between "society-centered"and "state-centered"theories. We challenge
the state-centeredapproach by analyzing the interrelationshipof state and society,focusing
on the convergence of state institutionalcapacity and class capacity. We explore the social
origins of state-building in U.S. agriculture and show the historical class biases of state
agriculturalinstitutions.Throughan examinationof the majorNewDealfarm policy themes,
particularly the rise andfall of reformin theAgriculturalAdjustmentAdministration and the
Resettlement/FarmSecurity Administration,we demonstrate the interdependenceof state
and society. We analyze statelsociety relations as they affected each agency and examine
class conflict both within and beyond the state. Instead of assuming the separation of the
state and social forces, we investigate how they interact to shape policy.
T he social andeconomicpolicies of the New lenged (Finegold 1981; Skocpol and Finegold
Deal offer rich empirical grounding for 1982; Finegold and Skocpol 1980, 1984; Wier
currentdebatesin politicalsociologybetweenso- and Skocpol 1985;Hooks 1990).
called "society-centered"and "state-centered" We believe this argumenthas been too one-
perspectives.1The basic theoreticalissue con- sided. We thereforefocus on the uneven devel-
cernsthe relationshipamongsocial classes, state opmentof bothstatestructuresandclass capaci-
structures, and public policies. Skocpol and ties as theyconvergedin the 1930s.Afteroutlin-
Amenta(1986,p. 136)heldthatautonomousstate ing recent theories of the state and reviewing
factorsareoften"morecausallysignificant"than state-centeredinterpretations of New Deal agri-
class factors.In discussionsof New Deal agriculturalpolicy, we offerourown theoreticalsyn-
culturalpolicy, whichhasemergedas a key case, thesis of the "statevs. society"debate.We then
such "state-centered"analyses remain unchal- examinethe institutionalcapacitiesof the state,
* detailing agriculturalstate-buildingbefore the
Direct correspondenceto Jess Gilbert, Depart-
ment of RuralSociology, 340 AgricultureHall, Uni-
New Deal and showing how this development
versity of Wisconsin-Madison,Madison,WI 53706 cementeda state/societyrelationshipthatfavored
or Carolyn Howe, Departmentof Sociology, Holy the dominantclass. We also identifythe capaci-
Cross College, Box 65A, Worchester,MA 01610. ties of dominant and subordinateagricultural
Both authorscontributedequally to this article;the classes, whichvariedby regionin the 1930sand
orderingof our names is alphabetical.We thankthe stimulateda New Deal in agriculture.In thefinal
following people for comments on earlierversions: section,we analyzethe dominantpolicy themes
Bill Friedland,HarrietFriedmann,GaryGreen,Rog- of the New Deal, focusingon the rise andfall of
ers Hollingsworth,Greg Hooks, Bob Jessop, Rogers reformin the AgriculturalAdjustmentAdminis-
Johnson,LaneKenworthy,JoleenKirschenman,Dan
trationand the Resettlement/Farm SecurityAd-
Kleinman, David Lachman, Jerry Lembcke, Scott
McNall, Max Pfeffer, Rachel Schurman, Spencer ministration.Each agency is treatedin termsof
Wood, BrigitteYoung, membersof the Universityof the convergenceof institutionalandclass capac-
Wisconsin-MadisonDepartmentof Sociology's So- ities. We arguethatstate-centeredtheoristsdis-
cial OrganizationColloquium,and several ASR re- regard the interrelation of state and society; in
viewers. We appreciatefinancial supportfrom the
GraduateSchool and the AgriculturalExperiment theoristshave adoptedthatlabel for themselves,they
Station(USDA HatchGrants2554 and3395), bothof aretheones who referto worksby McConnell([1953]
UW-Madison, and from the Holy Cross College 1969), pluralists,power structureresearchers,and
BachelorFordSummerFacultyFellowship.We also Marxistsas "society-centered."A carefulreadingof
thankNancy Carlislefor typingthe paper. many of these theoriesreveals more complex analy-
l We say "so-called"because,while state-centered ses thanadmittedby state-centeredadvocates.
204 AmericanSociological Review, 1991,Vol. 56 (April:204-220)
BEYOND STATE VS. SOCIETY 205
viewing the state as an independententity,they struggles(see Skocpol 1980, 1985). State-cen-

fail to see how it is relatedto the wider society. teredanalystshave examinedNew Deal agricul-
Further,they oversimplify societal forces and turalpolicy extensively;it remainstheirstrongest
ignoreclass conflictwithinandbeyondthe state. empirical case (Finegold 1981; Finegold and
State and society are interdependent,and must Skocpol1980,1984; SkocpolandFinegold1982;
be analyzedas such. Weir and Skocpol 1985;Hooks 1990).
SkocpolandFinegold's(1982) analysisof the
THE "STATEVS. SOCIETY"DEBATEAND New Deal comparedthe NationalRecoveryAd-
NEW DEAL AGRICULTURALPOLICY ministration(NRA) for industryand the Agri-
culturalAdjustmentAdministration (AAA).They
Since the mid-1970s, Marxistpolitical sociolo- arguedthatwhile the U.S. stategenerallylacked
gists have held thatthe stateis an institutionthat autonomyin the 1930s, the AAA was an excep-
is bothconstrainedby thestructural requirements tion. They held thatthe statehad developedsuf-
of capitalismand shapedby concreteclass de- ficient institutionalcapacity throughthe land-
mands(Offe 1974;Esping-Andersen,Friedland, grantcollegesandU.S. Department of Agriculture
and Wright 1976; Block 1977, 1980; Therborn (USDA) to design and successfully implement
1978;Poulantzas1978;Wright1978;Harrington the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.
1983; Jessop 1985; cf. Lindblom 1977). They Throughthe priorhistoryof institution-building
emphasizethe role of class strugglein forming within the USDA (particularlythe Extension
and transformingstate policies and institutions. Service and the Bureau of AgriculturalEco-
However, these theoristsrecognize both the ir- nomics), a process of political learninghad oc-
reducibilityof stateinstitutionsto classforcesand cuffed. The basic idea behindthe AAA - vol-
the effect that state structureshave on society. untaryproductioncontrols to raise farm prices
They also criticizea "statism"wherebygovern- - was developedby "state-broken" agricultural
mentbureaucraciesandpoliticalelites appearas economists.SkocpolandFinegold(1982, p. 260)
autonomousagents,isolatedfromsociety.Instead, arguedthat since the economists proposedthe
they see states in relationto class actors;class legislation themselves (indeed, major farm or-
relationsare concentratedin and throughstate ganizations offered other policies), they were
institutions.The state thus contains systematic autonomousfrom social forces.
institutionalbiasesorstructuralprivilegesin favor Unlike the AAA, the NRA was not housed in
of certainclasses and againstothers.However, an existing agency like the Departmentof Com-
hegemonyis never guaranteedto the privileged merce.New Deal industrialpolicywas developed
class, precisely because the state is a terrainof and directedby self-interestedbusiness leaders.
strugglethatmodifies as well as reflectsthe rel- Despite upper-classdominanceof the NRA, the
ative power (balance)of class forces. This theo- New Deal led to "unwantedoutcomes"for the
reticalpositionhas not beenappliedto New Deal capitalists, including "losing power to labor
farmpolicy;we integrateit intoouranalysisbelow. unions."However,the less organized"commer-
In the 1980s, Skocpol and associates devel- cial farmers"wereableto "beatbackall challeng-
oped a state-centeredchallengeto existing state es fromtheagricultural underclasses"andgainan
theories.They showed that states are not mere enduring niche within the government. The
reflectionsof social classes but ratherhave their AAA's successis notattributable to the"demands,
own structuresandcapacitiesthataffect society. the organization,or the class economicpowerof
They presentedthe stateas an organizerof class socialgroups";rather,it succeededbecauseof the
interestsand stressedthe role of key policy in- state's autonomous capacity to use its "own
tellectuals and bureaucrats.According to this knowledgeable administrativeorganizations"
perspective,statemanagerscreateandimplement establishedthroughyearsof institution-building
policies stemmingfromtheirown experttraining (Skocpol andFinegold 1982, pp. 258-61).
and commitmentto publicserviceratherthanin While state-centeredtheoristshave given us
response to pressuresfrom social forces. The valuable insights into institution-buildingand
state-centeredapproachrejectsthe pluralistview varying state capacities,they have done so by
that the state is a neutralarenaopen to societal virtuallyneglectingthe social forces within and
influence,the power structureview thata ruling beyond the state that influence those develop-
class governsthroughthe state,and the Marxist ments. Agriculturaleconomistsdid develop the
perspectivethatthe stateis shapedby eitherthe AAA's productioncontrolscheme, yet Skocpol
structuralrequirementsof capitalism or class and Finegold(1982) overlookedthe class biases
206 AMERICANSOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
builtintotheplanandminimizedtheroleof class power-playsas an explanationfor the BAE's de-

forces in bringingit about.They scarcelymen- motion, Hooks downplays societal factors and
tioned the historicaldominant-classorientation looks only at the FarmBureau.He then claims
of the stateagenciesgoverningagriculture.This that "the actions of the [FarmBureau]and its
omission becomes more importantwhen ana- Congressionalallies werenot responsiblefor the
lyzing the AAA's implementation.Skocpol and declineof theBAE"(Hooks1990,p. 38). Hooks's
Finegold confused two very differenttypes of own historicalsourcescould not disagreemore.2
policy elites: agriculturaleconomistswho origi- In our view, bureaucraticdecisionswere impor-
natedthe productioncontrolplan and conserva- tant,but to discountthe role of the FarmBureau
tive agribusinessmenwho dominatedthe AAA's andCongressis simplywrong.As themostrecent
implementationand gave it an explicit class treatmentof the "statevs. society"debate,it is
content.By not analyzingthe differentclass in- unfortunatethatHooks's insightsultimatelyre-
terestsadvancedby each, they conflatethe two inforcethe dichotomy.We arguethatthe oppo-
groups as the state's "agriculturalexperts"and sitionis a false one.
misinterpretthe AAA's class resultsas "surpris- In the remainderof this paperwe clarifyhow
ing" (Skocpol and Finegold 1982, p. 259), even the stateand society are interrelatedby examin-
ironicandunintended(Finegold1981, p. 26; Fi- ing variationswithinNew Deal agriculturalpol-
negoldandSkocpol1980).Furthermore, thestate- icies both over time and across agencies. We
centeredanalysts'concepts("commercialfarm- synthesizepositive aspectsof the state-centered
er"and "underclass")aretoo imprecisetheoret- case withthecontributionsof recentMarxistthe-
ically to explainthe actualdynamicsof the New ory. While state institutionsand class relations
Deal years. can be analyticallyseparate,the formerare part
Hooks's (1990) recent account differs from of the whole society andthusreflect,shape,and
Skocpol's and her associates'primarilythrough containsocialrelations.Similarly,class relations
its more historicaltreatmentof changesin New arein partconstitutedby the state.Ourargument
Deal agencies, examininghow and when state centers on state institutional capacities and social
autonomyoccurs.Inallcrucialrespects,however, class capacitiesthat convergedto producethe
Hooks's analysisis anotherstate-centeredtreat- specific outcomesof the 1930s. Institutionalca-
ment of the New Deal. His disagreementwith pacitiesincludestructuralmaturityand efficacy
Skocpoland associatesis empirical,not theoret- - to implementeffectively both policy objec-
ical, and he furtherreifies the state/societydis- tives and specific programs.The capacity of a
tinction. Hooks (1990, pp. 32-35) challenges state institutionis affected by the timing of its
Skocpol and Finegold's (1982) claims that the own historical development, the social forces
AAA lost autonomyin the late 1930s and that influencing its creation,and its specific struc-
the statewas autonomousonly in agriculture;he ture.Newerinstitutional structurestendto be more
showsthattheUSDA's successfuleffortsat state- vulnerableto influence from the oppositional
buildingin the latter 1930s were closely linked classes;olderstructurestendto be moreresistant
to developmentsin the Executive branch.The to such influences.3Class capacitiesare defined
USDA's abilityto increaseits controlover agri- 2 For example, while quoting
culturalpolicy was tied both to its priorhistory Kirkendallthat Sec-
retaryof Agriculture"Wickard'srole was crucial,"
of institution-building and to Executiveefforts. Hooks (1990, p. 36) omits Kirkendall's(1966, pp.
Despite disclaimers to the contrary(Hooks 195-238) broaderdiscussionof the importantrole of
1990, pp. 32, 41), Hooks repeatedlysets up a the FarmBureauin the attackon the BAE. See also
simpledichotomyin whichexplanationsareeither Campbell(1962, pp. 177-94).
state-centeredor society-centered(pp. 32-40). In 3 By structuralmaturitywe suggestthatthe longer
his analysis,it is always the former.He fails to an institutionhas been in existence, the more imper-
see the contributionthatbothfactorsmustmake meableit is to structuralchanges.This does not mean
to any satisfactoryaccountof New Deal agricul- thatdramatichistoricalevents can't weakenolder in-
turalpolicies. For example,in 1938, the Bureau stitutions;rather,newerones aresimplymorevulner-
of AgriculturalEconomics (BAE) became the able. A "mature"institutionis able to draw upon
agencies and resourcesthatallow it to be more effi-
central planning agency of the USDA. In the cient andeffective in its operation,partlybecause,as
early 1940s, a new Secretaryof Agricultureat- Skocpol and Finegold (1982, pp. 276-77) say, state
temptedto consolidatehis power by demoting managersdevelopa degreeof "politicalleading" from
the influentialBAE (Hooks 1990,p. 36). By giv- their experience. An efficacious agency is one that
ing causal primacy to internal administrative can develop and implement policies quickly, effi-
as the ability of particularclasses or class seg- THE DEVELOPMENTOF UNEVEN

ments to obtain the outcomes they desire. The INSTITUTIONALAND CLASS
capacitiesof classes to act in their interestsde- CAPACITIES
pendslargelyon theirorganizationalstrengthand
resources in relation to those of other classes. We examinethe developmentof capacitiesboth
These areaffectedby how intensivelythey have within agriculturalstate institutionsand among
organizedthe humanand financialresourcesof farmingclasses - capacitiesthat convergedto
their potentialmembers,how extensively they shape New Deal farm policy. First,the USDA/
have organizedin a geographicalsense, andhow land-grantcomplex developedin a way thatin-
hegemonictheirideologicaland politicalvision creasedthe capacityof the dominantfarmclass-
is (Therborn1983; Lembcke 1988). es and structurallyprivileged them within the
Our model is exemplified by the late nine- state. Our dispute with state-centeredtheorists
teenth-centuryU.S. Departmentof Agriculture, concernstheirclaimthattheAAA was aninstance
which was open to influencefromboth subordi- of "state autonomy" and that state managers
nate and dominantclasses. Early on, however, createdand implementedpolicies "independent
the orientationof USDA officials to a scientific of social groups"(Hooks 1990, p. 32; Skocpol
agricultureled them to structuralties with the andFinegold1982).Rather,ourhistoricalreview
most prosperous farmers. By the 1930s, the of these institutions suggests "a blurring of
USDA was moreresponsiveto thedominantfarm boundariesbetweenstateand society"(Quadag-
classes, andits AgriculturalAdjustmentAdmin- no 1987, p. 119).
istrationwas relativelyresistantto pressuresfrom Second,we outlinethe diverseclass structures
the subordinateclasses. The ResettlementAd- of the threemajoragriculturalregions, showing
ministration,on the other hand, a new agency that simple referenceto "commercialfarmers"
housed outside the USDA, was created in re- andan"underclass" (SkocpolandFinegold1982,
sponse to subordinateclass influences and ad- p. 258) is an inadequateconceptualizationof
ministrators'concernswith ruralreform.How- complex societal forces. In addition,these agri-
ever, because of its newness and the precarious culturalregionsfaced seriousunrestin the early
balanceof power betweendominantand subor- 1930s. This threatof disruption,combinedwith
dinate classes, it was vulnerableto challenges widespreadorganizingin agricultureand indus-
fromthe dominantclasses. try, led to a shift in the balanceof class power.
It is thus the convergence of the state factor - The importanceof these social forces in creating
institutionalcapacity- andthe societyfactor- a needforgovernmentinterventionin agriculture
class capacitythat must be examinedto ad- is downplayedby state-centeredtheorists.
vance our empiricaland theoreticalunderstand-
ing of the state.Furthermore, it is theirmutually
InstitutionalCapacities:AgriculturalState-
shapingrelationshipthat determinesthe nature BuildingbeforetheNew Deal
of thesefactors.The state-centered approachrests
on a partialand one-sidedreadingof the histori- The context within which the institutionalcom-
cal record.We need insteadto graspthe interre- plex of agriculturedevelopedis crucial.The U.S.
lationof stateand society. Department of Agricultureandthestateland-grant
ciently, and smoothly. This does not mean that the colleges arose duringthe Civil War,following a
institutionis autonomousfromclass forces. An insti- periodof class strugglewithinagriculture.These
tution'sorganizationalstructurecan be responsiveor institutionswerecreatedin a progressiveclimate,
nonresponsiveto influence"frombelow." It can de- andtheircreationwas a victoryfor smallfarmers.
rive its strengthfrommembershipparticipation(more The USDA and the land-grantagricultural
participatory)or primarilyfrom financial resources collegesworkedtogetheras institutions to develop
anddonations(less participatory).Whetherorganiza-
tions develop participatoryor nonparticipatory struc- agriculture.The formerwas createdlargely as a
tureshas political implicationsthataffect the institu- resultof agitationby anassociationof farmgroups
tion'sresponsivenessto subordinate groups.Inthecase calledtheUnitedStatesAgriculturalSociety.The
of nonparticipatory structures,the class or groupthat departmentwas one of the first fruitsof the alli-
wields powerat the outsetwill likely shapethe direc- ance between newly-elected PresidentLincoln
tion of that organizationindefinitely,commensurate Protestand
with its powerwithinsociety. Insightinto these orga- and the farmerswho supportedhim.
nizational dynamics comes from Lembcke (1988), lobbyingby theNationalGrangeandtheFarmers'
Lembcke and Howe (1986), Offe and Wiesenthal Alliance helped elevate the USDA to cabinet
(1980), and Therborn(1983). statusin 1889 (Baker 1939). The state colleges
wereoriginallyteachinginstitutions; 25 yearslater Chamberof Commercein New York set up an

CongressaddedresearchunitscalledAgricultural agencyto sponsora countydemonstrationagent
ExperimentStations.Withan orientationtoward and called it a "farmbureau."The name stuck,
scientific agriculture,most of the researchcon- even after Smith-Leverfederalizedthe agents.
ductedin the stateExperimentStationsbenefited From 1914 on, Extension agents organized
primarilylargerandwealthierfarmers(Rosenberg thousandsof farmersinto farmbureausto help
1978, pp. 170-76). them work more effectively with local farmers.
The agriculturaleducationleaders "strongly Theselocal organizationssoonbeganassociating
partookof the ideological suppositionsof the at the state level. In 1919-1920 the American
existingorder"(McConnell[1953] 1969,p. 23). FarmBureauFederationwas founded,"a direct
They believed that farmersshould mediate the outgrowthof the county agent system"(McCo-
class conflict between capital and labor. From nnell 1969, p. 48). A governmentbureaucracy
the outset,concernsaboutclass conflict and the - the Extension Service - had suddenly created
developmentof a particular(scientific)form of the largestandmost powerful"private"farmor-
agricultureshapedthe mission of these statein- ganizationin the country.In manyinstances,the
stitutions.Society-centeredfactors- social dis- county agents became publicly-paidorganizers
ruptionand economic change - help explain of the FarmBureau(McConnell1969, p. 47).
the origins of these institutions;state-centered The strengthof the FarmBureauby the early
factorscome intoplay as intellectualswithinthe 1930s accountsin partfor the absence of a na-
institutions developed their own agendas for tionwide, progressive farm organization.The
solving agriculturalproblems.Those agendas, earlyFarmBureau,with USDA support,under-
however,were developedwithin the context of minedpotentiallypowerfulradicalfarmgroups
late nineteenth-centuryindustrialdevelopment. such as the NonpartisanLeagueandthe Farmer-
The particularproblemsthe intellectualstriedto LaborParty.These lattergroupssoughtto help
solve dependedon the vulnerabilityof theirin- farmers defend against powerful agribusiness
stitutionsto social pressuresas well as theirown intereststhroughstateownership(of banks,rail-
class biases, shapedby the "ideologicalsupposi- roads,andgranaries)andpoliticalorganizations
tions" of the time: scientism,privateproperty, unitingfarmersand workers.The FarmBureau,
andlaissez-fairecapitalism. appealingto the propertyinterestsof farmers,
The interpenetration of stateandsocietyis no- offered instead a comprehensivebusiness-ori-
wherebetterexemplifiedthanin the creationof ented ideology (Howe 1986, p. 133). The class
anotherpartof the land-grantsystem:the Agri- capacities of smaller and poorerfarmerswere
culturalExtensionService. Extensiongrew out ultimatelyno matchfor the powerfulAmerican
of theeducationaleffortsof countydemonstration FarmBureauFederation.
agentswho were fundedby the Rockefeller-en- Second,creationof the countyExtensionSer-
dowed GeneralEducationBoard,Chambersof vice set in place an institutionalstructurethat
Commerce, and local business communities. linked the federal government with the most
Countyagentsdemonstratedthe effectivenessof prosperousfarmersat the local level. Through
new farmingmethodson willing farmers'land. the FarmBureau'sties to Extension,largerand
Believingthata prosperouscountrydependedon wealthierfarmershad privileged access to the
prosperityin agriculture,theAmericanBankers' state. In the 1930s, the FarmBureau/Extension
Association sought to help farmers become relationshipprecludedthe developmentof alter-
"'more successfulproducers,a bettercreditrisk, native structuresfor implementingthe Agricul-
and a more contentedand prosperouspeople"' tural AdjustmentAct - structuresthat might
(McConnell 1969, p. 31). Lobbyists for such have been moreresponsiveto populardemands.
businessassociationshelpedpass the Smith-Le- As the state's institutional capacity created and
ver ExtensionAct of 1914, establishingthe offi- built the Farm Bureau, it simultaneously
cial countyagentsystemwithfundingandspon- strengthened the class capacity of those large
sorship from business organizations and the farmerswho werebest able to takeadvantageof
USDA (Baker1939;McConnell1969, p. 45). Extension.
The importanceof the countyagentsystemfor In summary,the USDA/land-grantcomplex
our thesis is twofold.First,the rise of Extension developedin a way that increasedthe class ca-
includes a remarkablestory of public/private pacity of the dominantfarm classes, subverted
cooperationin institution-building thatshowsthe that of oppositional groups, and structurally
interaction of state and society. In 1911, a privilegedthe formerwithinthe state.Whenthe
AgriculturalAdjustmentAct was passedin 1933, took place from 1930 to 1932, three involving
theinstitutionalstructurewas in place,as Skocpol over 1,000 workers.The next year, when the
andFinegold(1982) claimed,to createan effec- New Deal began,therewere37 farmlaborstrikes
tive new agency. The USDA could drawon its in California.These culminatedwith the "great-
own Bureauof Agricultural Economics,theland- est single strikein the historyof agriculturalla-
grant colleges, the Extension Service, and the bor relationsin America"(Daniel 1981, p. 165):
quasi-publicFarm Bureau for trained,willing the cotton strike of 1933 that involved 18,000
leaderscapableof creatingandimplementingits workers.Daniel (1981, p. 175) concluded that
policies.Yet ourpointremains:Thedevelopment the New Deal "could hardly ignore the active
of statecapacitycannotbe separatedfrom class and militantlabormovementamong California
capacitiesandthebalanceof class forces;in turn, farm workers in mid-1933." Nor could the
class capacitiesare shapedby the state. growers.The CaliforniaChamberof Commerce
formed the Associated Farmersto fight union-
ization.Theorganizationinitiatedphysicalattacks
Class Capacities:ThreeRegionalStructuresin
on strikersand receivedinformationon militant
U.S. Agriculture
farm workers from state government offices
Contrary to Skocpol and Finegold's (1982) (Jamieson1945; Majkaand Majka 1982). Both
treatment,therewas no common type of "com- classes in capitalistagriculturehada high degree
mercialfarm"in the 1930s. Rather,each major of unityandconsciousnessof theirdivergentin-
U.S. agriculturalregion had its own distinctive terests.
class structureorientedtowardcommercialpro- The class structurein southernagriculture,es-
duction:plantationsharecroppingin the South, pecially the "Cotton Belt," involved planter-
capitalistagriculturein the Pacific West (Cali- landlordsand landlesstenantsor sharecroppers.
fornia particularly),and family farming in the TheDepression-eraplantationownerswerequite
Midwest, Plains, and Northeast (Kirby 1987; consciousof theirclassinterestsandpursuedthem
Pfeffer 1983). The naturalconstraintsimposed vigorously-- most clearlyin relationto the two
by agriculturalproductioninteractedwith dif- majortenantunions. After organizingthe Ala-
ferentforms of laborto yield these threemodal bama Sharecroppers'Union in 1931, several
systems,each with its own dominantand subor- African-Americanswere killed. The union later
dinateclassinterests.Agriculturalpolicythushad called a strikeand the "strugglesoon developed
to deal withextremelydivergentinterestsamong into a miniaturecivil war" (Jamieson 1945, p.
farmers,but, as we have seen, the existing state 299). The Southern Tenant Farmers' Union,
institutionsalreadyhad a structuralbias. New though, was the major organizingeffort in the
Dealers themselves recognized this. A leading region. Foundedby black and white farmersin
New Dealer, RexfordTugwell, early on linked Arkansasin 1934, three years later it claimed
"the Land GrantCollege system with its State 30,000membersin six states.Theplantersreacted
Extension Directors and corps of County violently.The unioncalled one periodin 1935 a
Agents ... with the rulingcaste of farmers,the "reignof terror."TheNew YorkPost editorialized
most conservativeFarmBureauleaders,the cot- that"'therecan be no doubtof the reversionto
tonbaronsof the South,theemergingAssociated slave law, mob violence, andFascistmethodsin
Farmersof California,the banker-farmers of the Arkansas"'(Jamieson1945, p. 313). The orga-
Middle West"(Lord 1947, p. 381). These agri- nizing and protestof southerntenantsplayed a
culturalregions faced serious disruptionin the significantrole in bringingabout the reformist
early 1930s,leadingto a shiftingbalanceof class ResettlementAdministration.
power.The organizingeffortsandunrestamong Those who worked the land in the Midwest
familyfarmers,sharecroppers, andfarmworkers and Northeastwere usually landowners.Self-
were seriousenough to threatenthe interestsof employed family farmersconfrontedthe domi-
the dominantclasses and to push for unprece- nantclass of bankersand agribusinessfirms. In
dentedgovernmentinterventionin agriculture. late 1932, abouthalf of Midwesternfarmswere
Only in Californiadid full capitalistrelations threatenedby foreclosure(Dyson 1986, p. 87).
dominate,resulting in industrial-typeconflicts That year, 2,000 men and women, mainly Na-
betweengrowersandworkers.4Tenmajorstrikes
right to unionize underthe WagnerAct (Majkaand
IThe strugglesof farm workersaffected both in- Majka 1982) but pro-laborwage and hour standards
dustrialandagriculturalpolicy. Farmworkerslost the were laterset by the FarmSecurityAdministration.
tionalFarmers'Unionmembers,gatheredin Des the New Deal was able to unite the dominant
Moines to form the Farmers'HolidayAssocia- farmersin each regionbecauseof theircommon
tion.Throughout Iowa,SouthDakota,Minnesota, interestin highercommodityprices. Structural-
and Nebraska,the organizationgained support ly, they were all sizable propertyowners and
as thousands of farmers picketed, blockaded manywereemployers,giving themsimilarclass
roads,marchedon courthouses,andheld"penny interestsdespite their commodity-baseddiffer-
auctions"to preventforeclosures(Shover1965). ences.However,theregionalsubordinateclasses
Midwesternfarmers,in the words of USDA's were structurallydifferentiatedby class position
leadinghistorian,"werenearerarmedrevoltthan and interest.They were unableto develop a na-
any grouphadbeen sincethe WhiskeyRebellion tionwide organizationthat could challenge the
of 1794"(Rasmussen1983, p. 1158). In the fall power of the Farm Bureau. California farm
of 1933, afterCongresshad passedthe Agricul- workerssoughtcollective bargainingrights,not
turalAdjustmentAct, the Farmers'HolidayAs- propertyrights. Without collective bargaining
sociation continued its pressure on state and they could not benefit from higherfarmprices;
federalgovernments.Fivemidwesterngovernors the early New Deal failed them. Midwestern
endorsedmore radicalfarmlegislationand lob- farmerslost theirmotivationformilitancywitha
bied in Washington,leadingPresidentRoosevelt moratoriumon foreclosures. By emphasizing
to announceadditionalfarmrelief.TheFarmers' higher prices, the New Deal reinforcedthe fi-
Holiday historiannotes: "Neverhad a national nancialandpropertyinterestsof family farmers,
administrationbeen subjectedto such potential whobenefitedsomewhatfromtheearlyprograms.
and unknown pressure from the farm belt" Inthe South,though,theearlyNew Deal harmed
(Shover 1965, p. 96). thesubordinate classof tenantsandsharecroppers,
In sum,differentagriculturalregionshadvery andthey organizedagainstit. The class struggle
differentclass structuresthatcannotbe homoge- intensifiedin theSouth.Therefore,southernclass
nized into "commercialfarmers"and the "agri- relationsplay a centralrole in the subsequent
culturalunderclass,"as Skocpol and Finegold storyof New Deal agriculturalpolicies.
(1982, p. 258) did. These regionalfarmingsys-
tems - Californiacapitalism,southernplanta- STATEAND SOCIETY:THENEW DEAL
tions, and midwesternfamily farming- pro- IN AGRICULTURE
vide the essentialbackgroundto New Deal agri-
culturalpolicy. The regionalclass conflicts di- New Deal agricultural policies includedthreedi-
rectly affected policy-making,despite Skocpol vergentthemes:productioncontrolsto raisefarm
and Finegold's (1982) contraryclaim. One par- prices, land-useplanningto rationalizeagricul-
ticipantin 1933 recalled: ture, and economic reform to increase social
Those [protest]movementswere more influential
justice in ruralAmerica.Tied to these policy di-
thanall the farmorganizationpresidentsand farm rections were differentgovernmentpersonnel,
economistsbundledtogether.In the final analysis, politicalideologies,andclassinterests(Soth1982,
farm and congressional leaders were willing to Hooks 1983). Only productioncontrol would
gambleon anAgriculturalAdjustmentAct of 1933 survivethe early yearsof WorldWarII andbe-
becausetheywerescared.(Breimyer1983,p. 1155) come the core of farmpolicy. Thateventuality,
however,was neitherapparentnor inevitablein
It is the role of widespreadfarmprotest,not spe- 1933.Rather,theU.S. Departmentof Agriculture
cific policy proposalsof farmorganizations,that housed all three themes within the early Agri-
supportstheinsightsof so-calledsociety-centered cultural AdjustmentAdministration.By mid-
theoriesregardingtheoriginsof statepolicy.The decade, both planning and reform settled into
absenceof a progressivefarmalliancecapableof other USDA agencies. In 1937-1938, all three
making direct policy proposals was certainly policies achieveda degree of institutionalrein-
important- an absence of class capacitythat forcement.The next five years, though, would
was determinedby the state and by the earlier bring about the destruction of both land-use
strengthof the dominantfarmgroups.Nonethe- planningand ruralreform.We trace these de-
less, theabilityto mountsignificantsocialprotest velopmentsfrom 1933to 1943,concentratingon
was presentandhelpedcreatethe necessityfor a the politicalextremesof increasingcommodity
New Deal. pricesandsocial-economicreform.We look be-
The coming New Deal undertookto restore yond intrastatepower strugglesto focus on the
prosperityandquellunrestin agriculture.Indeed, mostvocalandclass-consciousorganizations that
providedstateagencieswithopposingviews: the southernlandlord/tenant relations,these agency

American Farm Bureau Federation and the leaders from the "triplealliance of Extension
SouthernTenantFarmers'Union. Service, FarmBureau,and land-grantcolleges"
sided entirely with the dominant agricultural
classes.Moreover,"theyweretheones who made
Convergenceof Capacities:TheEarlyAgricul-
the AAA work"(Conrad1965, p. 105).
9335
turalAdjustmentAdministration,1933-
A quite differentgroup existed in the land-
The AgriculturalAdjustmentAdministration, grant/USDAsystem:publicservice-orientedag-
establishedin 1933,containedall threeNew Deal riculturaleconomists(row2, Table 1).Theywere
policy themes: production control, land-use representedby M. L. Wilson, L. C. Gray, and
planning, and rural reform. The actors in the HowardTolley.6They were mostly University
subsequentdramaof implementation- culmi- of Wisconsin-trainedinstitutionaleconomists
natingin the AAA's 1935 "purgeof liberals"- who, duringthe 1920s, had continuedtheirPro-
included other USDA agencies, Congress, the gressive"education"in theUSDA's new Bureau
colleges,andfarmorganizations
stateagricultural of AgriculturalEconomics.Wilson's views were
as well as ruralsocial classes. We concentrate typical of the group.While seeing the need for
here on the threemain groupswithinthe AAA: social change, he was a gradualist.Wilson and
conservativeagriculturalists(large farmersand the otherssaw no inherentclass contradictionsin
agribusinessmen),economist-planners,and lib- society, abhorredradicalagitation,and thought
eral reformers.Table 1 summarizesthese three the statecouldrationallymediatesocialconflicts.
factions. Theybelievedthatallpeoplecouldbenefitequally
The largest and most powerful of the three fromeconomicplanning,whichshouldtakeplace
AAA groups comprisedthe conservativeagri- at the local level with equal participationby
culturalistswho believed that the major(if not farmersand agriculturalexperts.Althoughtheir
sole) governmenteffort should be to increase main policy goal was long-range agricultural
farmprices(row 1in Table1).Productioncontrol planning,Wilson himself developedthe Volun-
was the preferredpolicy tool.5 This group in- tary Domestic AllotmentPlan that became the
cludedthe "Triple-A"Administratorin the mid- basis of AAA productioncontrols.As a strong
thirties,agribusinessmanChesterDavis, as well advocateof grassrootsdemocracy,Wilsonhoped
as mostleadersof the AAA commoditysections. the plan would be a first step in establishingthe
Most importantwas the CottonSection,directed principleof planningfor morerationallanduse;
by farmeditorCullyCobb.Cottonaccountedfor as a pragmatist,he knew thata quickrise in farm
over one-fourthof all U.S. (andhalf of southern) prices was needed (Conkin 1959, pp. 73-97;
farms,andnearlythree-quarters of allcottonfarms Kirkendall1966, pp. 22-25, 182-90). Unlike the
were operatedby tenants (Turner1936, p. 2). first group, however, the economists saw that
Davis andCobb"personifiedthe establishedag- withdrawinglandfromproductionon each farm
riculturalcomplex"of theMidwestandtheSouth, was haphazardand irrational.Overall, Wilson
respectively(Daniel1985,p. 104).Cobb'sfellow and his group best representedthe interestsof
Mississippian, Oscar Johnston, head of the successfulfamilyfarmersandlandowners(Gray
world'slargestcottonplantation,was theAAA's 1938;Wilson 1940).
Finance Directorand residentexpert on cotton Unlike the above two groups,the thirdgroup
issues (Nelson 1983).Theirprimaryconcernwas withinthe earlyAAA - the social reformers-
increasingagriculturalprices to assist in farm weredecidedlynot agrarians(row 3, Table 1). A
recovery.They and most other USDA officials smallgroupclose to RexfordTugwell,they were
assumedthattheAAA's mainbeneficiarieswould largelyyoung, idealistic,Easternlawyers in the
naturallybe largefarmersandthattheirprimary AAA's Consumers'Division andits Legal Divi-
clientelewas the "betterclass"of farmers.These sion, led by JeromeFrank.They exemplified a
traditional attitudesstronglyinfluenced
land-grant 6 Wilson was head of AAA's Wheat Section in
the AAA (Gray 1938; Saloutos 1982, p. 261; 1933, USDA's Assistant Secretaryand later Under-
Wilson 1940). In the coming AAA conflict over secreatrythroughthe decade,and nationalExtension
Service directorfrom 1940 to 1953. Gray was the
I Productioncontrolsoughtto raise farmpricesby
USDA's leadingland-useexpert.Tolley was the first
creatingartificialshortages.Farmerswerepaidto take head of AAA's ProgramPlanning Division, AAA
a percentageof their land out of production;larger Administratorfor 1936-1938,andBureauof Agricul-
farmsreceivedlargerpayments. turalEconomicschief from 1938 to 1946.
Table 1. Policy Themes and Class Interestsin the AgriculturalAdjustmentAdministrationof the U.S. Departmentof
Agriculture,1934-1935
Important SupportiveAgencies/ Class Interests

Policy Themes Personnel Organizations Supported Outcome
1. Farmproduction Davis USDA "Establishment," Capitalistfarmers Victory(immediate
controls Johnston ExtensionService, and southernlandlords and long-term)
Cobb agriculturalcolleges,
FarmBureau
2. Long-term Wilson ProgramPlanning Family farmers Success initially
agricultural Tolley Division of AAA and and landowners (failurein 1942)
planning Gray Bureauof Agricultural
Economics
3. Ruralsocial Tugwell AAA Legal and Consumers' Farm/laboralliance, Defeat in 1935 (followed
reform Frank Divisions, STFU, Farmers' small farmers, share- by Resettlement/Farm
Holiday Association, croppers,farmworkers SecurityAdministration
Farmers'Union "radicals" defeat in 1943)
new type in Washington, especially for the productioncontrolwon out.Wilsontookthelead

USDA, wheretheybecameknownas the "urban in encouragingthe electionof stateandcommu-
liberals."Tugwell, theirintellectualleader,was nity "farmercommittees"to runthe programlo-
not in the AAA buthadbroaderresponsibilities, cally althoughthe need to act quicklyled him to
firstas AssistantSecretary,thenUndersecretary, rely on the ExtensionService.The decentralized
of theentireUSDA. Tugwell'spoliticalideology organizationof Extensionandits earlyties to the
had radical social and economic reform as its Farm Bureauensuredthe latterorganization's
goal; while a strong supporterof production controlatthe local level (Baldwin1968,pp.410-
controls and land-useplanning,it was the Re- 11; Kirkendall1966,pp. 91-94). The Iowa Farm
settlementAdministrationthat embodiedmany Bureau,for example,boastedin 1934 that"'the
of his ideas. An Ivy Leagueinstitutionalecono- FarmBureauand the A.A.A. are inseparable"'
mist, he rejected neoclassical economics and (McConnell1969, p. 75).
proposed centralized planning. While pro-in- The most seriousproblemsof implementation
dustry (Tugwell was no Jeffersonian),he had arose in the cotton-growingSouth where the
little faith in business leadersand did not mind plantersjoined withExtensionandthe FarmBu-
saying so publicly.One speech in 1935, for in- reau to guarantee"the class natureof the com-
stance, emphasizedthe need for a progressive mitteesystemof theAAA"(James1986,p. 151).
farmer/worker alliance(Kirkendall1966,p. 118; Part of the AAA plan to cut supply and raise
Tugwell 1937). The agriculturalclass interests prices was that farmerswould take land out of
supportedby USDA's liberal reformerswere productionin exchange for government pay-
those of small farmers,sharecroppers, andfarm ments. Many southernlandlords,however, did
workers.They were in contactwith membersof not sharethe AAA paymentswith theirtenants.
the NationalFarmers'Union,midwesternfann- As a result,in mid-1934ArkansasSocialistsand
er cooperatives,and the new SouthernTenant sharecroppersorganized the SouthernTenant
Farmers'Union(Grubbs1971,p. 94; Lord1947, Farmers'Union (STFU). The union sought a
p. 459; Saloutos 1982, p. 115). numberof objectives,but as its co-founderre-
The AAA, then,containedthreedifferentand called, the STFU's "real basis was the share-
important groups: traditional conservatives, cropperswho wantedtheirshareof the govern-
moderate economist-planners,and liberal re- mentmoney.It was thatsimple.That'swhy they
formers.Which of theirviews would dominate organized"(Mitchell,n.d.; 1979,pp.40-47). The
policy? The outcomerestedon both the institu- STFU mounteda vigorouscritiqueof the New
tional structuresalreadyin place and the class Deal farmpolicy. The union'sfirst"Programfor
capacitiesof differenttypes of farmers.Institu- Action"calledfor a fairerAAA. The agencydid
tionally,thepriorexistenceof theExtensionSer- notensurethattheactualcultivatorswouldreceive
vice provided a federal agency to implement payments,and there was widespreaddisplace-
productioncontrolat the local level, wherelarge ment of croppersand theirfamilies.AAA's im-
farmerinterestsalreadydominated.These fac- plementationwas undemocraticin thatit failed
torsconvergedsuchthatthe narrowerversionof to providefor tenantrepresentation on the local
committees.The AAA was biasedagainsttenant pect cannot be separatedfrom the societal fac-
farmers,and the STFU fought it (Kester 1936). tors impingingon the institution'ssurvival:the
This strugglesooneruptedwithintheAAA itself. economic importanceof cotton and the political
In January,1935, the STFU sued a landlord clout of cottongrowersin bothCongressandthe
for evictingunionmembersfrom his plantation. AAA. With the growth of the STFU, planters
It also askedthe AAA to interveneon behalf of could not afford to have the New Deal's main
the tenants.The agency's Legal Division, led by farm program favor sharecroppers.Wallace,
JeromeFrank,reviewedthe AAA's cottoncon- Davis, and otherswantedto avoid any possible
tractand gave an opinion that favoredthe ten- challengeto the dominantfarmgroups,even if it
ants.7AAA Administrator ChesterDavisreceived meantsacrificingtheAAA liberals(Conrad1965,
hundredsof complaintsfromplanters,Extension p. 206; Grubbs1971, p. 60).
agents, and Chambersof Commerceover the The second factor reflected class conflict in
proposedlegal interpretation. He also got pres- the field. Johnstonadvised Wallace that "'our
sure from within the agency. Oscar Johnston agriculturalprogramshould [not] be distorted
warnedhim thata pro-tenantdecision would be into or used as a weaponto bringaboutso-called
"absolutelyfatalto the successof the cottonpro- "socialreform"or to revolutionizethe social and
gram."Davis agreedwith Johnstonthatthe law- economic life of the cottonbelt"' (Nelson 1983,
yers had oversteppedtheir bounds in trying to p. 428). More secureland tenurefor sharecrop-
use the AAA to reform the social system of pers, as proposedin the Legal Division's ruling,
southernagriculture(Kirkendall1966, pp. 100- could have underminedlandlords'laborcontrol
1;Nelson 1983,pp.427-28). Davis tooktheissue and reinforcedinterracialunion organization-
to SecretaryWallacewho rejectedthe Legal Di- seriousthreatsto the southernplantationsystem.
vision'sopinion.Thereupon,on February5,1935, Thiswasunderstoodby one Memphisnewspaper,
Davis dismissed Frankand three other "urban which hailed the purgeas "'a victory over radi-
liberals"fromthe AAA; otherswere demotedor cals and agitatorswho were organizingshare-
soon resigned.Tugwell offered his resignation, croppersandtenants"'(Nelson 1983, p. 433). A
butRoosevelturgedhimto stayon (Conrad1965, farmjournalistadded:"'It is clear that Wallace
pp. 136-53). has no intentionsof taking any steps likely to
Several factorsled to this "purge,"including conflict with the interests of the planters"'
administrative problemsandpersonalityconflicts (Grubbs1971, p. 52). The political salience of
(McConnell 1969, pp. 72-73). The two major class conflictseemedclearenoughat the time-
factors,however,wereinstitutionalmaintenance in contrastto the state-centeredview that dis-
andclass conflict.First,withoutthepurge,Davis, misses it (SkocpolandFinegold 1982).
most of the CottonSection,andmanyelsewhere Fortheirpart,themoderateUSDA economists
in the AAA mayhaveresigned.Cottonlandlords supportedthe purge (Kirkendall1966, pp. 101,
themselves may have withdrawnfrom the pro- 152; Lowitt 1979; Saloutos 1982, p. 119). Wil-
gram, as Johnstonwarned.Wallace feared of- son and Tolley were not simply public servants
fendingpowerfulSouthernersin Congress,who taking"thepoint of view of the state"(Skocpol
were tied to landlordinterestsand could, more- and Finegold 1982, pp. 274-75), for the state's
over, force his own resignation(Conrad 1965, interestwas being determinedby the AAA's ac-
pp. 146-53, 207; Grubbs1971, pp. 52-57; Lord tions to appeasethe cotton growers.And while
1947, pp. 406-8; Lowitt 1979;Nelson 1983). In- the economistswere not fully "captured"by the
stitutionalmaintenance,then,was the firstmoti- dominantfarmgroups,as were the CottonSec-
vatingforce behindthe purge.However,this as- tion personnel,they were unwillingto challenge
existing power arrangementsin U.S. agriculture
7 Most AAA leadersand landlordsinterpretedthe (Kirkendall 1966, pp. 102, 159, 193). Their
contractto read that landlordsshould keep approxi- "ideologicalblinders"preventedthemfrom see-
mately the same numberof tenantson theirfarmsas ing thatlarge-growerdominanceovertheAAA's
they had in 1933. The Legal Division lawyers ruled
thatlandlordswere requiredto keep the same people,
implementationmade it extremely difficult to
bothto protectthe ruralpoorandto preventlandlords redresstenantgrievances(Hamilton1986, p. 43;
from evicting union activists."Infact, the new inter- Hawley 1983, p.217).
pretationhad been advocatedfor some time by the AmongtheAAA's divergentpolicy directions
TenantFarmers'Union, andthe opinionwas given as - recovery throughproductioncontrol, long-
a consequence of the efforts of that organization" termplanning,and social reform- the firsthad
(Kirkendall1966, p. 99). won decisively.Economicplanningwas reduced
to local productioncontrolcommitteesunderthe ties alone can explain the rise and fall of this
directionof Extension.Ruralreformprograms agency,the "poorman'sDepartmentof Agricul-
would not be housed within the USDA again ture"(McConnell 1969, p. 89). Administrative
until 1937. Sharecroppers lost in the AAA strug- will and know-how- key state-centeredvari-
gle, first, because the agency's institutional ables- cannotaccountfortheinitialsuccessand
structuremade landlordsthe key agents to im- subsequentfailureof the FarmSecurityAdmin-
plementthe plan at the county level, which en- istration.Equallyimportantarethe social forces
couragedthehistoricalbiastowardlargefarmers. thatcreateda need for the agencyand shapedits
Second, sharecropperslost because they faced programs.Its incorporationinto the USDA in
the greaterclass capacities of planters,which 1937, with all thatdepartment'shistoricalstate-
included domination of Farm Bureaus and buildingandinstitutionalcapacity(Skocpoland
Chambersof Commerceas well as stronginflu- Finegold 1982), did not protectFarm Security
ence in Congress and the USDA. In addition, from an eventualfatal attackby dominantclass
landlordspossessedgreaterfinancialandpolitical forces.
resourcesthandidtenantfarmers,who werepoor, Given the recent"purgeof liberals"from the
weak,andlargelydisorganized- conditionsthat AAA, Roosevelt and his advisorsrealized that
the local AAA reinforced(James 1986, p. 174). the USDA was inhospitableto ruralpovertyef-
Landlordsand capitalistfarmersnot only domi- forts. Nonetheless, somethinghad to be done.
natedsharecroppers andlaborersin thefield;they The Administrationwas receiving heavy criti-
also held the state hostage, forcing it to use its cism from the political left for its treatmentof
capacitiesin their favor. Successful policy im- small farmersand sharecroppers. In 1934, Nor-
plementationrelied on the institutionalcapacity man Thomas,well-knownnationalleaderof the
of the state.This capacitywas, in turn,basedon Socialist Party,wrote The Plight of the Share-
the supportthat the dominantfarm classes and cropper,a bookletcriticalof New Deal agricul-
the stategave each other. turalpolicy;thattitle becamea popularphrasein
the nationalmedia. In early 1935, Thomaswas
Convergenceof Capacities.TheResettlement/ physically assaulted while addressing the
FarmSecurityAdministration,1935-1943 SouthernTenantFarmers'Unionin Arkansas-
part of the widely publicized "reignof terror"
Althoughthe AAA failed the poorestproducers againstthe sharecroppers. At the sametime,three
in U.S. agriculture,
otherNew Dealagencieswere prominentliberalsreleasedresearchfindingsthat
moresympatheticto theirtroubles.Threemonths claimed the "governmentunder the AAA has
afterthe AAA purge,PresidentRooseveltestab- assumedmany of the risks of the landowners,
lished the Resettlement (later Farm Security) and thrownthem on the tenant"(Johnson,Em-
Administration, whichconsolidatedandexpand- bree, and Alexander1935, p. 50). PopulistU.S.
ed New Deal programsto attackruralpoverty.8 SenatorHuey Long also attackedthe program.
This contrastingcase to the AAA substantiates Many nationwidegroupsurgedthe Presidentto
ourargumentforthe interdependence of stateand addressruralpovertydirectly(Grubbs1971, pp.
society.Neitherstatecapacitiesnorclass capaci- 70-80).
In addition,RexfordTugwell,disillusionedby
8 The Resettlement/FarmSecurityAdministration
theAAA purge,wasincreasinglyconcernedabout
had several antipovertyprograms.RuralRehabilita-
tion made farmloans and grantsto help needy fami- the problemsof the ruralpoor. This concern,
lies become more self-sufficient,and also provided plus his desire to coordinatethe many agencies
technical assistance. The Tenant-Purchaseprogram governing land use, led him to approachthe
issued loans to assist landless farmersin becoming Presidentand the Secretaryof Agriculturewith
owners.The poorestregionof the country,the South, alternativeways of implementingruralreform.
receivedmost of the fundsfromthe "rehab"and ten- In April, 1935, by Executive Order,Roosevelt
ant-purchaseprograms,although poor midwestern createdthe ResettlementAdministration(RA),
farmersalso benefited. The Resettlementprograms
led by Tugwell and staffed largely by liberals
set upmigrantlaborcamps(primarilyin theFarWest)
and provideddisplacedfarm families and industrial who werenot land-grant-trained agriculturalists.
workerswithplots of landfor subsistenceproduction. Ratherthan seek change in the USDA, the RA
The agencyalso organizedsome large-scalecoopera- was establishedoutsideof the large-farmer-ori-
tive farms.In addition,the FSA triedto enforcewage, ented departmentso thatTugwell could operate
housing,andworkingstandardsfor farmlabor(Bald- morefreely.It was explicitlyrecognizedthatdif-
win 1968;McConnell 1969). ferentgovernmentagencies would serve differ-
ent group interests. The RA brought together Resettlement AdministratorWill Alexander,

variousruralrelief programsas well as the land- Wallace,Tugwell, Wilson, Gray, and represen-
use planningpartsof theAAA. Tugwellbelieved tatives from the FarmBureauand the STFU -
that ruralpoverty was relatedto inefficientre- the latteraddedonly afterprotest(Baldwin1968,
sourceuse;thegovernmentshould"buytheacres pp. 124-36, 157-69; Grubbs 1971, pp. 109-61;
thatwere being used improperly,switchthemto Mitchell 1979). Tugwell's outspokencalls for
betteruses, move thepeopleto placeswherethey reformhadbecome a politicalliability,however,
could make a living, andhelp these people with andhe left the governmentat year'send, leaving
loans andsupervision"(Kirkendall1966,p. 109; Alexander as head of the RA (Tugwell 1937;
Baldwin 1968, pp. 85-92). Kirkendall1966, pp. 118-22).
The originsandpurposesof the AAA andRA In its reportof early 1937, the Committeeon
illustratehow the stateis not a monolithicentity FarmTenancyendorsedexpansionof the Reset-
with interestsof its own but rathera set of insti- tlementAdministration(which hadjust become
tutions variouslypenetratedby differentsocial partof USDA). This was too radicalfor the Farm
forces.The way thatlegislationon ruralpoverty Bureaurepresentative,who held that local Ex-
was eventuallyachievedfurthershows the inter- tension agents ratherthan a centralizedfederal
actionof stateand social forces. Because it was agency should directthe antipovertyprograms.
createdby Presidentialdecree, the RA had no The FarmBureau'scontrol over USDA's field
legislativefoundation.One of its majorpolitical staff would be threatenedby an expandedRA.
problemswas this lack of legitimacywith Con- The STFU, in contrast,fearedadministrationby
gress. In 1935, Congressconsideredfarmtenant eitherExtensionor the USDA. Both, the union
legislationand over the next two years a host of maintained,weredominated"bytherichandlarge
liberalstestifiedon the bill. As early as March, landowningclass of farmersand theirpolitical-
1936,thefamily-farm-oriented NationalFarmers' pressurelobbies"(NationalResourcesCommit-
Unionendorsedruralpovertyefforts(Kirkendall tee 1937, pp. 20-23; Baldwin 1968, pp. 167-74;
1966, p. 117). LeadingUSDA economistsL. C. GilbertandBrown1981).InJuly, 1937,Congress
Gray and M. L. Wilson also supportedtenant passed the Bankhead-JonesFarm Tenant Act.
legislationbecauseit wouldpromotesmallfarm This gave a legislative basis to rural poverty
ownership and treat rural poverty without programs,butfailedto endorsethemainactivities
threateningtheAAA (Mertz1978,pp. 115,259). of the RA, which in Septemberwas rechristened
The notionthatthe statebothreflectsandme- theFarmSecurityAdministration (FSA).Despite
diates class conflict is also illustratedin the RA thislackof legislativemandateforRA programs,
case. SecretaryWallacedeclaredin 1935: FSA head Alexanderand his staff followed the
progressiverecommendationsof the President's
"Thepresentconditions,particularlyin the South, Committeemore than the narrowprovisionsof
provide fertile soil for Communistand Socialist Bankhead-Jones(Baldwin 1968, pp. 187-92;
agitators.I do not like the bitternessthatis aroused
Conkin1959,pp. 183-85;Grubbs1971, pp. 155-
by this sortof agitation,butI realizethatthe cureis
not violence or oppressivelegislationto curbthese 57; Mertz 1978, pp. 169-75).
activitiesbutratherto give these dispossessedpeo- The FSA grew into a major federal agency
ple a stakein the social system.The Americanway between1937and 1942,despiteinsufficientfunds
to preservethe traditionalorderis to providethese andattacksfromthe politicalright.Conservative
refugeesof theeconomicsystemwithanopportuni- agriculturalforces, both within and outside the
ty to buildanddevelop theirown homes andto live state,hadsome cause for alarm.The FSA's chal-
on the land which they may call theirown and on lenge lay preciselyin its commitmentto the rural
whichtheycanmakea modestlivingyearafteryear." poor.9Its constituencywas large and oppressed
(Baldwin 1968, p. 135)
9 FSA personnel numbered over 19,000. It had
Wallace was referringto the SouthernTenant nearly 2,300 county offices working with more than
Farmers'Union (STFU), which also testifiedon 800,000 client families, 20 percent of whom were
the farm-tenantlegislation (Gilbertand Brown black. ThroughFSA programs,over 12,000 tenant
families became owner-operatorswhile ten percent
1981). In fact, the STFU helpedmakeruralpov- of all U.S. farmersreceivedrehabilitationloans. More
ertya nationalissue in theelectionof 1936,when than16,000purchasingcooperativeswereestablished,
Roosevelt finally committedhimself to action. as well as over 1,000 medicalanddentalgroupsserv-
In November, the Presidentappointeda Com- ing 142,000 families in 41 states. The Resettlement
mitteeon FarmTenancythatincludedAssistant programfurnished10,000 families with homes. The
but generally unorganized- a condition the conservativefarm organization,the Farm Bu-

agency meant to change. An FSA official de- reau.Since 1938 the departmenthad grownless
clared:"'If out of all ourworktheredoes not ... dependenton the AFBF. Wallace elevated the
arisea leadershipwhich can takeover andcarry liberalBureauof AgriculturalEconomicsas US-
on whereour"management" leaves off, ournew DA's centralplanningagency, which began a
whitehouses aredestinedto becometombstones new programof coordinatedcounty land-use
for a greatidea"' (Baldwin1968, p. 283). In ad- planning(Kirkendall1966, pp. 137-80; Hooks
dition, the FSA strengthenedits ties to the Na- 1990). In 1940, USDA/FarmBureaurelations
tional Farmers'Union and STFU as well as to worsenedas Wallacesteppedup his anti-Repub-
the AmericanFederationof Labor,the Congress lican rhetoricin the Presidentialcampaign,and
of IndustrialOrganizations,andotherprogressive the AFBF accused him of being too labor and
organizations(Baldwin1968,pp. 298-303). The consumeroriented(Kile 1948,p. 260). Whenhe
FSA was alsoanaffrontto southernracism."Now resignedas Secretaryto be the DemocraticVice-
comes the New Deal," a Mississippiplanterre- Presidentialcandidate(and Roosevelt lost the
marked,"witha law to acquireourplantations... midwesternfarmvote for thefirsttime),theFSA
and divide the land up again into family sized lost an importantally. Anotherpersonnelshift
farmsof 40 acresanda mule - the same prom- was even more crucial:C. B. Baldwin became
ise the otherYankeesmadeto the negroesduring FarmSecurityAdministrator in 1940. The Farm
the otherCivil War."The FarmBureaureacted Bureauwas outraged;it could "workwith"his
to the agency with pamphletsheadlined:"'Rad- predecessor,Will Alexander,but Baldwin was
ical Groupin Departmentof AgricultureUrging too militant,too much like his formerRA boss,
Triple Alliance of FSA-Farmers'Union-CIO"' "RextheRed"Tugwell(Campbell1962,pp. 173-
(Holley 1975, pp. 242, 255). 94; Baldwin 1968, pp. 325-43).
The mainstreamagriculturalinstitutionsnever A second factor that facilitatedthe attackon
liked most of the FSA programs,which were the FSA was wartimemobilization.Withinthe
criticizedthroughouttheirexistence.Yet during state,warfever andmilitaryproductionreplaced
the 1930's the conservative USDA agencies, the economiccrisis as the majorpolicy concern.
Extension,most of the land-grantcolleges, and This led to administrativeshifts that weakened
the Farm Bureautoleratedthem as emergency thecapacityof theFSA andits alliesto implement
"relief"measures.Duringthe GreatDepression, reform programs.The U.S. economy was im-
even the AFBF Presidentcould see the need for proving and the political-economic crisis ap-
"thedole."However,the FSA came to threaten pearedto be over. Most significant,the outbreak
the FarmBureau'shegemonyat the local level. of war alterednearlyeveryone'spriorities,from
As the official FarmBureauhistorianwrote: PresidentRoosevelton down.Withconcernabout
the Depressionabating,conservativesmounted
Whatstartedout duringthe depressionyearsas an attackon reformefforts and the Administra-
meritorious ruralreliefundertakings,or at leastas tion no longerdefendedthe reformers.The most
interestingexperiments, developedintooneof the
New Deal agencies(e.g., FSA, Works
weirdest,mostfantasticexamplesof government innovative
bureaucracy gonemad.(Kite1948,p. 264) Projects Administration, Civilian Conservation
Corps, the NationalResourcePlanningBoard)
By the early 1940s, toleranceturnedto confron- becamethe targetsof conservativesin andout of
tationas Congress,the FarmBureau,and other government.
conservativeorganizationslaunchedan aggres- These political, economic, and ideological
sive attackon the FSA. Why did they go on the shiftschangedthe balanceof class forces.By the
offensivethen?Whathadchangedsincethemid- early 1940s, conservativesin business and in
thirties?New institutionalfactorshadconverged Congresswere attackingprogressiveleadersin
with importantsocietalelements. all walks of life. Radical union memberswere
The first factor was a growing rift between kickedout of CIOunionsandentireCIOunions
HenryWallace'sUSDA andthelargestandmost with leftist leadershipwere expelled (Keeran
1980;LembckeandTattam1984). Strikeactivi-
migrantfarm-labor program built 95 camps that ac- ty haddeclineddrastically(Skocpol1980,p. 188)
commodatedmorethan75,000 people.TheFSA stood and unrestwas quicklyrecedingfromthenation-
up for African-Americansin the South and experi- al landscape.Liberalgovernmentagenciesfaced
mentedwith long-termleases and cooperativefarms accusationsof "communism"and began tem-
(Baldwin 1968; Conkin 1959). peringtheir supportfor reform(Baldwin 1968,
p. 323). Withinthis context,the conditionswere "... threatensthe foundationsof Americanagricul-

ripefor the Farmn Bureauandotherconservative ture and, throughtheir contentionfor a minimum
forces to attackan agency they had toleratedbut wage per hourfor cotton picking, threatensto dis-
never supported. rupta fairandsatisfactorysystem thathas success-
fullyoperatedin theCottonBelt forover 100years."
The line-upof forces in the FSA strugglewas
(McConnell1969, p. 107)
bothlike andunlikethatof the 1935 AAA purge.
Insteadof threefactions,by the early 1940sthere FSA Administrator Baldwin replied to such
were only two: conservativesand liberals.The charges by insisting:
dominant-classgroups had become anti-New
"The choice ... is whetherthe small independent
Deal althoughstill supportiveof theirown gov- farmershould be given an opportunityto maintain
ernment programs.They were joined by key andimprovehis statusor whetherthese largeinter-
conservative midwestern and southern Con- ests should be permittedto take advantageof the
gressmen,whosestrengthincreasedas WorldWar warsituationto accumulatelargelandholdingsand
II expanded. The National Farmers'Union, a to makelaborersoutof farmers."(Baldwin1968,p.
majororganizationof familyfarmers,hadbecome 357)
the New Deal's biggest supporterin agriculture.
USDA's New Dealers were concentratedin the For its defense, the FSA drew upon its liberal but
FSA andthe BAE, whichcame to sharea "com- weakened supporters, including the Southern
munity of interest" regarding social reform Tenant Farmers' Union and the National Farm-
(Baldwin 1968, p. 303). The FarmBureau/con- ers' Union as well as USDA economists Wilson
servative Congress coalition attacked both and Tolley - all to no avail. Congress effectively
agencies,firstkillingtheBAE'sland-useplanning killed the FSA in 1943 by denying major appro-
project. priations; agency personnel and budget were cut
The battleover the FSA was "oneof the most in half. In 1946, what was left of the FSA became
bitter domestic issues during World War II" the docile Farmers' Home Administration
(Conkin1959,p. 220). Fromearly 1941 through (Baldwin 1968, pp. 352-402; Conkin 1959, pp.
1943, both House and Senate budget and agri- 214-33; McConnell 1969, pp. 88-113).
culture committees as well as the new Joint The FSA story points to two conclusions. First,
Committeeon Reductionof NonessentialFederal to understandthe agency's development, we must
Expenditures(chairedby Virginiaconservative examine the convergence of institutional and class
HarryF. Byrd) targetedthe FSA. Economizers capacities. A focus on one or the other is not
andanti-NewDealerssoughtto endthe agency's enough. The subordinateclasses won a significant
"sociological experimentation."Congressmen victory in the creation and growth of the Reset-
alleged thatthe FSA promotedsocializedmedi- tlement/FarmSecurity Administration, from 1935
cine and"sovietism."Testifyingbeforethe Byrd until World War II. The agency represented their
Committee,theFarmBureaurepeatedlycharged interests in a department that generally opposed
that the FSA had deceived Congress, solicited them. The RA/FSA succeeded during those years
clients,assistedlobbyists,underminedindividu- because of its own zealous institutionalleadership,
alism, and duplicatedactivitiesof the AAA and its support from progressive farm and labor or-
Extension.In 1943, the FarmBureau'scase was ganizations, and the relative "space" accorded it
reinforcedby powerfulregionalorganizationsof by Congress and the dominant agricultural
largegrowers,who complainedaboutthe FSA's classes, especially the Farm Bureau, during the
enforcement of wage, housing, and working Depression years.
standardsfor farm labor. Both the Associated By 1941, however, the FSA had attracted in-
Farmersof Californiaand the National Cotton creasing opposition as reformers throughout the
Council testified.The latterwas representedby U.S. came under attack. Second, then, the FSA
OscarJohnston,the Mississippiplanterwho had was defeated mainly because of a shift in the
been so centralto the early AAA. Johnstoncrit- balance of class forces in society and in the state.
icized the "un-Americanideas"of RexfordTug- By the early 1940s, the war had become the ma-
well. He was aidedin his attackon FarmSecuri- jor policy concern. The weakened voices of sub-
ty by his formerAAA boss, ChesterDavis, who ordinate classes in agriculture and industry had
as WarFood Administratordivestedthe FSA of lost the ear of their allies in government. The
its farm-laborprogram,thusguttingits mainwar capacity of those allies within the state to re-
effort (Baldwin 1968, pp. 343-85). Johnson's spond was also weakened by bureaucratic
CottonCouncilheld thatthe FSA changes, specific policy decisions, and wartime
economizingthat switchedattentionfrom New particularagency, at least for a time. However,

Deal reforms.The dominantclasses and their the institutionalcapacities of the AAA were
stateallies saw the FSA as a majorthreat.Under greaterthanthoseof the FSA, despitetheircom-
the new conditionsof WorldWarII, despitethe mon locationin the USDA. Struggleswithinthe
best efforts of USDA liberals, conservatives state,linkedto class strugglesin society,resulted
provedpowerfulenoughto kill the agency. in the 1935 purgeof AAA liberalsand the 1943
guttingof the FSA.
CONCLUSION Insteadof trying to determinewhetherstate
structuresor class forceshavegreatereffects, we
To understandtheoriginsandfatesof publicpol- have examined how the two interactto shape
icies, we needto go beyondthe dualismof "state policies.State-centered analysishasmadea valu-
vs. society." We must analyze the uneven de- able contributionby focusingon the state,but it
velopment of both institutionalstructuresand ignoresthe social natureof stateinstitutionsand
class capacities as they converge in particular policyintellectuals.Itpositsadualisticframework
periods.While acceptingSkocpolandAmenta's thatprecludesan understanding of the actualre-
(1986, p. 136)call to identify"thepoliticalactors lationshipbetween state and society. We have
thatinitiateand shapepublicpolicies,"we have shown,in contrast,thedynamicinterplayof state
challenged the state-centeredanalysis of New andsocialfactors.The statehelpsconstituteclass
Deal farmpolicy in severalways. The Agricul- relations,which also permeatestateinstitutions.
tural AdjustmentAdministration'sinstitutional Viewedrelationally,thestateis notseparatefrom,
capacitycannotbe viewed apartfromthe under- butratherpartof, the largersociety.It is time for
lying economicdimensionsandhistoricalstrug- political-sociologicaltheoryto move beyondthe
gles thatgave rise to it; nor can the institutions dualismof statevs. society.
and statemanagersbe seen as autonomousfrom JESSGILBERT is AssociateProfessorof RuralSociol-
those social forces. Rather, state institutions ogy at the Universityof Wisconsin,Madison.He has
structurallyprivilegedthe dominantagricultural studiedregional class structuresand land tenurein
classes, and state managers- includingthose U.S. agriculture.His currentresearchis on state the-
who supportedthe subordinantclasses - were ory and agriculturalreformandplanningpolicies in
constrainedby these institutionalbiases. Differ- theNew Deal and WorldWarII years. In additionto
ent groupsof agriculturalexpertssupporteddi- the USDApolicy intellectualsand programstreated
vergentinterests,whicharebest understoodby a in this article, he is examiningtheBureauofAgricul-
region-specificclass analysisof U.S. agriculture. tural Economics'project of long-termcounty land-
The state-centereduse of generalconcepts like use planning (1938-1942).
"commercialfarmers"and "the underclass"is CAROLYN HOWE is AssistantProfessorof Sociologyat
inadequateto capturesuch diversity. Holy CrossCollege in Worcester,Massachusetts.She
Institutional capacities converged with a has publishedarticles on class structureand on the
changingbalanceof classforcesatdifferenttimes U.S. labor andfarmers' movements.Her currentre-
duringtheRooseveltera.Theycoalescedin 1933 searchfocuses on therelationshipbetweenrace,class,
andgendersystemsof inequalityandsocial movement
to producethe AgriculturalAdjustmentAdmin-
mobilization.She is currentlywritinga bookon wom-
istration,which, in turn, strengthenedthe con- en's empowermentand communityactivism.
servativeFarmBureauandthreatened thesurvival
of many sharecroppers in the South.This threat
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Beyond "State vs.

Society": Theories of the State and New Deal Agricultural Policies

204 AmericanSociological Review, 1991,Vol. 56 (April:204-220)

viewing the state as an independententity,they struggles(see Skocpol 1980, 1985). State-cen-

builtintotheplanandminimizedtheroleof class power-playsas an explanationfor the BAE's de-

as the ability of particularclasses or class seg- THE DEVELOPMENTOF UNEVEN

wereoriginallyteachinginstitutions; 25 yearslater Chamberof Commercein New York set up an

providedstateagencieswithopposingviews: the southernlandlord/tenant relations,these agency

Important SupportiveAgencies/ Class Interests

new type in Washington, especially for the productioncontrolwon out.Wilsontookthelead

ent group interests. The RA brought together Resettlement AdministratorWill Alexander,

but generally unorganized- a condition the conservativefarm organization,the Farm Bu-

p. 323). Withinthis context,the conditionswere "... threatensthe foundationsof Americanagricul-

economizingthat switchedattentionfrom New particularagency, at least for a time. However,

Mertz,Paul E. 1978. New Deal Policy and Southern Farmers' HolidayAssociation.Urbana:Universi-

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