Training Services

Relief System Design

EDS 2004/RV-1
 Outline

„ Introduction
„ Hazard Identification
„ Process Model for Relieving Conditions
„ PRV Calculations: External Fire
„ PRV Calculations: Electrical Power Failure
„ Sizing and Selecting a Pressure Relief Device

EDS 2004/RV-2

Relief system design begins with identifying the causes of overpressure in the process
unit. Various qualitative methodologies are used to identify events that require
overpressure protection, e.g. safety checklists and HAZOP studies.

Each overpressure event is quantitatively analyzed to determine the maximum relieving

rate that will develop during the failure event. The process model of relief conditions
incorporates assumptions that significantly affect the relieving rate obtained, and API
recommendations regarding those assumptions are closely followed.

Once the relieving rates are determined, pressure relief devices are sized and selected for
each service.

Note: Relief system design only addresses those events that cause high pressure. Vessels
can fail due to over-temperature, brittle fracture, corrosion, erosion, metal fatigue, etc.
These failure events have to be managed by other means, such as depressurization,
metallurgy selection, inspection and maintenance.

In addition, relief valves discharge to a disposal system, or in rare instances, to the

atmosphere. The design of the disposal system is not covered in this training session.
 Protection Layers Emergency Response
in Community
Emergency Response
within the Process Unit

Pressure Relief Systems

Safety Instrumented Shutdowns

Critical Alarms & Operator Intervention

Basic Process Control

Plant Design (Inherent Safety)

EDS 2004/RV-3

Many protection layers are needed to provide effective process safety, and the
pressure relief system is only one of them.

This training session focuses on relief system design, but the student should be
aware that multiple systems are required for process safety.
 Managing Process Safety
Maintenance
Inspection Procedures

Process Safety
Management

Permits Training

Managing Change
EDS 2004/RV-4

Process Safety Management extends beyond process design and construction. It has
to address and manage safety issues that develop throughout the operating life of the
process unit.
 Collapsed Fractionating Column

EDS 2004/RV-5

Not all hazards are addressed with pressure relief. This incident occurred during a
repair operation. Hot metal from a welder’s torch ignited polymer that had built-up
on the trays in this fractionating column. The ensuing fire weakened the vessel wall,
and caused it to collapse under its own weight. .
 Failed Pressure Test

EDS 2004/RV-6

Here is another example. A pressure test was conducted on this vessel during an
exceptionally cold winter day. The vessel failed due to brittle fracture before its
design pressure was reached.

Note: A relief valve is typically removed prior to the pressure test, and its inlet
nozzle is blanked-off. Hazards associated with pressure tests must be managed
using other safety systems, such as testing protocols.
 OSHA 1910.119 Process Safety Management

„ Process Safety Information

„ Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)
„ Operating Procedures
„ Training
„ Pre-Startup Safety Review
„ Hot Work Permits
„ Management of Change
„ Incident Investigation
„ Emergency Planning

EDS 2004/RV-7

Although OSHA 1910.119 has a comprehensive set of process safety

requirements, we will only focus on one of their requirements.

Process hazard analysis (PHA) identifies the events that can cause high pressure
in a process unit. Thus, the PHA report provides a convenient source for those
overpressure events that are addressed by pressure relief protection.

Safety checklists can also be used to generate a list of high pressure events.
These lists appear in API recommended practice, Center for Chemical Process
Safety (CCPS) publications, and journal articles.
 OSHA Requirements

„ Accepted methodologies for the process hazard

analysis (What If, HAZOP, FMEA, Fault Tree)
„ Team make-up and experience level
„ Systematic review of the process unit
„ Documentation of the process hazard study
„ Protocol of resolving action items and managing
changes to the process design
„ Periodic updating of the hazard analysis

EDS 2004/RV-8

Various techniques can be used for PHA, and the choice depends on process
complexity, the past incident history, the available personnel and other factors.
Since the PHA lists pressure relief valves as safeguards for high pressure events, it
provides information pertinent to relief system design.

The PHA team should include personnel familiar with the design and operation of
the process unit, and it should led by a person experienced in PHA methodology.

PHA recommendations must be reviewed and resolved, and action taken by the
follow-up team must be documented.
 Factors Affecting PHA Methodology

„ Current Stage of the Design

„ System Characteristics
– Complexity
– Type of operation
– Nature of hazard
– Event of concern
„ Perceived Risk and Experience
– Length of experience
– Accident history
– Potential risk

EDS 2004/RV-9

Before conducting the PHA, the team leader determines:

• What is the goal of the PHA?

• What PHA methodology is best suited to that goal?
• What information is available?
• What experience level is needed for team members?
• What practical constraints are imposed on the study?
Factors Affecting PHA Methodology
(continued)

„ Available Resources and Preferences

– Personnel availability
– Time constraints
– Funding
– Consistency

EDS 2004/RV-10
 Approved PHA Methods

„ Checklist
„ "What if " Analysis
„ Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
„ Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Studies
„ Fault Tree Analysis

EDS 2004/RV-11

OSHA approves five PHA methodologies. The owner/operator is free to choose any
method on this list, but we will focus on HAZOP methodology..
 HAZOP
Methodology

EDS 2004/RV-12

Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Analysis is a systematic, team effort that uses
process deviations to identify hazards and operating problems.
 HAZOP Objectives

„ Identify credible causes, consequences, and safeguards

„ Qualitatively rank each credible scenario
„ Recommend improvements to the process design or to
its operation
„ Provide compatible information for subsequent process
safety efforts
„ Comply with OSHA’s process safety requirements

EDS 2004/RV-13

The HAZOP study has five main objectives as listed above. Although OSHA
requires a process hazard analysis to be performed, the benefits of the HAZOP
study go far beyond regulatory compliance.

Note: After the HAZOP study is complete, an action plan must be developed to
address recommendations. All recommendations are reviewed, and if accepted,
they must have an implementation plan. Hazards identified but not addressed will
dramatically increase the owner’s liability.
 Scope of HAZOP Analyses

„ Review is limited to the piping, instrumentation, and

equipment shown on the P&IDs
„ Review is limited to deviations from normal operation
„ Primary intent is to identify hazards
„ Impact of process unit on the utility systems or other
process units will be noted as requiring further study

EDS 2004/RV-14

The scope of the HAZOP study must be defined prior to conducting the
analysis. Otherwise, the study can easily expand beyond allocated time and
resources. A well planned study minimizes the potential for a cursory
analysis toward the end of the study due to time pressure.
 Process Unit Interface
Feed(s) from Other
Feed(s) from Storage
Process Units

Utilities

Injection
Chemicals

Process Unit
Catalysts,
Absorbents

Ancillary
Systems

Product(s) to Other Product(s)

Process Units to Storage
EDS 2004/RV-15

The process unit may affect or be affected by upstream units, storage

facilities, utility systems, etc. Process deviations entering the process unit
boundary need to be included in the HAZOP study. In addition,
consequences may propagate outside the boundary and create hazards in
downstream units, systems, or facilities. Deviations originating outside the
boundary are addressed in the feed node, an equipment node, or a global
node, e.g. utility system failure. Consequences propagating outside the
process unit boundary are captured in recommendations, which are then
transmitted to the person responsible for the downstream unit, system, or
utility.
 HAZOP Flowchart
Study Node

Design Intention

Process Deviation

Causes
Consequences
Safeguards
Risk Ranking
Recommendations

Yes
More Deviations ?

Yes
Other Nodes ?
EDS 2004/RV-16

The flowchart illustrates major aspects of HAZOP methodology, ensuring that

each study node and process deviation is systematically analyzed.
 Study Nodes

„ P&IDs for the process unit are broken into manageable

sections called study nodes.
„ Study nodes generally consist of major unit operations
and associated piping.
„ Study nodes are defined prior to the meeting, but can be
redefined by the PHA team as needed.
„ A “Global Issues” node is included to capture hazardous
events that impact the entire process unit. For example:
– Loss of containment
– Sampling
– PSV maintenance
– Utility failure
– Facility siting and equipment spacing
EDS 2004/RV-17

Generally, a HAZOP team needs 1-2 hours to analyze each study node, based
on average size and complexity. The number of nodes can be used for cost
estimates, meeting planning, or as a coarse measure of study progress.

There is no “right” way to break the process unit into study nodes. Node size
depends on process complexity, team experience, company policy, and/or
personal preference. However, node size may affect team efficiency. If
nodes are defined too small, the study becomes tedious and team members
may lose interest. If nodes are defined too large, the team may get lost in
their analysis and miss important hazards.
 Problem 1A: Node Break-Up

Using the Process Flow Diagram provided, divide the

C3/C4 Splitter into study nodes.

z There is no “right” way to define study nodes.

z Focus on defining manageable study sections.
z Unit operations with associated piping make
convenient node breaks.
z There is a direct relationship between the size of the
node and the number of process deviations analyzed in
that node.
z An external heat stream can be incorporated in the
exchanger node or it may be defined as a separate
node.
EDS 2004/RV-18

Take away message from this problem:

1. There is no right way to define the study nodes. Node size is a function of
the skill of the team leader, personal preference, team experience, and
process complexity.
2. There is a direct relationship between node size and the process deviations
considered in that node. As a node gets smaller, process deviations are
fewer.
3. Utilities that interface with the process unit can be added to the equipment
using that utility, or they can be defined as a separate node. If the utility is
added to the equipment node, utility system deviations are entered as
causes.
 Process Deviations

„ Process deviations are developed list for each node.

„ Controlled variables are, by definition, important to
process operation and deviations (high/low) from the
control point should be considered.
„ Unit operations may also indicate process variables.
„ Once significant process variables are identified, the
process deviations follow automatically.
„ Supplement the process deviation list using deviation
lists given in commercial software and/or process safety
books.

EDS 2004/RV-19

Process deviations provide structure to the HAZOP study. Once a deviation is

defined, causes for that deviation are determined, consequences investigated,
safeguards noted, and recommendations made.

Process control indicates which variables are important, and as such, it makes
a significant contribution to the deviation list. For example if pressure is
controlled, both high pressure and low pressure deviations should be analyzed

Likewise, unit operations can supplement the deviation list. For example, a
fractionating column (unit operation) distributes feed components into two or
more product streams. If the fractionating column does not function as
designed, heavy components will exit with the overhead product, or light
components will exit with the bottoms. Either way, poor fractionation should
be considered as a process deviation.

Deviation lists are included in commercial software, and published in books,

and can be used to stimulate your thinking.
 Design Intent for Process Parameters

„ The design intent for each process parameter should

be listed.
„ Design intent identifies:
– Control range for a process variable.
– Unit operation being conducted.
– Operating procedure being performed.
„ The normal operating range for a process variable is
the difference between rated and turndown operation.

EDS 2004/RV-20

The design intent defines the safe operating envelop for a process variable,
and process deviations are defined as those falling outside that range. For
example, if a pump is designed for 50%-125% of its normal operating
capacity, the low flow deviation only considers the consequence of flow less
than 50%. Likewise, the high flow deviation only considers the consequences
of flow greater than 125%.
 Problem 1B: Process Deviations

Using the P&ID provided, identify the process variables

that apply to the overhead condenser system (node
highlighted in yellow). Construct your process deviation
list based on these process variables.

z Use the process control instrumentation to help

identify the process variables.
z Determine the function of the unit operations
contained in the node, and add that functionality to
your process variable list.
z For each process variable, build a deviation list by
adding a guideword to the process variable.

EDS 2004/RV-21

Take away message from this problem:

1. Only those process variables that are controlled within the study node
are listed. Likewise, only the unit operations found in the study node
are considered.
2. Process control and unit operations indicate which variables are
significant.
3. Supplement your process deviation list using commercially available
deviation lists. Refer to the deviation list provided for this problem.
4. Once the process variables are identified, deviations are constructed
using guidewords. For example if “pressure” is the process variable,
the standard guidewords are “high” and “low”. Process deviations for
“pressure”become “high pressure” and “low pressure”.
 Determining the Causes for a Deviation

„ Consider only those causes that originate within

the study node boundary.
„ Deviations could be caused by:
– Equipment or process control failure
– Human error
– Loss of utilities
– External events, e.g. fire
– Long term processes, e.g. erosion, corrosion, coking
„ If process instrumentation crosses a node
boundary, control malfunction is considered a
cause in both nodes.

EDS 2004/RV-22

Once the process deviations are identified, causes for each deviation must be
determined. Only those causes originating within the node are analyzed. This
strategy focuses team effort, minimizes redundancy, and makes the HAZOP
study more efficient.

If process instrumentation can cause a deviation in two nodes, control

malfunction is considered a cause in both nodes. For example if a level
instrument resets a flow controller, this dual control function would be
assigned to each node. In this case, the level deviation is considered in the
vessel node, and the flow deviation is considered in the liquid outlet node.
 Determining the Causes for a Deviation
(continued)

„ Deviations that require the simultaneous occurrence

of two or more unrelated causes are not considered in
the HAZOP study.
„ Process deviations occurring upstream of the process
unit, and therefore outside the study scope, are
included in the feed node as “causes”.

EDS 2004/RV-23

The probability that two unrelated causes will occur at the same time is very
remote, but not impossible. If the consequence of two unrelated events
occurring simultaneously is catastrophic, this low probability event is better
investigated using fault tree analysis.

Process deviations that occur upstream of the node boundary are included in
the feed node as “causes”. For example, changes in feed composition can be
listed as causes in the “As Well As Flow” deviation.
 Problem 1C: Causes

Using the P&ID for the overhead condensing system, list the
causes for two deviations: “High Pressure” and “Low Pressure”.

z Consider this failure list when determining causes.

– Equipment or process control failure
– Human error
– Loss of utilities
– External events
– Long term processes
z Loss of control function is treated as a single cause, and
it is not broken down to its component parts, ie. a sense
element, process controller, valve, improper set point,
improper isolation, etc.

EDS 2004/RV-24

Take away message from this problem:

1. For each process deviation, develop a list of causes for that deviation.
After the list is completed, the individual causes can be further analyzed,
i.e. determining consequences, identifying safeguards, etc.
2. Focus on loss of function to combine a number of causes, assuming that
each cause has similar consequences. For example, condenser duty can be
lowered by control failure, losing electric power to the fans, vapor
blanketing, etc. However, the consequences of reduced heat removal is
qualitatively the same regardless of the cause.
3. Include equipment names and item numbers in all descriptions. This
makes the HAZOP study more understandable for future users.
 Consequences

„ Describe all consequences, even those that propagate

outside the node.
„ Consequences may include:
– Personnel injury
– Environmental damage
– Equipment damage
– Property loss
– Extended downtime
– Operability problems
„ Consequences are described assuming there are no
safeguards.
„ Describe consequences as a chronological sequence
of events.
EDS 2004/RV-25

Causes are limited to the study node, but consequences are not. Since
consequences (effects) are linked to a specific cause, a complete description
of the failure event must include consequences that propagate outside the
study node.

Consequences include hazardous situations, as well as significant financial

losses. Destroying $10 million worth of catalyst, or having extended
downtime should be noted even though they are not particularly hazardous.

If the consequence is a minor upset or an operability issue, it is listed as a

consequence, but safeguards, recommendations, etc. are not. This approach
helps to make the HAZOP study more efficient.

Describing consequences chronologically makes the failure event easier to

follow. It also makes it easier to link specific safeguards to specific
consequences. For example, high pressure may trigger an alarm, high-high
pressure may trigger a shutdown, overpressure will lift the relief valve, and
excessive pressure may cause loss of containment.
 Safeguards

„ Safeguards may include:

– Equipment design
– Instrumentation (control and shutdown)
– Pressure relief valves, depressuring valves
– Administrative procedures
„ Only list those instruments that have an alarm as a
safeguard.
„ Control instrumentation response must automatically
correct or mitigate a process deviation.
„ Operator training and administrative procedures can
be listed provided they are part of an overall process
safety management program.
EDS 2004/RV-26

Safeguards has many areas to cover.

• the original inherit design philosophy,

• effective instrumentation for providing stable operation and also early

warning for potential abnormal operation,

• establishing practical and executable administrative procedures to avoid

foreseeable incidents,

• regular maintenance and inspection is another area of safeguards which

could reduce incidents and provide better operation,

• emergency response is the last part of safeguards, which must be

practiced regularly.
 Problem 1D: Consequences and Safeguards

Using the P&ID provided for the overhead condensing system,

describe the consequences and safeguards for each cause of
high and low pressure.

z Determine the consequence(s) for each cause listed for

the high and low pressure deviations.
z Describe significant consequences, including those that
propagate outside the node.
z Describe consequences chronologically.
z For each consequence, list the safeguards that will
prevent it from happening, mitigate the effect, or alert
the operator to take corrective action.

EDS 2004/RV-27

Take away message from this problem:

1. The analysis for the failure event is recorded hierarchically. Consequences

are attached to a cause; safeguards and recommendations are attached to
consequences
2. Only significant consequences are pursued beyond the study node. Not
every consequence originating in the feed node has to be pursued to the
product storage tank.
3. Safeguards are be linked to consequences. If a consequence is severe has
no safeguard, a recommendation should probably be made.
4. Consequences limited to operability problems do not have to be analyzed
further, i.e. safeguards and recommendations do not have to be listed.
 Qualitative Risk Assessment

„ Rankings establish a priority for resolving action items

and a rationale for allocating process safety resources.
„ It considers the severity of the event and the likelihood
that it will occur.
„ Severity is assigned assuming the safeguards do not
respond as designed.
„ Likelihood is assigned assuming that the safeguards do
respond as designed.
„ If sufficient information is not available to estimate the
risk ranking, a recommendation should be made for
further study.

EDS 2004/RV-28

A risk ranking system must be established prior to the HAZOP study. The
size of the risk matrix should reflect HSE policy and be used consistently
throughout the company.

Risk is defined by a combination of the severity of the event and the

likelihood that it will occur. If an event is catastrophic, but the team considers
that it is highly unlikely to occur, consider using fault tree analysis to further
evaluate the risk.

Risk ranking is generally not applied to operability problems.

 Severity Definitions

Level I II III IV
Description Catastrophic Severe Moderate Low
Human Impact Death Injury Minor None
Environmental Damage Major Serious Minor None
Production Loss > 6 Months 1- 6 Months 1- 4 Weeks < 1 week
Damage Value > $10M $1M - $10M $0.1M - $1M < $0.1M

M = Million

EDS 2004/RV-29

Severity has three factors to consider: human impact, environmental damage,

and economic losses.

The consequence with the highest severity ranking determines the severity
level.
 Likelihood Definitions

„ Frequent (Level 1)
– Expected to occur frequently (many times a year)
„ Occasional (Level 2)
– Expected to occur occasionally (once a year)
„ Infrequent (Level 3)
– Expected to occur under unusual circumstances
(once or twice during facility lifetime)
„ Unlikely (Level 4)
– Could occur; however, not likely during facility
lifetime

EDS 2004/RV-30

Determining the frequency of an event is based on operating history or an

informed opinion. Most of the time the team reaches consensus about
likelihood of an event. On those few occasions where disagreements arise,
enter the lower of the two level numbers into the matrix, i.e. the highest
frequency estimate) into the matrix. If the risk ranking doesn’t change, there
is no need to reconcile the different opinions. If the ranking changes, select
the level that triggers an action acceptable to the team.
 Risk Ranking Matrix

Severity

I II III IV

Likelihood 1 D D C B
2 D C B A
3 C A A A
4 A A A A

EDS 2004/RV-31

Based on likelihood and the severity of an event, its risk ranking is

determined. Except for the “A” ranking, each ranking has an associated
action as shown on the next slide.

Note: “D” risk rankings require a design change to improve the ranking to
“C” or better. As such, they are only assigned to a consequence and its
safeguards when it is absolutely necessary.
 Response to Risk Ranking

Ranking Action

A No action required; risk is considered acceptable.

B Consider adding an administrative control to manage

risk.

C Consider a design change and/or administrative control

to manage risk.

D Risk is unacceptable; a design change is required to

improve the risk ranking to “C” or better.

EDS 2004/RV-32

The Ranking-Action Table given above is UOP’s risk matrix. Each

company must determine what actions are required for a given a risk
ranking, and these definitions should be used consistently throughout the
company.

The risk ranking can be used to prioritize recommendations (action items).

Although “A” risk ratings do not require an action, the team can still make
recommendations that improve safety or operability.

As mentioned previously, the “D” risk ranking requires a design change to

improve the ranking to “C” or better. As such, they are only assigned to a
consequence and its safeguards when it is absolutely necessary.
 Recommendations

„ Recommendations are made to:

– Eliminate a cause
– Prevent or mitigate the consequence
– Reduce the likelihood that the hazard will occur

„ Examples of recommendations include:

– Equipment changes
– Instrumentation changes
– Further study needed
– Verification of design assumptions
– Administrative systems to manage hazards
– Inspection and maintenance
– Operator training

EDS 2004/RV-33

Recommendations are made to improve safety and/or operability of the

process unit.

Whether or not a recommendation is accepted, a follow-up (or close-out)

report, documenting the action taken for each recommendation, is required by
OSHA.
 Engineering Review of Recommendations

Make Engineering review:

Recommendation
Address the Hazard?
Introduce New Hazards?
Warranted Given Risk?
Assign Technically Feasible?
Responsibility Best Option?

Assign Priority
Implement or Reject
Recommendation

During After
HAZOP HAZOP Document Decision in
Meeting Meeting Follow-up Report

EDS 2004/RV-34

The process hazard analysis has four phases: the HAZOP meeting itself, an
engineering review of all recommendations, implementation of those that are
valid, and issuing a close-out report. The PHA is not finished until all four
phases are complete.

Since the recommendations are made in a brain-storming session, not every

recommendation will actually improve safety and operability. If the
engineering review determines that a recommendation does not address the
hazard, introduces new hazards, etc., it may be rejected. However, the
reason(s) for rejection must be clearly documented.
 Using the Results from a HAZOP Study
List of Overpressure Events
Requiring PRV Protection Enhanced Process Safety
Management Systems

Rationale For
Allocating Resources

HAZOP
Study Results
Operator Training

Documentation
Required by OSHA
EDS 2004/RV-35

Documentation for the HAZOP study not only meets OSHA requirements,
but also provides information for operator training, and a rationale for
allocating resources for process safety.
 Fire-Heated Boiler

EDS 2004/RV-36

Multiple attempts to light a fire-heated steam boiler were unsuccessful. The

operator’s last attempt to ignite the fuel was catastrophic.
 Process Modeling
for Relief Conditions

EDS 2004/RV-37

Heat and mass balances are constructed at relief conditions to determine the amount of
material that needs to be relieved to limit overpressure .
The process model for relief conditions incorporates assumptions that can significantly
affect the relieving rate obtained, and API recommendations regarding those
assumptions are closely followed.
A process model is constructed for each overpressure case identified in the safety
checklist or HAZOP study. Once the relieving rates are determined for the overpressure
cases, the maximum rate is used to size and select the pressure relief device.
 Heat and Mass Balances

Steady State Balance:

In = Out

Unsteady State Balance:

In + Depletion = Out + Accumulation

EDS 2004/RV-38

Steady state balances are used for process design, but unsteady state balances
are required for relief calculations. Although only two terms are added to the
unsteady state equation, multiple, non-linear differential equations result, and
complicate the analysis immensely.

However for most problems, a time interval can be carefully selected, and
quasi-unsteady state balances constructed. This reduces the problem to one
that can be solved algebraically. The difficulty with this approach is
selecting the “right” time interval.
 Blocked Outlet Transient

RS 31.4-R00-4
EDS 2004/RV-39

For a blocked liquid outlet, flow through the relief valve will increase very
rapidly once the vessel becomes liquid full. The time interval chosen to
construct the heat and weight balance occurs after the surge drum liquid fills.
 Upstream Control Valve Fails Open

RS 31.4-R00-5
EDS 2004/RV-40

When the upstream control valve fails open, liquid from the HP separator
flows into the LP Flash drum. Once the liquid level in the HP separator is
lost, reactor vapor breaks through, and the reactor circuit depressurizes into
the LP Flash Drum, causing its pressure to rise rapidly. The pressure relief
valve on the LP Flash Drum will open and relieve the excess flow. As
pressure in the reactor circuit decreases, less mass will flow into the the flash
drum, and the relieving rate will tail off.

The time interval selected to construct the relieving heat and mass balance.
occurs relatively soon after the failure event, when HP reactor circuit
pressure is at its maximum.
 Relief Model Development

„ Identify Credible Causes for Overpressure

„ Determine the Sequence of Events

„ Rate Equipment Performance for Relief Conditions

„ Consider Instrumentation Response

EDS 2004/RV-41

The credible causes of overpressure are determined using a safety checklist or a

HAZOP study.

If a HAZOP study was conducted, the sequence of events can be extracted from
the HAZOP report. If a safety checklist was used to identify the causes of
overpressure, the sequence of events will have to be constructed. As the failure
event progresses, additional failures may occur, and the relief model has to take
the worsening situation into account.

Process conditions during relief can be significantly different from normal

operation. As such, equipment must be rated to determine its performance under
relief conditions.

API recommended practice does not allow credit for a beneficial instrumentation
response during the relief event. However, if the normal instrumentation
response increases the relief load, it is assumed to function as designed.
 Codes and Practices

ASME Code Requirements

Section I Steam Systems

Section VIII Pressure Vessels

API Recommended Practice

520 Parts I & II Sizing, Selection, and

Installation of Pressure Relieving Devices
in Refineries
521 Guide for Pressure Relieving and
Depressuring Systems
2000 Atmospheric and Low Pressure Storage

EDS 2004/RV-42

Normal calculation procedures are based on API RP 520/521.

 Simplifying Assumptions

If simplifying assumptions are made, they should:

„ Incrementally increase the relieving rate

„ Have minimal economic impact
„ Consider the risk associated with making a wrong
assumption
„ Make use of available information

EDS 2004/RV-43

Any simplifying assumption should incrementally increase the relieving rate

to provide some conservatism in the analysis.

However, no simplifying assumption can be in conflict with applicable codes

or standards.
 Instrumentation Response
API recommends that no credit for instrumentation
response should be taken if that response reduces
the relieving requirement.

RS 31.4-R00-7
EDS 2004/RV-44

We can take credit for the valve’s normal position when calculating the
relieving requirement.
 Instrumentation Response

API recommends that instrumentation should be

assumed to respond as designed if that response
increases the relieving requirement.

RS 31.4-R00-8
EDS 2004/RV-45

The maximum required relieving rate is the maximum expected inlet flow
based on this diagram.
 Operator Response

„ Consider the time it takes to correct the problem

„ Do not assume the operator will respond if
the emergency affects many process variables
simultaneously (multiple alarms)
„ Assess operator effectiveness
„ Consider the risk involved if the operator does
not respond as assumed

EDS 2004/RV-46

To take an operator intervention credit to avoid a contingency case, the

typical operator response time is 10 to 20 minutes. In most cases, the
intervention credit is taken for a blocked liquid outlet case.
 PSV Calculations:External Fire

EDS 2004/RV-47

The following section will concentrate on the relief valve calculation for an external
fire.
 EDS 2004/RV-48

I don’t know where this picture came from, but I thought it provided a sobering
introduction to external fires.
 Feed Surge Drum

LLC

RS 31.5-R00-9a
EDS 2004/RV-49

A feed surge drum system will be examined in this section to determine the
relieving rate during an external fire. Feed is normally pumped to the drum,
and liquid is pressured out of the surge drum to a fractionating column.
 Fire Case Model

„ Assume that the operator stops

feed to the surge drum
„ Heat from the fire will vaporize
the stagnant liquid
„ The relieving rate is equal to
vaporization rate

Qfire RS 31.5-R00-9c
EDS 2004/RV-50

For the fire case model, it is assumed that the system is isolated, i.e. there is
no liquid input and no liquid output.
 Heat Input Due to External Fire

Q = 2100FA0.82

where: Q = heat input due to fire, Btu/h

F = environmental factor
A = wetted surface area, ft2

EDS 2004/RV-51

The heat input equation is based on API Recommended Practice 521. This
equation assumes that English units of measurement are used.
 Environmental Factor

„ The environmental factor provides a credit for

insulation reducing heat input to the vessel.
„ If the insulation can be dislodged by water spray
from the fire hoses, F = 1.0.
„ The factor assumes General Refining Conditions,
such as:
– Ground sloped; no pools of flammable liquid
beneath the vessel
– Adequate fire fighting equipment is available
– Trained personnel

EDS 2004/RV-52

The environmental factor (F) can be less than 1.0 if credit is taken for fire
proof insulation. API RP 520 lists environmental factors for various
insulation thickness. UOP recommends that a minimum environmental factor
0.075, regardless of insulation thickness.

Uninsulated vessels have an environmental factor of 1.0.

 Wetted Surface Area

25 ft.
Elev.

RS 31.5-R00-10
EDS 2004/RV-53

API Recommended Practice specifies 25 ft as the effective fire height.

If the actual liquid level is lower than 25 ft from grade, we use the actual
liquid height to calculate the wetted surface area of the vessel. If the liquid
level is higher than 25 ft, then the wetted surface area of the vessel should be
calculated based on 25 ft.

For trayed vessels, assume 2 to 3 inch liquid hold-up on each tray. The total
liquid height of a trayed vessel includes the bottom liquid inventory plus the
sum of the liquid holdup on all the trays. Then apply the 25 ft effective fire
height for wetted surface area.

For packed columns, the total liquid height is the bottom liquid inventory plus
5% of the packing volume.
 Vaporization Rate

Q
Wfire =
∆Hv

„ Minimum latent heat of vaporization is 50 Btu/lb

„ Above critical temperature, expansion rate of the
dense fluid is estimated using the vaporization
approach

EDS 2004/RV-54

The liquid vaporization rate inside the vessel can be calculated by dividing the
total heat input by the latent heat of vaporization of the liquid. This
vaporization rate is equal to the required relieving rate through the relief
valve.

The latent heat of vaporization is calculated at the relieving pressure. Usually

the latent heat of vaporization of the liquid at relieving conditions should be
determined by computer simulation.

When the relieving conditions approach critical, the latent heat of

vaporization approaches zero. In this case we use a latent heat of vaporization
of 50 Btu/lb.
 Latent Heat of Vaporization

EDS 2004/RV-55

Figure A-1 of API RP 521 is for pure single-component paraffin hydrocarbon

liquids. This figure can be used for rough estimation when simulation data is
unavailable.

The latent heat of vaporization can be found by using the vapor pressure (i.e.
absolute relieving pressure) and molecular weight of the boiling liquid. The
chart will also provide the relieving temperature.

The maximum relieving temperature should be limited to 800oF, due to the

possibility of coking and/or cracking. Do not extrapolate on this chart to
obtain latent heat of vaporization.
 Problem 2: Relief Rate for an External Fire

„ Design Pressure = 50 psig

„ Vessel Tangent Length = 15 ft.
15 ft. „ Liquid Mole Weight = 100
6 ft. „ Vessel Diameter = 5 ft.
„ Liquid Height = 6 ft.
„ Vessel Elevation = 18 ft.
18 ft. „ ∆Hv = 75 BTU/lb

(Hint: The surface area for an elliptical head = 1.089D2 )

EDS 2004/RV-56

Using the data given in the problem, calculate the vapor relieving rate. Use
Figure D-3 in API RP 520 to estimate the latent heat of vaporization and the
relieving temperature.
 Liquid Filled Vessel: Initial Conditions

Initially, all liquid is

displaced out the PSV

Qfire Qfire

EDS 2004/RV-57

Initially, thermal expansion causes liquid to be released through the relief

valve, even before vaporization takes place.

After the initial thermal relieving stage, vapor will form at the top of the
vessel, and the relieving material will be two phase because there is no vapor-
liquid disengaging space available.
 Liquid Filled Vessel: Later Conditions

Later on, sufficient space is

available for vapor-liquid
disengagement, and all vapor
flows out the PSV

Qfire Qfire

EDS 2004/RV-58

The above diagram shown that sufficient space is available for vapor-liquid
disengagement, and all vapor flows out the relief valve.
 UOP Design Practice for Liquid Full Vessels

„ Size PSV for all vapor flow

„ Rate PSV selected for all liquid flow and report
liquid flow rate
„ Determine the total volume of liquid discharged
to relief header and report that volume for
sizing the flare KO drum
„ If auto-chilling occurs upon flashing in the relief
header, report the flash temperature obtained

EDS 2004/RV-59

The KO Drum should be designed by the largest liquid discharge volume of

all casualties, including fire cases.

Auto-chilling minimum temperatures will affect the design of the material for
the relief valve and the relief header.
 PSV Calculations:
Debutanizer

EDS 2004/RV-60

The Debutanizer relief valves calculations are covered in the following section.
 Debutanizer

EDS 2004/RV-61

The debutanizer has a fire-heated reboiler, feed-bottoms exchanger, and an air-

cooled condenser. Pressure is maintained by adjusting the net vapor rate. Net
overhead liquid is flow controlled. Reflux and net bottoms product are adjusted on
level control.
 Problem 3: Construct a HWB at Normal Conditions
Using the HWB report for normal conditions, construct a heat
and weight balance around two sections of the fractionating
column.
„ Draw an envelope around fractionating column,
including the feed -bottoms exchanger and reboiler,
but not the overhead system.
„ Draw a second envelope around the overhead
condensing system, including the condenser and
overhead receiver.
„ Construct a HWB for each envelope, assigning
positive values to streams entering the envelope
and negative values to streams leaving.
„ Sum the heat and mass streams entering/leaving
the envelope, and confirm that the total is zero.
EDS 2004/RV-62

Take away message from this problem:

1. The normal heat and weight balance is modified to construct the HWB at
relieving conditions. If everything balances at normal conditions, proceed
with the relief analysis. If heat and mass do not balance for both envelopes,
correct your mistake before proceeding with the relief analysis.

2. Two envelopes are used to construct the heat and weight balances because
this format makes the relief analysis somewhat easier.
 Summary of Overpressure Events
for the Debutanizer

„ Electrical power failure (refinery wide & localized)

„ Loss of air-cooled condenser duty
„ Reflux failure
„ Pressure control loop malfunctions
„ Product separator LLC fails open
„ External fire

EDS 2004/RV-63

These are the main overpressure events considered in this training session.
The overpressure events could have been taken from a safety checklist, or
they could have been extracted from the HAZOP report.

There are other overpressure cases not listed here, e.g. higher than normal
reboiler duty, but these cases usually do not govern PRV sizing, nor does they
impact the flare design. However, the designer should use engineering
judgment regarding pertinent overpressure cases for a specific design.
 Refinery-Wide Electrical Power Failure

„ Motor-driven feed pump stops.

„ Low-low flow shutdown stops reboiler firing; 40% reboiler
duty remains due to radiation as the refractory cools down.
„ Condenser fans stop; 20% residual duty remains due to
natural convection.
„ Receiver level control eventually stops reflux; bottoms level
control stops net bottoms product.
„ Once feed and reflux stop, no fractionation occurs.
„ Pressure controller will open the net vapor product valve.
However, no credit is taken for this instrumentation
response.

EDS 2004/RV-64

Although not shown, the feed is pumped to the debutanizer, When electrical
power is lost, the motor driven feed pump stops. If the feed is pressured into
the column, feed may/may not continue depending on upstream control, and
system hydraulics during the relief event.

UOP assumes that the low-low flow shutdown instrumentation functions as

designed when sizing the relief valve. If heater firing continued with no flow,
the heater tubes would rupture in a few minutes. Since a relief valve cannot
protect the system from over-temperature, this is not a SIZING case for the
relief valve.

API recommended practice allows a 20-30% residual duty credit for air-
cooled exchangers. UOP conservatively uses 20%.

If the receiver level control functions as designed, it would close the reflux
valve. Since losing reflux tends to increase the relieving rate, API
recommends that reflex be stopped.

If the pressure controller functions as designed, it would open the net vapor
product valve. Since this would reduce the relieving rate, API recommends
that the pressure control valve be “frozen”in its normal position.
 Debutanizer
(Electrical Power Failure Model)

Condenser Duty
(natural convection)

HWB 1 HWB II

Reboiler Duty
(radiation from refractory)

EDS 2004/RV-65

Analysis of the power failure model requires two steps. First, construct a heat
and material balance around the column (HWB I) to determine the quantity of
bottoms material that has to be vaporized to maintain heat balance. Second,
construct a heat and mass balance on the overhead system to determine the
relieving rate required during the power failure.
 Power Failure HWB I

Mass Heat

Reboiler Duty + QREB

Vaporized Bottoms − WB − WBhv
Depleted Bottoms + WB + WBhl
Liquid

Total 0 0

EDS 2004/RV-66

The heat and mass must balance during relief.

Note: In order to balance heat and mass during relief conditions, bottoms
liquid is vaporized (depleted). The vaporized bottoms material then leaves
the envelope and removes the excess enthalpy.
 HWB I: Power Failure Case
(Working Equations)

0 = QREB − WBhv + WBhl

QREB
WB =
∆H V

Vaporization rate is determined by solving heat

and mass balance equations simultaneously.

EDS 2004/RV-67

If the reboiler duty during relieving conditions is known, then the amount of
material that is vaporized can be directly calculated if the latent heat of
vaporization of the material is known.

If the feed is assumed to continue, then the material to be vaporized is based

on feed composition. If the feed is assumed to stop, then the material to be
vaporized is based on bottoms composition.
 HWB II: Power Failure Case

Residual Condenser Credit (natural convection):

Qcond
Wcond =
∆H v

Relieving rate (difference between vaporization

rate and residual condensation rate and net vapor):

Wrel = WB − Wcond − Wnet vap

EDS 2004/RV-68

The air condenser will still have partial condensing duty based on natural air
convection. It is acceptable to take 20% of the normal air condensing duty as
the residual condenser credit.

The latent heat of vaporization in this equation (HWB II) should be the same
as that used in HWB I.

The amount of vapor to be relieved is the difference between the quantity of

vapor generated in the column less the quantity of vapor condensed in the air
condenser and leaving as net vapor. The difference is is equal to the relieving
rate for the electrical power failure.
 Problem 4: Construct HWB I at Relief Conditions
Using the working equation for HWB I, determine the amount
of bottoms vapor that must leave the first envelope to obtain a
heat and mass balance during the electrical power failure
case.
„ Assume that your process simulator reported the
bubble point temperature of the bottoms liquid
was 435°F at relieving pressure, and that its
specific enthalpy was 230 BTU/lb.
„ In addition, assume that your process simulator
reported the specific enthalpy the bottoms vapor
to be 315 BTU/lb for the first bubble.
„ Determine the amount of bottoms liquid that must
be vaporized the balance the system during an
electrical power failure.
EDS 2004/RV-69

Take away message from this problem:

1. Heat and weight must balance during for relief conditions. Bottoms liquid
is vaporized to obtain a heat balance, and its depletion must be accounted for.

2. Debutanizer pressure increases during relief, and this effects bottoms

temperature, and the specific enthalpy of the bottoms liquid and vapor.

3. Bottoms material will reach the top of the debutanizer only after the trays
dry out, and this generally takes 10-15 minutes to occur. (No fractionation
will occur once the tray liquid is gone.) A refinery-wide power failure is so
disruptive that it will take hours (not minutes) to recover. Thus, UOP
assumes that bottoms material will have plenty of time to migrate to the top of
the debutanizer.
 Loss of Air-Cooled
Condenser Duty

EDS 2004/RV-70

This section covers the loss of air-cooled condenser duty.

 Loss of Condenser Duty

„ PRC opens wide to attempt pressure control

„ Debutanizer pressure increases in spite of controller
action
„ Liquid inventory in overhead receiver decreases
„ LLC on overhead receiver stops reflux by resetting
FRC on reflux
„ Heavy material migrates to top section as liquid
contacting in top section of debutanizer stops

EDS 2004/RV-71

During the casualty the PRC control valve will attempt to open wide, but API
does not allow to consider this credit. Therefore, we assume the net overhead
vapor will be the normal rate during relieving conditions.

Because the reflux stops, heavy material will migrate to the top of the column.
 Debutanizer
(Model for Loss of Condenser Duty)

Condenser Duty
(natural convection)

HWB 1
HWB II

Reboiler Duty
(normal)

RS 31.6-R00-17
EDS 2004/RV-72

As in the power failure case, the analysis is a two step process, i.e. construct
HWB 1 and then HWB 2.
 Condenser Failure HWB I

Mass Heat

Feed
+Wf +Wf hf
Net bottoms −Wnb −Wnbhnb
Reboiler Duty
+ Qreb
− Wno − Wnohno
Net Overhead Vapor
− WT − WThv
Vaporized Tray Liquid
+ WT + WThl
Depleted Tray Liquid

Total 0 0
EDS 2004/RV-73

The heat and mass balances should not have any accumulation, i.e. net in
must equal net out.
 Vaporized Tray Liquid
(Working Equation)

0 = WFhF − WNBhNB + QREB − WNOhNO − WThv+ WT hl

(WFhF − WNBhNB + QREB − WNOhNO)

WT =
∆Hv

EDS 2004/RV-74

The vaporized liquid inventory must be a positive value to continue,

otherwise assume that fractionation stops and recalculate HWB 1.

The overhead liquid material is used to estimate the latent heat of

vaporization.
 Reflux vs. Liquid Inventory

Normal Operation Reflux Stops

Gross Total Overhead

Overhead at Relief

Reflux Liquid Inventory

on Tray

RS 31.6-R00-18
EDS 2004/RV-75

The above drawing shows normal operation and when the reflux stops.
Notice the liquid inventory on the tray.
 Heat Content of Net Bottoms
(Leaving the Envelop)
Before F/B exchanger After F/B exchanger

F/B exchanger
must be rated
regardless of
heat & mass
envelop

RS 31.6-R00-19
EDS 2004/RV-76

In order to close the heat balance on the fractionator, the F/B exchanger must
be analyzed at relieving conditions. This will then provide the corrected heat
content to the column.
 Feed/Bottoms Exchanger Duty

Thsi

( Thsi − Tcsi ) rel 

Qrel = Qnor  
( Thsi − Tcsi ) nor 
Tcsi

Assumes:

Straight line enthalpy profiles.

Similar thermal effectiveness factor.
Constant overall heat transfer coefficient.
EDS 2004/RV-77

The corrected duty of the F/B exchanger will depend on the inlet temperatures
of the feed and bottoms at relieving conditions.
 Problem 5: Construct HWB I at Relief Conditions
Using the working equation for HWB I, determine the amount
of tray material that must leave the first envelope as a vapor to
obtain a heat and mass balance during a condenser failure case

„ Assume that your process simulator reported the

bubble point temperature of the tray liquid was 180°F
at relieving pressure, and that its specific enthalpy was
80 BTU/lb.
„ In addition, assume that your process simulator
reported the specific enthalpy the tray vapor to be 190
BTU/lb at its dew point.
„ Determine the amount of tray liquid that must be
vaporized the balance the system during an condenser
failure case.
EDS 2004/RV-78

Take away message from this problem:

1. Heat and weight must balance during for relief conditions. Bottoms liquid
is vaporized to obtain a heat balance, and its depletion must be accounted for.

2. Debutanizer pressure increases during relief, and this effects bottoms

temperature, and the specific enthalpy of the bottoms liquid and vapor.

3. Bottoms material will reach the top of the debutanizer only after the trays
dry out, and this generally takes 10-15 minutes to occur. (No fractionation
will occur once the tray liquid is gone.) A refinery-wide power failure is so
disruptive that it will take hours (not minutes) to recover. Thus, UOP
assumes that bottoms material will have plenty of time to migrate to the top of
the debutanizer.
 Condenser Failure HWB II

Mass Heat

Overhead Vapor +Wo + Wo h v

Relieving Rate − (Wo - WA) − (Wo - WA) hv
Condenser Duty − Qcond
Accum. Liq. Inventory − WA − WA hl

Total 0 0

EDS 2004/RV-79

The air condenser will have partial condensing duty based on natural air
convection. It is acceptable to take 20% of the normal air condensing duty as
the residual condenser credit.
 Loss of Condenser Duty Relieving Rate

Residual condenser duty (natural convection):

Qcond
Wcond =
∆Hv
Relieving rate (difference between total vapor rate
leaving debutanizer and residual condensation):

Wrel =Wtotal−Wcond

EDS 2004/RV-80

The residual condenser duty is only for air coolers.

The air condenser will have partial condensing duty based on natural air
convection. It is acceptable to take 20% of the normal air condensing duty as
the residual condenser credit.

The latent heat of vaporization is based on the composition of the liquid in the
overhead receiver.

The amount of vapor to be relieved is the difference between the quantity of

vapor generated in the column less the quantity of vapor condensed in the air
condenser. The net vapor rate will be used to size the relief valve.
 Reality Check

Always check the reasonableness of the calculated relieving

rates for each case.

„ During a reflux failure, loss of condenser duty, or PRC

failing closed, the relieving rate should be similar to the
normal gross overhead rate.

„ During a electrical power failure, the relieving rate

should be similar to the normal reboiler vapor rate.

If the rates differ significantly from that given above,

rationalize the difference, i.e., dramatic loss of reboiler duty
due to low LMTD.
EDS 2004/RV-81

In reality, for the case of reflux failure, loss of condenser, or PRC failing
closed, the required relieving capacity should not be greater than the normal
overhead vapor rate.
 Receiver PRC Fails Closed

„ Net vapor cannot exit overhead system and it blankets

the overhead condenser
„ Lose overhead condenser duty
„ Debutanizer pressure increases
„ LLC on overhead receiver stops reflux by resetting FRC
„ Heavy material migrates to top section as liquid
contacting in top section of debutanizer stops
„ Net overhead liquid continues until pump loses positive
suction

EDS 2004/RV-82

These items refer to the assumptions that are made when the net overhead
vapor control valve fails closed. Refer to Debutanizer flow sketch in Slide 2
of this section.

Since feed continues into the column in this case, use feed composition as the
heavy material to be vaporized.
 Separator LLC Fails Opened

„ Initially, liquid feed rate to column doubles and floods

bottoms section of debutanizer
„ Reactor vapors then enter debutanizer and blanket the
overhead condenser
„ Lose overhead condenser duty
„ PRC opens wide to attempt pressure control
„ Debutanizer pressure increases in spite of controller action
„ LLC on overhead receiver stops reflux by resetting FRC
„ Heavy material migrates to top section as liquid contacting
in top section of debutanizer stops
„ Net overhead liquid continues until pump loses positive
suction
EDS 2004/RV-83

These items refer to the assumptions that are made when the separator control
valve, which is the column’s feed control valve, fails opened. Refer to
Debutanizer flow sketch in Slide 2 of this section.

Even though the PRC control valve will tend to open wide during this
casualty, credit for this cannot be taken. Assume the PRC control valve is at
its normal position.
 Selecting the
Pressure Relief Device

EDS 2004/RV-84

This section provides assistance in selecting the pressure relief valve.

 Types of Relief Devices

„ Spring Loaded Pressure Relief Valve

„ Pilot Operated Pressure Relief Valve
„ Rupture Disc
„ Weighted Pallet
„ Vent Line

EDS 2004/RV-85

Weighted pallet commonly used for tank vents for pressures 2 psig and lower.

Vent lines are sized by hydraulic formulas, and should contain no pockets
(free draining).
 Conventional
Pressure Relief Valve

RS 31.7-R00-22
EDS 2004/RV-86

This type of valve is the most common and are not used where high
backpressures may be present.
 Balanced-Bellows
Pressure Relief Valve

RS-31.7-R00-23
EDS 2004/RV-87

The principal difference between the conventional spring loaded relief valve
and the balanced-bellows spring loaded relief valve is the presence of a
bellows located between the spring and the disk.
 Opening & Closing
Spring-Loaded PSV

EDS 2004/RV-88

This is a detail view of typical opening and closing of a spring loaded relief
valve. This chart plots relieving capacity versus system pressure.

As the system pressure approaches set pressure, the relief valve may start to
leak. Once set pressure is reached, the relief valve pops open, and the
relieving capacity reaches 70 - 80% of the design capacity.

If the system pressure continues to increase, then the relief valve will reach
the fully open position.

Blowdown, which is closing of the valve, follows a different path. Once the
system pressure drops to approximately 93% of the system set pressure, the
valve will close. Blowdown percentage will vary depending on whether the
valve is designed for vapor relief, liquid relief, or two-phase relief.

This chart is valid for conventional and balanced-bellows relief valves.

 Impact on Design

„ Spread between operating and set pressure

(preventing leakage through valve)
„ Inlet pressure loss (avoiding valve chattering)
„ Capacity affected by back pressure (outlet line size,
spring setting, valve type)
„ Rapid opening (free draining inlet and outlet piping)

EDS 2004/RV-89

There is much impact on the design. There is the spread between the
operating and the set pressure. In addition inlet pressure losses must be
reviewed. Rapid opening of the valve is another design criteria.
 Force Balance
Conventional Pressure Relief Valve

RS 31.7.R00- 27
EDS 2004/RV-90

For a conventional relief valve the spring force is opposed by the inlet
pressure force.
 Seating Force
Spring-Loaded Pressure Relief Valve

RS 31.7.R00-26
EDS 2004/RV-91

Fsp is the spring force

Ao is the area of the relief valve orifice
Pb is the total back pressure
Pinlet is the pressure at the inlet to the relief valve orifice

As the operating pressure increases, the seating force decreases. When the
operating pressure approaches the set pressure, the seating force decreases to
zero. When the seating force approaches zero, the valve starts to open.
 Valve Leakage

„ Valve will “simmer” at 92% of set pressure

„ Set pressure of valve is chosen relative to
operating pressure and selected to minimize
leakage, e.g. 10% or 25 psi, whichever is greater
% of Set Pressure
100

Set Pressure

Spread between operating

92

Significant Leakage pressure and set pressure

90

Operating Pressure

EDS 2004/RV-92

These characteristics apply to spring-loaded valves.

To obtain a stable operation, the spread between set pressure and operating
pressure should be a minimum of 10%. The minimum spread should be
larger for liquid or two-phase applications.
 Design Options for Leakage

„ Provide greater pressure differential between operating

and set pressure
„ Lap valve seat surfaces to improve tightness
„ Install elastomeric seats
„ Select a pilot operated relief valve
„ Install spare relief valves to permit maintenance while
unit is operating

EDS 2004/RV-93

The above slide shows the design options for leakage in relief valves.
 Inlet Pressure Loss

„ Valve will “chatter” if the inlet pressure loss exceeds

the blowdown pressure of valve
„ Blowdown pressure varies between 5-7% of PSV set
pressure (depending on valve model)
„ Inlet pressure loss is limited to 3% of the PSV set
pressure % of Set Pressure
97 100
Set Pressure
Minimum Inlet Pressure
95

} Blowdown Pressure
90 93

Operating Pressure
EDS 2004/RV-94

Both API and ASME limit the inlet pressure loss to 3% of the PSV set
pressure for spring loaded relief valves.

The blowdown pressure is the pressure required to reseat the valve after it has
opened during a relieving case.
 Inlet Line Sizing
Pressure Drop Calculated Using
Rated Capacity of Valve

Equivalent length
includes:

Sudden contraction
Elbows
Tee
Reducer
Length of piping

RS 31.7.R00- 40
EDS 2004/RV-95

The sudden contraction means the pipe entrance (from the vessel).

The total frictional loss from the protected vessel to the inlet of the relief
valve should not exceed 3% of the valve’s set pressure.

The pressure drop is based on the valve’s “rated” capacity. For example, if
the required relieving capacity of 5000 lb/hr needs 0.25 in2 orifice area, we
have to select an “F” orifice with 0.307 in2 orifice area. Therefore, the
frictional loss should be based on 6,140 lb/hr of relieving (rated) capacity.
 Design Options for Meeting 3% Inlet ∆P

„ Do not ignore — this is a severe problem

„ Locate PSV nearer to vessel (shorter inlet line)

„ Increase diameter of inlet piping

„ Select a pilot operated relief valve with remote

pressure source

EDS 2004/RV-96

Since this is a code requirement, it should not be ignored.

Other possibilities could include a rounded pipe entrance, or location of the

relief valve on the vessel itself.
 Force Balance
Conventional Pressure Relief Valve

RS 31.7.R00- 25
EDS 2004/RV-97

The above diagram shows the force balance in convention pressure relief
valves.
 Effect of Back Pressure

RS 31.7.R00-29
EDS 2004/RV-98

When the built-up back pressure reaches 10%, there will be no flow through
the relief valve with 10% overpressure. Similarly, when the built-up back
pressure reaches 21%, there will be no flow through the relief valve with 21%
overpressure.
 Force Balance
Balanced Pressure Relief Valve

RS 31.7-R00-30
EDS 2004/RV-99

The back pressure force on the disk is reduced due to the presence of the
bellows.
 Effect of Back Pressure
Balanced Relief Valve
16 %

RS 31.7-.R00-31
EDS 2004/RV-100

If the built-up back pressure is less than 30% of set pressure, the relieving
capacity will not be reduced. The maximum allowable built-up back pressure
for balanced bellows relief valves is 50%.
 Design Options for High Back Pressure

„ Increase diameter of discharge piping

„ Select a balanced bellows or pilot operated relief
valve which can withstand a higher back pressure
„ Offset the back pressure by lowering the
springsetting of a non-balanced pressure relief
valve (constant back pressure only)
„ Lower set pressure of non-balanced pressure relief
valve below vessel design pressure to offset the
higher backpressure

EDS 2004/RV-101

Increasing the diameter of the discharge piping will reduce the built-up back
pressure only. It will have no effect on the superimposed back pressure

Lowering the spring setting will offset the superimposed back pressure only.
It will have no effect on the built-up back pressure.
 Summary
Spring-Loaded Pressure Relief Valves

110
Accumulated Pressure

% of Set Pressure
97 100
Set Pressure (Design Pressure)
Minimum Inlet Pressure
90 92 95

Closing Pressure (Blowdown)

Significant Leakage
Operating Pressure

EDS 2004/RV-102

The above diagram shows the percent of set pressure for spring-loaded
pressure relief valves.
 Sizing for Vapor
Spring Loaded Relief Valve

W TZ If heat capacity ratio is

RA =
CKPacc K b MW unknown, assume CK = 306

RA = Required area, in2

W = Flow rate, lb/hr
C = Coefficient based on Cp/Cv ratio
K = Coefficient of discharge (K = 0.97 for JOS/JBS
series)
Kb = Back pressure correction factor
Pacc = Accumulated pressure, psia
T = Temperature, °R
Z = Compressibility factor
MW = Molecular weight, lb/lb mol
EDS 2004/RV-103

The temperature and compressibility factor are based on the relieving

conditions.

The coefficient of discharge (K) will vary depending on the valve type and
manufacturer of the valve.

The flow rate is the required relieving capacity.

The back pressure correction factor (Kb) is for balanced bellows relief valves
only. For conventional relief valves, Kb is 1.0.
 Sizing for Liquid
Pressure Relief Valve with Liquid Trim

Q SpGr
RA =
38 K Pacc − Pb

RA = Required area, in2

Q = Flow rate, gpm
K = Coefficient of discharge
SpGr = Specific gravity of liquid
Pacc = Accumulated pressure, psig
Pb = Total back pressure, psig

EDS 2004/RV-104

The API equation includes two other terms in this equation. There are
correction factors due to back pressure and liquid viscosity. This simplified
equation assumes the correction factors are both 1.0.

The coefficient of discharge (K) will vary depending on the valve type and
manufacturer of the valve.

The flow rate is the required relieving capacity.

 Sizing for Flashing Flow

1. Determine pressure at outlet of nozzle

Subcooled liquid - One-half saturated pressure at inlet
Temperature two phase flow - One-half accumulated pressure
Low vapor pressure material - Relief header pressure
2. Flash material at nozzle outlet pressure or relief
header pressure, whichever is greater
3. Determine area required for vapor part of relieving
fluid
4. Determine area for liquid part of relieving fluid
5. Add the two areas together

EDS 2004/RV-105

This approach for sizing of flashing flow is UOP design practice. API will
soon publish new methods for calculating two phase flow.
 Pop-Action Pilot-Operated Valve
(Flowing Type)

RS 31.7-.R00 -34
EDS 2004/RV-106

There are actually two valves, the main relief valve and a pilot valve. The
main valve

The pilot controls the opening and closing of the main valve.
 Flow Characteristic
Open and Closing

% Capacity
No Blowdown

Modulating Pilot

No Leakage

-10% Pset +5% +10%

Inlet Pressure
RS 31.7-R00-35
EDS 2004/RV-107

The pilot can be specified to give pop action like we saw before, or
modulating action.

Modulating is preferred for two reasons:

1) The valve only opens as much as needed, saving product.

2) The valve closes in the same fashion as it opens, providing a stable
operation.

There is no leakage as set pressure is approached, because the force exerted

by the pilot is increased as set pressure is approached.
 Force Balance
Pilot Operated Pressure Relief Valve

Exposed area on top of piston

is greater than the exposed area
at bottom of piston.

Seating Force = Pinlet (Atop - Abott)

RS 31.7-R00-36
EDS 2004/RV-108

One of the advantages for the PORV is that the seating force increases when
the inlet pressure increases. When it reaches the set pressure, the seat force
reaches its maximum. Therefore, there is no leakage before the valve
relieves.
 Seating Force
Pilot Operated Pressure Relief Valve

RS 31.7-R00-37
EDS 2004/RV-109

Once the inlet pressure reaches the set pressure, the seating force becomes
less than inlet pressure and the valve opens.
 Unique Considerations
Pilot Operated Relief Valves

„ Backflow Preventer

„ Remote Sense Line

„ Material Compatibility (Elastomeric Seats and

Seals, Lower Metallurgy Availability)

„ More Restrictive Temperature Limits

EDS 2004/RV-110

Three different types of materials can be used for seats and seals: viton
(elastomer), teflon (plastic), and metal. Each material has its own pressure
and temperature limitations. For example, elastomers are only acceptable up
to temperatures of 400-450F.
 Backflow Through a PORV

RS 31.7-R00-36
EDS 2004/RV-111

In cases where the inlet pressure is low (providing very low force to keep the
valve closed), an increase in relief header pressure could cause the valve to
open, resulting in back flow.
 Backflow Preventer

RS 31.7-R00-39
EDS 2004/RV-112

The backflow preventer will use the relief header back pressure to keep the
valve closed when the inlet pressure to the valve is low. For vacuum
operation a backflow preventer must be installed.
 Remote Sensing
Applying the 3% Pressure Loss Constraint

„ 3% rule applies to pressure drop

from vessel to sense point
„ Sense point should be on relatively
low velocity line (Bernoulli effect)
„ Capacity of PORV may have to be
adjusted for high inlet pressure
losses (DP>5% Pset)
P

EDS 2004/RV-113

If the pressure loss from the vessel to the inlet of the PORV is greater than
3%, then the required relieving area of the valve will need to be increased.
 PORV Advantages

„ Seat Tightness
„ Remote Pressure Sensing
„ Less Sensitive to Back Pressure
„ Field Testing of Pilot Set Point
„ Remote Depressuring
„ Ability to Modulate Flow

EDS 2004/RV-114

Seat tightness prevents leakage at set pressure and allows for the application
of a narrow spread between set pressure and operating pressure.

Remote pressure sensing allows inlet line losses greater than 3% of set
pressure.

PORV can be used for vacuum and low pressure operation with backflow
preventer.

Field testing provides easy maintenance of the valve.

Ability to modulate flow will reduce loss of product to the relief header.
 PORV Disadvantages

„ Difficult to Specify
„ Temperature Constraint
„ Elastomeric Compatibility
„ Limited Metallurgy Selection
„ Unfamiliar Technology

EDS 2004/RV-115

For small sizes, pilot operated valves can be more expensive than spring
loaded valves
 PORV Applications

„ High Pressure (Above 1000 psig)

„ Low Pressure (Below 20 psig)
„ Revamps (Operating Pressure Close to Set Pressure)
„ Remote Sense Required for 3% Rule
„ Minimize Valve Leakage
„ Large Liquid Relief

EDS 2004/RV-116

PORV are commonly used in specialty chemical plants so that product loss
can be reduced due to modulating action of the valve.

PORV are also used in large vapor relief services, e.g. in gas pipeline
applications.
 PORV Sizing for Vapor

W TZ
RA =
CKPacc MW

RA = Required area, in2

W = Flow rate, lb/hr
C = Coefficient based on Cp/Cv ratio
K = Coefficient of discharge (K = 0.86 for 400
series PORV)
Pacc = Accumulated pressure, psia
T = Temperature, °R
Z = Compressibility factor
MW = Molecular weight, lb/lb mol

EDS 2004/RV-117

The required area equation is an API formula.

Accumulated pressure can be 21% for fire case or 10% for non-fire cases.
 PORV Sizing for Liquid

Q SpGr
RA =
38 K Pacc − Pb

RA = Required area, in2

Q = Flow rate, gpm
K = Coefficient of discharge (K = 0.67 for
400 series PORV)
Pacc = Accumulated pressure, psig
Pb = Total back pressure, psig

EDS 2004/RV-118

The required area equation is an API formula.

The equation assumes the correction factor for the liquid viscosity and correction
factor due to back pressure are 1.0.

Accumulated pressure is 10%.

 Multiple Valves

„ Select minimum number of PSVs for a given service

„ Select multiples of same size PSV

„ At least one valve must be set at design pressure;

other valves can be set up to 5% above design

„ Code permits accumulated pressure of 116%

EDS 2004/RV-119

Selecting multiple valves of the same size is a UOP practice. Some refiners
use valves of different sizes in the same service.
 Example

Required Area 8.5 in2 28.0 in2 65.0 in2

Number of Valves One Two Three

Area per Valve 8.5 in2 14.0 in2 22.0 in2

Orifice Designation 6Q8 6R10 8T10

Accumulation 110% 116% 116%

EDS 2004/RV-120

The above example shows the required area and number of valves required.
 Spare Valves

„ Spare valves may be requested when a customer’s

experience indicates:
− Fouling or plugging of PSV
− Severe corrosion
− Valve leakage is likely
− PSV testing period is shorter than turnaround

„ UOP design practice is not to spare PSV’s

„ UOP will specify spare PSV in accordance with

customer design practice

EDS 2004/RV-121

If a spare valve is specified, both the spare valve and the on-line valve must
have isolation valves.
 Isolating Block Valves
Design Considerations

„ Isolating block valves and vents permits maintenance

of leaking valve while operating

„ Inlet line size must ensure that the 3% inlet pressure

loss is not exceeded

„ For multiple valves applications, install one spare set

at design pressure

EDS 2004/RV-122

The isolating block valve must be locked open (or car sealed open) on the
operating relief valve and locked closed (or car sealed closed) on the spare
relief valve.
 Rupture Discs

Tension Loaded Reverse Buckling

Safety Head

Process Process
Pressure Pressure

RS 31.7-R00-41
EDS 2004/RV-123

Rupture discs are sometimes used in conjunction with relief valves.

The rupture disc is not recoverable, i.e. once it opens, it must be replaced.
Once the rupture disc opens, the process pressure will drop to outlet pressure,
resulting in large loss of product.
 Rupture Disc Applications

„ Protecting temporary piping used for inert gas

regeneration operation
„ Installed under a PSV to prevent leakage or to protect
valve from corrosive environment
„ Fast response time required, e.g., tube rupture in a high
pressure exchanger which is liquid filled on LP side
„ Runaway reaction (highly exothermic) where pressure is
intentionally reduced below normal operating pressure
to regain control

EDS 2004/RV-124

The above shows the rupture disc application.

 In Combination With PSV

„ Capacity of PSV derated by 10%

„ Means of isolation for disc
replacement
„ Inlet pipe size may have to be
increased
„ Telltale indicator monitoring
pressure between disc and PSV

RS-31.7-R00-42
EDS 2004/RV-125

The inlet pipe size may need to be increased due to the pressure loss of the
rupture disc device.
 Rupture Disc Sizing

Atmospheric Discharge Piping System

Assume Equivalent Length =75 L/D

Critical Flow Equation

RS 31.7-R00-43
EDS 2004/RV-126

For purposes of frictional loss calculation, assume the opened rupture disc is
equivalent to 75 pipe diameters.
 Critical Flow
(Critical Flow Equation for a Rupture Disc)

Qm S g T
RA =
260 Pacc

RA = Required flow area for rupture disc, in2

Qm = Flow rate at standard conditions, scfm
Sg = Specific gravity of vapor, (MW/29)
T = Temperature, °R
Pacc = Accumulated pressure, psia

EDS 2004/RV-127

This equation is for vapor service only, and is simplified from the API critical
flow equation using a Kd value of 0.62.
 Piping Systems

Atmosphere
Po

P2
Rupture Disc P1

P4
P3
From Reactor To Reactor
Section Section

P5

RS 31.7-R00-44
EDS 2004/RV-128

The above shows a rupture disc around a control valve if the control valve
fails.