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Sorites and Dilemma
Sorites and Dilemma
Sorites and Dilemma
Group 3B
PHILO1
Th 1:00- 4:00 pm
Bro. Jensen DG. Mañebog
SORITES
Sorites is an abridged form of polysyllogism wherein the intermediate conclusions are left out. It
is an argument which states the premises and a main conclusion but conceals conclusions in
between. There are two kinds of Sorites: Aristotelian sorites and Goclenian sorites. 1
A. Aristotelian Sorites
All A is B;
All B is C;
All C is D;
All D is E;
∴ All A is E.2
Example:
All philosophers are wide readers;
All wide readers are intelligent;
All intelligent people are creative;
All creative people are producers of good ideas;
∴ All philosophers are producers of good ideas. 3
B. Goclenian Sorites
All A is B;
All C is A;
All D is C;
All E is D;
∴ All E is B. 4
Example:
One who will not sacrifice truth for power is a responsible person;
One who is a paragon of honesty will not sacrifice truth for power;
One who is worth emulating is a paragon of honesty;
1
Santiago, Alma Salvador Ph. D. LOGIC: The Art of Reasoning. 2002. P. 185.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
Santiago, Alma Salvador Ph. D. LOGIC: The Art of Reasoning. 2002. P. 186.
A model of decency is worth emulating;_______
∴ A model of decency is a responsible person. 5
There is no essential difference between the Aristotelian sorites and Goclenian sorites
except in the manner of the arrangement of the premises. To construct the Aristotelian sorites
from Goclenian sorites and vice-versa, we start with the last premise and end with first. The
conclusion remains the same. 6
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.
DILEMMA
The dilemma is sometimes used as a rhetorical device, in the form "you must accept
either A, or B"; here A and B would be propositions each leading to some further conclusion.
Applied incorrectly, it constitutes a false dichotomy, a fallacy.
Colloquially, we call a 'dilemma', any impossible choice. 'If I do this, I've had it; if I do
that, I've had it — so I've had it anyway (and it is no use my doing this or that)'. This is indeed a
case of dilemma, but in logic the expression is understood more broadly, to cover more positive
situations. Thus, often, in action contexts, when we are faced with a choice of means to get to a
goal, we might resolve the dilemma by using all available means, even at the cost of
redundancies, so as to ensure that the goal is attained one way or the other. 8
Although dilemmatic argument may be derived from apodosis and syllogism, it has a certain
autonomy of cogency and is commonly used in practise, so it deserves some analysis. Note well
first that the disjunction used in dilemma is the 'and/or' type (not the 'or else' type), even if in
practise this is not always made clear.
The hypotheticals which constitute the major premise of a dilemma are called its 'horns';
they give an impression of presenting us with a predicament. The minor premise is a disjunction;
it is said to 'take the dilemma by its horns'. The conclusion is said to 'resolve' the dilemma.
7
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dilemma
8
http://www.thelogician.net/2_future_logic/2_chapter_30.htm
9
Ibid.
If M, then P — and — if N, then P (original major premise)
and not P (denial of conclusion)
so, not M and not N (contrary of minor).
This shows the essential continuity between the concepts of apodosis and dilemma, note.
c. Concerning both the simple and complex valid moods, note that, formally
speaking, we could use as minor premises the equivalent forms 'not M or else not N' and 'M or
else N', respectively, in the valid constructive and destructive moods. But this would not reflect
the true format of dilemma. The goal here is only to describe actual thought processes, not to
accumulate useless formulas. However, in view of the similarity in appearance between these
valid substitutes, and the minor premises of the invalid moods, it is well to be aware of the
possibility of confusion. 11
A special case of complex constructive dilemma is worthy of note, because people
sometimes argue in that way. Its form is:
We may understand this argument as follows: contrapose the left horn to 'if not-{P and
nonQ}, then nonM'; the minor premise means 'if nonM, then N'; these propositions, together with
the right horn, form a sorites whose conclusion is 'if not-{P and nonQ}, then {nonP and Q}'. But
11
Ibid.
we know on formal grounds, for any two propositions, that 'if {P and nonQ}, then not-{nonP and
Q}'. Therefore, 'either {P and nonQ} or {nonP and Q}' is true, which can in turn be rephrased as
'either P or Q'.
Thus, what this argument achieves is the elimination of the remaining two formal
alternatives, {P and Q} and {nonP and nonQ}; the combinations {P and nonQ} and {nonP and
Q} become not merely incompatible, but also exhaustive. There is no destructive version of this
argument, because its result would only be 'if {P and nonQ}, then not-{nonP and Q}', which is
formally given anyway.
There is also no equivalent argument in simple dilemma. But note that if we substitute
nonM for N in the one above, we obtain something akin to it: if M, then {P and nonQ}, and if
nonM, then {nonP and Q}; but either M or nonM; hence, either P or Q. This is not really simple
dilemma because the antecedents are not identical; but there is a resemblance, in that only three
theses are involved. Also, the minor premise here is redundant, since formally true, so the
conclusion may be viewed as an eduction from the compound major premise. 12
Also note, simple and complex dilemmas may consist of more than two horns. The
following are examples of multi-horned simple dilemma:
Constructive:
If B and/or C and/or D… is/are true, then A is true
but B and/or C and/or D…etc. is/are true
therefore A is true.
Destructive:
If A is true, then B and C and D …etc. are true
but B and/or C and/or D…etc. is/are false
therefore A is false'.
Similarly with other sorts of arrays. This shows that we can view the horns of dilemmas
as forming a single hypothetical proposition whose antecedent and/or consequent is/are
conjunctive or disjunctive. It follows that simple and complex dilemma should not be viewed as
essentially distinct forms of argument; rather, simple dilemma is a limiting case of complex
dilemma, the process involved being essentially one of purging our knowledge of extraneous
alternatives.
12
Ibid.
Dilemma, especially its ultimate, simple version, is a very significant form of reasoning,
in that it is capable of yielding factual results from purely problematic theses (implicit in
hypotheticals or disjunctives). Like the philosopher's stone of the alchemist, it turns lead into
gold. Without this device, knowledge would ever be conjectural, a mass of logically related but
unresolvable problems.
Note however that the conclusion of a simple dilemma is still, logically, only factual in
status. A thesis only acquires the status of logical necessity or impossibility, when it is implied or
denied by all eventualities; this means, in dilemma, when the exhaustiveness of the alternatives
in the premises is itself logically incontingent (rather than a function of the present context of
knowledge). The significance of this will become more transparent as we proceed further, and
deal with paradoxical logic. 13
13
Ibid.
I must either win or lose this case.
Therefore, I do not have to pay Euathlus.