U.S. Supreme Court
JUSTICE KENNEDY's reasons for permitting the creche on
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989)
County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union,
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter
No. 87-2050
Argued February 22, 1989
Decided July 3, 1989*
492 U.S. 573
Syllabus
This litigation concerns the constitutionality of two recurring
holiday displays located on public property in downtown
Pittsburgh. The first, a creche depicting the Christian nativity
scene, was placed on the Grand Staircase of the Allegheny
County Courthouse, which is the "main," "most beautiful," and
"most public" part of the courthouse. The creche was donated
by the Holy Name Society, a Roman Catholic group, and bore a
sign to that effect. Its manger had at its crest an angel bearing
a banner proclaiming "Gloria in Excelsis Deo," meaning "Glory
to God in the Highest." The second of the holiday displays in
question was an 18-foot Chanukah menorah or candelabrum,
which was placed just outside the City-County Building next to
the city's 45-foot decorated Christmas tree. At the foot of the
tree was a sign bearing the mayor's name and containing text
declaring the city's "salute to liberty." The menorah is owned by
Chabad, a Jewish group, but is stored, erected, and removed
each year by the city. Respondents, the Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union and seven local
residents, filed suit seeking permanently to enjoin the county
from displaying the creche and the city from displaying the
menorah on the ground that the displays violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, made
applicable to state governments by the Fourteenth
Amendment. The District Court denied relief, relying on Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, which held that a city's inclusion of
a creche in its annual Christmas display in a private park did
not violate the Establishment Clause. The Court of Appeals
reversed, distinguishing Lynch v. Donnelly and holding that
the creche and the menorah in the present case must be
understood as an impermissible governmental endorsement of
Christianity and Judaism under Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S.
602.
Page 492 U. S. 574
Held: The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part,
and the cases are remanded.
842 F.2d 655, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court with
respect to Parts III-A, IV, and V, concluding that:
1. Under Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 612, a
"practice which touches upon religion, if it is to be permissible
under the Establishment Clause," must not, inter
alia, "advance [or] inhibit religion in its principal or primary
effect." Although, in refining the definition of governmental
action that unconstitutionally "advances" religion, the Court's
subsequent decisions have variously spoken in terms of
"endorsement," "favoritism," "preference," or "promotion," the
essential principle remains the same: the Clause, at the very
least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position
on questions of religious belief or from "making adherence to a
religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the
political community." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 465 U. S.
687 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). Pp. 492 U. S. 589-594.
2. When viewed in its overall context, the creche display
violates the Establishment Clause. The creche angel's words
endorse a patently Christian message: Glory to God for the
birth of Jesus Christ. Moreover, in contrast to Lynch, nothing
in the creche's setting detracts from that message. Although the
government may acknowledge Christmas as a cultural
phenomenon, it may not observe it as a Christian holy day by
suggesting that people praise God for the birth of Jesus.
Pp. 492 U. S. 598-602.
3.
the Grand Staircase and his condemnation of the Court's
reasons for deciding otherwise are unpersuasive. Pp. 492 U. S.
602-613.
(a) History cannot legitimate practices like the creche display
that demonstrate the government's allegiance to a particular
sect or creed. Pp. 492 U. S. 602-605.
(b) The question whether a particular practice would constitute
governmental proselytization is much the same as the
endorsement inquiry, except to the extent the proselytization
test requires an "obvious" allegiance between the government
and the favored sect. This Court's decisions, however, impose
no such burden on demonstrating that the government has
favored a particular sect or creed, but, to the contrary, have
required strict scrutiny of practices suggesting a
denominational preference. E.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S.
228, 456 U. S. 246. Pp. 492 U. S. 605-609.
(c) The Constitution mandates that the government remain
secular, rather than affiliating itself with religious beliefs or
institutions, precisely in order to avoid discriminating against
citizens on the basis of their religious faiths. Thus, the claim
that prohibiting government from celebrating Christmas as a
religious holiday discriminates against Christians
Page 492 U. S. 575
in favor of nonadherents must fail, since it contradicts the
fundamental premise of the Establishment Clause itself. In
contrast, confining the government's own Christmas
celebration to the holiday's secular aspects does not favor the
religious beliefs of non-Christians over those of Christians, but
simply permits the government to acknowledge the holiday
without expressing an impermissible allegiance to Christian
beliefs. Pp. 492 U. S. 610-613.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, joined by JUSTICE STEVENS,
concluded in Part III-B that the concurring and dissenting
opinions in Lynch v. Donnelly set forth the proper analytical
framework for determining whether the government's display
of objects having religious significance improperly advances
religion. 465 U.S. at 465 U. S. 687-694 (O'CONNOR, J.,
concurring); id. at 465 U. S. 694-726 (BRENNAN, J.,
dissenting). Pp. 492 U. S. 594-597.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN concluded in Part VI that the menorah
display does not have the prohibited effect of endorsing
religion, given its "particular physical setting." Its combined
display with a Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty does
not impermissibly endorse both the Christian and Jewish
faiths, but simply recognizes that both Christmas and
Chanukah are part of the same winter holiday season, which
has attained a secular status in our society. The widely accepted
view of the Christmas tree as the preeminent secular symbol of
the Christmas season emphasizes this point. The tree,
moreover, by virtue of its size and central position in the
display, is clearly the predominant element, and the placement
of the menorah beside it is readily understood as simply a
recognition that Christmas is not the only traditional way of
celebrating the season. The absence of a more secular
alternative to the menorah negates the inference of
endorsement. Similarly, the presence of the mayor's sign
confirms that, in the particular context, the government's
association with a religious symbol does not represent
sponsorship of religious beliefs, but simply a recognition of
cultural diversity. Given all these considerations, it is not
sufficiently likely that a reasonable observer would view the
combined display as an endorsement or disapproval of his
individual religious choices. Pp. 492 U. S. 613-621.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR also concluded that the city's display of
a menorah, together with a Christmas tree and a sign saluting
liberty, does not violate the Establishment Clause. The
Christmas tree, whatever its origins, is widely viewed today as
a secular symbol of the Christmas holiday. Although there may
be certain secular aspects to Chanukah, it is primarily a
religious holiday, and the menorah its central religious symbol
and ritual object. By including the menorah with the tree,
however, and with the sign saluting liberty, the city conveyed a
message of pluralism and freedom of belief during the holiday
season, which, in this particular physical setting, could not be
interpreted by a reasonable
Page 492 U. S. 576
observer as an endorsement of Judaism or Christianity or
disapproval of alternative beliefs. Pp. 492 U. S. 632-637.
JUSTICE KENNEDY, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE,
JUSTICE WHITE, and JUSTICE SCALIA, concluded that both
the menorah display and the creche display are permissible
under the Establishment Clause. Pp. 492 U. S. 655-667.
(a) The test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 403
U. S. 612 -- which prohibits the "principal or primary effect" of
a challenged governmental practice from either advancing or
inhibiting religion -- when applied with the proper sensitivity
to our traditions and case law, supports the conclusion that
both the creche and the menorah are permissible displays in
the context of the holiday season. The requirement of neutrality
inherent in the Lemon formulation does not require a
relentless extirpation of all contact between government and
religion. Government policies of accommodation,
acknowledgment, and support for religion are an accepted part
of our political and cultural heritage, and the Establishment
Clause permits government some latitude in recognizing the
central role of religion in society. Any approach less sensitive to
our heritage would border on latent hostility to religion, as it
would require government in all its multifaceted roles to
acknowledge only the secular, to the exclusion, and so to the
detriment, of the religious. Thus, this Court's decisions disclose
two principles limiting the government's ability to recognize
and accommodate religion: it may not coerce anyone to support
or participate in any religion or its exercise; and it may not, in
the guise of avoiding hostility or callous indifference, give direct
benefits to a religion in such a degree that it, in fact, establishes
a state religion or tends to do so. In other words, the
government may not place its weight behind an obvious effort
to proselytize on behalf of a particular religion. On the other
hand, where the government's act of recognition or
accommodation is passive and symbolic, any intangible benefit
to religion is unlikely to present a realistic risk of
establishment. To determine whether there exists an
establishment, or a tendency toward one, reference must be
made to the other types of church-state contacts that have
existed unchallenged throughout our history or that have been
found permissible in our case law. For example, Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, upheld a city's holiday display of a
creche, and Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783, held that a
State's practice of employing a legislative chaplain was
permissible. Pp. 492 U. S. 655-663.
(b) In permitting the displays of the menorah and the creche,
the city and county sought merely to "celebrate the season," and
to acknowledge the historical background and the religious as
well as secular nature of the Chanukah and Christmas holidays.
This interest falls well within the tradition of governmental
accommodation and acknowledgment of religion
Page 492 U. S. 577
that has marked our history from the beginning. If government
is to participate in its citizens' celebration of a holiday that
contains both a secular and a religious component, enforced
recognition of only the secular aspect would signify the callous
indifference toward religious faith that our cases and traditions
do not require; for by commemorating the holiday only as it is
celebrated by nonadherents, the government would be refusing
to acknowledge the plain fact, and the historical reality, that
many of its citizens celebrate the religious aspects of the
holiday as well. There is no suggestion here that the
government's power to coerce has been used to further
Christianity or Judaism, or that the city or the county
contributed money to further any one faith or intended to use
the creche or the menorah to proselytize. Thus, the creche and
menorah are purely passive symbols of religious holidays, and
their use is permissible under Lynch, supra. If Marsh,
supra, allows Congress and the state legislatures to begin each
day with a state-sponsored prayer offered by a government-
employed chaplain, a menorah or creche, displayed in the
limited context of the holiday season, cannot be invalid. The
facts that, unlike the creche in Lynch, the menorah and creche
at issue were both located on government property and were
not surrounded by secular holiday paraphernalia are
irrelevant, since the displays present no realistic danger of
moving the government down the forbidden road toward an
establishment of religion. Pp. 492 U. S. 663-667.
BLACKMUN, J., announced the judgment of the Court and
delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts III-A,
IV, and V, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, STEVENS, and
O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, an opinion with respect to Parts I and
II, in which STEVENS and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, an opinion
with respect to Part III-B, in which STEVENS, J., joined, an
opinion with respect to Part VII, in which O'CONNOR, J.,
joined, and an opinion with respect to Part VI. O'CONNOR, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment, in Part II of which BRENNAN and STEVENS, JJ.,
joined, post, p. 492 U. S. 623. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which MARSHALL
and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 492 U. S. 637. STEVENS, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in
which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 492 U.
S. 646. KENNEDY, J., filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE and SCALIA, JJ.,
joined, post, p. 492 U. S. 655.
United States Supreme Court
ZOBREST v. CATALINA FOOTHILLS SCH.
DIST.(1993)
No. 92-94
Argued: February 24, 1993 Decided: June 18, 1993
Petitioners, a deaf child and his parents, filed this suit after
respondent school district refused to provide a sign-language
interpreter to accompany the child to classes at a Roman
Catholic high school. They alleged that the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment required respondent to provide the
interpreter, and that the Establishment Clause did not bar such
relief. The District Court granted respondent summary
judgment on the ground that the interpreter would act as a
conduit for the child's religious inculcation, thereby promoting
his religious development at government expense in violation
of the Establishment Clause. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held:
1. The prudential rule of avoiding constitutional questions if
there is a nonconstitutional ground for decision is inapplicable
here, since respondent did not urge upon the District Court or
the Court of Appeals any of the nonconstitutional grounds it
now raises in this Court. Pp. 6-8.
2. The Establishment Clause does not prevent respondent from
furnishing a disabled child enrolled in a sectarian school with a
sign-language interpreter in order to facilitate his education.
Government programs that neutrally provide benefits to a
broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion are
not readily subject to an Establishment Clause challenge just
because sectarian institutions may also [509 U.S. 1, 2] receive
an attenuated financial benefit. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388
; Witters v. Washington Dept. of Services for Blind, 474 U.S.
481 . The same reasoning used in Mueller and Witters applies
here. The service in this case is part of a general government
program that distributes benefits neutrally to any child
qualifying as disabled under the IDEA, without regard to the
sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the
school the child attends. By according parents freedom to select
a school of their choice, the statute ensures that a government-
paid interpreter will be present in a sectarian school only as a
result of individual parents' private decisions. Since the IDEA
creates no financial incentive for parents to choose a sectarian
school, an interpreter's presence there cannot be attributed to
state decisionmaking. The fact that a public employee will be
physically present in a sectarian school does not by itself make
this the same type of aid that was disapproved in Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 , and School Dist. of Grand Rapids v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373 . In those cases, the challenged programs
gave direct grants of government aid - instructional equipment
and material, teachers, and guidance counselors - which
relieved sectarian schools of costs they otherwise would have
borne in educating their students. Here, the child is the primary
beneficiary, and the school receives only an incidental benefit.
In addition, an interpreter, unlike a teacher or guidance
counselor, neither adds to nor subtracts from the sectarian
school's environment, but merely interprets whatever material
is presented to the class as a whole. There is no absolute bar to
the placing of a public employee in a sectarian school. Pp. 8-14.
963 F.2d 1190, reversed.
OCTOBER TERM, 1994
Syllabus
CAPITOL SQUARE REVIEW AND ADVISORY BOARD
ET AL. v. PINETTE ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 94-780. Argued April 26, 1995-Decided June 29,
1995
Ohio law makes Capitol Square, the statehouse plaza in
Columbus, a forum for discussion of public questions and for
public activities, and gives petitioner Capitol Square Review
and Advisory Board (Board) responsibility for regulating access
to the square. To use the square, a group must simply fill out an
official application form and meet several speechneutral
criteria. Mter the Board denied, on Establishment Clause
grounds, the application of respondent Ku Klux Klan to place
an unattended cross on the square during the 1993 Christmas
season, the Klan filed this suit. The District Court entered an
injunction requiring issuance of the requested permit, and the
Board permitted the Klan to erect its cross. The Sixth Circuit
affirmed the judgment, adding to a conflict among the Courts
of Appeals as to whether a private, unattended display of a
religious symbol in a public forum violates the Establishment
Clause.
Held: The judgment is affirmed. 30 F.3d 675, affirmed.
JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court with
respect to Parts I, II, and III, concluding that:
1. Because the courts below addressed only the Establishment
Clause issue and that is the sole question upon which certiorari
was granted, this Court will not consider respondents'
contention that the State's disapproval of the Klan's political
views, rather than its desire to distance itself from sectarian
religion, was the genuine reason for disallowing the cross
display. Pp. 759-760.
2. The display was private religious speech that is as fully
protected under the Free Speech Clause as secular private
expression. See, e. g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384. Because Capitol Square
is a traditional public forum, the Board may regulate the
content of the Klan's expression there only if such a restriction
is necessary, and narrowly drawn, to serve a compelling state
interest. Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460
U. S. 37,45. pp. 760-761.
3. Compliance with the Establishment Clause may be a state
interest sufficiently compelling to justify content-based
restrictions on speech,
754
Syllabus
see, e. g., Lamb's Chapel, 508 U. S., at 394-395, but the
conclusion that that interest is not implicated in this case is
strongly suggested by the presence here of the factors the Court
considered determinative in striking down state restrictions on
religious content in Lamb's Chapel, id., at 395,
and Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 274. As in those cases,
the State did not sponsor respondents' expression, the
expression was made on government property that had been
opened to the public for speech, and permission was requested
through the same application process and on the same terms
required of other private groups. pp.761-763.
JUSTICE SCALIA, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE
KENNEDY, and JUSTICE THOMAS, concluded in Part IV that
petitioners' attempt to distinguish this case from Lamb's
Chapel and Widmar is unavailing. Petitioners' argument that,
because the forum's proximity to the seat of government may
cause the misperception that the cross bears the State's
approval, their content-based restriction is constitutional
under the so-called "endorsement test" of, e. g., County of
Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater
Pittsburgh Chapter,492 U. S. 573, and Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U. S. 668, is rejected. Their version of the test, which would
attribute private religious expression to a neutrally behaving
government, has no antecedent in this Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, which has consistently upheld neutral
government policies that happen to benefit religion. Where the
Court has tested for endorsement, the subject of the test was
either expression by the government itself, Lynch, supra, or
else government action alleged to discriminate in favorof
private religious expression or activity, see, e. g., Allegheny,
supra. The difference between forbidden government speech
endorsing religion and protected private speech that does so is
what
distinguishes Allegheny and Lynch from Widmar and Lamb's
Chapel. The distinction does not disappear when the private
speech is conducted close to the symbols of government. Given
a traditional or designated public forum, publicly announced
and open to all on equal terms, as well as purely private
sponsorship of religious expression, erroneous conclusions of
state endorsement do not count. See Lamb's Chapel, supra, at
395, and Widmar, supra, at 274. Nothing prevents Ohio from
requiring all private displays in the square to be identified as
such, but it may not, on the claim of misperception of official
endorsement, ban all private religious speech from the square,
or discriminate against it by requiring religious speech alone to
disclaim public sponsorship. Pp.763-769.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, joined by JUSTICE SOUTER and
JUSTICE BREYER, concluded that the State has not presented
a compelling justification for denying respondents' permit. Pp.
772-783.
A3S5 #13.
Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v.
Office of the Executive Secretary
Ponente:Corona, J.
Keywords: EO 46, Halal, Office of Muslim Affairs
Facts:
This is a petition for prohibition filed by the Islamic Da’wah
Council of the Philippines, Inc. (IDCP) praying for the
declaration of nullity of EO 46 and the prohibition of the Office
of the Executive Secretary and the Office of Muslim Affairs
(OMA) from implementing the subject EO.
IDCP is an NGO that extends voluntary services to the Filipino
people, especially to Muslim communities. It is accredited by
the Regional Islamic Da’wah Council of Southeast Asia and the
Pacific (RISEAP) to issue halal certifications in the Philippines.
In 1995, the IDCP formulated internal rules and procedures
based on the Qur’an and the Sunnah for the analysis and
inspection of food, and the issuance of halal certifications. That
same year, IDCP began issuing, for a fee, certifications to
qualified products and food manufacturers.
In 2001, the Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46
creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and
designating the OMA to oversee its implementation. The EO
gave the OMA exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and
perform other related regulatory activities. In 2002, a news
article entitled “OMA Wars NGOs Issuing Illegal ‘Halal’
Certification” was published in the Manila Bulletin. In the
article, the OMA warned Muslim consumers to buy only
products with its official halal certification since those without
said certification had not been subjected to careful analysis and
therefore could contain pork or its derivatives. OMA also sent
letters to food manufacturers asking them to secure the halal
certification only fromOMA. As a result, IDCP lost revenue as
food manufacturers stopped securing certifications from it.
IDCP’s contention:
- EO 46 violates the constitutional provision on the separation
of Church and State as it is unconstitutional for the
government to formulate policies and guidelines on the halal
certification scheme because said scheme is a function only
religious organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and
validly perform for the Muslims.
- Respondents violated Section 10, Article III of the
Constitution which provides that no law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be passed. EO 46 impaired the
existing contracts between IDCP and food manufacturers as
the latter ceased to obtain certifications from the former.
- EO 46 violates Sections 15 and 16 of Article XIII of the
Constitution which provide the role and rights of people’s
organizations.
- EO 46 was issued with utter haste and without even
consulting Muslim people’s organizations like IDCP before it
became effective.
Issue:
Whether or not EO 46 violates the non-establishment clause
and the free exercise of religion provision found in Section 5,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
EO 46 violates Section 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
OMA was created in 1981 through EO 697 “to ensure the
integration of Muslim Filipinos into the main-stream of
Filipino society with due regard to their beliefs, customs,
traditions, and institutions. OMA deals with the societal, legal,
political and economic concerns of the Muslim community as
a national cultural community and not as a religious group.
The OMA should not intrude into purely religious matters lest
it violatethe non-establishment clause and the free exercise of
religion provision.
Classifying a food product as halal is a religious function
because the standards used are drawn from the Qur’an and
Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify
products as halal, EO 46 en-croached on the religious freedom
of Muslim organizations like IDCP to interpret for Filipino
Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption.
By virtue of the EO, the State has forced Muslims to accept
itsown interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunnah on halal food.
To justify EO 46’s intrusion on the subject, the Solicitor
General offered the argument that freedom of reli-gion is
subservient to the police power of the State. The government
allegedly seeks to protect and promote the Muslim Filipinos’
right to health, and to instill health consciousness in them. The
Court rejects this con-tention. Only the prevention of an
immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If
the government fails to show the seriousness and imme-diacy
of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.
In the case at bar, there is no compelling justification for the
government to deprive muslim organizations of their religious
right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the
health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by
assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal
certifications. The protec-tion and promotion of their right to
health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered
to by gov-ernment agencies charged with ensuring that food
products released in the market are fit for human con-
sumption, properly labels and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws
do not encroach on religious freedom.
- Section 48 (4) of the Administrative Code of 1987 gives to the
National Meat Inspection Commission (NMIC) the power to
inspect slaughtered animals intended for human
consumption to ensure safety of the meat released to the
market.
- RA 7394, otherwise known as “The Consumer Act of 1992,”
gives to certain government departments the duty to protect
the interests of the consumer, promote his general welfare
and to establish standards of conduct for business and
industry.
- Empowered by RA 7394, the Bureau of Food and Drugs has
the duty to promulgate and enforce rules and regulations
fixing and establishing a reasonable definition and standard
of identity, a standard of quality, and a standard of fill of
containers for food.
- Also empowered by RA 7394, the Department of Trade and
Industry is tasked to protect the consumer against deceptive,
unfair and unconscionable sales acts or practices. The DTI
also enforces compulsory
labeling and fair packaging to enable the consumer to obtain
accurate information as to the nature, quality and quantity
of the contents of consumer products and to facilitate his
comparison of the value of such products.
Through the above State mechanisms, the perceived danger
against the health of Muslim and non-Muslim Filipinos alike is
totally avoided. The State indirectly aids Muslim consumers in
differentiating food from non-food products.
The halal certifications issued by IDCP come forward as the
official religious approval of a food product fit forMuslim
consumption.
Petition granted.
Separate opinion of Vitug, J.:
Vitug concurs with the majority, but clarifies that the halal
certification is not taken as a compulsory re-quirement for
Muslim food manufacturers to secure. Adequate safeguards
being already in place to ensure the safety of all food products,
food manufacturers would thus have the option, decided solely
on the basis of marketing advantages, whether or not to obtain
the certification on their food products. The acquisition of halal
certificates should remain optional or only on a voluntary basis
on the part of manufacturers of Muslim food products.
RE: LETTER OF TONY Q. VALENCIANO
Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano Holding of Religious
Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City
A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC
March 7, 2017
Facts:
This controversy originated from a series of letters written by
Valenciano and addressed to the Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
reporting that the basement of the Hall of Justice of Quezon
City had been converted into a Roman Catholic Chapel,
complete with Catholic religious icons and other instrument for
religious activities. He believe that such practice violated the
constitutional provisions on the separation of Church and State
and the constitutional prohibition against the appropriation of
public money and property for the benefit of a sect, church,
denomination, or any other system of religion. He further
averred that the holding of masses at the basement of Hall of
Justice showed that it tended to favor the Catholic litigants;
that the rehearsals and other activities caused great
disturbance to the employees; and that court functions are
affected due to the masses that is being held from 12:00 to 1:15
in the afternoon.
Issue:
Whether or not the holding of masses at the basement of the
Quezon City Hall of Justice violates the constitutional principle
of separation of Church and State as well as the constitutional
prohibition against appropriation of public money or property
for the benefit of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
institution or system of religion.
Ruling:
The holding of Religious Rituals in the Hall of Justice does not
amount to the union of Church and State. The 1987 constitution
provides that the separation of Church and the State shall be
inviolable; if further provides that the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. Allowing
religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle of separation
of Church and state. In fact, these two principles are in perfect
harmony with each other. The Roman Catholic express their
worship through the holy mass and to stop these would be
tantamount to repressing the right to the free exercise of their
religion.
It is also the view of the Supreme Court that the holding of
Catholic masses at the basement of the Quezon City Hall of
Justice is not a case of establishment but merely
accommodation wherein the government recognize the reality
that some measures may not be imposed on a certain portion
of the population for the reason that these measures are
contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be shown
that the exercise of the right does not impair the public welfare,
the attempt of the State to regulate or prohibit such right would
be an unconstitutional encroachment.
No appropriation of Public money or property for the benefit of
any Church. The constitution provides that “No public money
or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed,
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support any sect,
church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of
religion, or any priest, preacher, minister or other religious
teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces,
or any penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium.
The prohibition contemplates a scenario where the
appropriation is primarily intended for the furtherance of a
particular church. The aforecited constitutional provision
“does not inhibit the use of public property for religious
purposes when the religious character of such use is merely
incidental to a temporary use which is available
indiscriminately to the public in general. Thus, the basement of
the Quezon City Hall of Justice has remained to be a public
property devoted for public use because the holding of Catholic
masses therein is a mere incidental consequence of its primary
purpose.
 American Bible Society vs. City of Manila
GR No. L-9637 | April 30, 1957
Facts:
· American Bible Society is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit,
religious, missionary corporation duly registered and doing
business in the Philippines through its Philippine agency
established in Manila in November, 1898
· City of Manila is a municipal corporation with powers that are
to be exercised in conformity with the provisions of Republic Act
No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila
· American Bible Society has been distributing and selling bibles
and/or gospel portions throughout the Philippines and
translating the same into several Philippine dialect
· City Treasurer of Manila informed American Bible Society that
it was violating several Ordinances for operating without the
necessary permit and license, thereby requiring the corporation
to secure the permit and license fees covering the period from 4Q
1945-2Q 1953
· To avoid closing of its business, American Bible Society paid the
City of Manila its permit and license fees under protest
· American Bible filed a complaint, questioning the
constitutionality and legality of the Ordinances 2529 and 3000,
and prayed for a refund of the payment made to the City of
Manila. They contended:
a. They had been in the Philippines since 1899 and were not
required to pay any license fee or sales tax
b. it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles
· City of Manila prayed that the complaint be dismissed,
reiterating the constitutionality of the Ordinances in question
· Trial Court dismissed the complaint
· American Bible Society appealed to the Court of Appeals
Issue: WON American Bible Society liable to pay sales tax for
the distribution and sale of bibles
· As held in Murdock vs. Pennsylvania, The power to impose a
license tax on the exercise of these freedoms provided for in the
Bill of Rights, is indeed as potent as the power of censorship
which this Court has repeatedly struck down. It is not a nominal
fee imposed as a regulatory measure to defray the expenses of
policing the activities in question. It is in no way apportioned. It
is flat license tax levied and collected as a condition to the pursuit
of activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the constitutional
liberties of press and religion and inevitably tends to suppress
their exercise. That is almost uniformly recognized as the
inherent vice and evil of this flat license tax.
· Further, the case also mentioned that the power to tax the
exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its
enjoyment. Those who can tax the exercise of this religious
practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the
resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the
privilege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can
close all its doors to all those who do not have a full purse
· Under Sec. 27(e) of Commonwealth Act No. 466 or the
National Internal Revenue Code,Corporations or
associations organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, . . . or educational purposes, . . .: Provided, however,
That the income of whatever kind and character from any of its
properties, real or personal, or from any activity conducted for
profit, regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall
be liable to the tax imposed under this Code shall not be taxed
· The price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was
in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the
same but this cannot mean that American Bible Society was
engaged in the business or occupation of selling said
"merchandise" for profit
· Therefore, the Ordinance cannot be applied for in doing so it
would impair American Bible Society’s free exercise and
enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its
rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.

Ruling: NO Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing

· Under Sec. 1 of Ordinance 3000, one of the ordinance in considerations, We hereby reverse the decision
question, person or entity engaged in any of the business, trades appealed from, sentencing defendant return to plaintiff
or occupation enumerated under Sec. 3 must obtain a Mayor’s the sum of P5,891.45 unduly collected from it
permit and license from the City Treasurer. American Bible
Society’s business is not among those enumerated
· However, item 79 of Sec. 3 of the Ordinance provides that all
other businesses, trade or occupation not mentioned, except
those upon which the City is not empowered to license or to tax
P5.00
· Therefore, the necessity of the permit is made to depend upon
the power of the City to license or tax said business, trade or
occupation.
· 2 provisions of law that may have bearing on this case:
a. Chapter 60 of the Revised Administrative Code, the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila is empowered to tax and
fix the license fees on retail dealers engaged in the sale of books
b. Sec. 18(o) of RA 409: to tax and fix the license fee on dealers
in general merchandise, including importers and indentors,
except those dealers who may be expressly subject to the
payment of some other municipal tax. Further, Dealers in general
merchandise shall be classified as (a) wholesale dealers and (b)
retail dealers. For purposes of the tax on retail dealers, general
merchandise shall be classified into four main classes: namely (1)
luxury articles, (2) semi-luxury articles, (3) essential
commodities, and (4) miscellaneous articles. A separate license
shall be prescribed for each class but where commodities of
different classes are sold in the same establishment, it shall not
be compulsory for the owner to secure more than one license if
he pays the higher or highest rate of tax prescribed by ordinance.
Wholesale dealers shall pay the license tax as such, as may be
provided by ordinance
· The only difference between the 2 provisions is the limitation as
to the amount of tax or license fee that a retail dealer has to pay
per annum