act no.

4221

constitute an undue delegation of legislative power

infringe the equal protection clause of the Constitution

encroach upon the pardoning power of the Executive.

Probation implies guilt be final judgment. While a probation case may look into the circumstances
attending the commission of the offense, this does not authorize it to reverse the findings and
conclusive of this court, either directly or indirectly, especially wherefrom its own admission reliance
was merely had on the printed briefs, averments, and pleadings of the parties.

Shioji vs. Harvey ([1922], 43 Phil., 333, 337), and reiterated in subsequent cases, "if each and every Court
of First Instance could enjoy the privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be
no end to litigation, and judicial chaos would result."

#1

(1.1) whether or not the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised in these proceedings;
and (1.2) in the affirmative, whether or not said Act is constitutional.

The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and
directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a
jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested

The general rule, although there is a conflict in the cases, is that the merit of prohibition will not
lie whether the inferior court has jurisdiction independent of the statute the constitutionality of which is
questioned, because in such cases the interior court having jurisdiction may itself determine the
constitutionality of the statute, and its decision may be subject to review, and consequently the
complainant in such cases ordinarily has adequate remedy by appeal without resort to the writ of
prohibition

Exception: where the inferior court or tribunal derives its jurisdiction exclusively from an
unconstitutional statute, it may be prevented by the writ of prohibition from enforcing that statute.

**Note: Indisputably under our constitutional system the right to try offenses against the criminal laws
and upon conviction to impose the punishment provided by law is judicial, and it is equally to be
conceded that, in exerting the powers vested in them on such subject, courts inherently possess ample
right to exercise reasonable, that is, judicial, discretion to enable them to wisely exert their authority.
But these concessions afford no ground for the contention as to power here made, since it must rest
upon the proposition that the power to enforce begets inherently a discretion to permanently refuse to
do so. And the effect of the proposition urged upon the distribution of powers made by the Constitution
will become apparent when it is observed that indisputable also is it that the authority to define and fix
the punishment for crime is legislative and includes the right in advance to bring within judicial
discretion, for the purpose of executing the statute, elements of consideration which would be
otherwise beyond the scope of judicial authority, and that the right to relieve from the punishment,
fixed by law and ascertained according to the methods by it provided belongs to the executive
department.

**Note: Although, as a general rule, only those who are parties to a suit may question the
constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been held that since the decree
pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, where the jurisdiction of the court depends on the
validity of the statute in question, the issue of the constitutionality will be considered on its being
brought to the attention of the court by persons interested in the effect to be given the statute.(12 C. J.,
sec. 184, p. 766.)

Supreme Court of New Mexico "the element of punishment or the penalty for the commission of a
wrong, while to be declared by the courts as a judicial function under and within the limits of law as
announced by legislative acts, concerns solely the procedure and conduct of criminal causes, with which
the executive can have nothing to do."

**Note: Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are actually district
and different from each other, both in origin and in nature. In People ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Sessions
([1894], 141 N. Y., 288, 294; 36 N. E., 386, 388; 23 L. R. A., 856; 15 Am. Crim. Rep., 675), the Court of
Appeals of New York said:

. . . The power to suspend sentence and the power to grant reprieves and pardons, as understood when
the constitution was adopted, are totally distinct and different in their nature. The former was always a
part of the judicial power; the latter was always a part of the executive power. The suspension of the
sentence simply postpones the judgment of the court temporarily or indefinitely, but the conviction and
liability following it, and the civil disabilities, remain and become operative when judgment is rendered.
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender. It
releases the punishment, and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law, the offender
is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. It removes the penalties and disabilities, and
restores him to all his civil rights. It makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and
capacity. (Ex parte Garland, 71 U. S., 4 Wall., 333; 18 Law. ed., 366; U. S. vs. Klein, 80 U. S., 13 Wall., 128;
20 Law. ed., 519; Knote vs. U. S., 95 U. S., 149; 24 Law. ed., 442.)

In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally and
completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment which the law inflicts. Under the
Probation Act, the probationer's case is not terminated by the mere fact that he is placed on probation.
Section 4 of the Act provides that the probation may be definitely terminated and the probationer
finally discharged from supervision only after the period of probation shall have been terminated and
the probation officer shall have submitted a report, and the court shall have found that the probationer
has complied with the conditions of probation. The probationer, then, during the period of probation,
remains in legal custody — subject to the control of the probation officer and of the court; and, he may
be rearrested upon the non-fulfillment of the conditions of probation and, when rearrested, may be
committed to prison to serve the sentence originally imposed upon him. (Secs. 2, 3, 5 and 6, Act No.
4221.)

That the power to suspend the sentence does not conflict with the power of the Governor to grant
reprieves is settled by the decisions of the various courts; it being held that the distinction between a
"reprieve" and a suspension of sentence is that a reprieve postpones the execution of the sentence to a
day certain, whereas a suspension is for an indefinite time. (Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker, Cr. R., 262; In re
Buchanan, 146 N. Y., 264; 40 N. E., 883), and cases cited in 7 Words & Phrases, pp. 6115, 6116. This law
cannot be hold in conflict with the power confiding in the Governor to grant commutations of
punishment, for a commutations is not but to change the punishment assessed to a less punishment.

A "pardon" is an act of grace, proceeding from the power intrusted with the execution of the laws which
exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has
committed (United States vs. Wilson, 7 Pet., 150; 8 Law. ed., 640); It is a remission of guilt (State vs.
Lewis, 111 La., 693; 35 So., 816), a forgiveness of the offense (Cook vs. Middlesex County, 26 N. J. Law,
326; Ex parte Powell, 73 Ala., 517; 49 Am. Rep., 71). "Commutation" is a remission of a part of the
punishment; a substitution of a less penalty for the one originally imposed (Lee vs. Murphy, 22 Grat.
[Va.] 789; 12 Am. Rep., 563; Rich vs. Chamberlain, 107 Mich., 381; 65 N. W., 235). A "reprieve" or
"respite" is the withholding of the sentence for an interval of time (4 Blackstone's Commentaries, 394), a
postponement of execution (Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker, Cr. R. [N. Y.], 272), a temporary suspension of
execution (Butler vs. State, 97 Ind., 373).

#2

Under the constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among three coordinate and
substantially independent organs: the legislative, the executive and the judicial. Each of these
departments of the government derives its authority from the Constitution which, in turn, is the highest
expression of popular will. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction, and is
supreme within its own sphere.

potestas delegata non delegare potest

"The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to anybody else, or place it
anywhere but where the people have."

Judge Cooley: "One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the
legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority. Where
the sovereign power of the state has located the authority, there it must remain; and by the
constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the Constitution itself is charged. The power to
whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been intrusted cannot relieve itself
of the responsibilities by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be devolved, nor can it
substitute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any other body for those to which alone the people
have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust."

"on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be
performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the
matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. (U. S. vs. Barrias, supra, at p.
330.)

The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It
admits of exceptions. An exceptions sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the central legislative
body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [1919], 39
Phil., 660; U. S. vs. Salaveria [1918], 39 Phil., 102; Stoutenburgh vs. Hennick [1889], 129 U. S., 141; 32
Law. ed., 637; 9 Sup. Ct. Rep., 256; State vs. Noyes [1855], 30 N. H., 279.) "It is a cardinal principle of our
system of government, that local affairs shall be managed by local authorities, and general affairs by the
central authorities; and hence while the rule is also fundamental that the power to make laws cannot be
delegated, the creation of the municipalities exercising local self government has never been held to
trench upon that rule. Such legislation is not regarded as a transfer of general legislative power, but
rather as the grant of the authority to prescribed local regulations, according to immemorial practice,
subject of course to the interposition of the superior in cases of necessity." (Stoutenburgh vs. Hennick,
supra.)

MAIN ANSWER: The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon
the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is
granted, if we may use the language of Justice Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a "roving
commission" which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the
Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to
the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. In
other words, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether
the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the
Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not
wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed
amount for the salary of a probation officer. The plain language of the Act is not susceptible of any other
interpretation. This, to our minds, is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards.

jUDGE COOLEY: "The principle which permits the legislature to provide that the administrative agent
may determine when the circumstances are such as require the application of a law is defended upon
the ground that at the time this authority is granted, the rule of public policy, which is the essence of the
legislative act, is determined by the legislature. In other words, the legislature, as it its duty to do,
determines that, under given circumstances, certain executive or administrative action is to be taken,
and that, under other circumstances, different of no action at all is to be taken. What is thus left to the
administrative official is not the legislative determination of what public policy demands, but simply the
ascertainment of what the facts of the case require to be done according to the terms of the law by
which he is governed."

English Constitution, "that absolute despotic power, which must in all governments reside somewhere,"
is intrusted to the parliament

True, the statute does not expressly state that the provincial boards may suspend the operation of the
Probation Act in particular provinces but, considering that, in being vested with the authority to
appropriate or not the necessary funds for the salaries of probation officers, they thereby are given
absolute discretion to determine whether or not the law should take effect or operate in their
respective provinces, the provincial boards are in reality empowered by the legislature to suspend the
operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces, the Act to be held in abeyance until the provincial
boards should decide otherwise by appropriating the necessary funds. The validity of a law is not tested
by what has been done but by what may be done under its provisions.

We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.

#3

The classification, however, to be reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions
only, and must apply equally to each member of the class

In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted
delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case
PARTING WORDS:

Probation as a development of a modern penology is a commendable system. Probation laws have been
enacted, here and in other countries, to permit what modern criminologist call the "individualization of
the punishment", the adjustment of the penalty to the character of the criminal and the circumstances
of his particular case. It provides a period of grace in order to aid in the rehabilitation of a penitent
offender. It is believed that, in any cases, convicts may be reformed and their development into
hardened criminals aborted. It, therefore, takes advantage of an opportunity for reformation and avoids
imprisonment so long as the convicts gives promise of reform. (United States vs. Murray [1925], 275 U.
S., 347 357, 358; 72 Law. ed., 309; 312, 313; 48 Sup. Ct. Rep., 146; Kaplan vs. Hecht, 24 F. [2d], 664, 665.)
The Welfare of society is its chief end and aim. The benefit to the individual convict is merely incidental.
But while we believe that probation is commendable as a system and its implantation into the
Philippines should be welcomed, we are forced by our inescapable duty to set the law aside because of
the repugnancy to our fundamental law.