Memorandum: Revised Rules of Civil Procedure Which Seeks To Declare As Unconstitutional

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Republic of the Philippines

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT


Fifth Judicial Region
Branch 13
Konoha City

RENAL REJUSO,
Petitioner,

SCA Case No. 14-010


-versus- For: Declaratory Relief

HON. BHEM ARCILLA in his


capacity as the Chief Executive
Officer of the City of Konoho,
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------x

MEMORANDUM
(FOR THE PETITIONER)

Petitioner RENAL REJUSO, through counsel, to this Honorable


Court, respectfully submits the hereunder Memorandum and pleads, thus:

THE CASE

This is a Petition for Declaratory Relief under Rule 63 (1) of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks to declare as unconstitutional
Executive Order No. 1-2017 otherwise known as “An Executive Order
Prescribing Guidelines for the Inter-Barangay Travel Registration
Mechanism” dated 10 January 2017 issued by public respondent Hon. Bhem
Arcilla in her capacity as the Chief Executive Officer of Konoha City on both
substantial and procedural grounds. First, the assailed issuance is substantially
infirmed as it is violative of the right to privacy, and right to travel and liberty
of abode guaranteed under the 1987 Constitution. And, the questioned
issuance is technically flawed for being contrary to Republic Act No. 7160
also known as the “Local Government Code of 1991.”

1
THE PARTIES

1. Petitioner Renal Rejuso (Rejuso, for brevity) is of legal age,


with capacity to sue and be sued being a taxpayer, Filipino, married and a
resident of Sunrise Subd. Konoha City, where he may be served with this
Honorable Court’s notices and other processes;

2. Public Respondent Hon. Bhem Arcilla (Hon. Arcilla, for


brevity) is impleaded in her official capacity as the Chief Executive Officer
of the City of Konoha who may be served by this Honorable Court’s notices
and other processes in her Office at the City Mayor’s Office, Konoha City,
Province of Maute;

THE ANTECEDENT FACTS

3. On 10 January 2017, Hon. Arcilla, in her capacity as the City


Mayor of Konoha, issued Executive Order No. 1-2017 otherwise known as
“An Executive Order Prescribing Guidelines for the Inter-Barangay Travel
Registration Mechanism.” By virtue of this issuance, [e]very person
travelling to another barangay of which he/she is not a resident of and is
staying at the said barangay for (24) twenty-four hours or more is required to
register his/her name, duration, and purpose of travel or stay, at the respective
barangay hall1;

4. Concomitantly under Sec. 1 of the aforesaid issuance, the


chairman and officials of each barangay were ordered to create and maintain
a record of all individuals who are not residents of the barangay indicating
their names, duration, and purpose of travel or stay. Incidentally under Sec. 3
thereof, any individual registered who is suspected to be a criminal, drug
personality, or a person exhibiting suspicious behavior should be immediately
reported by any barangay official to the nearest police station;

5. On 11 October 2017, petitioner, by way of an Affidavit, filed a


Complaint assailing the constitutionality of the aforesaid issuance. In his
sworn statement, petitioner inter alia alleges that Executive Order No. 1-2017
violates an individual’s right to privacy, and right to travel and liberty of abode
guaranteed under the 1987 Constitution. Further, petitioner maintains that
herein public respondent does not have the authority to issue such issuance
which is presumably issued pursuant to the police power of the local
government unit;

6. Subsequently in an undated Reply, public respondent proffers


that: (1) the issuance is not violative of one’s right to travel and liberty of
abode since it does not prohibit traveling from one barangay to another; (2) it
is neither a violation of one’s right to privacy as it is only the name which is
being required and therefore akin in writing an individual’s name in a logbook

1
par. 4 (Whereas clauses) of Executive Order No. 1-2017

2
before entering a government office, or private subdivisions, or hotels, or
motels; and (3) the issuance merely authorizes the barangay officials to
formulate their own mechanism which later on will be submitted to the
Sangguniang Panglungsod for review. Therefore, it is only at this juncture that
that the specifics and the issues of legality as well as the specific guidelines
of the issuance will be threshed out;

7. Consequently, in an Order dated 03 November 2017, this


Honorable Court directed the parties to submit their respective memorandum
within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt hereof;

8. Hence, the timeliness of the extant Petitioner’s Memorandum;

THE ISSUES

9. Based on the foregoing factual premises, petitioner submits the


following issues for resolution of this Honorable Court, to wit:

9.1 WHETHER OR NOT EXECUTIVE ORDER


NO. 1-2017 VIOLATES AN INDIVIDUAL’S
RIGHT TO TRAVEL AND LIBERTY OF ABODE;

9.2 WHETHER OR NOT EXECUTIVE ORDER


NO. 1-2017 VIOLATES AN INDIVIDUAL’S
RIGHT TO PRIVACY; and

9.3 WHETHER OR NOT EXECUTIVE ORDER


NO. 1-2017 WAS ISSUED IN ACCORD WITH
EXISTING LAWS;

ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSSION

Executive Order No. 1-2017 transgresses


an individual’s right to travel and liberty
of abode.
------------------------------------------------------

10. Public respondent, in her undated Reply, contends that Executive


Order No. 1-2017 otherwise known as “An Executive Order Prescribing
Guidelines for the Inter-Barangay Travel Registration Mechanism” does
not violate the right to travel and liberty of abode “since it does not prohibit
traveling from one barangay to another”;

10.a While concededly the said issuance does not


prohibit but rather regulate one’s right to travel, such regulatory

3
measure however runs contrary to Sec. 6, Art. III of the 1987
Philippine Constitution which provides that:

“Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the


same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right
to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided
by law.”(Emphasis underscoring supplied)

10.b Further, in Del Rosario v. Pascua 2 , the Supreme


Court held that:

“[A] citizen’s right to travel is guaranteed by Section


6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution:
SEC. 6. The liberty of abode and of
changing the same within the limits prescribed
by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall the right to
travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public
health, as may be provided by law.
Although the constitutional right to travel is not
absolute, it can only be restricted in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law.”

10.c Perceptively from the aforequoted basic provision


of law and relevant jurisprudence, the right to travel may be
impaired or limitations may be imposed thereat only in cases of
“national security, public safety or public health” and “as may
be provided by law.” Parenthetically, the act of travelling by an
individual from a barangay of which he or she is not a resident
for twenty-four (24) hours or more may be impaired only in cases
of national security, public safety and public health and as maybe
provided by law;

10.d In the extant case, said issuance which requires an


individual to register his/her name, duration, and purpose of
travel or stay, at the respective barangay hall is substantially
infirmed as it fails to show in what way will the act of
travelling per se by an individual from a barangay of which
he or she is not a resident for twenty-four (24) hours or more
be a threat to national security, public safety and public

2
A.M. No. P-11-2999, 27 February 2012

4
health. Stated otherwise, the act of travelling per se will not in
any way endanger or be a threat to national security, public safety
and public health. In fine, said issuance which concededly does
not prohibit but rather regulates one’s right to travel fell short of
the regulatory requirement enshrined under our fundamental law.
For this reason alone, it must be struck down as unconstitutional;

Executive Order No. 1-2017 violates an


individual’s right to privacy.
------------------------------------------------------

11. According to public respondent, Executive Order No. 1-2017


does not violate one’s right to privacy as it is only the name which is being
required and therefore akin in writing an individual’s name in a logbook
before entering a government office, or private subdivisions, or hotels, or
motels;

11.a In a consolidated cases the Supreme Court stated in


no uncertain terms that [T]he right to privacy, or the right to be
let alone, was institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution as a facet
of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures. But the Court acknowledged its existence
as early as 1968 in Morfe v. Mutuc, it ruled that the right to
privacy exists independently of its identification with liberty; it
is in itself fully deserving of constitutional protection. Relevant
to any discussion of the right to privacy is the concept known as
the "Zones of Privacy." The Court explained in "In the Matter of
the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v.
Senator Gordon"the relevance of these zones to the right to
privacy: Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our
laws. Within these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible
unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal
process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises
not only from our conviction that the right to privacy is a
"constitutional right" and "the right most valued by civilized
men," but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights which mandates that, "no one shall be subjected
to arbitrary interference with his privacy" and "everyone has the
right to the protection of the law against such interference or
attacks3";

11.b As can be gleaned from the aforesaid jurisprudence,


the right to privacy or the right to be let alone entails freedom
from intrusion in the absence of any legal ground;

3
Disini Et Al v. The Secretary of Justice Et Al., G.R. No. 202225, 11 February 2014; Biraogo v. NBI, G.R.
No. 2013299, 11 February 2014

5
11.c In the case at hand, having established earlier that
the act of travelling per se by an individual from a barangay of
which he or she is not a resident for twenty-four (24) hours or
more will not be a threat to national security, public safety and
public health, it necessarily and logically follows that the
registration mechanism finds no basis not only in fact but also in
law as it runs contrary to one’s right to privacy or the right to be
let alone. After all, the name and affairs of an individual are
private matters and therefore a mechanism requiring one to
register his/her name, duration, and purpose of travel or
stay, at the respective barangay hall would constitute an
intrusion to one’s privacy;

11.d Moreover, public respondent’s argument that the


registration is akin in writing an individual’s name in a logbook
before entering a government office is misplaced. It bears
stressing that there is a thin fine line between travelling from one
barangay to another of which one is not a resident and is required
to register vis-à-vis writing an individual’s name in a logbook
before entering a government office. This is so because in the
latter, the individual to some extent surrenders a portion of his
privacy by logging-on his name and purpose in availing the
services provided by the government. In the former, it bears
utmost significance that the individual does not in any way avails
the services of the government from which he may be required
to validly comply by registering his name and purpose;

11.e Similarly misplaced is the argument expounded by


the public respondent that registration is akin in writing an
individual’s name in a logbook before entering private
subdivisions, or hotels, or motels. While it is true that individuals
are regulated by writing their name in a logbook before entering
private subdivisions, or hotels, or motels, such logbook however,
remains private and cannot in anyway be confiscated or taken by
the government for any legal purpose without a Court order. The
reason behind this is that such logbook maintained by private
subdivisions, or hotels, or motels remains private and cannot
intrude upon except for some lawful cause;

Executive Order No. 1-2017 was issued


contrary to existing laws.
------------------------------------------------------

12. Executive Order No. 1-2017 which was issued presumably on


the basis of police power is procedurally flawed for having been issued

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contrary to existing law particularly Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise known
as the “Local Government Code of 1991”;

12.a In Cruz Et Al. v. Pandacan Hikers, Inc. 4 , the


Supreme Court quoting the General Welfare Clause held that:

“The general welfare clause provides for the exercise


of police power for the attainment or maintenance of the
general welfare of the community. The power, however, is
exercised by the government through its legislative branch
by the enactment of laws regulating those and other
constitutional and civil rights. Jurisprudence defines police
power as the plenary power vested in the legislature to make
statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people. The Latin maxim is salus populi est suprema lex (the
welfare of the people is the supreme law). Police power is
vested primarily with the national legislature, which may
delegate the same to local governments through the enactment
of ordinances through their legislative bodies (the
sanggunians). The so-called general welfare clause, provided
for in Section 16 of the Local Government Code, provides for
such delegation of police power, to wit:

Section 16. General Welfare. Every local


government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare.
Within their respective territorial jurisdictions,
local government units shall ensure and support,
among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety,
enhance the right of the people to a balanced
ecology, encourage and support the development
of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals,
enhance economic prosperity and social justice,
promote full employment among their residents,
maintain peace and order, and preserve the
comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
.” (Emphasis underscoring supplied)

12.b Conclusively from the aforequoted jurisprudence,


the police power validly delegated to local government units is
legislative in character and therefore must emanate from the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Konoha City through ordinances
and not from herein public respondent whose function plainly

4
G.R. No. 188213, 11 January 2016

7
entails the execution and implementation of said ordinances. For
this reason, the issuance of Executive Order No. 1-2017 by
herein public respondent is devoid of any legal basis;

12.c Finally, neither can public respondent claim that the


issuance merely authorizes the barangay officials to formulate
their own mechanism which later on will be submitted to the
Sangguniang Panglungsod for review. Therefore, it is only at this
juncture that that the specifics and the issues of legality as well
as the specific guidelines of the issuance will be threshed out. In
fine, public respondent juxtaposes that there is no actual case or
controversy to speak of as of yet;

12.d In Belgica Et Al. v. The Executive Secretary Et


5
Al. , the Supreme Court ruled that:

“By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only


when there is an actual case or controversy. This is embodied
in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which
pertinently states that "judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable x x x."
Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is
one which "involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or
dispute. In other words, "there must be a contrariety of legal
rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of
existing law and jurisprudence." Related to the requirement of
an actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness,"
meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny
are already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a
prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the
challenged action." "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon
constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they
are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions.”
(Emphasis underscoring supplied)

12.c In the instant action, it is undeniable that what is


being assailed is Executive Order No. 1-2017 itself which is
already in full force and effect and therefore applies and affects
the residents of the City. Hence, it is already ripe for adjudication

5
G.R. No. 208566, 19 November 2013

8
and falls within the realm of judicial power of review by the
regular Court of law;

13. Viewed under the light of the foregoing factual and legal
disquisitions, herein petitioner submits the hereunder prayer;

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed of this


Honorable Regional Trial Court that Executive Order No. 1-2017
otherwise known as “An Executive Order Prescribing Guidelines for the
Inter-Barangay Travel Registration Mechanism” be declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL having no force and effect.

Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed
for.

Konoha City, 05 November 2017.

TRIBU ABOGADO LAW FIRM


30-17, Mapina St., Sagpon, Daraga,Albay
Counsel for the Respondent

By:
ATTY. EMMANUEL L. ESMER
PTR No.
IBP No.
ROLL No.
MCLE COMPLIANCE No. Exempted

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