David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the Philippines.

Leticia obtained a decree

of divorce from the Superior Court of California in June 2005 wherein the court awarded all the properties in the
USA to Leticia. With respect to their properties in the Philippines, Leticia filed a petition for judicial separation of
conjugal properties. The Court ruled that even if the Court applies the doctrine of processual presumption as the
lower courts did with respect to the property regime of the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different
matter because, to begin with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid
recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court
thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation. DAVID A. NOVERAS vs. LETICIA T. NOVERAS, G.R. No.
188289, August 20, 2014, J. Perez

DAVID A. NOVERAS v. LETICIA T. NOVERAS, GR No. 188289, 2014-08-20

Facts:
Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the Superior Court of
California, County of San Mateo, USA. The California court granted the divorce on 24 June 2005 and judgment was
duly entered on 29 June 2005.[6] The California court granted to Leticia the custody of her two children, as well as
all the couple's properties in the USA.[7]
On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC of Baler,
Aurora. She relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and David's failure to comply with his obligation under
the same. She prayed for: 1) the power to administer... all conjugal properties in the Philippines; 2) David and his
partner to cease and desist from selling the subject conjugal properties; 3) the declaration that all conjugal properties
be forfeited in favor of her children; 4) David to remit half of the purchase price as share of
Leticia from the sale of the Sampaloc property; and 5) the payment of P50,000.00 and P100,000.00 litigation
expenses.[8]
In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their marriage was entered on 29 June 2005 by the
Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo. He demanded that the conjugal partnership properties, which
also include the USA properties, be liquidated and... that all expenses of liquidation, including attorney's fees of both
parties be charged against the conjugal partnership.
David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree
of divorce from the Superior Court of California in June 2005 wherein the court awarded all the properties in the
USA to
Leticia. With respect to their properties in the Philippines, Leticia filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal
properties.
Leticia and David had indeed separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. First,
while actual abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had been living separately... since
2003 when David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia heard from her
friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras.
Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital... where David was once confined, testified that she saw the name of
Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation form.[20] Third and more significantly, they had
filed for divorce and it was granted by the California court in June

2005.

Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for judicial
separation of absolute community of property should be granted.
Issues:
Whether or not respondent David A. Noveras committed acts of abandonment and marital infidelity which can result
into the forfeiture of the parties' properties in favor of the petitioner and their two (2) children.
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the properties in California, U.S.A. and the same can be included in
the judicial separation prayed for.
Whether or not the "Joint Affidavit" x x x executed by petitioner Leticia T. Noveras and respondent David A.
Noveras will amount to a waiver or forfeiture of the latter's property rights over their conjugal properties.
Whether or not Leticia T. Noveras is entitled to reimbursement of one-half of the P2.2 [M]illion sales proceeds of
their property in Sampaloc, Manila and one-half of the P1.5 [M]illion used to redeem the property of Atty. Isaias
Noveras, including interests and... charges.
How the absolute community properties should be distributed.
Whether or not the attorney's fees and litigation expenses of the parties were chargeable against their conjugal
properties.
Leticia and David had indeed separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. First,
while actual abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had been living separately... since
2003 when David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia heard from her
friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras.
Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital... where David was once confined, testified that she saw the name of
Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation form.[20] Third and more significantly, they had
filed for divorce and it was granted by the California court in June

2005.

Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for judicial
separation of absolute community of property should be granted.
Ruling:
We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the California
properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real property as well as
personal property is subject to the law of the country... where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to
the Philippine properties.
We affirm the modification made by the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the spouses in the absolute
community properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their children's presumptive legitimes, which the
appellate court explained in this wise:
Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc property. While both claimed
to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property, absent a clear showing where their contributions
came from, the same is presumed to have... come from the community property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to
reimbursement of half of the redemption money.
David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property for the benefit of the
absolute community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of P120,000.00 incurred in going to and from
the U.S.A. may be charged thereto. Election expenses... in the amount of P300,000.00 when he ran as municipal
councilor cannot be allowed in the absence of receipts or at least the Statement of Contributions and Expenditures
required under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 duly received by the Commission on Elections. Likewise,...
expenses incurred to settle the criminal case of his personal driver is not deductible as the same had not benefited the
family. In sum, Leticia and David shall share equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of P120,000.00 or
in the respective amounts of
P1,040,000.00.
xxxx
Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of legitimate children and descendants
consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother." The children are therefore entitled to
half of the share of each spouse in the net... assets of the absolute community, which shall be annotated on the
titles/documents covering the same, as well as to their respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the
Sampaloc property including the receivables from Sps. Paringit in the amount of P410,000.00.
Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay them the amount of P520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes
therefrom.[21]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 88686
is AFFIRMED.
At the risk of being repetitious, we will not remand the case to the trial court. Instead, we shall adopt the
modifications made by the Court of Appeals on the trial court's Decision with respect to liquidation.
We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the California
properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real property as well as
personal property is subject to the law of the country... where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to
the Philippine properties.
We affirm the modification made by the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the spouses in the absolute
community properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their children's presumptive legitimes, which the
appellate court explained in this wise:
Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc property. While both claimed
to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property, absent a clear showing where their contributions
came from, the same is presumed to have... come from the community property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to
reimbursement of half of the redemption money.
David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property for the benefit of the
absolute community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of P120,000.00 incurred in going to and from
the U.S.A. may be charged thereto. Election expenses... in the amount of P300,000.00 when he ran as municipal
councilor cannot be allowed in the absence of receipts or at least the Statement of Contributions and Expenditures
required under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 duly received by the Commission on Elections. Likewise,...
expenses incurred to settle the criminal case of his personal driver is not deductible as the same had not benefited the
family. In sum, Leticia and David shall share equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of P120,000.00 or
in the respective amounts of
P1,040,000.00.
xxxx
Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of legitimate children and descendants
consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother." The children are therefore entitled to
half of the share of each spouse in the net... assets of the absolute community, which shall be annotated on the
titles/documents covering the same, as well as to their respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the
Sampaloc property including the receivables from Sps. Paringit in the amount of P410,000.00.
Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay them the amount of P520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes
therefrom.[21]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 88686
is AFFIRMED.

Noveras v Noveras GR No 188289

Facts:
David and Leticia Noveras are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the Philippines. Theyhave 2
children, Jerome and Jena. Leticia states that sometime in 2003, David abandoned his family tolive with his
mistress. Further, she states that David executed an affidavit where he renounced all hisrights and interest in the
conjugal and real properties in the Philippines.

After learning of the extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce before the Superior Court ofCalifornia.
Upon issuance of the judicial decree of divorce in June 2005, the US properties were awardedto Leticia. Leticia then
filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal property before the RTC ofBaler, Aurora.

The RTC regarded the petition for judicial separation of conjugal property as a petition for liquidation ofproperty
since the spouses’ marriage has already been dissolved. It classified their property relation as absolute community
because they did not execute a marriage settlement before their marriageceremony. Then, the trial court ruled that in
accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law should apply because the court cannot take
judicial notice of the US law since the partiesdid not submit any proof of their national law. The court awarded the
properties in the Philippines toDavid, subject to the payment of the children’s legitimes.

Upon Leticia’s appeal to the CA, the CA ruled that the Philippine properties be divided equally betweenthe spouses
and that both should pay their children P520k. David argues that the Court should haverecognized the California
judgment that awarded him the Philippine properties and that allowing Leticiato share in the PH properties is
tantamount to unjust enrichment considering she already owns all theUS properties.

Issues
1. Whether the marriage between David and Leticia has been dissolved
2. Whether the filing of the judicial separation of property is proper

Held:

1. No. the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the bond of marriagebetween the
parties. Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of asovereign authority or tribunal
may be proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copyattested by the officer having the legal
custody thereof. Such publication must be authenticatedby a seal of a consular official. Section 25 of the
same Rule states that whenever a copy of adocument or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the
attestation must state that thecopy is a correct copy of the original. The attestation must be under
the official seal of theattesting officer. Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in
evidence. Therequired certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on
divorcewere not presented. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the partiesare
still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly toliquidation.

2. Yes. Art 135 of the Family Code provides that:Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient
cause for judicial separation ofproperty:xxxx(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been
separated in fact for at leastone year and reconciliation is highly improbable.Separation in fact for one
year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property was nottackled in the trial court’s decision
because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of the absolute community
of properties.The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed
separatedfor more than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actualabandonment
had not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had been living separatelysince 2003 when David
decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business. Second,Leticia heard from her friends that
David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, whorepresented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha
Apolonio, who worked in the hospital whereDavid was once confined, testified that she saw the name of
 Estrellita listed as the wife of Davidin the Consent for Operation form. Third and more significantly, they
had filed for divorce and itwas granted by the California court in June 2005.Having established that Leticia
and David had actually separated for at least one year, thepetition for judicial separation of absolute
community of property should be granted.

Noveras v. Noveras
G.R. No. 188289
August 20, 2014
Facts:

David and Leticia Noveras are US citizens who own properties in the US and in the Philippines. Upon learning that
David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of California wherein
the court awarded all the properties in the US to Leticia. With respect to their properties in the Philippines, Leticia
filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC.

The RTC awarded the properties in the Philippines to David, with the properties in the US remaining in the sole
ownership of Leticia. The trial court ruled that in accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine
law should apply because the court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not submit any
proof of their national law.

On appeal, the CA directed the equal division of the Philippine properties between the spouses. David insists that the
CA should have recognized the California Judgment which awarded the Philippine properties to him. Hence, this
petition.

Issue: Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the California properties

Held: No. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. For Philippine courts to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage, the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as
facts under our Rules of Evidence, together with the

FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ARTICLE 91:

This article tackles about what constitutes the ACP or Absolute Community Property.

This property consists of all the properties owned separately by each spouse at the time of the celebration of the

marriage and all properties acquired by each or both spouses during the marriage.

Upon marriage, their separate properties will be automatically converted into common property.

Noveras vs. Noveras

GR No. 188289, Aug. 20, 2014

Facts:
 In Dec. 1988, David and Leticia got married. They lived in California and eventually granted with

American citizenship. Out of this marriage, they produce two children and also several properties both in USA and

Philippines.

In 2001, David returned to the Philippines to supervise their business. But after a year, Leticia learned that David

had an extra-marital affair with other woman. She then filed a petition for divorce in California and in 2005 the court

granted the decree of nullification of their marriage. Also, the California court granted to Leticia the custody of her

two minor children, as well as all the couple’s property in USA.

In Aug. 2005, Leticia filed for Judicial Separation of Conjugal property in Baler, Aurora. In his answer, David filed

for a petition to grant him all of their properties in the Philippines considering that Leticia got all of their properties

in USA.

Issue:

Whether or not David is right in claiming all of their properties in the Philippines?

Ruling:

The court held no, David was wrong in claiming all of their properties in the Philippines.

Article 91 of this Code, provides that property owned before and during marriage are under ACP of Absolute

Community Property.

In this case their marriage contracted in Dec. 1988, therefore ACP governs. But, considering that they are both

American citizen, the California court decision with regards to their property in USA governs. The property in the

Philippines will be equally divided between them.

FAMILY CODE OF THE P HILIPPINES ARTICLE 75:

This article is about the property relations between husband and wife. The future spouses may execute marriage

settlement with regards to their properties.

They may agree upon these kinds of property regimes:

1. CPG = Conjugal Partnership of Gains = All

properties acquired during their marriage only = Each property acquired

before marriage will be exclusively owned by each party.

2. ACP = Absolute Community Property = All

properties acquired before and during marriage. = It excludes the properties

inherited, donated or given gratuitously to either of the spouse before or

during marriage. (This property owned exclusively by the receiving spouse)

3. CSP = Complete Separation of Property = Each

spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his or her own separate estate,

without need of the consent of the other.

However, the marriage settlements must not be contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public order or public

policy.

In the absence of marriage settlements the ACP or Absolute Community Property shall govern.

Under the doctrine of processual presumption, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our
courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. Hence, pleading a
foreign law without proving the same will bar its application in the Philippines.NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO for
and in behalf of her Minor Child RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM vs. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN
VAN WILSEM, G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014, J. Peralta

NORMA DEL SOCORRO V. WILSEM CASE DIGEST - CIVIL LAW

DEL SOCORRO VS. WILSEM G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014

FACTS:

Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were blessed with a son named
Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the
appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her son came home to the Philippines. According to Norma,
Ernst made a promise to provide monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in
the Philippines, Ernst never gave support to Roderigo.Respondent remarried again a Filipina and resides again the
Philippines particulary in Cebu where the petitioner also resides. Norma filed a complaint against Ernst for violation
of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. The trial court dismissed
the complaint since the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he
being an alien
ISSUES:

1. Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under the Philippine law?
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to
support his minor child.

RULING:

1. YES. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC that
he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child,
as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This does not, however, mean that Ernst is not obliged to support
Norma’s son altogether. In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case
has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, Ernst hastily concludes that being a national of the
Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded
the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the
same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon
the parents the obligation to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our
courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or
residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract
that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if the
laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-compliance
therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the
child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.

2. YES. The court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A 9262) because the foreigner is living here in the Philippines
and committed the offense here

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO v. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, GR No. 193707, 2014-12-10
Facts:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set
aside the Orders[1] dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court... of
Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan
Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,
otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland
on September 25, 1990.[2] On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem,
who at the time of the filing of the... instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.[3]
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate
Court of Holland.[4] At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old.[5] Thereafter, petitioner and her
son... came home to the Philippines.[6]
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the amount of Two
Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene
However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in... the Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son,
Roderigo.[8]
Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have
been residing thereat.
To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.[11]
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from respondent. However,
respondent refused to receive the letter.[12]
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of
Cebu City
Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against respondent.[16]
Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail.
Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order
Subsequently,... respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,[21] dismissing the instant criminal case
against respondent
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order[25] denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
Issues:
Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law
Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to
support his minor child
Ruling:
We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with petitioner's contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal
obligation to support exists.
we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195[34] of the New Civil Code in demanding support
from respondent, who is a foreign citizen
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the respondent is
a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country,
not to Philippine law, as to whether... he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his
failure to do so.[37]
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner's son under Article 195 of the
Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland.
This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support... petitioner's son altogether.
In view of respondent's failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual
presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our
courts will presume that the foreign law is... the same as our local or domestic or internal law.[44] Thus, since the
law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant
case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which... enforces the obligation of parents to support their
children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
the
Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show that he is not liable to give support to his son
after the divorce decree was issued.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states that parents have no
obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still not find
applicability,... Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a... foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing
the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Principles:
the doctrine of processual presumption

Duty of alien to support his Filipino child

See - Presumed to be similar | Opinion, News, The Philippine Star | philstar.com

"x x x.
So Delia already filed a complaint affidavit before the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor against Andersen for violation of
Section 5 (e) (2) of R.A. 9262 otherwise known as “Anti Violence against Women and their Children Act” which
considers “depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support due her or her family”
as an act of violence against women and their children.
Opinion ( Article MRec ), pagematch: 1, sectionmatch: 1

After preliminary investigation the Prosecutor charged Andersen before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
“willfully, unlawfully and deliberately depriving, refusing and still continue to deprive his son of financial support
legally due him.” Upon motion of Delia, after due notice and hearing, the RTC issued a Hold Departure Order
against Andersen. Consequently, he was arrested and subsequently posted bail.

But subsequently on motion of Andersen, the RTC dismissed the criminal case since he is a foreign national and
therefore not subject to our national law particularly the Family Code (FC, Article 195) in regard to a parent’s duty
to give support to his child. Consequently, the RTC said he cannot be charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged
failure to support Rodger. Was the RTC correct?

According to the Supreme Court where the case was appealed via a petition for certiorari of Delia on purely a
question of law, the RTC is correct in ruling that Andersen is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine
Law (Art.195 FC) as to whether he is obliged to support his child as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.

This does not mean however that Andersen is not obliged to support Rodger altogether. Since he wanted to apply the
national law of Netherlands in advancing his position he should have properly pleaded and proven said law. But in
this case he never proved the same. And since the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our
courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic internal law which enforces the
obligation of parents to support their children and penalizes non-compliance therewith. Besides, in the second page
of the Divorce Covenant presented by Andersen himself, his obligation to support his child is specifically stated.

Furthermore, even if the national law of Netherlands states that parents have no obligation to support their children
or that such obligation is not punishable by law, said law shall not be applied here because it is contrary to the sound
and well established public policy of the Philippines as it would work great injustice to the child to be denied of
financial support. So Andersen may be held liable under Section 5 (e) and (i) R.A. 9262 for unjustly refusing to give
support to Delia’s son (Del Socorro etc. vs. Van Wilsem, G.R. 193707, December 10, 2014)

LAWS & JURISPRUDENCE

OBLIGATION OF A FOREIGN NATIONAL TO SUPPORT HIS MINOR CHILD UNDER

PHILIPPINE LAW

Petitioner Norma and respondent Ernst Johan contracted marriage in Holland. They were blessed

with a son named Roderigo, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16)

years of age.

Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate

Court of Holland. At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old. Thereafter, petitioner

and her son came home to the Philippines.

According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the

amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less).

However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respond ent never gave

support to the son, Roderigo.

Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in Cebu City, and since

then, have been residing thereat. Petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for

support from respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.

Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial

Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No.

9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. Thereafter, the

Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an information

for the crime charged against herein respondent with the RTC -Cebu.

The RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order, dismissing the instant criminal case against

respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense

with respect to the respondent who is an alien,

Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s

obligation to support their child under Article 195 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so
makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in the Phil ippines

who are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the obligor’s nationality."

The RTC-Cebu issued an Order denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, the

present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under our Philippine Law?

RULING:

A foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child. Petitioner cannot rely on Article

195 of the New Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since

Article 15 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as

Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the

same only applies to Filipino citizen s. By analogy, the same principle applies toforeigners such

that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties.

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties.

Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands he is subject to the laws of his

country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as

the consequences of his failure to do so.

It cannot be gainsaid, there fore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son

under Article 195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained

in Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s

son altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to adispute or case has the

burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a

national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and

capacity to support. While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing

his positionthat he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead an d prove that the national law of the Netherlands does

not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the

issuance of a divorce decree). In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the
Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine,

if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the

foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal la w. Thus, since the law of the

Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the

instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of

parents to support their childr en and penalizing the non -compliance therewith. Such obligation is

still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be

denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.

G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN

WILSEM,Petitioner, vs. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.

PERALTA, J.:

MINORU FUJIKI v. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, GR No. 196049, 2013-06-26

Facts:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay
(Marinay) in the Philippines[2] on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner's parents. Thus,
Fujiki could not bring his wife to
Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved,
Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to
Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.[3]
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay
obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on
the ground of bigamy.[4] On
14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree
of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that
the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;[5] and (3) for
the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the
Certificate of
Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).
the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition
The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered.
The... petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines[11] on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.[12]
Issues:
Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
Ruling:
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its
parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines, Philippine courts must... determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and
other mandatory laws.[60] Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or
to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are... binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require,
for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment... affecting its citizen, over
whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine
court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume
to know the foreign laws under which the... foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment
on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus,
Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to... the rules of evidence.
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no
divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully... consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous
marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court
judgment... in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition.
Principles:
Civil Law
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its
parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines, Philippine courts must... determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and
other mandatory laws.[60] Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or
to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are... binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require,
for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment... affecting its citizen, over
whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine
court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume
to know the foreign laws under which the... foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment
on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus,
Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to... the rules of evidence.

MINORU FUJIKI VS. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013

FACTS:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay
(Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus,
Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved,
Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to
Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact
Fujiki.

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay
obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on
the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).”

RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment ·(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.

Fujiki filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied upon consideration that Fujiki as a "third person” in
the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which
he now seeks to be judicially recognized.

The OSG agreed with the petitioner that the RTC’s decision be set aside.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

2. Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

3. Whether the RTC can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in
the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

RULING:

1. No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.

2. YES. The prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he
contracted and the property relations arising from it. Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy
because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay.

3. YES. The Philippine court can recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which
was already tried and decided under foreign law. Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a
foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public
policy. However, the Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a
case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition
and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited
to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to
extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code

Fujiki vs Marinay (art.41)

G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,

vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY,
AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS
OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.

Facts:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay
(Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus,
Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved,
Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to
Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact
Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay
obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on
the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).”

The decision of the lower courts (RTC): dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment ·(or
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru
Fujiki, to file the petition.

Issues:
1. Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

2. Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

3. Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Held:

1. No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the
rule in A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage “does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.” While the Philippines has no divorce law, the
Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are
declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance
with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

2. Yes, the recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of
special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a
party or a particular fact.”
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status
of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction
of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it.

3. Yes, there is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law,
nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to
nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a
case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the “family rights and duties, or on the status, condition
and legal capacity” of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited
to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to
extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an
overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to
repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine
courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations.

FUJIKI vs. MARINAY

Citation: G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013
Ponente: Carpio; SECOND DIVISION

Doctrine:
Recognition of foreign judgment declaring nullity of marriage – A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action
to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. Article 26 of the Family Code further
confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code provides that “[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”

FACTS:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki), a Japanese national married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in
the Philippines on January 23, 2004. Sadly, petitioner Fujiki could not bring respondent Marinay back to Japan and
they eventually lost contact with one another. In 2008, Marinay met Shinichi Maekara and they married without the
earlier marriage being dissolved.

Marinay suffered abuse from Maekara and so she left him and was able to reestablish contact with Fujiki and
rekindle their relationship. The couple was able to obtain a judgment in a Japanese court that declared Marinay's
marriage to Maekara void on the ground of bigamy in 2010. Fujiki then filed a petition in the RTC entitled:
“Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)”. In this case, petitioner
prayed that:

(1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for
the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the
Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).

The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it did not meet standing and venue requirements as
prescribed on the Rule on Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), specifically, only the spouses (i.e. Marimay or Maekara) may file an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage. Petitioner in a Motion for Reconsideration claimed that the case should not be
dismissed as the above rule applied only to cases of annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity and not in a petition for recognition of a foreign judgment. Notably, when the Solicitor General was
asked for comment, it agreed with the Petitioner stating that the above rule should not apply to cases of bigamy and
that insofar as the Civil Registrar and the NSO are concerned, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provide the procedure
to be followed. Lastly, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void
marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro and Niñal v. Bayadog which declared that “[t]he validity of
a void marriage may be collaterally attacked.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying
the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

HELD:
YES. Firstly, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this
Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage “does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.”

The Supreme Court further held that:

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is
a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of
Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the
Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the
officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the
certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office.

xxx

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine
court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume
to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on
the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus,
Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.

xxx

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no
divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous
marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment
in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to
recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under
foreign law. Article 26 of the Family Code further confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a
foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of
the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that “[w]here a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”

Petition was granted and the RTC was ordered to reinstate the proceedings.

Fujiki v. Marinay, 2013

In 2004, Fujiki (Japanese) married Marinay in Pasay. Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides
because the marriage did not sit well with his parents. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met Maekara (another Japanese). In that same year, without the first marriage being dissolved,
they got married in QC. Maekara brought her to Japan. She allegedly suffered physical abuse because she concealed
from him the fact that she was previously married. She left him and started to contact Fujiki. In 2010, Fujiki helped
Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara
void on the ground of bigamy.
In 2011, Fujiki filed a Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage) in RTC QC which dismissed the same, grounded on lack of personality to sue and improper venue.
On appeal via Rule 45, the SC held that:
1. Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment. He has a personal
and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising
from it.
2. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages does not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.
3. The recognition of the foreign judgment before the RTC may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
SC reversed RTC QC and ordered it to reinstate the petition for further proceedings

FUJIKI VS. MARINAY, G.R. NO. 196049, JUNE 26, 2013

Recognition of a Foreign Judgment of Divorce.

(Excerpts of the case, Fujiki vs. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013).

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is
a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of
Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the
Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the
officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the
certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office.

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the
trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition, the service of
summons, the investigation of the public prosecutor,the setting of pre-trial,the trial and the judgment of the trial
court.This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign
judgments, which is “to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues.”The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount
to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada, this Court explained that “[i]f every judgment of a
foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action,
rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation.”

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its
parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and
other mandatory laws. Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that “[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to
the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.” This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for
effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom
it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine
court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume
to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on
the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus,
Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person creates
a “presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.”
Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that “the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.” Thus, Philippine
courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign
judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds
external to its merits, i.e. , “want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact.” The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations, as
well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.

Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a
Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence. Divorce involves the
dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law,
Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree
abroad.

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki (the first husband of the Filipina Marinay) to simply prove as a fact
the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the
Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence
of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that “[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish
a status, a right, or a particular fact.” Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded
by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth,
death or marriage, which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto.
Tomas this Court declared that “[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.”

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil
status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or
correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to
Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the
cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his
marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited
instances) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law
the moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported “in keeping
with the financial capacity of the family”and preserving the property regime of the marriage.

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse’s right in a marriage
extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III (“Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife”)
of the Family Code. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot “diminish, increase, or modify” the substantive right of the
spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage. In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this
substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity
of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that “[a] petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife“—it refers to the
husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are
void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the
law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate
prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes. If anyone
can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, there is more reason to
confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share
in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect
of protecting his marriage.

When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is
therefore interested in the judgment of the suit. Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse “is clearly the aggrieved
party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse.”Being a real party in interest, the prior
spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is
effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the
bigamous marriage in the civil registry.

Philippine judicial recognition of a foreign judgment affecting the marital status of a Filipino citizen in a Rule
108 proceeding

In an earlier post on this blog, the Philippine judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree in a Rule 108
proceeding was discussed. The discussions in that post were anchored primarily on the Supreme Court Decision
in Corpuz vs Sto. Tomas (GR 186571, 11 Aug 2010).
Recently in the case of Fujiki vs Marinay (GR 196049, 26 June 2013), the Supreme Court applied Corpuz vs Sto.
Tomas in reinstating petitioner Fujiki’s (a Japanese national) petition for judicial recognition before the RTC of
Quezon City of a foreign judgment obtained in Japan by Fujiki’s wife Marinay (Fujiki & Marinay married in 2004)
declaring Marinay’s subsequent marriage to Maekara (Maekara & Marinay married in 2008 in Quezon City) void
due to its bigamous nature.

The Fujiki vs Marinay case has repercussions on various principles under Philippine Family law.

We have traditionally understood Article 26 of the Family Code (in allowing a judicial recognition by the Filipino
spouse of a foreign divorce decree obtained abroad) as the only express statement in Philippine law allowing the
judicial recognition of a foreign judgment affecting the marital status of a Filipino citizen. Fujiki has made us
understand that Article 26 of the Family Code is merely an expression of a greater general rule that foreign
judgments relating to marital status may be recognized in the Philippines if the foreign judgment is consistent with
Philippine public policy and the State has a sufficient interest in the recognition of the foreign judgment. The
Supreme Court said:

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its
parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and
other mandatory laws.[CIVIL CODE , Art. 17.] Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that “[l]aws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.” This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the
Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign
judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal
capacity of such citizen.

In other words, although Article 26 of the Family Code is an express legislative statement that a divorce decree is
consistent with Philippine public policy so long as the requisites laid down by jurisprudence (see eg, Republic v.
Orbecido(GR 154380, October 5, 2005) where a spouse must be an alien at the time the divorce is procured,
irregardless of the original citizenship of that spouse at the time of marriage) are complied with, Article 26 of the
Family Code does not preclude the recognition in the Philippines of a judgment affecting the status of Filipino
citizen, so long as that judgment is ‘consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws’ (quote
from Fujiki). From the reinstatement in Fujiki vs Marinay (GR 196049, 26 June 2013) of the petition, it may be
inferred that, at the very least under Fujiki’s facts, a petition for judicial recognition filed by a foreigner spouse of a
foreign judgment declaring the Filipino spouse’s subsequent marriage as void, due to its bigamous nature, is
consistent with Philippine public policy, even if that foreign judgment was obtained by the Filipino spouse
(in Fujiki, the foreign judgment was obtained by the Filipino spouse). It, however, remains to be seen whether or not
such a petition filed in Fujiki would succeed had it been the Filipino spouse who filed the petition for recognition of
the foreign judgment. This is because while the Supreme Court in Fujiki explained the public policy repercussions
of maintaining a direct action under Philippine law to declare as null and void a marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC (Rule On Declaration Of Absolute Nullity Of Void Marriages And Annulment Of Voidable Marriages), It did
not go further in explaining the standards by which foreign judgments should be deemed sufficiently or substantially
in accordance with the public policy sought to be protected by a direct action. The Supreme Court
in Fujiki explained the public policy underlying a direct action as follows:

A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of
proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,[FAMILY CODE , Art. 35-67.]83 support pendente lite
of the spouses and children,[quoting ARTICLE 84 FAMILY CODE; Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 61] the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,[quoting ARTICLE 50 FAMILY CODE] and
the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the
Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court “where the corresponding civil registry is located.”[quoting
ARTICLE 48 FAMILY CODE; quoting s 9 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC]

Fujiki vs Marinay (GR 196049, 26 June 2013) also affirmed the earlier pronouncement in Juliano-Llave vs
Republic (G.R. No. 169766, March 30, 2011), which gave a spouse of the first marriage, an interest as an ‘aggrieved
spouse’ under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC to file a direct action to have his/her other spouse’s subsequent bigamous
declared null and void.
In Fujiki vs Marinay (GR 196049, 26 June 2013), the Supreme Court citing Corpuz vs Sto. Tomas (GR 186571, 11
Aug 2010) stated what the petitioner seeking recognition of the foreign judgment must prove:

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is
a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of
Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the
Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the
officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the
certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office.

xxx

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that “[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish
a status, a right, or a particular fact.” Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded
by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth,
death or marriage, which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto.
Tomas this Court declared that “[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.”

xxx

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a
case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the “family rights and duties, or on the status, condition
and legal capacity” of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited
to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to
extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an
overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to
repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact. If there is either inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine
courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already “presumptive evidence of a right between the parties.”
Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the
correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact that needs to be reflected in the
civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign
judgment and the public records in the Philippines.

Notwithstanding the lack of an express statement in Fujiki vs Marinay (GR 196049, 26 June 2013), it is submitted
that foreign law must also be proven in the petition for judicial recognition of the foreign judgment, for how else can
one determine whether or not the foreign court had jurisdiction, or that the foreign procedure is consistent with our
public policy, or that the effects of the foreign decision is to capacitate the parties to remarry (see where Corpuz vs
Sto. Tomas (GR 186571, 11 Aug 2010) citing Garcia vs Recio (G.R. No. 138322, 2 October 2001) where
‘conformity to the foreign law allowing it’ must be demonstrated)? In Fujiki, the Supreme Court alluded to the need
to prove foreign law, when it said that ‘Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the
foreign judgment was rendered.’

A Divorce Decree Obtained Abroad By Filipino Against Foreigner Spouse Is Valid In The Philippines

Republic v. Manalo; G.R. No. 221029; 24 April 2018

Although divorce is not allowed under Philippine laws, Article 26 of the Family Code recognizes the validity of a
divorce decree obtained in a foreign country in respect of mixed marriages. Article 26, particularly second paragraph
thereof, states:

Art. 26. X x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

For the provision to apply, the Supreme Court laid down the following requisites:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

It was held that under the second requisite it should be the foreigner spouse who initiated the divorce proceeding. If
it was the Filipino spouse who filed the case for divorce, the decree would not be recognized as valid in the
Philippines. Consequently, under Philippine laws, the Filipino spouse remained married to his or her foreigner
spouse and incapacitated to contract marriage. Recently, however, the Supreme abandoned that view in Republic v.
Manalo.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, – versus – MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent.

G.R. NO. 221029

24 April 2018

Facts:

On January 20, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of entry of
marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese
court. The petition was later amended and captioned as a petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign
judgment.
The petition alleged, among others, that:

 Petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named YOSHIDO MINORO;
 Recently, a case for divorce was filed by petitioner in Japan and after due proceeding, a divorce decree
was rendered by the Japanese Court;

The trial court (RTC) denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan
should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law “does not
afford Filipinos the right to file a divorce, whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to
Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country” and that
unless Filipinos “are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related
to Filipino family rights and duties, together with determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into
contracts and civil relations, including marriages”.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the
Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband
because the decree they obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry.
Conformably with Navarro, et al. v. Exec. Secretary, et al. [663 Phil. 546 (2011)] ruling that the meaning of the law
should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be
the height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married
to her. For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential.

Issue:

Whether a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce proceeding abroad and obtained a favorable judgment
against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry, has the capacity to remarry pursuant to Article
26 (2) of the Family Code.

Ruling:

Yes.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry”. Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce
validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated
the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the
petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.

The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it is rendered, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse...

The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it is rendered, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address the anomaly where the
Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to remarry under the laws of his or her
country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving
the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse
will effectively be without a husband or a wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same
place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore,
the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the
residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by
operation of the latter’s national law.
There is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding and a
Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and
foreign laws, both are considered Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in an alien land. The
circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their
foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them are based
merely on superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the
treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.

Thus, a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce proceeding abroad and obtained a favorable judgment
against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry, has the capacity to remarry pursuant to Article
26 (2) of the Family Code.

Declaration of nullity of marriage - "In a recent landmark ruling in Republic of the Philippines v. Marelyn Tanedo
Manalo (GR 221029, April 24, 2018), the Supreme Court held that a foreign divorce secured by a Filipino is also
considered valid in the Philippines, even if it is the Filipino spouse who files for divorce abroad."

Foreign divorce in mixed marriages

In a recent landmark ruling in Republic of the Philippines v. Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (GR 221029, April 24,
2018), the Supreme Court held that a foreign divorce secured by a Filipino is also considered valid in the
Philippines, even if it is the Filipino spouse who files for divorce abroad. With 10 Justices in favor, 3 Dissenting
(Associate Justices del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa) 1 Abstaining (Justice Jardeleza, then solicitor general)
and former Chief Justice Sereno on leave, the Supreme Court affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Tenth Division that reversed a Dagupan Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision, which ruled that “the kind of divorce
recognized here in the Philippines are those validly obtained by the alien spouse abroad, not by the Filipino spouse
pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code.”

Petitioner was a certain Marelyn Tanedo Manalo who was married to a Japanese national, Minoru Yoshino. Manalo
(not her Japanese husband) filed for and was granted divorce in Japan sometime in 2011. Manalo filed with a
Dagupan RTC to have her Japanese divorce recognized in the Philippines. The RTC denied her Petition, which was
subsequently reversed by the CA in 2014. The CA recognized the foreign divorce and ruled that Manalo had the
right to remarry. The Supreme Court affirmed this CA Decision.

Excerpts from the Majority Decision penned by Justice Diosdado M. Peralta are herein quoted.

“Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry.” Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly
obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the
petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute xxx .”

“The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the
Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country.
Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the
marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: The Filipino spouse will
effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place
and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the
subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual
effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of
the latter’s national law.

“On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated foreign divorce
proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of
the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in an
alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still
married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between
them based merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly
unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other. x x x”

“To be sure, a good number of the Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react adversely to any attempt to
enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals and traditions that has looked upon
marriage and family as an institution and their nature of permanence, inviolability and solidarity. However, none of
our laws should be based on any religious law, doctrine or teaching; otherwise, the separation of Church and State
will be violated.”

In a separate Concurring Opinion, Justice Marvic Leonen, underscored the reality that it is the Filipino wife who is
prejudiced if Article 26 of our Family Code is given “an interpretation which capacitates and empowers the Japanese
husband the option to divorce and how such choice has effects in our country while, at the same time, disallowing
the Filipina wife from being able to do the same simply because she is a Filipina.”

“That interpretation may be unconstitutional. Article II, Section 14 of our Constitution provides:

Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality
before the law of women and men.

“This constitutional fiat advances the notion of gender equality from its passive formulation in Article III, Section 1
to its more active orientation.

Indeed, our laws were never intended for the Filipino to be at a disadvantage. In the words of Justice Leonen, “to say
that one spouse may divorce and the other may not contribute to patriarchy. It fosters an unequal relationship prone
to abuse in such intimate relationship. The law is far from rigid. It should passionately guarantee equality.”

I fully agree with Justice Leonen and the majority opinion of Justice Peralta. But still, no amount of judicial activism
can be a real substitute for an Absolute Divorce Law that has long been advocated by countless suffering wives
chained to the shackles of loveless marriages with philandering and abusive husbands!

SC says divorce acquired abroad valid in PHL

The Supreme Court on Tuesday ruled that divorce obtained by a Filipino outside of the country against a foreign
spouse is considered valid in the Philippines.
SC voted 10-3-1 on G.R. No. 221029 (Republic of the Philippines v. Marelyn Tanedo Manalo) to rule "that a
foreign divorce secured by a Filipino against a foreign spouse is also considered valid in the Philippines, even if it is

the Filipino spouse who files for divorce abroad."

Prior to the ruling, a divorce abroad is only considered valid in the Philippines when it is initiated by the foreign
spouse, according to SC spokesperson Theodore Te.

Those who dissented to the ruling were Justices Mariano del Castillo, Estela Perlas-Bernabe, and Alfredo Benjamin
Caguioa.

Associate Justice Francis Jardeleza took no part in the voting due to his previous participation in the case as Solicitor
General, while Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno was on leave.

A lower court had earlier ruled Article 26 (2) of the Family Code did not apply in Marelyn Tanedo Manalo case
because it was the Filipino spouse that initiated the divorce.

The provision states that "where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have the capacity to remarry under Philippine law."

The Court of Appeals, however, overturned the lower court's decision, saying Article 26 of the Family Code applies
even if it was the Filipino spouse who filed for divorce against the foreign spouse because the decree obtained
makes the foreigner no longer married to the Filipino, enabling the foreigner to remarry.

The Supreme Court sided with the CA.

REPUBLIC VS ORBECIDOG.R. No. 154380October 5, 2005

FACTS:

I n 1 9 8 1 , C i p r i a n o O r b e c i d o I I I m a r r i e d L a d y M y r o V i l l a n u e v a i n L a m - a n , Ozamis City.

In 1986, Orbecido discovered that his wife had had been naturalized as anA
merican citizen.

Sometime in 2000, Orbecido learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and
married an American.
O r b e c i d o f i l e d w i t h t h e T r i a l C o u r t a p e t i t i o n f o r “ A u t h o r i t y t o R e m a r r y ” in
voking Article 26 Paragraph 2 of the Family Code, the Court granted the petition.

T h e R e p u b l i c , h e r e i n p e t i t i o n e r , t h r o u g h t h e O f f i c e o f t h e S o l i c i t o r G e n e r a l , sought for
reconsideration but it was denied by the Trial Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the allegations of the respondent was proven as a fact accordingto the rules of evidence.

HELD:

Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as
a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreignlaw allowing it. Such foreign law must also be proved as our
courts cannot take judicialn o t i c e o f f o r e i g n l a w s . L i k e a n y o t h e r f a c t , s u c h l a w s m u s t b e
a l l e g e d a n d p r o v e d . Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife
toremarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to
declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.

However, in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and onrecord, we are unable to
declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, w h o w a s n a t u r a l i z e d a s a n
A m e r i c a n c i t i z e n , h a d o b t a i n e d a d i v o r c e d e c r e e a n d h a d remarried an American, that
respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declarationcould only be made properly upon respondent’s
submission of the aforecited evidence inhis favor.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED.The assailed Decisio n dated
May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del
Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

RP v Orbecido
RP v Orbecido
2005
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, - versus - CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.

FACTS:

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a
certain Innocent Stanley.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code.
DECISION OF LOWER COURT:
(1) Regional Trial Court: declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry.

ISSUE:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under
Philippine law?

RULING:
Yes.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration
of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains
a divorce decree.
The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within
its spirit or intent. The twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an
American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading
it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.

REPUBLIC VS ORBECIDO
Posted by kaye lee on 9:15 AM
472 SCRA 114, GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005 [Article 26;Divorce]

FACTS:
Orbecido and Villanueva were married ad had two children. Wife went to US to work and later became a US citizen.
Thereafter he learned from his son that his wife obtained divorce and married another man. Orbecido filed a petition
for authority to remarry under the Article 26 (2) of the Family Code. RTC Zamboanga del Sur granted his petition.
The SolGen's motion for reconsideration was denied. Orbecido filed a petition for review of certiorari on the
Decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 (2).

RULING:
Yes. Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of
the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at
the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
The reckoning point is not their citizenship at the time of celebration of marriage, but their citizenship at the time the
divorce decree is obtained abroad by alien spouse capacitating him/her to remarry.

However, Orbecido is barred from remarrying because he did not present competent evidence showing his wife had
obtained a divorce decree and had remarried.

Divorce abroad between Filipino citizens; legal effects; Art. 26, Family Code

See - Divorce between Filipino citizens recognized in the Philippines | The Manila Times Online

"x x x.

There is no law allowing divorce in the Philippines. It is yet to be enacted. Thus, a divorce decree obtained abroad
dissolving the marriage between Filipino citizens shall not be recognized in the Philippines.

But in cases of mixed marriages involving a Filipino citizen and a foreigner, a divorce decree obtained by the latter
enabling him/her to remarry in accordance with their law shall be recognized in the Philippines and shall also make
the Filipino citizen eligible to remarry. This is according to the 2nd paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code of
the Philippines, which states:

“ART. 26. xxx

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.”

The literal interpretation of the aforesaid provision of the law suggests that the parties to the marriage must only be
between a Filipino and a foreigner. Following then this line of interpretation, it does not cover scenarios where the
marriage is between Filipino citizens, but later on one of them became a citizen of another country and obtained a
divorce decree. But to give life to the meaning, legislative intent and purpose of the law, the Supreme Court in the
case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Cipriano Orbecido III (G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005) held:

“Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time
of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the
interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene
the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as
necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its
terms, so long as they come within its spirit or
intent. (http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/oct2005/gr_154380_2005.html – fnt12)

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.”

Based on the above decision of the Supreme Court, divorce dissolving marriages between Filipino citizens, where
one of them subsequently became naturalized citizen of another country and a divorce decree was obtained by the
latter, shall be recognized in the Philippines.

x x x."