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Quo Warranto
Quo Warranto
Quo Warranto
Petitioner undisputedly lacked CES eligibility. Thus, he did not And so petitioner filed a petition for Quo Warranto against
hold the position of AGMO in a permanent capacity or acquire Limkaichong before the HRET. Petitioner asserted that
security of tenure in that position. Otherwise stated, his Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen and ineligible for the office
appointment was temporary and "co-terminus with the she was elected and proclaimed. Petitioner asserted that
appointing authority." In Carillo v. CA, this Court ruled that "one Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen and ineligible for the office
who holds a temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of office; she was elected and proclaimed. They alleged that she was born
his employment can be terminated at the pleasure of the to a father (Julio Sy), whose naturalization had not attained
appointing power, there being no need to show that the finality, and to a mother who acquired the Chinese citizenship of
termination is for cause." Therefore, we find no violation of Julio Sy from the time of her marriage to the latter. Also, he
security of tenure when petitioner was replaced by respondent invoked the jurisdiction of the HRET for a determination of
upon the latter’s appointment to the position of AGMO by Limkaichongs citizenship, which necessarily included an inquiry
President Aquino. into the validity of the naturalization certificate of Julio Sy.
All appointments to positions which have not been previously For her defense, Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural-
classified as part of the CES would be deemed co-terminus with born Filipino citizen. She averred that the acquisition of
the appointing authority. (Emphasis supplied) Philippine citizenship by her father was regular and in order and
had already attained the status of res judicata. Further, she
Therefore, considering that petitioner is an appointee of then claimed that the validity of such citizenship could not be assailed
President Arroyo whose term ended on 30 June 2010, through a collateral attack.
petitioner’s term of office was also deemed terminated upon the
assumption of President Aquino. However, petitioner Vilando argued that the quo warranto
petition does not operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship
Likewise, it is inconsequential that petitioner was allegedly of Limkaichongs father as the certificate of naturalization is null
replaced by another non-CESO eligible. In a quo warranto and void from the beginning. He further asserted that as an
proceeding, the person suing must show that he has a clear right incident in determining the eligibility of Limkaichong, the HRET,
to the office allegedly held unlawfully by another. Absent a having the plenary, absolute and exclusive jurisdiction to
showing of that right, the lack of qualification or eligibility of the determine her qualifications, can pass upon the efficacy of the
supposed usurper is immaterial. certificate of naturalization.
All the foregoing considered, the petition merits an outright The Office of the Solicitor General in siding with the HRET wrote
dismissal for disregarding the hierarchy of courts and that a collateral attack against a judgment is generally not
petitioner’s lack of cause of action against respondent for failure allowed, unless the judgment is void upon its face or its nullity is
to sufficiently show that he has undisturbed rights to the position apparent by virtue of its own recitals.Thus, relying on the
of AGMO of the MMDA. presumptionn of validity of the naturalization of private
respondent Limkaichong's father - Julio Sy - the HRET dismissed
VILANDO V. HRET, G.R. NO. 192147, 23 AUGUST 2011 the petition and declared Limkaichong not disqualified as
SURRALTA Member of the House of Representatives grounded on
petitioner's failur to satisfy the quantum of proof to sustain their
Principle: theory that respondent is not a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the aforesaid decision, but it
"The power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive, was denied by the HRET.
does not carry with it the authority to delve into the legality of
the judgment of naturalization which is raised as issue in the ISSUE:
petition for quo warranto. To rule otherwise would operate as a
collateral attack on the judgment of citizenship which, is not Can the Congress pass upon the validity of the naturalization
permissible." proceeding raised as issue in the petition for quo warranto?
VILANDO vs. HRET, G.R. Nos. 192147-49, Aug. 23, 2011 HELD:
FACTS: NO.
Petitoner Vilando and private respondent Limkaichiong were The Court ruled, the HRET has jurisdiction over quo warranto
candidates for Congressman. Petioner filed a disqualification case petitions, specifically over cases challenging ineligibility on the
before the Comelec against respondent questioning her ground of lack of citizenship. No less than the 1987 Constitution
citizenship. In the meanwhile, respondent was proclaimed as the vests the HRET the authority to be the sole judge of all contests
duly elected Congressman and thereby assumed office. The relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its Members.
disqualification case filed against her by petitioner Vilando was
dismissed by the Comelec and directed the latter to seek relief
Time and again, this Court has acknowledged this sole and
before the HRET by way of a petition for Quo Warranto.
exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET.The power granted to HRET by
the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as
if it had remained originally in the legislature. Such power is
It’s not a PROVREM 2015 2
WEEK 11- QUO WARRANTO
regarded as full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise of The power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive,
any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise does not carry with it the authority to delve into the legality of
restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same. the judgment of naturalization which is raised as issue in the
petition for quo warranto. To rule otherwise would operate as a
Such power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive, collateral attack on the judgment of citizenship which, is not
does not carry with it the authority to delve into the legality of permissible.
the judgment of naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying
Limkaichong. To rule otherwise would operate as a collateral TOPACIO V. ONG, GR NO. 179895, DECEMBER 18, 2008
attack on the citizenship of the father which, as already stated, is BITANGJOL
not permissible. Principle:
For a quo warranto petition to be successful, the private
Evidently, there is no basis to oblige the Tribunal to reopen the person suing must show a clear right to the contested office. In
naturalization proceedings for a determination of the citizenship fact, not even a mere preferential right to be appointed thereto
of the ascendant of respondent. A petition for quo warranto is not can lend a modicum of legal ground to proceed with the action.
a means to achieve that purpose. To rule on this issue in this quo In the instance in which the Petition for Quo Warranto
warranto proceeding will not only be a clear grave abuse of is filed by an individual in his own name, he must be able to
discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction, but also a prove that he is entitled to the controverted public office,
blatant violation of due process on the part of the persons who position, or franchise; otherwise, the holder of the same has a
will be affected or who are not parties in this case. right to the undisturbed possession thereof.
Long digest:
Well-settled is the principle that the judgments of the HRET are Facts:
beyond judicial interference. The only instance where this Court Ferdinand Topacio (petitioner) via the present petition
may intervene in the exercise of its so-called extraordinary for certiorari and prohibition seeks, in the main, to prevent
jurisdiction is upon a determination that the decision or Justice Gregory Ong (Ong) from further exercising the powers,
resolution of the HRET was rendered without or in excess of its duties and responsibilities of a Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or upon a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of its power to On July 9, 2007, Ong immediately filed with the
constitute a denial of due process of law, or upon a Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City a Petition for the
demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly “amendment/ correction/ supplementation or annotation of an
constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a entry in [his] Certificate of Birth,” docketed as S.P. Proc No.
remedy for such abuse. In this case, there is no showing of any 11767-SJ, “Gregory Santos Ong v. The Civil Registrar of San Juan,
such arbitrariness or improvidence. The HRET acted well within Metro Manila, et al.”
the sphere of its power when it dismissed the quo warranto Meanwhile, petitioner, by verified Letter-
petition. Request/Complaint of September 5, 2007, implored respondent
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to initiate post-haste a quo
warranto proceeding against Ong in the latter’s capacity as an
BAR EXAM QUESTION
incumbent Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. Invoking
paragraph 1, Section 7, Article VIII of the Constitution in
Vilando vs. HRET conjunction with the Court’s Decision in Kilosbayan Foundation
v. Ermita, petitioner points out that natural-born citizenship is
Petitioner Karingking filed a petition for quo warranto before the also a qualification for appointment as member of the
HRET questioning the citizenship of respondent Winjalingling. Sandiganbayan and that Ong has failed to meet the citizenship
Petitioner argued that respondent father 's naturalization from requirement from the time of his appointment as such in October
Chinese to Filipino was null and void as it was attended by 1998.
irregularities and thus, this being the case, respondent
Winjalingling is not a Filipino. Petitioner urged the HRET to look The OSG, by letter of September 25, 2007, informed
upon the validity of the naturalization proceeding of resondent's petitioner that it “cannot favorably act on [his] request for the
father. Respondent countered that the HRET has no power to filing of a quo warranto petition until the [RTC] case shall have
delve into that issue as it would tantamount to collateral attack been terminated with finality.” Petitioner assails this position of
on the citizenship of his father; and further argued that a direct the OSG as being tainted with grave abuse of discretion, aside
action for attacking the validity of her father's citizenship should from Ong’s continuous discharge of judicial functions.
be filed instead of a petition for quo warranto. But petitioner
Karingking contended that the HRET, having the plenary, Hence, this petition, positing that:
absolute and exclusive jurisdiction to determine her
qualifications, can pass upon the efficacy of the naturalization. IN OCTOBER OF 1998, RESPONDENT WAS NOT DULY-
QUALIFIED UNDER THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 1,
Is petitioner Karingking correct? SECTION 7, OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, TO BE APPOINTED AN
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, MERELY ON THE
Answer: STRENGTH OF AN IDENTIFICATION CERTIFICATE ISSUED BY
THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND A 1ST INDORSEMENT
No. DATED 22 MAY 1997 ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,
BECAUSE, AS OF OCTOBER 1998, RESPONDET’S BIRTH
CERTIFICATE INDICATED THAT RESPONDENT IS A CHINESE the discharge of its task, the Solicitor General must see to it that
CITIZEN AND BECAUSE, AS OF OCTOBER 1998, THE RECORDS the best interest of the government is upheld within the limits set
OF THIS HONORABLE COURT DECLARED THAT RESPONDENT IS by law.
A NATURALIZED FILIPINO CITIZEN. In the exercise of sound discretion, the Solicitor General
Petitioner thus contends that Ong should immediately may suspend or turn down the institution of an action for quo
desist from holding the position of Associate Justice of the warranto where there are just and valid reasons.
Sandiganbayan since he is disqualified on the basis of citizenship, Upon receipt of a case certified to him, the Solicitor
whether gauged from his birth certificate which indicates him to General exercises his discretion in the management of the case.
be a Chinese citizen or against his bar records bearing out his He may start the prosecution of the case by filing the appropriate
status as a naturalized Filipino citizen, as declared in Kilosbayan action in court or he may opt not to file the case at all. He may do
Foundation v. Ermita. everything within his legal authority but always conformably
with the national interest and the policy of the government on
Ong, on the other hand, states that Kilosbayan the matter at hand.
Foundation v. Ermita did not annul or declare null his It appears that after studying the case, the Solicitor
appointment as Justice of the Supreme Court, but merely General saw the folly of re-litigating the same issue of Ong’s
enjoined him from accepting his appointment, and that there is citizenship in the quo warranto case simultaneously with the RTC
no definitive pronouncement therein that he is not a natural-born case, not to mention the consequent risk of forum-shopping. In
Filipino. He informs that he, nonetheless, voluntarily any event, the OSG did not totally write finis to the issue as it
relinquished the appointment to the Supreme Court out of merely advised petitioner to await the outcome of the RTC case.
judicial statesmanship.[9]
Petitioner cannot file a Quo Warranto.
By Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss of January 3,
2008, Ong informs that the RTC, by Decision of October 24, 2007, By petitioner’s admission, what is at issue is Ong’s title
already granted his petition and recognized him as a natural- to the office of Associate Justice of Sandiganbayan. He claims to
born citizen. The Decision having, to him, become final,[10]he have been constrained to file the present petition after the OSG
caused the corresponding annotation thereof on his Certificate of refused to heed his request to institute a suit for quo warranto.
Birth.[11] Averring that Ong is disqualified to be a member of any lower
collegiate court, petitioner specifically prays that, after
Invoking the curative provisions of the 1987 appropriate proceedings, the Court:
Constitution, Ong explains that his status as a natural-born
citizen inheres from birth and the legal effect of such recognition . . . issue the writs of certiorari and prohibition against
retroacts to the time of his birth. Respondent Ong, ordering Respondent Ong to cease and desist
from further exercising the powers, duties, and responsibilities of
Ong thus concludes that in view of the RTC decision, a Justice of the Sandiganbayan due to violation of the first
there is no more legal or factual basis for the present petition, or sentence of paragraph 1, Section 7, of the 1987 Constitution; . . .
at the very least this petition must await the final disposition of issue the writs of certiorari and prohibition against Respondent
the RTC case which to him involves a prejudicial issue. Ong and declare that he was disqualified from being appointed to
the post of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan in October of
Issue: 1998, considering that, as of October of 1998, the birth certificate
1. Whether or not the OSG committed grave abuse of of Respondent Ong declared that he is a Chinese citizen, while
discretion in deferring the filing of a petition for quo even the records of this Honorable Court, as of October of 1998,
warranto. declared that Respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino.
2. Whether or not the petitioner (who did not show any While denominated as a petition for certiorari and
clear right to the contested office of the respondent) can prohibition, the petition partakes of the nature of a quo warranto
file a petition for quo warranto. proceeding with respect to Ong, for it effectively seeks to declare
Ruling: null and void his appointment as an Associate Justice of the
The OSG did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Sandiganbayan for being unconstitutional.
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and Being a collateral attack on a public officer’s title, the
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of present petition for certiorari and prohibition must be dismissed.
jurisdiction, or, in other words, where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal The title to a public office may not be contested except
hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an directly, by quo warranto proceedings; and it cannot be assailed
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty collaterally, even through mandamus or a motion to annul or set
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. aside order.
The Court appreciates no abuse of discretion, much less, A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy
a grave one, on the part of the OSG in deferring action on the to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to
filing of a quo warranto case until after the RTC case has been oust the holder from its enjoyment.[33] It is brought against the
terminated with finality. A decision is not deemed tainted with person who is alleged to have usurped, intruded into, or
grave abuse of discretion simply because the affected party unlawfully held or exercised the public office,[34] and may be
disagrees with it. commenced by the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, as the
The Solicitor General is the counsel of the government, case may be, or by any person claiming to be entitled to the
its agencies and instrumentalities, and its officials or agents. In
public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised trace his title to the same source. This follows from the nature of
by another. the writ of quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as
Nothing is more settled than the principle, which goes such, but always against the person.
back to the 1905 case of Acosta v. Flor, reiterated in the recent
2008 case of Feliciano v. Villasin, that for a quo warranto petition Facts:
to be successful, the private person suing must show a clear right On March 1, 1988, Mendoza was appointed Customs Service Chief
to the contested office. In fact, not even a mere preferential right of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service (CIIS). In
to be appointed thereto can lend a modicum of legal ground to 1989, the position of Customs Service Chief was reclassified by
proceed with the action. the Civil Service as "Director III" in accordance with Republic Act
No. 6758 and National Compensation Circular No. 50. Petitioner's
In the present case, petitioner presented no sufficient position was thus categorized as "Director III, CIIS" and he
proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of an discharged the function and duties of said office.
Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. He in fact concedes that On April 22, 1993, petitioner was temporarily designated as
he was never entitled to assume the office of an Associate Justice Acting District Collector, Collection District X, Cagayan de Oro
of the Sandiganbayan.[39] City. In his place, respondent Ray Allas was appointed as "Acting
Director III" of the CIIS. Despite petitioner's new assignment as
In the instance in which the Petition for Quo Warranto Acting District Collector, however, he continued to receive the
is filed by an individual in his own name, he must be able to salary and benefits of the position of Director III.
prove that he is entitled to the controverted public office, In September 1994, petitioner received a letter from Deputy
position, or franchise; otherwise, the holder of the same has a Customs Commissioner Cesar Z. Dario, informing him of his
right to the undisturbed possession thereof. In actions for Quo termination from the Bureau of Customs, in view of respondent
Warranto to determine title to a public office, the complaint, to be Allas' appointment as Director III by President Fidel V. Ramos.
sufficient in form, must show that the plaintiff is entitled to the On December 2, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto
office. In Garcia v. Perez, this Court ruled that the person against respondent Allas before the Regional Trial Court,
instituting Quo Warranto proceedings on his own behalf, under Paranaque, Branch 258.The case was tried and on September 11,
Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, must aver and be able to 1995, a decision was rendered granting the petition.
show that he is entitled to the office in dispute. Without such Respondent Allas appealed to the Court of Appeals. On February
averment or evidence of such right, the action may be dismissed 8, 1996, while the case was pending before said court,
at any stage. respondent Allas was promoted by President Ramos to the
position of Deputy Commissioner of Customs for Assessment and
The rightful authority of a judge, in the full exercise of Operations. As a consequence of this promotion, petitioner
his public judicial functions, cannot be questioned by any merely moved to dismiss respondent's appeal as having been rendered
private suitor, or by any other, except in the form especially moot and academic. The Court of Appeals granted the motion and
provided by law.To uphold such action would encourage every dismissed the case accordingly. The order of dismissal became
disgruntled citizen to resort to the courts, thereby causing final and entry of judgment was made on March 19, 1996.
incalculable mischief and hindrance to the efficient operation of On May 9, 1996, petitioner filed with the court a quo a Motion for
the governmental machine. Execution of its decision. On July 24, 1996, the court denied the
Short Digest: motion on the ground that the contested position vacated by
Petitioner (Topacio) filed petition certiorari and respondent Allas was now being occupied by respondent
prohibition, in the main, to prevent Justice Gregory Ong (Ong) Godofredo Olores who was not a party to the quo warranto
from further exercising the powers, duties and responsibilities of petition.
a Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, alleging that Ong is not a
natural born Filipino citizen. ISSUE:
On July 9, 2007, Ong immediately filed with the WON the court can executed the judgement eventhough Olores
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City a Petition for the was not a party to the quo warranto petition?
“amendment/ correction/ supplementation or annotation of an
entry in [his] Certificate of Birth,” which the same court ruled and RULING:
recognized on October 24, 2007 that Ong is a natural born No.
Filipino citizen. A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's
Petitioner implored (OSG) to initiate post-haste a quo successor in office, even though such successor may trace his title
warranto proceeding against Ong in the latter’s capacity as an to the same source. This follows from the nature of the writ of
incumbent Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. The OSG quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as such, but
deferred from filing the petition because of the pending case of always against the person-- to determine whether he is
Ong in the RTC regarding his citizenship. constitutionally and legally authorized to perform any act in, or
Hence, petitioner filed a certiorari and prohibition exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim.In the
against the OSG and Ong. case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was filed by petitioner
solely against respondent Allas. What was threshed out before
MENDOZA V. ALLAS, G.R. NO. 131977, FEBRUARY 4, 1999 the trial court was the qualification and right of petitioner to the
GIME contested position as against respondent Ray Allas, not against
Godofredo Olores. The Court of Appeals did not err in denying
PRINCIPLE: A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the execution of the trial court's decision.
respondent's successor in office, even though such successor may
RTC-Br. 58 issued an Order transferring the case to the RTC in 5.2. The Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated
Naga City. According to RTC-Br. 58, since the verified petition under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby
showed petitioners therein (herein respondents) to be residents transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the
of Naga City, then pursuant to Section 7, Rule 66 of the 1997 appropriate Regional Trial Court: Provided, That the Supreme
Rules of Civil Procedure, the action for quo warranto should be Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional
brought in the RTC exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these
where the respondents or any of the respondents cases. Xxx
resides. However, the Executive Judge of RTC, Naga City refused
to receive the case folder of the subject case for quo warranto, Therefore, actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp an
stating that improper venue is not a ground for transferring a quo office in a corporation, which were formerly cognizable by the
warranto case to another administrative jurisdiction. Securities and Exchange Commission under PD 902-A, have been
The RTC-Br. 58 then proceeded to issue and serve summons transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction. But, this does
on herein petitioners (respondents below). Petitioner Tabora not change the fact that Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
filed his Answer, raising therein the affirmative defenses of (1) Procedure does not apply to quo warranto cases against persons
improper venue, (2) lack of jurisdiction, and (3) wrong remedy of who usurp an office in a private corporation. Presently, Section
quo warranto. Thereafter, the other petitioners also filed their 1(a) of Rule 66 reads thus:
Answer, also raising the same affirmative defenses. All the parties Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. – An action
were then required to submit their respective memoranda. for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be
RTC-Br. 58 issued the assailed Order: "xxx xxx commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the
Under Section 8, of the Interim Rules, [a] Motion to Dismiss is Republic of the Philippines against
among the prohibited pleadings. On the otherhand, the Supreme (a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
Court under Administrative Order 8-01 has directed the transfer exercises a public office, position or franchise;
from the regular courts to the branches of the Regional Trial xxxx
Courts specially designated to try and decide intra-corporate
dispute. xxx The Motion to Dismiss is DENIED pursuant to the As explained in the Unilongocase, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 of the
Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies present Rules no longer contains the phrase “or an office in a
(A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC) which mandates that motion to dismiss is a corporation created by authority of law” which was found in the
prohibited pleading (Section 8) and in consonance with old Rules. Clearly, the present Rule 66 only applies to actions
Administrative Order 8-01 of the Supreme Court dated March 1, of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office,
2001, this case is hereby ordered remanded to the Regional Trial position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office;
Court Branch 23, Naga City which under A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC and associations which act as corporations without being
has been designated as special court to try and decide intra- legally incorporated despite the passage of R.A. No. 8799. It
corporate controversies under R.A. 8799. xxx The scheduled is, therefore, The Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-
hearing on the prayer for temporary restraining order and Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 which applies to
preliminary injunction set on July 18, 2005 is hereby the petition for quo warranto filed by respondents before the trial
cancelled.For reasons of comity the issue of whether Quo court since what is being questioned is the authority of herein
Warranto is the proper remedy is better left to the court of petitioners to assume the office and act as the board of directors
competent jurisdiction to rule upon." and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated.
Petitioners no longer moved for reconsideration of the foregoing
Order and, instead, immediately elevated the case to this Court The next question then is, which branch of the Regional Trial
via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Court has jurisdiction over the present action for quo
Rules of Civil Procedure. warrato? Section 5 of the Interim Rules provides that the petition
should be commenced and tried in the Regional Trial Court that
HELD: It should be noted that allegations in a complaint for quo has jurisdiction over the principal office of the corporation. It is
warranto that certain persons usurped the offices, powers and undisputed that the principal office of the corporation is situated
functions of duly elected members of the board, trustees and/or at Goa, Camarines Sur. Thus, pursuant to A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC
officers make out a case for an intra-corporate controversy. Prior and A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, it is the Regional Trial Court
to the enactment of R.A. No. 8799, the Court, adopting Justice Jose designated as Special Commercial Courts in Camarines Sur
Y. Feria’s view, declared in Unilongo v. Court of Appeals that which shall have jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto
Section 1, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is “limited filed by herein respondents.
to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public
office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their Evidently, the RTC-Br. 58 in San Jose, Camarines Sur is bereft of
office; and associations which act as corporations without being jurisdiction over respondents’ petition for quo warranto. Based
legally incorporated,” while “[a]ctions of quo warranto against on the allegations in the petition, the case was clearly one
corporations, or against persons who usurp an office in a involving an intra-corporate dispute. The trial court should have
corporation, fall under the jurisdiction of the Securities and been aware that under R.A. No. 8799 and the aforementioned
Exchange Commission and are governed by its rules. (P.D. No. administrative issuances of this Court, RTC-Br. 58 was never
902-A as amended).” designated as a Special Commercial Court; hence, it was never
vested with jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by the in the complaint as constituting the plaintiff's causes of action.
SEC. Corollarily, the one-year period fixed in Section 16, Rule 66 of the
Revised Rules of Court within which a petition for quo
The petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED. The Order of warranto should be filed, counted from the date of ouster, does
the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur dated July 13, not apply to the case at bar.
2005 is SET ASIDE for being NULL and VOID. The petition for 2. No.
quo warranto in Civil Case No. T-1007 (now re-docketed as SEC The action is primarily against the Society and the past members
Case No. RTC 2005-0001), entitled “Jose Pierre A. Panday, et al. v. of the Board who are responsible for her removal. Where the
Sps. Joaquin M. Calleja, Jr., et al.” is ordered DISMISSED. respondents, except for Romulo, are not actually holding the
office in question, the suit could not be one for quo warranto.
MADRIGAL V. LECAROZ, G.R. NO. L-46218, OCTOBER 23, 1990 The absence of a fixed term in the letter addressed to petitioner
BRAGAT informing her of her appointment as Executive Secretary is very
significant. This could have no other implication than that
PARDO DE TAVERA V. PHIL. TUBERCULOSIS SOCIETY, GR. NO. petitioner held an appointment at the pleasure of the appointing
L-48928, FEBRUARY 25, 1982 ROLLAN power.
Petitioner cannot likewise seek relief from the general provisions
Principle: The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern of the New Civil Code on Human Relations nor from the
it, including the period of prescription, is to be determined not by fundamental principles of the New Constitution on preservation
the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or of human dignity. While these provisions present some basic
brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship
for relief. between human beings and the stability of social order, these are
Facts: Plaintiff is a doctor of Medicine by profession and a merely guides for human conduct in the absence of specific legal
recognized specialist in the treatment of tuberculosis. She is a provisions and definite contractual stipulations. In the case at
member of the Board of Directors of the defendant Society, in bar, the Code of By-Laws of the Society contains a specific
representation of the PCSO. She was duly appointed as Executive provision governing the term of office of petitioner. The same
Secretary of the Society. On May 29, 1974, the past Board of necessarily limits her rights under the New Civil Code and the
Directors removed her summarily from her position, the lawful New Constitution upon acceptance of the appointment.
cause of which she was not informed, through the simple
expedient of declaring her position vacant. Defendant Romulo PPSTA V. APOSTOL, G.R. NO. L-36966, FEBRUARY 28, 1974
was appointed to the position and defendants Pardo, Nubla, 11/13 GOMBA
Garcia and Adil, not being members of defendant Society were
elevated as members of the Board of Directors. Not being LIBAN V. GORDON, G.R. NO. 175352 SITOY
qualified, petitioner alleged said acts to be null and void. The
court a quo rendered a decision holding that the present suit SANTIAGO V. GUINGONA, G.R. NO. 134577, NOVEMBER 18,
being one for quo warranto it should be filed within one year 1998 PAGAPONG
from plaintiff's ouster from office; that nevertheless, plaintiff was
not illegally removed from her position as Executive Secretary in
Doctrines:
The Society since plaintiff was holding an appointment at the
• In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the
pleasure of the appointing power and hence temporary.
person suing must show that he or she has a clear right to the
contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office
Issues:
allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent.
1. Whether or not the present case is one for quo warranto and
the one-year period to file the action has prescribed.
2. Whether or not petitioner was illegally removed and thus • In the regular course, the regional trial courts and this Court
entitled to damages. have concurrent jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for quo
warranto (as well as certiorari, prohibition and mandamus), and
Ruling: a basic deference to the hierarchy of courts impels a filing of such
1. No. petitions in the lower tribunals. 2 However, for special and
The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it, important reasons or for exceptional and compelling
including the period of prescription, is to be determined not by circumstances, as in the present case, this Court has allowed
the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or exceptions to this doctrine. 3 In fact, original petitions for
brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto assailing
for relief. acts of legislative officers like the Senate President 4 and the
Speaker of the House 5 have been recognized as exceptions to
In this case, while it is true that the complaint questions this rule.
petitioner's removal from the position of Executive Secretary and
seeks her reinstatement thereto, the nature of the suit is not Facts:
necessarily one of quo warranto. The nature of the instant suit is On the first session of the eleventh Congress, Sen. Fernan was
one involving a violation of the rights of the plaintiff under the declared the duly elected President of the Senate against Sen.
By-Laws of the Society, the Civil Code and the Constitution, which Tatad, by a vote of 20 to 2.
allegedly renders the individuals responsible therefore,
accountable for damages, as may be gleaned from the allegations
Senator Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Senator LONG DIGEST:
Santiago (allegedly the only other member of the minority), he
was assuming the position of minority leader. FACTS:
He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan The municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur, is a town that is not
comprised the majority, while only those who had voted for him, supposed to exist yet is actually insisted by some as alive and
belonged to the minority. thriving. The creation of the putative municipality was declared
void ab initio by the Supreme Court four decades ago, but the
Subsequently however, Senator Flavier manifested that the present petition insists that Andong thrives on and, hence, it’s
senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party (7 senators) legal personality should be given judicial affirmation.
are the minority and had chosen Senator Guingona as the
minority leader. The factual antecedents derive from the ruling in Pelaez
vs.Auditor General in 1965. Then President Diosdado Macapagal
By virtue of the letter indorsed by the 7 senators (Lakas-NUCD) issued several Executive Orders creating 33 municipalities in
the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as Mindanao.
the minority leader of the Senate.
President Macapagal justified the creation of these municipalities
Senators Santiago and Tatad filed a petition for quo warranto, citing his powers underSec.68 of the Revised Admin. Code. Then
alleging that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully VP Emmanuel Pelaez filed a special civil action for a writ of
holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a prohibition alleging that the EOs were null and void, Sec. 68
position that, in their view, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad. having been repealed by RA 2370, and said orders constituting an
undue delegation of legislative power.
After due deliberation, the SC ruled that the challenged EOs were
Issue:
null and void since Sec. 68 of the Revised Admin. Code did not
WON the person suing ( Tatay Tatad) has a clear right to the
meet the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of
contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office
legislative power to the executive branch.
allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent (Manong
Gingona).
Among the EOs annulled was EO 107 which created the
Municipality of Andong.
Ruling: NO! Petitioner represents himself as a current resident of Andong and
alleged that Andong “has metamorphosed into a full-blown
In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the municipality with a complete set of officials appointed to handle
person suing must show that he or she has a clear right to the essential services for the municipality and its constituents,”
contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office despite the fact that no person has been appointed, elected or
allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. 58 In qualified to serve any of the local government offices of Andong
this case, petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear and since 1968.
indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader.
As discussed earlier, the specific norms or standards that may be Camid imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of DILG “in
used in determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed not classifying [Andong] as a regular existing municipality and in
position has not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, not including said municipality in its records and official database
or the Senate itself in which the power has been vested. Absent as [an] existing regular municipality”. He argues that Pelaez has
any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality or already been modified by supervening events consisting of
irregularity tainted Respondent Guingona's assumption and subsequent laws and jurisprudence, particularly citing
exercise of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader. Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez wherein the court
Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to affirmed the unique status of the Municipality of San Andres as a
characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader. “de facto municipal corporation”. Camid also cites Sec. 442(d) of
the Local Government Code of 1991 as basis for the recognition
Bar Exam type: of the impugned municipality.
Senator Pogi loss the bid for the majority leadership against ISSUE:
senator Tanda, thus he manifested that being a losing party he 1. Whether a municipality whose creation by executive fiat
must be automatically the minority leader. However, senator was previously voided by this Court may attain
Sexy manifested that his party, the Lakas-Napolis party recognition in the absence of any curative or
composing of just 7 senators should be the minority and thereby reimplementing statute.
elected Senator Acosta. Senator Pogi protested and filed a qou 2. Jurisprudential basis regarding quo warranto invoked
warranto alleging that senator Pogi has usurped the office. in this case.
Decide the plunder case against the senators. RULING:
1. Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where
CAMID V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. NO. 161414, it is shown that the community has claimed and
JANUARY 17, 2005 DACUA exercised corporate functions with the knowledge and
acquiescence of the legislature, and without
interruption or objection for period long enough to municipalities judicially dissolved remain inexistent
afford title by prescription. What is clearly essential is a unless recreated through specific legislative
factual demonstration of the continuous exercise by the enactments.
municipal corporation of its corporate powers, as well
as the acquiescence thereto by instrumentalities of the The legal effect of the nullification of a municipality in
state. Camid’s plaint should have undergone the usual Pelaez was to revert the constituent barrios of the
administrative gauntlet and, once that was done, should voided town back to their original municipalities.
have been filed first with the Court of Appeals, which at
least would have had the power to make the necessary If there is only a strong impulse for the reconstitution of
factual determinations. Petitioner’s seeming ignorance the municipality nullified in Pelaez, the solution is
of the principles of exhaustion of administrative through the legislature and not judicial confirmation of
remedies and hierarchy of courts, as well as the void title. The time has come for the light to seep in and
concomitant prematurity of the present petition, cannot for the petitioner and like-minded persons to awaken to
be countenanced. legal reality.
The question as to whether a municipality previously 2. In the 1969 case of Municipality of Malabang v. Benito
annulled by the Supreme Court may attain recognition what was challenged is the validity of the constitution of
in the absence of any curative/reimplementing statute the Municipality of Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, also
has never been decided before. The effect of Sec. 442(d) created by an executive order, and which, similar to
of the Local Government Code on municipalities such as Lawigan, was not one of the municipalities annulled
Andong warrants explanation. in Pelaez. This time, the officials of Balabagan
invoked de facto status as a municipal corporation in
EO 107 which established Andong was declared “null order to dissuade the Court from nullifying action. They
and void ab initio in 1965 by the Supreme Court alleged that its status as a de facto corporation cannot
in Pelaez vs. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 (1965), be collaterally attacked but should be inquired into
along with 33 other EOs. The phrase ”ab initio“ means directly in an action for quo warranto at the instance of
“from the beginning”. Pelaez was never reversed by the the State, and not by a private individual as it was in
SC but was rather expressly affirmed in the cases that case. In response, the Court conceded that an
of Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva, Municipality of inquiry into the legal existence of a municipality is
Malabang v. Benito, and Municipality of Kapalong v. reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto,
Moya. No subsequent ruling declared Pelaez as but only if the municipal corporation is
overturned/inoperative. No subsequent legislation has a de facto corporation.
been passed since 1965 creating the Municipality of
Andong. Given these facts, there is hardly any reason to Under Rule 66, of the Rules of Court, a quo
elaborate why Andong does not exist as a duly warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its
constituted municipality. charter must be commenced within five (5) years from
the time the act complained of was done or committed.
Pelaez and its offspring cases ruled that the President
has no power to create municipalities yet limited it’s SHORT DIGEST:
nullificatory effects to the particular municipalities Then President Diosdado Macapagal issued several Executive
challenged in actual cases before this Court. With the Orders creating 33 municipalities in Mindanao.
promulgation of the LGC in 1991, the legal cloud was
lifted over the municipalities similarly created by After due deliberation, the SC ruled that the challenged EOs were
executive order but not judicially annulled – Sec. 442(b) null and void since Sec. 68 of the Revised Admin. Code did not
of the LGC deemed curative whatever legal defects to meet the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of
title these municipalities had labored under. legislative power to the executive branch.
There are eminent differences between Andong and Among the EOs annulled was EO 107 which created the
municipalities such as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban. Municipality of Andong.
Most prominent is the fact that the EO creating Andong
was expressly annulled by the SC in 1965. Court Petitioner contended that the Municipality of Andong is a de facto
decisions cannot lose their efficacy due to sheer Municipal Corporation and should be afforded with great respect
defiance by the parties aggrieved. as to its existence being created by an executed fiat.
Is the petitioner correct?
Sec. 442(d) of the LGC does not serve to
affirm/reconstitute the judicially dissolved YAP V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. NO. 104226,
municipalities which had been previously created by AUGUST 12, 1993 EDOMBINGO
presidential issuances/EOs. The provision only affirms
the legal personalities of those municipalities which Principle:
may have been created using the same infirm legal A person claiming to be entitled to a public office or
basis, yet were fortunate enough not to have been position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another may
judicially annulled. On the other hand, the bring an action for quo warranto (Rule 66, Sec. 6, Rules of Court).
And the role of the courts, through quo warranto provisional authority or the CPC is, in effect, to cancel
proceedings, neatly complements the traditional the franchise or otherwise prevent its exercise. What
separation of powers that come to bear in our analysis. could happen is that if the courts conclude that private
DIVINAGRACIA’s theory that NTC has the presumed respondents have violated the terms of their franchise
authority to cancel licenses and CPCs issued to due and thus issue the writs of quo warranto against them,
holders of legislative franchise to engage in then the NTC is obliged to cancel any existing licenses
broadcast operations would violate the separation and CPCs since these permits draw strength from the
of powers. possession of a valid franchise.
Administrative Case No. LMWD-OGCC-01-01.5 Feliciano original charter, falling under the jurisdiction of the CSC
was accused of authorizing payment of his backwages and Commission on Audit (COA).
amounting to P134,721.64, for the period 6 March 1990 Not satisfied, Feliciano appealed CSC Resolutions No.
up to 23 October 1990, although he did not report for 002107 and 010218 to the Court of Appeals via Petition
work during said period. for Certiorari. DENIED
The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel On 22 March 2005, Feliciano again sought recourse at
(OGCC) handled the investigation of the charges against the Court of Appeals where he filed a Petition for
Feliciano. In a Resolution dated 16 September 1991, the Certiorari and Prohibition with application for
OGCC found Feliciano guilty as charged and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of
recommended the penalty of dismissal. Injunction, seeking to enjoin the implementation of CSC
On 11 November 1991, the Interim LMWD Board of Resolution No. 050307, Series of 2005. The case was
Directors approved in toto the findings of the OGCC docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00489.19
including its recommendation to dismiss Feliciano.7 On 30 March 2005, while CA-G.R. SP No. 00489 was still
On 1 October 1993, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) pending with the Court of Appeals, with no injunction
issued Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1993, having been issued by the appellate court, the LMWD
directing Board Chairpersons and GMs of water districts Board of Directors declared the GM position occupied
to submit personnel appointments for approval by the by Feliciano vacant by virtue of LMWD Resolution No.
CSC. 050307.20
On 20 July 1998, the take-over of the management and The Court of Appeals subsequently issued on 12 April
operations of the LMWD by the LWUA was lifted by the 2005 a Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 00489 granting a
LWUA Board of Trustees in its Resolution No. 138, TRO effective for sixty days. After the lapse of the TRO,
Series of 1998.8 the LMWD Board of Directors appointed Villasin as the
On 25 September 1998, the new regular LMWD Board new GM of LMWD on 14 June 2005. On 16 September
of Directors unanimously approved Resolution No. 98- 2005, the Court of Appeals dismissed CA-G.R. SP No.
002 ordering Feliciano to re-assume9 the post he had 00489 which reached this Court via petition for review
vacated as GM of LMWD. The position was accepted by in G.R. No. 172141. This was eventually denied by this
Feliciano on 27 September 1998.10 Court and entry of judgment was made on 14 November
As GM, Feliciano appointed Edgar R. Nedruda, Milagros 2006. On 28 December 2005, the LMWD Board of
A. Majadillas and Edgar B. Ortega as Division Manager, Directors unanimously approved LMWD Resolution No.
Quality Control Assurance Officer and Plant Equipment 05-145 certifying that Villasin was the GM of LMWD
Operator E, respectively, at the LMWD.11 In compliance pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
with CSC Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1993, 198 and the CSC Rules and Regulations.
Feliciano submitted the same to the CSC Regional Office On 28 March 2006, Feliciano thus filed with the RTC a
(CSCRO) for approval. The CSCRO, however, Petition for Quo Warranto against Villasin under Rule
disapproved Feliciano’s LMWD personnel appointments 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed as
in its Order issued on 8 June 1999 since GM Feliciano Civil Case No. 2006-03-29 and asked the RTC to restore
did not possess the required CSC-approved him as General Manager and to remove Villasin
appointment pursuant to CSC Memorandum Circular therefrom. RTC denied the petition hence this instant
No. 41, S. 1993.12 Feliciano appealed the Order to the case.
CSC. ISSUE: WON Feliciano can avail of the action for quo
On 8 September 2000, the CSC through its Chairperson warranto
Corazon Alma G. de Leon, issued CSC Resolution No. No! In the instance in which the Petition for Quo
002107 denying Feliciano’s appeal of his disapproved Warranto is filed by an individual in his own name, he
LMWD personnel appointments on the ground that he must be able to prove that he is entitled to the
was only a de facto officer.13 It found that Feliciano had controverted public office, position, or franchise;
no authority to make appointments since he himself otherwise, the holder of the same has a right to the
lacked the required CSC-approved appointment undisturbed possession thereof. In actions for Quo
pursuant to CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, Series of Warranto to determine title to a public office, the
1998, and Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1993 complaint, to be sufficient in form, must show that the
Feliciano filed a Motion for Reconsideration citing as plaintiff is entitled to the office. In Garcia v. Perez,35
main argument the fact that the LMWD was not a this Court ruled that the person instituting Quo
government-owned and controlled corporation, but a Warranto proceedings on his own behalf, under Section
special type of non-stock, non-profit private corporation 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, must aver and be able
imbued with public interest, and therefore, not covered to show that he is entitled to the office in dispute.
by the civil service rules. Without such averment or evidence of such right, the
The CSC denied Feliciano’s Motion for Reconsideration action may be dismissed at any stage.
in its Resolution No. 010218, issued on 22 January Due to the recent turn of events, Feliciano lost any legal standing
2001, which reiterated that Feliciano’s argument on the to pursue via Quo Warranto proceedings his claim to the position
private character of water districts had long been put to of GM of LMWD considering this Court’s En Banc Resolutions
rest in Davao City Water District v. Civil Service dated 6 June 2006 and 22 August 2006 in G.R. No. 172141 which
Commission, which declared water districts to be denied with finality his Petition for Review on Certiorari of the
government-owned or controlled corporations with Court of Appeals Decision dated 16 September 2005 and
Resolution dated 31 March 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00489 Commissioners Dayrit and Garcia submitted their joint report9
upholding the legality of CSC Resolution No. 050307. To recall, wherein they appraised the value of the property at P1,900.00
CSC Resolution No. 050307 treated Feliciano as a de facto officer per square meter or a total of P1,179,000.00, while
with regard to his acts as GM of LMWD; and declared him to be a Commissioner Abcejo submitted his Commissioner's Report10
usurper of or an intruder to the said position beginning 6 pegging the value of the property at P875.00 per square meter.
February 2001, and thus ordered him to vacate the same.
The RTC declared the validity of the expropriation and ordered
petitioner to pay the sum of P1,179,000.00, with interest at 6%
per annum beginning 15 April 2002, the date of actual taking,
until full payment.
It is settled that just compensation is to be ascertained as of As earlier mentioned, Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395, as
the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the amended, substantially provides that properties which
commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the will be traversed by transmission lines will only be
institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the considered as easements and just compensation for
just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the such right of way easement shall not exceed 10 percent
filing of the complaint. of the market value.26 However, this Court has
repeatedly ruled that when petitioner takes private
The general rule is what is provided for by Rule 67. There property to construct transmission lines, it is liable to
are exceptions—grave injustice to the property owner,32 the pay the full market value upon proper determination by
taking did not have color of legal authority,33 the taking of the courts.27
the property was not initially for expropriation34 and the
owner will be given undue increment advantages because of 2. Just compensation should be reckoned from the date of
the expropriation.35 However, none of these exceptions are the filing of the complaint.
present in the instant case.
Rule 67 clearly provides that the value of just
Based on the foregoing, the reckoning date for the compensation shall "be determined as of the date of the
determination of the amount of just compensation is 27 June taking of the property or the filing of the complaint,
2001, the date when petitioner filed its expropriation whichever came first."
complaint.
It is settled that just compensation is to be ascertained
Quick Digest: as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with
the commencement of the expropriation proceedings.
Facts: Where the institution of the action precedes entry into
the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained
as of the time of the filing of the complaint.
Petitioner filed a complaint7 with the RTC of San Fernando,
Pampanga, for the acquisition of an easement of right-of-way PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK V. BASES CONVERSION
over three (3) lots at Barangay Cabalantian, Bacolor, Pampanga DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, G.R. NO. 173085, JANUARY 19,
with a total area of 575 square meters belonging to respondent, 2011 DELVO
in connection with the construction of its transmission lines for
its Lahar Affected Transmission Line Project (Lahar Project).
COMPILE- REALINO
Commissioners Dayrit and Garcia appraised the value of the 43 CASES= 43 ASSIGNMENTS
property at P1,900.00 per square meter or a total of LET’S EXEMPT CORTES, CLAROS AND MARCELO. THEY ARE
P1,179,000.00, while Commissioner Abcejo pegged the value of BUSY PREPARING FOR THE MOOT.
the property at P875.00 per square meter.
The Court of Appeals held that petitioner is liable to pay the full
fair market value at the time of actual taking, with interest at 6%
p. a. and ordered the RTC to appoint a new set of disinterested
commissioners.
Issue/s:
Held:
1. Yes.