THE PRESIDENCY xi THE PRESIDENCY: THE 1980 ELECTIONS ‘The American presidency is the most important public office in the world, and the one whose holder is chosen by the most intricate and protracted process. No other major democratic ration reposes so much power in a single elected official, and no other nation spends so ‘much time and energy determining who the next president is going to be. Prime ministers in Other countries, leaders in such dictatorships as Russia and China —each is one in a crowd ‘of many politicians strugeling for power. But the president stands alone. The Constitution Sets him apart, and his atleast theoretical control over the huge executive branch gives him power far outweighing that of any member of Congress. The most important powers of the president ate not necessarily formal: he is circumscribed by law and custom and can seldom ohieve his major goals by command, What the president does have isthe spotlight. More than any other American, or any other world leader, he has the power and the ability to frame issues, to seta national agenda, to dominate the public dialogue, and to set the terms of discussion. The president can set the tone of our public life ‘And inevitably he does—for better or worse. Franklin Roosevelt, entering the presidency in 1933, had few clear ideas of how to extricate the nation from economic catastrophe. But from the time he told Americans that they had nothing to fear but fear itself, he made people believe that something would be done and that it would work. Roosevelt was one ofthe (wo ‘Americans who have been nominated for national office by a major politcal party five times, and he seta tone for his generation and the oneafter. The other American nominated for national office five times was Richard Nixon, and it is tempting to say that he seta very different tone for our own times. Certainly the Watergate scandal helped create a negative national mood, as had the Vietnam war before it. Lyndon Johnson ran in 1964 promising rot to send American boys to fight where Asian boys should fight and then did just the op posite; Richard Nixon ran in 1968 promising to uphold middle-class morality and then was forced out of office for breaking the law. Vietnam, Watergate, the new experience of persis~ tent inflation, the various energy erises ofthe 1970s — these all contributed toa very negative climate of public opinion, a climate none of the presidents ofthe 1965-80 period could alter. Nor did they have much luck winning reelection. Americans in the 1960s assumed that most presidents could win a second term; since then only one president has, and he was foreed out of office soon after, Inthe 1970s we adjusted our presidential selection system; we hoped to get better results out of a better system. But the new process isso complicated anid the primary season so long that it seems that only politicians who campaign fulltime ean ‘win; and in any case no process can guarantee good results. The nation also needs luck —the ind of luck that gave America Franklin Roosevelt in 1932, One president after another has been ousted — Johnson in 1968, Nixon in 1974, Ford in 1976,and Carterin 1980, Each time wwe were surprised, and never more than we were in 1980 by the size of Ronald Reagan’ ‘margin. Carter did not have a good job rating and was not personally popular, but no one ‘expected that he would be beaten by 10% by a 69-year-old former governor; no one expect- ‘ed that the Democratic Party would lose control ofthe Senate. Indeed, asthe 1980campaignxii | THE PRESIDENCY began, the focus was on the Democras, and many thought Carter’ real atte was forthe ‘nomination, not the general election, “The Democratic Nomination, Edward Kennedy entered the race cles favorite on No- ‘ember 4, 1979. That was also the date the Iranians seized the hostages. From that time until the Democratic nomination was effectively decided, Jimmy Carter stayed in the White House and attended to the hostage problem — with occasional strategic phone callsto Dem ‘cratic Paty activists and officeholders in key caucus and primary sates. Kennedy was hurt by his fajering performance in an infeview in October with Roger Mudd on CBS and was hurt further in December when he condemned the Shah of Iran. By the end ofthe year, Car~ ter had taken the lead over Kennedy i the polls: California Governor Jerry Brown, alsoa candidate, never was @ significant factor. “The nomination was essentially dcided in three contests: the Towa caucuses and the New Hampshire and Ilinois primaries, Kennedy campaigned atively in Iowa, but he was over- wwielmed by Carter support the president had kept close couch with the lowa Democrats ‘who had given him his first important victory four years before, but his triumph was more than a matter of personal contact with afew hundred Key leaders; more than 100,000 Lowa Democrats participated and the anti-Kennedy trend was unmistakable. New Hampshire, for years the first primary, is next door to Kennedy's Massachusetts; but here Carter again prevailed, Finally. Ilinois was the first ofthe nation’s big industrial tates to have @ primary. ‘Reain Kennedy campaigned hard; here the response was unequivocal, a better than 2-0-1 victory forthe president ‘Kennedy didnot withdraw from the election then; indeed, he stayed inthe competition forfive months, until the Democrats held their convention in New York. Heeven won some ‘primaries, including trong wins in Massachusets and New York, but he was unable to win butside the East Coast and California with two minor exceptions, and his showings tended to fet better when votes thought he ha lite chance forthe nomination, Kennedy impressed ‘oters of all parties with his grace and composure duringthis period and managed to makea ‘plausible case against proposed convention rues that would have made Cartersnomination mathematically certain, But the high point of Kennedy's candidacy came in New York, on the second night of the eonvention, when be addressed the delegates purportedly in support fof @ minority platform plank. This s Kennedy's meter a stirring speech before a large and ffiendly crowd. He disappointed no one: he defended the Democratic vision of a compas- sionate government, attacked Ronald Reagan, even made few bowsto Jimmy Carter. His ‘doomed campaign had won 40% ofthe delegates; the Carter managers must have reflected. fs they saw the erowds emotion at Kennedy's speech, on how easly he might have taker ‘control ofthe convention if he had won just a few more delegates. ‘Kennedy’ performance dominated Carter’ convention: on the lastnight, when Kennedy ‘came up on the platform, he gave Carter only the most lukewarm of handshakes, and that ‘vas the pctte that made the newsmagazines. Cate failed to stir the delegates and he did hot ge far in making a case for himel! withthe voters He surely blames Kennedy's persis- tence for that, and with some justice, butt isalso true that there was litle postive enthusiasm among either the delegates or if we can trust the pols, from the voters who renominated the president “The Republican Nomination, The contest forthe Republican nomination was largely the ‘process of the inital favorite, Ronald Reagan, overcoming his disadvantages and capturing THE PRESIDENCY xiii 8 victory at lat after two unsuecessful races, Reagan's disidvantages were wo, hisage (09) ‘nd bis lack of experience in national government; his identification with ideological conser- ‘tives was an aset, no a ibility, n the Republican delegate selection process niall, in the Towa caucuses, his strategy scemed to be to keep alight schedule and avoid appearances with other candidates; when George Bush won the Lowa caucuses after Reagan rlused to appear ata multcandidafe debate, tht strategy changed. Reagan campaigned hard in New Hampshire and accepted the invitation of the Nashua newspaper to debate George Bush ‘one-otrone, When the paper backed out of paying forthe hall someone questioned whether it would be s corporate contribution), Reagan agreed to foot the bil he then invited the ‘other Republican candidates. Bush, caught off guard, declined to appear with the others ‘Reagan, when the newspaper editor turned off the sound in his microphone, was outraged land came out with the campaign's best ine: “I paid for ths microphone, Mr. Breen.” Rea [Ban's support had been climbing rapidly and Bush’ falling in New Hampshire before the ‘debate; after it Reagan beat Bush by nearly a 240-1 margin. After big victories in southern states, including a triumph over John Connally in South Carolina where the Texan had ‘campaigned intensively, Reagan beat Bush and John Anderson handily in Ilinos, ‘In eflet the fight was over. Other candidacics had been dispatched, Senator Bob Dole was never able to gota campaign organized. Connally, with strong support from business ‘executives and $11 million in contributions, could not charm ordinary people and ended up With single delegate; he gracefully bowed out and supported Reagan. Congressman Philip, CCrane had support from activists ofthe right but wor few votes. John Anderson, having failed to win a single Republican primary, pereeived a call for an independent candidacy. Senator Howard Baker blamed his lack of success on his failure to abandon his duties as minority leader. Bush kept on campaigning for a while and even won some primaries, but bby June the Republicans wete united around Reagan. The Republican National Conven- tion was his to command, and while there were some missteps ~ notably the elfort to per= ssuade Gerald Ford to take the vice presidential nomination in reurn for promises of "C0 presideney"—on the whole the proceedings in Detroit were devoted 10 expounding the ideas that Reagan and other Republicans had been spreading and which had been proving ‘0 persuasive to so many voters ‘The Anderson Difference. Jolin Andersdh's candidacy in 1980 had its genesis in the 1978 primary election inthe I6th congressional distict of Minos. After I8yearsin office, Ander~ Son was unable to win more than $8 ofthe vote against a dull-witted right-wing minister, disgusted, he decided not to run for Congress again and tory forthe presidency instead. He «id not fin it ficult to distinguish himself from the other candidates. He looked askance ‘atthe Kemp- Roth tax cut although he had supported itasa House Republican), and in the Towa debate he cited as his greatest mistake hs vote forthe Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1964 making him perhaps the lst presidential candidate to win votes on his postion on ‘Vietnam, He also had a distinctive and original proposal fora SOe gas tax. Anderson’ diss tinctiveness eamed him some votes in lowa and, more important, prominent and repeated ‘mention in Doonesbury: which helped him become kind of hero to college and posteollege voters. But not even in New England, where Republican primary voters are more liberally inclined than anywhere ele, could Anderson actually win @ primary; Bush edged him in Massachusetts and Reagan in Vermont. Fora time Anderson led the polls in Ilinois, more ‘on the bass of his issue stands than local popularity because his congressional dstitisonly ‘a small part of the state; but in the end Reagan had s handsome vietory there —_——_—_—__——“xiv THE PRESIDENCY Anderson faced a quandary. Should he continue what must inevitably bea losing race for the Republican nomination? Or should he run asan independent or third party candidate? ‘The latter possibility was tempting. There was an obvious constituency, votes who think of themselves as liberal on cultural sues and conservative on economic issues, a body ineres- ing in size asthe Vietnam generation of college graduates moves into the voting stream, An derson fit their polities pretty well, although there were a few embarrassing exceptions; he had always been a backer of nuclear power, for example, and now had to search his record for votes that might be plausibly claimed as skepticism. And there were many other voters who were simply dissatisied with the choice of Jimmy Carterand Ronald Reagan, and were looking for someone else Tere was an opening, in other words, and the potential fra candidate suchas Anderson to become competitive forthe electoral votes of many states. In polls through the summer he {got more than 20% and, when voters were asked to assume he had a chanee of winning, he ‘was more competitive with Carter and Reagan. Yet in the end bis campaign fizzled he had tonly 79) ofthe vote, with his best showings (IS) in Massachusetts and Vermont. Why didn fe do better? First of al, there was the etical error of spending too much time and, ‘campaign money on qualifying Anderson forthe ballot in all S0 states. George Wallace, ‘operating 12 years before in les hospitable legal environment, had accomplished the same thing with mich less fus, Second, Anderson forces spent tie money on tekvision adverts ing although his campaign manager, David Garth is ont of the most skilful maker of pli- tical commercials around. Thied, the candidate showed litle ability to communicate ideas. He was stil a man of the House, ready to speak ina loud scolding tone on any subject for to minutes, he never understood that a candidate as to speak ina conversational tone for 30 seconds om the subject he wants to emphasize. Consequently, many of the origina ideas his campaign developed simply never got conamunicated, as he spent histime responding to {questions on stray topics such as abortion or his chances to win. “Anderson nevertheless won one vitory:by getting 7% ofthe vot, he qualified for federal ‘matching funds and paid of his eampaign debts. He also left the race witha mailing list of contributors three times larger than that ofthe Democratic Party. Anderson thus fas the ‘Potential of revving hs candidacy in 1984 and may be an important political factor nthe years in between “The General Election. The fundamentals ofthe general cletion were fairly apparent easly on Jimmy Carter hada lo ob rating; voters wanted to get rid of him if they could find good ‘ternative, Ronald Reagan was for many voters an unknown quantity; they had their doubts about him (was he too old? was he too impulsive or warlike? that they wanted re~ Solved before they made a decision. The fall campaign can be divided into thee periods, ‘nd only during the ist of those did Ronald Reagan seem tobe making the kindof mistakes ‘that could cost him the presidency. “These were Reagan’ inital bloopers. when he talked too freely and without discipline to the press, between the Democratic Convention and early September. Reagan gotinto.voi able trouble by questioning the theory of evolution and asserting that the creation theory ‘should be taught in high schools as wel. Gratutously he offered the opinion that the Viet- ham war wasa moral cause. While Los Angeles was suferingits worst airpollationinecent years, Reagan was saying that Mount Saint Helens and the Great Smoky Mountains cause more pollution than does man’ civilization. All of these statements might be defensible; but they ran against voters conventional wisdom and they were peripheral tothe main econom- THE PRESIDENCY xv ie and foreign policy concerns voters had. It was odd as well to see a man who preaches ‘against federal intusion offering, asa candidate fr the presidency. opinions on high school cursieulums By carly September Reagan had evidently been convinced that greater circumspection| ‘was necesary, and afterwards he disiplined himsel very well indeed. The undisciplined ‘candidate during the second period was President Carer. This was the time when he charged that Reagan’ election would divide black and white, Christian and Jew —a particularly in- “appropriate comment when one considers that throughout the campaign Reagan refrained {rom capitalizing on the one ethnic prejudice that was really aring in America, the diske of the sudden influx of Cuban refugees. Carter suddenly found himself under attack for his “meanness” (an attack begun by a Washington Post editor) and actually had to apologize {for it in an interview with Barbara Walters, Carter strategists had hoped to find Reagan by mid-October on the defensive on charges Usa he was too likly to rsk war and was too un- sympathetic to blacks and the poor. Instead Carter was on the defensive for his tactics. Even so, Carter was inching upward in the polls. But he was doing litle more thancorral- ling some, but not al traditional Democratic voters, and neither he nor Reagan was running consistently over 40% in published polls through mid-October, even though Anderson was ‘Sinking fast. The nation ad not yet made itschoice. Against this backdrop, Carter, who had resisted debates throughout the campaign, agreed to debate his challenge. The debate was held the Tuesday before the election, and many professional observers thought the esp factual, serious Carter had won, But voters—at first by a small plurality, then a few days later in much larger numbers — made Reagan the winner. The reason was notso much what hhappened inthe debate as it was inthe dynamics ofthe campaign. Voters wanted to reject Carter and were looking for reassurance that Reagan was acceptable. Inthe debate they got i Reagan made no obvious mistakes; he stressed convincingly his desire for peace; he Pre- sented himself as an amiable and Knowledgeable man, and one capable of inspiration. “The result was the massive Reagan vitory: 51 for Reagan, 41% lor Carter, 7 for An- derson, 1% for others (mostly the Libertarian ticket of Ed Clark and David Koch, which had advertised heavily on television). Hopes were raised during the last weekend that the hostages would be returned by Iran. But those hopes were dashed before election day, and for once the hostage situation did not work in Carters political favor. He had delended himself against Kennedy's attacks on the Shah and some Republicans” desire for stronger action by citing his concern forthe hostages’ safety; but by November 4-— exactly one year ater the hostages were seized — it was apparent that Carter policy had failed, and he paid the price for making the hostages the central focus of American politics. Reagan’ victory ‘was not just a personal one; it was a vietory of ideas, The Republicans captured 12 Demo cratic Senate seats and won control ofthe Senate for the ist time sinoe 1952, and they made substantial gains in the House as wll They were running, moreover, allo roughly the same ‘issues and the same philosophy —in vivid contrast to the Democrats, who tend to adapt ther polities 10 the local terrain ‘The Reagan Victory. It is worth considering the dimensions of Ronald Reagan's vitory. ‘Whatever happens to his administration, the support won in 1980 gives usa good picture of ‘the kind of nation we were that year and what we were sccking in our government. It as certainly @ decisive victory, but not quite the landslide that has been claimed: ofthe «wo- party vote, Reagan got about the same share as Eisenhower in 195207 1956, and only about