DIGEST FOR RECITATION

Art. 249, in re Art 50, RPC/Indeterminate Sentence Law

G.R. No. 198400 October 7, 2013

FE ABELLA y PERPETUA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
REYES, J.:
FACTS
Fe Abella was convicted by the RTC of Misamis Oriental, CDO and the CA for Frustrated
Homicide committed against his younger brother, Benigno Abella Benigno.

On October 7, 1998, the petitioner, who at times worked as a farmer, baker and trisicad driver,
was charged with frustrated homicide in an Information. After the Information was filed, the
petitioner remained at large and was only arrested by agents of the NBI on October 7, 2002.

During the arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. The
Prosecution evidence established that on September 6, 1998, at around 11:00 p.m., Benigno
was watching television in his house. A certain Roger Laranjo arrived and asked Benigno to
pacify the petitioner, Fe Abella, who was stirring trouble in a nearby store. Benigno and
Amelita (Benigno’s wife) found the petitioner fighting with Alejandro and a certain Dionisio
Ybañes (Dionisio). Benigno was able to convince Fe to go home. Benigno and Amelita
followed suit and along the way, they dropped by the houses of Alejandro and Dionisio to
apologize for Fe’s conduct.

Benigno and Amelita were in Alejandro’s house when Fe arrived bringing with him two
scythes, one in each of his hands. Benigno instructed Alejandro and Dionisio to run away and
the latter two complied. Fe wanted to enter Alejandro’s house, but Benigno blocked his way
and asked him not to proceed. Fe then pointed the scythe, which he held in his left hand, in the
direction of Benigno’s stomach, while the scythe in the right hand was used to hack the latter’s
neck once. Benigno fell to the ground and was immediately taken to the hospital while Fe ran
to chase Alejandro. Benigno incurred an expense of more than ₱10,000.00 for hospitalization,
but lost the receipts of his bills. He further claimed that after the hacking incident, he could no
longer move his left hand and was thus deprived of his capacity to earn a living as a carpenter.

The petitioner, Fe, relied on denial and alibi as defenses. He claimed that from September 2,
1998 to October 2002, he and his family resided in Buenavista, Agusan del Norte. Sitio Puli,
Canitoan, Cagayan de Oro City, where the hacking incident occurred, is about four (4) hours
drive away. Fernando testified that on September 6, 1998, he saw the petitioner gathering
woods to make a hut. Later in the evening, at around 5:00 p.m., Urbano spotted the petitioner
drinking tuba in the store of Clarita Perpetua.
RTC RULING
The RTC found the petitioner’s defenses of alibi and denial as weak. The RTC awarded
₱10,000.00 as actual damages to Benigno for the medical expenses he incurred despite the
prosecution’s failure to offer receipts as evidence. The petitioner was likewise ordered to pay
₱100,000.00 as consequential damages, but the RTC did not explicitly lay down the basis for
the award.

The petitioner then filed an appeal before the CA primarily anchored on the claim that the
prosecution failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the existence of intent to kill
which accompanied the single hacking blow made on Benigno’s neck. The petitioner
argued that the hacking was merely accidental especially since he had no motive whatsoever
which could have impelled him to hurt Benigno, and that the infliction of merely one
wound negates intent to kill.

CA RULING
The CA rendered a Decision affirming the petitioner’s conviction for the crime of frustrated
homicide ratiocinating that:
Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of:
a. motive;
b. the nature or number of weapons used in the commission of the crime;
c. the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim;
d. the manner the crime was committed; and
e. the words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by
him on the victim.

Here, the intent to kill was sufficiently proven by the Prosecution. The petitioner attacked
Benigno with deadly weapons, two scythes. The petitioner’s blow was directed to the neck of
Benigno. The attack on the unarmed and unsuspecting Benigno was swift and sudden. The latter had
no means, and no time, to defend himself.

Dr. Roberto Ardiente, Jr., who attended and issued the Medical Certificate, testified that Benigno
suffered from a hack wound on the left neck, and an incised wound on the left hand palm. He said that
the wounds might have been caused by a sharp, pointed and sharp-edged instrument, and may have
resulted to death without proper medical attendance. Benigno was hospitalized for about a month
because of the injuries. The location of the wound (on the neck) shows the nature and seriousness of
the wound suffered by Benigno. It would have caused his death, had it not been for the timely
intervention of medical science.

However, the CA modified the sentence to "imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1)
day to six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum." The CA explained that:
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for the crime of
consummated homicide is reclusion temporal , or twelve (12) years and one (1) day
to twenty (20) years. Under Article 50 of the same Code, the penalty for a frustrated
crime is one degree lower than that prescribed by law. Thus, frustrated homicide is
punishable by prision mayor , or six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, absent any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should be taken from the
medium period of prision mayor. To determine the minimum of the indeterminate
penalty, prision mayor should be reduced by one degree, which is prision
correccional , with a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. The
minimum of the indeterminate penalty may be taken from the full range of prision
correccional.
ISSUE
Are the lower courts correct in convicting Fe Abella for the crime of Frustrated Homicide?
(Yes.)

RULING
To successfully prosecute the crime of homicide, the following elements must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt:
1. that a person was killed;
2. that the accused killed that person without any justifying circumstance;
3. that the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and
4. that the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or
by that of parricide or infanticide.
Moreover, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if the wound
inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim without medical
intervention or attendance.

In cases of frustrated homicide, the main element is the accused’s intent to take his
victim’s life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every
possible doubt regarding homicidal intent. And the intent to kill is often inferred from,
among other things, the means the offender used and the nature, location, and number of
wounds he inflicted on his victim.

The petitioner now wants to impress upon this Court that he had no motive to attack,
much less kill Benigno. The petitioner likewise invokes the doctrine in Pentecostes, Jr. to
argue that homicidal intent is absent in a case where the accused shot the victim only
once when there was an opportunity to do otherwise. The petitioner belabors his claim
that had he intended to kill Benigno, he could have repeatedly hacked him to ensure the
latter’s death, and not leave right after the blow to chase Alejandro instead.

The analogy is flawed.

In Pentecostes, Jr., the victim was shot only once in the arm, a non vital part of the body.
The attending physician certified that the injury would require medical attendance for ten
days, but the victim was in fact promptly discharged from the hospital the following day.
In Benigno’s case, he sustained an 11-centimeter long hacking wound in the neck and a 4-
cm long incised wound in his left hand caused by the unsterile scythe used by the petitioner.
Dr. Ardiente testified that "it is possible to have complications resulting from these injuries
because the wounds were extensive and they were big and they were open wounds, so there is
a possibility of infections resulting from these kinds of wounds, and the instrument used was
not a sterile instrument contaminated with other things." No complications developed from
Benigno’s wounds which could have caused his death, but he was confined in the hospital
for a period of 17 days from September 6, 1998 to September 23, 1998.
From the foregoing, this Court concludes and thus agrees with the CA that the use of a
scythe against Benigno’s neck was determinative of the petitioner’s homicidal intent
when the hacking blow was delivered. It does not require imagination to figure out that a
single hacking blow in the neck with the use of a scythe could be enough to decapitate a
person and leave him dead. While no complications actually developed from the gaping
wounds in Benigno’s neck and left hand, it perplexes logic to conclude that the injuries he
sustained were potentially not fatal considering the period of his confinement in the hospital.
A mere grazing injury would have necessitated a lesser degree of medical attention.
This Court likewise finds wanting in merit the petitioner’s claim that an intent to kill is
negated by the fact that he pursued Alejandro instead and refrained from further
hacking Benigno. What could have been a fatal blow was already delivered and there
was no more desistance to speak of. Benigno did not die from the hacking incident by
reason of a timely medical intervention provided to him, which is a cause independent of
the petitioner’s will.

All told, this Court finds no reversible error committed by the CA in affirming the RTC’s
conviction of the petitioner of the crime charged.

The Court modifies the award of damages.

As to the civil liability of the petitioner, the CA was correct in deleting the payment of
the consequential damages awarded by the trial court in the absence of proof thereof. Where
the amount of actual damages cannot be determined because of the absence of supporting
receipts but entitlement is shown by the facts of the case, temperate damages may be awarded.
In the instant case, Benigno certainly suffered injuries, was actually hospitalized and
underwent medical treatment. Considering the nature of his injuries, it is prudent to award
temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00, in lieu of actual damages.
Furthermore, we find that Benigno is entitled to moral damages in the amount of
₱25,000.00. There is sufficient basis to award moral damages as ordinary human experience
and common sense dictate that such wounds inflicted on Benigno would naturally cause
physical suffering, fright, serious anxiety, moral shock, and similar injury.

SO ORDERED.
DIGEST FOR CASEBOOK
Art. 249, in re Art 50, RPC/Indeterminate Sentence Law

G.R. No. 198400 October 7, 2013

FE ABELLA y PERPETUA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
REYES, J.:
FACTS
The petitioner, Fe, was charged with frustrated homicide in an Information. After the
Information was filed, the petitioner remained at large and was only arrested by agents of the
NBI in 2002. During the arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

Benigno was watching television in his house. A certain Roger Laranjo arrived and asked
Benigno to pacify the petitioner, Fe Abella, who was stirring trouble in a nearby store.
Benigno and Amelita (Benigno’s wife) found the petitioner fighting with Alejandro and a
certain Dionisio Ybañes (Dionisio). Benigno was able to convince Fe to go home. Benigno
and Amelita followed suit and along the way, they dropped by the houses of Alejandro and
Dionisio to apologize for Fe’s conduct.

Benigno and Amelita were in Alejandro’s house when Fe arrived bringing with him two
scythes, one in each of his hands. Benigno instructed Alejandro and Dionisio to run away and
the latter two complied. Fe wanted to enter Alejandro’s house, but Benigno blocked his way
and asked him not to proceed. Fe then pointed the scythe, which he held in his left hand, in the
direction of Benigno’s stomach, while the scythe in the right hand was used to hack the latter’s
neck once. Benigno fell to the ground and was immediately taken to the hospital while Fe ran
to chase Alejandro.

The petitioner, Fe, relied on denial and alibi as defenses. He claimed that he and his family
resided in Buenavista, Agusan del Norte. Sitio Puli, Canitoan, Cagayan de Oro City, where the
hacking incident occurred, is about four (4) hours drive away.

The RTC convicted Fe. Fe then filed an appeal before the CA primarily anchored on the claim
that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of intent to kill which accompanied the single
hacking blow made on Benigno’s neck. The petitioner argued that the hacking was merely
accidental especially since he had no motive whatsoever which could have impelled him to
hurt Benigno, and that the infliction of merely one wound negates intent to kill.

The CA rendered a Decision affirming Fe’s conviction.

ISSUE
Are the lower courts correct in convicting Fe Abella for the crime of Frustrated Homicide?
(Yes.)
RULING
In cases of frustrated homicide, the main element is the accused’s intent to take his victim’s
life. And the intent to kill is often inferred from, among other things, the means the offender
used and the nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his victim.

The petitioner now wants to impress upon this Court that he had no motive to attack, much
less kill Benigno. The petitioner likewise invokes the doctrine in Pentecostes, Jr. to argue that
homicidal intent is absent in a case where the accused shot the victim only once when there
was an opportunity to do otherwise. The petitioner belabors his claim that had he intended to
kill Benigno, he could have repeatedly hacked him to ensure the latter’s death, and not leave
right after the blow to chase Alejandro instead.

The analogy is flawed.

In Pentecostes, Jr., the victim was shot only once in the arm, a non vital part of the body. In
Benigno’s case, he sustained an 11-centimeter long hacking wound in the neck and a 4-cm
long incised wound in his left hand caused by the unsterile scythe used by the petitioner. No
complications developed from Benigno’s wounds which could have caused his death, but he
was confined in the hospital for a period of 17 days.

From the foregoing, this Court concludes and thus agrees with the CA that the use of a scythe
against Benigno’s neck was determinative of the petitioner’s homicidal intent when the
hacking blow was delivered. It does not require imagination to figure out that a single hacking
blow in the neck with the use of a scythe could be enough to decapitate a person and leave him
dead. This Court likewise finds wanting in merit the petitioner’s claim that an intent to kill is
negated by the fact that he pursued Alejandro instead and refrained from further hacking
Benigno. What could have been a fatal blow was already delivered and there was no more
desistance to speak of. Benigno did not die from the hacking incident by reason of a timely
medical intervention provided to him, which is a cause independent of the petitioner’s will.

AS TO THE PENALTY IMPOSED

The SC, sustained the CA with respect to its modification of the penalty of imprisonment. The
CA modified the RTC’s sentence to "imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to six
(6) years of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor in its medium period, as maximum." The CA explained that:
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for the crime of
consummated homicide is reclusion temporal , or twelve (12) years and one (1) day
to twenty (20) years. Under Article 50 of the same Code, the penalty for a frustrated
crime is one degree lower than that prescribed by law. Thus, frustrated homicide is
punishable by prision mayor , or six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, absent any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should be taken from the
medium period of prision mayor. To determine the minimum of the indeterminate
penalty, prision mayor should be reduced by one degree, which is prision
correccional , with a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. The
minimum of the indeterminate penalty may be taken from the full range of prision
correccional.

SO ORDERED.
DIGEST FOR RECITATION
Guidelines in appreciating age as an element of qualifying circumstance

G.R. No. 201105 November 25, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
NATALIO HILARION y LALIAG, Appellant.
BRION, J.:
FACTS
Natalio Hilarion is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape by the
RTC and the CA. He was sentenced to a penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape under
Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended (RPC). It
gave credence to the testimony of AAA that the appellant inserted his penis into her
vagina in the afternoon of November 15, 2002. It further held that AAA’s testimony was
corroborated by the medical findings of the Philippine National Police medico-legal officer
stating that the victim had "deep healing laceration at 3 o’clock position" on her hymen. The
RTC sentenced the appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to
pay AAA ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment in toto. The CA held that AAA positively
identified the appellant as the person who inserted his penis into her vagina in a grassy area on
November 15, 2002; her testimony was corroborated by Medico-Legal Report No. 3472-02
showing that AAA had deep-healing hymenal lacerations, and that her posterior fourchette had
been "abraded." It further held that the victim's age had been sufficiently proven by the
written and oral testimonies of AAA's mother, BBB. The CA also rejected the appellant's
denial for his failure to substantiate his defense.

In his brief, the appellant maintained that the prosecution failed to prove the elements of
force and intimidation; he also claimed that the victim's age had not been proven with
certainty.

ISSUE
Were the lower courts correct in appreciating the age of the victim as a qualifying
circumstance? (NO.)
RULING

We DENY the appeal, but modify the designation of the crime committed and the awarded
indemnities.

For a charge of rape under Article 266-A of the RPC, the prosecution must prove that:
1. the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and
2. he accomplished this act through force, threat or intimidation, when she was
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age
or was demented.
The prosecution in the present case positively established the elements of rape required
under Article 266-A of the RPC.

First, the appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim. AAA was steadfast in her assertion
that the appellant inserted his penis into her vagina, and her testimony was corroborated by the
medical findings of Dr. Winston Tan. "We have held that when the testimony of a rape victim
is consistent with the medical findings, there is sufficient basis to conclude that carnal
knowledge has taken place."

"Second, the appellant employed threat, force and intimidation to satisfy his lust. As an
element of rape, force, threat or intimidation need not be irresistible, but just enough to bring
about the desired result." In the present case, AAA testified that she cried when the appellant
inserted his penis into her vagina. As a child of tender years, she could not reasonably be
expected to resist in the same manner that an adult would under the same or similar
circumstances. Nonetheless, AAA's act of crying during the rape is sufficient indication that
the appellant's act was against her will. AAA also revealed that the appellant threatened to kill
her parents if she disclosed the incident to anyone.

In addition, the appellant did not impute any improper motive on AAA or on any other
prosecution witnesses on why they would falsely testify against him.

We additionally note that while the CA’s dispositive portion affirmed in toto the RTC s
decision (which found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape under
Article 266-A, in relation with Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended), the
body of the appellate court's decision showed that it was convicting the appellant of
statutory rape.

It is not lost on us that the victim's age had been properly alleged in the Information which
stated that AAA was a minor and six (6) years of age at the time of the rape. We cannot,
however, sustain the appellant's conviction for statutory rape since the prosecution failed
to sufficiently prove the victim's age.
In People v. Buado Jr., the Court reiterated the guidelines in appreciating the victim's age,
either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, thus:
In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing cases, we
hereby set the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the
crime or as a qualifying circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original
or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents
such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of
birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have
been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear
and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the family either
by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters
respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the
offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is
sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is
sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is
sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the
testimony of the victim s mother or relatives concerning the victim s
age, the complainant s testimony will suffice provided that it is
expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the
offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial
evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age
of the victim.

In the present case, the records are completely devoid of evidence that the certificates
recognized by law have been lost or destroyed or were otherwise unavailable. The
mother simply testified without prior proof of the unavailability of the recognized
primary evidence. Thus, proof of the victim s age cannot be recognized, following the
rule that all doubts should be interpreted in favor of the accused.

Accordingly, as the Court did in Buado we can only sustain the accused s conviction for
simple rape, as the victim s and her mother s testimonies to prove the victim s minority are
insufficient. We stress that age is an essential element of statutory rape; hence the
victim's age must be proved with equal certainty and clarity as the crime itself.

The trial and appellate courts correctly sentenced the appellant to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, as none of the circumstances that qualify the rape under Article 266-B of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, had been proven.

SO ORDERED.
DIGEST FOR CASEBOOK
Guidelines in appreciating age as an element of qualifying circumstance

G.R. No. 201105 November 25, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
NATALIO HILARION y LALIAG, Appellant.
BRION, J.:
FACTS
Natalio Hilarion is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape by the RTC and
the CA. He was sentenced to a penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The RTC gave credence to the testimony of AAA that the appellant inserted his penis into her
vagina in the afternoon of November 15, 2002. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment
in toto. It further held that the victim's age had been sufficiently proven by the written and oral
testimonies of AAA's mother, BBB.

In his brief, the appellant maintained that the prosecution failed to prove the elements of force
and intimidation; he also claimed that the victim's age had not been proven with certainty.

ISSUE
Were the lower courts correct in appreciating the age of the victim as a qualifying
circumstance? (NO.)

RULING
For a charge of rape under Article 266-A of the RPC, the prosecution must prove that:
3. the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and
4. he accomplished this act through force, threat or intimidation, when she was deprived
of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was
demented.
The prosecution in the present case positively established the elements of rape required under
Article 266-A of the RPC.

However, the body of the appellate court's decision showed that it was convicting the
appellant of statutory rape. We cannot, however, sustain the appellant's conviction for
statutory rape since the prosecution failed to sufficiently prove the victim's age.

In People v. Buado Jr., the Court reiterated the guidelines in appreciating the victim's age,
either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, thus:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or
certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such
as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of
the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been
lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and
credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the family either by affinity
or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree
such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to
Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the
following circumstances:
 a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is
sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought
to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is
sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the
testimony of the victim s mother or relatives concerning the victim s age, the
complainant s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended
party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence
regarding age shall not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the
victim.

In the present case, the records are completely devoid of evidence that the certificates
recognized by law have been lost or destroyed or were otherwise unavailable. The mother
simply testified without prior proof of the unavailability of the recognized primary evidence.
Thus, proof of the victim s age cannot be recognized, following the rule that all doubts should
be interpreted in favor of the accused.

We stress that age is an essential element of statutory rape; hence the victim's age must be
proved with equal certainty and clarity as the crime itself.

SO ORDERED.
DIGEST FOR RECITATION
Concept of Self Defense/ Intent to Kill/Conspiracy
G.R. No. 170462 February 5, 2014
RODOLFO GUEVARRA and JOEY GUEVARRA, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
BRION, J.:
FACTS
Rodolfo and his son, Joey, were charged with the crimes of frustrated homicide and
homicide under two Informations.

Although the informations stated that the crimes were committed on January 8, 2000, the true
date of their commission is November 8, 2000, as confirmed by the CA through the
records. The parties failed to raise any objection to the discrepancy.

On arraignment, the petitioners pleaded not guilty to both charges. At the pre-trial, the
petitioners interposed self-defense, which prompted the RTC to conduct a reverse trial of the
case.

Version of the Defense

Testimony of Rodolfo
Rodolfo, who was then fifty-five (55) years old, narrated that, at around 11 :00 p.m., on
November 8, 2000, brothers Erwin Ordonez and David Ordonez, together with their
companion, Philip Vingua, forced their way into his compound and threw stones at his
house and tricycle. Through the back door of his house, Rodolfo went down to the
basement or "silung' and shouted at the three men to stop. David saw him, threatened to
kill him, and struck him with a ''panabas," hitting him on the palm of his left hand.
Rodolfo responded by reaching for the bolo tucked in the "so/era" of his house, and
hacked and stabbed Erwin and David until the two brothers fell to the ground. Upon
seeing Erwin and David lying on the ground, Rodolfo called on someone to bring the
brothers to the hospital. He stayed in his house until the policemen arrived.

Testimony of Joey
Joey, who was then thirty-one (31) years old, narrated that, at around 11:00 p.m., on
November 8, 2000, he was awakened by the sound of stones being thrown at their house
in Bliss, Paddad, Alicia, Isabela. Through the window, he saw Erwin, David and Philip
breaking into their gate, which was made of wood and interlink wire and located five ( 5)
to six ( 6) meters away from their house. He then heard his father Rodolfo say to the three
men, "kung ano man ang problema bukas na natin pag-usapan," and David retorted in
their dialect, "Okininam nga lakay adda ka gayam dita, patayin taka."

Testimony of Balbino
Balbino narrated that, from inside his house in Bliss, Paddad, Alicia, Isabela, at around
10:00 p.m., on November 8, 2000, he heard a person from the outside saying "Sige banatan
ninyo na." He opened his door and saw David, Erwin and Philip throwing stones at the
house of his neighbor Crisanto Briones. Briones got mad and scolded the three men,
"Why are you hitting my house? Why don't you hit the house of your enemy, mga
tarantado kayo!" David, Erwin and Philip then aimed their stones at the petitioners'
house. Balbino heard David calling out to Joey, "Joey, kung tunay kang lalaki lumabas
ka diyan sa kalsada at dito tayo magpatayan," but no one came out of Rodolfo's house.
The stoning lasted for about thirty (30) minutes.
Afterwards, Balbino saw David, Erwin and Philip destroy Rodolfo's gate and pull the gate
towards the road. He heard David say to his companions, "koberan ninyo ako at papasok
kami." David, Erwin and Philip entered the petitioners' compound and damaged
Rodolfo's tricycle with stones and their ''panabas." Also, he heard Rodolfo say to David
in Filipino that they could just talk about their problems with him the following day. But
David approached Rodolfo and hacked him with a ''panabas." Rodolfo parried the blow
with the back of his hand, and David and Rodolfo struggled for the possession of the
''panabas."

Balbino also saw Erwin hit Rodolfo on the face with a stone and Joey was hit on his right foot,
causing Rodolfo and Joey to retreat to the "silung" of their house from where Rodolfo got
"something shiny," and with it stabbed David and Erwin. He saw the two brothers fall to the
ground.

Version of the Prosecution

As its rebuttal witness, the prosecution presented the sole testimony of Erwin who survived
the hacking.

Erwin narrated that, at around 10:00 to 11 :00 p.m., on November 8, 2000, he, his brother
David and Philip went to a birthday party and passed in front of the petitioners'
compound. He was walking twenty (20) meters ahead of his companions when, suddenly,
Philip ran up to him saying that David was being stabbed by Joey with a bolo. While
approaching the scene of the stabbing, which was three (3) meters away from where his
brother David was, Erwin was met by Rodolfo who then hacked him, hitting his arm and
back. Thereafter, Rodolfo and Joey dragged Erwin inside the petitioners' compound and
kept on hacking him. He was hacked and stabbed thirteen (13) times. He became weak
and ultimately fell to the ground.

Erwin denied that he and David threw stones at the petitioners' house and damaged
Rodolfo's tricycle. They did not likewise destroy the petitioners' gate, which was only
damaged when his brother David clung on to it while he was being pulled by Rodolfo and
Erwin into their compound. While they were being hacked and stabbed by Rodolfo and Erwin,
stones actually rained on them and people outside the petitioners' gate were saying, "Do not
kill the brothers. Allow them to come out."

After the incident, Erwin and David, both unconscious, were brought to the hospital. David
died in the hospital while being treated for his wounds.

The RTC's Ruling

The RTC found the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of frustrated
homicide and homicide. It disbelieved the defense's version of the events due to material
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the defense witnesses. It denied the petitioners' claim of
self-defense for lack of clear, convincing and satisfactory supporting evidence.
The RTC explained in its decision that "when an accused invokes the justifying
circumstance of self-defense, he loses the constitutional presumption of innocence and
assumes the burden of proving, with clear and convincing evidence, the justification for
his act"; that self-defense is an affirmative allegation which must be proven with
certainty by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of
criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it. The RTC held that the
petitioners miserably failed to prove that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the
victims, Erwin and David.
The CA's Ruling
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's judgment and convicted the petitioners of the crimes
charged. The CA further held that the petitioners' plea of self-defense was belied by the nature
and number of wounds inflicted on Erwin, who sustained thirteen (13) stab wounds on his arm
and back, and David, who suffered around ten (10) stab wounds on his back and stomach
causing his death. These wounds logically indicated that the assault was no longer an act of
self-defense but a determined homicidal aggression on the part of the petitioners.

ISSUES
Was self-defense sufficiently proven?

RULING
We deny the present petition as we find no reversible error in the CA decision.

The crime of frustrated homicide is committed when:

1. an "accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon
in his assault;
2. the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely
medical assistance; and
3. none of the qualifying circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code is present."

On the other hand, the crime of homicide is committed when:

1. a person is killed;
2. the accused killed that person without any justifying circumstance;
3. the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and
4. the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or
by that of parricide or infanticide.

The petitioners' intent to kill was clearly established by the nature and number of wounds
sustained by their victims. Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may
consist, among other things:
1. of the means used by the malefactors;
2. the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after the killing of
the victim; and
3. the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim.

The CA aptly observed that the ten (10) hack/stab wounds David suffered and which
eventually caused his death, and the thirteen (13) hack/stab wounds Erwin sustained,
confirmed the prosecution's theory that the petitioners purposely and vigorously attacked
David and Erwin.

In fact, the petitioners admitted at the pre-trial that "the wounds inflicted on the victim
Erwin Ordonez would have caused his death were it not for immediate medical
attendance."
By invoking self-defense, the petitioners, in effect, admitted to the commission of the acts
for which they were charged, albeit under circumstances that, if proven, would have
exculpated them. With this admission, the burden of proof shifted to the petitioners to
show that the killing and frustrated killing of David and Erwin, respectively, were
attended by the following circumstances:
a. unlawful aggression on the part of the victims;
b. reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression;
and
c. lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the persons resorting to self-defense.

Of all the burdens the petitioners carried, the most important of all is the element of
unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a
threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. The element of unlawful aggression
must be proven first in order for self-defense to be successfully pleaded. There can be no
self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful
aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense.

As the RTC and the CA did, we find the absence of the element of unlawful aggression on the
part of the victims. As the prosecution fully established, Erwin and David were just
passing by the petitioners' compound on the night of November 8, 2000 when David was
suddenly attacked by Joey while Erwin was attacked by Rodolfo. The attack actually
took place outside, not inside, the petitioners' compound, as evidenced by the way the
petitioners' gate was destroyed. The manner by which the wooden gate post was broken
coincided with Erwin's testimony that his brother David, who was then clinging onto the
gate, was dragged into the petitioners' compound. These circumstances, coupled with the
nature and number of wounds sustained by the victims, clearly show that the petitioners
did not act in self-defense in killing David and wounding Erwin. The petitioners were, in
fact, the real aggressors.

SO ORDERED.
DIGEST FOR CASEBOOK
Concept of Self Defense/ Intent to Kill/Conspiracy

G.R. No. 170462 February 5, 2014

RODOLFO GUEVARRA and JOEY GUEVARRA, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
BRION, J.:
FACTS
Rodolfo and his son, Joey, were charged with the crimes of frustrated homicide and homicide,
committed against Erwin and David Ordonez and Philip Vinuga, under two Informations.

On arraignment, the petitioners pleaded not guilty to both charges. At the pre-trial, the
petitioners interposed self-defense, which prompted the RTC to conduct a reverse trial of the
case.

The prosecution presented the sole testimony of Erwin who survived the hacking.

Erwin narrated that, at around 10:00 to 11 :00 p.m., on November 8, 2000, he, his brother
David and Philip went to a birthday party and passed in front of the petitioners' compound. He
was walking twenty (20) meters ahead of his companions when, suddenly, Philip ran up to
him saying that David was being stabbed by Joey with a bolo. While approaching the scene of
the stabbing, Erwin was met by Rodolfo who then hacked him, hitting his arm and back.
Thereafter, Rodolfo and Joey dragged Erwin inside the petitioners' compound and kept on
hacking him. He was hacked and stabbed thirteen (13) times. He became weak and ultimately
fell to the ground.

Erwin denied that he and David threw stones at the petitioners' house and damaged Rodolfo's
tricycle. They did not likewise destroy the petitioners' gate, which was only damaged when his
brother David clung on to it while he was being pulled by Rodolfo and Erwin into their
compound. While they were being hacked and stabbed by Rodolfo and Erwin, stones actually
rained on them and people outside the petitioners' gate were saying, "Do not kill the brothers.
Allow them to come out."

After the incident, Erwin and David, both unconscious, were brought to the hospital. David
died in the hospital while being treated for his wounds.

The RTC found the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of frustrated
homicide and homicide. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's judgment and convicted the
petitioners of the crimes charged. The CA further held that the petitioners' plea of self-defense
was belied by the nature and number of wounds inflicted on Erwin, who sustained thirteen
(13) stab wounds on his arm and back, and David, who suffered around ten (10) stab wounds
on his back and stomach causing his death. These wounds logically indicated that the assault
was no longer an act of self-defense but a determined homicidal aggression on the part of the
petitioners.

ISSUES
Was self-defense sufficiently proven? (NO.)
RULING
We deny the present petition as we find no reversible error in the CA decision.

The petitioners' intent to kill was clearly established by the nature and number of wounds
sustained by their victims. Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may
consist, among other things:
a. of the means used by the malefactors;
b. the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after the
killing of the victim; and
c. the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim.

The CA aptly observed that the ten (10) hack/stab wounds David suffered and which
eventually caused his death, and the thirteen (13) hack/stab wounds Erwin sustained,
confirmed the prosecution's theory that the petitioners purposely and vigorously attacked
David and Erwin.

By invoking self-defense, the petitioners, in effect, admitted to the commission of the acts for
which they were charged. With this admission, the burden of proof shifted to the petitioners to
show that the killing and frustrated killing of David and Erwin, respectively, were attended by
the following circumstances:
d. unlawful aggression on the part of the victims;
e. reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression;
and
f. lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the persons resorting to self-defense.

Of all the burdens the petitioners carried, the most important of all is the element of unlawful
aggression. Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real
imminent injury, upon a person. The element of unlawful aggression must be proven first in
order for self-defense to be successfully pleaded. There can be no self-defense, whether
complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the
person who resorted to self-defense.

As the RTC and the CA did, we find the absence of the element of unlawful aggression on the
part of the victims. As the prosecution fully established, Erwin and David were just passing by
the petitioners' compound on the night of November 8, 2000 when David was suddenly
attacked by Joey while Erwin was attacked by Rodolfo. The attack actually took place outside,
not inside, the petitioners' compound, as evidenced by the way the petitioners' gate was
destroyed. The manner by which the wooden gate post was broken coincided with Erwin's
testimony that his brother David, who was then clinging onto the gate, was dragged into the
petitioners' compound. These circumstances, coupled with the nature and number of wounds
sustained by the victims, clearly show that the petitioners did not act in self-defense in killing
David and wounding Erwin. The petitioners were, in fact, the real aggressors.

SO ORDERED.